The Breakdown of Law Enforcement Focused Deterrence Programs: An Examination of Key Factors and Issues

Approved: Dr. Cody Gaines Date 5/21/2019

The Breakdown of Law Enforcement Focused Deterrence Programs: An Examination of Key Factors and Issues

A Seminar Research Paper Presented to the School of Graduate Studies at the University of Wisconsin – Platteville

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Masters of Science in Criminal Justice

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Spring Semester 2019

Acknowledgements

Most importantly, I want to thank my wife, Marie, and my two children, Kaylee and Frederick. Your patience and support during this endeavor has been unwavering despite all the times I could not play or had to miss a family event because of schoolwork. I could not have done this without you. Words cannot express my appreciation and love to you all.

Thank you to my faculty paper advisor, Dr. Cody Gaines, for your support and feedback during this process. This research was a new challenge for me and your guidance definitely made it less intimidating.

Finally, I want to thank Chief Michael Koval, Assistant Chief Paige Valenta, and Detective Brian Baney from the City of Madison Police Department. Chief Koval, you believed in me enough to approve tuition reimbursement for the majority of my Criminal Justice Master's Degree program. I am extremely grateful to you for financing this opportunity. Assistant Chief Valenta and Detective Baney, our conversations about focused deterrence sparked my interest in this area of criminal justice. I regard you both as mentors and have been honored to work with you over the years. Thank you both for your continued support while I wrote this paper.

Abstract

Focused deterrence is a crime reduction strategy that has been used in numerous cities throughout the U.S. and around the world. Empirical research and data generally support that it can be used effectively to reduce violent crime rates. This paper introduces and defines the concept and components of focused deterrence programs. Focused deterrence programs generally include a specific target population, collaboration between criminal justice practitioners and numerous community stakeholders, a means of notification to the targeted group, offering alternatives to crime, and strict enforcement if criminal behavior continues. Current literature and empirical studies will be reviewed. Criminological theory related to focus deterrence will be discussed.

Current research suggests that many focused deterrence programs are initially successful at reducing rates of violent crime, but that success begins to diminish over time. While some programs thrive for many years, others lose effectiveness and disintegrate over time. This paper will study the most common issues that lead to program breakdown. Sustainability factors of successful programs and pitfalls of unsuccessful programs will be examined. From these, practical recommendations will be made regarding the sustainability of focused deterrence programs. This paper will include recommendations for future research on focused deterrence.

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Throughout history, many different approaches to crime control have been tried with varying degrees of success. One of those approaches is focused deterrence. Focused deterrence is a crime control strategy created in the 1990's by Dr. David Kennedy, a criminologist at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. Dr. Kennedy's idea of focused deterrence was first put to the test with Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts. His approach was credited with a substantial decrease in gang-related youth violence (Kennedy, 2011). Since the mid 1990's, many other U.S. cities and foreign countries have implemented this strategy. Focused deterrence programs attempt to address a long-standing issue in criminal justice, criminal recidivism and the chronic victimization and violence associated with it (Kennedy, 2011).

Focused deterrence programs target repeat offenders identified by law enforcement as being consistently engaged in criminal activity. These programs, also known as "pulling levers strategies", are a collaboration between police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections pulling every lever or using every legal tool available to arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate repeat offenders (Engel, Tillyer, & Corsaro, 2013). As of 2018, 84 U.S. cities and numerous other countries including Scotland, Turkey, and Brazil have implemented some form of focused deterrence programs into their criminal justice strategies (Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, 2018).

The operating philosophies and areas of focus for programs can vary depending on the needs and resources of that community. The common elements of focused deterrence programs include: a specific target population, collaboration between the police, criminal justice system practitioners, and community organizations, notification of the targeted group regarding their status in the program, offering selected offenders alternatives to crime, and strict enforcement and sanctions if criminal behavior continues (NIJ, nd.).

Offenders selected for focused deterrence programs are notified of their status in the program either in person at a call-in meeting or on the street by law enforcement or probation officials. Generally, representatives from law enforcement, probation, the prosecutor's office, social services, and various community organizations attend the meeting and address the notified offenders. Offenders are told, in no uncertain terms, that their criminal behavior has set them apart in the community and it will no longer be tolerated (Braga et al., 2018). They are offered social services support such as housing and job placement assistance and drug, alcohol, and anger management counseling in order to help them desist from criminal behavior. The message is made clear that if they continue to engage in criminal behavior, they will be arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to the fullest extent of the law (Braga et al., 2018).

The most common targeted population of focused deterrence programs is repeat violent offenders and/or criminal street gang members (Engel et al., 2013). Focused deterrence programs have also successfully addressed recidivism among repeat drunk drivers, domestic violence offenders, and to disrupt drug markets in urban areas (Talpins, Voas, DuPont, & Shea, 2011). The common theme of all focused deterrence programs is to identify and disrupt chronic criminal behavior.

Research has indicated that focused deterrence programs can have significant crime-reducing effects. Braga & Weisburd (2011) completed a meta-analysis of 11 different evaluations of focused deterrence programs in small, medium, and large cities throughout the U.S. The program evaluations utilized comparison groups as well as pre and post program crime rate measurements. Statistically significant post-program crime rate reductions were reported in 10 out of 11 program evaluations (Braga & Weisburd, 2011).

Statement of the Problem

According to Engel (2018), focused deterrence programs in many cities fail and disband within several years of inception. A few of these cities include Boston, Cincinnati, and New Orleans. This research will examine the shortcomings of the focused deterrence programs in these and other major U.S. cities that have generally led to lower program performance and eventual program disbandment.

This research will show that there are two deficiencies in the current focused deterrence research. The first is that there is very little research into why seemingly successful programs lose traction over time and disintegrate. The other deficiency is the lack of research into how much each stakeholder element contributes to the overall success of the program. This second research deficiency has been referred to as the "Black box problem". This means that focused deterrence programs are made up of many different facets, like data-driven offender selection, enhanced enforcement, offender notifications, and offering assistance to offenders, but it is unknown how much each facet contributes to the total effectiveness of the program. Further research on this area could have significant budget implications for practitioner agencies as limited resources could be allocated where they are needed most (Braga et al., 2018).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to identify the common factors and issues present when focused deterrence programs fail. This research will discuss leadership changes, shifts in law enforcement priorities, the breakdown of stakeholder partnerships, and other factors. Examples of successful programs will be presented.

In addition to examining key issues that lead to program failure, this research will make recommendations for program sustainability and improvement as well as future research.

Significance and Implications of the Study

How to address violent crime is a major concern in communities across the United States. Community leaders and policy-makers want to know how and where to invest their limited resources. Analysis of various focused deterrence programs have indicated positive outcomes with lowering rates of violent, gang-related, crime (Braga et al., 2018). Many researchers like David Kennedy of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, political leaders such as Detroit, Michigan Police Chief James Craig, and street level criminal justice practitioners have advocated for this law enforcement strategy (Rosenberg, 2018). Despite this, many programs fail to achieve their full potential and the programs are done away with (Engel, 2018). This trend will be examined further throughout this paper.

This research will identify the most common and prevalent issues that lead to program failure. This will be useful for criminal justice administrators and practitioners who are currently engaged in focused deterrence efforts or are considering creating a focused deterrence program in their community. Practical recommendations for program sustainability will further guide criminal justice administrators and practitioners in regard to best practices. Identifying the shortcomings in program operation and current research could guide future research in this area.

Methods of Approach

This research will be based on detailed examinations of the structures and operations of successful and unsuccessful programs. A qualitative review of primary and secondary sources will assist with this examination by identifying the various strengths, weaknesses, and trends with these programs. There are many variables that can affect the success or failure of focused deterrence programs. There are also many different variables among urban communities that start focused deterrence programs such as population size, current violent crime rates, and

availability of criminal justice funding. This research will conduct case studies of large cities, like Boston, New Orleans, and Kansas City, that had focused deterrence programs aimed at reducing gang-involved violent crime and had those programs either disintegrate or disband all together.

This research will examine the structures and operations of successful programs like in Chicago, Cincinnati, and High Point. From this, recommendations for best practices will emerge. Since every program and every community that implements them is different, a qualitative research approach is most appropriate for examining program strengths and shortcomings. There are differences in sample sizes, available data to analyze, and outcome measurements between cities. Some programs utilize pre and post intervention crime rate measurements localized to their city while others compare their outcome measurements to different similarly-situated cities that are not implementing comparable interventions. Any time a complex social problem with numerous variables is being studied, researchers must look beyond simple quantitative measures to gain an understanding of the full scope of the issue.

Contribution to the Field

This study will provide criminal justice administrators and practitioners with a breakdown of the most common issues that lead to program disintegration. It will provide recommendations for a focused deterrence program model that can be sustained over a long period of time and through community and agency leadership changes. This study will identify the deficiencies in the current body of research on focused deterrence program sustainability so that future research can be appropriately guided. Currently, there is very little research on the topic of sustaining focused deterrence programs over a longer time frame.

Anticipated Outcomes

This research will examine and test the following three hypotheses. First, that successful and unsuccessful focused deterrence programs will likely have common factors which will become apparent trends. Second, the similar issues with unsuccessful programs will likely include one or more of the following: Changes in political and/or agency leadership, shifting of agency goals, reduction or elimination of funding, and the breakdown of key stakeholder partnerships. Third, it is not expected that all successful focused deterrence programs will be structured and run the exact same way, but similarities will emerge between these programs from the variables examined. These trends will be used to make practical recommendations for the structure and administration of a successful program. The shortcomings in program sustainability research will be used to make recommendations for future research.

Study Limitations

This research will be based on primary and secondary sources. The program issues and recommendations to be presented will be based on case studies of numerous programs in large, medium, and smaller urban communities. While the issues and recommendations may be generally applicable to most focused deterrence programs, every community and program is different. The needs, challenges, and structures of programs will vary from place to place. As such, the information presented in this research will have varying degrees of applicability depending on the type and scope of the focused deterrence program implemented and the size and type of community that it is in.

Section Two: Literature Review

Much of the current literature on focused deterrence concentrates on the function and effectiveness of the programs. Relatively few studies focus on the internal and external factors

that lead to program failure (Engel, 2018). This literature review will cover the basic criminological theories relevant to focused deterrence, the scope of violent crime, criminal recidivism, and gangs in the U.S., the prevalence of focused deterrence programs, the various types of focused deterrence programs, and other crime control strategies that have been used over time.

Classical Deterrence Theory

Classical deterrence theory is relevant to any focused deterrence program. This theory was created by Cesare Beccaria, an enlightenment philosopher, during the 1700's. His theory of deterrence was a radical change from the conventional ideas of criminal justice at the time. This theory centers on the idea that people have free will to make their own decisions about whether or not to commit crime. More specifically, people weigh the benefits of committing crime versus the costs associated with getting caught. This cost benefit analysis factors into whether or not people choose to offend (Tibbetts & Hemmens, 2010), (Beccaria, 1764).

Beccaria believed that if punishments incorporated three elements, swiftness, certainty, and severity, then people would be deterred from committing crime. However, punishments should not be so severe that offenders are tempted to commit additional, more violent crimes to avoid apprehension. Classical deterrence theory proposes that punishments serve to deter crime in two ways, specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific deterrence is related to the individual offender and general deterrence relates to how the punishment deters others from committing the same offense (Tibbetts & Hemmens, 2010), (Beccaria, 1764).

Focused deterrence programs are a prime example of classical deterrence theory in practice. In an ideal focused deterrence model, the punishments for notified offenders who

commit crimes should be swift, certain, and severe. They are swift because law enforcement immediately targets the notified offender and their gang once it is determined that they committed a violent crime (Engel et al., 2018). They are certain because each offender is notified of the expectations in the program ahead of time. Law enforcement, prosecutors, and probation and parole follow through with strict consequences when the offender breaks the law. The consequences are severe because prosecutors and judges are both on board with the strategy that notified offenders will be given harsher sentences for committing violent offenses (Engel et al., 2013). While deterrence theory is central to the concept of focused deterrence programs, it is not the only theory that is relevant to these programs.

Rational Choice Theory

According to Tibbetts and Hemmens (2010), rational choice theory (RCT) is a Classical School-based framework that emphasizes not only the traditional formal deterrents to crime, but also informal factors. The traditional formal deterrents to crime include law enforcement, the court system, and corrections. Informal factors that can influence criminal behavior include friends, family, employers, and community groups like churches and charitable organizations. This theory also factors in the benefits of offending, such as monetary gains, peer acceptance, or the psychological thrills of engaging in deviant behavior (Tibbetts & Hemmens, 2010), (Katz, 1988).

Rational choice theory centers on the idea that all people want the best possible results from their actions. This theory posits that people make choices by constantly weighing the benefits versus the negative consequences of their actions. If the risk or cost of a particular action is too great, people will make a conscious decision not to take that action. This theory

focuses on the motivations of individuals as opposed to the motivations of groups or of society as a whole (Coleman, 2006).

Rational choice theory relates to focused deterrence programs in numerous ways. It emphasizes the traditional formal deterrents to crime from the criminal justice system. These formal deterrents are a significant part of any focused deterrence program and serve as the primary severe cost of engaging in criminal behavior. If the cost of committing crime is too great, offenders will be dissuaded from engaging in it (Weisburd & Lum, 2018).

Rational choice theory also recognizes that informal factors like friends, family, and community groups can have an impact on crime. Focused deterrence programs incorporate community groups like churches and other charitable organizations into a support network for offenders who choose to desist from crime (Walker, 2011). Focused deterrence programs often incorporate a selected offender's peer group into the crime deterrent efforts. This is particularly evident in the group violence initiative focused deterrence programs where entire street gangs are the target of the program (Weisburd & Lum, 2018). While RCT mainly focuses on individual motivations, peer influence from an offender's gang can influence that individual offender's criminal behavior.

The Scope of Violent Crime, Recidivism, and Gangs in the United States

Homicide and aggravated assaults are significant public safety issues in the United States. According to the 2017 Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), there were an estimated 17,284 homicides in the U.S. This represents a 20.7 percent increase in homicides from 2013 (FBI UCR, 2017). Of the 2017 homicides, 72.6 percent were committed with a firearm (FBI UCR, 2017). The U.S. rate of homicides in 2010 was seven times higher

than 23 other high-income developed nations. The same study found that the U.S. rate of firearm-related homicide was 49 times higher (Grinshteyn & Hemenway, 2015).

According to the FBI (2017), there were 810,825 aggravated assaults in the U.S. in 2017. The FBI defines aggravated assault as "An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury". This type of assault usually involves the use of a weapon or some other means that is likely to lead to death or great bodily harm to the victim (FBI UCR, 2017, para.1). Violence reduction is the goal of most focused deterrence programs. The numbers of homicides and aggravated assaults in cities are common outcome measurements for determining the effectiveness of focused deterrence programs (Engel et al., 2013).

According to Braga and Brunson (2015), the majority of U.S. homicides occur in urban communities. Between 1980 and 2008, almost 58 percent of all homicides occurred in cities with populations of 100,000 or more. Over one third of all homicides occurred in cities of 1 million or more residents. The majority of suspects and victims in urban homicides are involved in high-risk criminal groups, such as street gangs or drug-selling crews (Braga & Brunson, 2015).

Braga and Brunson (2015) examined the homicide rates of African Americans in Boston, Massachusetts between 2000 and 2013. Of the 836 homicides during that time, almost 74 percent of the victims were black. The victims in these cases were mostly young with a mean age of 26.6 years and 54 percent being 24 or younger. An overwhelming 91.1 percent were male and 84.1 percent died from gunshot wounds. The arrested homicide suspects largely fit into the same demographic group as the victims with a mean age of 25 and 59.5 percent being 24 and younger. Arrested suspects were male in 94.2 percent of the cases (Braga & Brunson, 2015).

A significant majority of both homicide suspects and victims had prior contacts with the criminal justice system before the homicides with 78 percent for victims and 90 percent for suspects. Both victims and suspects averaged about 12.5 prior arraignments in Massachusetts courts for a variety of criminal offenses prior to the homicides. About 72.9 percent of victims and 73.6 percent of suspects were on prior probation or parole supervision (Braga & Brunson, 2015). Approximately 55 percent of these homicides were gang-related and 14.7 percent were drug-related. About 78.9 percent of the victims were killed in one of three neighborhoods in Boston, all of which were characterized as low income, mostly black residents, with high levels of crime and social disadvantage. One final noteworthy detail is that the most recent estimate suggests that only about one percent of Boston's 14 to 24 youth population are involved in street gangs engaging in firearm violence (Braga & Brunson, 2015).

Braga and Brunson (2015) posit that while demographics and other factors will cause small variances between urban communities, the aforementioned statistics are fairly representative of black homicide rates in large cities across the U.S. These statistics suggest a number of trends, first homicide suspects and victims are overwhelmingly black and from poor disadvantaged neighborhoods. Secondly, homicide victims and suspects tend to be young males who have had repetitive negative interactions with the criminal justice system. Finally, both victims and suspects are engaged in relatively small, but active groups that engage in criminal behavior and gun violence (Braga & Brunson, 2015).

According to the U.S. Center for Problem Oriented Policing, a large portion of crime is committed by a relatively small portion of the population. Many of the offenders in this small segment of the population are recidivist or repeat offenders. Marvin Wolfgang's famous

Philadelphia crime study suggests that about five percent of offenders commit about 40% of the crime (Clarke & Eck, 2015), (Wolfgang, 1975).

In 2005, the National Institute of Justice directed a study of over 400,000 prisoners released in 30 states. They found that about 76.6% of the offenders were rearrested within five years. Over half of those 76.6% were rearrested within one year or less (NIJ, 2014). Both practitioners and researchers agree that recidivism is a fundamental problem in the criminal justice system. Copious research and criminal justice programming have been devoted to addressing this problem (Clark & Eck, 2015).

According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2011), a criminal street gang is defined as "Any ongoing organization, association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more criminal acts, having a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity" (U.S. NIJ, 2011, para.5). There is copious research supporting the idea that individuals who associate with street gangs are at a much greater risk for engaging in criminal activity and violence (Engel, et al., 2013).

The National Youth Gang Survey showed that there were an estimated 850,000 gang members and over 30,000 different gangs in the U.S. in 2012. This is the highest number of gang members in the last 16 years prior to 2012. A majority 57.3 percent of gang members live in large cities while 24.4 percent live in suburban communities (National Gang Center, 2012). Approximately 35 percent of all gang members are under the age of 18. Notably, the percentage of juvenile gang members is lower in large cities than it is in small towns and rural areas. An overwhelming 92 percent of all gang members are male. As of 2011, the racial/ethnic

breakdown of gang members was 46.2 percent Hispanic, 35.3 percent African American, 11.5 percent white, and 7 percent all others (National Gang Center, 2012).

Between 2007 and 2012, about 13 percent of all homicides in the U.S. were identified as gang-related. Approximately 84 percent of those homicides were in cities with populations of 100,000 or more or in suburban counties. During the same time period, agencies that served rural areas or small cities that reported some gang activity only accounted for about five percent of the gang-related homicides in the U.S. These statistics illustrate that gang-related homicide is largely an issue in urban areas (National Gang Center, 2012).

Of the law enforcement agencies reporting gang activity in 2011 and 2012, 48.9 percent of all violent crimes, 42.9 percent of property crimes, and 39.9 percent of drug sales were attributed as gang-related. Of the agencies that reported gang-related violence in 2012, the following five factors, in order of contributing significance, influenced the violence: Drug-related factors, intergang conflict, return of gang members from secure confinement, intragang conflict, and emergence of new gangs (National Gang Center, 2012).

Prevalence of Focused Deterrence Programs

As of 2018, there were 84 U.S. cities operating some type of focused deterrence program. A few other countries including Scotland, Turkey, and Brazil have also begun experimenting with this form of crime control. The vast majority of programs in the U.S. fall into one of three categories: Programs that target individual repeat violent offenders, programs that target violent groups of offenders also commonly known as group violence reduction initiatives, and programs that target hot spot areas of crime. This last type of program typically focuses on drug markets, but can target other types of crime as well (Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, 2018).

Braga et al. (2018) studied 24 different quasi-experimental evaluations of focused deterrence programs in small, medium, and large cities throughout the U.S. For this study, program evaluations had to utilize comparison groups as well as pre and post program crime rate measurements. The programs had to fit into one of the three types of focused deterrence programs mentioned in the last paragraph. All of the evaluations utilized either a comparison group or a one group time series design. If the latter was used, extraneous factors that were likely to cause variations in crime trends pre and post intervention had to be accounted for. Measurements of program effectiveness had to be official records, such as police calls for service, crime incident reports, and arrest data. Particular attention was paid to evaluations that measured displacement or diffusion of crime (Braga et al., 2018).

All of the program evaluations were conducted after 2000 and 15 of them were conducted after 2010. Twelve of the programs, including: Boston, Massachusetts (Operations Ceasefire I and II), Rochester, New York, New Orleans, Louisiana, Kansas City, Missouri, New Haven Connecticut, Cincinnati, Ohio, Chicago, IL (Group violence reduction strategy), Indianapolis, Indiana, Los Angeles, California, Lowell, Massachusetts, and Stockton, California all focused on street gang activity and the associated commission of violent crimes. Crime related to street level drug markets was the focus of the programs in the Guntersville, Alabama, High Point, North Carolina, Montgomery County, Maryland, Nashville, Tennessee, Ocala, Florida, Peoria, Illinois, Roanoke, Virginia, Seattle, Washington, and Rockford, Illinois programs. Chicago, Illinois (Project Safe Neighborhoods), Glasgow, Scotland, and Newark, New Jersey focused on individual repeat violent offenders (Braga et al., 2018).

Statistically significant post-program crime rate reductions were reported in 19 out of 24 program evaluations. The programs that reported no statistically significant benefits were

Newark, Montgomery County, Guntersville, Ocala, and Peoria. None of the studies utilized randomized controlled trial designs. Braga et al. (2018) contend that this is a limitation with their meta-analysis. Five of the evaluations measured crime diffusion and displacement. Two of these studies reported crime diffusion benefits from the intervention into non-intervention areas and none reported crime displacement (Braga et al., 2018).

The most robust crime reduction benefits were found with group violence reduction strategies. Drug market intervention programs showed statistically significant crime reduction benefits, but were the least effective of the three types of focused deterrence programs evaluated. Despite the lack of randomized controlled trial designs, Braga et al. (2018) noted that the quality of the quasi-experimental evaluation designs has improved significantly since Braga and Weisburd's 2011 meta-analysis. Some of these improvements included better panel designs, sophisticated statistical matching techniques, and more precise statistical models. Appendix A shows a detailed breakdown of each evaluation's findings (Braga et al., 2018).

The systematic review conducted by Braga et al. (2018) was an update to the focused deterrence program evaluation meta-analysis completed by Braga & Weisburd in 2011. Braga and Weisburd (2011) examined quasi-experimental evaluations from 11 different focused deterrence programs and found that ten showed statistically significant reductions in crime post intervention. The authors concluded that the focused deterrence approach to crime control seems promising, as crime rate reductions were consistent and significant in most cases. Braga and Weisburd (2011) noted a lack of rigorous randomized experimental assessments associated with some of the program evaluations. Braga & Weisburd (2011) posit that evaluations with weaker designs tend to show inflated positive outcomes. They concluded that focused deterrence

programs are worthy of future research, but care should be taken to scrutinize the scientific integrity of the program evaluations (Braga & Weisburd, 2011).

Engel, Tillyer, & Corsaro (2013) studied the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) program. The CIRV program started in 2007 and was designed to reduce gang-related violent crimes through communication and swift consequences for gang-involved criminal offenders. A sudden and dramatic rise in homicides and gun violence in Cincinnati lead to the creation of CIRV. The city averaged about 41.3 homicides per year between 1991 and 2000. By 2006, that number had risen to 88 homicides per year. A known violent gang member was either a victim or suspect in about 75 percent of those homicides.

Like most focused deterrence programs, the CIRV was a collaborative effort between the police, courts, corrections, and social services. Housing assistance, educational opportunities, and job services were offered to all notified offenders as a way out of their violent gang lifestyles. Engel, et al. (2013) examined data from homicides and shooting incidents from January 2004 to December 2010. The time period of this study covered 3.5 years of crime data prior to CIRV and 3.5 years after the start of CIRV. Rates of gang-involved homicides and shooting incidents were compared to non-gang-involved violent incidents to measure if CIRV interventions made a difference. Rates of non-violent crime over the study period, which typically was not the focus of CIRV, were also compared. Engel et al. (2013) took into account seasonal fluctuations in overall crime rates as well as other factors that could affect rates of violent gang-involved crime. The results of the study showed that 3.5 years after the CIRV was implemented, gang-related homicides dropped by 41.4% and overall violent firearm incidents declined by 22%. Rates of non-gang-involved homicides, shooting incidents, and non-violent crime, not subject to CIRV, did not show this same decrease (Engel, et al., 2013).

Walker (2011) suggests that deterrence programs that target a specific group or type of offender can have crime reduction potential. Walker cites the successes of Operation Ceasefire, a program in Lowell, MA, and the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). Walker (2011) theorizes that the potential of focused deterrence programs, like CIRV, are not fully realized yet, but results so far are promising. Walker believes that, in order to be effective, focused deterrence programs must be data driven, focus on a specific group of offenders, deliver a deterrent message and offer rehabilitative services, and swiftly deliver on enforcement promises. Walker suggests that other, more traditional, forms of crime deterrence strategies like police "sweeps" and "neighborhood crackdowns" are not as effective at reducing crime because the targeted group is too broad and the police often do not have the resources to follow through with their enforcement promises (Walker, 2011).

Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos (2014) evaluated the effectiveness of "Operation Ceasefire" in Boston, Massachusetts. Created in the early 1990's, Operation Ceasefire was the first organized focused deterrence program. It started off targeting a small group of young, gang-involved repeat violent offenders in Boston's inner city. This small group of offenders was responsible for a significant number of homicides, shootings, and other violent crimes in Boston. Selected offenders were notified that their violent behavior would not be tolerated any further. These notifications were typically accomplished by "call-in meetings" where offenders were brought to a location and notified about their status in the program or they were advised by police during street contacts.

There were two components to the program. The first component included offering social services, such as assistance with job placement, housing, and education, to offenders as an alternative to their criminal behavior. If offenders ignored their notice and continued to commit

violent crimes, then the second component of the program, strict enforcement, was used. Individual offenders, as well as the gangs that they belonged to, were targeted by law enforcement. The Boston Police Department Gang Unit would arrest gang members for any crimes they committed including drug offenses, trespassing, public consumption of alcohol, and other low-level offenses (Braga et al., 2014).

Local, state, and federal law enforcement, the prosecuting attorney's office, area judges, probation and parole agents, and other criminal justice system representatives were all involved in this collaborative effort. Targeted offenders would be vigorously prosecuted and would generally not be offered plea agreements. If convicted, offenders would be given higher sentences by judges. Offenders who were on probation or parole would be sent back to prison for violating the terms of their release. Local authorities also collaborated with the federal court system in order to aggressively prosecute offenders who violated federal statutes. Operation Ceasefire was the first large-scale program of its kind that was collaborative between police, courts, corrections, and social services (Braga et al., 2014).

Shortly after the program started, a U.S. Department of Justice sponsored evaluation of the program found that Operation Ceasefire was associated with a 63% reduction in youth homicides, a 34% reduction in total homicides, a 32% reduction in shots fired calls, and a 25% reduction in firearm assaults (Braga et al., 2014). Despite its favorable statistics, Operation Ceasefire was discontinued in 2000. It was reinitiated in 2006 following a sharp rise in gang-related homicides. Boston had five gang-related homicides in 1999, the last full year of the original Operation Ceasefire. The number of yearly gang-related homicides rose to 37 by 2006 (Braga et al. 2014).

Braga and his colleagues examined the effectiveness of the post-2006 model of Operation Ceasefire (Ceasefire II) using gang-related shooting incident data from 2006 to 2010. It is important to note that Braga et al. (2014) grouped both firearm-related homicides and firearm-inflicted nonlethal injuries into the single category of "shooting incidents". Braga and his team compared shooting incident data from Ceasefire-treated gangs to other Boston street gangs that were not subject to Ceasefire sanctions. The results showed that during the five-year study, Ceasefire-treated gangs had a 57.3% reduction in the yearly mean total of gang-related shooting incidents. This is compared to a 20.2% reduction for non-treated gangs. These results were consistent with total mean yearly trends in shooting incidents. Utilizing a growth curve regression model and controlling for other covariates, Braga and his colleagues found a significant 30.8% reduction in total gang-related shooting incidents during the study time period credited to Operation Ceasefire II interventions (Braga et al., 2014).

Types of Focused Deterrence Programs

According to Weisburd and Lum (2018), most focused deterrence programs target specific violent repeat offenders or criminal groups like street gangs. A significant number of programs focus on street level drug markets. Focused deterrence strategies have also been successfully used to address repeat impaired driving and domestic violence offenders. For instance, the 24/7 Sobriety Program, a focused deterrence program targeting repeat drunk drivers in South Dakota, has shown that program participants were 45 percent less likely to re-offend three years after their arrest as compared to non-program control group offenders (Talpins, Voas, DuPont, & Shea, 2011).

Another noteworthy focused deterrence program is Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program. This program was designed to address the issue of rampant drug

use and probation violations with offenders on extended supervision. The HOPE program incorporated offender call-in sessions where the expectations of the program were explained. Frequent drug tests were conducted on HOPE offenders and immediate sanctions, typically consisting of short jail stays, were handed down for violations (Larkin, 2016). The program incorporated mandatory drug treatment for offenders even if they were on probation for a non-drug-related offense. Three years after HOPE started, a randomized control evaluation found that there was an 80 percent decrease in positive drug screenings among participants, offenders were 55 percent less likely to be re-arrested, and 53 percent less likely to have their probation revoked (Larkin, 2016)

Regardless of their target audience, all focused deterrence programs are data-driven. Individual offenders and/or targeted gangs are identified and selected for the programs based on numerous factors. These can include, but are not limited to arrest history, gang affiliation, involvement in past violent incidents, history in the corrections system, and law enforcement surveillance operations (Fox, Novak, & Yaghoub, 2015).

With street level drug market interventions, specific individuals and criminal groups are targeted based on data. Often times, law enforcement will conduct surveillance and make undercover drug buys from targeted dealers prior to notification meetings (Corsaro, 2013). Targeted drug markets are often chosen based upon police calls for service data, police surveillance, data on gangs or other criminal groups controlling the illegal trades in that area, drug arrest data in the area, and data on other crimes associated with drug markets like robberies, assaults, and weapons offenses (Corsaro, 2013).

Other Crime Control Strategies

Over the years, numerous crime control strategies have been implemented across the U.S. with varying degrees of success. One common tactic used by law enforcement is preventative patrol. This is when officers patrol an area in recognizably marked police vehicles in the hopes of deterring criminal behavior (Lombardo & Lough, 2007).

The 1972 Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment shed new light on the effectiveness of preventative patrol. The experimental area was divided into 15 beat areas. Five of the beats were "reactive" beats where officers would only respond if there was a call for service and no proactive patrol was done. There were five "control" beats where officers conducted their normal levels of proactive patrol in addition to responding to calls for service. Finally, there were five "proactive" beats where officers conducted proactive patrols that were two to three times the normal levels (National Police Foundation, 2016).

The findings of this experiment were that most citizens did not notice the increase or decrease in police patrols in their neighborhood. The patrol changes had little to no impact on citizen's feelings of security or satisfaction with the police. The changes had no significant or consistent impact on reported crime rates. These findings were based on reported crime rates, arrest data, victimization surveys, satisfaction surveys with citizens and business owners, and trained observers who monitored the interactions between officers and citizens (National Police Foundation, 2016).

While it cannot be concluded from one experiment that preventative patrol has no impact on crime control, this experiment has some implications. It indicates that preventative patrol has minimal impact on crime and citizen's perceptions of the police. Time and resources can be

reallocated to more productive crime control strategies like targeted crime prevention without jeopardizing the overall safety of the public (National Police Foundation, 2016).

Another common crime control tactic used by law enforcement are neighborhood crackdowns. According to the Center for Problem Oriented Policing (N.D.) neighborhood crackdowns are when police deploy additional officers to address a particular problem area. The three basic elements of crackdowns are increased police presence, increased certainty or severity of legal sanctions against offenders, and publicity about the operation and its results. Research has shown that the police surveillance and arrests should be intense and for relatively short durations and should rotate between several different hot spot areas. Crackdown activity should resume either at unpredictable times or when criminal activity in the target area rises back up to unacceptable levels (POP Center, N.D.).

The basic idea of crackdowns is that they increase the certainty that offenders will be arrested, but more importantly, they increase the perception of everyone in the target area that offenders will be arrested. Another benefit of crackdowns is that they remove some of the repeat offenders from the neighborhood. Using the example of an urban drug market, removing some of the high-rate dealers from the area will dry up the drug market causing buyers to go elsewhere in search of drugs. This will have the diffuse benefit that crimes associated with drug markets, like robberies and assaults, will also go down due to less potential victims being in the problem area (POP Center, N.D.). Crackdowns can have short-term crime reduction benefits that are generally apparent in a short amount of time. For this reason, crackdowns are a relatively popular crime control tactic with both the public and law enforcement leaders (POP Center, N.D.)

There are several drawbacks to crackdowns. Often times, crackdown operations target all offenders in the targeted areas, not just the high-level offenders. This can lead to decreased levels of trust between the police and community members. In a study in Jersey City, New Jersey, Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) found that neighborhoods that were the subject of police crackdown initiatives actually reported higher levels of fear of crime after the intervention. These test neighborhoods were compared to control neighborhoods with similar crime rates that were not the subject of police crackdowns. At least part of this increase in citizen fear was attributed to the manner in which the police crackdowns were conducted (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008).

When residents in a neighborhood, that are used to seeing crime, inequality, and disorder, see a large number of officers making seemingly indiscriminate arrests of people in their neighborhood, this can lead to feelings of intimidation and distrust. The equipment and tactics used by law enforcement during the apprehension of violent or high-risk offenders can also be very intimidating to neighborhood residents who do not understand the full dynamics of the situation (POP Center, N.D.).

Another drawback of crackdowns is that they tend to be expensive since overtime often has to be paid out to obtain the number of officers necessary to have a successful operation. The crime reduction benefits are often very short-lived as police interventions typically become less rigorous over time and offenders adapt their behavior to crackdown (POP Center, N.D.). Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) found that police crackdowns can easily just displace crime to other locations versus actually reducing it overall.

Section III: Methodology

This section will explore how and why some focused deterrence programs slow down and eventually fail. This will be done by examining research on programs that have slowed down in effectiveness or disbanded all together. Programs that have thrived will also be examined. Since every program and every community is different, the evidence from these case studies will be somewhat anecdotal. The program challenges faced and the resources available will vary from one place to another. By examining factors present in successful and unsuccessful programs, common trends will emerge. From this, recommendations can be made regarding focused deterrence program sustainability.

This section will examine several focused deterrence programs in different U.S. cities. The information about these programs was obtained from scholarly articles, government and non-profit organization websites, news articles from reputable media sources, and an interview with Stanley Ross, a current program director in Cincinnati, Ohio. The scholarly articles used were located on the University of Wisconsin – Platteville Karrmann Library online database as well as the Google Scholar search engine. The government websites for the various cities running focused deterrence programs as well as the news articles were found with the Google search engine. Stanley Ross' name and contact information was obtained from Lieutenant David Schofield of the Cincinnati Police Department Criminal Intelligence Unit.

The terms "Focused deterrence", "Focused deterrence programs", "Group violence reduction" and "Drug market intervention" were used to search for scholarly articles about the different programs presented in this section. After reading the article results, the name of a specific program and/or city would then be searched for to obtain additional information. This research focuses on programs that aim to reduce violent crime in urban areas. Specifically,

group violence reduction strategies and drug market intervention programs were searched for. If a relevant scholarly article was cited within an article being analyzed, that relevant article would then be searched for separately using the methods mentioned above.

The programs examined in this section all fit the criteria that they aimed to reduce violent crime in urban areas. They represented a cross section of different sized cities ranging from small, High Point, North Carolina, medium, Cincinnati, Ohio, and large, Los Angeles, California. Examining different sized cities will illustrate some of the unique challenges related to program sustainability in each city. This will also demonstrate that some of the program sustainability challenges are similar regardless of the location. The following programs were chosen due to the fact that they either sustained over time or did not. Long-term sustainment or failure of a program was determined by examining scholarly articles, news articles, current program information on the program city's website, and an interview with a program director. Program reviews will be qualitative in nature.

This section also studies police legitimacy and public trust and support of law enforcement as they relate to focused deterrence programs. This information was obtained from scholarly articles and news articles. This examination will stress the importance of public trust and police legitimacy to long-term sustainment of focused deterrence programs.

Operation Ceasefire I Boston

Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts was the first focused deterrence program. Started in the early 1990's, it was hailed by some as being the miracle cure for inner-city violence. A U.S. Department of Justice sponsored study found that the program reduced youth homicide rates by as much as 63 percent (Tillyer, Engel, & Lovins, 2012). Despite this, the program was discontinued, in its original form, in 2000. Within six years of ending Ceasefire I,

youth violence and homicides in Boston increased by 160 percent (Braga, Hureau, & Winship, 2008).

According to Braga et al. (2008), a number of factors culminated in the disbanding of Operation Ceasefire I in the early 2000's. The original Boston PD director of the program since its inception, Lieutenant Gary French, left the position to lead the Sexual Assault Unit. The new program director discontinued Lieutenant French's practice of weekly meetings with Ceasefire program stakeholders. Boston PD resources were largely re-allocated to reactive policing activities like serving outstanding arrest warrants. Boston PD also expanded Ceasefire tactics to other crime issues like addressing criminogenic families and investigating unsolved shootings. With the scope of policing activities being expanded beyond preventing youth gang violence, the Boston PD's ability to address gang conflicts before they erupted into violence was significantly reduced because that was not the singular focus of any unit. The BPD's reduced capacity to address gang conflicts was due to officers and resources being spread too diffusely on other policing issues (Braga et al., 2008).

At the time Ceasefire was disbanded in its original form, many of the key partnerships between the police and other community organizations remained intact, but were devoted to other societal issues like facilitating the re-entry of paroled offenders back into the community and similar activities not directly related to violent gang-related crime prevention (Jonas, 2006). Some of the key partnerships formed during Ceasefire were strained and damaged due to the initial success of the program. Numerous entities, including the Boston Police, the Ten Point Coalition, and probation and parole quickly took credit for the effectiveness of the program. This led to division in the program's leadership and political bickering between organizations. These, and other issues, culminated in program disbandment in 2000 (Bridgespan.org, N.D.).

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 presented another challenge to programs like Operation Ceasefire. Federal funding was channeled into anti-terrorist activities instead of being allocated to cities like Boston for crime prevention programs (CSG.org, 2005). Between 2000 and 2005, the Boston PD lost funding and eliminated 200 patrol officer positions. The city was struggling to maintain basic reactive patrol functions, let alone maintain proactive programs like Ceasefire (Braga et al., 2008). Around 2004, there was a significant change up to the command of the Boston PD. Shortly thereafter, a deep rift emerged between the commanders of the Uniformed Services and the Investigative Services Divisions. Both men had their own ideas about what crime control activities were needed in Boston and BPD personnel ended up in competing factions. The newly-appointed Boston Police Commissioner did nothing to try to resolve the in-fighting (Braga et al., 2008).

Crime control efforts in the early to mid-2000's largely consisted of neighborhood sweeps and crackdowns that were both short-lived and had little to no effect on Boston's violent crime. Instead of targeting known repeat violent offenders, residents of entire neighborhoods were often indiscriminately targeted based on where they lived and arrested for violations like trespassing, simple drug possession, or traffic offenses. With in-fighting and ineffective leadership, the Boston PD was hardly in a position to take on the task of targeting high level violent offenders in a coordinated effort (Jonas, 2006).

According to Brunson (2015), a critical element to the success of Operation Ceasefire I was the Ten Point Coalition (TPC). The TPC was a group of clergy leadership from various churches in the black communities of Boston. The group was first formed in response to high profile gang violence incidents in the early 1990's. Initially, the TPC was very distrusting of the Boston PD and would publicly criticize the tactics and motivations of the department. During

Operation Ceasefire I, Boston PD officers and TPC leadership established a working relationship for the good of the program's mission. The relationship between the Boston PD and the TPC was often tenuous, but the two groups were able to build and maintain rapport with one another. This relationship was beneficial to both groups and contributed to the overall success of Operation Ceasefire I (Brunson, 2015).

During the 1990's, the TPC grew substantially in both size and influence. Over a 13-year period, the TPC and its affiliated non-profit organizations received about 10 million dollars in state and federal funding as well as private donations. With increased fame and influence, the TPC leadership became increasingly concerned with who was getting the most "Face time" with local media versus accomplishing their mission of preventing violence. By the early 2000's, the TPC leadership was divided on what the mission of the organization should be. The TPC partnered with various other social service organizations and resources were allocated to other issues besides gang violence like community support for HIV/AIDS infection (Braga et al., 2008).

By the mid-2000's, the TPC had split into separate factions, all doing different community initiatives. Street advocates and members of the clergy were no longer walking the streets of Boston making face to face contacts with gang members. During Ceasefire I, the TPC would meet routinely to discuss gang activity and conflicts and how they could address the issues. Training sessions were done with street activists on activities like how to do a neighborhood walk. These organized meetings and trainings withered and dissolved in the early 2000's (Rivers, 2013).

By 2006, gang violence in Boston returned to pre-Ceasefire I levels and public confidence and satisfaction with the Boston PD was at an all-time low. At that time, Edward

Davis III was sworn in as the new Boston Police Commissioner. Davis was the former Police Chief in Lowell, Massachusetts and a huge proponent of focused deterrence and data-driven policing initiatives. Davis promoted Lieutenant Gary French to Deputy Superintendent and tasked him with reinvigorating the Boston PD's gang violence reduction efforts. This was the start of Operation Ceasefire II. Motivated by rising crime rates, the working relationship between the Boston PD and the TPC was re-initiated and re-focused on gang violence prevention (Braga et al., 2008).

Operation Ceasefire II was implemented citywide by the end of 2006 and into early 2007. An interesting side note was that the Boston PD attempted to implement a Ceasefire type initiative in one high crime district early in 2006 before Ceasefire II went citywide. A street gang known as the Lucerne Street Doggz was targeted due to their disproportionately high involvement in violent incidents in the district. The resources from the Boston PD were largely district-level officers and detectives. Larger, department-wide resources, were not involved in this smaller scale initiative. The Boston PD partnered with probation and parole, the prosecuting attorney's office, social services, and the TPC for this district-level initiative (Braga et al., 2014).

The targeted gang members of Lucerne Street were warned at call-in meetings that continued violence would not be tolerated and social services were offered. The result of this small-scale initiative was insignificant. After a brief lull in violence over the winter of 2006-2007, members of the Lucerne Street Doggz continued to engage in violence and murder. By May 2007, Lucerne Street gang members were implicated in 21 gang-involved shootings. The issue with this small-scale initiative was that the Boston PD was not fully invested in its implementation. After the targeted gang was warned, but continued to engage in violence, the police did not allocate the officers and resources necessary to follow through with their

enforcement threats. Enforcement action was sporadic and proved to be an ineffective deterrent (Braga et al., 2014).

When Operation Ceasefire II was implemented citywide in late 2006 to early 2007, the initiative was fully supported with resources and officers. Regular meetings were held with partner agencies and organizations as all stakeholders got on board with making violence reduction the group's sole focus. Between 2006 and 2010, the citywide implementation of Operation Ceasefire II lead to a 31 percent reduction in gang-involved shootings among the 19 targeted gangs. A 24 percent reduction in gang-involved shootings were observed among non-targeted, but socially-tied gangs suggesting a diffusion effect to the intervention (Braga et al., 2018).

New Orleans Group Violence Reduction Strategy

In 2012, New Orleans, Louisiana implemented a focused deterrence program aimed at reducing violent crime from gangs and other criminally active groups. This program was modeled after the original Operation Ceasefire program in Boston, Massachusetts. The New Orleans Group Violence Reduction (GVR) strategy was a collaborative effort between the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), local prosecutors, social service providers, and academic researchers from the University of Cincinnati (NIJ, 2016). Researchers from the University of Cincinnati assisted NOPD personnel with examining and interpreting historical crime and gang activity data in order to choose the most appropriate street gangs to include in the program. Academic researchers also tracked and evaluated crime and gang activity data after program implementation in order to measure program effectiveness (NIJ, 2016).

According to the National Institute of Justice (2016), the New Orleans GVR showed favorable outcomes three years into the program. New Orleans was compared to 14 other large cities with similar violent crime rates that did not have similar focused deterrence programs in effect. The overall homicide rate was 17.3 percent lower than those of the comparison cities. After examining pre-program versus post-program rates, researchers found that there was an 18.6 percent reduction in homicides in New Orleans. This was after accounting for crime-affecting factors like seasonal fluctuations. Firearm-related homicide incidents declined 17.4 percent and non-lethal firearm-related assaults declined 16.2 percent. A significant 30.1 percent decline in the number of gang member-involved homicides was observed post-program (NIJ, 2016). Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018) evaluated the New Orleans GVR and noted that non-gang-involved homicides, involving offenders not subject to the program, showed no significant changes.

It is important to note that while the New Orleans GVR was implemented, another program called the CURE Violence program was simultaneously started. The CURE Violence program utilized outreach workers, not law enforcement, to act as violence interrupters. These outreach workers would contact gang members in conflict and would attempt to mediate disputes before they turned violent. These workers would also offer gang members access to social services to help them leave their criminal lifestyles. New Orleans' CURE Violence program was based off of a similar program implemented in Chicago, Illinois (NIJ, 2016).

According to Engel (2018) it is imperative for focused deterrence practitioners and academic researchers to work in partnership. Researchers fulfilled a critical role with the New Orleans GVR by assisting practitioners with identifying problem gangs, implementing strategic problem-solving approaches, managing limited program resources, and program evaluation.

Against the advice of the researchers from the University of Cincinnati, the New Orleans Police Department dissolved their partnership with the academic researchers. Engel (2018) reassessed the effectiveness of the New Orleans GVR two years after the decision to cut ties with the academic research team. She found that the initial violent crime reduction benefits of the program were no longer existent as the key components of the program had emaciated over that time. Key partnerships between the New Orleans PD, the court system, and social services had disconnected. Violent gang-involved crime had returned to normal levels in New Orleans (Engel, 2018).

Kansas City No Violence Alliance

In 2013 and 2014, Kansas City, Missouri implemented a focused deterrence program aimed at reducing violent gang-related crime in the city. The Kansas City No Violence Alliance (KCNoVA) identified the most prolific criminal street gangs through street-level intelligence and analysis. The alliance included the Kansas City Police Department (KCPD), the Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, Missouri Probation and Parole, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Kansas City Mayor's Office, local social service agencies, researchers from the University of Missouri – Kansas City, and various federal law enforcement agencies (NIJ, 2018).

A strong deterrent message was communicated repeatedly to the targeted gangs and support from social services was offered. Community members challenged the notified gang members to change their mindsets that accepted violence and retaliation as the norm. With a population of just under 460,000 people in 2010, over 17 percent of the city's residents lived below the poverty level (U.S. Census, 2018). Three key incumbent political figures, the Jackson County Prosecutor, the KCPD Chief of Police, and the Kansas City Mayor, all left office in

2012. With the new leadership in place, there was an environment for creating ambitious collaborative crime reduction efforts (Fox et al., 2015).

According to Fox et al. (2015), the KCNoVA was created in response to the city's consistently high violent crime rates. For the last several years prior to the initiative, Kansas City ranked among the 50 worst cities in the U.S. for rates of homicide. Kansas City averaged more than 100 homicides per year between 2010 and 2013. During that same period, Kansas City averaged over 2,400 aggravated assaults and over 1,600 robberies. From 2010 to 2014, 86.3 percent of all homicides and 42.1 percent of all aggravated assaults involved the use of a firearm. Kansas City's violent crime was found to be concentrated in three regions of the city (Fox et al., 2015).

The KCNoVA created an Interagency Enforcement Group comprised of law enforcement and probation and parole officials. This group was to meet on a weekly basis and review incident reports involving the targeted gangs in the program. If one of the gangs was involved in a violent incident, such as a homicide, this would trigger a swift enforcement response coordinated by the Interagency Enforcement Group (NIJ, 2018). An early implementation problem with the KCNoVA was that the Interagency Enforcement Group did not actually convene until the program had been in operation for nearly a year. This lack of communication and direction left law enforcement practitioners to essentially "wing it" (Fox et al., 2015).

During the first year of operation, there was no formal documented implementation plan in place. This lack of a formal plan caused numerous mishaps during the early stages of the program. Enforcement operation decisions were unorganized and were made at a variety of organizational levels. Law enforcement and prosecutors were ready to act but had no clear

guidance on who or what to focus on. Communication between partner agencies was limited at best (Fox et al., 2015).

Gang dynamics and triggering events for violent crime are constantly changing. As such, focused deterrence programs rely on intelligence from front line officers on the street. These officers will be the most familiar with the problems and factors that are driving group violence (Corsaro, 2013). The KCNoVA relied heavily on group audits of front line KCPD officers assigned to work in the areas where program-targeted gangs operated. For most of 2013, these group audits failed to occur due largely to a lack of understanding and/or support of the KCNoVA from KCPD command staff who were not initially brought on board when the program was started. At the end of 2013, Dr. David Kennedy put on a training session with KCPD command staff about the operations and benefits of focused deterrence programs. This helped bring command staff to support the program and facilitate the street officer group audits (Fox et al., 2015).

After there was buy-in from the KCPD command and street level officers, the group audits were scheduled every 90 days and were generally well-attended. This provided valuable up to date information about gangs and street conflict for the Interagency Enforcement Group to make decisions. After the KCNoVA started running effectively in early 2014, there were significant reductions in violent crime. Researchers measured the rates of homicides and aggravated assaults compared to pre-intervention rates at one month, three month, six month, and 12 month intervals post-intervention (Fox et al., 2015). See the table in Appendix A for these violent crime rate outcomes.

Interestingly, the crime-reducing effectiveness of the KCNoVA appeared to peak at about one to three months after implementation and then quickly wore off. Success diminished and

crime rates returned to pre-intervention levels within one year of effective program implementation (Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, 2018). According to the National Institute of Justice (2018), two years post-implementation, the KCNoVA still showed no apparent effects on homicides, gang-involved homicides, or aggravated assaults. The City of Kansas City conducted an introspective evaluation of the shortcomings of the KCNoVA. The program faced a number of challenges during it implementation and operating period that likely contributed to its eventual downfall. Partnerships between involved agencies were not sustained due to high turnover rates in government leadership positions. When new leadership begins, those in charge often have a new vision and new goals for their agency (KCMO.gov, 2015).

Funding and resources are a limited commodity. Most aspects of the KCNoVA were funded by the individual agencies responsible for their facet of the program. When funding was cut due to budget constraints or required for other programming, then programs like the KCNoVA suffered. Partner agencies lost sight of the original mission over time and tried to utilize their partnerships for unrelated social issues or problems. Over time, KCNoVA practitioners became accustomed to the program as the norm. New program innovations did not keep up with the current crime trends in Kansas City. This led to practitioners being less effective with their work and less enthusiastic about the mission of the program. Along with agency leadership turnover, there was consistent turnover with street-level practitioners. The effectiveness of the program waned as these new practitioners were not adequately brought up to speed about the program and its mission (KCMO.gov, 2015).

Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles

Beginning in 1999, the RAND Corporation partnered with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to identify a neighborhood in Los Angeles that was suitable for a focused

deterrence intervention. They settled on the Boyle Heights neighborhood, part of the Hollenbeck Police District, due to the high number of gang-involved homicides and other violent crime incidents. Research found that neighborhood homicides were driven by gang rivalries and a continuous cycle of retaliatory violence. Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles utilized a working group model similar to Boston's Operation Ceasefire consisting of law enforcement, probation and parole, the courts, Los Angeles Housing Authority, social services, and various community and religious organizations. Also similar to Boston's Ceasefire was that Los Angeles solely focused on one task, reducing gang-related firearm violence (Justice Policy Institute, N.D.).

Officials from the LAPD and RAND Corporation visited Boston to learn more about the original Operation Ceasefire and how it could be applied to Los Angeles. It became apparent that Los Angeles would not be able to simply copy Boston's Ceasefire model. One of the implementation challenges in Los Angeles was that the scope and structures of their gangs were different than that of Boston. Gangs in Los Angeles that were responsible for much of the violent crime were larger gangs that were deeply entrenched in their respective neighborhoods versus gangs in Boston. Los Angeles gangs also formed a complex network of associations and criminal activities that spanned across Los Angeles County. This meant that gang-related crimes were happening across multiple jurisdictions. Attempting a city-wide initiative would have involved bringing many criminal justice leaders and stakeholders to the table at once. This would have been a very difficult task to get everyone on the same page with the common goals of the initiative. This is why the Boyle Heights Neighborhood was chosen as an initial test site for Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles (Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, & Greenwood, 2005).

A gruesome gang homicide incident in Boyle Heights that left one gang member and a 10-year-old girl dead sparked a heavy police suppression initiative. A deterrence message was

delivered to targeted gang members. Initially, the targeted area saw a 37 percent drop in violent crime. The RAND Corporation compared the violent crime statistics of the targeted Boyle Heights neighborhood to the rest of the Hollenbeck District six months post-intervention. They found that violent crime was declining throughout the district, including many neighborhoods that were not part of the intervention. Violence in the targeted neighborhood was only about 13 percent lower than the non-targeted areas. The RAND evaluation concluded that the success of the intervention could be described as modest at best. Given the limited success of the program, the LAPD and their partner agencies scaled back suppression and deterrence activities. Shortly thereafter, violent crime rates returned to pre-intervention levels (Tita et al., 2005).

There were two main criticisms of the Los Angeles Operation Ceasefire program. The first was that Ceasefire was just another police initiative that was heavy on suppression and enforcement. Critics contend that during program implementation, violent crime was already declining as evidenced by crime rates regressing to the mean after a temporary spike all across the district. The second criticism was that the deterrence message to offenders and the offering of social services programming was very lacking. The RAND evaluation found that far more resources were expended on enforcement activities compared to offering targeted offenders life-changing assistance like job training, tattoo removal, and drug and alcohol counseling (Justice Policy Institute, N.D.).

Due to an increase in violent crime between two particular gangs, culminating in the Boyle Heights double homicide, police suppression efforts were started before services that provided an alternative to crime were put in place. These services were being retailed to gang members by various community organizations, but the resources were not actually in place to fulfill those promises in a consistent manner (Tita et al., 2005). According to the RAND

Corporation (2003), Los Angeles Ceasefire failed to achieve long-term success because the program working group immediately focused their attention on the two gang factions that were involved in the most violence. Law enforcement resources were devoted to these two gangs while other gangs in Boyle Heights continued to engage in violence with little or no repercussions. This diminished the deterrent effect because the program did not create the perception that all gang-related gun crimes would be addressed swiftly and aggressively (Tita et al., 2005), (RAND Corporation, 2003).

Frequent agency leadership turnover and a lack of additional funding for many of the partner agencies also lead to program disintegration. Many practitioners were expected to perform their regular job duties in addition to the work involved with Ceasefire. Agency budgets were not structured in a way that encouraged interagency collaboration. Many practitioners were not encouraged by their supervisors to engage in interagency collaboration. Finally, the program working group never took on a sense of ownership for Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles. The group always viewed the program as an experiment that would only last for the duration of the study period as opposed to viewing Ceasefire as a new way of addressing violent gang crime through interagency collaboration and focused enforcement (Tita et al., 2005).

Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods

The Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) was started in 2002 and focused on enhanced enforcement and prosecution of firearms laws and notification and monitoring of known violent offenders. Initially implemented in two high crime police districts, the PSN was associated with a 37 percent reduction in homicides and a significant reduction in firearm-related violent incidents (Braga et al., 2018). According to Grunwald and Papachristos (2017), after the first few years of favorable results, the City of Chicago expanded the PSN to several other police

districts. However, the PSN did not receive any additional funding, personnel, or resources when it was expanded. Within a few years of expansion, an updated PSN evaluation showed that the initial crime reduction benefits of the program did not sustain over time. Initiatives of the PSN were so diffuse that their effect on violent crime was largely insignificant (Grunwald & Papachristos, 2017). Despite the inability of the PSN to sustain over time, there was a positive outcome worth noting.

Braga et al. (2018) posit that focused deterrence can improve police-community relations with an emphasis on procedural justice and collective efficacy. The 2007 evaluation of the Chicago PSN program tends to support this idea. Evaluations showed that, in the context of an enforcement environment, direct communication with offenders in a procedurally just manner increased the initially-observed effectiveness of the program. This finding is encouraging in that focused deterrence can be viewed by both the public and even offenders as a legitimate law enforcement strategy. Braga and his colleagues believe that community policing and engagement efforts, coupled with focused deterrence strategies, can further legitimize police efforts and improve community relations. Community engagement can include activities like officers attending neighborhood meetings and events, taking part in youth or community athletic events, and conducting foot or bicycle patrols in neighborhoods (Braga et al., 2018).

Chicago Group Violence Reduction Strategy

The Group Violence Reduction (GVR) Strategy was implemented in 2009 in Chicago, Illinois. It was initially implemented in two police districts that experienced high rates of violent crime. The program focuses on violent street gangs and delivers a strong anti-violence message to targeted offenders and their associated gangs. The program is a collaborative effort between Chicago Police, state and federal law enforcement, prosecutors, probation and parole, social

service providers, and street advocates (Fontaine, Jannetta, Papachristos, Leitson, & Dwivedi, 2017). A 2015 program evaluation showed a 32 percent decrease in shooting victimizations and a 23 percent reduction in shooting involvement for targeted gangs compared to non-targeted gangs (Braga, et al., 2018).

Further evaluation revealed that nearly all of the notified offenders reported to researchers that they spread the anti-violence message to family and friends during the program. Neighborhood surveys revealed that perceptions of community safety improved in both targeted districts post-intervention. Among the notified offenders who took advantage of the program's social services function, employment assistance was by far the most requested. A significant implementation challenge for this program has been the building of trust and rapport between community leaders involved in delivering the anti-violence message and the Chicago Police Department (Fontaine, et al., 2017).

According to the City of Chicago website, the Chicago GVR is still in operation and has expanded to four police districts in the city. The GVR is currently credited with 30 to 40 percent reductions in gang-involved violent incidents in targeted districts. Researchers from Yale University, John Jay College, and the University of Chicago are all involved in the strategic planning, implementation, and data analysis of the GVR. The goal of the GVR is to build the anti-violence mission into the infrastructures of violent neighborhoods so community residents can begin to police themselves. Central components to the GVR mission include adhering to principles of procedural justice and improving police legitimacy with community members (City of Chicago website, N.D.).

Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence

The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) was created as a group violence reduction strategy in 2007. Public outcry about community violence lead to the creation of this program when the homicide count reached an all-time high of 88 victims in 2006. A known violent gang member was either the suspect or the victim in about 75 percent of those homicides. Three and a half years post-implementation, CIRV was associated with a 41.4 percent decrease in gang-related homicides and a 22 percent decrease in overall incidents of firearm violence (Engel et al., 2013).

According to the City of Cincinnati website, CIRV is still in operation as of 2019. The city posts on their website that CIRV is a collaborative partnership between Cincinnati PD, various state and federal law enforcement agencies, community groups, and social service providers. Targeted offenders are offered social services programming in an effort to change their criminogenic lifestyles. Reducing violence by focusing on suspected violent gang members and their associated gangs is still the emphasis of CIRV (Cincinnati website, 2019).

From their evaluation of CIRV, Engel et al. (2013) found that the program was originally designed with sustainability in mind. Program administrators consulted with business executives at the pharmaceutical company, Proctor and Gamble, to design a program structure that would both institutionalize and sustain CIRV over time. The program was structured into four strategy teams: law enforcement, services, community engagement, and systems. All of these teams were managed by a strategy/implementation team who reported to a CIRV governing board. The program co-chairs acted as the spokespersons for CIRV and answered to the governing board. This structure ensured more accountability for each strategy team regarding their aspect of

CIRV. It also divided the workload of running the program into fair and logical work groups (Engel et al., 2013).

The CIRV governing board was comprised of Cincinnati city officials who secured funding and resources for the program and worked through barriers to program success like gaining buy-in from key political and criminal justice system leaders. The strategy/implementation team included the program executive director, leaders of each strategy team, and expert consultants. This team ran the daily operations of the program, secured funding and resources, developed CIRV strategies and operating procedures, and evaluated program results. Each strategy team was responsible for conducting their aspect of the program. Over the years, CIRV has survived administrative leadership changes in all of the most significantly-involved agencies in the program. This sustainability is credited, at least in part, to the way the program is structured (Engel et al., 2013).

An early implementation challenge for CIRV was defining the roles and responsibilities of the co-chairs. These two positions were filled by respected and influential members of the community. They represented CIRV to the media and at public functions. The specific responsibilities and decision-making authority of the co-chairs was not defined by the governing board until about two years into the launch of CIRV. This initial role ambiguity led to confusion and in-fighting among members of the team. It also led to the co-chairs addressing community issues that were not the focus of CIRV. After this issue was addressed by the governing board and their corporate consultants, CIRV operations improved (Tillyer, Engel, & Lovins, 2012).

The law enforcement team consisted of Cincinnati PD personnel and state and federal law enforcement. They obtained and shared data and intelligence on high level offenders and their associated gangs, conducted enforcement activities as needed, participated in offender

notifications, and helped monitor the behavior of notified gang members. The services team consisted of trained street advocates, social service agency workers, and employment specialists. A self-referral system was in place where notified offenders could contact the services team if they were interested in receiving services to help change their lifestyles. Street advocates would engage in direct outreach with notified offenders when gang conflicts arose. The community engagement team worked to change the community norms that accepted violence. This was done through community outreach initiatives, direct outreach with offenders and their families, and community trainings to help neighborhoods organize and exert informal social controls that rejected violence. The systems team focused on collecting and analyzing data and helped secure necessary resources to continue the program (Engel et al., 2013).

According to Engel et al. (2013) 622 offenders utilized some type of social services from CIRV during the 42 month post-intervention evaluation. Of those, only 55 offenders took part in the services specifically tailored to address criminogenic behavior. Only 138 of the offenders who took part in social services were identified as members of violent gangs by law enforcement. The rest were identified and referred by CIRV street advocates. The advocates used a very informal ad hoc assessment system to determine which offenders were at a high risk for engaging in violent behavior. Formal advocate training and validated violence screening tools were not utilized until well into the evaluation period. Engel et al. (2013) believe that a significant number of offenders who took part in CIRV social services were not actively involved in violent gang crime. Engel et al. (2013) posit that the social services component of CIRV likely had an insignificant impact on overall violent crime rates.

Though CIRV is still in operation, the program's effectiveness has fluctuated over time. Engel (2018) states that several years into the program, CIRV's crime reduction effectiveness

suffered due in part to partnerships disbanding and practitioners no longer putting in the work. Cincinnati's homicide count rose from 46 in 2012 to 60 in 2014 (FBI UCR, 2012 & FBI UCR, 2014). According to an article in a Cincinnati news outlet, The Enquirer, CIRV suffered a significant budget cut in 2011. The following year, the funding was restored by the City of Cincinnati, but the program had weakened during 2011. Commitment to CIRV principles was lacking with judges and probation agents in particular. Probation officials were not forcing offender participation in CIRV as a condition of release. This led to reduced offender attendance at CIRV notification sessions (Coolidge, 2014). In 2014, CIRV administrators requested Hamilton County, Ohio to provide funding for probation agents to take part in CIRV initiatives in an attempt to revamp the program. This was in response to an upward trend in violent crime in Cincinnati (Coolidge, 2014).

By the end of 2014, CIRV functions had improved compared to the previous couple years and the program was once again active. Hamilton County probation agents were actively participating in CIRV by ordering supervised offenders to take part in notification sessions and conducting home visits with offenders along with law enforcement personnel. Cincinnati PD command staff and CIRV practitioners were meeting on a weekly basis with researchers from the University of Cincinnati. By analyzing crime data, this group developed crime reduction strategies to be implemented as part of CIRV as well as some place-based hot spot initiatives. Numerous community and youth engagement initiatives were implemented in conjunction with CIRV. From 2013 to 2014, gang-involved homicides decreased 23.4 percent and gang-involved shooting incidents decreased 32.4 percent (Engel, 2014).

Program administrators were able to increase the institutionalization of CIRV by implementing proven corporate sustainability principles. Program objectives, goals, and

strategies were all quantified to the greatest extent possible and were measured on a regular basis using a series of balanced scorecards. Long and short-term goals, each with their own performance measurements, were monitored and linked to the overall program strategy. Though CIRV has had its ups and downs over its 12-year lifespan, the program structure and performance measurement system has undoubtedly contributed to its longevity (Reichert et al., 2018).

According to Stanley Ross, the current coordinator of CIRV, program sustainability is largely achieved by recruiting the right people as practitioners and program administrators. Choosing people who are self-motivated and passionate about the mission of the program is the key to success. Ross states that he meets with his practitioners and program leaders on a biweekly basis so that information can be shared and issues can be addressed. Both administrators and practitioners can become mentally and emotionally fatigued given the nature of working with violent offenders. It's important to periodically change out both practitioner and administrator positions with new people. Ross recalls that both budget cuts and personnel issues contributed to the slowdown of CIRV in 2012 and 2013. Program activity increased in 2014 due to rising violent crime rates, restoration of funding, getting county probation agents engaged in the program again, and making personnel changes in some key leadership positions. These changes infused a sense of motivation and purpose back into the program and were essential to making CIRV effective again (S. Ross, personal communication, March 29, 2019).

Ross states that he strives to keep CIRV practitioners motivated by periodically changing program strategies, experimenting with new methods and ideas, seeking input and feedback from practitioners, and empowering CIRV workers to take on program responsibilities. In 2007, notification sessions occurred six times a year and about 40 to 50 offenders were called in to

each session. Now, the six notification sessions per year call in about 10 to 15 offenders at a time and focus on the ten most violent neighborhoods in the city. Ross says that CIRV now focuses on the highest-level violent offenders in the community. According to Ross, even though violent crime rates are down in Cincinnati currently, it is important to maintain the momentum of the program and continue to foster positive agency partnerships since violent crime is constantly fluctuating. Per Cincinnati PD statistics, as of March 2019, the homicide count is down 32 percent over the last three years (Cincinnati PD website, 2019).

Drug Market Initiative High Point

In 2004, the Drug Market Initiative (DMI) was introduced in High Point, North Carolina. This program was designed to reduce violence associated with street level drug markets in four High Point neighborhoods. It was established under the consultation of Dr. David Kennedy from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. This program operates under the theory that crime, violence, and disorder all thrive in neighborhoods plagued by street level drug markets. This creates a sense of fear for all area residents. In reality, a relatively small group of offenders are responsible for the drug dealing and violence that is often associated with drug market neighborhoods (Corsaro, 2013).

The High Point Police Department tried many different traditional policing tactics including neighborhood sweeps and extensive drug investigations involving undercover drug buys. These activities did little or nothing to resolve the issues in the affected neighborhoods. Since its inception, the High Point DMI has been honored numerous times for its effectiveness including being a finalist for the 2006 Herman Goldstein Award and a 2008 Gold Award winner with the National League of Cities (City of High Point website, 2019).

The High Point DMI is a collaborative partnership between the High Point PD, state and federal law enforcement, probation and parole, prosecutors, social services, civic groups, and academic researchers. The process starts with meticulously analyzing data to identify where the drug markets are located and which offenders are most involved in the criminal behavior. Data sources include arrest records and police calls for service, intelligence surveys with street-level police officers and probation/parole agents, and surveys of community members to identify drug dealers in their neighborhoods (Corsaro, 2013). This data is used to create a master list which is then analyzed further to determine which dealers are currently active, which have a history of violence, if the dealer is street level or mid-level, the offender's probation or parole status, and if they currently have any pending criminal charges (City of High Point website, 2019).

Once the list is refined, law enforcement partners conduct extensive surveillance and undercover drug buys on the identified dealers. Generally, the most violent and prolific dealers are immediately arrested and prosecuted. The rest of the dealers are then issued a letter from the Chief of Police inviting them to a notification session. Dealers who are on probation or parole are ordered to attend the call-in session by their agent. Most of the time, probable cause already exists to arrest the notified offenders for drug charges thanks to the investigative efforts conducted before the call-in session. These charges are held in abatement while the offender is involved in the DMI program (Reuter & Pollack, 2012).

At the call-in session, offenders are offered services to help change their lifestyles and are warned that continued drug dealing and violent behavior will be met with strict consequences. Law enforcement and probation/parole will then continuously monitor the notified offenders and their associated drug market neighborhoods. If drug dealing and involvement in violence continues, the notified offenders will be arrested and prosecuted aggressively for any new crimes

as well as the drug charges that were held in abatement. In order to avoid cases being overlooked, the prosecutor's office assigned one full-time prosecutor to handle cases related to the DMI (City of High Point website, 2019).

A 2012 evaluation of the High Point DMI showed that the program was associated with a 14 percent reduction in violent crime in the targeted neighborhoods (Braga et al., 2018). According to Pollack (2017), the High Point DMI maintained reduced violent crime rates several years into its implementation. After the success of the High Point DMI became more well-known, the U.S. Bureaus of Justice Assistance (BJA) conducted trainings with 32 other cities that were interested in creating a DMI program modeled after High Point's. Unfortunately, only a fraction of the cities were able to effectively implement a DMI that lead to significant crime reductions. Ten of the program cities were not able to reach the call-in session phase of the program. These failures were attributed to lack of cooperation between partner agencies, lack of funding to completely implement the program, program staff turnover, and failure to secure buy-in from key political leaders (Pollack, 2017).

One of the most notably successful DMI replications was in Roanoke, Virginia. Of note, Roanoke and High Point are similar communities both in size and in the fact that much of their violent crime was driven by street-level drug markets. The structure and operations of the two programs were also very similar (Pollack, 2017). Saunders, Robbins, and Ober (2017) noted a number of similarities between High Point and Roanoke. In addition to being of similar size and in close geographic proximity, they both had drug markets that were relatively small and well-defined. Post intervention surveys of practitioners revealed that the success of both programs was credited to committed leadership, a clearly defined program focus, and support from key politicians and community members (Saunders et al., 2017).

Reuter and Pollack (2012) state that one of the primary goals of the High Point model, and other DMI's, is to increase police legitimacy in the community. The High Point DMI was able to decrease violent crime through non-criminal justice influences like religious and civic groups, social service organizations, and the friends and family members of the notified offenders. These groups, as well as the High Point Police, were able to leverage pressure on street level dealers to get them to desist, or at least reduce, their criminal activities. This was accomplished with the police making relatively few arrests during the program (Reuter & Pollack, 2012).

The City of High Point website's (2019) explanation of the DMI emphasizes face to face communication with offenders, consistent follow-up meetings, and following up with offender services as promised. The program is designed to be respectful and honest with offenders while still assertively conveying the message that violence and drug dealing must end. According to Reichert et al. (2018), the High Point DMI utilizes various community groups, working with the police, to educate residents about the program and its goals and listen to concerns from residents. This increases the transparency of the program and improves the sense of police legitimacy with the community (Reichert et al., 2018).

Public Trust in the Police and Program Legitimacy

The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing identified that public trust should be the most important goal of any law enforcement agency (Braga et al., 2018). In the meta-analysis of focused deterrence program evaluations completed by Braga et al. (2018), a total of five programs experienced threats to the integrity of their interventions due to lack of public trust, lack of community engagement, or police corruption scandal. The programs in Guntersville, Maryland, Peoria, Illinois, and Montgomery County, Maryland all reported having

police-community trust issues and all reported no significant reductions in crime post interventions. The programs in Los Angeles, California and Roanoke, Virginia reported reductions in crime despite the threats to the integrity of the program implementations (Braga et al., 2018).

The evaluation from Newark, New Jersey also found no significant benefit to its focused deterrence program even though researchers reported no threats to the integrity of the program implementation (Braga et al., 2018). According to King (2018), Newark Police have historically had a very strained relationship with some of their citizens. Public distrust in the police due to excessive use of force complaints and outwardly racially-biased arrest practices have plagued Newark for years.

Fox and Novak (2018) suggest that a nationwide discontentment with the police in 2014, 2015, and 2016 known as the "Ferguson Effect" could limit the success of focused deterrence or any police-initiated program (Fox & Novak, 2018, p.16). In 2014, a white male police officer shot and killed a teenage black male named Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The circumstances and aftermath of this shooting, coupled with numerous other controversial police shootings around the same time, created a nationwide backlash of protest and distrust against law enforcement. Media outlets and politicians at all levels contributed to this frenzy which some have dubbed "The war on cops" (Hosko, 2018, p.10).

Although the "Ferguson Effect" is not the focus of this research, it deserves some attention as it relates to focused deterrence programs. According to Fox and Novak (2018), there are two aspects of the "Ferguson Effect". The first is a slowdown of law enforcement activity due to apprehensiveness of the police to make proactive contacts that could be scrutinized. The second aspect is discontent and distrust of law enforcement amongst citizens, particularly

citizens of color, which causes them to not provide information or want to engage in partnerships with the police. With less police involvement, citizens are more likely to take the law into their own hands by engaging in violence (Fox & Novak, 2018). The "Ferguson Effect" has also been referred to as "The de-policing of America" (Hosko, 2018, p.14).

Hosko (2018) points out that violent crime rates in the U.S. hit a record low in 2014. In 2015, overall violent crime rose 3.1 percent while the homicide rate rose 10.8 percent. This was followed by a 4.1 percent increase in violent crime and an 8.6 percent increase in homicides in 2016. Much of this increase in crime was credited to large cities like Chicago and Baltimore, where anti-police violence had become common. Around the same time, proactive police contacts and arrest rates declined sharply in cities across the U.S., but most notably in large cities like Chicago, Baltimore, and New York City (Hosko, 2018).

Surveys of officers around the nation revealed record low morale levels and a belief among law enforcement that political leaders endorsed anti-police behaviors and sentiments. During this time period, violent attacks on law enforcement rose significantly with deadly assaults on officers in places like New York City, Dallas, and Baton Rouge to name a few. While correlation does not prove causation, it is interesting to note the increase in violent crime starting in 2015 coinciding with the sudden decrease in police-community engagement (Hosko, 2018).

Section Four: Conclusion and Recommendations

Focused deterrence programs have shown positive crime reduction outcomes across the U.S. These programs are collaborative efforts between law enforcement, probation and parole, the court system, social services, and other partner organizations. Collaboration allows practitioners to address the issues that contribute to violent crime from many different angles.

Despite the success of many of these programs, long-term sustainment has proven to be challenging (Engel et al., 2018). Some of the primary challenges that often lead to program breakdown include agency leadership changes which often result in a re-direction of agency priorities, loss of program funding, failure of practitioners and program leadership to maintain the long-term efforts needed for focused deterrence, breaking down of relationships between partner agencies and organizations, failure of programs to adapt to changes in violent crime and gang activity trends, and poor relations between the police departments and their communities.

Agency Leadership Changes

The nature of community leadership positions, whether it's the mayor, police chief, prosecutor, social services agency director, or non-profit organization director, is that there are typically high levels of turnover. This is especially true when it comes to elected positions like mayor or prosecuting attorney. Oftentimes, when new leadership takes office, they have their own sets of priorities and visions for how they will run the agency. New priorities can sometimes consume resources used by focused deterrence efforts (Engel et al., 2013). Agency leadership changes can lead to the complete disbandment of a focused deterrence program or a reduction in program services due to a partner agency dropping out of the effort. This was the case in Boston, Los Angeles, and Kansas City.

The Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence provides a great example of how to survive community and political leadership changes. The program's leadership structure, consisting of a governing board and various strategy teams, has helped keep CIRV running for 12 years. The power to determine the mission and direction of the program is vested with a structured group of people instead of just one person. Communication and collaboration are also key elements of surviving leadership changes. The three most successful programs examined in the previous

section, Cincinnati, Chicago GVR, and the High Point DMI, all stress regular communication and collaboration with partner agencies. Stakeholder meetings are held on a regular basis where information is shared and feedback is sought for program improvement.

The final, and possibly most important, element of surviving leadership changes is to consistently show that the program is effective at delivering what it originally promised. A program that has shown a track record of success will be much harder to do away with versus a program that has not delivered results. Urban violent crime, in particular, is a very political, highly publicized issue. Programs like CIRV and the High Point DMI have been honored with numerous awards and have been replicated in cities across the U.S. They have been evaluated by academic researchers more than once and have consistently been associated with significant declines in rates of violent crime. A politician or agency director would be hard-pressed to disband or remove their agency's involvement from such a program. Commitment to the program from street-level practitioners and community leaders will also increase program sustainability during agency leadership turnover.

Loss of Program Funding

The nature of all criminal justice and community-based programs is that they rely on funding from either public or private sources. Without funding, no program will sustain over time. This will be one of the greater challenges to sustaining a focused deterrence program since loss of funding is oftentimes out of the control of program administrators and practitioners. This was part of the downfall of Operation Ceasefire I in Boston. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 caused an immediate shift in law enforcement priorities from traditional policing activities like violent crime control and community policing over to addressing terrorism.

Federal funding that was critical to Operation Ceasefire I, and programs like it, was suddenly no longer available.

The local economy of a city will also play a significant role in the availability of program funding. As seen in Boston in the early 2000's, many cities lost officers due to shrinking municipal budgets. An economic recession during that time contributed the massive nationwide police layoffs. Many cities, including Boston, struggled to keep basic patrol functions staffed, let alone staff crime control programs like Ceasefire. Many policy makers view crime control and community policing initiatives as nice to have, but not absolutely essential (Meyer, 2003).

A track record of crime-reducing effectiveness will help focused deterrence programs sustain over time even when budget cuts are looming, but success alone is not enough to guarantee survival. This was seen with CIRV in 2011 when program funding was cut. To paint a complete picture however, around that same time, there was a stagnation of program activity due to ineffective leadership and a lack of participation by some of the key partner agencies. An increase in funding in 2012 and a change-up to program leadership helped reinvigorate CIRV. Maintaining a fiscal mindset all of the time is likely the best way to sustain a program through budget cuts. With CIRV, for instance, one of the duties of the governing board is to constantly be searching for sources of funding and program resources both in good economic times and bad.

Focused deterrence program leaders should always be looking for funding sources, both public like state and federal grants and donations from private individuals and organizations. In order to secure donations, it will be necessary for program leaders to publicize and retail program successes to potential donor groups and grant funding sources. Tracking program success data, like statistics on violent incidents, arrests, street contacts, call-in sessions, and offenders who sought assistance, will be critical to selling the program to various funding sources. The CIRV

program accountability measures were set up based on proven corporate strategies. Each strategy team has short-term and long-term goals that are clearly defined and measurable. This will help CIRV leaders show what parts of the program are working and what parts need improvement.

Program money should ideally be set up in a trust fund under the control of the governing board and an emergency fund should be established in the event that regular program budget cuts occur. Funding should not be spent frivolously and high impact fiscal decisions should be made by the governing board. Program fiscal decisions should be based on previous successful measures and established evidence-based practices.

The provision of offender social services should follow recognized best practices to make sure that resources are only being expended on offenders who significantly impact the violent crime rate. In the beginning of CIRV, social services resources were provided to offenders in a very informal ad-hoc fashion. The majority of offenders who initially received services were not identified by law enforcement as prolific gang members and were likely not involved in significant violent crime. It wasn't until later in the program that the services team implemented formal training to street advocates and the use of scientifically-validated screening tools to determine violent versus non-violent offenders.

Failure to Maintain Long-Term Efforts

Focused deterrence programs are very labor and resource intensive. They require continuous commitment from both practitioners and administrators. Police officers and probation and parole agents have to constantly monitor offenders and respond appropriately and consistently when violence occurs. Social service providers and community outreach workers have to keep making street contacts, mediate disputes that could lead to violence, and make sure

services are in place for offenders who want out of the criminal lifestyle. Prosecutors must be ready to aggressively charge and try violent cases against notified offenders who did not heed the warning of the program. Program administrators must meet regularly to make decisions regarding program activities and direction and engage in the never-ending task of securing program funding and resources. They must also maintain program statistics and present those to stakeholders and community groups. In sum, focused deterrence programs are a lot of work to maintain.

The importance of program buy-in and support cannot be understated. Everyone involved in the program from practitioners to administrators to community leaders should maintain a healthy professional investment in the program. People who believe in the work they do will be more committed to putting in the necessary effort to maintain success and to constantly seek to improve their abilities. The difference of program buy-in is evident in successful versus unsuccessful programs. The High Point DMI and CIRV have both become staples in the criminal justice systems of their respective communities. There is program support at all levels, from street practitioners to city leadership. Comparatively, Los Angeles Ceasefire was always regarded as a temporary social experiment instead of a new way to address violent gang crime.

A distinct advantage that Operation Ceasefire Boston, CIRV, and High Point all had was that they were original programs. They were planned and implemented from the ground up and were lauded for their success. It is easier for practitioners and community leaders to be excited and passionate about an original successful program versus a replication program in another city.

Some programs, like Los Angeles and Kansas City, experienced program failure, at least in part, due to staff not maintaining necessary long-term efforts. There was high turnover with

both practitioners and administrators in both of those cities. When new staff filled the positions, sometimes, they were not adequately trained on the mission and operations of the programs. This can lead to a misunderstanding of the goals of the program and a reduction in effectiveness. Having high staff turnover and/or inadequately trained staff will reduce the sustainability of the program.

Focused deterrence practitioners are expected to maintain a significant base of knowledge regarding offenders, their associated groups, current and historical conflicts between criminal groups, people and organizations that can influence offenders, and many other things. If practitioner turnover is too high, the new staff members will constantly be climbing the learning curve of the job. This will undoubtedly reduce the overall effectiveness of the program. Program managers must find ways to retain qualified and competent practitioners. This can be done by consistently seeking feedback for program improvement from street-level staff. Doing so will let practitioners know that their opinion and experience is valued. Allowing practitioners to take on new responsibilities and seek additional trainings and educational opportunities in order to improve their professional knowledge will also improve staff satisfaction. Allowing practitioners a reasonable amount of flexibility to do the work in their own way will also improve staff satisfaction. Of course, the work must still be done in a way that's in line with the mission and goals of the program.

Programs should not be expected to handle more work than they were originally designed for. The Project Safe Neighborhoods program in Chicago was originally implemented in two police districts and showed significant crime reduction benefits. The PSN was then expanded to several more police districts, but no additional staff or funding was added to the program. The result was a diffusion of program resources that ultimately led to the PSN having no discernable

effects on violent crime in any of the districts where it was implemented. The district-level launch of Operation Ceasefire II, before the initiative went citywide, also illustrated the need to invest adequate resources into a focused deterrence strategy. A deterrence message was spread to the targeted gang, the Lucerne Street Doggz, but when that gang continued to engage in violence, law enforcement resources were not robust enough to follow through with enforcement promises. This mitigated much of the deterrent effect of the strategy.

There are certainly benefits to implementing a program in a smaller defined area before launching it citywide. The program will take less resources and there is less of an initial investment risk. It is also easier to measure the success of a program when it can be compared to a similar untreated area of the same city. However, if a program is expanded, resources like staffing, leadership, and funding will need to expand accordingly.

Program managers must understand and accept that there will be staff turnover. Whether in law enforcement, probation, or social services, the nature of working with violent offenders and groups engaged in criminal activity can be very stressful. Managers need to understand and contend with practitioner burnout. Periodically, program practitioners and leaders should rotate out of their positions to avoid burnout and performance stagnation. When program staff leaves, if possible, they should assist with the selection and training of their replacements. Ideally, practitioners should rotate out of the program in a stagnated fashion so that not all of the experience is leaving at once. Stanley Ross, the Director of CIRV, describes himself as a talent scout who is constantly looking for motivated people to fill staff positions. Ross states that he looks for practitioners and program leaders who have skills and talents that will complement the existing team members. Ross believes that the most important trait to look for in any focused

deterrence staff member is a sense of motivation and commitment to the program (S. Ross, personal communication, March 29, 2019).

Breakdown of Partnerships Between Agencies

According to Brunson (2015), the effectiveness of focused deterrence programs most likely results from the collaboration of agencies and organizations working together and pooling their talents and resources toward one common goal. In the cases of Los Angeles and New Orleans, interagency collaboration and communication were not encouraged. According to Tita et al. (2005), when many of the practitioners for Los Angeles Ceasefire were evaluated by their supervisors, interagency collaboration was not even a category on the evaluation. Police practitioners in New Orleans cut ties with academic researchers and other partner agencies shortly after implementing their group violence reduction strategy. Both of these programs failed to sustain long-term.

Collaboration and communication both inside and outside of a practitioner's agency should be encouraged and supported by all levels of program management. The idea that different agencies and different practitioners specialize in particular areas that can benefit the overall success of the program should be embraced by all levels of program staff. Meetings and communication between partner agencies should be maintained regularly so information and ideas can be shared and issues can be resolved. The governing board of a program should consist of representatives from multiple partner agencies. Program funding must be allocated in a manner that encourages interagency collaboration. For example, if two agencies take part in an initiative with the focused deterrence program, each agency should receive funding according to the personnel and resources they put into that initiative. While this may not work out perfectly in

reality, equitable compensation between agencies according to the work they put in should be the goal.

Partner agencies should share in the credit for program success. Failure to do this was one of the factors that lead to the disbandment of Operation Ceasefire I in Boston. For example, if a press conference is held or a media release is done regarding a program success, stakeholder agencies should be equally represented and the program spokespersons should make a point of giving credit where it is due. Program buy-in and commitment between partner agencies will also help ensure that collaboration does not break down. The goals and focus of the program must be clearly defined so all stakeholders understand them and what their role is in the overall system. This was an early implementation issue with both CIRV and the KCNoVA. Stakeholders were ready to get to work, but there was no clear direction on what they were supposed to be doing. This led to decisions being made haphazardly at all different program levels. It can also lead to program activities straying away from the intended goals. Strong leadership is needed to establish a clearly defined mission and measurable goals for each partner agency.

Failure of Programs to Adapt to Change

Violent crime and trends in gang and drug activity are constantly changing. If focused deterrence programs do not keep up with and adapt their tactics to these changes, they will not sustain. Gang conflicts, territories, and associations fluctuate very quickly. Drug markets may close in one neighborhood and open up in another and trends in popular drugs vary. If program practitioners and leaders do not stay apprised of these changing trends, they will always be reactive. The players in violent active street gangs also change constantly. According to Fox and Novak (2018) a longitudinal review of gang membership studies showed that about 63

percent of members leave the gang within the first year. Gang membership lasting more than three years was reported in less than 20 percent of the surveyed gang members. This means that gang member turnover is relatively high. Active gang members can also be taken off the street by long periods of incarceration or homicide. If program practitioners do not continuously track active gang members and deliver the deterrent message to them, chances are likely that new active members may not even know the program exists.

The failure of the KCNoVA was partially credited to program staff not adapting to changing violent crime trends in the city. The slowdown in effectiveness of CIRV in 2011 and 2012 was also in part due to this. A multitude of issues including agency in-fighting and lack of leadership caused Operation Ceasefire Boston practitioners to lose track of violent gangs and their activities in the early 2000's. Keeping up with change entails obtaining and analyzing street level data from the practitioners who interact with the targeted groups every day. This will require ongoing open communication between program leaders, street-level practitioners, and researchers who will compile and analyze the data.

Research is continually improving evidence-based practices when it comes to social sciences. Both practitioners and program leaders will need to keep up on the latest evidence-based practices when it comes to deterrence, enforcement, and delivery of services to notified offenders. Laws and court case precedents are also constantly changing. This will require frequent legal updates and continuing education for program staff. It is critical for practitioners to conduct their work in accordance with current case law. Failure to do so could result in criminal cases being dismissed, civil liability against the practitioner and their agency, and public humiliation against the program. Any of those situations would be detrimental to program sustainability.

Program leaders and practitioners must be cautious not to focus all of their attention on one particular gang or crime problem for an extended period of time. If this happens, other targeted gangs can become emboldened to engage in crime because they are not being watched as closely. This was one of the downfalls of Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles. Punitive sanctions for violent criminal behavior need to be equal and consistent across the board in order to maintain a deterrent effect.

Poor Police-Community Relations

Focused deterrence programs, or any police initiative, will perform better and be more likely to sustain over time if the police department has a positive relationship with the community that they serve. Several programs that were examined in the methodology section that either failed over time or did not even get up and running had issues with either community distrust or lack of engagement between the police and the community. One of the basic tenets of focused deterrence is for the police and other community representatives to convey to offenders that they are still valued members of the community and they have an opportunity to turn away from crime. For this to be credible, there must be some level of trust between offenders, their associates, and the police.

It is essential for all program staff to be transparent and honest with offenders and other community members. If promises are made by the program, they must be followed through with. This was a problem with Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles. Social services were being retailed to gang members by program staff, but the resources did not actually exist to fulfill those promises. This undermined the legitimacy of the entire program. Both the Chicago Group Violence Reduction Strategy and the High Point DMI emphasize transparency, open communications, and fair, but firm warnings to notified offenders at the outset of a call-in

notification meeting. They both also emphasize following through with promises, whether that means providing social services to offenders or aggressive enforcement actions against offenders who continue to engage in violence.

Brunson (2015) states that offender notification meetings improve the overall image of legitimacy for focused deterrence programs. These meetings are typically highly publicized. Community services and support are offered to notified offenders as an alternative to crime. Community leaders and criminal justice officials often speak at these meetings to assertively let offenders know that further violence will not be tolerated. Involving minority community leaders can increase the efficacy of the program with both the offender and the minority community. Research has shown that gangs and individuals who participate in in-person notification meetings are less likely to engage in violent behavior while in the program (Brunson, 2015).

If implemented properly, focused deterrence programs can improve police-community relations. Disadvantaged urban areas tend to have higher crime rates. Minorities and people of color tend to live in these same areas. Research has shown that aggressive and seemingly indiscriminate policing tactics have contributed to a significant lack of trust between the police and members of minority communities. Furthermore, studies have shown that zero tolerance policies or neighborhood saturation operations tend to have limited success at reducing violent crime long term. Focused deterrence uses data-driven methods to identify high-risk violent offenders. Enforcement activities are focused on groups, such as criminal street gangs, who are consistently involved in violent incidents. This should give focused deterrence programs, and the police in general, a more legitimate and trustworthy public image (Brunson, 2015).

Focused deterrence programs can also be coupled with police-community engagement initiatives like foot patrol, neighborhood-assigned officers, and community sporting events. According to Ors (2016), these types of police initiatives have demonstrated over time that they can improve police-community relations and bolster a sense of police legitimacy. Community policing activities can be complimentary to focused deterrence initiatives. As demonstrated in Chicago, the use of street advocates and anti-violence community campaigns, like CURE Violence, can also be complimentary to focused deterrence. Both of these complimentary activities are likely to increase the long-term sustainability of focused deterrence programs.

Pollack (2017) posits that drug market interventions can be effective and sustainable in the right communities. Cities that are smaller with more well-defined drug markets and a higher level of political and community support seem to achieve better results with DMI's. A larger community with complex inter-connected drug markets, like Chicago, will have less success with a DMI. Chicago attempted to implement a DMI based on the High Point model and failed. Larger cities, like Chicago, also tend to experience violent crime for a variety of reasons outside of drug market activity like gang conflict and other haphazard causes (Pollack, 2017).

Study Limitations and Future Research

The conclusions and recommendations made in this study are based on a review of secondary sources and an interview with a current program director. Though the programs examined represent a cross-section of small, medium, and large sized cities from across the U.S., there are many more focused deterrence programs in existence and studies that examine their effectiveness that were not covered in this paper. This paper examined sustainability factors for programs in urban communities that address violent crime. One of the programs examined targets the violent crime associated with street level drug markets while the rest focused on

group violence reduction. The conclusions and recommendations made in this paper may or may not be applicable to focused deterrence programs that fall outside of those parameters. Many of the programs examined in this paper likely succeeded or failed for more than one reason. Though multiple reasons regarding the successes and failures of programs were discussed in this paper, it is unknown how much each of those reasons contributed to the positive or negative outcome of the program. When studying a social program, it is often difficult to definitively say to what extent a particular factor influenced the ultimate outcome since so many inter-connected factors can play into program results.

Future research on focused deterrence would benefit the field of study and policy makers greatly by examining how much each component of a program contributes to overall success. While it is very likely that program component collaboration is what makes focused deterrence successful, it is unknown to what extent each component contributes to a successful outcome. Knowing this would have enormous policy implications as funding and resources could be invested strategically on the most successful program components. It would be very beneficial for future research to examine which sustainability factors were the most influential on the success or failure of a program. Knowing this would help guide policy-makers on how to best invest the time and resources of their program to ensure long-term sustainability. Future research should further examine the applicability and sustainability of drug market interventions, similar to the High Point model, in larger cities like Chicago or Los Angeles. The current research supports the High Point DMI model in small to medium sized cities, but it is unknown if or how this model could be successful in large urban communities with complex widespread drug markets.

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Appendix A (Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan 2018, p.16-24)

Meta-Analysis of 24 Focused Deterrence Program Evaluations

Program	Treatment Strategy	Units of Analysis	Research Design	Program Outcomes
Operation Ceasefire Boston, Massachusetts Evaluation in 2001	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included monthly numbers of citywide youth homicides, citywide firearm assaults, citywide shots fired calls for service, and youth gun assaults in one high risk city district	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design that compared youth homicides in Boston to 39 other U.S. cities Count-based regression models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	63% reduction in youth homicides 25% reduction in gun assaults 32% reduction in shots fired calls for service 44% reduction in youth gun assaults in one high risk city district Displacement or diffusion effects not measured
Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership Indianapolis, Indiana Evaluation in 2006	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included monthly count of homicides citywide	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design that compared homicides in Indianapolis to six other similar sized Midwestern cities ARIMA models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	34% reduction in homicides Displacement or diffusion not measured
Operation Peacekeeper Stockton, California Evaluation in 2008	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included monthly count of firearm-related homicides citywide	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design that compared gun homicides in Stockton to 8 similar cities in California Count-based regression models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	42% reduction in firearm-related homicides Displacement or diffusion not measured
Project Safe Neighborhoods Lowell, Massachusetts Evaluation in 2008	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included the monthly count of fatal and non-fatal firearm assault incidents	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design that compared gun homicides in Stockton to 8 similar cities in California Count-based regression models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	44 % reduction in firearm assault incidents Displacement or diffusion not measured
Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence Cincinnati, Ohio Evaluation in 2010	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included the monthly count of targeted group member involved homicides compared to homicides committed by non-targeted groups	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design that compared targeted group homicides relative to non-targeted group homicides in Cincinnati Count-based regression models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	35% reduction in targeted group member-involved homicides Displacement or diffusion not measured
Operation Ceasefire Newark, New Jersey Evaluation in 2010	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by targeting individual gang members. Implemented in two square mile area with high level of gun violence No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included the weekly count of gunshot wound incidents occurring in the two square mile intervention area	Near-equivalent quasi-experimental design that compared gunshot wound incidents in the intervention area to that of a comparable high crime area in Newark. ARIMA models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention. Dual kernel density special analysis used to analyze the distribution of gunshot wound problem areas compared to the intervention area before and after implementation of the intervention	No statistically significant reduction in gunshot wound incidents in the intervention area Displacement and diffusion analysis were inconclusive

Operation Ceasefire Los Angeles, California Evaluation in 2004	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Integrity of the intervention was undermined by a lack of commitment by some working group members and the consequences of a police corruption scandal Targeted area within the Boyle Heights neighborhood of Los Angeles	Outcome measurements included monthly counts of violent crime incidents, gang crime incidents, and gun crime incidents in the target area, immediate areas around the target area, and similar areas in LA not exposed to the intervention	Quasi-experimental evaluation utilized two non-equivalent comparison areas and one near-equivalent comparison Variety of regression-based models were utilized to estimate the impact of the intervention before and during the program. Analyzed immediate spatial displacement/diffusion effects surrounding the target area and gang-related crime associated with non-targeted gangs that were socially tied to the targeted gangs	Significant reductions in violent crime, gang crime, and gun crime in the targeted area Significant reductions in violent crime, gang crime, and gun crime in the areas immediately surrounding the target area as well, but not as high as the targeted area These areas were compared to similar LA neighborhoods that were not exposed to the intervention Results suggest significant diffusion of crime control benefits to socially-tied gangs in surrounding areas to targeted area
Operation Ceasefire Rochester, New York Evaluation in 2006	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention Integrity of the intervention was undermined by limited enforcement actions, issues with inter-agency communications, and inadequate delivery of the deterrence message	Outcome measurements included monthly counts of homicide, 1st degree firearm assault, and 1st degree firearm robbery. Sub-analysis on black male victims ages 15 to 30 for each outcome	One group interrupted time series evaluation comparing outcomes pre and post intervention citywide Multiple regression models controlled for seasonal fluctuations, delayed intervention effects, economic condition changes, and policing behavior changes to estimate the true impact of the intervention	25% reduction in homicide and 1st degree firearm robberies involving black male victims ages 15 to 30 No significant reduction in 1st degree firearm assaults against black male victims ages 15 to 30 No significant reduction in total homicides and firearm violence incidents Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Project Safe Neighborhoods Chicago, Illinois Evaluation in 2007	Strategy focused on reducing firearm violence with four separate interventions 1. Increased federal prosecution of convicted felons carrying or using firearms 2. Increased sentences for federal prosecutions 3. Firearm supply-side enforcement activities 4. Offender notification meetings to push deterrence message and acceptance of social norms Targeted areas were two adjacent police districts that had high levels of homicide No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included monthly and quarterly counts of homicides, firearm homicides, gang-related homicides, and aggravated assault and battery incidents	Quasi-experimental evaluation compared trends in targeted districts to those in similar police districts not exposed to the intervention Hierarchal generalized linear growth curve regression models used to estimate true impact of the intervention	37% reduction in homicides in targeted districts Significant reductions in firearm homicides and aggravated assaults in targeted districts No significant reduction in gang-related homicides in targeted districts Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Drug Market Intervention Nashville, Tennessee Evaluation in 2009	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a single street level drug market No threats to treatment integrity noted during the program implementation Targeted area was one neighborhood in Nashville	Outcome measurements included monthly count of violent crime incidents, property crime incidents, illegal drug and paraphernalia possession incidents, and total police calls for service	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhood to trends in the rest of Davidson County ARIMA models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention. Analyzed immediate special displacement and diffusion effects in neighborhoods immediately adjacent to target area	55% reduction in illegal drug possession 37% reduction in drug paraphernalia possession 28% reduction in property crimes No significant reductions in violent crimes or total police calls for service Analysis suggests significant diffusion of crime control benefit to adjacent neighborhoods
Drug Market Intervention Rockford, Illinois Evaluation in 2009	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a single street level drug market No threats to treatment integrity noted during the program implementation Targeted area was one neighborhood in Rockford	Outcome measurements included monthly count of violent and non-violent crime incidents	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhood to trends in the rest of Rockford Hierarchal generalized linear growth curve regression models used to estimate true impact of the intervention	22% reduction in non-violent offenses No significant reduction in violent offenses Displacement and diffusion effects not measured

Drug Market Intervention High Point, North Carolina Evaluation in 2012	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a four street level drug markets No threats to treatment integrity noted during the program implementation Targeted areas were four neighborhoods in High Point	Outcome measurements included the annual count of violent crime	Quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhoods to trends in matched comparison neighborhoods Count-based panel regression models with difference-in-difference estimators and place-based and time-varying fixed effects at the census block level Analyzed immediate spatial displacement and diffusion effects of areas immediately adjacent to targeted areas	14% reduction in violent crime in targeted areas Non-significant increase in violent crime in areas immediately adjacent to targeted areas
Drug Market Intervention Peoria, Illinois Evaluation in 2013	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a single street level drug market Integrity of the intervention was undermined by a lack of citizen involvement and community awareness of the program Targeted area was one neighborhood in Peoria	Outcome measurements included monthly counts of violent crime, property crime, drug and disorder crimes, and total police calls for service	One group interrupted time series evaluation comparing outcomes pre and post intervention for the targeted area ARIMA models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention. Telephone surveys with residents of targeted area to gauge their understanding of the intervention and any perceived changes in neighborhood crime and disorder compared to six months before intervention	No significant reduction in violent crime, property crime, drug and disorder crimes, or total police calls for service Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Operation Ceasefire II Boston, Massachusetts Evaluation in 2014	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by 19 identified street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included quarterly counts of victim and suspect gang-involved shootings and total gang-involved shootings	Quasi-experimental evaluation compared trends for targeted gangs to similar non-targeted gangs Negative binomial growth curve regression models with differences-in-differences estimators controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate the true impact of the intervention. Displacement and diffusion effects measured for non-targeted gangs that were socially connected to targeted gangs	Targeted gangs: 31% reduction in total gang-involved shootings 35% reduction in suspect gang-involved shootings 27% reduction in victim gang-involved shootings Non-targeted comparison gangs: 24% reduction in total gang-involved shootings 27% reduction in suspect gang-involved shootings
Community Initiative to Reduce Violence Glasgow, Scotland Evaluation in 2014	Strategy focused on reducing violence and weapons carrying by gang-involved youth No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation Targeted areas were two police divisions in Glasgow	Outcome measurements included annual counts of violent crime, non-violent crime, and weapons-carrying crime	Quasi-experimental design comparing trends of one and two year cohorts of targeted youth to groups of non-targeted comparison youth Conditional fixed-effects Poisson regression models including a group-time period interaction term to estimate the true impact of the intervention	65% reduction in weapons carrying for 1-year targeted cohort group 84% reduction in weapons carrying for 2-year targeted cohort group Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Group Violence Reduction Strategy Chicago, Illinois Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by 149 identified street gang factions. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included the number of victimizations, offending, and total shooting incident involvement for each gang faction	Quasi-experimental design compared post-intervention shooting counts for targeted gangs to similar non-targeted gangs Difference-of-group means Z-test comparison	32% reduction in shooting victimization for targeted gangs compared to non-targeted gangs 23% reduction in total shooting involvement for targeted gangs compared to non-targeted gangs Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Group Violence Reduction Strategy New Orleans, Louisiana Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included monthly counts of overall homicides, overall violent crime, overall property crime, gun-related homicides, gun assaults, gang member-involved homicides, and non-gang member-involved homicides	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental evaluation compared homicides in New Orleans to 14 other similar cities. Difference-in-difference count regression models utilized to compare homicide trends in New Orleans to the non-equivalent controls with counterfactual tests	17% reduction in total homicides 32% reduction in gang member-involved homicides 17% reduction in gun-related homicides 17% reduction in gun assaults No significant change in non-gang member-involved homicides Displacement and diffusion effects not measured

No Violence Alliance Kansas City, Missouri Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention Early implementation had issues with poor leadership and communication Those issues were resolved after the first year	Outcome measurements included monthly counts of homicides and aggravated firearm assaults	One group interrupted time series evaluation comparing outcomes pre and post intervention at 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 12 months for the targeted groups	Homicide: 40% reduction at 1 month 34% reduction at 3 months 29% reduction at 6 months No significant reduction at 12 months Aggravated firearm assaults: 19% reduction at 1 month 14% reduction at 3 months No significant reductions at 6 or 12 months Displacement/diffusion effects not measured
Project Longevity New Haven, Connecticut Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing violent crime by street gangs. Citywide intervention No threats to treatment integrity noted during program implementation	Outcome measurements included monthly counts of citywide fatal and non-fatal shootings, targeted gang member-involved shootings compared to non-targeted gang member-involved shootings	Non-equivalent quasi-experimental design comparing shooting trends in New Haven to a similar city in Connecticut. ARIMA models controlled for crime trends and seasonal fluctuations to estimate impact of the intervention.	37% reduction in total shootings and homicides 73% reduction in targeted gang member-involved shootings and homicides Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Drug Market Intervention Roanoke, Virginia Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by two street level drug markets Integrity of the intervention was undermined by poor police-community relations despite community engagement efforts during the program Targeted area was two neighborhoods in Roanoke	Outcome measurements included annual counts of violent crime, property crime, drug-related crime, and total crime	Quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhoods to trends in matched comparison neighborhoods Negative binomial regression models controlled for trends and were used to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	Hurt Park Neighborhood: 30% reduction in total crime at 3 months, 19% at 6 months, 28% at 9 months, 23% at 12 months 45% reduction in property crime at 6 months, 57% at 9 months, 50% at 12 months 24% reduction in violent crime at 3 months, 29% at 9 months Melrose-Rugby Neighborhood: 15% reduction in violent crime at 3 months, 34% at 6 months Displacement/diffusion effects not measured
Drug Market Intervention Montgomery County, Maryland Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street level drug market Integrity of the intervention was undermined by a lack of police-community engagement Targeted area was one neighborhood in Montgomery County	Outcome measurements included annual counts of violent crime, property crime, drug-related crime, and total crime	Quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhood to trends in matched comparison neighborhoods Negative binomial regression models controlled for trends and were used to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	No significant reduction in violent crime, property crime, drug crime, or total crime Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Drug Market Intervention Guntersville, Alabama Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a single street level drug market Integrity of the intervention was undermined by a lack of citizen involvement and lack of trust in the police Targeted area was one neighborhood in Guntersville	Outcome measurements included annual counts of violent crime, property crime, drug-related crime, and total crime	Quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhood to trends in matched comparison neighborhoods Negative binomial regression models controlled for trends and were used to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	No significant reduction in violent crime, property crime, drug crime, or total crime Displacement and diffusion effects not measured
Drug Market Intervention Seattle, Washington Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by two street level drug markets No threats to treatment integrity noted during the program implementation Targeted areas were two neighborhoods in Seattle	Outcome measurements included annual counts of violent crime, property crime, drug-related crime, and total crime	Quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhoods to trends in matched comparison neighborhoods Negative binomial regression models controlled for trends and were used to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	International District: 15% reduction in total crime at 3 and 6 months 8% reduction in property crime at 3 months, 17% at 6 months 53% reduction in violent crime at 3 months, 40% at 6 months, 34% reduction at 9 and 12 months 29% reduction in drug crime at 3 months, 17% at 6 months 23rd Street Corridor Neighborhood: No significant reduction in any type of crime Displacement/diffusion effects not measured
Drug Market Intervention Ocala, Florida Evaluation in 2015	Strategy focused on reducing crime driven by two street level drug markets No threats to treatment integrity noted during the program implementation Targeted areas were two neighborhoods in Ocala	Outcome measurements included annual counts of violent crime, property crime, drug-related crime, and total crime	Quasi-experimental design compared crime trends in targeted neighborhoods to trends in matched comparison neighborhoods Negative binomial regression models controlled for trends and were used to estimate the true impact of the intervention.	No significant reduction in violent crime, property crime, drug crime, or total crime Displacement and diffusion effects not measured