

The Use of Military Tactics during Pacification Missions in the Favelas of Brazil:
A review of multi-agency incursion operations from 2012 to 2015 in Rio de Janeiro

A Seminar Paper

Presented to the Graduate Faculty

University of Wisconsin – Platteville

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree

Master of Science in Criminal Justice

Eduardo Jany

2015

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to dedicate this work to my brothers and sisters in the United States Marine Corps and our sister services, as well as those law enforcement officers who have made the ultimate sacrifice in defense of country and our communities. Each and every one of those who I had the pleasure of working with and has gone before us has made an indelible impact in my life and helped stimulate me to improve and grow academically, physically and emotionally.

I would also like to thank Dr. Susan Hilal and Dr. Cheryl Banachowski-Fuller and the Staff at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville for their incredible support and patience as I completed this program while deployed overseas.

To my family, a very special thank you; especially my Dad, Joseph Jany, a University of Wisconsin graduate who provided constant encouragement, motivation and guidance throughout my education; and my wife Luciana who has always stood behind me through thick and thin.

Finally, to the police of Rio de Janeiro who put their lives on the line and despite the incredible challenges and dangers of policing in the UPPs return to the favelas each day with the hopes of improving the lives of those less fortunate. Their work is not in vain.

The Use of Military Tactics during Pacification Missions in the Favelas of Brazil:
A review of multi-agency incursion operations from 2012 to 2015 in Rio de Janeiro

Eduardo Jany

Under the Supervision of Dr. Susan Hilal

Statement of the Problem

The shanty towns of Brazil, known as *favelas*, have long been recognized as the living place of the poor, disenfranchised, and lacking in real representation and protection. Dozens of these communities exist within the city limits of Rio de Janeiro but have suffered from a lack of accessibility and basic services, excessively high rates of violent crime and essentially no government control. In an effort to re-take these areas and effect a clean-up prior to hosting of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, Brazil's military and police forces have acted in concert in an unprecedented manner to conduct peacekeeping operations and establish law and order through the employment of Police Pacification Units.

Despite a significant investment in resources and emphasis from the state on improving living conditions in the favelas, violence continues leaving many to wonder if the military style incursions being employed in order to implant the pacification units known as UPPs (*Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora*) in the favelas of Rio are not causing more damage than good. Alves (2011), as well as Musumeci (2013) question the protracted gun battles and unnecessary deaths while reports of police abuses (Fleury 2013) abound. From 2012-2015 joint pacification operations have become commonplace and Brazilian state police forces continue to operate with military equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures. As funding and resources decline in the

face of Brazil's current economic crisis; public safety professionals, civic leaders and politicians are wondering whether or not to proceed with the UPPs as they exist today and the critical question is whether police can effectively implement the UPP strategy in the favelas without an aggressive military doctrine and the support it requires.

Method of Approach

The researcher examines secondary academic research on the topic of violence in the favelas and public safety operations as well as doctrinal data related to units engaging in incursions and how these have affected the state of crime in those communities. The primary method of approach for this project consists of thorough reviews of current literature in both English and Portuguese as well as secondary data analysis of research and statistics relevant to the topic presented. Additionally, examination of data information specific to the demography of each community, statistical information on crime prior to and post UPP deployment, the types of incursions conducted, and the ways UPPs were implemented and operate was obtained from sources such as reports, academic analyses, and articles. From this extensive research and review it is the intent of the researcher to formulate a recommended set of best practices for law enforcement units engaging in similar operations. This research will focus on the implications of such incursion missions executed by joint police and military forces in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and whether pacification through military tactics has in fact been achieved and how police can improve the conditions through peacekeeping operations.

Results of the Study

The findings show there is a dire need for doctrinal change away from simply effecting military style incursions and for police to improve in their integration, selection and training practices. Additionally, organizations must have continuity in policing the favelas with scalable conditions based rather than time based pacification plan. Each favela is different from the other and as such, police agencies in Rio must continue pacification missions in a customized manner with a keen awareness as to how each is conducted, how UPPs are installed; and effect continuous planning and assessment in a cyclical manner. Additionally, there is a clear need for unification of command, personnel and resources specifically relating to such incursions as a means to improve accountability, control, and continuity of service and mitigate any duplication of efforts, inefficiency, and operational issues. Although the state has suffered from budgetary shortfalls their ability to appropriately manage in a more efficient and cost-effective manner is essential and current operational underperformances illustrate a need for the UPP doctrine to be reevaluated and presented as a meaningful concern within the current political arena.

Table of Contents

APPROVAL PAGE	i
TITLE PAGE	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
SECTIONS	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW	
A. Historical perspective of the favelas in Rio	5
B. Culture of Violence in the favelas	5
C. Policing in Rio’s favelas	11
D. Police-Community Relations in Rio.....	15
E. Incorporating Counter Insurgency doctrine.....	17
F. Police operations and tactics, techniques and procedures.....	21
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS.....	26
A. Validity of government statistics.....	26
B. Crime Statistics in Five Favelas.....	27
C. Crime rates in and around Favelas.....	30
IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	33
A. Best Practices	33
B. Lessons Learned Colombia and Mexico	34
C. Recommendation for ongoing support of the UPPs.....	36
REFERENCES.....	38

Section I. INTRODUCTION

Years of violent crime, narcotics traffic and attacks on police and public servants in and around the shanty towns of Rio, known as *favelas*, coupled with widespread fear of violence seem to be emphasized in every election and by every new government. Since 2010 Rio has been in the world spotlight from their award of the 2014 FIFA World Cup to the 2016 Olympic Games, fueling new efforts on the part of the state and federal governments to undertake hard measures to abate crime against the offenders. The State's public safety responses to criminal activity almost always began in the favelas with police raids similar to military strikes. These incursions were, for the most part, quick operations designed to arrest leaders of certain factions and violent offenders and were never intended to gain a foothold, nor maintain a presence in the favelas and provide basic services for the populace. For years the favelas have been disenfranchised, and lacking in real representation in government, in resources and services and in protection by police.

Rio's hillsides and lowland areas have been dotted with dozens of these informal communities since the mid-19th Century. Racism, segregation, and inaccessible pricing resulted in these as the only option for some to reside. The most recent statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística - IBGE 2010) show that there are 763 favelas within the city limits of Rio de Janeiro. Each of these has its own personality replete with excessively high rates of violent crime and essentially no government control. In an effort to re-take these areas and effect a clean-up prior to hosting of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, Brazil's military and police forces have acted in concert in an unprecedented manner to conduct peacekeeping operations and establish law and order through the use of what have been termed Police Pacification Units.

In reviewing how the pacification missions have progressed it is clear, as expressed by Carvalho (2013) that while public safety forces in Brazil have historically adopted a bellicose, heavy force, militaristic style of policing, many have since progressed and realized that previous police incursions into favelas, while routine, were not achieving desired effects. In fact, in Rio, many if not most, cases resulted in protracted gun battles and unnecessary deaths. From 2012-2015 joint pacification operations have become commonplace and Brazilian state police forces continue to operate with military equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures but with a different charter. The State of Rio de Janeiro (2015) boldly articulates on their official website that:

The Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) Police Pacification Unit is a new model of policing and public safety which promotes understanding between the population and the police, allied towards the strengthening of social policies in the communities. Upon recuperating the territories occupied by decades by traffickers and more recently by militias, the UPPs bring peace to the communities.

Despite the aggressive appearance and undertaking, the objective has evolved from arrest and repression to the implementation of actual dedicated pacification units in the favelas of Rio. However, notwithstanding these efforts, violence continues and public safety professionals, civic leaders and politicians are wondering whether to proceed or not with the UPPs as they exist today.

Fleury (2013) refers to police as a means of exercising control and articulates that Brazil has, for the past three decades, struggled to construct a democratic nation. One of the main issues at heart is the topic of violence in the favelas and how and why police operate with aggression in

order to combat criminal activity, and that the economic development continues to influence how conservative the nation is or is not with regards to social controls. In Rio this is particularly salient as the city received an influx of funds associated with the large scale events intended to be applied towards social programs and security measures.

Fleury (2013) expresses that in the favelas the programs intending to bring peace come with the social controls which were generously funded when security and popular support existed. Carvalho (2013) also explains that during such periods the government flexes as necessary in order to transform the city into a stage but reverts after the events conclude. This is particularly timely in that the economy in Brazil is such that resources are no longer as available as they were five years ago and closer scrutiny is being given to programs such as UPP as politicians and policy makers are suffering from dwindling budgets. Additionally, the popular support once enjoyed by police from many favela residents has now waned in the face of corruption scandals, complaints of improper searches and seizures, excessive force and even missing persons suspected to have been killed by police (LAV-UERJ 2012).

An examination of joint operations where military repression measures are combined with police incursions will be undertaken as will an assessment into how such doctrine have affected the state of crime in those communities. Additionally, the research will effect extensive examination of data information specific to the demography of each community, statistical information on crime prior to and post UPP deployment, the types of incursions conducted, and the ways UPPs were implemented.

The significance and implication of this study is important, as citizens in the favelas are once again losing faith in the establishment. This could result in negative consequences leading to second and third order effects where the communities resort to returning to informal structures led by drug trafficking organizations which exert power through criminal activity fomenting more

extreme violence. This research will also focus on the implications of continuous deployment of public safety forces in such incursion missions in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and whether pacification through military tactics has in fact been achieved and how police can improve conditions through peacekeeping operations.

Section II. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to assess and understand the effect public safety organizations have had on the favelas and whether or not military tactics have a place in pacification operations, a review of the history of the favelas as well as of policing operations in Rio must be conducted. Along with these, a comprehensive review of literature related to police operations offers a look at how police have engaged favela areas, how the situation has evolved, and whether establishment of the UPPs has affected violence. A thorough examination of crime statistics and empirical data from both state and non-governmental organizations as well as examination and review of studies conducted in the favelas can provide insight into the current situation and whether the military style of policing operations in the implementation of the UPPs is achieving the desired results.

Historical Perspective – The favelas in Rio

Rio de Janeiro is a beautiful city on the southeast Atlantic coast which served as the capital of Brazil for well over 100 years and throughout its history has seen incredible wealth, and terrible poverty. With a population of over 12 million people in its metropolitan area and over six million in the city limits, Rio is a tremendously large city in terms of urban concentration and population. It is presently the 30th largest city in the world and sixth in the Americas with more than twenty favelas each with subdivisions totaling 1,071 favela communities of just over 1.4 million. (IBGE 2010) By these accounts and what are arguably very conservative Census estimates, nearly ten percent of Rio's citizens reside in favelas at or below the poverty line. Poverty and suffering have been historically associated with violence and the favelas which are often described as the "divided cities" (Jovchelovitch & Priego-Hernandez 2013) where the tug of war for institutional control are mired in a lack of infrastructure, social exclusion and poor conditions that result in eruptions of violence or criminal behavior. Commerce and shipping to and from

Europe, the influx of slaves from Africa, immigrant workers during the late 19th century and an industrial boom with a population explosion in the latter part of the twentieth century attracted casual laborers, migrant workers and their families from northeastern Brazil all of which contributed to the growth of the city. (Rose 2005) Many, if not most, of these were people of lower income with barely any resources and little in the way of options for housing resulting in informal land grabs. The favelas were born in the late 18th century as slave camps generally inhabited by free slaves who began to appear on certain hilltops and hillsides along Rio's Guanabara Bay. Rose (2005) expresses that these were initially small encampments for slaves which later grew to full scale villages for the lower classes. Perhaps the first of these was the Morro da Providência (Providence Hill), a large grassy slope near the city center where free slaves planted Portuguese fava plants thus lending the name "favelas" to these areas.

Throughout the twentieth century, Rio's favelas grew in numbers and in density and recognizing the need, certain government administrations managed to bring in some basic services. Rose (2005) chronicles the little advancement in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the first water cisterns were installed in a few of Rio's larger favelas including Mangueira and Rocinha. Power connections began to appear in Cantagalo and Pavão-Pavãozinho nearest to Copacabana and the flicker of lights began to illuminate the hillsides. Despite this, police units were only called in if there was an imminent need such as a death or urgent medical situation and even then their response was difficult. The shantytown structure was informal and no addresses or coordinates existed. In most cases police who did not know the area would be dispatched and would need to be led in or escorted by citizens with tips and references to "turn at Mrs Cida's house" or "at the shack with the tires out front". Moreover, police avoided the favelas which were on sloped, unpaved variable terrain and difficult to traverse, not to mention filled with potential dangerous armed gangs.

Cardoso (2013) explains that the government treated the favelas as complexes of populated areas or communities within the city. This concept resulted in the state pushing the responsibility to the municipal government and the local aldermen expressing an expectation for increased police presence. Although favelas already existed, their boom came during Brazil's industrialization in the mid twentieth century through the early 1980's administration of Rio's Populist-Communist Governor Leonel Brizola. Under Brizola growth was unfettered, favelas were left to their devices and people were encouraged to find their plot of land free from any encumbrances or controls and nothing in the way of zoning laws, ordinances or restrictions. Carvalho (2013) explains the effect that the facility and availability of such land and relative lax attitude toward squatters made for easy migration and acquisition of small plots, though public services were non-existent and a sort of informal government of those with power began to form. This resulted in massive construction of corrugated tin roof and adobe tile, cement and mud shacks along the hillsides creating a paradox of the poor having the best real estate with the greatest views of the city and the bay.

Rio is officially divided into four main sections and is often described as a city with many smaller cities within it. The south zone comprises most of the more affluent beaches and popular areas while the west has seen the more concentrated recent growth including the Olympic Village, convention centers and new commercial areas, while the north is largely poor and underdeveloped. Each of these contains their own favelas and none is given as much attention as what is afforded to what are known as "noble areas" or *area nobre*. Years of emphasis on cleaning, maintaining and managing the *area nobre* of the south zone of the city with the visibility on tourism and events at the iconic beaches of Copacabana and Ipanema leaves the rest of the city and the favelas with little or nothing in terms of attention and resources. (DaCruz

2013) Water and sanitation, electricity and other public works would make it to the entryways to the favelas or the outskirts of the *area nobre* but no further. Arijon (2014) explains in the documentary film “Battle for Rio” that in the early days the lack of police presence impeded penetration of the state into these areas and that when they did come: “Police would enter; they killed, they died, were corrupted but didn’t resolve anything...” In effect, the only city services that occasionally touched the favelas were the police and these were episodic at best and negative at worst. The residents learned to recognize their place in the community as the state concerned itself more with the fairer skinned noble areas of the city rather than the darker, poor and underprivileged on the hillsides. Arijon (2014)

The most recent Brazilian Census and statistics (IBGE 2010) show that most of Rio’s favelas are indeed located on the city’s hillsides with the majority of residents identified as black, African descendent or mixed race. Nearly 93% of the homes are made of mud-stone or cement and well over 70% describe themselves as having informal work beneath minimum wage. Burgos (2005) examines population and the personality of the favela and the convergence between formal and informal communities and cultures explaining that those societies tend to have fragile structures that do not always succeed in representing common interests especially when brokering or articulating needs. The migratory and transient nature of many in the favelas makes it difficult to have any lasting or collective effect of any sort. Burgos (2005) adds that the favelas are prone to frustration in that neither the state nor society is capable of making regulations or ordinances that would be universally agreeable to the various cultures in each favela and many of these sub-cultures are ill-prepared or unwilling to adapt to the new infrastructure or adhere to the practices and laws the state imposes.

Arijon (2014) captures the frustration of favela residents who were previously accustomed to making illegal power and cable connections known as “*gatos*” who were now saddled with state

provided energy and cable services and experienced having to pay bills but suffered frequent outages and poor quality. In many cases police presence was required in order to compel the changes and ensure service providers had unfettered access and ability to install in the communities. Fleury (2012), however, explains that the introduction of services in the favelas was excessively abrupt and that the use of police activity as a barometer to identify any level of success in these newly structured communities is erroneous since it is a state apparatus forcing a change through coercive means. Despite the abrupt changes, and the need to employ force in order to effect control of certain areas, some favelas have evolved and found a common voice and empowerment since the inception of the UPPs and the public has largely preferred the presence of police to that of the *tráfico* as related by Leite (2012) and LAV-UERJ (2012).

Culture of violence in the favelas.

Favelas have been the mirror of the cultural make-up of their citizens. Some of the north zone favelas such as *Alemão* have a great deal of northeastern Brazilian influence mainly from Pernambuco, while others have more Afro-descendant culture. (Rose 2005) Violence however has little to do with the cultures of origin and more to do with the impact of the *tráfico* and the sub-culture of abhorrent behavior which with gang influence has become more pronounced particularly among juveniles. Developmental theories regarding why and how the favelas have become so eternally violent have abounded. Wolfgang & Feracutti (1982 as cited in Ramos, 2011) makes a case regarding the subculture of violence theory where the culture of violence exists as a product of conformity to a pro-violent subculture in conflict with the dominant culture. These communities are, in reality, no different than similar shantytowns, ghettos or projects in Soweto or Baltimore. They share a common thread where violence is committed most notably by

and among young men between ages 15-24 with weapons. Burgos (2012) explores the association between the prevalence of life-course anti-social behavior (ASB) in favelas and low socio-economic status and expressed the importance of examining certain environmental factors which have harmful effects. Children in favelas live generally below the poverty line, coexist with criminality, violence, and high degrees of police repression and as such are far more likely to exhibit ASB. There is an ongoing debate in Brazil regarding the lax juvenile laws which afford a separate set of corrective and re-education versus penal measures with a maximum of three years of incarceration time even in the case of homicides or violent crimes. Ramos (2011) conducted extensive research with youth in favelas and explains that exposure to violence see weapons as a natural part of their lives and that 80% of deaths to young men ages 15 to 24 in favelas are attributed to firearms. Additionally, the coexistence in a violent war-like state which includes frequent aggressive contact with police, first hand observation of persons being killed or dead and routine family violence tend to increase the chances of a juvenile to exhibit ASB. This is exacerbated by a lenient juvenile justice system which has barely any ability to mete out consequences for crimes committed.

Policing in Rio's favelas

Fleury (2012) attributes the formalizing of favela structure to Governor Brizola's administration which brought the first level of legitimacy with primary schools and some small health clinics in early 1992. Brizola was, however, reticent to bring police as they feared political ramifications if repression were to occur and thus public safety forces were discouraged from incursions. The favelas accounted then, as they do now, for a large portion of Rio's violent crime with near constant battles between police and criminal organizations which base themselves in these densely populated at-risk areas as reported by Musumeci (2013) As many describe it

today, Rio is Saint Tropez surrounded by Mogadishu. Each of the favela communities is known to be under the influence of factions of the “*tráfico*” the generic term for drug trafficking organizations led by two of Rio’s notorious drug gangs; the *Amigos dos Amigos* (ADA) and the *Comando Vermelho* (CV). Both of these together with their respective sub-gangs enforce a strict code of silence which impedes citizens from reporting crimes, requesting basic services and having freedom of movement. Anderson (1994) argues that simply living in such conditions renders an individual, particularly young people, at risk of falling victim to aggressive behavior. Although positive forces in a community such as family or church can counter negative influences, the pervasive violence and despair are often strong enough to drive an oppositional culture. Constant turf battles and police incursions aimed at getting to the chief drug lords and seizing weapons has made it so that running gun battles and brutal violence were, and in some cases continue to be the norm in these favelas. Such pervasive action and uncertainty often force young people to adhere to self-preservation through a code of the streets binding them to the culture of violence they see every day according to Anderson. (1994)

Drugs foment the power of the *tráfico* and by the mid 1980’s Rio de Janeiro had become one of Latin America’s greatest consumers and purveyors of highly potent, near pure cocaine. Although Brazil does not have native grown coca plants the porous borders and accessibility to and from Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru make it readily available and relatively inexpensive. Feeding the domestic drug market of this large nation which is now the world’s second largest consumer of cocaine (CIA Fact Book 2015), and acting as the jump off point for narcotics traffic to Europe and Africa had made for high profit and aggressive competition among criminal organizations, many of which are based in and around the favelas.

The lack of government control, lack of police presence and residents who turned a blind eye because of fear contributed to the growth of the trafficking industry and their relevance as de facto leaders and bankers for the communities in the favelas. This resulted in a number of favelas being “led” by the *trafico*’s informal governments of *donos* (owners) who yielded incredible power and influence in their areas known as *bocas* (mouths) which were left unchecked for well over twenty years. Criminal activity includes not only sales and delivery of narcotics, but weapons trafficking, robberies, theft of services, extortion and graft as well. The crises are further aggravated, as expressed by Ramos (2011) in that there is instability from the constant power struggle within the *trafico*. Feeble attempts at overcoming the gangs through state control of certain favelas came in small scale and normally only during election campaigns when candidates brought scant resources as a show of support per Burgos (2005). These were short lived and rarely if ever resulted in any impactful changes so favelas went on their routines suffering from repression from the *trafico* and the police with an occasional sprinkling of basic subsistence items or a barbeque from a candidate seeking support.

Carvalho (2013) explains that violent acts by aggressive youth, drug gangs and the relative impunity seen by the public led to outcries which increased police repression and by 1996 several militia groups led by police and private security began to surface charging special security taxes to citizens for protection while police were paid bounties for line of duty killings. Human Rights Watch - HRW (1997) described this led to the favelas receiving their first resident police posts in the form of Rio de Janeiro’s State Military Police Grupamento de Policiamento de Áreas Especiais (GPAE). Despite the good intent with daily patrols, a crime hotline and a Commanding Officer with a degree in sociology, the GPAE was less than stellar. (Ramos 2011) The police in the unit were given no specialized training, little instruction in community oriented

policing and no special equipment. The deficient policing employed by the GPAE was directly attributed to the lack of resources and weak deployments. HRW (1997)

Violence in the favelas has always been a concern and the public perception in Rio was that police were outgunned and too scared or too corrupt to take any real action. The crescendo came with a doctrinal shift by Rio's Military Police in the 1990s, when the state, recognizing the need to access the favelas and conduct police operations, re-created their elite State Police Special Operations Battalion or BOPE. (Vianna 2013) This highly trained, intensely militaristic Battalion had been formed in 1978 as a crisis response element (PMERJ 2014) but grew to become the only unit which had the necessary equipment and trained personnel specializing in military style incursion operations into the dangerous favelas. Conventional police missions were rarely if ever undertaken in the shantytowns and when they did occur often resulted in massive exchanges of gunfire. The *tráfico* knew they could take on the grey uniformed PM (Military Police) street cops who were poorly trained and poorly equipped but were decidedly more reticent and hidden when the black clad BOPE operators with military weapons and specialized training were present. Batista (2006) explains the mythical impact that BOPE had and how it was one of the only effective measures the state could undertake in the favelas. The operations with BOPE were typically effected for a specific purpose, with military planning which included operations orders, rehearsals, inspections and movements normally to apprehend specific targets or seize weapons. The BOPE used special heavy armored vehicles nicknamed the "Big Skulls" after the red circle skull and dagger logo of the unit and conducted most operations under the cover of darkness concluding within a few hours. People in the favelas would often scurry or find cover once the BOPE "men in black" entered the communities and even the police knew that any real police operations required the support of the men from BOPE and the armored

vehicles thus placing BOPE squarely in the line of fire making them responsible for all special operations and repression in the favelas which resulted in over 800 deaths reported as “resisting arrest” in a single year according to Human Rights Watch (2009). The sense of urgency and recognition that Rio was suffering from several “no man’s lands” located within city limits, called for yet another new strategy as expressed by Silva (2015) and Ribeiro and Ferraz (2012).

The concern over the image of the out of control favelas coupled with the fact that the city was scheduled to host several world class events including the 2013 Confederations Cup, the 2014 Papal Visit Catholic World Youth Day, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, led the city administration and state government to join together to act in concert to provide significant changes. One of the first of these was to put aside petty politics and promote a new policy where the state would request and accept federal support in the form of military and Federal Police resources. Both Cardoso (2013) and LAV-UERJ (2012) underscore the effect this had on the citizens reinforcing that in order to make an impact in the communities and ensure security, police would no longer enter, conduct an operation and exit. Instead the focus would be, much like a military counter-insurgency operation, where teams would insert, conduct an operation, then remain in place to support introduction of basic services, proactive patrolling and security measures to bring order and peace to the area. The effect was positive during the large scale events, however since then some favelas have reverted to violence and the *trafico*.

Police-Community relations in Rio.

Prior to the inception of UPPs, employing military tactics and high powered weapons on routine operations became the norm in the favelas and police community relations were in effect non-existent. Cavalcanti (2009) explains that neither the State Military Police patrols nor the units of the Civil Police took any decisive action towards improving their position with respect to establishing and maintaining rapport within the community. This was further exacerbated by the fact that the two organizations could not get along with each other, much less the community.

Since the inception of the State Secretariat of Public Safety and the political connection thereto, the burden of the disjointed and less than cooperative Civil and Military Police has continued to hamper progress in some areas. Both DaCruz (2013) and Cavalcanti (2009) articulate that political machinations and promises coupled with weak and sometimes corrupt leaders have led to inefficiency in public security. From 1999-2002 then Governor Anthony Garotinho, turned his back on resources for police in favor of esoteric programs designed to bolster his image in certain neighborhoods during election cycles. Garotinho and then Civil Police Chief Alvaro Lins were indicted on corruption involving police receiving bribes which were passed along to the governor to disregard illegal gambling and other offenses. The involvement of several top Civil Police officers resulted in even more distrust and animus between the police forces of Rio. These scandals, as highlighted by Ribeiro and Silva (2010), contributed to critical issues such as a coherent public safety and community policing strategy being ignored in favor of action being taken to clean the organizations and their respective images. With the election of Governor Sergio Cabral public safety became a front and center topic as police were given top priority to achieve results and clean-up before the Confederations Cup in 2013. His selection of Federal Police District Chief José Mariano Beltrame as Secretary of Public Safety was considered popular

and well thought out. Silva (2015) relates that Beltrame, a relative outsider and non-native of Rio had the experience and was known as an “untouchable” who would succumb neither to political pressure, nor to corruption. Beltrame (2014) expressed an urgent need for a change in attitude with an emphasis not only on repression but on outreach. He, much like US military leaders in the Middle East, articulated that peace in the favelas and public safety could be achieved, but that the results would need to be conditions based, not on timelines or events. He articulated an urgent need for improvements in border security, and judicial and penal reform, adding that public safety is a chain and at the end of that chain is the police, which is most vulnerable and most prone to attack. The fact that the weak part of the chain was left even weaker with poor training, poor supervision and poor equipment is testament to how the favelas are today.

Beltrame (2014) also expresses that among his top priorities he immediately sought to improve professionalization of the police forces, demanding integration and interoperability at every level of his cabinet and in the operational units. This new style of policing was to be most visible in the at-risk communities, most notably in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The newly formed Secretaria de Segurança do Estado (SESEG) (State Secretary of Security) included the construction of the world’s largest Central Integrated Command and Control Center (CICC) where Beltrame and his Staff coordinated major events and incidents joining technology, personnel and services from both the public and private sector with complete transparency and objectivity. These efforts and the combined interest from federal and defense forces in assisting in pacification led to the incorporation of military methodologies towards reducing violence in Rio.

Incorporating counterinsurgency doctrine.

Calese (2005) examines insurgent groups and compares them with criminal organizations explaining that they defy neat categorization. He expresses the fight against such insurgencies requires not only a doctrinal shift, but a cultural change as well. Beltrame (2014) expresses that the strategy he chose along with the State and SESEG was to occupy the favela areas with force but with a definitive long-term cultural change in mind. His plan involved using the Military Police BOPE and the Civil Police Coordenadoria de Recursos Especiais (CORE) for initial intervention together with selected military forces, which would provide back-up and logistical support with armored vehicles, engineers and aircraft. Once an area was taken and control established, public services would be introduced and protected by police which would install a permanent post in the form of a UPP. The third and final stage was the sustainment phase where ongoing dialogue was to be maintained between the favela residents and the city via a formal policy network. This is precisely what Calese (2005) promotes as the “five concepts” in use by law enforcement that should be applied to counterinsurgency operations. These are; a cultural shift, improving personal identification on the ambiguous battlefield through technical solutions, synchronizing communications and intelligence on the insurgent battlefield and effecting community policing. The process seemed to work and incursions into each of the major favelas and the occupation of UPPs with permanent structures along with public services and utilities seemed to bring a new sense of pride and well-being to the favelas which had suffered for so long. In 2012 and 2013 Brazil watched on live TV as coverage of such incursions captured police engaging in operations to take terrain that was once unthinkable. Police were enjoying near hero status as they, and military forces were welcomed as liberators in Complexo do Alemão as bandits from the *tráfico* fled on foot. The Confederations Cup, the Papal Visit and several other

smaller though significant events went off without a hitch, and the police were enjoying reductions in violent crime throughout the city.

Ribeiro and Silva (2010) have provided chronological reviews and comparative studies on policing in the favelas of Rio and explain that these UPP missions are not themselves without controversy while Pereira (2010) and Faria (2012) studied the police impact on the at-risk population viewing density, demographics and attributes of police units operating there. Both of these articulate the requisite focus on the need for a different style of policing and improvement of public safety through the provision of basic needs and services for the community rather than strictly security oriented operations. Governor Cabral made good on his promise to change the way police operate and bring safety and security to Rio, though the honeymoon was short-lived.

Months after the 2014 World Cup, Rio's favelas, even those with UPPs were seeing rises in violence and somewhere between the second and third phases of the UPP strategy things were getting lost. Citizens were again complaining of excessive repression and unnecessary levels of use of force by police. Machado da Silva (2010) addressed the issue stating that Beltrame's plan seemed to be unwinding as the public appetite for police presence was dying in the face of innocent citizens suffering from police brutality. MacNiven (2014) highlights what he calls the "*estopim*" or fuse to the proverbial powder keg was lit by controversial case of missing laborer Amarildo de Souza who was detained and allegedly tortured and killed by UPP police during a 2013 police dragnet at the infamous Rocinha favela. Just as Beltrame was touting his UPP as the new deal model of successful policing in the conflicted areas, and the Chief of Military Police confidently told the world that Rocinha was "under control" the community was asking why officers took the bricklayer's papers, interrogated him as an accomplice hiding

weapons for the *tráfico* then disappeared with him leaving nary a trace as reported by Bowater (2013).

CESEC/UCAM (2010) research is showing that a scant few are volunteering for UPP service, police are losing credibility as UPPs are suffering attacks and police are being targeted as slashed budgets are resulting in minimal staffing at some posts. Posts are, in some cases staffed by a crew of twelve to a shift to cover a densely populated area of nearly 70,000 persons. Contrast this to the average US city where the average is for 15 officers per a population of 10,000. FBI (2010). This lack of manpower is not lost on the *tráfico* which took full advantage of the vulnerability of the UPP at Alemão in May 2015 where several police were taken hostage. This attack came, however, not long after a massive incursion by over 270 police into the favela in April of 2015. Teixeira (2015) Meanwhile, neither the State Police website nor the ISP (2015) reports covered any attacks on police. Brasil (2014) and others criticize the laxity in staffing and resources calling the UPPs a farse citing the ongoing violence in Rocinha as warlike.

While many would indeed categorize Brazil's favelas as 'at war', other researchers such as Western and Goldstein (2011) explain that war-like conditions are on the decline worldwide and that the very categorization of "war" is imprecise and fuzzy. They, along with Pinker (2014) would express that violent deaths are declining and that wars are waning. Such theories are based on the fact that large scale interstate wars fought between large armies are the deadliest. While this is in line with Elias (1939) and his theory on the "civilizing process" which asserts that as the world transitions from patchwork feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized governments there is a decline in armed conflict, it fails to account for low intensity urban conflict, insurgencies, terrorism and non-state actors the likes of which have been present in Brazil's favelas waging armed conflict and terrorizing citizens. Western and Goldstein (2011)

also posit that there has been an evolution of "international norms about violence" which has led to the emergence of "the responsibility to protect". Doctrinally, there have, indeed been improvements and as expressed by Western and Goldstein there are more robust options in peacekeeping and conflict management. Unfortunately, for Brazil, and Rio's favelas, the changes and evolution have been mired in bureaucracy; inertia and at times corruption which has helped foment the increased violence.

Whether police in favelas need to be more tactical or lean toward the community service oriented is at debate. The question of the need for a military structure for police continues to linger and Gomes (2012) analyses military executing police and public safety operations in the favelas examining the sense of occupation expressing concerns as to increased hostility caused by such overtly bellicose actions. Ribeiro and Ferraz (2012), as well as Velazquez (2012) have also expressed concerns as to aggressive police and highlighted the economic impact that military style occupation has had on favelas under UPP. In most cases the net effect has been positive with new businesses, internet connectivity, access to services and improved transportation contributing to the positive. Mattar (2012) examines the impact from a psychological perspective to determine how persons in favelas perceive their safety with the presence of police as an occupation force. Of those interviewed in his research and Burgos (2012) study even those who were not in favor of police presence or UPPs commented that "at least there (is) less shooting" and "businesses can open".

Police operations and tactics, techniques and procedures.

Prior to the inception of the UPP program police operations in favelas were restricted to an as needed basis only. The favelas became difficult to access for non-residents and nearly impossible for police and were ostensibly controlled through informal leadership in the form of the *traficante* who acted as a local boss. Their gangs would set roadblocks, decide who could or could not access areas, and who controlled which *boca* where drugs, weapons, and other contraband or stolen goods were sold. Local Military Police Battalions would occasionally go on ad-hoc operations at the entries to the favelas with some daring to penetrate deeper on probe patrols only to find themselves engaged in gunfire. Some conventional police units would enter, usually in teams of six to ten, effect selective stop and frisk searches of young men and adolescents and then depart the area according to Ramos (2011). Once committed into the area police were often subjected to hostile fire and found it difficult to be extracted. Challenges to their operations included poor communications between ground forces, lack of supporting personnel, an inability to enter certain areas except on foot, and a lack of adequate training for the missions. Until approximately 2003, most units operated solely with .38 caliber pistols on which they received a scant 25-50 rounds of training and qualification per year. Bueno (2013) expresses that the *trafico* on the other hand was operating with military grade weapons including rifles, grenades and automatic pistols, many of which were smuggled illegally from Paraguay and Bolivia or stolen from military armories.

Public awareness of the levels of armament used in Rio became more pronounced when two Police helicopter crew members and an aircraft were hit by rifle fire in 2006 and another was shot down killing three police during an operation at the Morro dos Macacos favela in 2009. Suspicions of military training in the favelas were already being investigated and handouts as instructional manuals on how to ambush police and attack aircraft were being found. The *trafico*

was clearly making use of young men leaving military service without follow-on opportunities who were contracted to provide training and support to their gang members. This called for a different style of policing, one with doctrine more akin to military counterinsurgency tactics than police patrol according to Ribeiro (2012).

As police began to employ a more military methodology, units began to seek out training and guidance from U.S., European and Israeli advisors. Many of these have provided exceedingly aggressive tactics, techniques and procedures which do not align with modern low intensity conflict tactics. Combat tactics and deadly force training, while important, cannot be the mainstay of a Police intent on a pacification mission. A few of the commonly contracted providers of self-proclaimed SWAT training in Brazil are operations led by individuals who have never served in any real policing function, nor military role but have profited from marketability and opportunistic contacts. In some cases doctrinally they are completely off-base and focus on bizarre hand-to-hand combatives or tactics “as seen on TV”. Non-operators and conventional police flock to the training to get the t-shirt and the badge then proceed to offer missionary type tactical training touting their newly learned tactics as gospel from “SWAT”. Additionally, it is unrealistic and equally irresponsible to think that doctrine and operational tactics that work on the streets of Dallas, or New York will translate to the favelas of Rio.

One of the more difficult aspects to inserting into, patrolling in and assuming control of a territory such as a favela is the ability for police to identify who or what is a threat. Many of the units, having lacked in appropriate training in use-of-force, opt to enter and engage everyone equally with aggression. This was readily apparent as reported by Cardone (2012) during a highly publicized police vehicle pursuit of a known drug lord where a Civil Police helicopter fired indiscriminately at the fleeing vehicle impacting hundreds of stray rounds of 7.62 and .556 caliber military rounds into a favela. Another, a 2009 case caught on video at the Morro dos Macacos

(Cidade Alerta 2009) shows conventional Police forces engaged in a protracted gun battle firing automatic weapons into the favela often without aiming or identifying targets.

While Brazil has not participated in any armed conflict since World War II, their police have been engaging in combat operations daily. The training, however, for such operations has failed to keep up with the reality particularly in terms of target identification, acquisition and discrimination. Because of issues during more than twelve years of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East, the U.S. Military and Law Enforcement forces recognized the need to mitigate use of force and minimize collateral damage during combat engagements. Many of the improper use of force and wrongful death cases were a result of subjective interpretation by military personnel who erroneously identified and engaged what they thought were enemy forces.

The United States Marine Corps sought a way to improve operators' ability to read their environment and better understand who or what comprises the real threat by utilizing a combination of behavioral psychology with profilers, law enforcement subject matter experts, and experienced hunters and trackers with special understanding of physical evidence, "tells" and signs. Thus came the development of the "Combat Hunter" program based on the "Left of Bang" concepts (Van Horne & Riley 2013) which incorporate a number of profile factors employing both the inductive as well as deductive reasoning methods in a holistic manner where troops are taught to look at statistics, the environment, and behavior, along with patterns of actions or inaction. This amalgamated method addresses concerns regarding lack of uniform training and education and has resulted in marked reductions in use of force and improved the ability to understand and interpret not only from the subjective but objective as well. Cavalcanti (2009) and DaCruz (2013) express that police in Rio are under stress, underpaid and under pressure to come to conclusions and "wrap things up" during such operations. Faria (2012) expresses that in

so doing the operator's own experience, education, cultural bias or influence can indeed result in less than optimal outcomes. The average police operator engages in the favelas as if everyone is a potential threat, which results in general assumptions being made and inferences being articulated as valid.

Prior to 2012 the principal units engaged in favela policing operations in Rio de Janeiro were the Military Police Special Operations BOPE teams and the Civil Police CORE Unit. Innumerable videos and reports on You Tube and social media show Rio's police on patrol often under attack or engaging in violent action in order to capture gang members. While the BOPE was feared by many and recognized for higher levels of deadly force encounters this can be easily attributed to the fact that much like a US Special Operations or Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Unit, their activities typically involve a higher risk level than that of standard police organizations with a greater number of overall deployments.

In cases where the conventional battalions would attempt incursions, they were often met by aggressors and left as quickly as they entered. Police would frequently conduct search operations going from house to house and enter, often unannounced and in an aggressive manner, while in the more affluent south zone of the city police would never dare such intrusions. Burgos (2005) explains that the lack of civic energy on the part of the favelas results in a sort of apathy or tolerance which permits such aggression. Carvalho (2013) explains that the public in general accepts such occupations and even the frequent shoot outs as a routine part of life in the favela. Batista (2006) explains that notwithstanding the fear, citizens of the favelas recognized that when the BOPE Units were in their area, they were far more deliberate, tactical and though aggressive, and far more professional. It is important to note that BOPE training includes a myriad of military style courses and ongoing instruction that far exceeds that of the conventional units. The

special operators pride themselves on being warriors; the toughest and brightest in the Military Police and they are revered and feared in the favelas.

Parallel to the sub-culture of the *tráfico*, there exists, in certain police units, a culture or ethos of the *guerreiro* or warrior who may, after long-term exposure to such violence, also exhibit a numb sense of normalcy and banality when confronting death and destruction. The consequences of anomie and strain have a palpable effect on both public and police in Rio. Both have had to seek adaptation and innovation in order to fight the situation, and both have experienced failures in exercising institutionalized means to deal with their respective situation. This is being seen in numerous effects including those related by Batista (2006) and more recently in Leitão (2015) which reported that BOPE's previously revered status as an incorruptible unit has been marred by scandals this past year as no less than three former senior officers from the Battalion have been indicted on corruption charges and another few non-commissioned officers are under investigation for receiving bribes to provide intelligence to the *tráfico*. The difference between BOPE and other units is their effectiveness at urgently expelling and marginalizing such offenders. This is, of course, easier to do in a smaller more cloistered unit as reported by Leitão (2015).

Section III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

In order to establish whether the installation of police pacification units is having any effect on crime and violence, an analysis on statistical data was conducted comparing crime in five favelas during a five year period from 2010-2015. Special attention was given to criminal homicides, police use of deadly force and police activity in the form of arrests. These present a picture of how favelas have, or in cases, have not evolved with UPPs.

Validity of government statistics.

It is most notable that while data collection and statistical analysis has improved in Brazil, the favelas are not always accurate in reporting crimes as more often than not citizens are influenced or intimidated to keep from reporting crimes. Thus emphasis is specifically on examination of occurrences of homicides having been reported and investigated within these communities along with police involved deadly force cases are reflected here. Previously homicide statistics did not differentiate between legitimate police use of deadly force and criminal deaths. Institute of Public Safety (ISP) (2015) research reports that crime is dropping in the favelas, however, the statistical reviews on declining violence are, in some cases, being challenged. Santos (2012) criticizes the UPP statistics and the government as a statistical source on violent crime calling some collection measures “thin” and “disorganized” in that some organizations deliberately skew the numbers including those where UPP’s are being questioned, in order to display efficacy.


Examination of crime statistics in five favelas.

Although it is difficult to qualify or quantify which favela has the worst crime or condition there are a number that stand out as relevant in terms of needing attention because of their size and levels of violence. These are Complexo do Alemão, Morro da Providência, Macacos, Rocinha, and Jacarézinho. Statistics from the Institute of Public Safety in Rio de Janeiro for the year 2007 showed that among favelas that have since received UPPs, the homicide index was 30.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, (ISP 2015) remembering that the United Nations and World Health Organization standards consider any number above 10 per 100,000 as epidemic level. Some favelas had statistics in the 80 per 100,000 range which far exceeds many insurgencies and the margin of 1,000 per year localized occurrence of violence in conflict the WHO defines as war.

Table 1. Criminal homicides in selected favelas 2010-2015

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	5 Year Total
Alemão	0	0	3	1	2	6
Jacarézinho	2	3	8	4	3	20
Macacos	3	2	2	2	0	9
Providência	3	1	2	2	2	10
Rocinha	3	2	6	5	2	18

Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP 2015)

 Denotes periods without UPP Presence


Statistical reviews showed that prior to the installation of UPPs each of the favelas had higher than average numbers of robberies, assaults and homicides than after police incursion and installation of posts and UPPs. The statistical data also reveals that during the past five years only the Complexo do Alemão favela has experienced a notable rise in homicides and police deadly

force while the other favelas declined in occurrences or remained stable. While noteworthy, the data on pre-UPP violence and the post-UPP peacekeeping has not been sustained in any long term. Nearly every favela has seen a resurgence of violence and *trafico*, though arguably not to the degree they were present in the past. Police related use of force has shown a demonstrable decline during the last five years. (ISP 2015) The Beltrame and Cabral Administration have undertaken a policy of announcing incursions which has, perhaps, contributed to reductions in deadly force events; 2015, however is proving to be a paradox. Much like the effect of military surge operations in combat areas, initial incursions involve large scale operations which are gradually scaled back. This, combined with budgetary restraints due to Brazil's current fiscal crisis has resulted in unanticipated reductions to UPP staffing and ceasing of new construction of UPP facilities. Many of the UPP installations were built in modular container/trailers which were intended to be temporary. These continue to be in use and in some favelas have been attacked or breached. Aggressive action on the part of some criminal factions has created increased reaction by police. Although new long-term statistics have not been assessed, in 2015, numbers of deaths attributed to Police use of force and stray bullets have shown to have increased with over a dozen injured or killed during the first six months of this year per the ISP statistics (2015). No less than fifty two cases in the first few months of the year resulted in deaths and significant injuries with most attributed to police rifle fire. Noticias R7 (2015) reported that even pacified favelas were degenerating back to violent encounters and citizens again feared being hit by stray gunfire during police confrontations. Despite this, Silva (2015) and Leite (2012) show data which support that the favelas are better off with the UPPs. By every indication police related violence is going to increase in the favelas as factions attempt to re-establish themselves and police attempt to hold back their efforts.

Table 2. Police related deadly force (citizens killed) in selected favelas 2010-2015

	Pop	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	5 Year Total
Alemão	69,143	0	0	0	0	3	3
Jacarézinho	36,102	1	5	4	2	0	12
Macacos	19,079	2	1	0	0	1	4
Providência	4,889	0	0	0	2	0	2
Rocinha	71,080	6	1	5	1	4	17

Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP 2015)

 Denotes periods without UPP Presence

The 2009-2012 City Strategic Plan proposed by Rio's Mayor Eduardo Paes called for the reduction of 1.6 million square meters or approximately 3.5 percent of areas occupied by favelas in Rio (Bastos & Schmidt, 2009). Additionally Paes' Administration set forth a comprehensive plan to increase staffing in UPPs, increase specially trained Police Pacification forces and invest nearly R\$278 billion for relocation of displaced citizens from these areas to new government housing under the federally subsidized Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) (World Bank, 2010). Unfortunately, widespread corruption scandals involving the federal government, several major firms, state officials and financial entities has presented a setback for the UPP programs which were reliant not only on City and State funding in Rio de Janeiro, but on Federal funding as well. The 2014-2015 government financial shortfalls have led to a crisis resulting in previously earmarked funds being held back and UPP operations being placed on the back-burner. The second and third order effects have included reductions in patrols, minimum staffing, reduction in crime prevention and community policing activities and, as expected, an increase in crime. This,

in turn, has resulted in some skepticism as to the efficacy of the UPPs and the policing programs in the favelas.

Crime Rates.

Criminal activity (violent crime) rates in and around Favelas are being examined carefully as a measure for success for the UPPs in their respective areas. Rio de Janeiro's Secretary of Public Safety (SESEG) has adopted a model similar to New York's CompStat which was created in 1994 by New York City's then Chief of Police Bill Bratton. This performance based management model synthesizes complaints and crime statistics and measures police response and productivity, holding local commanders or Precincts accountable. In Rio, the metrics are used in conjunction with video monitoring and reporting in order to determine rates of efficacy. Bratton's (1998) principles of; accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics and plans, rapid deployment and relentless follow-up and assessments are having a positive impact on the City and State.

Commanders are being held accountable, crime reporting measures by both Military and Civil Police forces have improved but remain far from perfect. The UPP program which began in earnest in 2008 had as its primary objective the recovery and retention of legitimate control of favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The program includes among its chief objectives the reduction of crime and criminality in and around the favelas. According to the State Institute of Public Safety Report (ISP 2015) at present there are 40 UPPs in Rio with 38 of those in the City of Rio de Janeiro impacting 196 communities of nearly 600,000 people. In these the data shows that between 2007-2014, the rate of homicides dropped to 7.4 deaths per 100,000, nearly two thirds less what it was in 2008. (ISP 2015).

Prevalence of crime prior to UPPs from 2007 was analyzed and data suggests that statewide homicides continue to be high while in the city where most the UPPs are located, violent crime


has dropped. The most recent 2014 statistics show that State of Rio de Janeiro homicides are at 30 victims per 100,000 while in the City the rate has dropped to 19 per 100,000 (as compared to 2007 rates of 39 per 100,000 and 38 per 100,000 respectively). (ISP 2015)

On view arrests and apprehensions are a good measure of police proactivity and in the five favelas reviewed the statistical data shows that arrests have increased. Each of the five showed marked increases in arrests and apprehensions, many of which are initiated through citizen reports or tips. This would indicate that police are receiving at least some level of cooperation through ongoing interaction with the public in the favelas.

Table 3. Police activity – Arrests in selected favelas 2010-2015

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Alemão	0	13	6	23	23
Jacarézinho	11	22	13	56	92
Macacos	4	30	23	36	32
Providência	20	31	45	51	38
Rocinha	1	19	77	53	52

Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP 2015)

 Denotes periods without UPP Presence

One area that merits additional examination and study is that of the prevalence of juvenile violent crime in and around favelas which continues to be an area of concern as criminal activity, most notably related to weapons and drugs has increased. Statistically, as reported, however, police are effecting more arrests and there appear to be greater number of drug seizures and apprehensions of juveniles being documented as a result of the UPP presence. Victimization

among juveniles continues to be high and many point to the *trafico*'s use of juveniles to facilitate sales and delivery of narcotics, settle debts and commit murders on their behalf in order to avert attention from the *donos*. Many of these have resorted to reliance on juveniles to 'hold down the fort' in the favelas while the gang leaders themselves relocated to the lowland areas of the Baixada Fluminense just outside the city.

Despite the uptick in violence in certain areas, UPP presence is being recognized as a step in the right direction as the government and police are demonstrating resolve and the intent to effect real, long term changes. Statistics are showing that there is indeed a marked overall decrease in crime in the favelas where UPPs are functioning however additional long term studies should be undertaken in order to determine if the crime has simply shifted elsewhere and if, in fact, there is a sustained effect.

Section IV. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Having reviewed the dynamic in the various favelas of Rio along with the purpose of the UPP programs, the structure of the units engaged in police pacification missions, as well as the statistical data for crime during the past five years, this section seeks to address how to improve the program for future employment. A brief summary of best practices, lessons learned from similar police programs in Colombia and Mexico and military counter insurgency will be discussed with conclusions and recommendations for Rio de Janeiro's UPP program.

Best Practices.

Effective units and personnel continue to be the crux of the matter in UPP operations. In keeping with a strong sense of core values of service, ethics and democratic policing, respect for human rights and accountability, the State of Rio has recently embarked upon a special selection, training and indoctrination process for UPP police which would blend the necessary ethos, skill sets and capabilities with the right individuals. Musumesi (2013) conducted extensive research on UPP Personnel and found that nearly 60 percent of those surveyed expressed a desire to serve in a regular Police Battalion versus a UPP Unit. Several indicated they would prefer to work "anywhere but a UPP". Many of those interviewed in the study articulated that they felt compelled to work in the UPP but did not have the requisite training or support to do so. This underscores the need for special recruitment, selection and training of individuals to serve in UPP functions.

One critical issue is that of which units and individuals should be employed in the favelas for pacification missions. Besides having exceptional police skills, personnel being considered for UPP operations must be specially selected for judgment and tact and have a sound psychological

profile. In some cases it may not be advantageous or advisable to employ a conventional local Battalion. While it would be beneficial to have BOPE operators participate in certain UPP police-community relations activities operations, as they are doing, having a veteran special operator come directly from the combat environment to a UPP function would likely have disastrous results. Tactical Units will inevitably be needed and BOPE will continue to be the likeliest to respond for any Special threat or additional incursion. This being the case, every effort should be made to include a number of BOPE personnel imbedded on an episodic basis with UPPs or participating in selected community action meetings in order to ensure they too have full situational awareness of the new dynamic and or key figures in the pacified favelas.

Perhaps the greatest opportunities in best practices for public safety in the favelas lies in the preparation of personnel who are culturally aware and savvy in small specialized teams possessing adaptability, agility, flexibility and versatility versus cumbersome single purpose logistics heavy organizations. Jany and Robinson (2013) explain four basic tenets for police in such roles; a) prepare people for success; b) use common sense; c) work intelligently rather than forcefully; and d) maximize communications. Additionally there should be an emphasis on intelligence based planning and preparation for every single operation where personnel are engaged in the decision making process and feel valued for their contributions.

Lessons Learned.

Colombia's military and National Police experienced significant success by improving selection, training and retention processes for their units engaging in counter narcotics and counter terror operations. Special pay, special training, distinct uniforms and incentives were provided. This improved troop morale and professionalism. These were particularly fortunate to

have had exceptional success due to budget increases attributed to U.S. funding for anti-drug programs during nearly twenty years. The mainstay of Colombia's actions were enforcement and limited repression, however there has been a consistent emphasis on human rights, and building rapport with local populace in affected areas which has improved police relationships in at-risk communities. In the case of Medellin, the notorious drug cartel capitol, revolutionary forces and drug kingpins reigned supreme until the mid-2000's when police and military took the city and engaged the populace established COIN strategies initiating public services, promoting foreign investment and ensuring government presence in durable form. Despite best efforts, programs such as UPP and similar activities in Colombia and Mexico have not been completely successful. Much like the case of some of Rio's UPPs a false sense of security coupled with the world economic crisis led to some divestiture of important police and community programs and violence, while still not at the levels of the Cartel days, has nearly doubled in Medellin. Mexico has also seen the fruits of employing a community oriented strategy which includes Military and Police operating in concert with public services to effect long-term changes and improvements to at-risk areas. The poor reputation of police agencies led the Federal Government to rely on Mexican Marine Corps to undertake the tougher missions only after some U.S. advisors provided special training which emphasized minimum use of force, discretion and respect for human rights. To date the units are enjoying unprecedented success in abating drug trafficking and violence areas that were challenging if not inaccessible to Mexican Police forces.

One of the best takeaways from places where police have succeeded in effective COIN strategies is that of interoperability, unified action and unity of effort. Recognizing the value of a harmonized whole of government response and co-opting partner agencies, municipal services and leveraging NGOs is key to overcoming challenges in a COIN environment. Constant

communication and interaction with the public and partner agencies along with the implementation of joint patrols including social program personnel will do more to open doors and improve conditions than solely policing will. Use of CompStat like metrics will be important as well in order to ensure local Commanders coincide with efforts of the UPP.

Recommendations for ongoing support of the UPP program.

There is no better barometer for improvement than the evidence of normalcy in the favelas where children are on the street playing, transportation is functioning, and government services and administration are in order. These are the basics. With improved selection and retention of UPP Police and a real sustainable effort towards continuing financial support of these endeavors the favelas will likely be pacified. These projects are far too important to be relinquished once the world events are concluded. McChrystal (2009) imparts an important lesson relating that (communities) and “Villagers” are supremely rational and practical people: they make the decision on who they will support, based upon who can protect them and provide for them what they need.” adding that if there is a perception that the government or security forces cannot protect the citizen from coercion or harm from insurgents, he will not support the government as it would be illogical.

The UPP process is expected to be a lengthy and costly one that will undoubtedly have challenges just as those experienced in Colombia and Mexico. From the perspective of the favelas resident, it is understandable that frustration will run high and that the sense of security may experience peaks and valleys. The initial shock of the military and police show of force and presence of troops, tanks, police armored vehicles and patrols has since died down leaving UPP police on foot beats to effect expectation management for citizens who anticipated quick outcomes and a long lasting large scale security presence.

The Secretary of Public Safety must undertake a policy of ensuring sustainable support of the UPPs and continue operating with partner agencies and NGOs in an effort to address the root causes of social strife and drivers of influence by the *trafico* in order to disrupt any of their attempts to regain control. Reflecting upon the favelas as an insurgency problem one should consider that peace and normalcy will pass through several life cycle stages. Statistical review of criminal activity may lead researchers to believe that regression is occurring when in reality, as expressed in COIN doctrine, insurgencies often experience periods of fits and starts, occasionally regressing to earlier stages; while others remain mired in one stage for years. In theory, any insurgency will eventually reach a conclusion. In the favelas, this is no different. There is one certain element here; the police must continue to effect operations in the favelas in support of public safety and to ensure the integrity and continuity of city services. In order to do so, there must be a healthy mix of military style control measures and tactics together with a keen focus on understanding the community and comprehending where threats of corruption and human rights violations may occur. Strict accountability and oversight will be necessary. There will be some that may revert to influence by the *trafico*, but with continued investment and emphasis on an amalgamated effort consisting of enforcement, community relations, proactive patrols, joint collaboration between police organizations, and a keen focus on ensuring no interruption of public services the State will emerge victorious in achieving pacification in these delicate areas. The research revealed that there is a dire need for public safety agencies operating within the favelas to improve in terms of; doctrine and procedures, integration, force options, training, and supervision. Most notably, pacification plans may indeed involve military style incursions, however the retrograde operations must be conditions based and scalable leaving a well-trained, well equipped, and motivated force that is capable of sustainment and continuity in policing the favelas.

There is no single simple policy which meets this [insurgency] challenge. Experience has taught us that no one nation has the power or the wisdom to solve all the problems of the world or manage its revolutionary tides--that extending our commitments does not always increase our security--that any initiative carries with it the risk of a temporary defeat--that nuclear weapons cannot prevent subversion--that no free people can be kept free without will and energy of their own--and that no two nations or situations are exactly alike.

-President John F. Kennedy to Congress May 25th 1961

References

- Alves, A. (2011). *Public safety and pacification police: the fruition of the rights to public safety in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. (Segurança pública e polícia pacificadora - a fruição do direito a segurança pública nas favelas do Rio de Janeiro) University of Brasilia.
- Anderson, E. (1994) *The code of the streets*. The Atlantic. No. 3060, May 1994.
- Arijon, G. (2014). *Battle for Rio*. Documentary Film. Dir. Gonzalo Areijon, Writer Anne Vigna. Arte France – First Floor Prods.
- Barbosa, J. (2014, March 14). *The favelas after pacification of the territory: Challenges for democratization of the city*. (As Favelas Após a “Pacificação do Território”: Desafios À democratização da cidade) GeocritiQ - Plataforma Ibero-Americana para la Difusión del Trabajo Científico. Retrieved from: <http://www.geocritiq.com/2014/04/as-favelas-apos-a-pacificacao-do-territorio-desafios-a-democratizacao-da-cidade>.
- Bastista, A., & Pimentel, R. (2006). *Elite Troop*. Elite da Tropa. Objetivo. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
- Beltrame, M. (2014) *Every day is Monday*. (Todo dia é Segunda Feira). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Sextante Press. I ed.
- Bowater, D. (2013, August 4). *Where’s Amarildo? How the disappearance of a construction worker taken from his home by police has sparked protests in Brazil*. The Independent. No. 766.
- Brasil, F. (2014) *The Pacification farse: do you know how police refer to the UPPs? Or what is happening in Rocinha?* (A Farsa da Pacificação: Sabem como a Polícia Refere as UPPS). Veja Magazine, Ed XX, Dec 18 2014, Editora Abril, Brazil.
- Bratton, W. J. (1998). *Crime is down in New York City: Blame the police*. In Norman Dennis Zero tolerance: Policing a free society, 2nd ed. (pp.29-42). London: IEA.
- Brito, A., & Santana, L. (2014). *Rio mais social: territórios, UPPs*. (Rio-More Social) Rio de Janeiro. Retrieved: <http://www.riomaisocial.org/territorios/>
- Burgos, M.B. (2005). *Cities, territories and citizenship*. Cidades, Territórios e Cidadania. DADOS-Revista de Ciências Sociais, 48, (1), 2005. 189-222.
- Burgos, M., Pereira, L. and Cavalcanti, M. (2012). *The effect of UPP on the perception of favela residents*. (O Efeito UPP na Percepção dos Moradores das Favelas) Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro, Rio. Desigualdade & Diversidade – Revista de Ciências Sociais da PUC-Rio, nº 11, ago/dez, 2011, 49-98
- Calese, G. (2005). *Law enforcement methods for counterinsurgency operations*. School of Advanced Military Studies. US Army Command and General Staff College. AY 04-05.

- Cardone, M. (2012). *Shots that killed “Matemático” came from police helicopter*. Tiros que mataram Matemático foram disparados de helicóptero. R7 News. Rio de Janeiro Afternoon edition. May 12, 2012.
- Cardoso, M. (2013). *The Symbolic dimension of conflicts: favela residents and the police*. A Dimensão Simbólica dos Conflitos: Moradores de Favela e Polícia. Anuário Antropológico. Universidade de Brasília. 167-190. Brasília.
- Carvalho, M.B. (2013). *The Politics of favela pacification and contradictions for the production of a secure city*. A política de pacificação de favelas e as contradições para a produção de uma cidade segura. J. Soc. ‘O Social em Questão’. XVI. 29. 285-308.
- Cavalcanti, R. (2009). *Problems and challenges of the Civil Police*. Problemas e desafios da Polícia Civil. Centro Edelstein de Pesquisas Sociais, 107-125 Rio de Janeiro.
- Cavallieri, F. & Vial, A. (2012, May). *Favelas in the City of Rio de Janeiro: The Population as related by the 2010 Census*. Favelas na cidade do Rio de Janeiro: o quadro populacional com base no Censo 2010. Rio de Janeiro City Hall – Study Number 20120501 May 2012. Instituto Pereira Passos. Rio de Janeiro.
- CESEC/UCAM. (2010). *Social UPP ethnographic research*. (UPP Social. Pesquisas Etnográficas) Rio de Janeiro: Secretaria de Estado de Assistência Social e Direitos Humanos, 2010.
- Cidade Alerta (2009, January 5). *Shootout at Morro dos Macacos*. Tiroteio Morro do Macacos. TV News. Rede Record Brasil. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDVxcwF8bUs>
- CIA (2015). *World Fact Book – Brazil*. Central Intelligence Agency. *Country comparison. Illicit drugs Brazil*. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>
- Curto, B., & Paula, C. (2011). *Environmental factors associated with adolescent antisocial behavior in a poor urban community in Brazil*. J. Soc Psychiatry Epidemiology, 46, 1221-1231.
- DaCruz, G. (2013). *The History of public safety in Brazil and challenges of public participation*. A historicidade da segurança pública no Brasil e os desafios da participação popular. Instituto de Segurança Pública – Rio de Janeiro. Year 5, Number 4. March 2013.
- DOD (2013). *Counterinsurgency*. United States Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-24. 22 Nov 2013. USDTIC.
- Elias, N. (1939). *The civilizing process - sociogenetic and psychogenetic investigations*. Translated 1994 Gouldsbloum.

- Faria, Alessandra M.T., Costa, André S. & Corrêa, R. (2012). *Integrated areas of public safety and their representation: police units, demographic density e incidence of crime*. (Áreas integradas de segurança pública e suas representações: efetivo policial, densidade demográfica e ocorrências criminais) In: Ribeiro - Segurança Pública. Temas e Perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2012, pp. 161-186.
- FBI (2010). *Law enforcement officers per capita for cities and local departments*. US Department of Justice FBI UCR Annual Report 2010.
- Fleury, S. (2012). *The Militarization of socialization as an integration strategy - the UPP case in Santa Marta*. Militarização do Social Como Estratégia de Integração - O Caso da UPP do SantaMarta. Sociologias. Ano 14, no. 30. Pp 194-222. Porto Alegre.
- Fleury, S. (2013, March 14). *From welfare to warfare state. Cities under control*. Le Monde Diplomatique Brasil. Retrieved from: <http://www.diplomatique.org.br/artigo.php?id=1347>.
- HRW (2009). *Deadly Force. Police violence and public safety in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo*. Força Letal. Violência Policial e Segurança Pública no Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo. Human Rights Watch Report. Dec 2009. New York.
- HRW (1997). *Urban police brutality in Brazil*. Brutalidade Policial Urbana no Brasil. Human Rights Watch Americas Report. Apr 1997. New York.
- IBGE (2010). *Brazil Census and Surveys*. Brazilian Institute of General Statistics. Retrieved online Jun 3, 2015. <http://censo2010.ibge.gov.br/pt/noticias/censo?busca=1&idnoticia=2508&t=censo-2010-mostra-caracteristicas-territoriais-aglomeradossobnormais-suas-diferencas-demais-areas-cidades&view=noticia>
- IBPS (2010). *Research on the perception regarding police pacification units*. (pesquisa sobre a percepção acerca das Unidades De Polícia Pacificadora) IBPS- Instituto Brasileiro de Pesquisa Social (IBPS) 2010. Retrieved from: <http://www.ibpsnet.com.br/index.php/pesquisa/2009/114-o-impacto-das-unidades-de-policia-pacificadora-nas-favelas-da-cidade-do-rio-de-janeiro>.
- ISP (2015). *Statistical data on crime in favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. (Estatísticas de Criminalidade nas Favelas) Instituto de Segurança Pública Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Retrieved from: <http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/>
- ISP (2015). *Balances and indicators of police pacification policies*. Balanço de Indicadores das Políticas de Pacificação. Instituto de Segurança Pública, Rio de Janeiro. May 2015
- Jany, E. & Robinson, J. (2012). *Maximizing the efficiency of public safety*. Maximizando a eficiência da segurança pública. J. Caderno FGV Projetos. Seg. Pública em Fôco. Ano 6, no. 18. ISSN 1984-4883. Rio de Janeiro. Jan 2012.

- Jovchelovitch, S & Priego-Hernandez, J. (2013) *Subterranean societies. Identity, culture and resistance in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. Sociabilidades subterrâneas, identidade, cultura e resistência em favelas do Rio de Janeiro. UNESCO. Brasília.
- Ladwig, W. (2013). *The Forgotten Force: Police-Building in Iraq and Afghanistan*. World Politics Review. Retrieved online at: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12976/the-forgotten-force-police-building-in-iraq-and-afghanistan> June 22, 2015
- Leitão, L. (2015, July 3). *Warning signs in BOPE*. Sinal de alerta no BOPE. Veja magazine. Ed. Abril.
- MacNiven (2014). *O Estopim*. The fuse. Documentary Film. Dir. Writer Rodrigo MacNiven. TvA2 Prods. 2014
- O'Neill, B. (1990). *Insurgency and terrorism, inside modern revolutionary warfare*. Brassey's Inc. Dulles, 1990
- LAV-UERJ (2012). "*The Owners of the hill*": *An Evaluative Exploration of the Impact of Police Pacification Units on Rio de Janeiro*. 'OS DONOS DO MORRO': Uma avaliação exploratória do impacto das Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) no Rio de Janeiro. Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública. Laboratório de Análise da Violência – (LAV-UERJ). Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. May 2012
- Leite, F. (2012). *Without UPP, suburban Rio has homicide rates 20 percent higher than peacekeeping areas*. Sem UPP, subúrbio do Rio tem taxa de homicídio 20 vezes maior do que área pacificada. UOL Notícias-Rio de Janeiro, RJ. 6th Ed. AM News Report UOL.
- Mattar, F. Chequer, J. & Dias, M. (2010). *UPP: weaving discussions: live democracy*. (UPP: Tecendo Discursos. Democracia Viva) IBASE - Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas. (IBASE), nº 45, 2010, pp. 72-79.
- Machado da Silva, L. (2010). *After all, what is with the UPPs?* (Afinal, Qual é a das UPPs?) Observatório das Metrôpoles. Journal of Urban Studies - UFRJ. March 2010 Edition Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
- McChrystal, S. (2009). Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London ISAF. Commanding General Stanley McChrystal. October 1, 2009.
- Musumeci, L., Mourão, B., Lemgruber, J. (2013). *To be a policeman in a UPP: Approaches and resistance*. Ser Policial de UPP: Aproximações e Resistências. J. Boletim Seg e Cidadania. No 14. CESEC, Centro de Estudos de Segurança e Cidadania. Rio de Janeiro.
- Noticias R7 (2015, April 25). *Terror: 52 persons killed, victims of stray bullets in Rio de Janeiro*. Terror: 52 pessoas foram mortas vítimas de bala perdida no Rio de Janeiro. Record News R7, Retrieved from: <http://noticias.r7.com/cidade-alerta/videos/terror-52-pessoas-foram-mortas-vitimas-de-bala-perdida-no-rio-de-janeiro-25042015>

- Pinker, S. (2011). *The Better angels of our nature: why violence has declined*. Viking Press. New York.
- PMERJ (2014). Batalhão de Operações Especiais – Histórico. Retrieved from: www.policiamilitar.rj.gov.br/bope
- Ramos, S.D. (2011). *Trajectories in trafficking: youth and armed violence in Rio's favelas*. Trajetórias no tráfico: jovens e violência armada em favelas cariocas. Universidade Candido Mendes. 2011. Rio de Janeiro.
- Ribeiro & Silva (2010). *A Chronology of public safety policies and policing models in Rio de Janeiro, 1983-2010*. (Cronologia das políticas de segurança pública e dos modelos de policiamento: Rio de Janeiro, 1983-2010) Projeto História do Policiamento Comunitário do Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC/FGV, s/d.
- Ribeiro & Ferraz (2012). *Public safety topics and perspectives*. (Segurança Pública Temas e Perspectivas) Rio de Janeiro, Garamond.
- Rose, R.S. (2005). *The Unpast: Elite violence and social control in Brazil, 1954-2000*. Ohio University Press.
- Santos, L.C. (2012). *Violence and criminality: A study of existing data in Teresina, PI*. J. Ambito Jurídico XV. V 99.
- Silva, S. (2015, May 11). *Areas with UPPs see drop in homicides according to government research*. Áreas com UPP tiveram queda de homicídios, aponta pesquisa do governo. Estadão – Estado de São Paulo newspaper.
- State of Rio de Janeiro (2015). *Police Pacification Units - UPP - Official Site*. (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora). Retrieved online at: <http://www.upprj.com/index.php/parceiro> March 22, 2015.
- Teixeira, F. (2015, May 1). *Policiais de UPP são atacados com tiros no Complexo do Alemão, no Rio*. UPP Police attacked by gunfire in the Complexo do Alemão in Rio. Estadão – Estado de São Paulo newspaper. Retrieved from: <http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2015/05/01/policias-de-upp-sao-atacados-com-tiros-no-complexo.html>
- Van Horne, P. & Riley, J. (2013). *Left of Bang. How the Marine Corps' Combat Hunter Program can save your life*. Black Irish. New York, NY.
- Velazquez, H. (2012). *How to recover and guarantee security for citizens*. (Como recuperar y garantizar la seguridad de los ciudadanos) In: Ribeiro & Ferraz, Segurança Pública. Temas e Perspectivas. Rio de Janeiro, Garamond, 2012.

Vianna, T. (2013). *Demilitarizing and unifying the police*. Desmilitarizar e unificar a polícia. Forum magazine. Jan 9, 2013. Retrieved from:
<http://www.revistaforum.com.br/blog/2013/01/desmilitarizar-e-unificar-a-policia/>

Western, J. & Goldstein, J.S. (2011). *Lessons from Somalia to Libya*. Foreign Affairs. Nov 2011 CFR. Council on Foreign Relations. New York. 2012.

WHO (2002). *World report on violence and health*. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2002

Wolfgang, M.E. (1982) Subculture of violence – Towards an integrated theory in criminology.
(in: Ramos 2011)

World Bank (2012). *Bringing the state back into the favelas of Rio de Janeiro*. Sustainable Development Sector Management Unit LATAM and Caribbean Region. Oct 2012

World Population Review (2015). *World Cities*. Retrieved online Jun 3, 2015
<http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/rio-de-janeiro-population/>

Worms, J.L. (2015). *Mental mapping - the transformation of social space in Rio De Janeiro's oldest favela: Morro da Providência*. Dissertation – Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.