PRESS CENSORSHIP IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

"On a Clear Day You Can See MacArthur"

By

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Preface

Whether we like it or not, the winning of the war has placed on us grave international responsibilities, of which one of the most important is our position of leadership in the Occupation of Japan. Even though we have had almost no previous experience in the lengthy occupation of a defeated nation, we are now in our fifth year of this gigantic task.[1] But instead of entrusting this role to the Department of State, which traditionally handles our country's affairs abroad, we have placed this tremendous new phase of our foreign policy almost entirely in the hands of the Military, under the supervision of General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan. In addition to the expense of maintaining a four-division Army of Occupation, it is costing the American taxpayer about $400,000,000 a year -- more than $1,000,000 a day -- to keep the Japanese alive on meager rations.[2]

Here in America we believe that each of us should have

1. For our previous experience with military government see Blair Bolles, "Influence of Armed Forces on U. S. Foreign Policy," October 1, 1946, in L. H. Chamberlain and R. C. Snyder, American Foreign Policy, Rinehart and Company, Inc. New York, N. Y. 1948, p. 225.
2. Hallett Abend, "The Strange Case of MacArthur in Japan," Look, January 18, 1949, p. 47. Also, see New York Times, September 12, 1949, p. 20. Col. 2.

a voice in guiding the destiny of our country. We believe that important decisions which shape our foreign affairs should be responsive to public opinion. Therefore, it is a fundamental tenet of our democratic system that we be a people well-informed on the direction we are heading at every major turn. The right of people to know is basic to the formation of a wise public opinion. In this case, if we are to assure ourselves that continued warm support of the Occupation of Japan is justified, we must guarantee ourselves a true picture of conditions over there.

Freedom of the press is our one indispensable means to acquire this all-important picture. This freedom was guaranteed to us by our forefathers who enshrined it in the First Amendment to our Constitution. It is our inherent right, as Americans, to have full information completely independent of governmental interference, direct or indirect.

The foot soldiers of the press are our eyes and ears in the story of the Occupation. On them we rely for facts and opinions. For them we must insist on access to the news, which includes freedom to travel at will, to talk with whomever they wish, to find adequate communication facilities available.

We must also assure them the freedom to write what

they see and as they see it, that is, freedom to interpret the news in the best way they know how, even if it means criticizing the conduct of our foreign relations. Healthy criticism plays a constructive part by warning of dangers and by forestalling failures. Exposure of weakness and error creates the opportunity for correction. For this reason, we believe in a reporter's right to be frank in discussing any action by our government officials. The publisher of the New York Times, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, defines his staff's responsibility in these words:

> "We are anxious to see wrongs corrected, and we attempt to make our position very clear in such matters on our editorial page. But we believe that no matter how we view the world, our chief responsibility lies in reporting accurately that which happens.
>
> "Whichever way the cat may jump, we should record it, and we should not allow our excitement about the direction which it takes, or plans to take, to interfere with our primary mission. We believe that you will look after the cat if we inform you promptly, fully, and accurately about its movements."[3]

The right of a reporter to be free from official regulation is essential to the general freedom of a society. It is one guarantee we have against government becoming totalitarian, for tyranny can prevail only when criticism is suppressed.

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3. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, "The Newspaper--Its Making and Its Meaning," Vital Speeches, June 15, 1945, p. 540.

> "The great strength and value of any good reporter and his sole responsibility is to serve his readers with factual, accurate news and not to have his efforts approved or disapproved by any government."[4]

Government must limit its capacity to regulate the press or to manipulate the data on which public opinion is based, if the freedom of the press is to function.[5]

Independent reporting by enterprising newsmen overseas is our only way of knowing what our representatives in Japan are doing. John Foster Dulles has expressed its importance: "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy and no other, I would make it a free flow of information."[6]

Freedom of the press, however, "is not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free society," as Justice Frankfurter has warned.[7] That is to say, our press must not only be free, it must also be responsible.

> "No right embraces a power to wreck the society granting it or to subvert the end it was designed to serve. It would seem, then, that even in this freest of societies there is at some point a limit to the immunity conferred upon the press. It follows from a self-imposed responsibility -- that is, by a

4. John S. Knight, "World Freedom of Information," Vital Speeches, May 15, 1946, p. 472.
5. Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free And Responsible Press, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 1947, p. 20.
6. Knight, "World Freedom of Information," op. cit. p. 472.
7. Supreme Ct. of the United States, N. 473, October term, 1945. John D. Pennekamp and the Miami Herald Publishing Co. Petitions v. The State of Florida.

reasonable degree of self-discipline and self-restraint."[8]

Because of these many factors, we expect rather good presentation of information from reporters who have access to the sources of news and who feel that it is their duty to satisfy our legitimate public concern. Although there are always reporters who will deliberately write lies and abuse their press freedom, on the whole I believe most of our correspondents will do an honest job, given the opportunity. This is true, I believe, of the Tokyo Press Corps which, on occasion, has acted to correct certain fallacies committed by one of its members. For example, when Sidney Whipple, of Scripps Howard, exaggerated a minor Russian-American squabble, two dozen members signed a public statement making clear the facts.[9]

The wartime performance of the newsmen was generally good.

> "...Correspondents have an excellent code of their own, which does credit to the profession... They will not print information voluntarily revealed to them in confidence by responsible persons. During the war they have, on the whole, justified the trust

8. Alan Barth, "Position of the Press in a Free Society," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1947, p. 82. This opinion was also expressed by the Commission of Freedom of the Press, op. cit.
9. Richard Lauterbach, "A Failure of the American Press," reprinted from Frontpage by PM, October 11, 1946, p. 2, col. 3.

placed in them by military leaders; few military secrets have leaked out before the proper time."[10]

As the Occupation of Japan does not directly affect the daily living of every American, except for the broader aspects, we cannot expect each citizen to be highly interested in our role there. We cannot expect to be each directly involved in helping to make the keen decisions on every point in the Occupation. But the majority of people should know the general trend of our actions there and should be able to evaluate them, if they are well interpreted. In our society, as the Commission on Freedom of the Press shows, large numbers of citizens voluntarily delegate analysis and decisions to leaders that they trust. "Such leadership in our society is freely chosen and constantly changing; it is informal, unofficial, and flexible. Any citizen may at any time assume the power of decision. In this way government is carried on by consent."[11] Democratic society, in actual operation, depends on opinion leaders. They, especially, need information, and, because they are not easily identified, we can inform them only by insisting that the facts are available to all.

It is my thesis that we are not so well-informed as

10. New Republic, "For A Responsible Press," May 21, 1945, p. 696.
11. Commission on Freedom of the Press, op. cit.

we should be on what is happening in Japan. A free and responsible American press does not exist there. And much of the blame for this can be traced to the governmental control of news at the source by General MacArthur and the Occupation authorities. If this be true, we not only are losing our own liberties in the matter of insuring the "right to know" to our opinion leaders, we are also being denied the opportunity to bring genuine freedom and democracy to the Japanese. For how can we demonstrate democracy when we do not practice it?

The American newsmen in Tokyo have been concerned about press censorship. Weldon James, former correspondent for Colliers magazine, calls it a real failure of MacArthur's regime.

> "No one need wait for history to put the finger on the most glaring defect of MacArthur's performance in Japan. It is a triangular, interrelated defect. It is readily apparent, it has been apparent from the day the Occupation began, and it was foreshadowed in his days as a general in the field; a failure to understand or respect the role of the free reporter in a democratic society, (my italics), an instinctive conviction that all criticism is either completely unjustified, or, at best, inspired by malice alone, and an innately optimistic tendency, as in his war communiques, to claim the objective before it has actually been taken."[12]

Much of this is a natural carry-over from wartime

12. Weldon James, "Generals' General," Men Who Make Your World, E. P. Dutton & Co., New York, N. Y. 1949, p. 63.

censorship when it was necessary to keep our plans and preparations secret, lest the enemy profit. Newsmen patriotically accepted this voluntary censorship and cooperated with it. This voluntary censorship was so effective in World War II that critics could find no obviously weak point to attack.[13] But the war has been over for more than four years, and we should be getting a free flow of facts with the possible exception of certain strictly military facts concerned with "security." The Occupation of Japan is not a military campaign. It is a peacetime phase of our foreign policy being carried out by the Military. The wartime controls should not apply.

> "...This (secrecy) must not continue when the fighting stops... The community is adult and is entitled to the facts on which to base its judgments and form its action. If for no other reason, we must hasten the war so that you may again become the full master of your destiny."[14]

The official control of news in wartime was much like other restrictions we endured for patriotic reasons. But the discomforts it caused reporters could result in a greater appreciation for press freedom at the war's end.

"Wartime controls appear to be an essential

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13. For details on voluntary censorship in the war, see Theodore F. Koop, Weapon of Silence, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 1947.
14. Sulzberger, "The Newspaper -- Its Making and Its Meaning," op. cit. p. 540.

> concomitant of war; but as long as they cease with the end of the war, the irritations they caused and the excesses to which they led may do as much to strengthen our desire for free sources of information after the controls are removed as they did to bewilder and plague us while they lasted."[15]

It is my purpose in this study to examine the press relations of General MacArthur and his staff from the point of view of the reporter. I will discuss some of the situations where it was claimed by newsmen that MacArthur and his staff failed to make information easily available, that his crippling objection to criticism resulted in the hamstringing of several distinguished journalists, that the news was often too narrowly channelled to the Japanese press, and that the Army service newspaper, the Pacific Stars and Stripes, the only American daily published in Japan, was gradually but completely muzzled.

I had ample personal experience in living under the directives of General MacArthur for two war years as a WAC corporal in his Southwest Pacific Command. Later I worked as a Department of the Army civilian in Japan for the first two years of the Occupation. Part of this time I was editor-in-chief of the Octagram Digest, published

15. Karl E. Mundt, "Government Control of Sources of Information," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, March, 1947, p. 29.

by the Troop Information and Education Section, Eighth Army, and for several months I worked on the staff of the Pacific Stars and Stripes.

Some of the material for this study is from my own personal observation of MacArthur's press relations. Some of the story was filed in news releases from Tokyo. Most of it is, however, the opinions expressed by journalists who have returned to the United States and commented in published articles and in personal interviews. This is their story, told from their point of view.

I should like to express my sincere thanks to Professor James L. McCamy, under whose guidance I have made this study, for his kindly interest and encouragement. He patiently read each page and steered me from many pitfalls. The independence he has allowed me in gathering and presenting this material and his many helpful suggestions have made this a most pleasant task. I also wish to thank John V. Field, of Temple University, for his assistance in helping me compile the background information for my chapter on Pacific Stars and Stripes.

Chapter I

MacArthur and the Inner Circle

General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, is holding one of the world's most important jobs. As representative of the Allied democratic nations, his job is to assure the emergence of a peace-loving and responsible Japan. And for us, with but a handful of aides and a small Army of Occupation, he is the keeper of our Eastern frontier. At seventy years of age, he is performing a gigantic task that would cower most men. His health is good, and we can assume that he will stay in Japan until the peace treaty is signed.

Originally, his task was four-fold. He was to eliminate Japan permanently as a military menace. He was to collect reparations for the nations who suffered from Japan's imperialism. He was to direct the Japanese people towards democratic self-government. And, he was to raise Japan's beaten economy from beggary to self-sufficiency.[1]

These were the original aims of the Occupation as laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945. This document ordered complete demobilization of the Jap-

1. Russell Brines, MacArthur's Japan, J. B. Lippincott Co., New York and Philadelphia, 1948. p. 44.

anese forces, Occupation of the homeland, reduction of Japan's sovereignty to the four main islands, purging of warlords, and the establishment of a new order of "peace, security, and justice." The Japanese government was to "remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people," and establish basic freedoms.

The Allied nations promised to return demobilized Japanese soldiers, guaranteed Japan "such industries as would sustain her economy" but none that would allow military rearmament. For this, "access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted." Foreign trade was promised. War criminals were to be punished, but it was not intended that the Japanese shall be "enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation..."[2]

With the growing social revolution on the mainland of Asia, and with America's foreign policy directed towards the "containment of Communism," there has been a shift in our aims in Japan. Although it was never publicly admitted, the feeling grew that "a friendly, stable, and not-too-weak Japan may hold the most likely promise of being the security bastion in the Far East."[3] Japan was

2. Ibid. p. 45.
3. Newsweek, October 27, 1947, p. 17.

to be brought within the American orbit and was to be transformed from a "beaten, floundering country into a beachhead against Soviet Russia, the last dependable foothold in East Asia."[4]

And so, in addition to the bulwarks set up at Potsdam against a potential Japanese imperialism, there were bulwarks set up against the Marxist tide. These changed the tenor of the Occupation and seemed to create more interest in the Occupation for the military minds. The basic purposes of the Potsdam Declaration decreased in importance, as "headquarters slowed many reforms and apparently scrapped plans for others...."[5]

In carrying out the terms of the Potsdam Declaration the terms of the militarists, who would like to see a solider Japan as a potential ally, MacArthur has thrived on the American tradition which allows a general in the field great latitude in the method and interpretation of his orders. He has swung the Occupation America's way, regarding the Allied powers as mere advisers whose advice he is not obligated to take. He bases this on the key point of the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan", jointly prepared by the State, War, and Navy

4. Brines, MacArthur's Japan, op. cit. p. 70.
5. Ibid. p. 51.

departments, sent to him on August 29, 1945, and approved by the President on September 6. This stipulated:

> "Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied powers, in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern."6 (Italics mine).

The personal authority that he was to exercise was clarified by this same policy statement:

> "1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied powers. You will exercise your authority as you deem proper to carry out your mission. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope.
>
> 2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force. (My italics.)
>
> 3. The statement of intention contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect. It will not be given effect, however, because we consider ourselves bound in a contractual relationship with Japan as a result of that document. It will be respected and given effect because the Potsdam Declaration forms a part of our policy stated in good faith with relations to Japan and with relation to peace and security in the Far East."7

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6. Ibid. p. 46.
7. Chamberlain and Snyder, American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 261-2.

It is hard to realize the vast powers which were granted to the general by this document.

It made him the supreme ruler of the Japanese people, in which capacity, his authority is unlimited. The Emperor and the eighty million Japanese are subject to him. The Japanese government must obey him. He can use the American Army to enforce his orders. Potentially, he is a militant with all the force and authority of an American Caesar.

This document places the responsibility for making all the complex day-to-day decisions of the Occupation on MacArthur. It was set up to be, and for the most part has been, strictly a one-man job.

It was issued, following Army-State department friction concerning Occupation policy, and was meant to reassure MacArthur that his word is the final authority, despite the fact that he has certain directives of the Far Eastern Commission to guide him.[8] The Department of State

8. The Far Eastern Commission is composed of representatives of the 11 countries which were the major Allies in the war against Japan. It meets in Washington and is legally the top policy-making group for the Occupation. However, the predominant position of the United States has been accepted by this body. To act, the votes of the majority of its members, including the US, USSR, United Kingdom, and China, were needed. To prevent this veto power from delaying urgent decisions, the US is authorized to deal with important matters by issuing interim directives. These unilateral direc-

is represented in Japan by a diplomatic mission with merely advisory functions. Ambassadors from other powers do business with MacArthur rather than with the Japanese government.[9]

The Allied Council for Japan, which meets in Tokyo as an advisory body, has offered little valuable assistance.[10]

MacArthur's role, then, is international as well as national. As SCAP, he is theoretically subject to the several Allied governments which form the Far Eastern Commission, but the machinery is set up so that he can control

8. (con'd) tives can not deal with basic changes in the Japanese government. The FEC is to review them and they are valid unless the FEC votes otherwise in regular voting procedure. In this case the US can veto any attempt for action against any of its interim directives.

   For further information on the FEC see Edwin M. Martin, The Allied Occupation of Japan, American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1948, Chapter I.

9. Allen Raymond, "Report From Japan," New York Herald-Tribune, April 16, 1950, p. 10, col. 1.

10. The Allied Council for Japan meets every two weeks in Tokyo to consult and advise MacArthur in advance of important decisions. Membership consists of MacArthur or his Deputy (He has always sent his deputy) as Chairman and US member; A member of the British Commonwealth; a Chinese member; and a USSR member.

    For the story of MacArthur's relegation of the Allied Council to insignificance, see W. MacMahon Ball, Japan, Enemy or Ally?, published under the Joint Auspices of the International Secretariat, the Institute

it on most counts. As an American Army officer, he is supposedly subject to the Department of the Army and to the President, but actually MacArthur has been given the traditional freedom allowed to American generals in the field. In the last analysis, his chain of authority should spring from the American people through the consent of our opinion leaders. But, in reality, I doubt if any of us, as citizens, have had the slightest say-so in the matter.

But there it is. He has supreme powers to act as our delegate in the supervision of the Occupation. All of the important decisions which are still being made are made in his office on the sixth floor of the Dai Ichi Insurance building in Tokyo. And, our only assurance that he is exercising his authority in the best interests of the American public, is a free flow of information from his headquarters.

Here we encounter a vicious circle. For while we rely on press freedom to report misuses of the powers we have given MacArthur, those powers include the right to say who can enter Japan, how long he can stay, and when he must leave. News agencies and newspaper reporters function in Japan only by his license.

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10. (con'd) of Pacific Relations, and the Australian Institute of International Affairs, NY 1949, The John Day Company.

In theory, newsmen can go to Japan upon clearance by the Department of the Army, but, actually, General MacArthur's veto power has prevented accredited correspondents from going there. This was brought to our attention in the recent case of Andrew Roth, Nation's Far Eastern expert, who has been repeatedly denied admission, although he has been cleared by the National Military Establishment. I will discuss this case in greater detail in a later chapter.

And newsmen in Japan have not been allowed to work freely, for MacArthur has little or no use for reporters and hardly ever allows them near the inner sanctum. He is one of the few American high-ranking government administrators who refuses to schedule regular press conferences. He welcomes visiting publishers and editors, but is all but inaccessible to the working reporters.

It wasn't until March 17, 1947, that MacArthur gave his first mass press conference since the early days in Australia.[11] On that rare occasion, he made a brief address at the Tokyo Correspondents Club and answered questions for the reporters. It was one of the few open meetings he has ever held. He sends a monthly report on the

11. Lindesay Parrott, New York Times, March 18, 1947, p. 1. col. 5.

occupation to the Department of the Army in Washington, but this is in the form of a progress report with little or no interpretation. Each year he makes a public speech acclaiming the achievements of that particular year of Occupation, never deviating from the theme that the job is entirely successful.

Newsmen have said that MacArthur hates criticism. He has demonstrated, they say, that in his own mind he is still fighting a military campaign, and the critic, just as in wartime, is unpatriotic and dangerous.

There have been several instances where MacArthur has been so upset about the appearance of magazine articles criticizing certain aspects of the Occupation, that he has felt compelled to sit down and write long personal rebuttals to the editors. A striking example of this occurred when Fortune magazine published an economic report on Japan which blamed SCAP's bureaucratic controls for the stagnation of Japanese industry.[12] General MacArthur wrote a long article explaining his policies and disputing Fortune's charges of failure. In this article he displayed his extreme sensitivity to criticism, and stated that he felt that most critics either do not know the true

12. Fortune, "Two Billion Dollar Failure in Japan," April, 1949, p. 67 ff.

facts or are distorting the facts for political purposes. He begins his article by what he has often said he believes is true -- that reporters in Japan do have full access to the facts and full freedom to criticize. He immediately contradicts this charge by disclaiming the critics and by denying their many charges.

> "The only effective antidote to the American public's traditional neglect of our national interests in the Far East is informed public opinion. Thus I have welcomed the attention of press and periodicals ever since the Occupation of Japan began. All matters not affected by security have been fully disclosed and writers have had every facility to acquaint themselves with the facts. The reports of these observers have been preponderantly favorable but there has, of course, been criticism ranging from mild disapproval to violent attack.
>
> "On examination, the criticism has usually proved to be based on either misinformation as to the facts, or subjective appraisals of the administration of the Occupation as too conservative or too liberal. Much of it has come from Allied interests abroad, fearful of Japanese economic competition; from frustrated men who vainly sought to exploit postwar Japan through a 'carpetbagging' invasion; from apologists for the prewar feudalistic Japan who vainly sought to restore the old order; and from a few disgruntled former Occupation employees. Much of the remaining criticism has come from Communists, following the party purpose to destroy public confidence in the Occupation and to create in Japan conditions of disorder leading ultimately to violence and failure."13

His article gave an over-all picture of postwar Japan. Then, he went on in lengthy detail to list nine "misstate-

13. Douglas MacArthur, "General MacArthur Replies," Fortune, June, 1949, p. 74.

ments" made by the Fortune writers and to list his own answer to each of the nine points.

Fortune editors commented:

"We do not feel that our criticism was motivated by politics of left or right, or by sympathy with frustrated 'carpetbaggers'." They went on to say that they still disagreed with MacArthur on the degree of SCAP's responsibility for Japan's economic recovery, and on the role and needs of private enterprise therein. They pointed out instances where business matters are so cluttered up with bureaucracy that even the act of getting routine permission to go to Japan requires many months.[14]

On another occasion, Helen Mears, who spent four months in Japan as a member of a labor advisory committee, wrote an article for Saturday Evening Post in which she blamed Japan's bankruptcy on the high cost of the Occupation and on SCAP reform programs. She stated that Allied policy destroyed Japan's sources of income, such as foreign trade, overseas enterprises, and services like shipping, etc. This was a very short article, less than a page.[15]

General MacArthur protested in a much longer letter

14. Editor's Comment, Fortune, op. cit. p. 204.
15. Helen Mears, "We're Giving Japan 'Democracy' But She Can't Earn Her Living," Saturday Evening Post, June 18, 1949, p. 12.

than the Post article with a request to the editors that "you give this message equal prominence in an early issue."[16] He says that Miss Mears has no "personal knowledge of Japan's progress during the past few years" and calls her report "fallacious" and "misleading." He points out that Japan is progressing to "complete economic self-sufficiency by 1952" because of "Japanese absorption of liberties." He adds that "it must be a source of deep Communist satisfaction to see...progress in the discharge of American commitments abroad so disparaged."[17]

The editors of the Post backed up Miss Mears' charges and noted: "The Post has published many articles which praised the achievements of the Occupation, but we feel that attention to the deficiencies is also a part of editorial responsibility."[18]

A magazine article by Hallett Abend appeared in Look magazine, charging that MacArthur is misleading us about the extent of Communist infiltration into Japanese labor unions. Abend said that MacArthur has "lulled us into a false sense of security" regarding Communism in Japan. He said further that the facts are kept from the American

16. Douglas MacArthur, Letters to the Editors column, Saturday Evening Post, July 30, 1949, p. 4.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

people by a censorship "as vicious as it is effective, one for which General MacArthur must be held personally accountable."[19]

MacArthur replied in a cablegram to Gardner Cowles, Look editor, that the article was completely unrealistic. Look quoted the General as saying that the article "follows the exact line of false propaganda now being put forth almost daily by Moscow...and is calculated to achieve the same purpose." MacArthur was also quoted as saying Abend had not been to Japan since the war and had no personal knowledge of conditions.[20]

This was MacArthur's comeback, in many instances, -- the critic is unpatriotic, he is playing Russia's game. It seems rather amazing that a man of his strong position would be personally concerned about criticism to such an extent that he sits down and takes time out to draft refutations.

The Men Around MacArthur: "SCAP goats"

The subordinates in MacArthur's empire are military men, mostly wartime friends who have been loyal to him. Sometimes loyalty seems to be their only virtue. They

19. Hallett Abend, "The Strange Case of MacArthur in Japan," op. cit., p. 51.
20. Associated Press, "'False Security' Article Gets Sharp Reply from MacArthur," Baltimore Sun, January 9, 1949, p. 2. col. 3.

are the senior officers of GHQ. They control the information that is channeled from his headquarters, and they try to shield him from criticism. They seem to be running the Occupation as a military conflict with little consideration for the political or economic issues. They know the wartime use of propaganda and they have tended to carry this over into Japan. For them, it is sound policy to play down defeats and difficulties and to exaggerate the successes.

> "...the men around him are constantly aware of what one friend has called MacArthur's 'sincere inability to understand how anyone could possibly disagree with him,' of his loathing of criticism (as powerful and instinctive as that of any prima donna or poet or novelist, reinforced by the steel-and-concrete prejudice of the brass-hat mind), of the deep hurt he sustains from any public suggestion that a MacArthur success might be only partial and not triumphantly complete. With their eyes on their numbers, in the immemorial way of the Army, these men have invariably acted to 'protect' their chief from the slings and arrows of a possibly outrageous press. The battlefield virtues of command, discipline, and death-defying conviction of righteousness are not easily adjustable to even a semicivilian society, and in the civil-military superstate of SCAP there has been no visible effort to adjust them. The unwritten order of the day, from the very beginning, has been that MacArthur's administration of our mission in Japan was an unqualified success; facts indicating something less than that were to remain hidden, if possible, and if some diligent reporter did dig them up and use them there being no censorship of outgoing dispatches, he was to find his way made difficult by colonels and generals and department heads and clerks retreating behind a blank wall of fictional ignorance or 'military

security.'"[21]

It is only natural that the top men of the Occupation fight loyally for MacArthur, as their own destiny is welded with his. Because their own success depends on his, they, likewise, are sensitive to criticism.

There seem to be about a dozen men around MacArthur, who wield great influence and who help form the high strategy. They are often called "the Bataan boys" or the "Inner Circle."

> "...Incompetence here is relatively rare. Most of the men are shrewd, hard working, and ruthless. What sins are found here are the typical sins of military minds, dedicated to the ideas of order and discipline, accustomed to the use of force as the answer to difficult problems, and -- with exceptions -- unendowed with the talent of statesmanship. There are in the Inner Circle men who had been civilians before the war. They, too, through the process of assimilation, have acquired the military mind."[22]

This elaborate super-government which runs Japan is nothing less than a military hierarchy with MacArthur on the top and the senior SCAP officers next in line. An Army organization by its nature is not adapted to democratic procedures. It seeks to eliminate the very atmosphere which fosters democracy -- the independence, the freedom of inquiry and discussion, individualism,

21. James, "Generals' General." op. cit. p. 64.
22. Mark Gagn, Japan Diary, William Sloane Associates, New York City, N. Y., 1948, p. 342.

and the equality of peoples. No wonder the press has run into difficulties in working with this clique.

These loyal old friends of MacArthur not only try to prevent the press from finding out about certain of MacArthur's failures; they also try to shield him from unpleasant news, "even going so far as to cull his mail from the Japanese to take out anything that might disturb him."[23]

Surrounding the base of MacArthur's pedestal, there is the all-important quartet, General Mueller, Chief of Staff, General Marquat, Chief of the Economic and Scientific Section, General Willoughby, Chief of Intelligence (G-2), and General Whitney, Chief of the Government Section. Upon this quartet MacArthur depends for counsel to some degree. They are his loyal wartime friends who brilliantly enacted their part in the military mission. Does this mean that their backgrounds qualify them for the top administrative jobs in the Occupation?

Major General Paul J. Mueller is a professional soldier, a veteran of the two World Wars. A native of Union, Missouri, he is a West Point graduate, and was decorated for bravery in France in the first World War.

23. Joseph Fromm, "MacArthur, Fact and Legend", US News and World Report, April 16, 1948p. 13.

He went overseas in 1943 as commander of the 81st Infantry Division, serving first in the Southwest Pacific area. He was not named Chief of Staff until May 3, 1946 when he succeeded Major General R. J. Marshall, who left Tokyo to become head of Virginia Military Institute.[24]

General Marquat is probably the best-liked by the correspondents. He has freely admitted his lack of qualifications for his post and has been willing to accept advice.

> "General Marquat once ran an automobile page on a West Coast daily, and still likes to remind listeners that he is a newspaperman. During the war he became chief of General MacArthur's anti-aircraft artillery. This is why men, mindful of his past qualifications, could not quite understand why he was appointed Chief of the Economic and Scientific Section, and thus granted powers roughly combining those of the U. S. Secretaries of Treasury, Commerce and Labor, Director of the Budget, and Chairman of the Federal Reserve System. It was then that official Tokyo originated the cruel, and totally unjustified, quip of 'MacArthur's worst mistake.' General MacArthur made no mistake in selecting Marquat for the post. He wanted a loyal military man at the head of the mass of suspicious civilian experts in a key section, and he picked Marquat. The latter candidly admitted his inadequacies and readily took the advice of his experts. He carried with him, to the most crucial financial conferences, a leather cavalry whip, with which he marked the emphases. He floundered in a sea of technical detail. He made a mess of his brief chairmanship of the Allied Council by behaving like a drill sergeant. But he fulfilled the mission assigned

24. Associated Press, "New M'Arthur Aide Named," New York Times, May 3, 1946, p. 8, col. 5.

> to him by General MacArthur. And he remained the most likable of the men of the Inner Circle. He did not pretend to be what he obviously could not be, and he had a rough sense of humor."25

Like the others in the quartet, Marquat has behind him a long military record and has been well-decorated with honors for past service. The Army Register carries this information about him:

> "Marquat, William Frederic, 06533, Born Missouri, 17 March, 1894, Army Washington, Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, (Oak Leaf Cluster), Silver Star, Legion of Merit, Air Medal, Graduate Command and General Staff School, 1933, Corps of Artillery School, Battery Officer Course, 1926, 2nd Lieutenant Coast Artillery Corps, National Guard, 27 October 1916, to Captain Coast Artillery Corps, USA, 17th October 1918. Honorable discharge 16th July 1919, Colonel of the Army of the United States, 19th October 1941, Major General Army of the United States, 24th January 1948, Regular Army 11th Coast Artillery Corps, 18th September 20, to Brigadier General 24th Jan. 1948."

General Willoughby, who had been MacArthur's intelligence officer since Bataan, now has the task of watching Japanese public opinion, the Japanese press, the security of the Occupation, the police, ultra-nationalists, and foreign agents. His background for this tremendous assignment is listed in the army register:

> "Charles Andrew Willoughby, 04615, born Germany, March 8, 1892. A-Pa. Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit, Equivalent National War College, Graduate, Army War College, 1936, Command and Gen-

25. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 341.

eral Staff School, 1931, Infantry School Advanced Course, 1929, B.A. Pa. College, 1914. Enlisted Oct. 10, 1910 to Oct. 9, 1913, Capt. Infantry Section Organized Reserve Corps, 20th Nov. 1916 to Major General Army of the United States, 12th April 1945; to Brigadier General, 1 June 1946; to Major General Army of the United States, 24th January 1948, Regular Army 21st Infantry 1 Dec. 1916; to Brigadier General 24th January 1948."

There are similar paragraphs on each of the key SCAP officers. They have all had brilliant military careers and have been decorated with all the honors possible.

Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, the Head of the Government Section, is extraordinarily sensitive to any inquiries which seemed to demand a precise and objective reply. He showed this very clearly when, in reply to the first question asked by a member of the Allied Council, he reminded Council members that "they had not been brought to Japan to pry into the Supreme Commander's armor."[26]

MacArthur's own personal welcome to the Council at its opening meeting was a warning against "sharp and ill-conceived criticism of our Occupation policies," and, he reminded Council members that there were evil forces seeking to sabotage the Occupation.[27] Whitney was a former Manila lawyer and somewhat of an actor. At this meeting

26. Ball, Japan - Enemy or Ally?, op. cit. p. 18.
27. Ibid. p. 24.

he spoke in an old-fashioned filibuster for hours in order to forestall the criticism of the other members that the Japanese were not complying with the purge directives.

> "...He listed the organizations purged. He read an entire three-month-old 10,000-word directive, already familiar to everyone in the room. Occasionally he stumbled over Japanese names, and reread the passage, or, with exaggerated courtesy, he asked the Council if it wanted the names of the subversive Japanese organizations in Japanese as well as in English, or if it desired any other information. It was, I suppose no worse than some filibusters carried on in Congress. But to us, in this international gathering in which we wanted to take pride in the United States, it was a juvenile, small-time performance. It made us feel as if we were slowly shriveling with shame for an American general....
>
> ...General Marquat ruled that it would be unfair to stop General Whitney, who had put so much time into the preparation of the report. Whitney, he said, had come in good faith. Moreover, since General MacArthur was challenged, it was 'not within the prerogatives of the Council to interrupt a representative of the Supreme Commander.'"28

In later sessions of the Council, General Whitney took his place at the side of the late George Atcheson, our former diplomatic representative in the group, and whispered instructions to him at such a rate that he disturbed the other members.[29] Later, when it was apparent that the United States did not want to cooperate with the Council and that it was relegated to an insignificant place in the shaping of policy, Whitney stopped attending

28. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 181.
29. Ibid. p. 210.

the meetings.

Whitney, like Willoughby, has sharply defined ideas on how the Occupation should be run, and both of them fight hard to sway General MacArthur's thinking. Though they are both conservative, Whitney is a little more liberal. They both believe in the defeat of Russian communism, but Willoughby believes in suppression and in drastic surgery, while Whitney feels that small reforms might win more allies than displays of force. Each hates the other.[30]

> "...The common denominator for the men of the Inner Circle is devotion to the Chief. Those who lack the full measure of loyalty have long been dropped by the wayside. It is this devotion, to a degree, that impels many of them to fight each other for the privilege of being closest to the Chief."31

> "...Possibly as a result of this rivalry, the composition of the Inner Circle fluctuates. In the first six weeks of the Occupation, two top men in Headquarters were Colonel Sydney F. Mashbir and Brigadier General Bonner Fellers. One of General MacArthur's key Intelligence officers through the war, Mashbir was constantly by the Chief's side. But he made some awkward statements, the correspondents pounced on them, and since adverse publicity is one of the cardinal sins in this theater, Mashbir quickly vanished from the scene. Fellers lasted a little longer, but he also could not survive his feuds."32

Fellers is an example of MacArthur ordering his aides

30. Ibid. p. 341.
31. Ibid. p. 342.
32. Ibid. p. 343.

not to express views which are not in keeping with the overall success picture of the Occupation. If any of the Bataan boys could be described as a political analyst, Fellers came closest, and it was thought by many correspondents that Fellers' views had some influence on MacArthur's thought patterns. But he refused to speak readily on political topics after MacArthur told him to "keep his mouth shut."[33]

Fellers was the first to admit to the correspondents that MacArthur's subordinates are instructed not to talk about his policies. Some subordinates who have talked to the press have been disciplined.[34] This situation has made it difficult for the reporters to establish satisfactory working relationships with the various SCAP offices, for their bosses are as inaccessible to the press as MacArthur himself.

The subordinates who have survived the discipline, the rivalry, and the feuds have fitted in to the well-oiled machinery of MacArthur's administration. Their personal devotion to him borders on fanaticism, and they view any criticism of him as a "kick at the ark of the covenant." Their loyalty adds to the efficiency of the

33. Ibid. p. 343.
34. Raymond, "Report From Japan," op. cit., p. 10. col. 2.

Occupation, and, since the disloyal have been allowed to go home, those who remain carry orders out smoothly, and keep objections to a minimum. Those who raised ideas which vary from MacArthur's were shifted to unimportant posts. They left for many reasons, some because they were not promoted, some because they felt they could not do an honest job, and some because they were demoted in rank.[35]

> "...During the first half-year of the Occupation, the Civil Information and Education Section was ably guided by Brigadier General Ken R. Dyke, a well-educated advertising and radio executive. This section, located in the Radio Tokyo building, a few blocks from SCAP, handles the Japanese press, radio, and movies, as well as schools, arts and religions.
>
> When Dyke returned home to become a vice-president of the National Broadcasting Company, the Bataan crowd was glad to see him go. Dyke's insistence that left-wing publications should have the same claim to news and newsprint sources as the more conservative press, made him a radical in the eyes of MacArthur's men. The chief of another section let it be known around headquarters that Dyke was considered 'pink' and that his staff had been infiltrated by Reds. As soon as Dyke was succeeded by one of his former assistants, Marine Lieutenant Donald R. Nugent, the section was purged of many liberals as well as any real Reds who may have been around. Nugent carries out orders brilliantly, rarely suggests or irritates.
>
> At least a half dozen other important and able officers have been weeded out or allowed to go home. MacArthur now has his machine so well-oiled and so

35. Richard Lauterbach, Danger From The East, Harper and Brothers, New York and London, 1947, p. 61.

> well-meshed that the visiting publisher, congressman, educator or clergyman cannot but be impressed by the smooth efficiency which unanimity often brings. To say that SCAP officials are all 'yes men' would be an exaggeration. But none of them have the temerity to argue very long with MacArthur on a major issue. He does not like disagreement. When an important decision must be made he will ask a section chief to submit one or more opinions. On occasion MacArthur has called in the officers who have prepared briefs with opposing viewpoints. After listening to them he makes the final decision. This kind of teamwork keeps everybody happy except perhaps the man who has drafted a directive which is issued in MacArthur's name. However, no one has to quarrel with The Boss, and subordinates optimistically feel that by weighting the briefs in favor of what they feel to be right, MacArthur can be influenced."36

It is impossible to actually measure the influence Mac Arthur's Inner Circle men have on him. It is true that his staff takes unusual precautions to avoid irritating him. It is true, also, that he must depend a great deal on this staff, for he, himself, never travels around Japan, sees only the little part of Tokyo when he rides from work to his apartment in the American Embassy, and has left the country only once -- to attend the Philippine independence ceremonies. He seldom sees any of the Japanese, as he only grants interviews to prime ministers and the Emperor at wide intervals. Therefore, for actual facts and figures on the many Occupation matters he depends on what his staff reports to him or what he reads in the newspapers.

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36. Ibid. p. 62.

In staff reports, "considerable editing makes them conform to the view of affairs the general already has made clear was his."[37]

> "...Officials were constantly on call. Some had 'back door' access to his office, like Brigadier General Courtney Whitney. ...But no man was so intimate that he could be considered predominantly influential. Power lay more in the selection of matters brought to MacArthur's personal attention, a function of the generals in the chief of staff section."38

But many of the men had strong political ambitions and strong personal desires which crept into their attempts to influence the Chief. It was his staff who advised him to announce his availability for the presidential candidacy in 1948. Staff members had seen him in a greater role on a greater stage with themselves as the supporting cast. The possibility of MacArthur for president had been discussed during the war and in previous election years.

> "...One of the choicest Inner Circle secrets, whispered about but never as yet published, is the story of how General MacArthur might have missed the climax to his career, the Occupation of Japan.
>
> In the last stages of the battle for Europe in 1944, the general's advisers began to feel that the time had come to move on to a larger stage. It was felt that the transfer of men and supplies to the Pacific theater would take many months. These would be months of enforced and unwelcome obscurity for the general.
>
> "Instead of waiting, the advisers felt, the

37. Brines, MacArthur's Japan, op. cit. p. 63.
38. Ibid. p. 63.

> general should seek wider responsibilities elsewhere. They wanted to see him as a U. S. spokesman in liberated Europe, an impregnable rock against foreign intrigue, a match for a Churchill or a Stalin. Enthralled by this vision, the advisers urged General MacArthur to announce that he had brought his mission to a successful end with the recapture of Corregidor and Bataan, and proclaim his availability for a new assignment.
>
> "General MacArthur did not take the advice. Perhaps he felt that his mission would not be complete until he entered Tokyo. Possibly he was not certain that once he gave up the job in the Pacific, jealous Washington would give him a top assignment elsewhere..."39

It is interesting to imagine just what recent history might have been had MacArthur taken the advice of his subordinates and asked to speak for us in Europe. It is no doubt true that they have had political ambitions and that they have functioned as a tight, little machine with a "favorite son" and with "intimate bonds with the solid, conservative, isolationist core of the Republican party."[40]

> "...In this union, the key role has belonged to Fellers, a friend of Herbert Hoover and General R. E. Wood, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Sears, Roebuck and former head of America First. Another important figure in Headquarters has been J. Woodall Greene, now with the Civil Information and Education Section. Greene is a retired millionaire, a former Republican National Committeeman, and a friend of Colonel Robert McCormick, of the Chicago Tribune. During the war, Greene requested duty with General MacArthur in Australia. According to shop talk in Headquarters, one of

39. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 344.
40. Ibid. p. 345.

Greene's tasks was to sound out General MacArthur on running in the presidential elections.

> "In 1944, some of General MacArthur's aides met in a secret conference in Brisbane to discuss the general's chances in the election. Among those present were Philip LaFollette, then on MacArthur's staff, and General Willoughby, himself an ardent Republican. The decision, of course, was against entering the election. It was realized that President Roosevelt was a tough man to beat. General MacArthur also wanted to complete his mission in the Pacific..."41

Colonel Philip LaFollette, former governor of Wisconsin, was the executive officer in MacArthur's Public Relations Office. When his request to go home at the end of the war was granted, MacArthur had him decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross and the Legion of Merit in recognition of his services.

The men around MacArthur have encouraged him to dally with the Hearst-McCormick-Patterson publishers and other hate-Roosevelt politicians who were looking so desperately for a hero-candidate to build up for elections.[42]

The stories of MacArthur's troubles with the press during the war are well-known. It was generally agreed among correspondents that he purposely issued misleading press releases, described by Weldon James as "the most optimistically inaccurate communiques produced by any

41. Ibid. p. 345.
42. James, "Generals' General", op. cit. p. 60.

general in any theater of the war."[43]

Allen Raymond of the New York Herald-Tribune recalls interviewing MacArthur in Australia, and says the Commander told him, "We will issue misleading communiques, and we shall expect your cooperation."[44] Raymond told New Yorkers after the war, "It disturbed me and gave me pause to be asked to deliberately mislead readers, although there seemed to be justification for a little of that in wartime."[45]

> "...The communiques kept up the myth of small casualties, they kept MacArthur's name in the papers, they kept the censors busy cutting out any references which reflected on the verity of MacArthur's releases or his generalship."46

The anecdotes about the communiques are legend. The GIs discussed them long after the candles went out in the tents, and they still are recited and embellished at reunions of the Pacific veterans. They were subject to some of the most biting wise-cracks the GIs could invent. There is one soldier poem that seemed to state the problem well:

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43. Ibid. p. 59.
44. Editor and Publisher, "MacArthur's Press Relations Deplored," April 1, 1950, p. 15, col. 1.
45. Ibid. p. 15.
46. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 48.

Doug's Communique[47]

For two long years, since blood and tears have been
so very rife,
Confusion in our war years, burdens more a soldier's
life.
But from this chaos, daily, like a hospice on the
way,
Like a shining light to guide us, rises Doug's com-
munique...

Here too is told the saga bold of virile deathless
youth
In stories seldom tarnished with the plain unvar-
ished truth;
It's quite a rag, it waves the flag, its motif is
the fray,
And modesty is plain to see, in Doug's communique.

He used to say, "And with God's help," but lately
it has seemed
That his patience is exhausted and God's on his
second team.
The Cabots and the Lodges, too, have long since
ceased to pray
They'll ever squeeze a by-line in Doug's communique.

And while possibly a rumor now, some day 'twill be
a fact
That the Lord will hear a deep voice say, "Move
over God, it's Mac!"
So bet your shoes that all the news that last great
Judgment Day
Will go to press in nothing less than Doug's com-
munique.

The misleading communiques, the claiming of victories before they were complete, the great push of the name "MacArthur" -- all these added up to a policy which reflected the idea prevailing in the Pacific at that time:

47. Austin E. Fife, ed. Anthology of Folk Literature of Soldiers of the Pacific Theater, Los Angeles, Cal., July, 1947.

that MacArthur was fighting the war on two fronts. On one of them, MacArthur was battling the Japanese. On the other, were his "enemies" in Washington who were deliberately trying to keep him from getting the Pacific war underway. It was felt that Washington was purposely keeping supplies from him. Public Relations Officers cooperated with him in every way to protect him against his enemies in the Pentagon. They, too, had fallen into this type of reasoning during the Bataan days when MacArthur's men were overwhelmed by the Japanese. They felt they were left alone, deserted by Washington. Consequently, they developed a persecution complex, and with it a determination that nothing should be written or broadcast from the Pacific that would in any way injure MacArthur.[48]

By suppressing all news unfavorable to MacArthur, they could keep Washington from getting ammunition to use against him. And, at the same time, they kept from MacArthur "any disturbing stories about the 'other side's foul tactics. To this end, MacArthur's aides and public relations officers carefully combed his incoming mail and destroyed letters or newspaper clippings that would have upset the Supreme Commander."[49] They managed somehow, as

48. Clark Lee, One Last Look Around, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, New York, N. Y. 1947. p. 139.
49. Ibid. p. 139.

part of this strategy, to keep the lights of all others beneath the bushel and reserved the spotlight for him alone. There were many brilliant militarists who led our troops on to victory in the Pacific, but few of their names will ever make history. It was MacArthur and he alone who got the credit.

Brigadier Legrande A. Diller was MacArthur's Public Relations chief from the Bataan days until the early days of the Occupation of Japan, and as such, was head of the self-constituted "Protect the Chief" Society.

> "...He was a slight, nervous West Pointer who started the war as a major and ended it as a brigadier general in command of a strangely assorted Army consisting of some communications officers and equipment, a couple of cooks, a few jeep drivers, a handful of censors and several score hard-to-handle correspondents who were dependent on Diller's organization for transportation, food, lodging, and communications facilities, and to a great extent for news -- inasmuch as the independent gathering of news was not encouraged in MacArthur's area where it was preferred that reporters get their 'facts' through official channels and communiques. That Diller should undergo rapid promotions to general was accepted as natural by those who know that MacArthur always rewards those who are loyal to him."50

Relations between Diller and the newsmen were not always cordial. It was widely believed that he didn't think newsmen had any business around a war. Clark Lee, veteran reporter, has this to say about him:

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50. Ibid. p. 138.

> "I myself had the opportunity to see censorship at work in all theaters of the war, and, having been under Diller's control at both the beginning and end of hostilities, I feel competent to pronounce his censorship the worst that existed anywhere. It was a perfect example of what Fletcher Pratt has called the 'technique of suppressing any facts but those they (the censors) want people to believe."

Diller, like many of the other MacArthur aides, was convinced that the enemies in the Pentagon were holding up Pacific supplies because President Roosevelt feared MacArthur as a rival for the White House. Because of this, Diller put Roosevelt on the list of "enemies", while, on the other hand, "correspondents from the anti-New Deal papers became the fair-haired boys at press headquarters. The New York Daily News and the Chicago Tribune were furnished many newsbreaks by Diller and became mouthpieces in the campaign to get more material for the Pacific."[51]

As stated above, certain of MacArthur's aides and perhaps he himself had dreams of a White House assignment. Rumors of this must have reached Washington, but whether or not Roosevelt or his staff had any fears would be hard to prove. It also would be impossible to find any evidence to prove that because of these political fears Roosevelt decided to fight the war in Europe first

51. Ibid. p. 142.

and withhold supplies from Mac Arthur. However, Diller seemed to be convinced that this was the case and governed his releases to Washington accordingly. It was also believed in the Pacific that when General Pat Hurley was suddenly recalled from Australia it was because Washington wanted him as far away from MacArthur as possible, because he might make a good running mate for MacArthur on the Republican ticket.[52] Likewise, the addition of Colonel Philip LaFollette to the Pacific staff was considered to have caused some worry in Washington.[53]

It was Diller, who at the broadcast of the landings in the Philippines, was able to rule off the air the recorded speech of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid with the proclamation that "nothing shall be said or done this day to detract from the personal publicity or glorification of the Commander-in-Chief."[54]

And, when the final jump to Japan had been made, General Diller said to his staff, "Thank you for helping me attain my goal of seeing that General MacArthur got credit for everything in the Pacific and making sure that he was appointed Supreme Commander."[55] As reward for their

52. Ibid. p. 142.
53. Ibid. p. 142.
54. James, "Generals' General" op. cit. p. 60.
55. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 48.

services, 37 of MacArthur's 40 censors and Public Relations men received decorations.[56]

In Situation in Asia, Lattimore analyzes MacArthur's relationship to his staff officers, and concludes that although he is a "general of genius, an extremely capable administrator, a great statesman, his one great weakness, which has prevented him from realizing his full potential as a statesman, is his inability to keep sychophants out of his entourage."[57]

MacArthur backs them up as loyally and as uncritically as they back him. They are outstanding militarists, whose qualifications are not their specialized knowledge of their fields but rather their attunement to the Chief's mind and methods. They are politically ambitious, reluctant to discuss, even off the record, the policies and plans of the Occupation. But, because they hold the key positions in the Occupation, our correspondents must go to them for news, in order to tell us, as well as possible, the story of what is happening over there -- a story which should be of tremendous importance to each of us as Americans.

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56. Ibid. p. 48.
57. Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, an Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, Mass. 1949. p. 109.

Chapter II

Occupation Begins Under Wartime Censorship

It was not until October 6, 1945, almost two months after the fighting stopped, that General MacArthur terminated censorship of news dispatches from his command.

During the intervening weeks the reporters "chafed under a censorship which they said grew tighter and tighter in regard to criticism of Occupation policies."[1]

When the ban was lifted, they spoke out loudly about the censorship. While most of them had accepted and cooperated with the security codes of the war, they felt that MacArthur had gone far beyond his legal powers in controlling their reporting.

Frank Kelley, usually placid New York Herald-Tribune veteran of both the European and Pacific wars, called the wartime censorship "one of the most disgraceful episodes of the war. Correspondents ...(have) been subjected to autocratic control, insults, arrogance, and old-fashioned stupidity."[2]

Kelley said that in the Pacific MacArthur's com-

1. Theodore F. Koop, Weapon of Silence, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 1946, p. 271.
2. Newsweek, "No Censors, Less News," Oct. 22, 1945. p. 94.

muniques had announced the capture of Manila and Clark Field days ahead of time. The Censorship rule, he said, was: "You cannot contradict the official communique."[3] On Leyte, General Diller and his assistants had called correspondents "shoe clerks," "two-bit palookas," and "sports writers."[4]

Kelley also quotes General Diller as reminding the newsmen, "Don't forget the Army controls the food here."[5]

Harold Isaacs, Newsweek correspondent, who reported from the China-Burma-India theater before going to Tokyo, told how one of his dispatches had been censored because of "implied criticism." This paragraph was deleted out of his story on the Hirohito-MacArthur rendevous:

> "POLICY OF ULTRASCRUPULOUS REGARD FOR SENSIBILITIES AND INVIOLABILITIES OF EMPEROR IN THIS INSTANCE APPARENTLY OUTWEIGHED EVEN MACARTHUR'S ACUTE SENSE FOR HAM DRAMATICS STOP JAPANESE AREN'T ONLY ONES WITH PECULIAR IDEA DIVINITY."[6]

Isaacs commented on the deletion:

> "This is my first encounter with this type of censorship but the boys tell me it's been going on for years. I am a little flabbergasted myself with the deliberateness of it."[7]

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3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Newsweek, "No Censors, Less News," op. cit. p. 94.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

William McGaffin, of the Chicago Daily News, who had also seen the European war as a reporter for the Associated Press, calls it: "One of the most unreasonable and dictatorial censorships...in any theater...not barring even Russia."[8]

Allen Raymond, veteran reporter for the New York Herald-Tribune, said:

> "Covering MacArthur is the same as covering Tito, Franco and Mussolini. You just hope for a breath of fresh air and when you get out you hope to tell all you can.
>
> "...I had served a few years trying to cover Mussolini and Franco and also had been around in the country of Tito, so I thought I was prepared. I found it relatively easy to send copy about alien dictators but relatively difficult to discuss with good temper and sane judgment one of your own."[9]

Clark Lee, who had also covered the European war and the Pacific theater, made similar strong statements:

> "...I have never heard a Public Relations Officer express the thought that the public had any vested interest in the news of the war. From the military standpoint, MacArthur's censorship was notably more liberal than that in most other theaters; units in combat could be named and other morale-building information published. But above and beyond strictly military censorship, there was one principle that guided MacArthur's Public Relations Officers from the early days of the war to Tokyo.
>
> "This principle was expressed in three words words which had a potent effect on American public

8. Ibid.
9. Editor and Publisher, "MacArthur's Press Relations Deplored," April 1, 1950, p. 15.

opinion throughout the war. The words were: 'Protect the general!'"10

Before the official censorship ended, all reporters were "war correspondents." As part of the Army Press Corps, they wore Army uniforms, lived in "press camps," used Army transportation and communication facilities, and were subject to Army censorship.

Three hundred and fifteen correspondents and photographers, representing more than a dozen Allied nations as well as Japan, were invited to "cover" the Imperial Surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945. It was a great moment in history for the United States, and especially for General MacArthur who signed the formal document. A triumphant day -- and all the world was to know about it.

But on the first official day of Occupation, September 3, when the First Cavalry Division's troops marched into Tokyo, it seemed that the press was no longer welcome. A mesh of red tape engulfed the city and frustrated the reporters at every turn.

"... Orders were repeated and enforced for the withdrawal of all correspondents from the capital...

"When a correspondent asked the reason for this step, a spokesman for General MacArthur replied,

10. Clark Lee, One Last Look Around, op. cit. p. 138.

'It is not American policy for correspondents to spearhead the Occupation.'"11

Tokyo, supposedly, was "off limits" for the first several days after the initial landings in August. MacArthur and his headquarters' officials were quartered in the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama, about twenty miles from Tokyo. But correspondents, cameramen, sightseeing GIs, and officers who could wangle some kind of official excuse to go, had moved into Tokyo in great numbers. Newsmen had rented rooms in some of the hotels.

On September 3, the Army billeting officers came into the city, looked over the hotels that the newsmen had found, claimed them for First Cavalry and GHQ officers, and ousted the correspondents at a moment's notice. Newsmen were told that eventually a hotel would be assigned to them, and meanwhile, since they had no official quarters, they were not allowed within a one-mile limit of the city.

Military police were stationed on the highways leading into Tokyo and at the railroad terminals, in order to turn back all persons in uniform, because they presumably had no billets. No one was allowed to enter unless he was officially assigned by Army traveling orders. The American newsmen, as part of the Army Press Corps,

11. New York Times, "Allied Reporters In Tokyo Ousted," September 6, 1945, p. 4, col. 4.

were still in uniform, and, therefore were not granted admission even for a few hours. Ironically enough, some reporters from other Allied nations, who happened to be dressed in civilian clothes, were permitted to enter and to travel about freely.

Some reporters managed, somehow, to get around the red tape. Others waited on the outskirts of the city for "handouts" from the Japanese news agency. The frustrated ones returned to Yokohama and filed complaints to their editors.

The New York Times of September 6 carried this account:

> "...News from Japan's capital and news center is now being filed abroad entirely by the Japanese news agency Domei.
>
> "...The Allied press is completely at the mercy of the Japanese Press and Information Board, their translation services and their mimeographed handouts.
>
> "Few Allied newsmen can read Japanese, and they now are reading Domei's translations of well-selected excerpts from the Tokyo press. Several commercial translation enterprises also have sprung up, but in no case is there an opportunity for Allied reporters to thoroughly cover developments and trends in this critical period of the Occupation.
>
> "What can happen in such a case was illustrated graphically when correspondents heard a speech in the Diet by Minoru Togo, a member of the House of Representatives, in which his blunt statement about Japan's reaction was hurriedly toned down, after first having been released to the press.
>
> "Forced to remain in Yokohama, correspondents belatedly receive handouts of translations from the Japanese press that are carefully edited and selected

with a view to upholding the official Japanese line that 'We were defeated but we hope the Americans will be as good winners as we are losers.'

"From time to time, the propaganda also stresses the view that Emperor Hirohito's 'benevolence,' rather than crushing Allied military superiority, ended the war and that Americans now occupy Japanese soil as guests of the gracious Japanese.

"The Board of Information undoubtedly approves the restrictions placed on correspondents ever since the initial landing.

"As long as they remain outside the main current of Japanese policies, Allied newsmen are unable to cover a story that will have far-reaching implications in the establishing and maintenance of peace in the Orient. Although General MacArthur stipulated that Japanese coverage should be confined to domestic purposes, the Domei radio has continued filing abroad and that is the medium through which the world is receiving coverage of this story."12

This situation was rectified, however, in a few days. The Army housing authorities assigned a certain number of rooms in the Dai Iti Hotel to the correspondents and they were permitted to move, legally, into town.

The Public Relations Office, under the direction of General LeGrande Diller, was located in Radio Tokyo on the main street, -- a huge, modern, concrete building, camouflaged in wartime black. One of the spacious rooms with several partitions was turned into a news workshop.

William McGaffin cites the inhuman treatment of the press at the Hirohito-MacArthur meeting, when Brigadier

12. Ibid.

General Diller told reporters that "We are going to get tougher. We are not going to let you give MacArthur's critics in the States any ammunition."[13]

On that memorable day in Japan's new history, the Emperor paid his visit to General MacArthur at the American Embassy. It was an important day for Americans, too, in our role as inexperienced Conqueror. But the correspondents were not allowed to attend the meeting, and so we never got a description of the event. Reporters were kept at a distance by guards with bayonets. The Public Relations Officer, General Diller, held a press conference simultaneously to issue an official statement about the meeting, so that reporters who wanted to get any news out that day were compelled to go to General Diller's office rather than do an eye-witness story of the historical event. Natually, all mention of the guards and the bayonets was censored out of the dispatches filed to the States.

> "Their (newsmen) irritation reached a climax on the day when Emperor Hirohito called on General MacArthur. American troops with bayonets formed a guard around the Embassy that kept reporters at a distance. And at the same hour Brigadier General LeGrande A. Diller, MacArthur's Public Relations Officer, held a press conference at which he issued a brief statement about the Emperor's call.

13. Newsweek, "No Censors, Less News," op. cit. p. 94.

"But the correspondents were not permitted at the time to write about the guards with bayonets. They complained to General Diller and asked why such details had been stopped. In the stories which they filed after censorship ended, they quoted the General as replying:

"Call it whimsy if you like."[14]

14. Koop, Weapon of Silence, op. cit. p. 271.

Chapter III

Unofficial Censorship Sets In

On October 6, 1945, General MacArthur issued a statement that censorship was automatically lifted for the Allied correspondents in Japan, but that the War Department permitted him, as SCAP, to continue whatever censorship was necessary for carrying out the objectives of his mission. He explained that this would apply only to the Japanese press, but that "American correspondents would be held responsible for sending 'doubtful material' to their newspapers."[1]

No sooner had the reporters started to breathe a sigh of relief, when a drastic decree was issued to them by the Public Relations Office, which seemed to be designed to establish a control over them in place of the officially abolished censorship.

It came in the form of a directive which, first of all, discharged the "war correspondents" from the Army and placed them on civilian status, then, shockingly enough, set up a very rigid quota system establishing the number of correspondents who would be permitted to remain in the Pacific area.

1. New York Times, Oct. 7, 1945, p. 29, col. 5.

The order stated that, effective October 27, the following quotas would be allotted:

"The Associated Press, the United Press, and the International News Service, five correspondents each in Japan, three in Manila, and one in Korea.
The British News Agency, Reuter, four in Japan, none in the Philippines, and none in Korea.
The New York Times, three in Japan, one in Manila, and none in Korea.
The New York Herald-Tribune, two in Japan, one in the Philippines, and none in Korea.
The New York Daily News and the Chicago Tribune in combination, three men in Japan, one in Manila, and none in Korea.
The Chicago Sun, two in Japan, one in the Philippines, and none in Korea.
The Chicago Daily News, two in Japan, one in the Philippines, and none in Korea.
The Christian Science Monitor, two in Japan, one in the Philippines, and none in Korea."2

"Other allotments were:

The National Broadcasting Company, the Columbia Broadcasting Company, and the American Broadcasting Company, and the Mutual Broadcasting System were allotted two correspondents each in Japan and one each in the Philippines. The Australian Broadcasting Company was allotted one correspondent for Japan and one for the Philippines. The British Broadcasting Company was allotted two correspondents in Japan.

"Still Photographers -- the Associated Press, Acme, and International News Photos, two each in the Philippines and Japan; Life Magazine, Australian Department of Information, one in Japan.

"Magazines -- American specials, six in Japan and six in the Philippines, all on a rotation basis.

"A Newsreel picture pool was allowed two photographers

2. New York Times, "M'Arthur Sets Up Quota For Press", October 13, 1945, p. 4, col. 5.

in Japan and one in the Philippines.

"News Magazines -- Time, two in Japan and one in the Philippines; Life, one in Japan; Newsweek, two in Japan and one in the Philippines."[3]

This is a total of 15 American writers from news agencies, 14 from independent papers, and a few photographers to tell the story of the Occupation of Japan to the Americans back home. It meant a cut of about one-third of the correspondents in Tokyo. At that time there were 102 correspondents assigned to Tokyo, of whom 75 were Americans. The new quota totalled 76 Allied reporters. The news agencies were hardest hit. Associated Press was to lose three men and the United Press bureau would be cut from twenty to eight. Only the six largest newspapers were to be allowed to be represented, and correspondents from other papers, such as the Baltimore Sun, who were already in Tokyo, were to be deported. The directive did not set up any procedure for publications which might later wish to send reporters to Japan.[4]

Of the five British newspapers represented in Tokyo, only two were to be allowed to continue. The reporters met at the British embassy to protest the order and to ask their authorities to give whatever assistance was

3. Associated Press, New York Times, October 13, 1945, p. 4, col. 6.
4. New York Times, "Newsmen in Tokyo Await Word On Cut," Oct. 14, 1945, p. 4, col. 1.

possible.[5]

The directive announced that the "War Department has concurred in the plan",[6] and then listed certain provisions for the return of the newsmen to the States. It said that they could go at Army expense to their homes or to Australia until October 27, but after that they would have to pay regular fare even though they were travelling on "space available" on Army transports.

Perhaps the most startling paragraph in the directive was the demand that correspondents must "qualify" to keep their Army accreditation. How this was to be done was not specified.

It was then added that "upon termination of their Army accreditation, they will cease wearing the official uniform of accredited correspondents."[7] It added that they would be allowed to wear Army clothing when available. The announcement said that "no ruling" was made for the correspondents to obtain heavy winter clothing from the Army. As most of them had come from the tropics with only light khaki uniforms, this seemed to add another annoyance to the mounting list.

Certain "facilities" were promised to the "acceptable"

5. Ibid.
6. New York Times, Oct. 13, 1945, p. 4, col. 5.
7. New York Times, Oct. 13, 1945, p. 4, col. 6.

newsmen, but, again, these were not specified. Those who were living in the Dai Iti Hotel were notified that their rooms must be vacated if they were absent more than three days. Thus, anyone going on a long assignment would return to find himself without a billet. He would then be quartered in the converted Nippon Yuson Kaisha Steamship Line building, where some of the junior officers were living. It was an unheated building, with poor sanitation, cold-water showers, and canvas Army cots in long dormitories. The officers living there were constantly complaining and were accustomed to going to the Dai Iti Hotel to use the warm baths attached to the correspondents' rooms.

These complaints seem trifling but really were serious problems to men who were trying to work in the bombed-out city where shelter and clothing were scarce. The newsmen took the view that the Army was using its monopoly on living accommodations and operating facilities as a control over them amounting to an indirect censorship.

> "...What is most serious, however, is the demand that the remaining correspondents must "qualify' and the warning that the essential facilities on which depend their work and their very life today will be extended only to those who prove themselves 'acceptable'. Since the Army controls all facilities in Japan and throughout the Far East today, including billets, food, clothing, and communications, not to speak of protection, the remaining correspondents will, so to speak, work and live only by the grace

> of General Diller, which gives him a greater power of censorship than the censor's blue pencil ever had. The mere announcement of this condition must henceforth create doubt whether the world public is getting all the news to which it is entitled. And this doubt cannot fail to create new troubles in our international relations."8

The above quotation pointed up the pressing issue. If the Army could control all the facilities on which the correspondents depended to work and to live, how far would it go in using these to control the flow of news from Tokyo? Certainly there was a potential danger in these conditions. The wartime censorship was legally to have come to an end. What right had the Army to use its superior position as a weapon to produce indirect censorship and undue control of the movement of reporters?

> "...The whole decree is an ill-considered measure which runs counter to every American instinct and policy. It smacks of military impatience with public scrutiny and recalls the worst days of naval censorship early in the war, when some of the admirals likewise attempted to limit the number of correspondents on the ground of 'lack of facilities', and to ration the facilities according to the 'acceptability' of the correspondents. The Navy had the excuse of wartime security; despite this the system was soon changed. The Army generals have no longer any excuse whatsoever, and it must be expected that General MacArthur, the President and Congress will soon put an end to what, in charity, can be characterized only as a grave mistake."9

There was no official explanation for the reduction

8. Editorial, New York Times, Oct. 15, 1945, p. 16, col. 2.
9. Ibid.

of the reporting staff, although theoretically it was the "housing shortage." A shortage did exist, true enough, but the correspondents refused to accept this reason, pointing out that the Army had the authority to take over any building it needed, and was doing so. And, then, too, there was no housing shortage in Korea where the directive was also to be effective. So, for these reasons, the correspondents continued to look on the order as a veiled threat to their existence. After all, they remembered that General Diller had recently told them, "There are far too many newspaper men around here."[10]

The next step was to send an appeal to the War Department in Washington. This was done, and by October 15 the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations asked MacArthur's Public Relations Office to review the directive and to liberalize the quota system. It asked General Diller to base his quotas on a fair representation of press and radio, even if it meant rearranging living facilities.[11]

On October 17, another order was issued, abolishing the quota system, and rescinding the directive, except for the paragraphs which provided for the reversion of correspondents to civilian status. The new announcement stated

10. Ibid.
11. Lindesay Parrott, "Hirohito Amnesty Sets 1,000,000 Free," New York Times, Oct. 18, 1945, p. 2. col. 2.

that the original order had not been signed but had come out from the Public Relations Office under the heading of "Memorandum For Accredited Correspondents." The implication was that perhaps General MacArthur hadn't known personally of it, but this was never proved. If he did not know, then the important decision of access to news was being left to the discretion of subordinate officers. And, incidentally, the second order was not signed either.

A large building, one of the Mitsubishi's party houses, was taken over by the Army for the use of correspondents, their home offices to pay the costs. This became the Tokyo Correspondents Club, located in Shimbun Alley a few blocks from MacArthur's headquarters.

> "...a tired, old five-story building that once was a restaurant. It stands in a narrow lane, now known as Shimbun (Newspaper) Alley, and lined mainly by roofless shells of office buildings. A punctured main sends out tiny, gurgling, rivulets into the ruins, and there is a rusty mess of iron safes, metal bars, and reddish earth..."12

The Press Corps, forgetting the many earlier inconveniences, happily moved into the rooms that the billeting officers assigned to them and began the job of reporting the Occupation.

During the first few months of the Occupation, glowing success stories from MacArthur's Public Relations Office

12. Gayn's Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 2.

predicted that Japan could be transformed into a democracy overnight. They were based on our illusion that the Japanese were an obedient people and would certainly become champions of freedom if we so directed. This illusion was based on the way in which the Japanese, stunned and docile, had accepted surrender and had brought their entire war-making machinery to a halt upon the broadcasted wishes of Hirohito. They were exhibiting what Americans called an "inherent sense of discipline." The idea was enhanced by the extreme efficiency with which MacArthur's administration took over.

A New Deal was quickly drafted for Japan. A beautifully-phrased Constitution was handed the government officials. Demobilization was swiftly ordered. MacArthur had hired many, who were known in Japan as New Dealers, for the middle-rank jobs in his bureaucracy. They helped draft policy which was progressive in form and in content, but was not always carried out. Some civilian New Dealers came from Washington after the surrender, when SCAP in Tokyo, desperately short of experienced bureaucrats, was squalling for help just at the time that President Truman, in his attempt to appease the Republicans in the name of 'unity', was junking government 'liberals' as fast

as he could.[13] The reformers got jobs in Tokyo, more often in positions of advice rather than in authority. Reforms were written which sounded good. The American public heard the news that the Occupation would be an unqualified success.

After these first few months, the public heard fewer reports and continued to believe the illusion that the Japanese, of course, would obey us, for they were a docile people, and the idealistic plans drafted by the New Dealers would rebuild them into a peaceful, responsible, and it was hoped, Christian nation.

Only this type of complacent satisfaction could cause Noal Busch, a senior editor of Life magazine, to write:

> "...The United States public has heard comparatively little about Japan. There are obvious reasons for this omission. The Occupation is a resounding success; and while trouble and scandal make news, success only makes history."14

The popular theme was to compare the Occupation of Japan favorably with the contemporary Occupation of defeated Germany. Busch expresses this feeling:

> "...Another convenient measure to apply to the Japanese Occupation is the yardstick of the Occupation of Germany where...the population is starving, where there is no national government at all, and plans have not yet matured for putting the country back together again...In Japan, starvation is at

13. Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, op. cit. p. 105.
14. Noel Busch, Fallen Sun, Appleton-Century-Company, Inc. New York and London, 1946. p. 4.

> a minimum, the government has never stopped functioning, and since the country was never taken apart, the United States is at no pains to reassemble it."[15]

Mr. Busch also measures the Occupation against the purposes of the Potsdam Declaration which, he says, were to make Japan (1) unable and (2) unwilling to make war. He calls the rapid demobilization "incredibly sensational" and the Japanese "so sincere as to be almost embarrassing" in their desire to renounce war.[16] He cites the new Constitution as the shining proof of this sincerity, without going on to explain that the clause "to renounce war as an instrument of national policy" was just one of the many clauses of the Constitution written by SCAP authorities under the direction of General Whitney of the Government Section and with the personal help of MacArthur himself.[17]

When criticism was levelled at the Occupation, one of the stock replies by the authorities responsible for our role in Japan was to point out how many American lives had been saved by the fact that we did not actually invade Japan. MacArthur and his Army had descended into Nippon without firing a single shot. Not an American life

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15. Ibid. p. 6.
16. Ibid. p. 7.
17. For further information of the drafting of the Japanese Constitution, see Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. pp. 126-130.

had been lost in our brave new venture. General Willoughby reminded correspondents of this again and again, and at one time referred in glowing terms to the "painless Occupation." Anything said in less praiseworthy terms was called "unjustified." The sensitivity of the authorities to press criticism was so great that statements defending their stand were usually issued promptly after adverse comments had come to the fore.

> "Major General Charles A. Willoughby, General MacArthur's intelligence officer since Bataan, charged...that 'unjustified criticism' of the Occupation methods used in Japan was being circulated in the United States. Such criticism was inspired by what he termed 'obscure sources.'
>
> "General Willoughby's statement, made before a press conference, coincided with reports from Washington ... that the Far Eastern Commission expected to recommend changes in the orders issued to General MacArthur for the government in Japan by American Occupation forces...
>
> "General Willoughby declared that the Occupation was being subjected to critical comment, with a 'menacing undertone,' particularly regarding the use of established machinery to demobilize the Japanese Army. (We converted the Japanese Army and Navy Ministry into a Demobilization board, used the same cadre, etc.) He also attacked the 'undercurrent of questioning' of General MacArthur's methods which, he said, was now being heard in the United States.
>
> "Pointing out that the Occupation had been carried out without the firing of a single shot and without a single American death, General Willoughby asked, 'Just what alternative was expected to this painless Occupation without casualties?"
>
> "...Characterizing General MacArthur's Occupation as 'a tremendous gamble carried to a brilliant-

> ly successful conclusion,' General Willoughby insisted that criticism of the supposed 'soft' methods used by General MacArthur was unjustified..."[18]

It is interesting to note how the General referred to the "brilliantly successful conclusion" as early as November, 1945. This was no doubt a habit carried over from the war to claim the objective before it had actually been taken.

A few days later another press conference was held. This time it was at the office of Colonel Raymond C. Kramer, a spokesman for the Economic and Scientific Section. The message was a defense of MacArthur's directives regarding the Japanese taxes. Both Japanese and Americans had criticised the abolition of military pensions and the levelling of high taxes at a time when starvation in Japan was high. Colonel Kramer said that the military pensions were being wiped out as part of the demobilization program and the food shortages could be attributed, at least partially, to "Japanese inertia."[19]

Reporters soon began to look on the press conferences, generally infrequent, as an official way of indirectly censoring complaints against Occupation policies.

18. Lindesay Parrott, "M'Arthur Policies Called Life-Saving," New York Times, November 21, 1945, p. 15. col. 1.
19. Burton Crane, "Need Will Govern Imports By Japan," New York Times, November 25, 1945, p. 3. col. 3.

Very little was written about the Occupation as it entered its second phase with the election of the 80th Congress. The fear of a dangerous Russia grew, and Japan was to become again the "workshop of Asia," a bulwark against Communism, a future ally for America. This change of direction in the Occupation caused the Republican-inclined staff officers to look with suspicion on the New Dealers in their employ. There was a purge, slow but effective, of most of the liberals. Some found their jobs abolished. Others went home on leave and, when safely in the United States, received telegrams from SCAP that their contracts had been cancelled. Others gradually had their responsibilities transferred to other desks in their offices. The Japanese sensed the change and demanded more materials from America to keep them from "going Communist." Yes, thank you, they would love again to be the workshop of Asia.

> "Portentous changes began when the 80th Congress was elected in America. As its first war whoops were borne on the air waves to Tokyo, its tribal kinsmen on General MacArthur's staff began to gather in powwows of their own. The scalps of the pale-faced New Dealers began to come loose. There was a purge. The cleverest--and crookedest--of the old-line Japanese politicians caught on. Recovering their poise and agility, they made new bids. Get Japan off the neck of the American taxpayer? Nothing easier, they said, with perfectly straight faces. If only the American taxpayer would stick his neck a long, long way out, they would get off it.

> They would make Japan an ally, a workshop, a bulwark."20

Civilians working in SCAP filled out long, detailed personal data forms so that their "loyalty" could be checked. "Suspicious" employees were weeded out. There was a constant shifting of personnel. Those who remained in the most permanent jobs were reluctant to discuss their jobs after work hours for fear of disclosing classified information. If they disagreed with the official policy on any score, they remained discreetly silent. A cloud settled over the Occupation through which the American public could not peer.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur's machine functioned efficiently, "particularly in all matters in which the old-line Japanese politicians wanted to help it to be efficient."[21] The efficiency was aided by the fact that the United States was virtually in sole occupation of Japan, as only 38,000 (later reduced in number) British Commonwealth forces were sharing the assignment.[22]

Any student of government would know that we could not expect to democratize Japan overnight, especially with a high-powered military GHQ hierarchy as an example of

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20. Lattimore, The Situation in Asia. Op. Cit. p. 106.
21. Ibid. p. 107.
22. Busch, Fallen Sun, op. cit. p. 17.

democracy.

> "...The Occupation of Japan, of course, has not been a complete and triumphant success; a semifeudal society has not been converted into a democratic state overnight, some of our policies and some of our achievements there are open to critical debate..."23

Many reporters have been able to lift the screen and write factual reports, some of them praising the Occupation and some of them highly critical of it. The critical reports make just a small dent in the vast number of "success stories" which are filed to the states from the regular official reports, the MacArthur grandiloquent statements, the words from on high.

But most of the praise for the Occupation has come from brass hats of the press -- the editors and publishers who are invited to Japan and given a whirlwind tour of the Occupied area. The tour consists of a few very crowded days of sight-seeing, a visit to Kamakura to see the Great Buddha statue, cocktail partying, well-planned interviews with official policy spokesmen, and maybe even a short session with MacArthur himself. They are handed sheafs of mimeographed "background material" for them to read. Many of them carry these home and write series of articles about the Occupation for their papers. MacArthur

23. James, "Generals' General," p. 64.

himself is a different man with the journalistic brass hats than he is with the foot soldiers of the press for he considers them the "civilian equivalent of generals."[24]

In December of 1946, the War Department had tactfully suggested a press tour for Japan such as had been conducted in Germany. According to Drew Pearson, MacArthur cabled the War Department that he didn't welcome representatives of certain papers that had been critical of the Occupation. Pearson quoted MacArthur's cable as reading:

> "While continuing my doubts as to the advisability of the contemplated trip, in view of the insistence of the War Department, I will withdraw my objection. I would like to have an opportunity to pass upon those contemplated for selection before their invitation is accomplished.
>
> "I believe the list should not include actual writers but should be limited to publishers and editors and should not include those connected with papers of known hostility to the Occupation.
>
> "Such papers as the Christian Science Monitor, The New York Herald-Tribune, Chicago Sun, San Francisco Chronicle, PM, Daily Worker, and others of this stamp whose articles and editorials have not only been slanted but have approached downright quackery and dishonesty."[25]

Those familiar with the conservative policies of the Monitor, the Herald-Tribune, and the Chronicle were amazed at this outburst. And it was hard to believe that

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24. Ibid. p. 65.
25. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 49.

MacArthur could express a belief that correspondents from all of these papers were dishonest!

However, confronted with a respectable opinion that not all of these reporters were Communists or followers of the party line, he welcomed it graciously, "admitting that he had never read the rationally critical dispatches of the correspondents under discussion, but had derived his opinion from the reports of his subordinates -- a capsule commentary in itself on MacArthur and on some of the men with whom he screens the base of his imposing pedestal."[26]

26. James, "Generals' General" op. cit. p. 64.

Chapter IV

GHQ Suppresses Ando Story

The story of Akira Ando, the fabulously wealthy Japanese rackateer who almost undermined the Occupation, was never told in detail to the American public. During the four months when Ando was being investigated by the Army's Criminal Investigation Detachment, reporters kept the name Ando out of their dispatches, so that the investigation might go on in complete secrecy. And when Ando was arrested and eventually found guilty on minor charges, GHQ officers acted effectively to suppress the real story.[1]

Ando was a labor contractor, operating the Daian Gumi (Great Ando Group) with 30,000 employees, building airports, docks, factories, and transportation facilities. Ando had been wartime head of the Tokyo Traction Union, a transportation company and trucking group. He advised the Munitions Ministry and Great East Asia Ministry on transportation problems. He owned 20 bordellos, several Daian Clubs, was president of the Tokyo Automobile Owners Association, got a five-million yen contract with the Communications Bureau of the Japanese government to repair

1. For full details on the Ando story, see Gayn's Japan Diary, op. cit.

and install telephone lines, had part interest in two Tokyo newspapers, in soap and gasoline rationing, and headed the Kamakura Industrial University.[2] During the past year, 1945, he had made a profit of $33 million.[3]

Banquets were given by Ando for hand-picked generals and colonels on General MacArthur's staff as part of the well-financed Japanese campaign to corrupt the Occupation leadership. The weapons were wine, women and hospitality, and the objective was to subvert the strength and purpose of the Occupation.[4]

Ando had succeeded in promoting his personal interests to such an extent that the Chief Film Officer of Central Motion Picture Exchange in MacArthur's headquarters had written a request to the Japanese Finance Ministry to lend Ando $1,333,000 to capitalize a new firm to exhibit American films. He also asked the Japanese government to release to Ando 50,000 tons of duralumin for the construction of "several hundred" movie houses. The film officer had also contracted to supply Ando enough movie films for a year. This was only one of the favors Ando had attempted to get from American officers in return for

2. International News Service release from Tokyo, "Ando Arrest Considered Blow At Anti-Occupation Forces," June 14, 1946.
3. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 178.
4. Ibid. p. 125.

the lavish parties he had sponsored for them.[5]

An International News Service release of June 14 from Tokyo quoted SCAP "investigators", without mentioning names, as saying that Ando's arrest was the most important in anti-Occupation activities.

The release said that "Although official secrecy shrouded the details of the continuing investigation, it was learned that Ando was considered one of the most dangerous of Japan's postwar figures, with his fingers in many pies from which he grabbed money and power."[6]

Ando was held on an open charge, the release said, but it was pointed out that he may be charged with any number of offenses, including possession of American government property, defiance of a SCAP order to close his Daian Club "in which American officers allegedly were entertained on a lavish scale, or for transporting women from Hokkaido to Tokyo as prostitutes, a practice in direct conflict with the SCAP 'Mann Act' directive."[7]

The INS dispatch upset GHQ officials by including a paragraph to the effect that "There was also the possibility of action against American Army officers who al-

5. Ibid. pp. 304-5.
6. International News Service, "Ando Arrest Considered Blow At Anti-Occupation Forces," op. cit.
7. Ibid.

legedly accepted gifts from Ando. It is an offense under the Articles of War for a member of the Armed Forces to accept gifts from people of an occupied nation."[8]

Ando was held for several weeks pending investigation and final trial. Meanwhile, GHQ officials were upset about the implication that some of them were involved in the Ando case. Reporters had received this information from Colonel Logie, the deputy provost marshal of GHQ, and also from many other GHQ officers who had attended Ando's parties and had told the reporters about them. During the intervening weeks, certain GHQ officers intimidated the reporters by threatening them with courts martial if they did not divulge the sources of their information.

Mark Gayn in his Japan Diary relates his experience with Colonel Wood in this matter. Roy Walker of the Christian Science Monitor, he says, had a similar meeting with Wood.

> "July 5, 1946. Was 'invited today to call on Colonel W. S. Wood, Civil Intelligence Officer, in connection with the Ando case. Wood saw Walker yesterday, and threatened him with court-martial if Walker did not disclose his sources of information. Walker stood his ground. This afternoon, he joined me in the visit.
>
> "The colonel was obviously fishing. He wanted

8. Ibid.

> to know how much I knew of the involvement of the U. S. Army officers in the Ando case, and where I obtained my information. I was prepared to tell the colonel all, except for the names of my informants. Some of them had themselves been Ando's guests at his 'club.' Others were subordinates of Ando's happy customers. I did not want them punished just because they had talked to me -- especially since the Army was doing nothing about some of the high-ranking men named by Ando himself.
>
> "Eventually the conversation got to the threats of court-martial against correspondents who refused to disclose their source of information. I told Wood I thought any correspondent -- including me -- would welcome a test. I would not challenge Wood's authority if national security were involved. But the Ando affair is a foul cesspool which had to be cleaned out whether the Army is sensitive to exposure or not. Wood did not take me up."[9]

On July 6, the Ando affair was formally closed. He was tried in a U. S. Provost Court and sentenced to six months in jail with a fine of $3,300 for possessing a couple of pistols and 20 cartons of cigarettes. General Baker, MacArthur's Public Relations Officer, issued an official "handout" which took exception to the "sensational news stories which converted this case of disobedience of orders into one alleging involvement of Occupation officers."[10]

The press release admitted that "some Allied personnel patronized Ando's third-rate night club, and on occasion, he had distributed to his guests traditional gifts."

9. Mark Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 262.
10. Ibid. p. 263.

But, it added, "a thorough investigation...failed to reveal the name of any military personnel that had illegal dealings with Ando."[11]

From the same press release, Stars and Stripes carried this account of the case to Occupation readers:

> "Akira Ando, head of the wealthy Ando Gumi constructors and owner of the Daian ('Great Ando') Night Club in Tokyo, has been sentenced in Provost Court to a fifty thousand yen fine and six months imprisonment after being found guilty on three counts, General Headquarters of the United States Army in Japan announced in a special release yesterday.
>
> "Ando, millionaire contractor who once was a truck driver for the Japanese Army in China, was found guilty of illegally possessing arms, possession of Post Exchange goods, and failure to close his night club against Provost Marshal orders.
>
> "Ando failed to comply with orders to close his entertainment joint but continued to operate it under a changed name. The press release, minimizing press reports at the time the night club was raided together with Ando's residence July 12 that high GHQ officers were allegedly involved in scandalous transactions with Ando, said:
>
> "'The investigation and interrogation of many witnesses failed to substantiate anything more than the fact that some Allied personnel had patronized Ando's third rate night club and that on occasions he had distributed to his guests traditional gifts such as Japanese dolls, and similar trinkets which are the Oriental counterpart of Occidental dinner favors.'
>
> "It was said, in return, Ando claimed to have received 'an occasional box of candy, a carton of cigarettes and other miscellaneous items such as gum and shaving cream.

11. Ibid. p. 263.

"The press release said the so-called 'large quantities' of Post Exchange goods Ando had received from Allied visitors turned out to be '23 cartons of cigarettes, 7 boxes of cigars and miscellaneous items such as: 18 cakes of soap, 4 tubes of shaving cream, 1 package of gum and a few other miscellaneous items.

"There was no evidence at the time of Ando's arrest to indicate that any Army officer had dealings with him and a thorough investigation failed to reveal the name of any military personnel that had illegal dealing with Ando, it was said.

"The press release attributed the sensational reports to 'unsubstantiated remarks by an officer in the Provost Marshal unit in Tokyo."12

Colonel Logie, the officer who had made the "unsubstantiated remarks" was removed from his command as deputy provost marshal in Tokyo and quietly transferred to a lower echelon to be in charge of troops at Yokohama port. The Army career of this colonel, who had more overseas service than any other GHQ officer, and whose chest wore five rows of military decorations, was ruined because he talked to reporters.

A friend of mine who worked as an investigator on the case, was shipped out of Japan on the morning of the Ando arrest. He called and nervously explained to his friends that he was leaving immediately on a hospital ship because he had suddenly become ill. Others left without

12. Stars and Stripes, "Ando Receives Fine," July 9, 1946, p. 1, col. 1.

saying good-bye. We often wondered if the Army wanted to protect them from Ando's underground gang who might seek revenge for Ando's arrest -- or whether the Army was afraid they might make more "unsubstantiated remarks" about certain GHQ officers and Ando's "Japanese dolls" some of whom were live dolls and not toys.

It was generally agreed among correspondents that the GHQ press release was a "cover up" for the real story. Just enough information about officer dealings with Ando had leaked out in order to make the arrest necessary. The Army had to find Ando guilty or the reporters' indignation might bring out the whole story. So he was tried on a minor charge and given a light sentence.

Reporters felt, as did Mark Gayn who deplored the light sentence for Ando and the extent of the charges on which he had been found guilty.

"Thus the Ando Affair," Gayn says, "which was at the least a symptom of a deep spiritual corrosion in the Army of Occupation, and at the most a hint of a vast and powerful nationalist underground, has been trimmed down to the size of a petty larceny...The incredible ramifications of Ando's interests, from films and communications to the imperial court, have been blandly ignored."[13]

13. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 263.

Chapter V

Special Cases of Press Censorship

When General Diller left Japan, his role as "chief tub-thumper"[1] was taken over by Brigadier General Frayne Baker, a former National Guardsman from North Dakota. Newsmen hoped that writing conditions would be much better under Baker.

But it wasn't long before correspondents began speaking of him in the same terms as Mark Gayn who called him, "stout, laconic, and surly...with little affection for special correspondents with their annoying habit of independent thought and inquiry."[2]

Reporters were expected to file the daily releases from the Public Relations Office, perhaps to re-write them slightly for style but not to alter the tone or to comment adversely on the Occupation job. When "persevering journalists began digging into the untold stories of the Occupation, when they found out that there was often a glaring discrepancy between directive and implementation, Baker hurriedly erected MacArthur's defenses."[3] Once more there was the deluge of official "handouts" to drown the

1. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 48.
2. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 4.
3. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 48.

lonely criticisms that had gotten through to the States.

The Public Relations Office knew who were the "reliable" correspondents and which ones would have to be "watched." A system for checking had been carefully worked out. A scoreboard was kept on the "favorable" and the "unfavorable" work done by each correspondent. Stories were never actually censored as they were filed out of Japan, but a careful check was made by the liaison Public Relations Officers in Washington and a daily report was cabled back to Tokyo.

> "The busy Public Relations Office kept itself and MacArthur well-informed on which correspondents were saying nice things about the Old Man and the Occupation, and which were being critical. A file of stories and a comment 'plus' or 'minus' was cabled daily by the War Department in Washington to Tokyo."4

Correspondents with too many "minus" ratings on their report cards found serious difficulties put in their way to hamper their work. Some who went home on vacation or took short trips to Manila or Shanghai could not return to Japan easily. A series of incidents occurred, which added to the mounting dissatisfaction of the reporters with their lot in Japan. Some of these incidents received enough publicity and public indignation to cause moves to be made which corrected the abuses on the rights of a

4. Ibid.

free press. Others were never corrected and will continue to exist until basic press relations of MacArthur are changed.

In gathering material for this thesis, I contacted certain newsmen who had suffered under the indirect censorship measures in Japan. Some of them were glad to see any discussion of the situation aired, but there were those who feared that any such disclosures might result in their dismissal from Japan, their loss of their accreditation to return, or their own publications' privilege of sending other reporters to Japan. This fear among reporters is widespread, and I feel, alarming. It was particularly reflected in a letter from a personal friend of mine who I have every cause to feel would have been happy to help me gather background for this study. His letter said in part:

> "...I was interested to read your request on MacArthur's public information policies in Japan. There are one or two things, however, that I would like to know before launching on a full fledged statement on MacArthur's policies.
>
> "Will I be quoted by name for publication?
>
> "Just where will this thesis of yours appear?
>
> "For whom are you writing it?
>
> "In other words, I can't run myself out on a limb that might back fire on our position out here. If such a back-fire occurs, yours truly will be looking for another job.

> "...I'll leave the throat-cutting to the boys who have left Tokyo and have no intention of returning. I might want to go back... I have no intention of throwing away years of effort even on the slightest chance of a boomerang. It's easy for you to do your thesis being footloose and free journalistically in the United States. I'm still living on the edges of the MacArthur orbit and I'm still an ambitious young man..."

This was the same position taken by several others who are still in Japan.

For this study, then, I have had to rely on the incidents that correspondents have freely reported, keeping in mind, however, that there were others that have never been told.

On April 30, 1946 correspondents met at the Press Club to draft a protest to General MacArthur against what appeared to be a one week's full-fledged anti-press campaign by his headquarters. Mark Gayn, correspondent for Chicago Sun, reports this meeting in his notes on Japan.

> "...The Army motor pool, where we have been getting vehicles, has been closed to us. Those of us who owned our jeeps found it impossible to get gasoline. One correspondent has been denied dental aid. The club has been deprived of the truck in which we have been bringing our food. An 'unfriendly' correspondent who was complaining about the 'continued delays in bringing wives here was told twice to 'go home if you don't like it.' Another correspondent, serving a string of newspapers, was told that 'special correspondents are not wanted here.' Those who are bringing their wives here have been informed that they will be unable to purchase food at the Army commissary after July 1. The pressure is particularly grave because there are no supplies to be bought in the Japanese market, and

all such deals are illegal anyway.

"Many correspondents feel that the campaign is an expression of displeasure with our coverage of the Allied Council sessions. But part of the blame must be laid at the door of General Baker, whose definition of a democratic press is seemingly that kind of a press which will publish nothing but his handouts.

"The Australian correspondent Jack Percival, who has been critical of some aspects of the Occupation, told us Baker had written to his editor accusing Percival of a variety of journalistic misdeeds. The propriety of such behavior by a Public Relations Officer, whose avowed function is to assist the press in its work, escapes me.

"An even more interesting story is told by Bill McGaffin of the Chicago Daily News, just in from China. He reports that both he and Gordon Walker, of the Christian Science Monitor, were denied permission to re-enter Japan on the curious ground that the travel space was needed for more essential personnel. Fortunately for him, McGaffin had return Travel Orders.. So he simply boarded a plane and flew to Japan. Having no such orders, Walker protested to his paper, which began an inquiry in Washington. Eventually, according to McGaffin, Baker informed the Monitor that the Army Command in Korea had objected to Walker's 'irresponsible coverage' and that Walker was free to come to Japan, but that his reporting would have to be more accurate. The Monitor replied with appropriate firmness. It said it was pleased to hear that Walker could return to Japan, where he could resume his reporting, 'with its usual high standards of accuracy.'

"Tonight's meeting drafted a resolution of protest, and named a committee, headed by Cochrane, to present it to General MacArthur."5

Two reporters, unknown to each other, said that Gen-

5. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 195-6.

eral Baker called them to extend General MacArthur's warm appreciation for their "fair and impartial" treatment of the Allied Council sessions. Both of them were embarrassed. They had originally filed stories very critical of the three generals at the opening sessions, MacArthur, Whitney, and Marquat, but they had been re-written by their home offices.[6]

Upon receiving the correspondents' protest, General MacArthur ordered the removal of the above-listed restrictions that had hindered their work, and assured them that no pressure on them had been intended and that henceforth they would be treated "like my own officers."[7]

In October of the same year, 1946, Mark Gayn was to experience another infringement on the freedom of working reporters. On this occasion, Gayn was threatened with a court martial by an Army officer if he did not reveal his sources of news for an article he had filed. In Gayn's own words this is what happened:

> "...Brigadier General A. P. Fox summoned me to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, announced that he was sitting as a court-martial officer, and demanded that I reveal the names of my informants for a recent article. The story was a belated report on that fantastic conference in May when a group of colonels objected to purging war criminals from Japan's big business. Headquarters apparently was

6. Ibid. p. 210.
7. Ibid. p. 210.

far less perturbed by what the colonels had to say than by the fact that one of them had talked to a reporter.

"I was told that I could inform no one -- not even my editor -- of the summons, and that I was not entitled to legal counsel. General Fox also told me that I could not leave Tokyo. I refused to answer any questions without guidance from the Sun, and promptly filed a long report to Chicago. The next morning, the Sun notified me it had taken action with the War Department. And yesterday morning thirteen correspondents, led by Russel Brines of the Associated Press, and Crane of the New York Times, filed into General Baker's office, and demanded an explanation. The right to protect one's sources of information is one of the basic elements of a free press, and no correspondent is willing to make any concessions to it. Ten minutes after the group left Baker's presence, General Fox telephoned me to tell me I would 'no longer be required in this investigation.'"[8]

In early 1947, Dixie Tighe, correspondent for the New York Post, died in Tokyo. The Post sent Robert P. Martin to Tokyo to care for her effects. Martin, who had previously done considerable reputable reporting in the Far East for the Post, naturally filed stories to his home office, some of them critical of the Occupation. For this, Martin was almost forced out of Japan.

"...After he had been sending dispatches for five weeks, SCAP suddenly gave him twenty-six hours to board a plane for Shanghai on the technical grounds that he had not entered Japan as a correspondent. The other newsmen in Tokyo unanimously protested to MacArthur's headquarters, and at the last moment Martin's status was changed and he was allowed to remain. The correspondents had threatened to make a big issue of 'freedom of the press,' and SCAP

8. Ibid. p. 347.

backed down, although an earlier cable from the War Department directing that Martin be duly accredited as a correspondent had been ignored.

"Writing of this incident, Martin was convinced the attempt had been made against him because he had filed critical stories about certain phases of the Occupation. He also reported that SCAP had warned Japanese officials not to talk with Allied reporters, that five correspondents had been threatened with court-martial if they filed a certain story, and still another was told he would be tried under the articles of war if he did not divulge his sources of information."9

Not long after the Martin affair, MacArthur's headquarters did manage to expel a correspondent. He was David Conde, formerly chief of SCAP's Motion Picture Division, who had left his job to work as a correspondent for International News Service and for the British Reuters Agency.

"...Early in 1947 he had a by-line article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch critical of the way SCAP was censoring the Japanese press; in the Far Eastern Survey he published an expose of the way the Yoshida government was mismanaging the problem of the Korean minority in Japan. Although he had applied for a correspondent's accreditation in July of 1946, he was suddenly notified in March 1947 that he must leave. The members of the Tokyo Correspondents' Club again protested, but even their demand that Conde be permitted to remain in Tokyo until he had appealed to the State Department was denied."10

It seemed that Public Relations officials did not want to settle for anything less than complete approval

9. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 50.
10. Ibid. p. 50.

of the Occupation. The issue seemed a very important one for the American people. As Martin wrote after he had been reinstated: "SCAP'S public relations policy at present is to convince America that the democratization of Japan has achieved unprecedented success and that the Japanese government has furthered this process voluntarily. The first premise is debatable and the second is contrary to fact."[11]

Ex-General Baker was reported to believe that anything unflattering written about MacArthur was "playing the Russian's game" and therefore disloyal and in effect, treasonable.

> "...When Dennis McEvoy was starting the Japanese edition of the Reader's Digest, it was decided that it would be good business and good politics to include a profile of MacArthur in the first issue. A copy of the article, which had originally appeared in Collier's, was sent to General Baker. When he had read the copy, Baker called in McEvoy. The normally placid General was slightly apoplectic. He said the article was a disgrace, an insult to MacArthur. McEvoy insisted that the over-all content of the story was favorable to the Supreme Commander.
>
> "After they had argued for a while, it became apparent that Baker objected to any criticism of MacArthur which the article cited but did not necessarily condone. 'You think it should be 100 per cent favorable?' McEvoy asked. Baker agreed."[12]

Richard Lauterbach of Life magazine had had a similar

11. Ibid. p. 50.
12. Ibid. p. 51.

experience. After a long period of waiting he was told by General Baker that certain high officers of the Inner Circle had advised against doing a story on MacArthur. Mr. Lauterbach relates the details of this situation in Danger From The East:

> "Baker explained that Time and Life had been critical of the General and therefore he could see no reason for doing a favor for the Luce publications. I drafted a cable to this effect for the New York office and submitted it to Baker for his approval. He changed a few words to tone it down slightly. In New York a comprehensive check was made in both magazines and practically nothing which could be considered 'critical' or unfavorable about the General was found. When General Baker was apprised of this, he suggested that the 'Old Man' was extremely fond of Henry and Clare Luce, and that perhaps the best step was for one of them to send MacArthur a personal cable asking the Life story as a favor. To my knowledge this was never done.
>
> "Before I left Japan, General Baker told me that he had a camera and he might be able to get the needed pictures for Life all by himself. His kind offer was rejected. On that occasion, I asked whether or not he could arrange for me an interview with MacArthur before my departure. Baker replied that the Old Man was probably too busy but that he would let me know. Baker never arranged for the interview. (The day before I was scheduled to leave for Korea, Guthrie Janssen of the National Broadcasting Company and I requested and got an interview through the intercession of MacArthur's aide, Colonel H. B. Wheeler.)13

In February, 1948, the Tokyo Press Corps was surprised and upset by a new shift in "policy" of the Public Relations office. The Army was again tightening controls

13. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 51.

on the correspondents. Hessell Tiltman, London Daily Herald, had criticized some of the Occupation policies. The Army got back at him when he applied for a round-trip set of travel orders to Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The Public Relations Officers told him that if he left the MacArthur-controlled area he would lose his credentials and his family would lose its quarters. He left anyway. Up to this time, reporters had been leaving Japan on short assignments and returning freely.[14]

William Costello of Columbia Broadcasting System, like Tiltman, had sent critical reports on General MacArthur. He planned a trip to Java but got the same notice as had Tiltman.[15]

Alpheus Jessup of McGraw-Hill publishers wanted to visit Burma and Malaya. General Baker told him he would lose his family housing. If he left, he would have to take his wife, who was expecting a baby, along with him.[16]

Again the correspondents held a meeting and nominated a committee to protest the "squeeze". They got an answer from Baker to the effect that, "Every time you have pressed for a clarification of policy, the policy has grown tighter."[17] The protest was forwarded to MacArthur.

14. Time, "Censorship in Tokyo?" February 2, 1948, p. 60.
15. Ibid. p. 60.
16. Ibid. p. 60.
17. Ibid. p. 60.

Harold Bristol, photographer for Fortune magazine, was assigned to make a short trip to Singapore. When he applied for travel orders, he received a reply from General Baker in the form of an open letter to all correspondents, apparently the official answer to their formal protest. The letter said that Bristol's family would have to give up its quarters if he left.[18]

Although he had applied for a round-trip ticket, he was told, orally, that he would only be issued a one-way permit and would have to apply for re-accreditation to Japan when he wanted to return. Baker suggested that "some other person be selected (by Fortune) to cover the assignment."[19] Baker said that Tokyo could not be press headquarters for the whole area. He said that the influx of commercial traders and Army families were straining the housing facilities.[20] The new rule, then, meant that as soon as a newsman left Tokyo, his housing would be re-assigned to a new family, and, upon his return he would have to take a chance -- not very good -- on securing others. His family had to either accompany him on the trip, or if that was too uncomfortable, would have to return to the States and await his re-accreditation to Tokyo.

18. Time, "The Squeeze" February 9, 1948, p. 46.
19. Ibid. p. 46.
20. Newsweek, "MacArthur and the Press", Feb. 9, 1948, p. 50.

About this time, Bill Costello, Columbia Broadcasting System's correspondent, announced in a Tokyo program that MacArthur's command would have 12,350 housing units available by Spring, of which newsmen rented 19.[21] Costello told listeners that MacArthur made correspondents feel "unwelcome" and that he wanted "bureaucratic censorship."[22] Other correspondents pointed out that if the housing shortage was so critical, MacArthur would never have thrown open Japan to tourists and business men as he had just done.

The Columbia Broadcasting System and the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company made a protest to the Department of the Army, claiming that MacArthur had set up these new rules as another weapon against reporters who sent stories critical of his policies. As the Army still controlled all living accommodations, it was possible that reporters could be "hand-picked". Also, if a reporter lost his accreditation by leaving Tokyo on a short assignment, he would have to be approved for re-entry. This was another means of screening those who had filed anything critical about MacArthur.

Meanwhile Newsweek magazine was waging its own little battle with MacArthur.

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21. Ibid. p. 50.
22. Ibid. p. 50.

Compton Pakenham, Tokyo bureau chief for Newsweek, had gone to the States on a leave of absence in August, 1947. When he was ready to return, he thought that he would be re-accredited automatically. But he had to go through the entire procedure of applying for accreditation again and this time he was refused.

On January 26, 1948 Newsweek cabled to General MacArthur asking him to review the decision not to re-accredit Pakenham or to state specific charges against him. Two days later, MacArthur replied: "I am sorry to have to disagree with you with reference to the Pakenham case."[23] Editors, of course, considered this a very vague and unsatisfactory reply.

Newsweek had been publishing stories reporting mounting dissatisfaction with many of the Occupation policies, especially in the field of Japanese economy. Senator William Knowland of California had demanded a Congressional investigation of the economic situation and Senator Brian McMahon of Connecticut had asked for a report on General MacArthur's personal responsibility for it.[24] Public scrutiny was on the Occupation because of articles written by Pakenham, and it seemed that he was being pun-

23. Newsweek, "Press versus MacArthur," Feb. 16, 1948. p. 61.
24. Newsweek, "MacArthur and the Press," op. cit. p. 50.

ished for it.

Consequently, on February 2, Newsweek editors cabled MacArthur: "Under the circumstances, we are forced to conclude your decision is motivated by the fact that articles published in Newsweek reported criticism which had been made of some policies adopted by your command."[25] They told MacArthur they would make this conclusion public.

The Department of the Army had intimated that MacArthur didn't like Pakenham because he was a British citizen, that MacArthur felt that Pakenham had "reactionary" Japanese friends, and that he had showed "marked antipathy for the Occupation."[26]

Newsweek released a public statement stating that it had hired Pakenham for Japan because he had not only been born in Japan (at the British Embassy)[27] but had spent many years there, had an exceptional command of the language, and knew the people and their country well.[28] The editors further pointed out that there were members of Congress who were questioning MacArthur's policies and that Pakenham had been instructed to probe the thinking

25. Time, "The Squeeze," Feb. 9, 1948, p. 46.
26. Newsweek, "MacArthur and the Press." op. cit. p. 50.
27. Newsweek, "Japan: The Conquered," June 10, 1946, p. 49.
28. Newsweek, "MacArthur and the Press," op. cit. p. 50.

of the Japanese, including so-called "reactionaries" who might constitute a future danger, as "lack of knowledge was a contributing factor in unpreparedness at Pearl Harbor."[29]

Newsweek, in protesting Pakenham's treatment, had made inquiries in Germany to see if a comparable indirect censorship was being applied to correspondents by the military commanders there. They were not able to find that the Army had excluded a single correspondent from the European theater since the end of the war, though many had written critical and even antagonistic reports about the official policies in Germany. Newsweek editors pointed this out to the Department of the Army, calling MacArthur's handling of the case an "infringement on the right of freedom of information."[30]

This was the reply MacArthur sent to Newsweek:

> "With reference to your message of February 2, I have no slightest objection to anything you publicize concerning the Pakenham matter, provided the true facts rather than a distorted version are carried.
>
> "There is no -- repeat no -- basis whatsoever for your suggestion that freedom of the press is any way involved, or that the critical editorial policies of Newsweek have a bearing upon the matter. To the contrary, such editorial criticism which Newsweek has expressed with reference to certain policies

29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.

being implemented here was based upon directives received from the United States government and the Far Eastern Commission and has never been attributed to Pakenham's reporting.

"As to the suggestion that freedom of the press is in any way infringed, I doubt that the Allied press enjoys anywhere in the world greater freedom in the gathering and dissemination of the news than it does here in Tokyo. Your own bureau would undoubtedly be among the first to bear this out.

"The danger with respect to the return of Pakenham during this critical period lies in the disturbing influence he is believed to exercise among Japanese malcontents, and the jeopardy this causes to the objectives and security of the Occupation and the interests of the United States.

"Your statement that no reasons for Pakenham's exclusion have been furnished you is not understood in view of the recent letter to you from the Department of the Army in Washington, which summarized the matter as follows:

"'In his recent residence in Japan, he (Pakenham) has shown a marked antipathy toward American policy and American personnel in the Occupation zone. This is undoubtedly due to his long residence and prewar affiliations in Japan which have led him to associate, personally, with reactionary Japanese of deep-rooted feudalistic and militaristic tendencies in their resistance to the objectives of the Allied Occupation.

"'This, as SCAP points out, makes his return undesirable as such return would not be in the best interests of either the Occupation forces or of your publication. I feel compelled to support SCAP'S position in this matter. I suggest your office assign another competent correspondent to proceed to Japan. We shall do everything in our province to expedite his clearance and to make suitable arrangements in order that we can evidence our desire that the pleasant and cooperative relationship we have enjoyed in the past can continue in the future.'

"This is the basis for Pakenham's exclusion and

the position with respect to his replacement in which I fully concur."31

Upon reading MacArthur's cablegram, Pakenham issued a rebuttal which appeared in the columns of Newsweek. It said:

> "Not one single fact is advanced (in MacArthur's cable) in support of these charges. Until he produces some evidence beyond the general statement that I had associated with some Japanese 'malcontents' I can only reply by giving an account in general terms of my activities in Japan. Let me add, though, that General MacArthur uses very serious language. If I or any other correspondent really were guilty of these things we may assume that SCAP is sufficiently security-conscious so that he would have been expelled rather than be allowed to leave the country and then prevented from returning.
>
> "It is quite true that extended residence in Japan before the first world war and a working knowledge of the language made it easy for me to get around among Japanese. It is equally true that some staff sections at SCAP don't like correspondents to do this. I had talks with laborers, farmers, petty shopkeepers, schoolteachers, priests, soldiers, and sailors, businessmen, newspapermen, actors, ex-Cabinet ministers, and ex-peers.
>
> "I have searched my diaries and my memories and am able to list only six Japanese whom I saw frequently enough to consider them friends. It is true that some of these people had been in official positions before Pearl Harbor. As editorial consultant to Newsweek during the war, it had been my job to estimate what went on in Japan at that time, and when I went out in May 1946, I was curious to expand my information on that period, as well as to find out all I could about the impact of defeat on the national mentality.
>
> "Moreover, I am well enough acquainted with the

31. Newsweek, "Press versus MacArthur", February 16, 1948, p. 62.

peculiarities of the Japanese mentality so that I took pains never to allow any Japanese to discuss policies in such a way as to reflect on the basic authority of the occupying powers. In three cases of people who tried to do so, I walked out and never saw them again.

"So far from being antagonistic in my attitude to SCAP, I was on excellent professional and personal terms with many officers of high rank. Since this difficulty arose, several of them have written to me to say that they were shocked by MacArthur's decision. It is true, however, that I was not treated cordially by several high officers of the Government Section, which was the staff section concerned with policies that had been criticized. I understand that this is the source of the objections to my return."32

After members of the Tokyo Press Corps had read MacArthur's statement, they issued the following protest:

"The Allied correspondents in Japan deplore the manner of exclusion of Compton Pakenham, Newsweek, correspondent, from the area under the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Command on the grounds that he has associated 'personally with reactionary Japanese of deep-rooted feudalistic and militaristic tendencies in their resistance to the objectives of the Allied Occupation.' We are not entering into a defense of his activities, of which as a group we are not informed, but we wish to point out the following:

"1. -- No evidence has been made public to substantiate the charges and action has been taken on unsupported accusation. No particulars of this correspondent's alleged derelictions so far have been given the readers of a publication who thus suffer the loss of his services for reasons unexplained to them. So far as the correspondent is concerned, this action might be characterized as depriving a man of his means of livelihood without a hearing.

"2. -- Correspondents in their work must associate with all kinds of people having all kinds of

32. Ibid.

views and purposes in order to furnish news reports dealing not only with official activities, but so far as possible with all trends in the country. If a correspondent may be penalized by an outside authority because of his associations, his usefulness to his employer and to the American public is obviously curtailed.

"3. -- The action taken with regard to one correspondent naturally raises the question whether other or all correspondents might not be excluded from this or any other Occupation area on equally vague charges. More specifically, it brings up the question as to whether 'security' is not being used, or is not susceptible of being used, as a means to enable an area commander to hand-pick such correspondents assigned to his headquarters, by excluding as 'undesirable' those critical of his policies. Such a precedent would confer upon public officials the right to select those who may write about them -- turning correspondents into press agents.

"4. -- It may be pointed out that all correspondents, before their departure from the United States for occupied areas, are carefully screened for their good American citizenship by government agencies and are certified as acceptable by area commanders. A system under which a correspondent once accepted, is later threatened with exclusion inevitably must tend to force him to govern not only his writing, but also his personal associations. Such a situation is likely to result in a consistent flow of dangerously distorted news.

"For these reasons, we would welcome a clarification of Mr. Pakenham's case."33

This denunciation of MacArthur's handling of the Pakenham case was cabled to the Department of the Army which had also received Newsweek's, as well as the Columbia Broadcasting System and Fortune magazine's complaints

33. Ibid.

about the curbs on correspondents leaving Japan for short periods. Senator William F. Knowland of California made loud cries against MacArthur's "iron curtain" which cut off criticism of the Occupation.[34]

On February 3, the Army moved to adjust some of the wrongs. Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall overruled MacArthur's regulation which required correspondents to undergo complete reaccreditation before returning to Japan from short trips throughout the Far East. Royall ruled that newsmen could spend thirty days out of every six months travelling outside of Japan without losing their accreditation or their housing as MacArthur's regulations would have provided.[35]

The reporters were not satisfied with the new ruling. They complained that thirty days was not enough time for some assignments in the Far East where distances are very great and transporation was slow and unreliable.[36] William Costello called the proposal "wholly inadequate and unworkable."[37] Senator Knowland, still fighting the case in the Senate, declared that "contrary to the views expressed by SCAP, Japan is an ideal place for American news services, American magazines, and American news-

34. Time, "Squeeze Eased," Feb. 16, 1948. p. 52.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Newsweek, "Press versus MacArthur" op. cit. p. 61.

papers to base their correspondents to cover the rest of the Far East...When a correspondent knows that if he leaves Japan he cannot get back into that country without going through the process of being accredited, it may have at least a tendency to make him not quite as free in reporting as he might otherwise feel he should be."[38] But Secretary Royall upheld MacArthur on this important point: "Correspondents can not use Japan as a base to cover surrounding areas."[39] Correspondents had been using Tokyo as such a base for two years.

The dissatisfied newsmen named a special committee to put all their grievances into a report. This was done and it was addressed to General MacArthur and to Wilbur Forrest, chairman of the Committee on Freedom of the Press of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. (From New York, the American War Correspondents' Association, composed of former and present accredited reporters joined in the Tokyo Press Corps' protest with a telegram to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and a cable to MacArthur.)[40]

The newsmen had hesitated about making this formal complaint. They maintained that it was too difficult to

38. Ibid.
39. Time, "Squeeze Eased." op. cit. p. 52.
40. Newsweek, "Press versus MacArthur", March 1, 1948, p. 48.

show the American public that MacArthur did not practice what he preached about freedom of the press. Furthermore, it was felt that any correspondent who made public complaints exposed himself and his publication to petty retaliations by the Army. However, by all of them banding together and making their complaints as a group, they felt they might be heard and some of the abuses might be rectified.

These were some of the charges they made:

1. The excuse of "security" had been repeatedly used to control or influence the handling of news.

2. MacArthur's headquarters, generally the Public Relations Officer, had written to at least nine correspondents' home offices seeking to embarrass the newsmen and requesting their removal from Japan.

3. That one correspondent (Pakenham) had been excluded from Tokyo for "marked antipathy toward the Occupation." At one time or another almost every reporter has faced the same charge.

4. That Army Criminal Investigation agents had raided the Tokyo home of a reporter who had written critically of the Occupation. He had been subjected "to interrogation and threats."

5. That two Occupation sections had attempted re-

prisals against a newsman who had obtained a story from a third section.

6. That General MacArthur himself had characterized some writers as among the "most dangerous men in Japan."

7. That General Baker had insisted that newsmen get their news from Public Relations Office press releases, that he had informed them they could be court martialled under the Articles of War for publishing information that an Occupation official had declared classified, and that an official could classify anything he wanted to.[41]

The bill of complaints was sent to MacArthur with the opening statement that for 18 months correspondents had been trying to get his definition of military security, but had never really understood it.

The correspondents felt that General Baker -- now "Mr. Baker" as he had been discharged from the Army rather than take a demotion in grade in the peacetime set-up for officers -- was to blame for a lot of the pushing around they had endured. He took his time about forwarding the report on to MacArthur and there was no reply for several days.

If any discussion went on between Washington and Mac Arthur concerning the correspondents' complaints, nothing

41. Time, "Definition Wanted," March 1, 1948. p. 68.

was ever brought to light. However, while the report was still on MacArthur's desk, ex-General Baker was relieved of his job and transferred elsewhere in MacArthur's headquarters. As he had been believed to have caused so much of the censorship trouble, reporters were generally happy about the change. His successor was Colonel Marion P. Echols, a West Pointer who once had been a press relations officer at the Academy.[42]

Correspondents writhed with discomfort for only a few more weeks. Then on March 29 came what was virtually a proclamation of emancipation. The Department of the Army announced that overseas commanders would no longer have authority to take away the credentials of the American writers or subject them to censorship. Overseas reporters were to be placed under direct jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Army.[43]

During this same year, the National Military Establishment announced that only one accreditation was needed to establish a person's bona fides for all military installations, Army, Navy, and Air Force.[44]

It seemed that the press had won the long battle, at least for a while.

42. Newsweek, "MacArthur Switch", March 8, 1948. p. 56.
43. Newsweek, "Press 1, MacArthur", April 5, 1948, p. 56.
44. Newsweek, "Accreditation", September 27, 1948. p. 54.

Chapter VI

MacArthur's Veto -- The Case of Andrew Roth

Andrew Roth, 30-year-old New Yorker, is Nation magazine's Far Eastern correspondent. For more than a year he has been seeking admission into Japan, but has consistently been barred. Editors of Nation have been crying for "loudly voiced public indignation" to help him take up his fight with the "military arrogance and dictatorship."[1]

Roth is the author of Japan Strikes South and co-author of French Interests and Policies in the Far East. Both books were published in 1941 by the Institute of Pacific Relations, which had employed him as a research associate. He wrote many articles on the Far East for Far Eastern Survey, the New York Times, PM, Pacific Affairs, the Christian Science Monitor, and Amerasia.

But perhaps he is best known for his controversial book, Dilemma in Japan, published by Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Mass., just at the end of the Pacific hostilities in September of 1945. In this book he warned that the Occupation of Japan was doomed to failure if we followed a policy of leaving the Japanese government in the hands of the so-called "moderates." He showed that

1. Nation, "MacArthur Says No," December 24, 1949, p. 609.

this would maintain the leading industrial families in power, the Zaibatsu, of whom the most wealthy was the Emperor. He warned of working through the current Japanese government, and of supporting the status quo. He showed that there were Japanese with whom we could work, although most of us had never heard of them under the recent regimes. He suggested policies which would win the support of the workers, small business men, farmers, and other potential democratic groups which had long been suppressed. The book seemed to be based on a careful study of the Japanese, their history, their economy, and their political and social experiences. He discusses our official foreign policy and points to certain weaknesses of the premises on which that policy is based. He calls for the abolishment of the Emperor system, the semi-feudal landlords, and the industrial Zaibatsu. The book is well-documented.

Owen Lattimore commented on Roth's book:

> "Andrew Roth analyzes the Japanese problem convincingly. His opinions require respect because they are grounded on facts and because they are the result of logical thinking. He represents the younger school of American experts who are not blinded, as are so many older experts, by myths which even the Japanese do not believe."2

Many of Roth's predictions have come true, according

2. Andrew Roth, Dilemma in Japan, Little Brown & Company, Boston, Mass. 1945. Jacket of book.

to recent economic writers. Roth himself guesses that his exclusion from Japan is because this book has been quoted by many of the critics of the Occupation. "It provides useful ammunition to progressive critics of the Great White Father."[3]

If this is the case, then Roth is being banned because he is critical of the official policy. Censorship is working effectively, by denying him the right to go to Japan, to see things for himself, and to write them as he sees them. And readers of the Nation are being denied the right to hear any but the official story of the Occupation.

But Roth offers another possible reason for refusal of entry. He says perhaps it hinges on the famous loyalty case of June, 1945 when he, as a lieutenant in the Navy, was arrested along with Mark Gayn of PM, Philip Jaffe,[4] editor of the left-wing, now defunct, magazine Amerasia, Kate Mitchell, co-editor of Amerasia, E. S. Larsen and John S. Service of the State Department, for allegedly conspiring to steal classified government documents.

3. Nation, January 7, 1950, p. 4.
4. Philip Jaffe in 1950 has been called a Communist by Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin in his charges that the State Department has Communists in its hire. McCarthy has attempted to link Jaffe's friendship with Service as evidence of Services's alleged guilt.

Roth had been cleared in this case, and so had all the others except Larsen and Jaffe. Larsen did not dispute the charge that he had given the documents to Jaffe, and Jaffe admitted having received them. Both Jaffe and Larsen were fined, and the charges against Roth and the other three were dropped. In this case, the government, according to Roth's account, made it clear that the documents were harmless and that the intent was not criminal. Mark Gayn went to Japan the same year to report the Occupation. This case is still on Roth's record, and even though he was cleared of all charges, he has said that he feels that it is an implied smear on his loyalty, and may be a possible reason for MacArthur's ban.

Roth began applying to go to Japan in December, 1948. His editors wrote to the National Military Establishment in January, 1949 to request his clearance. The clearance was delayed on the grounds that Roth was not a full-time employee of the magazine. This was corrected when Nation bought up his contracts with the other publications and agreed to act as a syndicating agency for him. The editors of Nation, then, sent notice to Washington that Roth was on a full-time basis of employment, and received word that he was being denied accreditation for security reasons.

It was then that the editors asked if the Amerasia

case had anything to do with the decision and were told that it had not. The editors, then, appealed the case to Secretary of Defense Johnson, and on June 10, 1949 received full accreditation for Roth.

It had been established in the case of Newsweek's Tokyo editor, Compton Pakenham, that the Department of Defense had the final say-so on the clearing of correspondents. Therefore, Roth and his editors assumed that a military entry permit from General MacArthur would be automatic. However, MacArthur exercised his veto power in this case and refused the entry permit. The editors again contacted the Accreditation Branch of the National Military Establishment in Washington, which wired MacArthur to submit justification of the refusal to admit Roth. The matter was supposed to have been reviewed personally by MacArthur, his opinion forwarded to the Army's Chief of Staff in Washington, who upheld it. No public statement was made by Washington regarding the case. No official reason was given, except that MacArthur felt that it was not in the interest of "security" to have Roth in Japan.

The ban was confirmed on the basis that "Current regulations covering accreditation hold commanders responsible for the security of their command."

Precisely how Roth would endanger what security was not explained.

What then are the security rules that a correspondent must meet?

What then are the limits of MacArthur's power to say what kind of an analysis of the Occupation the American public will get?

The New York Post comments:

> "If a correspondent can be willfully and summarily barred from Japan without even being told why he is unfit, no newspaperman can feel free to write independent copy there."5

A statement of the case in detail in the words of the editors of Nation magazine is attached in appendix.

5. New York Post as quoted in Newsweek, March 20, 1950, p. 48.

Chapter VII

The Japanese Press

Although a free press is to be the goal in Japan, few of us would be willing to allow Japanese writers uncontrolled liberties to attack the Occupation. Censorship had to be established for reason of security and morale. Certain standards were set up at the very beginning of the Occupation, the so-called Press Code for Japan, consisting of the following ten articles:

"1. News must adhere strictly to the truth.

2. Nothing shall be printed which might, directly or by inference, disturb the public tranquility.

3. There shall be no false or destructive criticism of the Allied Powers.

4. There shall be no destructive criticism of the Allied Forces of Occupation and nothing which might invite distrust or resentment of those troops.

5. There shall be no mention or discussion of Allied troop movements, unless such movements have been officially released.

6. News stories must be factually written and completely devoid of editorial material.

7. News stories shall not be colored to conform with any propaganda line.

8. Minor details of a new story must not be overemphasized to stress or develop any propaganda line.

9. No news story shall be distorted by the omission of pertinent facts or details.

10. In the make-up of the newspaper no news story shall be given undue prominence for the purpose of establishing or developing any propaganda line."1

Such was the Code set down for the press; a similar code was set down for all radio broadcasts (including a provision for any future commercial broadcasts). The Pictorial Code for Japan is somewhat different, and I quote it:

"1. Films of theatrical productions purporting to be factual representations of historical or current events must adhere to the truth.

2. Neither motion picture films nor theatrical productions will be used for anti-democratic, feudalistic, ultra-nationalistic or militaristic propaganda.

3. Nothing will appear on stage or screen which would hinder the accomplishment of the objectives of the Occupation or endanger the relationship between the Allied Powers.

4. Lead, sub-titles, explanations, advertisements and screen stage dialogue will conform to the above provisions."2

The code became a guide for the censors and for the Japanese writers.

Censorship officers looked on the first phase of the Occupation as a period to train Japanese writers in good journalistic practices and to help them develop a sense

1. Directives of the Supreme Commanders Allied Powers, Nippon Times, Ltd. p. 1.
2. Ibid.

of public responsibility. The Civil Censorship Detachment was set up as the operating agency, as a part of the Civil Intelligence Section of SCAP and was not designed to assist any other particular Section. It was administered as a measure of military control and had no functional connection with the Civil Information and Education Section which was supposed to bring democracy to the Japanese press. These two offices operated under different plans, with different objectives.

Censorship involved a period of "pre-censorship" which meant that the censors read everything before it went in print. Later, most of the publications were put on a "post-censorship" basis, which meant that they were trusted to follow the code. If they slipped consistently, they were punished.

During the early phases of censorship, there was evidence of overzealousness on part of the censors. For example, Burton Crane of the New York Times, examined sixty stories censored by SCAP and found "only two or three seemed direct violations of the press code."[3]

Another example of this type of eagerness came up in a personal interview when I talked with a censorship of-

3. Ralph Chapman, "Japan: Propaganda to Pornography," The Saturday Review of Literature, July 31, 1948, p. 9.

ficer after his return to the States. He complained that censors found so many things to censor that did not fit into the code. "However," he said, "it was amazing the flexibility which, under necessity, could be and was read into those rules in an endeavor to justify the condemning of what were palpable violations but which seemed to elude the strict interpretation of the code."

One of the most spectacular cases of censorship occurred in October of 1946.

A Japanese-written, paper-bound biography of General MacArthur had sold 800,000 copies as the post-war best seller. Its author Kazuyoshi Yamazaki, a former political journalist who was ousted by the Japanese police during the war, was beseiged by many letters from Japanese praising the book.

Excerpts from some of the letters were:

"General MacArthur is a living god."

"He is the reincarnation of the Emperor Jimmu, first Emperor of Japan."

"The Japanese people should be guided and directed by him, instead of arguing about the propriety of the emperor system."

" (MacArthur) will be remembered for centuries to come by this nation...he stands before the defeated nation

of Japan like the sun coming out of dark clouds and shining on the world."

"The only thing I wish at present to do is to see General MacArthur in person while I am alive. If it is possible, I wish then to hear the General's voice over the radio."

"As a school teacher of the primary school of democratic Japan, I deem it a mission for me to tell my pupils how great a man General MacArthur is."

An incurable invalid claimed the book had put him on the road to recovery.[4]

It seemed to some that the Japanese were making an idol of MacArthur.

It seemed to others that MacArthur must be holy to perform the consecrated task of saving the sacred soil of their homeland. Letters to the author of the MacArthur book brought many of these reactions into print.

The author commented:

"This popularity among Japanese readers has been gained only by virtue of the great character of the Supreme Commander."[5]

Because of the adoration and adulation shown to Mac

4. International News Service, "Gen. M'Arthur Biography Is Jap Best-Seller," Pacific Stars and Stripes, Sept. 24, 1946, p. 4, col. 4.
5. Ibid. p. 4. col. 4.

Arthur, a few Japanese intellectuals began to worry. The MacArthur myth was growing too strong. It was beginning to rival the Emperor myth.

On October 3, 1946, an editor of the Jiji Shimpo, a conservative Tokyo paper, wrote an editorial warning the Japanese against worshipping MacArthur as a living god. After a week's delay the editorial was passed by SCAP censors.[6] It was published October 11 and distributed to about 250,000 readers.[7]

The Nippon Times, the English language newspaper distributed by the Japanese Foreign Office,[8] (it was considered to be the mouthpiece of the Japanese government and was delivered free to American Occupation personnel) approving the feelings of the editor of the Jiji Shimpo, prepared to reprint the editorial. Again it was sent to the censors and passed.

After the presses began to run, Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, sat in his office in the Dai Ichi Building late that night, scanning the proofsheets. He read:

"...Japanese teachers have the habit of blind worship for...the man in power....They used to endeavor to instill

6. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 44.
7. "Holy Mac" Time, Oct. 21, 1946, p. 19, col. 2.
8. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 44.

in the minds of their pupils that the Emperor was God. Now they claim that General MacArthur is the Savior... Until the Japanese are cleansed of this servile concept, democracy in Japan will make no progress."[9]

The editorial went on strongly to attack MacArthur-worshippers who had transferred their former overwhelming reverence from Hitler, Togo, and the Emperor to the Supreme Commander. It added that these misguided people do not realize that MacArthur's voice is the "voice of the democratic system."

It said that unless this feudalistic concept of "worship of those in power" be corrected, some substitute "living god" will be searched out the day after MacArthur leaves Japan to bring on the sort of dictatorship which caused the past war. The editorial concluded by saying:

> "...The proper way for the Japanese to repay General MacArthur's sincere efforts to democratize this country and his wise administration is not to worship him, but to rid themselves of subservience and strive, with high self-esteem, to assume the actual authority of government by themselves. Only then will the Supreme Commander be assured that the object of the Occupation has been achieved."10

Perhaps the paragraph in which a direct comparison was attempted between the type of blind obeisance shown to Hitler and Tojo with the present worship of MacArthur was

9. "Holy Mac" op. cit. p. 19.
10. Gayn, Japan Diary, op. cit. p. 476.

the part of the story that upset General Willoughby most.

Quickly, he organized a full squad of military police, and descended on the printing plant, where presses were rolling off the last of an edition of 50,000.[11] He stopped the presses. He ordered trains to be halted and already-loaded editions removed and burned.

The General ordered Sergeant Kravetz, assistant composing room foreman for Stars and Strips which was made up in the same building, to set up a substitute story on "Sightseeing in Tokyo" for the Nippon Times page. The Stars and Stripes was not using the same editorial in their columns, so was permitted to go ahead with its schedule.

Willoughby said:

"Occupation authorities must be protected against correspondents. The article was not in good taste."[12]

This brought up the whole question of censorship in Japan. Just how far could the Japanese go in discussing the Occupation? The fact that the Allied censors had first permitted the editorial to be printed in Japanese and then censored it in the later translation proved that General

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11. "Holy Mac" op. cit. p. 19.
12. Lindesay Parrott, "Censorship Mix-Up Is Aired In Tokyo," New York Times Overseas Weekly, Oct. 20, 1946, p. 5. col. 5.

Willoughby differed from his subordinates, who had considered it unobjectionable. The question of whether or not there was an attempt to disparage the Supreme Commander was not decided.

The next day, Private First Class Ozanne of the Army Stars and Stripes wrote a combined news service story concerning the appearance of the editorial, and the staff made arrangements to submit the story to MacArthur's Intelligence (G-2) Section for approval. On October 13, G-2 approved the story, adding the paragraph linking Mac Arthur's name with that of Tojo and Hitler, which had purposely been left out of the original Stars and Stripes story. G-2 then submitted this revised story to MacArthur's office for clearance. SCAP headquarters refused permission to publish the Stars and Stripes' rewrite as "placing the Supreme Commander in a false position, and thus tending to undermine the authority of the Occupation forces and their commanders." This decision was presented to the editorial staff by the chief of Information and Education Services, Colonel Gard, in an off-the-record conference, on October 14.

On October 15, at a censorship conference in the office of the Assistant G-2, Colonel Bratton, it was asked by the Commanding Officer of the Civil Censorship Detach-

ment, Colonel Putnam, what Stars and Stripes would do in case any wire service was received concerning the Nippon Times incident. He was told by a Stars and Stripes officer that in view of the SCAP decision, such stories would be omitted from Stars and Stripes, unless it came in a Public Relations release, for it was pointed out that Stars and Stripes considered PRO releases as semi-official and certainly safe to use in any event. Colonel Putnam replied to this that unfortunately PRO releases are not always safe, but the Stars and Stripes officer told him that the soldier-newspaper could not be placed in a position of being held responsible for questionable releases from PRO, and that the editors would have to consider PRO material as useable at all times. Colonel Bratton then inquired in what way Stars and Stripes censored news, and was informed that it was simply a matter of editorial selection and that Stars and Stripes would be most happy to feel itself out from under censorship. To this, Colonel Bratton replied that Stars and Stripes was not under official censorship. His statement, however, was difficult to reconcile with the above events.

Although the Army paper had carried a story on the popularity of the MacArthur biography, it never reported the Nippon Times incident or referred to the burned edi-

torial page. So Occupation personnel were not to know of the censorship and of the extreme sensitivity of SCAP officers in this matter, although the General and the MPs at the printing plant had been dramatic enough to cause a lot of comment. This event has been repeated in most discussions of MacArthur's censorship as the classic example of censorial zeal. The editorial follows:

Hero Worship

"JiJi Shimpo -- Practically every Japanese holds it a supreme fortune to find General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Occupation forces in Japan, which consist mainly of the United States Army. No wonder that a booklet containing General MacArthur's biography has proved the postwar best-seller here, selling to the extent of 800,000 copies.

"However, the popular reaction to this booklet which almost borders on fanatical hero worship calls for sober reflection.

"The altogether excessive acclaim which the Japanese have accorded to the Allied Supreme Commander furnishes a testimony to none other than their ignorance of the fact that General Mad Arthur's pronouncements represent the pronouncements of the democratic system of government, instead of those of an individual. Democracy means liberty. It is the right of man and as such is not something to be deified or held in mystic reverence.

"The Japanese people have long been plagued by the mistaken idea that government is something which is to be executed by some deity, hero, great man or somebody with particularly superior faculties, but not by themselves. This servile feudalistic concept has been the very cause which prevented Japan from being democratized under the Meiji Constitution, and unless this idea is rectified, there can be no assurance for government in this country. Nay, there is

positive possibility that the moment General Mac Arthur pulls out from this country, the Japanese will pick up another 'living deity' in his stead, thus degrading themselves to their former status of slavery under totalitarian government.

"Japan used to abound in ardent Hitler worshippers. Grammar school teachers used to picture the German dictator before their pupils as a personality superior to Napoleon. When the Japanese-American War started, they switched the object of their worship to General Tojo and after the surrender, to General MacArthur. Japanese teachers have traditionally been bent on inspiring the children with this habit of blind worship for the ruler, that is, the man in power, of the time -- a tendency constituting the worst enemy of democracy.

"They used to endeavor to instill in the minds of their pupils that the Emperor was 'God,' that Hitler was the greatest hero of all times, that Tojo was the greatest man of the present era, and now, that General MacArthur is the 'Savior.' There has taken place no change in this servile way of thinking.

"Not a few Japanese must once have esteemed Hitler as a person greater than Napoleon. More wished that a Hitler emerged among the Japanese. It may be assumed that many Japanese are today wishing that General MacArthur take the leadership of the nation.

"It must be emphasized that unless and until the Japanese are cleansed of this servile concept, democracy in Japan will make no progress. A nation with enough guts to carve a destiny for themselves--only such a nation will be able to establish democratic government and operate it successfully. The first step in the process of democratization must be to rid the nation of the habit of hero worship which has imbued their minds during the past 20 centuries.

"This process, incidentally, will serve to ensure the stability of the Imperial Family, for people who refuse to idolize the authority are not liable to switch their attachment to the Imperial Family

> to other objects whereas those who worship the Imperial Family just as a type of the ruling authority will possibly shift their adoration to an authority that may newly emerge.
>
> "In democracy, the governments in the hands of the people and the Imperial Family resides apart from this, as the object of public attachment and reverence.
>
> "The proper way for the Japanese people to repay General MacArthur's sincere effort for democratizing this country and his wise administration is, not to worship him either as a deified personage or as a great man, but to rid themselves of the subservient way of thinking and make efforts, with high self-esteem, to grasp the actual authority of government by themselves. Then, and only then, the Supreme Commander will rest assured that the object of Occupation has been achieved.13

The record shows that SCAP officers through censorship have, at times, used their power over the Japanese press for reasons other than the progress of the Occupation. Some of these reasons have political significance and some seem to represent personal prejudices.

Richard Lauterbach cites two of these instances when news from America failed to reach the Japanese. He claims that "Henry Wallace's letter to President Truman about foreign policy and his subsequent speech were held up by the censors in Tokyo for 48 hours. When they were finally released they were so sliced into ribbons that only an 'interpretative' article and not a news story

13. Press Comments, Nippon Times, October 12, 1946, p. 4. col. 2. first-run edition.

could be written by bewildered Japanese journalists."[14] This was Mr. Wallace's now famous speech on foreign policy at Madison Square Garden. It was then transmitted by the State Department to Japan as a bulletin of public interest. Thus, it was official in origin as well as in distribution, as Wallace, at that time, was Secretary of Commerce.[15]

For New Years' Day, 1947, Philip Murray, president of the CIO, sent a greeting to Japanese labor which SCAP censored in part. According to Lauterbach, here is the Murray message with the censored portions underlined and bracketed:

> "I am happy to send a message from the American CIO to Japanese labor. Laborers of the world have many things in common and all (opposed to dictatorship in the black days before the war) seeking peace, safety and jobs. The CIO believes in world peace and depends on the collaboration of the laborers of the whole world. This collaboration has been possible through the World Federation of Trade Unions. (I earnestly hope the day will come soon when Japanese labor will send delegates to this fighting organization of democratic labor unions. There are American CIO members in the American Occupation's labor division, and others of our members helped reform the Japanese educational system. These men praise the Japanese masses who are longing for democracy.)[16]

There has also been a tendency for Occupation leaders

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14. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 46.
15. Robert H. Berkov, "The Press In Postwar Japan," Far Eastern Survey, July 23, 1947, p. 163.
16. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 46.

to coerce the Japanese press into publicizing SCAP messages -- "Some which it would have preferred to touch on lightly."[17] According to Harold Wakefield, the press was directed to interpret and amplify SCAP directives that it had previously published without comment. Particular pressure was brought on the editors to discuss the war guilt of Japanese military leaders and the position of the Emperor in the new era.

> "...When war trials began in Yokohama, in 1945, Allied Headquarters were dissatisfied with the press coverage. Editors were called to a conference and urged to publish adequate reports. This press conference was given front page publicity, possibly to indicate only the improved coverage of Allied Headquarters and not the sympathies of the newspapers."18

Often the Japanese are baffled by the inconsistencies of the censors. The Army Special Service group had presented "The Mikado" with a GI cast in 1946. But, in June, 1947, when a Japanese company was preparing to produce this same operetta, SCAP censors interceded and prohibited it out of deference to the Emperor.[19]

Commonweal magazine published an article by Paul V. Miller on censorship in Japan. Miller criticizes certain practices of the censors. Major Imboden, of SCAP's Civil

17. Harold Wakefield, New Paths For Japan, Oxford University Press, 1948, p. 158.
18. Ibid.
19. Lauterbach, Danger From The East, op. cit. p. 46.

Information and Education Section, wrote a reply to the editors of the magazine defending SCAP policy.

Mr. Miller says that a "high-ranking policy-making officer told censors throughout Japan that extreme secrecy must be maintained concerning all censorship operation inasmuch as there are groups in Congress and among the American people who would be adverse to the censorship policy. Those people must not be given access to the facts."[20]

To this Major Imboden replied, "I think it is not too much to say that General MacArthur has inspired these strange and mysterious people (Japanese) to embrace a new national life and rededicate their national life along the highway of peace and democracy....I doubt if any of these great accomplishments could have been attained without censorship."[21]

Mr. Miller charges:

> "...Censorship is not mild and perfunctory; it is carried out with such methodical diligence that even a people as patient and subservient as the Japanese are obliged to wince at it...In many instances speeches are cut not because they contain anything seditious or disadvantageous to the United States but merely because the candidate had given too accurate a picture of Japan's present miserable condition.

20. Paul Vincent Miller, "Censorship in Japan," Commonweal, April 25, 1947, p. 35.
21. Major Daniel C. Imboden, "Censorship in Japan," the Commonweal, June 13, 1947, p. 657.

> "The newspapers have been forced to become so circumspect that the Japanese people cannot help but feel that they merely are echoing SCAP policies. 'Daily papers and the radio are doing their best to eulogize the Yankees,' says one letter-writer. 'The administration is entirely carried on under the direction of General MacArthur.' Another letter-writer states, 'I was told to be very careful in writing about the Allied nations' policies, tendencies, etc. Therefore, if my thesis is to be made public, I should like to revise the proof again.' A third letter-writer confides, 'It makes me angry to think that this censorship is the work of an Army which prides itself on its freedom.' A fourth says, 'If it (censorship) is for the purpose of investigating opinions there is no freedom of correspondence...I have often discovered that the Americans do not practice what they preach concerning freedom and equality, and they do not regard us as human.' Still another declares 'At present the radio, newspapers, and magazines are released only after being censored by MacArthur's headquarters. Is this the so-called 'freedom of speech?' News or information cannot be released unless the crimes of Japanese committed in the past are compared to the perfect of the Allied Forces..."[22]

Certain books that were critical of the Occupation were not permitted to enter Japan from the States. The Japanese were not to read John Hersey's "Hiroshima," in the early days of the Occupation. Edgar Snow's book, "Battle For Asia," was thought dangerous by some SCAP censors. "The Case of General Yamashita," by A. Frank Reel, a defense lawyer for the Yamashita war crimes trial, who bitterly attacked MacArthur's handling of the case, was not to be mentioned in the Japanese press.[23]

22. Miller, "Censorship in Japan," op. cit. p. 35.
23. Chicago Tribune Press Service, October 6, 1949.

SCAP censorship was gradually relaxed and officially abolished on November 1, 1949. Control has now been turned over to the Japanese. What the results of our policy will be remains to be seen. An ex-censorship officer pointed out that in December of 1949, just after the SCAP ban was lifted, there was a bill before the Diet (legislature) which stated that "freedom of newspapers to 'report' the elections will not be obstructed," thereby, by implication, limiting or denying the right of critical comment.

Chapter VIII

The Pacific Stars and Stripes

The Pacific Stars and Stripes occupies a unique position among Army publications. It is the only American daily newspaper available to civilian and soldier Occupation personnel in Japan and Korea. Because it is the sole source of news, it is influential in the shaping of attitudes of those people who are planning and enacting our foreign policy in Japan. Its circulation has varied from 80,000 to 150,000. It is distributed free on the basis of one copy to every five persons in the offices and units. The paper's potential influence on the Japanese is likewise great, as it is used in Japanese schools in the study of the American language, quoted in the Japanese press, and filed in Japanese libraries.

Because it is such a powerful organ, it has been subjected to pressures of all kinds by those who wished to further their own voice. The soldier newsmen have fought to keep it as close to an enlisted man's paper as possible, written from his point of view. Staff sections have jealously fought for control over it. (From its inception it has been published under the Troop Information and Education Services of GHQ). The Army high command watched it carefully. At times even the Japanese have

tried to influence the staff.

One of the most popular features in the Tokyo paper was the daily column "Japan Today" which was intended to give readers a running account of the Occupation's progress. Cpl. Barnard Rubin, its resourceful columnist, delved independently into the realm of Japanese politics. His columns were well-written and well-documented. It was not long before his views were being quoted by Japanese editors, and American correspondents were coming to him for "tips."

As Rubin's opinions gradually moved away from the official Occupation policy, interest in his column soared to new heights and the wrath of important SCAP officers fell on him. The most spectacular deviation from SCAP policy was his column linking the Japanese Christian leader Kagawa with the support of the war effort just about the time that it was rumored that MacArthur was grooming him for the premiership. Rubin was informed that since Kagawa was not on SCAP's list of war criminals, he should not be tried in the columns of the Army newspaper. Further mention of Kagawa was banned. The order came from MacArthur through his Chief of Staff.[1] Upon

1. Barnard Rubin, "No Halo For Kagawa," The Protestant, October-November, 1946, p. 23.

receiving this notice, the staff resented what they called "brasshat interference" with the editorial freedom of their columnist.

During the first few months of the Occupation, there were many combat veterans in Japan, who were much more concerned with going home than with shouldering the problems of our Far Eastern foreign policy and postwar Occupation. These man anxiously awaited all news of deployment. They spoke out loudly against the shipping delays and what seemed to them the slow return of troops to the States. In the midst of this discontent, came the announcement from the War Department about the overall policy of slowing down demobilization. "Comment and Query," the letters-to-the-editor column in Stars and Stripes, reflected the deep gloom with which the homesick soldiers received the news.

On January 9, 1946, the staff received a letter from William Dunn, a civilian correspondent for Columbia Broadcasting System, who expressed a different view. To him the demobilization hysteria was a breach of faith with the earlier combat men. He said, in part:

> "During the past four years I gained a hearty respect for the American GI as a man who did his duty to his country to the best of his ability, and with no more griping than a situation demanded.
>
> "On March 2, 1942, in Bandoeng, Java, I watched

a battalion of American artillerymen move to certain defeat at the hands of an overwhelming Japanese force -- singing 'The Eyes of Texas are Upon You!'

"Later the same year I sat with American GI's in the steaming, stinking jungle of Buna and listened to men who hadn't had a mouthful of hot food or drink in three weeks ... who hadn't had their shoes off their feet in a longer time ... who had been fighting one of the cruelest, bloodiest battles of the war ... laugh at each other's appearance and joke about their plight.

"In 1943 I saw American soldiers, dogtired, hungry, and smeared with the red clay of Roosevelt Ridge--still able to crack wise and anxious to share their only canteen cup of lukewarm coffee with a buddy.

"I sat on the deck of a transport enroute to Cape Gloucester and watched American GI's endlessly cleaning their guns in preparation for a dawn landing that promised to be bitter, with never a word of complaint.

"I was with Americans on Leyte and I never saw them flinch in the face of the enemy or rail bitterly at conditions which too often could have been better. I remember those American boys who fought their way up the Villa Verde trail, inch by inch--many of them with a hundred and thirty or forty points and more than their share of purple hearts--talking wistfully of the home they hadn't seen in years--but with far less wailing and gnashing of teeth than the forty or fifty pointers so vividly portrayed by Stars and Stripes.

"Never in four years did I ever hear a wounded American threaten to write to his congressman or try to organize a march in defiance of constituted authority--and if you don't think any of them had adequate provocation you haven't been long in the Pacific.

"No one contends that conditions in Japan are perfect or that the powers above are moving with the wisdom of Solomon. But the fact remains that there

> is a job to be done in this Occupation and that the GI's who gave their lives on the long road to Tokyo can't be expected to do that job. They've done their share already and they aren't going home again, regardless of how low the War department cuts the points or how fast that cut is made."
>
> WILLIAM J. DUNN[2]

When this letter arrived at the news office, Colonel James Parks, the officer-in-charge, went to the composing room and inserted it in the "Comment and Query" column without consulting any of the men on the staff. Because of the length of the Dunn letter, several other letters had to be scrapped. Just before the page went to press, the editors noticed the substitution and protested that their integrity as newspapermen had been violated. Colonel Parks insisted that the paper should express varied views. As a compromise, part of the Dunn letter was cut out.

The next day, the editors released a statement to the civilian correspondents which was filed to the American press. The statement, signed by 26 enlisted men, critized the action of Colonel Parks and complained that their paper was being turned into a "house organ for the War Department." A United Press story, published on the back page of Stars and Stripes, summarized the GIs' feelings in the matter.

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2. William J. Dunn, "Still A Job To Be Done," Comment and Query column, Pacific Stars and Stripes, January 8, 1946, p. 3, col. 6.

"TOKYO (UP) -- Enlisted personnel of the Army service newspaper, Pacific Stars and Stripes, claiming it 'never enjoyed the privileges of a free press even by army standards' issued a statement Thursday asserting ... in this demobilization crisis we feel that the paper has been usurped from enlisted personnel to be converted into a house organ for the War department.

"The statement declared the newspaper has 'through open and implied pressure upon it been forced to delete, distort and play down news to serve personal and professional interests of the Army hierarchy and in many instances, officers generally.'

"The statement said the enlisted editorial staff agreed to subordinate news of demonstrations after the War department's latest demobilization announcement 'for we believe even as any general that such demonstrations--particularly in Occupied territory--are indefensible and can serve only to harm the Army's mission in Japan.'

"The statement continued that after agreeing in a staff meeting with Lt. Col. James Parks, officer in charge of the paper, upon handling of the demobilization story, 'Colonel Parks not only broke faith with his staff--which is relatively incidental--but with thousands of men who look upon the Comment and Query column of the paper as a medium through which they may freely express their opinions. Two hours before the paper was to go to press on the evening of Jan. 9, he (Parks) inserted a letter from a civilian news correspondent at the expense of letters written by enlisted men. This letter ... was inserted in the paper by Colonel Parks without consulting any member of the staff.'

"The statement added: 'The letter received his personal attention but did not pass through the channels which other letters are forced to go. The staff had no knowledge of the letter until the mechanical department was ordered to set it in type ... we therefore feel compelled to make known the facts surrounding this newspaper, whose name has come to imply some measure of integrity, freedom

and responsibility to members of the armed forces.'"[3]

After the statement appeared, MacArthur's headquarters directed the Inspector General to investigate. Results of the investigation were not published. The demobilization situation eased and the letters' column moved on to other GI complaints. In "Japan Today" Rubin analyzed the Zaibatsu, the industrialist families who controlled much of the concentrated wealth of Japan, pointing out the need to break up their large holdings in the process of democratization.

A month later, Colonel John F. Davis, the Troop Information and Education chief, ordered the managing editor Sgt. Kenneth Pettus and Corporal Rubin removed from their jobs and shipped to Okinawa because of "negative results on a loyalty check."[4]

Eleven of the 15 editorial staff members sent a letter "through channels" to General MacArthur asking for the reinstatement of the two men. The letter termed the transfers the "culmination of a long series of attempts by the Army hierarchy to muzzle the paper."[5] They added

3. United Press, "GI Editors Issue Statement," Pacific Stars and Stripes, January 11, 1946, p. 4, col. 3.
4. International News Service, "Stars and Stripes Men Removed For 'Disloyalty,'" Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 11, 1946, p. 1, col. 3.
5. New York Times, "GI Writers Fight Slur On Loyalty," Feb. 11, 1946, p. 8, col. 1.

that they linked the action to the statement signed by staff members in January which criticized the strict Army censorship and that they considered the transfers an "exile to the salt mines."[6]

In addition Pettus and Rubin personally addressed a letter direct to MacArthur requesting a review of their case. As a result, MacArthur's Chief of Staff General R.J. Marshall ordered an inquiry by the Inspector General and delayed the transfer of the two men to Okinawa.[7] Meanwhile Colonel Davis returned the staff letter to the staff, declining to send it on up "through channels" because the matter had already been brought to the attention of General MacArthur by the Pettus-Rubin letter.[8]

The Tokyo Chapter of the American Veterans Committee took a stand on the dismissal of Pettus and Rubin when a spokesman of the planning committee declared at a public forum that the men should be given a right to hear an explanation of the charges made against them. "It is a matter which concerns the hundreds of thousands of readers of the GI paper and the American public generally," he

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6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Associated Press, "Staff Letter Still In Channels" Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 13, 1946, p. 1, col. 6.

stated.[9]

On February 16, 18 staff members filed identical telegrams to the House and Senate military affairs committee asking the committees "to investigate Army policy and procedure which permits the branding of men as disloyal without giving them the opportunity to defend themselves.."[10] More than 75 other enlisted men and officers telegraphed their Congressmen to demand an investigation of this case.[11]

After several weeks, MacArthur's Inspector General made his report in which he stated that he had evidence that both Pettus and Rubin had belonged to the nationwide Communist Party and had "flavored" their writings with "communistic thought."[12]

Ken Pettus immediately asserted, "I am not a Communist, and don't contemplate joining the Communist Party." Rubin admitted having been a Communist for "about

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9. International News Service, "AVC Asks Hearing For Pettus, Rubin," Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 14, 1946, col. 2.
10. Associated Press, "18 GI Newsmen Seek Congressional Probe," Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 16, 1946, p. 1. col. 1.
11. Duane Hennessy, Associated Press, "Chief of Staff Studies Stars-Stripes Letter," Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 17, 1946, p. 1, col. 2.
12. Associated Press, "MacArthur Backs Ouster of GI Writers Accused of Voicing Communist Thought," New York Times, March 3, 1946, p. 34, col. 4-5.

four years" but had resigned and did not belong to the Party when he was inducted into the Army.[13]

Colonel E. J. Dwan, the Inspector General, emphasized that the loyalty of the soldiers was not in question and "nowhere in my study of their case histories have I found the word 'loyalty' even mentioned, let alone adversely associated with their names and deeds." In making a loyalty check, however, the Colonel explained, a soldier has to establish "loyalty, discretion and integrity" in order to receive a favorable report and "there is an abundance of evidence that reflects adversely."[14]

This is the Inspector General's report:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

CIRCULAR)
:
NO....13)

APO 500
2 March 1946

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION-re: RELIEF OF T/3 PETTUS AND T/5 RUBIN FROM I&E DETACHMENT, AFPAC

The following extract report of the Inspector General, United States Army Forces, Pacific is published for the information and guidance of all concerned. Its recommendations have been approved.

"1. AUTHORITY. This investigation was made by Col. E. J. Dwan, Inspector General, during the period 11--23 February 1946, pursuant to orders of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.

2. MATTER INVESTIGATED. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain the reasons for the relief of T/3 Kenneth L. Pettus, 36781911 and T/5 Barnard Rubin, 33837353, from assignment, the Information and Education Detachment, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

3. FACTS. War Department radiogram, dated 20 January 1946, ordered the immediate screening of all Information and Education personnel to establish their complete loyalty to the United States.

4. The I&E Officer, Colonel John F. Davis, immediately submitted the names of all members of his section, approximately thirty, to the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer (General Thorpe). A check of the files disclosed information that made questionable the complete loyalty of only T/3 Kenneth L. Pettus and T/5 Barnard Rubin. General Thorpe therefore recommended on 29 January 1946 that these men not be assigned to "sensitive" duties and if presently so assigned that they be removed therefrom.

5. On 31 January 1946, Colonel Davis reported T/3 Pettus and T/5 Rubin as available for immediate reassignment to any organization not pertaining to Information and Education. He noted that their release was directed as a matter of policy, and was not prejudicial to their character or efficiency as soldiers.

6. A follow-up Check Sheet from Col. Davis on 6 February 1946, repeated the request. It noted that the files contained derogatory information on these soldiers and that in accordance with War Department directives they should be relieved. Having heard that they were to be reassigned in the Tokyo area, he considered that they would continue to exert influence on their former associates. This would not be in accord with the purpose of their relief from I&E. Colonel Davis therefore expressed the desire that these two soldiers be relieved of further duty in Japan and assigned to Okinawa.

7. Orders, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, APO 500, dated 7 February 1946 ordered T/3 Pettus and T/5 Rubin attached unassigned to the 25th Replacement Depot, APO 105.

8. Contrary to conjectures in "Pacific Stars and Stripes" of 11 February 1946, the instant case is entirely independent and has no connection with a previous in-

vestigation made by Col H. J. McChrystal, IGD, during the period 12-22 January 1946. The report of this investigation is dated 29 January 1946. Its Conclusions and Recommendations mention neither of the two soldiers nor any other enlisted men. The genesis of the instant case is the War Department radiogram dated 20 January 1946.

9. ANALYSIS OF THE SOUNDNESS OF THE DECISION.

a. The scope of a loyalty investigation as directed in the basic War Department radiogram of 20 January 1946 is more comprehensive than the popular concept of the word "loyalty". War Department Technical Manual, dated 1 March 1944, Subject: "Counterintelligence Investigative Reports", defines it in the words:

> "b. Loyalty investigations. A loyalty investigation is an inquiry in which the loyalty, discretion, and integrity of the subject, (although not suspected) must be established because of present duties to which the subject is assigned."

b. From the same publication we also extract:

> "9. CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION OF CASES. a. Loyalty investigations. *** The (case) classification (i.e. loyalty) will not be changed because information is developed reflecting adversely on the character, integrity, or discretion of an individual which may render him unacceptable for the duties to which he is assigned or to which it is contemplated he will be assigned unless the element of disloyalty is also developed by the evidence."

c. The "element of disloyalty" refers to offenses (more serious case classifications) that can be classified as Sabotage, Espionage, Treason, Sedition, Subversive activity, and Disaffection.

10. Both T/3 Pettus and T/5 Rubin in their journeys from their induction centers to this Theater were the subjects of several routine loyalty investigations, or checks. With one exception--re: Rubin, 43d Infantry Division--the recommendations thereof were uniformly consistent with the decision of our Chief Counter Intelligence Officer; viz that "those men be not assigned to 'sensitive' duties,

and if presently assigned to such duties that they be removed therefrom."

11. The attached Supplement details the basic evidence in the case of each soldier under the self-explanatory section titles here listed:

a. Case of T/3 Kenneth L. Pettus.

(1) Hq Seventh Service Command, Adverse Classification by. Request for restriction to non-sensitive duties.
(2) New Caledonia Island Command Close Supervision; Restricted Duties. Questionably Communistic Radio Script Rejected.
(3) General Headquarters, American Forces, Pacific. Senior Noncommissioned Officer on Insubordinate Enlisted Staff, "Pacific Stars and Stripes", Jan 9, 1946.

b. Case of T/5 Barnard Rubin.

(1) New Cumberland, Pa, Reception Center Adverse Collateral Information Discovered
(2) Hq Camp Hood, Texas, Eighth Service Command Adverse Classification, Restricted from sensitive duties.
(3) Hq 43d Infantry Division (combat) Favorable Loyalty Check.
(4) 1st Cavalry Division Self Admitted Communist; Alleged Propagandist.
(5) General Headquarters, American Forces, Pacific Columnist purveyer of controversial subject.
(6) Questionable Use of Confidential and Restricted Official Files.

c. There is thus an abundance of evidence that reflects adversely on the "discretion and integrity" of each, but on their "loyalty" to the United States only by implication so faint as to be ignored. It is evidenced that each has held membership in the nationwide,

established Communist Party and has at times flavored his public writings with Communistic thought. In themselves, these are not cogent reasons for questioning one's loyalty to the United States. Nowhere in my study of their case histories have I found the word "loyalty" even mentioned, let alone adversely associated with their names and deeds. The evidence thus is obviously insufficient to impugn the loyalty of these soldiers.

12. Technically, the essence of a favorable loyalty check is that "the loyalty, discretion, and integrity of the subject *** must be established". Positive qualifications in all three categories is essential. Deficiency in any one is fatal to a favorable report. In the instant cases, the evidence is clearly repugnant to any favorable concept of discretion or of integrity. Too, the evidence originated at widely separated sources. Some of the former commanders of the two soldiers, in the proper exercise of their command functions, already had independently made similar adverse decisions that restricted the duties to which each of these soldiers should be assigned. In the consideration of all the records, the taking of due judicial notice of these decisions was indicated as a supplement to the evidence on their service since their arrivals in this Theater.

13. I must, therefore, conclude that the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer in his decision to recommend that "these men be not assigned to 'sensitive' duties, and if presently assigned to such duties that they be removed", was sound and well supported by adequate evidence.

14. DISCUSSION. The Pacific Stars and Stripes is an official daily newspaper published primarily for military personnel in the United States Occupational Forces in Japan and Korea. Its publication is governed by a War Department Circular dated 9 December 1944.

15. The purpose of the paper is to provide military personnel with current news that otherwise would not be readily available. It is a medium whereby other informational services, orientation and education opportunities; news of religious, athletic, and recreational activities, also other current information may be disseminated throughout the command. It may afford rank and file an opportunity to express individual reactions within the sphere of propriety. The editorial expression of individualistic opinions or the propaganda slanting of

news has no proper place in its columns.

16. The responsibility for publication is charged to the Chief of the Information and Education Services, Colonel Davis, at this headquarters.

17. The paper being published at government expense differs somewhat basically from the usual commercial newspaper. The relationship of Colonel Davis to the paper is, however, somewhat analogous to that of a publisher in his relationship to his editorial and reportorial staff. Nevertheless, all are members of the armed forces and are naturally subject to military rules and regulations.

18. The action taken in this case does not in the slightest degree represent a restrictive incident insofaras the paper is concerned. The greatest freedom has been and is being given to the Pacific Stars and Stripes. The very freedom given its personnel necessitates the taking of due precaution that its editors and reporters do not attempt to propagate their own special views in any manner that would prejudice the interests or the prestige of our nation, of any government activity or individual; or that would tend to cause administrative embarrassment. Precautionary measures on behalf of the United States Government are thus necessary because of the freedom and latitude that has been accorded the paper.

19. The intent of the Army in attempting the publication of its own newspapers is entirely beneficent. When this purpose is distorted into a disguised shield for propaganda or to stir up constant friction within military ranks, its continuance becomes a matter of grave concern. When the staffs of such papers attempt to exercise license yet with no commensurate private obligations the basic soundness of the government's liberal experiment is open to question. The project is certainly on test and just as certainly should not be continued if it proves detrimental to the efficiency and contentment of our forces. Such an instrument under circumstance may well be used by a small minority to accomplish much that is detrimental to the best interests of our Occupation Forces. There are thus inherent conflicts involved, which in the light of actual development throughout all theatres should be made the subject of serious consideration.

20. All military personnel are subject to loyalty checks. The term "loyalty check" is the technical nomen-

clature for an inquiry into several subjects, one of which is "loyalty". This is to protect our nation and to insure its integrity from insidious influences that might undermine its military branch, not intentionally but perhaps incidentally. To fail in due discretion in such a vital matter would be to jeopardize unduly our safety. To accomplish this protection is one of the duties and objectives of the Counter Intelligence Corps, a somewhat analogous service to the military establishment as is performed for the general public by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Its reports among many other things enable suitable assignments of personnel to be made without prejudice for the best interests of the Service.

21. CONCLUSION. The relief of T/3 Kenneth L. Pettus, 367819911, and T/5 Barnard Rubin, 33837353, from assignment to the Information and Education Detachment, AFPAC, was in conformity with a War Department directive of 20 January 1946, which ordered the immediate screening of all Information and Education personnel to establish their complete loyalty to the United States.

22. After his office had checked their files on all Information and Education personnel, the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer, Brigadier General E. R. Thorpe, reported that the complete loyalty to the United States of T/3 Pettus and T/5 Rubin was questionable. He recommended that they be not assigned to "sensitive" duties and if presently so assigned that they be removed therefrom. Under current War Department directives, Information and Education duties are classified as "sensitive."

23. An examination of the evidence on which the Chief Counter Intelligence Officer based his decision discloses that it was sound and in consonance with current War Department directives.

24. The actual "loyalty" of these two soldiers, according to popular concept, stands unimpeached. Their discretion and integrity were found to be questionable. Under War Department requirements this was fatal to their being positively established as acceptable for Information and Educational duties. Their relief therefrom was mandatory.

25. In the exercise of the command function, they were relieved by unprejudiced, routine staff action.

26. Their transfer to Okinawa was without intent of disobligation towards these soldiers. To insure this point, in consonance with the results of this investigation and because of delays incident thereto, their redisposition can now well be made to Replacement Depot at Yokohama.

27. RECOMMENDATIONS. That present orders on T/3 Kenneth L. Pettus, 36781911, and T/5 Barnard Rubin, 33837353, be amended to direct them to proceed to the Fourth Replacement Depot for normal reassignment.

28. That the Commanding Officer, Fourth Replacement Depot be informed by letter that T/3 Pettus and T/5 Rubin may be assigned to any duty other than those classified by the War Department as 'sensitive'."

By command of General MacARTHUR:

RICHARD J. MARSHALL,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

s' B. M. Fitch,
B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, AGD,
Adjutant General.

15

General MacArthur's headquarters approved this report which called for the re-assignment of these men to "non-sensitive" duties. Pettus was sent to a Signal Corps outfit, and Rubin, already a combat veteran from the Philippine campaign, was sent into a unit engaged in basic

15. GHQ, United States Army Forces, Pacific, APO 500, Circular No. 13, March 2, 1946.

training maneuvers in Southern Japan.

Immediately, seven other staff members requested transfers, and also were re-assigned to training outfits. They were:

T/3 Arthur Davidson, formerly of the Abilene, Texas Reporter-News, who temporarily replaced Pettus as managing editor. In requesting his transfer, Davidson said: "I find it impossible to reconcile my professional ethics with the type of editorial work demanded by the officers in charge of this newspaper."[16]

Sgt. Robert Cornwall, former city editor of the Jacksonville (Fla.) Times-Union, asked for an assignment where his "sensitivity and integrity" as a newspaperman "will not be subject to an undemocratic and mumbo-jumbo system of Army dictatorship."[17] Declaring that Japanese imperialists have been struck "many honest, democratic American blows by these two men," Cornwall expressed his desire to leave a "newspaper which--it has become clear to me--is not free to print news in a way that has been compatible with loyal Americanism since 1776."[18]

Sgt. Nick Reynolds, a staff photographer, formerly

16. United Press, "Protesting Newsmen Ask For Transfer," Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 4, 1946, p. 1. col. 1.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

with the Detroit News, said he felt he no longer cared to work "in any capacity" on the staff, because of the unjust removal of Pettus and Rubin.[19]

T/3 Edwin Q. White, from Tipton, Mo., who had reported for the St. Louis Star-Times, added his name to the request for transfer.

Sgt. Don Canavan, who had served for six years on the editorial staff of the New York Herald-Tribune, declared his action was necessary "because as a working newspaperman I cannot agree with the policies under which this newspaper is being published."[20]

Tech. Sgt. Henry L. Moore, whose last civilian job before induction into the Army, was with the Corpus Christi, Tex. Caller-Times, stated he was ready to undertake "the best service I can render my country, if it means guarding bridges, generals or what have you."[21] He added that he "refused to be a pander to a prostituted press." Upon discharge from the Army, Moore went to work as a public relations man for the National Broadcasting System.

Sgt. John Hancock, staff feature writer, whose civilian experience had been with the Joliet, Ill. Herald-

19. Ibid.
20. United Press, "Three More Newsmen Ask For Transfers," Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 5, 1946, p. 1. col. 5.
21. Ibid.

Times, requested a transfer "due to prevailing conditions surrounding the operation of this newspaper."[22]

Meanwhile, in the halls of Congress, Representative Hugh Delacy, Democrat from Washington, was asking for an investigation of a communication which he said Brigadier General Charles T. Lanham, director of the War Department's Information and Education Section, addressed to Pacific area officers. Delacy made the request in a letter to Robert Patterson, then Secretary of War. Delacy quoted Lanham as saying, "I have advanced the contention that our soldier papers are entitled, for example, to the same freedom of the press as enjoyed by the Hearst chain or the Scripps Howard chain. A reporter on the Hearst papers is not at liberty to attack Mr. Hearst or the Hearst policy.

"If he does, first, it does not get in the papers, and second, he is fired. Why then should the staff of a soldier publication feel that it is entitled to attack the War Department, War Department policy, and high officers who are responsible for the formulation of those policies?"[23]

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22. Ibid.
23. Associated Press, "Delacy Asks Probe Of Army Press Freedom," Pacific Stars and Stripes, March 5, 1946, p. 1. col. 5.

Later the same month, March, 1946, the War Department announced that it was barring Communists and other "subversive and disaffected" personnel from "sensitive assignments." It may be that the Pettus-Rubin incident came within the larger scope of the overall Army policy of tightening up on loyalty.

After his discharge from the Army, Rubin did some independent writing, and in recent years has gone to work as a columnist for the Daily Worker. Pettus as a civilian was on the National Planning Committee for the American Veterans Committee and is now a free-lance radio writer in Chicago.

As for their work with Pacific Stars and Stripes, I have made a careful study of their signed columns which fails to reveal their political opinions as soldiers. I don't think a good case could be made that the Army paper was "flavored" with Communist thought or that subversive elements were "boring from within."

After his honorable discharge from the Army, Rubin put his version of the story into two articles for The Protestant magazine. In these he claims that his column "Japan Today" had been continually subjected to censorship. First, he was told that he was not to discuss the Emperor. And, secondly, he was not to criticize the Japanese govern-

ment or government officials. The only reason he was able to print his material on Kagawa was the fact that at the time Kagawa held no official post. The publication of this column, according to Rubin, shattered one of Mac Arthur's fondest dreams. MacArthur's ambition, Rubin said, was to present to the world a picture of Japan under his command with a Premier blessed with an unblemished reputation, an international reputation as a great Christian leader with international Christian support, a social reformer, a pacifist -- a man who was regarded by millions of sincere people in the western world as the "Saint of Japan." This man, of course, was Toyohiko Kagawa.[24]

Kagawa, Rubin points out, was lecturing the Imperial Family daily on Christianity, as announced in a press release. "But prominent Japanese journalists, close to the Imperial Household, told me that a sensational announcement would soon be made: that the Emperor would be converted to Christianity -- by Kagawa."[25]

Kagawa was scheduled to deliver a Christmas Day sermon in The Dai Ichi Building auditorium, the same building which housed MacArthur's offices. The meeting

24. Barnard Rubin, "No Halo For Kagawa," op. cit. p. 19.
25. Ibid. p. 20.

was being arranged by Army chaplains. This column appeared in the December 20 issue of Stars and Stripes, five days before the meeting. It said:

> "A man who has propagandized for an aggressive war; a man who has called for the defeat of the United States on Nazi-like racial grounds, and who still has to a large extent, the reputation in the States of being a Christian pacifist and a social reformer, must be a very clever man indeed.
>
> "The man is Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa, who used to be one of the favorites of American lecture booking agencies. The combination of Kagawa's 'magnetic' personality, and the build up accorded him as a 'Christian reformer' from the 'mysterious' East proved an irresistable attraction to wide audiences. He lectured on Christianity, pacifism, social reform, education, and the cooperative movement.
>
> "Kagawa's camouflage was as skillfully worked out as that of a Nazi agent in a Hitchcock movie. And just as surely came the denouement.
>
> "The story of his American reputation was being relayed to the Japanese people by the Nippon government controlled press. Thus Kagawa's war-mongering was supposed to be that much more effective in convincing the Japanese people that the war against the United States was a just war. For was it not supported by a man who knew America, and who was known by both Americans and Japanese to be a Christian man of peace?
>
> "Throughout the war Kagawa served the fascist government of Japan well. In his 1942 Christmas message, for example, he blamed 'the Christian countries for bombing peoples and areas (Pearl Harbor, Manila, etc. don't count--B.R.) where they sent their missionaries to preach the Gospel, and slaughtering the sons of God whom their missionaries baptize.'
>
> "In the 'Magazine for Christianity' (a 1944 issue) he wrote an article entitled 'A Prophecy of

the Downfall of America.'

"He was sent to the Philippines during the invasion to help it along (according to Japanese records) 'by working on the Christian problems of the occupation.'

"His Christian background came in handy!

"And Kagawa's build-up in the cooperative movement was useful when he became advisor to the reactionary Great Japan Agrarian People's Association--the Dai Nippon Nomin Kumiai.

"Kagawa gave what he probably thought was one of his best efforts, in August 1942. It was an all-out attempt to whip up the Japanese to racial hatred against the Americans; to picture the war as a battle of race against race.

"In the sermon he spread the rumor that American soldiers were sending Japanese skulls and skeletons home as souvenirs. Thus, he easily proved that American actions were (the quotes are Kagawa's, from an FCC report) 'a kind of savagery comparable to the lowest cannibalism...

"'Today (Kagawa continued) I see America as a white grave. I cannot believe that the Almighty God of all the earth will permit the success of their inordinate ambitions for world domination which forged the spirit of racial superiority, but at the same time talks of freedom and liberty, using these words while waging this unjust war on the Oriental race. Ah, woe to America for so degrading the name of Christ by this butchery.'

"So spake the 'Christian pacifist!'

"But Japan's defeat has not brought an end to the activities of Dr. Kagawa. He is again active in the political field, and 'leading' a teachers' union and cooperative societies!

"He was on the platform at the inaugural meeting of the Social Democratic Party where he distinguished himself by giving three loud banzais for the emperor.

(Much to the disgust of the Social Democratic workers and to the discomfort of the party executive committee who have recently slipped over the resolution supporting Hirohito without consulting the irate local branches.)

"Kagawa, only lately was out stumping side by side with Yoshio Kodama, former leader of the fascist Patriotic Mass Party. During the war Kodama made a fortune by confiscating properties and commodities in China and then selling them at fantastic prices to the Japanese Navy. Until recently Kodama was using some of these profits to subsidize many of the now one-man ultranationalist 'parties' that have sprung up with the avowed intention of protecting the emperor system.

"Kodama and Kagawa had also worked together when they both were acting as advisors to Prince Higashikuni, former Prime Minister.

"Kodama was arrested the other day as a war criminal suspect. But Kagawa is still playing the game--as the Christian pacifist and social reformer.

"Very clever. But how clever remains to be seen."[26]

"The effect of the column was instantaneous," Rubin said. "MacArthur in a rage called the chaplains who were organizing the meeting and told them they would have to cancel Kagawa's speech."[27]

When the protests came from the chaplains, further Kagawa columns were banned.[28]

"Later at a meeting of the chaplains' association, 17 chaplains voted in favor of a petition

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26. Barnard Rubin, "Under Christian Guise, This Jap Fostered War," Pacific Stars and Stripes, December 20, 1945, p. 2, col. 6-7.
27. Rubin, "No Halo For Kagawa," op. cit. p. 21.
28. Ibid. p. 23.

to the Army, asking removal of the censorship ban. However, the motion was defeated."29

Rubin describes Topping House in Tokyo as "Kagawa Institute, spreading his fame and doctrines the world over and particularly in America."[30]

Mrs. Genevieve Topping, an American missionary who has lived in Japan for fifty years, had made several pacifist broadcasts to the States during the war urging the end of America's war effort. She had expressed the belief "that it was possible to negotiate peace if the Americans would only halt their atrocities."[31]

At one time, Ando, the racketeer, had given Mrs. Topping 300,000 yen to operate the Japan Social Welfare Consultative Society.[32]

Rubin's story regarding his "questionable use of classified material" is as follows:

> "...I had been closely working with the Counter Intelligence Corps. This relationship started in the early days of the column when I had run across evidence of terroristic activities against the new tenant farmers' organizations by members of the officially disbanded Secret and Thought Police.
>
> "I gave this evidence to the Counter Intelligence Corps, and shortly afterwards the CIC officers

29. Frank Robertson, International News Service, "Columns on Kagawa Censored" Pacific Stars and Stripes, February 13, 1946, p. 1, col. 4.
30. Rubin, "No Halo For Kagawa," op. cit. p. 23.
31. Ibid. p. 23.
32. International News Service, "Ando Arrest Considered Blow At Anti-Occupation Forces," op. cit.

asked me to cooperate with them which I did.

"As a matter of fact, I had given them some of the information they had on Kagawa.

"As a result of this work, I was introduced to General Thorpe, and we had a long conversation. The General told me that he appreciated my assistance and wanted to know if there was anything that he could do to help me in my work. I asked him if I could have his permission to consult Counter Intelligence Corps files which were not top secret. He thereupon instructed his Public Relations Officer, who was present, to let me have access to all material that was not top secret.

"I then at the time asked for permission to see the file on Kagawa, and he assented. The officer then took me down to look at the material, and I copied a few items which I later used in the column.

"The material was definitely not classified as top secret despite General Thorpe's later allegation after the editor and I had been fired. It would have been more peculiar if there had been any truth to Thorpe's statement, for I was given access to the material only after his explicit instructions that I was not to be shown top secret documents. And every item copied from the files was written directly under the eyes of his Public Relations Officer.

"After my dismissal when I accused General Thorpe of protecting American traitors, and gave him the lie on his charge of printing 'classified and confidential material', Thorpe could say nothing.

"That I, a mere enlisted man in a caste-ridden Army, was able to make grave, public accusations against a top-ranking general without suffering court-martial, imprisonment, and dishonorable discharge made it obvious that Thorpe had no defense.

"The statement I issued was widely circulated in the American press and radio...

"General Thorpe was never able to make a rebuttal. If he would have attempted to explain, it

> would have meant the direct involvement of General MacArthur. And that wasn't done in the Pacific Theater."33

In his articles in Protestant magazine, Rubin quoted recent militaristic speeches of Kagawa which he had made to Japanese schools in defiance of SCAP's directives on education.

Rubin also had located and had The Army Translator Service translate a speech that Kagawa had made to the Japanese Diet upon his return from the United States in 1941.

In this speech, Kagawa reported to the Japanese on America's unpreparedness for war, gave praise to the America First-ers, and showed such anti-Semitic feelings as:

> "...Many of America's chief war advocates are Jews. Even the people in America who never before had discriminated against the Jews, were now indignant at the conduct of the Jews...the Jews have certainly gone too far."34

Kagawa gave this speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Japanese government. It was made in the nature of a report designed to inform the Japanese government as to the feasibility of a war with the United States. Rubin had great difficulties in locating the

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33. Rubin, "No Halo For Kagawa," op. cit. p. 25.
34. For complete translation of the speech see Barnard Rubin, "No Halo For Kagawa," Part II. The Protestant, December, 1946, p. 31.

speech, he said. Although it was on the Diet records that Kagawa spoke, the speech itself was significantly missing. The Chou Koron, (Central Review magazine) had reprinted the speech, but that particular issue was missing from file after file of the magazine in libraries, schools, etc. which had complete sets with that one exception. Finally, after weeks of searching, a Formosan friend of Rubin's discovered a copy in the home of one of his friends.[35]

Rubin's column on Kagawa caused his appointment to the House of Peers to be held up by GHQ for several months, but he was permitted to carry on in many important fields of Japanese life.[36]

So ends the Pettus-Rubin-Kagawa chapter of Pacific Stars and Stripes.

The Muzzling

It was on the first of July, 1946 that Captain John Field was assigned to Stars and Stripes as the new Officer-in-Charge. Field, former city editor of the Ypsilanti (Michigan) Press, had had ten years of newspaper experience. He is, at present, adviser to student publications at Temple University, Philadelphia.

35. Ibid. p. 31.
36. Ibid. p. 36.

Captain Field was not briefed as to the precarious position of the paper when he assumed command. The Pettus-Rubin affair had ended, but the higher brass was still watching the staff for evidence of subversive writing. Field was told this, unofficially, but he received no warning as to what to look for. Consequently, he operated under the assumption that the Stars and Stripes was a soldiers' paper and that no officer should see a story until it is in print.

The staff was headed by such newsmen as: Jack Castel, Denver Post; George Cole, who had run a weekly, the Hegeswisch News from 1936-1945 and who is presently on the desk of the Chicago Herald-American; Dean Peiper, who was drafted into the Army from a United Press job and who is now editor of the Costa Contra Gazette in Martinez, California; Andy Headland, former reporter on the San Juan (P.R.) World Journal and with the United Press Washington Bureau before joining the Army; and Frank Emery, who later left the paper to join the Tokyo Bureau of the International News Service.

Because this was a group of mature, experienced newsmen, Captain Field trusted them to put out a good paper. He seemed to sense no need to watch for subversive activities. Certainly none of their newspaper backgrounds had

been with traditionally "liberal" papers. Nor had their writings been flavored with anti-MacArthur editorial opinions. They had established "positive" loyalty.

But the headquarters' chiefs were not so trusting. They screened the paper carefully for the slightest hint of criticism about the Occupation. After all, soldiers might go off on a limb if they were given too much freedom of expression.

On July 5, just four days after he had started his new job, Captain Field was called to the Troop Information and Education headquarters to "account for" the July Fourth front page. Jack Castel, make-up editor for that day, had written a five-column headline and allocated the most important spot on the front page to a story on the Office of Price Administration. The OPA story had been in and out of the news for the past several weeks but this particular day's news told of action taken by American soldiers in Tokyo in regard to the price agency. "OPA Still Stalled in Senate; Troops in Japan Urge Action" the headline screamed. An Associated Press story from Washington was carried, followed by a local Tokyo story which stated:

"Drive To Save Price Agency Is Launched

Telegrams Sent To Congress Through Use of a New Code

> "American servicemen and civilians in Japan began a telegraphic campaign yesterday for the extension of OPA for at least one complete year.
>
> "Using the code message, 'URGENT. YOU ARE EVER IN MY THOUGHTS AT THIS TIME,' Stateside-bound wires were dispatched to Congressmen now disputing with the administration over the extension of price control.
>
> "Sponsors estimated that several hundred code wires would be on their way to the nation's lawmakers by this morning.
>
> "The basic telegram was sent at noon yesterday by 1st Lt. Benjamin D. Lewis, 2nd Lt. Joseph Goldstein, 2nd Lt. James Riedel, Robert Featherstone..."[37]

Lieutenant Lewis was chairman of the Tokyo chapter of the American Veterans Committee, which was sponsoring the campaign. AVC members were collecting nine yen (about sixty cents) from servicemen and civilians for each telegram, using the Expeditionary Forces Message system which sent only the code number of a fixed message.

It was important news to GIs about to return home that butter had jumped to 94 cents a pound. Alarmed about protecting their savings, soldiers had joined in the "Save OPA" campaign. The editors of Stars and Stripes considered it the story of the day.

The brass, however, felt that something "more patritic" should have appeared on the Fourth of July front page.

The criticism had come down through General Mueller,

37. "OPA Still Stalled In Senate," Stars and Stripes, July 4, 1946, p. 1. col. 8.

Chief of Staff, who was Acting Commander while MacArthur was in Manila for the Philippine Independence ceremonies.

Mueller telephoned Colonel Nelson, acting Chief of the Troop Information and Education Section. His questions and charges were:

"What does the Officer-in-Charge of Stars and Stripes do down there?"

"Has his loyalty been checked?"

"Has the loyalty of the staff been checked?"

"The July Fourth edition hits an all-time low for Stars and Stripes."

"It violates Circular 103 and Army Regulations."

"It is the mouthpiece of a small group."

"The headline is misleading and inaccurate."

A Stars and Stripes staff meeting was immediately called and agreement was reached to have staff conferences over stories urging political action.

The staff also discussed certain factors of the OPA story which had brought on the official attention. The staff felt that General Baker probably wanted Stars and Stripes as his own Public Relations Office poopsheet to further his crumbling empire, not realizing that he would thus no longer have a newspaper, and so took the occasion of General MacArthur's absence to needle the Chief of

Staff into the idea that the paper was staffed by irresponsible editors and should be turned over to some other controlling agency. (PRO, of course.)

Good opportunity for this came from the former Pettus-Rubin affair which put the GHQ officers into holy horror of anything AVC might sponsor, and especially anything they might be able to do to influence Stars and Stripes in any way.

The opinion was expressed that fertile ground for this sort of reaction can always be found in Regular Army brass which is traditionally afraid of anything touching on political activity or even the expression of political opinion.

General Mueller was just back from "temporary duty" in the United States, and felt disturbed that the story broke during MacArthur's absence, as he felt it might be the beginning of another embarrassing and disturbing series of incidents. Of course, what they wanted to do, it was surmised, was completely to muzzle the press without being accused of so doing.

An interesting sidelight into this is the fact that General Baker accused the paper of "waiting until General MacArthur is out of the city to start something" -- obviously a subconscious guilt statement of his own, the

staff felt.

On July 5, the day following the reprimand, there appeared a five-column, nine-inch deep picture of the crack troops of the First Cavalry division, dressed in khakis and white helmets, parading their might down Tokyo's main street in a July 4 celebration. Other parades throughout Japan were described in glowing terms. Certainly this page looked patriotic. But, on the upper right side of page one (again the lead position), there was a two-column head over a story from Washington: "Living Cost to Double in 20 Days, Bowles Predicts." And, at the end of the column, there appeared a small local story, "1,000 Messages Sent In 'Save OPA' Drive' giving the roundup of what the Tokyo GIs and civilians were doing to urge passage of a strong price control bill.

On July 6, the OPA story received play at the third column top of page one, fourteen column inches of news. "OPA Head Meets Senate Group For Compromise" and, at the end of the Washington UP release, was a two-paragraph local story "3,000 Messages For OPA Support Sent To Congress."

July 7 issue carried a Washington story but no local story.

July 8 issue carried a full column of OPA news in

the first column of the front page. "Senate Girds For Showdown On OPA Bill" -- a UP story and an INS story from Washington. Then, at the bottom of the column, again not overplayed, but nonetheless in evidence, was the local scoreboard story, "4,500 Code OPA Messages Sent From Japan, Report," a four-inch story with a brief interview with Lt. Lewis, who had lectured to more than 1,000 GIs in Hibiya Hall. Japanese bellhops had been taught to say, "Good day; save your pay; save OPA." Some billets were bringing in 75-100 telegrams each day. Even a USO troupe touring Japan had joined in the campaign. This is news, said the editors, and refused to suppress it. Captain Field did not censor them. He was convinced that the Stars and Stripes should be a newspaper and not a mouthpiece of the Army's high command. It was apparent, then, that his tour of duty as Officer-in-Charge would be short. Already the frightened command was taking steps to fire him. But it had to be done subtly and quietly. They couldn't afford another spectacular incident such as the Pettus-Rubin case.

The OPA story continued for several days, sometimes claiming the most important spot on the page, sometimes buried in lesser news, depending upon the interest of the day.

It seems that hardly a day went by that Stars and Stripes wasn't under fire for something. SCAP officials, being overly sensitive, watched the news columns carefully and never hesitated to phone down their complaints.

On July 11, the editors ran a six-inch wire story from International News Service, in which the correspondents had quoted General MacArthur as predicting the Occupation of Japan to last from 50 to 100 years. The story went as follows:

> "General Douglas MacArthur envisages an Occupation of Japan lasting possibly a century, International News Service was told yesterday.
>
> "General MacArthur told visiting congressmen dining with him at the American Embassy that he felt the present military Occupation should be succeeded after 10 years by civilian rule of Japan by the Allies lasting at least 50 and possibly 100 years, it was said.
>
> "MacArthur, nevertheless, painted an optimistic picture of the Occupation for the senators and representatives who arrived here Tuesday from Shanghai after witnessing the Bikini atomic test and the Philippine independence ceremonies.
>
> "He said the Japanese military clique had been completely discredited and that the average Japanese was now looking toward democracy.
>
> "He pointedly told the group he absolutely had no political ambitions, it was said..."38

The first copies were off the presses in the evening

38. Stars and Stripes, July 11, 1946, p. 1. (from original run of paper, not distributed.)

and rushed to the trains to be delivered to units for delivery the following morning.

At 8:30 p.m., the editor of Stars and Stripes, Roy Trefftzs, received a phone call from General Willoughby's office. General Willoughby asked Sgt. Trefftzs to kill the story, adding that he would assume all responsibility for it.

Sgt. Ed Scott, a former Missouri lawyer who edited the "Comment and Query" letters column for the paper, and Sgt. George Cole helped Trefftzs call in about 26,000 copies of the paper. They re-made the front page, substituting a story that lounge cars would be added to military trains. They had to re-mat, then run on foot to the Asahi newspaper plant, where Stars and Stripes was printed. This delay caused the missing of many trains and routes. The Stars and Stripes was delivered a day late in the outlying areas, but MacArthur's off-the-record statement was secure.

In October, the Stars and Stripes published a wire service story on the Christian Science Monitor's round-up of the first year of Occupation. The story was frankly critical of many of the "accomplishments" of the Occupation, particularly in the field of education, as was the New York Herald-Tribune and many other dispatches filed

to the States at that time. This brought down the wrath of General Baker who pointed it out to General Mueller with a request for action. For this General Mueller severely criticized the Stars and Stripes and the Chief of Information and Education Services, Colonel Gard, who had replaced Colonel Davis. Colonel Gard passed along this criticism in the form of an order that news stories of unfavorable editorial comment would not be published in the Army paper. (It was at this time that MacArthur's message to the War Department linked the Herald-Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor with PM and Daily Worker as "undesirable publications...indulging in the lowest form of journalistic quackery" as I mentioned in Chapter 3 of this study.)

During this same month, certain critical letters in "Comment and Query" and a series of cartoons by Pfc. Glen Dines ridiculing the over-zealous "courtesy" regulations being enforced by the Military Police aroused the anger of many GHQ officers. This resulted in an order to the staff from the Chief, Information and Education Services that no more MP cartoons would be published in Stars and Stripes.

Up to this time, Stars and Stripes was enjoying freedom in the sense that no officer censored any of the material

before it was published. Captain Field insisted on this, and the Chief of Information and Education Services, Colonel Gard, backed him up. The staff was expected to use discretion and editorial selection as a sort of voluntary censorship in regard to stories criticizing the Occupation. Their selection seldom coincided with the wishes of all GHQ officers, and therefore, each day there were the customary phone calls and complaints. It was evident to the high command that if the paper was to be brought under control Colonel Gard would have to be removed along with Captain Field.

During these weeks, the Public Relations Officer General Baker continued to point criticism at the paper. The staff believed that he did this in the hopes of getting the paper transferred to his command.

Meanwhile General Robert Eichelberger, Eighth Army commander, also was seeking control of the paper. In a memorandum sent to GHQ on July 1, 1946, he expressed his feeling that Stars and Stripes was "being published by a staff of irresponsible enlisted men," and that, "By taking control of the paper, this headquarters can insure that only morale building material appears in the publication." He added that if this could not be permitted, he would like permission to publish a rival paper, "with comparable

budget and with full access to the same news services as enjoyed by Stars and Stripes." In that event, he further requested the discontinuation of Stars and Stripes to Eighth Army units. When these requests were rejected by GHQ, Eichelberger started a four-page mimeographed daily sheet, the Octagram, for Eighth Army headquarters personnel to supplement the news of Stars and Stripes.

On October 11, 1946, the Stars and Stripes published a United Press release which stated that the Russian Prosecution Section for the War Crimes trials indicated that the Soviet Union believed that Emperor Hirohito shared the war guilt. The Russian prosecutor S. A. Golunsky protested by letter to Stars and Stripes calling the report a "groundless fabrication." Captain Field forwarded the letter to Colonel Gard who replied directly to the Russians and seemed to have settled the difficulty satisfactorily by calling in the United Press reporter who assumed responsibility.

Colonel Gard was transferred two weeks later to a minor post in the G-3 Section. While we cannot know for certain, there were members of the Information and Education Services who said they felt that Colonel Gard's "skipping of channels," by replying directly to the Russians, was used as the excuse for his removal.

Gard was replaced by Colonel Niederpreum who frequently stated to various Stars and Stripes staffers that he "had not been sent down to do a job."

Soon after his arrival, however, he ordered that no more cartoons by Pfc. Glen Dines would be permitted. Dines and three other soldiers, two from the news desk and one reporter, requested transfers, which were effected.

Then, one day, Colonel Niederpreum flew to the States "on business for the Information and Education Services." One of his assignments was to hire four civilian editors for the Stars and Stripes. A "leak" from the I&E office offered the additional information that the Colonel was bringing a friend back to be the new Officer-in-Charge of the paper.

On December 15, the friend -- Captain Charles B. Taylor -- arrived in Tokyo. As Captain Field was still on duty, Taylor moved into a hotel and awaited further orders.

Three days later, an excuse was found to fire Captain Field.

General Mueller called the I&E Services and complained about a "race riot" story which had appeared on the front page of that morning's edition. This story gave a factual account of the death of a soldier in a fight between Negro

and white troops at a Japanese night club. It included no editorial comment.

Field was called to Colonel Niederpreum's office and was told that he should not have allowed the "race riot" story to appear, because it might have caused unrest among the soldiers. Field was told that he was relieved of his duties with the paper and could have any other job in I&E that was open, or could go elsewhere. He decided to go elsewhere. Taylor moved into the office that same day.

It was interesting to note that the same issue of Stars and Stripes had reported a rally of 500,000 Japanese who protested against the Japanese Yoshida Cabinet. The brass, however, refrained from using this story to fire Field because the staff would have argued that GHQ censorship was covering up political unrest in Japan. This was the comment that members of the staff made in discussing Field's removal.

Under the new Officer-in-Charge, immediate changes went into effect. All copy from staff members in the field was to be cleared by the Public Relations Office. And, all copy was to be reviewed by an officer before being sent to the composing room.

Since December 18, 1946, the Stars and Stripes has been under complete censorship.

Conclusion

MacArthur is unique. This "star-spangled Mikado," as Frank Kelley has called him, is subject to no government. The Far Eastern Commission, designed to be policy-making, is, in effect, merely advisory. He has refused Congressional requests to come home. Even the President would hesitate to recall him, because MacArthur-backers would retaliate with, "The White House fears MacArthur as a political threat." He can interpret all outside directives with the leeway of a "Commander in the field" and with the feeling that a five-star general can do pretty much as he pleases.

There has been nothing to prevent him from turning Japan into a tremendous jail, with people coming and leaving only by his special permission. He has surrounded himself with a tight clique of wartime loyal friends whose own destiny is welded with his. They hold the top jobs in the Occupation and have the power to censor news at the source.

MacArthur can hand-pick the correspondents who will write about the Occupation. He can veto the decisions of the National Military Establishment which is supposed to be the final authority on accreditation, on the grounds that a "commander is responsible for the security of his

troops." He not only can thereby control the news that flows to the States, he can also control the news within Japan, as Japanese information channels are under his thumb and the American daily newspaper in Tokyo is censored by his officers.

This is the situation, inherent with many dangers. Some of these dangers are:

1. As reporters are more and more discouraged from independent inquiry, they come to depend on the "handout" which shows only the official side of the story. They may be able to add some interpretation, but they are limited. The Public Relations Office gets the jump on reporters by presenting the Army version of the story as "fresh" news. Often it is weeks before the press finds out the other side of the story and by this time the readers have fixed ideas on the initial representation.

2. "Security" becomes an umbrella under which the officials can hide their mistakes. It is easier to stamp "secret" on a document rather than face the embarrassment of criticism.

3. Suppression of news often leads to misinformation. Rumors emerge that are often more harmful than frank discussion.

4. When sources of information are cut off, the first

person to suffer is the man of honest opinion, who no longer has the raw material to form his ideas. This prevents him from taking his place of leadership in shaping the public opinion of this country. The direct result is that Americans have no voice in our foreign relations with Japan.

5. A public convinced that MacArthur's work has already achieved success will hardly support a long Occupation which may be necessary.

6. Nor will a public, fed with the official story of success, be prepared for the big failure in Japan which is still a possibility.

7. The biggest danger, of course, is that the press may yield too readily to censorship. Reporters, who are willing to tempt punishment by writing information despite the obstacles, will then decrease in number.

8. Should this happen our very liberties are in danger.

It seems to me that as the situation now exists, it is almost impossible to buck the system. The only solution is to recognize the hazards of this tendency towards controlled thought, and to direct our public opinion forces towards those agencies of our government where we are more effective -- with a view to bringing about an early peace treaty with Japan, and a retired General.

Appendix

A Statement By The Editors of Nation

"On December 26, 1948, Andrew Roth, The Nation's correspondent in the Far East, wrote from Shanghai asking the editors to apply for his admission to Japan. He warned us that a similar request made by him in 1947 had never been acknowledged by the Army and that only upon his arrival in Shanghai, a few weeks earlier, had he learned that he had been denied entry because he was not a full-time correspondent of any one publication. His own guess as to the real reason for his exclusion was that his book, 'Dilemma in Japan,' had become 'somewhat of a bible to the progressive opposition to General MacArthur.' He went on to say that he did not believe that the ban could be upheld.

"Roth was to be proved wrong. He has been banned by MacArthur; there is no present likelihood of his admission into the new Mikado's domain. After fighting a running battle with the authorities for the better part of a year, the editors of The Nation have decided that it is time for full disclosure of the disgraceful incident.

"On January 6, 1949, The Nation wrote to the National Defense Establishment requesting Roth's clearance. The Accreditation Branch sent the necessary forms on January 11, assuring us that 'as soon as the processing (of the forms) had been completed we will notify the Department of the Army of Mr. Roth's accreditation. The liaison section...will then ask the Headquarters, Far East Command, to clear your correspondent for entrance into Japan.'

"The forms required a declaration that the correspondent was a full-time employee of the publication seeking his accreditation. Although Roth was under contract to file regularly, he was not a full-time employee of The Nation, and we so informed Washington. The Nation, however, did assume full responsibility for Roth. On February 15 Donald S. Davis of the Accreditation Branch wrote us regretting his in-

ability to consider Roth's application because he was not a full-time employee. (To go ahead a bit, Roth was to write on April 17 to tell us that Jack Percival, another correspondent had been accredited, although not a full-time employee. 'However,' continued Roth, 'he is a guy who...sees Communists under every bush. In Indonesia he was describing the Republican government as 'Communist' a week before the Communist revolt against it.')

"Realizing that the technique of the gentle brush-off had begun, we wrote at once to Roth asking for his suggestions for a way past this technicality. Roth by this time had moved on to Peiping, and his reply, sent on March 15, did not arrive until April 5. His suggestion that we buy up his contracts with the other newspapers and serve as a syndicating agent for him, was agreed to, and we wired Washington the same day that Mr. Roth was now on a full-time basis and therefore fulfilled the requirements. Washington was silent. Two days later we wired again, and the second wire jarred Mr. Davis into action. His reply was brief and to the point: 'The subject's application has been screened carefully and I regret to inform you that under security regulations he does not qualify for accreditation to the National Military Establishment.'

"After conferring with Roth's attorney, Colonel William A. Roberts of Washington, we resolved to fight this decision, first through Administration channels and then, if unsuccessful, in public.

"We telephoned Mr. Davis for further explanation of the brief telegram. Was the basis of the refusal of accreditation the charges made against Roth some time ago--the Amerasia affair? No, was the answer. Then why was Roth refused accreditation? Answer: He does not meet the requirements set up for a military correspondent. Was a direct charge of disloyalty made against Roth? Answer: I am afraid I can't tell you that. His situation was considered from an over-all point of view, and it was felt that he did not meet the requirements set up. Question: What are the requirements for a military correspondent? Answer: I am afraid I can't reveal those. They are determined by more than one governmental agency.

"Colonel Roberts then wrote to Secretary of Defense Johnson asking for a reversal of the decision, attaching a long and eloquent letter by Roth, pertinent excerpts of which follow:

> "'I have done journalistic work in twenty-five countries during the last three years. This is the first time I have ever been declared persona non grata before entry ... I believe that fundamentally the refusal to accredit me to Japan arises from my having written in 1945 a book entitled 'Dilemma in Japan.' ... 'Dilemma in Japan' was a warning, written in 1945, against some of the policies which seem to be followed now by the United States in Japan. I was particularly fearful that the United States would link itself with the Zaibatsu (economic monopolists), the authoritarian bureaucracy, and large landlords.'
>
> "'I understand ... that this is a rather accurate prediction of what has happened. I have not written upon developments in Japan since 1945 because I wanted to see conditions there under Occupation for myself.'
>
> "'I do not expect that it will be stated that I am being kept out of Japan because my views are critical. The popular tradition of free speech, free inquiry, and a free press is too strong in the United States for assaults to be made on them directly.'
>
> "I believe that this is an attempt to dredge up the famous 'Case of the Six.' In June, 1945, when I was a lieutenant in Naval Intelligence and a few days after I had submitted a draft of 'Dilemma in Japan' to the naval authorities for clearance, I was arrested with five other people, allegedly for conspiring to take government documents. The others were Mark Gayn, newspaperman and author, Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia, Kate Mitchell, co-editor of Amerasia, John Stewart Service and E. S. Larsen, of the State Department. The charges against myself and three others were dismissed. Jaffe pleaded guilty to having government documents

in his possession, and Mr. Larsen did not contend the charge he had given them to Mr. Jaffe. Both were fined, but the government made it clear that few if any of the documents had any real importance in the national defense or in the war effort, that no criminal intent had been established, and there was no evidence that any of the documents was ever put to any use harmful to the conduct of the war.'

"'Perhaps the most infuriating thing about these smears and implied smears is the assumption that conservatives and reactionaries have a monopoly on patriotism or loyalty. Actually recent world history has shown not only that there is a group in most countries whose first loyalty is to Moscow but that there is also a group whose loyalty is to their class and not to their country.'

"'As for myself, my whole and entire loyalty is to the United States, to the American people, and their democratic tradition, including the United States Constitution and its Bill of Rights. I volunteered for the navy before Pearl Harbor, and if we are in peril I'll volunteer again.'

"'My undivided loyalty to the United States does not mean that I think everything the United States does is correct... As the citizen of a democracy I will battle for the right to criticize Truman as well as Stalin, to attack American policy in Greece or China just as I have criticized Soviet policies in Persia or Communist putsches in Malaya and Indonesia.'

"'As a reporter abroad I have felt it my responsibility to report objectively in order to further international understanding. I have used as a yardstick the democratic aspirations of the majority of the people in every country for a fuller and freer life.'

"'Because I have attempted to use this yardstick of appraisal uniformly I have been attacked both from the right and the extreme left. ... Actually my own preference is for a demo-

cratic form of socialism.'

> "'One of the ways in which the world judges the United States is by whether our deeds are as golden as our words. ... I trust that when an American representative in the United Nations next gets up to attack the iron-curtain restrictions on press freedom it will not be possible for someone to ask, 'What about the nylon curtain around Japan?' "

"We heard nothing from the Defense Department from May 19 until June 8, at which time Colonel Robert's indefatigable efforts on behalf of his client finally bore fruit. Reversing the earlier decision, the National Military Establishment granted Roth full accreditation. This was confirmed in a letter dated June 10 from William Fry, assistant to Secretary Johnson. We felt that our troubles were over. They had only begun.

"It seems that, in our gratification, we had overlooked the last sentence in the letter of accreditation: 'Headquarters, Far East Command, clearance and a valid military entry permit will be required to enter Japan.' We had ignored similar terminology back in January because we felt that it was merely a technicality and that admission following Defense Department accreditation was almost automatic. We now learned that this language was, in effect, the implementing clause for General MacArthur's veto power over decisionsmade in Washington.

"But at the moment Roth in Hongkong and we in New York, were exulting over our victory, Roth wrote from Hongkong of June 15:

> "'One of the reasons I feel the subject of the clearance is so important is because of the implied slur on my loyalty as an American and honesty as a reporter. To do any good any liberal or progressive must have the confidence of the people in his own country whom he is trying to reach and persuade.'

"The letter of accreditation had been sent to Seoul, but our peripatetic correspondent had moved to Hongkong, and in that crowded city he waited anx-

iously for receipt of the all-important document. Accommodations were so scarce that he had to move several times. In preparation for his impending trip he wired Tokyo late in June for future accommodations. Then our house of cards collapsed. For SCAP, put on notice by Roth's request, wired the Hongkong consulate to hold clearance pending an investigation. Foreseeing further delay, he started to move around Southeast Asia again and wrote to us from Batavia on August 4:

> "'So far as I know the principle was established in the Compton Pakenham case that the Department of Defense has the final authority to clear correspondents... If SCAP has turned me down we'll have to make a public protest ....'

"On August 25 Andy cabled that he had been refused a permit to enter Japan. We wired Colonel Roberts, whose assistant, Charles F. O'Neall, wrote back the same day recounting a conversation with Major C. W. Hinkle, who had replaced Davis in the Accreditation Branch:

> "'Major Hinkle states that he had never heard of an accredited correspondent being turned down, and even after a full review of the Roth story, he was inclined to believe that entry would be possible. He indicated that the matter could be brought to the attention of Steve Early, if necessary, but he thought that by stretching the wording of an official cable to MacArthur's headquarters, such a development would be unnecessary.
>
> "'Major Hinkle is, of course, at the working rather than the high-policy level and it may be that he is over-optimistic. I think, however, that there is some chance that it might work out. I have emphasized the time element and feel confident that we can get some kind of action out of that office within a few days.'

"The attorney advised us to write Major Hinkle, who answered that 'the Army is making every effort to expedite the required information through neces-

sary channels.'

"On September 10 Mr. O'Neall wrote us that the National Military Establishment's final word was that Roth would not be admitted to Japan.

> "'In accordance with the request contained in your letter (to Major Hinkle) MacArthur's headquarters was asked to submit justification for the refusal to admit Mr. Roth, and it is my understanding that the matter was reviewed by General MacArthur personally before it was forwarded to Washington. In Washington the matter was reviewed personally by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the position of MacArthur's headquarters was found to be acceptable to him.'

"This decision was conveyed to Mr. O'Neall by a Colonel Newton, who said that no statement could be made as to the grounds for refusing Roth entry beyond the 'explanation' that it was not in the interests of national security. After conferring with Colonel Roberts we decided to make a last appeal to Secretary Johnson.

"Roth, who had been kept apprised of all the developments, wrote on September 28 from Batavia passing on information he had received from a friend of his in Tokyo, Hugh Dean. Dean, a correspondent for left-wing papers, indicated that SCAP intended to clean out all left sympathisers and didn't want a Nation correspondent around to report on such a purge. Roth concluded: 'They (SCAP) don't mind so much having Dean around because he can always be labeled as the Daily Worker correspondent.'

"On October 31 we received our last direct word from the National Military Establishment, confirming the ban on the basis of autonomy granted to theater commanders: 'Current regulations covering accreditation holds commanders responsible for the security of their command.'

"After some further exploration of the possibility of reversing this ruling by means of personal contact with high-ranking officials in Washington, we can no

longer hope there will be a change of heart in Administration circles. We are publishing the facts because of our confidence that loudly voiced public indignation can still obtain Andrew Roth's admission to Japan."1

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APPROVAL James L. McCamy

DATE June 1, 1950