

**Sovereignty and “Jihadist” Movements: A Comparison of Conflict in
Northern Ireland and Uganda**

Nicole Ries

Undergraduate Student, Applied Social Science

University of Wisconsin-Stout

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Around the world, globalization has influenced people’s experiences of time and space. Most formal colonial enterprises were dismantled after World War II. However, postcolonial international relations are highly reminiscent of colonial structures of exploitation, dependency and inequality. Barber (1995) rhetorically dubs “Jihad vs. McWorld” as two opposing tendencies taking shape within contemporary conditions of globalization. These tendencies describe a modernization of colonial practices rather than a replacement of an old order of things. Barber’s use of the term “Jihad” is purely metaphorical and describes local forces attempting to resist the invasive “economic, technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity. . . , pressing nations into one “McWorld” tied together by communications, information, entertainment, and commerce” (p. 4). In contrast, what Barber designates “McWorld” refers to an overarching force of homogenization that pervades all human interaction and increases interdependency according to specific commercialized and anti-democratic logics. States that have gained independence since the purported dissolution of colonial enterprise during the mid-twentieth century have been drawn with arbitrary borders. These states exist as “papier-mâché Mephistopheles” that foster alienation among minority groups (Conrad, 2007, p. 29). This alienation manifests itself in reactionary, anti-democratic, fundamentalist movements which take root among those marginalized and alienated by the homogenizing processes of “McWorld.” Such tendencies characterize some Islamic fundamentalist movements, which is why Barber uses the label “Jihad” to describe these patterns. Barber explains the destructive nature to democracy of both extremes in “McWorld vs. Jihad.”

The two cases explored in this paper are the Irish Republican Movement, formerly active

in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and the Lord's Resistance Movement, active in the Republic of Uganda and neighboring states. This paper applies Barber's (1995) term "Jihad" to the IRM and the LRM for heuristic purposes, although neither are true Islamic jihadist movements. While both the IRM and LRM have surfaced in response to British colonialism, they have yielded different results because of variation in historical context and experience. That is, by comparing the two groups this paper aims to demonstrate that localized and globalized groups can organize in legitimately "jihadist" ways to globalize on their own terms. Localized groups are those active within a particular region and operate with regard to an issue specific to that region. Globalized groups are those active on an international scale and operate with regard to a global issue. This paper synthesizes three theories of globalization (Jihad vs. McWorld, global governance theory, and world culture theory) to explain the success of the Irish Republican Movement in relation to the failures of the Lord's Resistance Movement. Specifically, the IRM has reformed itself along globally legitimized prescriptions, while the LRM has failed to do so.

Theoretical Overview

One theory by itself does not explain the variation that will be illustrated in this article. Therefore, three theories of globalization are used to tease out the different experiences of postcolonial conflict in Uganda and Northern Ireland, including Barber's (1995) theory of "McWorld vs. Jihad," world society theory as described by Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez (1997), and Stiglitz' (2002) theory on global governance. First, Barber's theory of "Jihad vs. McWorld" helps explain two oppositional yet dialectical forms of globalization. "Jihadist" movements have surfaced in response to the oppressive policies of "McWorld," a conglomeration of multinational corporations and developed countries. For Barber (1995), the conflict is that of the colonized resisting the colonizer. "Jihad" describes a movement towards

tribalism that “pursues a bloody politics of identity” reminiscent of both pre-colonial tribal affairs and postcolonial rebel groups (p. 8). The image of “McWorld” on the other hand describes a “bloodless economics of profit” by any means (Barber, 1995, p. 8). Since economic incentive largely drove colonial actions, today’s economic patterns encompassing the image of “McWorld” are a modern extension of colonialism; “McWorld” seeks to sow its seeds of modernity across the world. The process by which it endeavors to apply its economic and uniform ideals alienates local populations and cultural groups, a similar outcome observed when imperial forces colonized new lands and conquered indigenous populations. In response, “Jihadist” groups work to destroy the forces of “McWorld,” but in doing so simultaneously increase the fervor with which “McWorld” implements its uniformity. The net effect is that these two active forces undermine and reinforce each other while subverting states—people simultaneously become citizens of the world and citizens of a “tribe” (Barber, 1995).

One way in which society struggles to balance the tendencies of “Jihad” and “McWorld” is the organization of states within a greater globalized understanding of norms and values. The creation of states follows models prescribed by world society. Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez (1997) define world society as a collective global understanding of norms and belief; this causes states to follow common political structures and economic policies, whether or not these structures and policies are best suited for the situation. Ireland and Uganda have become sovereign states within the last century, and the effects of the statehood process are still evident. World culture theory is partially derived from Erving Goffman’s (1959) theory of dramaturgy, which can account for the isomorphism of states in spite of its traditional use in micro-sociology because world society is simply a larger scale society; it functions in similar ways to micro-societies. Dramaturgy is a function of the sociological paradigm symbolic interactionism, or the

idea that all symbols are ascribed meaning by society, that analyzes interaction through a theatrical metaphor (Appelrouth & Edles, 2008). It describes interaction as performances between individuals, or actors, and these actors display a front that Goffman (1959) describes as “expressive equipment of a standard kind of intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his [sic] performance” (p. 22). World society is the creation of an institutionalized script (Appelrouth & Edles, 2008). Meyer et al. (1997) state that “copying world models or conventions amount to simple mimesis that has more to do with knowing how to fill in forms than with managing substantive problems” (p. 158). This “simple mimesis” is nothing more than following socially prescribed scripts.

Furthermore, stabilization of a state by recognized sovereignty does “not preclude, and might even increase, instability in the state’s government” (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 159). This stability is questioned by an individual’s understanding of his or her citizenship and loyalties. If an individual considers him or herself part of a nation within a state, rather than the state itself, instability will increase. Recognition of sovereignty from outside states is a manifestation of “McWorld.” That is, states will move to recognize other nations as states because statehood is valued by world society. This recognition is a uniform and exogenous standard ignorant of the local culture. Whether or not these individuals view themselves as citizens of a state can lead to “Jihadist” uprisings. World society and “McWorld” are complementary because both are homogenizing forces. World society is the culture that McWorld delivers voluntarily and forcefully; multinational corporations strive to replace the new state’s norms and values with those of the state in which it originated. The deliverance of this culture benefits some states more than others because the interests of McWorld do not always parallel those of the local citizens. For instance, the introduction of fast food may threaten local restaurants, culture, and health.

This inequitable distribution of world culture’s benefits may be further explained by Stiglitz’s (2002) global governance theory.

Stiglitz’s (2002) article, “Globalism’s Discontents,” revolves around the idea “that globalization has meant different things in different places” (p. A16). Because globalization has meant different things in different places, it should be understood that each culture and state have their own set of problems and own set of solutions. This argument is supported by the failure of imposing a universal strategy on developing countries from the outside. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank encourage policies of market liberalization—often characterized by removal of trade barriers, deregulation of markets, elimination of social welfare programs, privatization of public sector industries and erosion of protections for workers and the environment—that tend to benefit the global North and allow it to manipulate the global South to extract maximum profit from it. Moyo (2009) argues a similar point in *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*. Referring to loans provided by the IMF and World Bank, which are often provided with many constraints, Moyo (2009) found that “the wall of freely supplied money led to extremely low, and even negative, real interest rates, and encouraged many poorer economies to start borrowing even more in order to repay previous debts” (pp. 15-16). Many countries become shackled to a cycle of debt and borrowing, a state of postcolonial dependency manipulated by the IMF and World Bank to impose certain types of development policies. In Moyo’s (2009) analysis of Africa, this is problematic because it redirects all of Africa’s growth to the loan countries while strengthening Africa’s dependency on aid in the form of loans and grants. While some in the global South have benefited from market liberalization, others have not, and success has been achieved by countries that have “determined [their] own pace of change” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. A17). Furthermore, prior to IMF and World Bank

influence “financial markets were highly regulated . . . those regulations promoted growth. It was only when these countries stripped away the regulations, under pressure from the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, that they encountered problems” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. A17). Stiglitz theorizes that global governance institutions will shape development in the global South in a way that produces more conflict compared to developing states in the global North. Some argue, for example, that development aid has decreased the quality of life in Africa. The “average African [is] poorer today than just two decades ago,” and “some 50 per-cent of the world’s poor” resides in sub-Saharan Africa (Moyo, 2009, p.5). Stiglitz (2002) argues that when states find a solution to their localized problems, it allows them to experience more of the benefits of globalization. Increasing sovereignty essentially increases equity, which has been the experience in Northern Ireland more than in Uganda.

World culture theory describes an overarching, homogenous force similar in some respects to Barber’s (1995) *McWorld*. World culture theory also illustrates that *McWorld* follows a script of domination and argues that a modernization of colonial and imperial actions follows global patterns of legitimacy, as do resistance efforts against homogenizing forces (Meyer et al., 1997). Similarly, Stiglitz’s (2002) global governance theory describes the necessity and legitimacy of sovereignty for all states. Essentially, it is this legitimization, or socially-recognized norms and values that allow states to work against some forces of homogenization while working within others. This legitimization also provides a solution to the mutually reinforcing and destructive forces of “*McWorld*” and “*Jihad*.” This is done by rewriting the goals or strategies of “*Jihadist*” movements according to world cultural scripts of formal and instrumentally rational behavior, such as statehood or just war theory, allowing them to work within world culture and redirect their tactics and strategies to find solutions to their set of

problems by globalizing on their own terms. Local movements that do so, such as the Irish Republican Movement, are more successful in resolving conflict. According to this logic and the evidence presented below, this paper offers a global explanation to the variance in conflict resolution in Northern Ireland and Uganda: a conglomeration of the three theories illustrates how differences in experience lead to differences in outcome.

Basis for Comparison

In comparison, Uganda and Northern Ireland exhibit more differences than similarities. However, the few similarities are just as important as the differences because they offer a useful analytical point of comparison. Both states experienced colonization as members of the British Empire. Stratification of citizenry, or an organization of the people based on cultural constructs, occurred in both states as a result of colonization. This stratification has fueled the respective movements. Finally, the longevity of both conflicts can be attributed to the fact that both states were unable to establish either legitimate police force or military forces that offered protection for marginalized groups of citizens.

British colonization introduced lasting conflict to both Ireland and Uganda. The Protestant-Catholic discord is a product of British Protestantism gaining control of Ireland in 1690 under King William III (Perry & Gerard-Sharp, 2006). In Uganda, colonization resulted in the arbitrary drawing of borders around the lands of 13 ethnic groups, with the highest concentration of an ethnicity, the Baganda, comprising approximately 18% of the population. Since 1986, President Yoweri K. Museveni has enacted policies oppressive to various ethnic groups, particularly the Acholi. Museveni belongs to the second-largest ethnic group, the Banyankole (Bureau of African Affairs, 2010). In 1888, the British East Africa Company acquired control of Uganda, and it was not until 1962 that independence from the United

Kingdom was granted. During the period of colonization both Ireland and Uganda were subjected to Protestant missionaries; however, only Ireland was flooded by a Protestant migration. The latter is significant because the high concentration of Protestants caused Northern Ireland to withdraw from the Irish State based on Section 12 of the Irish Free State Agreement Act in 1922 (BBC News, 1999). Secession occurred in spite of a large Catholic population. This exogenous governmental decision worsened lives for Catholics in Northern Ireland by removing their claim to land and legitimate rule. In Uganda, none of the ethnic groups have ever been extended an offer to leave the state and exist as a separate sovereign entity. In both cases, these decisions were made by the United Kingdom, acting as an outside, homogenizing force of “McWorld.” Active patterns of resistance by the Irish Republican Army and the Lord’s Resistance Army are thus not surprising.

In Northern Ireland, to be Catholic is to be second class citizen; in Uganda, to be any ethnicity other than Bagandan or Banyankole also means to be second class citizen. The hostility and tension these citizens face creates feelings of alienation and homelessness. This caused instability to increase exponentially, resulting in the formation of rebellion groups. However, while in Northern Ireland Catholics had not experienced the benefits of citizenship since before colonization, the Acholi in Uganda had been the ruling class from 1962 until 1986. In both states, other rebellion groups have surfaced. In Ireland, these groups formed in response to the Irish Republican Movement, but in Uganda, the other rebellion groups have existed separately.

The political instability in Uganda inspired Alice Lakwena and Joseph Kony to lead the resistance army. Lakwena and Kony “blamed the sins of the Acholi themselves for almost destroying their group. They both believed that the Acholi were about to be wiped out in massacres and reprisals driving them to look for a spiritual escape” (Jackson, 2009, p. 323). The

Acholi are still persecuted, particularly by those who are purportedly protecting them. Jackson (2009) found that members of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force “see their service in the north as being virtually in another country” (p. 325). Because of this, they have “been guilty of a series of violations of human rights that fuel bitterness amongst the Acholi, including systematic rape of both men and women, usually in the presence of their families, the murder of civilians and the burying alive of civilians by soldiers” (Jackson, 2009, p. 325). Oppression of the Acholi was further enforced by Yoweri Museveni, who as recently as 2002 “coerced the population into displaced camps, arguing that depopulation of the countryside would allow the government to provide adequate protection from the rebels [Yet] most of the camps fell far below emergency standards for hygiene and availability of water” (Annan, Brier, & Aryemo, 2009, p. 645).

In Northern Ireland, Catholics were subject to unfair employment, voting and housing restrictions, as well as a number of others. However, one of the most contentious points of disagreement was internment. As Dixon noted, “there was a major escalation of violence following the introduction of internment [without trial] in August 1971 [P]arties began to contemplate a major reassessment of the conflict and became more sympathetic to the goal of Irish unity” (2009, p. 451). Internment of Catholics was based on suspicion of Irish Republican support rather than proof of it. Most often, the offense these men had committed was simply being Catholic. Dixon (2009) estimates that one in four Catholic men, between the ages of 16 and 44, was arrested at least once between 1972 and 1977. Furthermore, it was discovered that interrogation techniques used against the Irish Republicans, as well as innocent Catholic citizens, “had been used in previous colonial campaigns: . . . wall-standing, hooding, continuous noise, deprivation of food and deprivation of sleep” (Dixon, 2009, p. 456). All of these techniques have

been considered torture by the European Commission on Human Rights and inhuman, degrading treatment by the European Court (Dixon, 2009, p. 459). The army additionally searched Catholic houses excessively. “On average every Catholic household in Northern Ireland had been searched twice, but since many homes would not be under suspicion some houses in certain districts would have been searched perhaps as many as ten or more times” (Dixon, 2009, p. 452). Protestants from all social classes supported the segregation and dehumanization of Catholics:

Even deprived Protestants had an interest in the preservation of the state of affairs, as the Protestant working classes were marginally better off [in comparison with their Catholic counter-part], if only in the sense that they “belonged” to the ruling class. Even for those Protestants who were close to the bottom of the economic heap, it was comforting to know that Catholics, as a class, were worse off. It fed the myth of superiority, of ascendancy, of exclusivity. Hence Protestants—even the poorest—were in some sense “better.” (Da Fazio, 2009, p. 171)

Both Uganda and Northern Ireland failed in a number of attempts to provide a legitimate state force that could protect its citizens. The Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF), in addition to torturing the Acholi peoples, is incapable of fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army with any success; the child-based army has always overcome the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, most notably because of their disorganization. For example, during an attack on the Lira Palwo camp, Captain Kavuma, the leader of that base, was arrested for his inability to lead the army and “it was alleged his team was ill-prepared and that he failed to radio for help in a timely manner. Additionally, eyewitnesses testified that several of his officers were drunk” (Feldman, 2008, p. 46). Similarly, the Irish Catholics could not count on any of the police forces supported by Northern Ireland that were created to protect them from counterinsurgency groups, such as the

Ulster Volunteer Force. The Ulster Volunteer Force and other similar groups delegitimized themselves by acting outside of the Catholic interests. For instance, after imposing the Falls Road Curfew, “the Army was no longer seen as the protector of the Catholic community, recruitment to the IRA accelerated, and the alienation of the Catholic population was now such that it could afford to take offensive action against the British Army” (Dixon, 2009, p. 456).

Variance in Experience, Variance in Outcome

The above similarities between Northern Ireland and Uganda offer a starting point for investigating the differences. Some variances are in the experience of the movement, while others are a product of it. The involvement of religion greatly differs between the two. While both conflicts are based in ethnicity, the conflict in Northern Ireland is dualistic, or between two groups, and the Ugandan conflict is pluralistic, among many. The level of legitimacy utilized by the movements greatly impacts the tactics they employ and also determines whether or not the perpetrators or the victims will need to undergo some sort of rehabilitation. Finally, while both groups desire sovereignty, the degree of sovereignty they desire is different. The different experience of global forces, described by the theories summarized above, offers an explanation for such variation between Uganda and Northern Ireland. Differences in religiosity, societal structure, daily experiences, and a variety of other factors require different conflict resolutions.

The Irish Republican Army and the Lord’s Resistance Army have long carried religious connotations. However, the level of religiosity held by the movements differs because of different experiences. As McMahon (2007) states, “unlike some unionists, the leaders of the IRA did not appeal to their followers by defining the conflict as religious” (p. 354). The Catholic-Protestant problem existed not as a religious disagreement, but as a social hierarchy that did not acknowledge the rights of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Because of this, Irish Republicans held

the view that “the representatives of the real enemy did not wear clerical collars and did not preach to rapt congregations. Instead the implacable foe wore everyday business attire and strode the corridors of power in Westminster and Whitehall” (McMahon, 2007, p. 354). Religion was not only ascribed to the conflict but used to create a polarization. World society finds this polarization comparable to tribal warfare in order to legitimize any interference. This follows the script of the benevolent developed world seeking to solve the problems of the less fortunate—a front, or script, institutionalized during the era of colonization.

For the Lord’s Resistance Army, religion is inseparable from ideology. In a state that persecuted the Acholi people, Alice Lakwena’s call to reject modernity and “retreat to spiritualism based on the traditional cosmology of the Acholi with added biblical elements” appeared legitimate to many Acholi adults (Jackson, 2009, p. 324). Following in her footsteps, Joseph Kony continued Lakwena’s armed religious rebellion against the norms of Ugandan culture. He and his followers sought to overthrow President Yoweri Museveni. Rice (2009) notes that even though “the rebels had few guns . . . Kony’s most potent weapon did not need bullets. The Holy Spirit was guiding him. Fight beside me and pray hard, pray very hard, and no harm will come to you, he told his followers” (p. 30). Mechanical solidarity fueled by the high degree of religiosity prevented the Lord’s Resistance Movement from following world patterns of legitimacy because the norms of the Movement were valued over those embraced by world society.

In contrast to Uganda, where ethnicity determines class, Irish social class was determined by one’s religious affiliation. Both armed movements express jihadist-like tendencies because of their opposition to state sanctioned homogenization, but this homogenization varies in form. In Northern Ireland, the Irish Republicans expressed similar tendencies because they continued to

fight against an invasive homogenizing Protestant force introduced by colonialism. In Uganda, the rebellion was a reaction to the injustices introduced by “McWorld.” First, the United Kingdom forced many tribes into a single land, and second, after decolonization began the arbitrary border drawn around a multitude of tribal land remained unchanged. Because statehood is valued by world society, it appeared to be in the interest of the Ugandan people to remain a state; to dissolve would increase unrest and instability and decrease development aid. While Moyo (2009) clearly articulated the negative consequences of receiving development aid, world society is a much more pervasive force. Both states displayed the instability Meyer et al. (1997) attributes with newly sovereign states.

Uganda and Northern Ireland both recognized the need to act as sovereign states in solving their domestic issues. However, the governments of Northern Ireland and Ireland pursued a legal approach that works within world culture, rather than against it, while Uganda pursued the opposite. Uganda desired amnesty, rather than persecution for its war criminals, because it would allow the Ugandan people to engage in Mato Oput, a forgiveness ritual that has been part of their culture for thousands of years (Ssenyonjo, 2007). Because Northern Ireland chose to work within world society, it was afforded much more sovereignty than Uganda, albeit not completely. The Clinton administration sought to solve Ireland’s problems.

Bill Clinton’s efforts in resolving conflict in Northern Ireland were a function of world society. He was simply following world society’s script of colonialism and imperialism. His efforts did not lead to successful resolution because he was not seen by the population of Northern Ireland or Ireland as a legitimate mediator but rather as a biased puppet; instead, the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland came to peaceful resolution on their own. Dixon (2010) found that “the Clinton administration was far from ‘even-handed’ in its attitude towards

nationalists and unionists, and this partiality towards nationalists was picked up by unionist actors and audiences who were already suspicious of US ‘interference’” (p. 217). Unionist leader David Trimble was quoted warning Clinton to stay away from Northern Ireland:

I would certainly prefer it if Bill Clinton arrived here after the referendum rather than before. I would not want people here to feel they are being dictated to by some foreign power or, indeed, that anything improper is being done to influence their decision.

(Dixon, 2010, p. 220)

However, the greatest indication of Bill Clinton’s inability to participate positively in the resolution became clear when he stated that “growing prosperity and opportunity was being threatened . . . in Northern Ireland . . . by ‘ancient hatreds’ which manifested itself in a murderous group superiority over neighbours,” and when he used the “Irish stereotype of ‘drunks’ failing to get over ‘600 years of religious fights’ to express his frustration with the progress of the [mediations] in October 1999” (as cited in Dixon, 2010, p. 222). In doing so, he was behaving as other imperialist forces before him, with a lack of cultural relativism. More so, Clinton sought to resolve the conflict by homogenizing populations instead of seeking a solution through peaceful coexistence. Specifically, he completely overlooked the differences in religion and instead focused on the similarities between the groups—both were “drunks” incapable of moving beyond “600 years of religious fights”. Essentially, Clinton saw the groups as the same because of these shallow and highly incorrect differences and did not bother to understand the rich differences or utilize them to find a solution.

In Uganda, the desire for sovereignty in peacemaking was greater than it had been in Northern Ireland because the desirable peacemaking process would require defiance of world culture norms. Specifically, Uganda rejected the International Criminal Court’s plans to arrest

and persecute the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army, opting instead to provide amnesty. This was because ritualized forgiveness, or Mato Oput, had to be utilized to instill peace to the troubled culture. However, it could not be practiced if the Lords’ Resistance Army’s leaders were persecuted. Because this was a violation of the international community’s norms and values, they completely rejected Ugandan plans for peace (Ssenyonjo, 2007). The Ugandan goal was to achieve peace and healing through forgiveness, reconciliation, and an end to all violence. This was their definition of justice, and it could not be achieved without mercy or forgiveness and begs engagement of Mato Oput. Ssenyonjo described the ritual as follows:

When a crime is committed against humanity with impunity, the accused or perpetrator must be the first witness against himself or herself. He/she must stand outside the ‘Gate of the Village’ and tell the people his/her name and names of his/her parents and uncle. He/she also talks about the crime he/she committed and why he/she committed it the way he/she did. After his/her testimony, the elders of the Village immediately take collective responsibility on his/her behalf. After the confession and the culprit’s community taking collective responsibility, the elders then perform the rituals of the self-confessed culprit. (Ssenyongo, 2007, p. 374)

Mato Oput could not occur without complete amnesty being granted to all members of the Lord’s Resistance Army. The call for amnesty began in the Acholi community and continued to resonate throughout Uganda. The apologies would be made to the entire community and would be subject to the approval of religious leaders. In the event of the leaders’ acceptance of these apologies, “the two parties shall be required to ‘bend spears’ and formally declare an end to hostilities and drink the juice from the root of the Mato Oput tree as a form of cleansing” (Ssenyonjo, 2007, pp. 374-375). Betty Amongi, a Ugandan member of parliament, stated that the

“indictment by the ICC [International Criminal Court] against the LRA’s five leaders would not end the conflict in Northern Uganda. She observed that the ‘greatest justice to the people who have been suffering for the past 20 years is to have peace’” (as cited in Ssenyonjo, 2007, p. 371).

Engaging in Mato Oput had the potential to be a legitimate form of “Jihad,” or local resolution that transcends the inherent problems of McWorld vs. Jihad. However, Mato Oput defies world society. If a “Jihadist” conflict is to achieve its goals, or come to a resolution, it must work within and not against world society. While it was imperative that only the Acholi people determine how justice is achieved, they needed to find a way to act with legitimacy within their own culture and world culture simultaneously. This means that the Ugandan people needed to find peace in a way that satisfies both local and global norms and values. Without a stronger degree of authority, the Acholi people could not resolve this conflict on both a global and a local scale.

The Irish Republican Army largely had the benefit of legitimacy within the Irish Isle. At its advent, the army was actually the army of the Irish State. Over time, the army lost this legitimacy by engaging in armed resistance, but it was able to realize legitimacy again by transforming from an armed rebellion to an informed political movement. It is through this legitimacy that the conflict transformed from a violent rebellion to a political party working through the government. In contrast, the Lord’s Resistance Army had little to no legitimacy. More so, what little legitimacy it had completely vanished as more and more adults abandoned Kony’s mission. The tactics employed by the Lord’s Resistance Army reinforced the fact that the movement would not be seen as legitimate by world society. That is, according to world society, armed rebellion is not a legitimate form of resistance because there are political avenues that allow for change. However, in Uganda, these political avenues were closed to all ethnic

minorities. The Acholi people, who originally supported the effort to overthrow Loweri Museveni’s unjust government, abandoned Kony’s campaign because of the guerilla army’s tactics.

The Irish Republican Army was a terrorist organization, just as the Lord’s Resistance Army. However, there were considerable differences between the two organizations’ methods of resistance. Irish Republicans targeted government officials, government buildings and counterinsurgents. Citizens were harmed only when they were brought into the conflict by either government or counterinsurgent forces. The tactics included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion and robberies. The Irish Republican Army managed to work closer to world society’s just war theory than the Lord’s Resistance Army. Just war theory varies between societies, but there are globally recognized rules: war must be proportional and just (Forge, 2009). This means that force exerted must not exceed that of force received and targets must not be civilians. The Lord’s Resistance Army purposefully targeted civilians. Kony abducted children for his army “not only [because] they were easier to indoctrinate, but also because Kony had effectively given up on the adults” (Jackson, 2009, p. 324). He forced these children to fight with him, engaging in animalistic brutality. Victims of the army have reportedly had padlocks forced through their mouths, lips, ears and noses, had their noses sliced off and been victims of cannibalism (Rice, 2009). Women were forced to beat their infants to death, and children were forced to make the choice of killing their brothers or being killed by their brothers (Rice, 2009). The goal of the group was to maximize casualties, and they were known to “wait for villagers to gather for church services or celebrations before striking” (Rice, 2009, p. 30).

Conclusion

Two key points can be drawn from this paper. First, globalization penetrates and affects

local conflicts in different ways. Second, if states can be afforded the right to solve problems on their own terms by determining which global forces should help in conflict resolution, conflict resolutions may be more successful. Movements with “Jihadist” tendencies described by Barber (1995) have become active in most states in the aftermath of colonialism and in response to contemporary globalization processes. However, these movements have achieved vastly different results and experienced very different outcomes due to unique histories of colonialism and globalization. Consequently, there have been clear differences between the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland regardless of the fact that both movements were armed rebellions aimed at solving the problems introduced to their cultures and countries by colonialism. Specific differences related to this variance in experiencing globalization included the role of religiosity, degrees of legitimacy in world society, tactics employed by each rebellion, and degrees of sovereignty. Religiosity defined class in Northern Ireland, but in Uganda it fueled the LRM; this hindered the LRM’s ability to embrace world society’s norms and values. Embracing just war theory caused the IRA to legitimize itself in world society. That is, the IRA’s evolution of tactics from militarism to the political sphere was legitimate locally as well as within world society. Furthermore, the IRA was the official state army at the beginning of statehood; this afforded the armed movement more legitimacy than other armed movements have had. The LRM failed to meet any standards of world society’s scripted resolution of conflict or just war theory and thus failed to experience legitimacy by any exogenous norms. The case in Northern Ireland is an example of a third global force, existing between “Jihad” and “McWorld,” capable of satisfying both. This third option is dependent on endogenous solutions to local problems within the framework of world culture. If “Jihadist” or “McWorld” groups seek to achieve their goals, they must find overlap between the

best local and global solutions available; to avoid either extreme, localized and globalized groups will have to compromise to come to successful and lasting solutions.

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