THE ORIGINS OF THE SHANGHAI PEOPLE'S COMMUNE OF 1967

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INTRODUCTION

The movement of the Shanghai proletariat in the last months of 1966 and early 1967 that culminated in the abortive Shanghai Commune of February, 1967 is widely viewed as a crucial turning point in the history of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.[1] Charles Bettelheim, for example, in a recent commentary on what he terms the "great leap backward" taken by Mao Tse-tung's successors, sees the process of the triumph of a "bourgeois policy" over the "revolutionary line" of Mao Tse-tung as originating a decade earlier, more specifically, with the demise of the Shanghai Commune in late February, 1967: "In fact, when we look back and analyze what has happened since 1965-66, we can say that this change in the relation of forces was already apparent in the first months of 1967 (when the political form of the Shanghai Commune was created and then abandoned), and that thereafter it continued, with zigzags in the same direction."[2]

Insofar as the Shanghai Commune marks the beginning of the abandonment of the original principles and goals of the Cultural Revolution, an analysis of the origins, nature, and fate of the Commune is crucial for understanding the course of the Cultural Revolution and its place in the history of modern China. And since the mass movement in Shanghai that resulted in the January Revolution and culminated in the establishment of the Shanghai Commune was a popular response to the principles that originally

guided the Cultural Revolution, an understanding of that mass movement is no less crucial.

Although the importance of the Shanghai Commune in the Cultural Revolution is widely acknowledged, the research on this topic has been noticeably incomplete and flawed. This is partially due to the uncritical acceptance of the Shanghai Commune as an attempt to establish a new form of political organization based on the Marxist model of the Paris Commune. As such it is seen as a reflection of the most radical goals and principles that were proclaimed at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in an attempt to provide alternative models for the organization of political power. But in reality, the choice of the title "commune" for the new form of political organization in Shanghai did not reflect the content of the new government, as this study will attempt to demonstrate. This does not mean that there was not a mass movement in Shanghai that responded positively to the original goals of the Cultural Revolution. That mass movement did exist. And in a sense the Shanghai Commune was the result of that movement. But the sense in which the Shanghai Commune grew out of the revolutionary movement of the people of Shanghai is a negative one. For the Commune, rather than expressing the goals and ideals of that movement, was in effect an attempt to control and put an end to that movement. The process of the January Revolution and the establishment of the Shanghai People's Commune which followed was clearly a turning point, but it was a turning away from the original goals of the Cultural

Revolution. The Commune was not the culmination of the revolutionary movement in that it expressed the goals of that movement, and then was forced to retreat because the goals were too radical. Rather, the Commune itself was the beginning of that process of negating the revolutionary thrust of the mass movement and the goals of the Cultural Revolution.

The common misunderstanding that the end of the Commune, rather than its beginning, was the crucial point of retreat in the Cultural Revolution has resulted in an overemphasis on the events of the Commune to the neglect of the period of the January Revolution that preceded it. Actually it was in this prior period that the Shanghai revolutionary movement reached its zenith. It is a complex period, filled with contradictory currents and yielding contradictory evidence. Declarations of the rebel groups that participated in the movement and official pronouncements on the direction of the Cultural Revolution are the main sources for outside observers to unravel, but the explanations they offer must be considered with great care. For example, the questions of "economism" and "power seizures" are critical for understanding the nature of the working class movement in Shanghai, but official discussions of these questions represent a particularistic point of view in a political struggle, not an objective account of the historical processes at work. Yet it is precisely the questions of "economism" and the nature of "power seizures" during the period of the January Revo-

lution that are ignored in most analyses of the Shanghai Commune. Without a clear understanding of these issues as they emerged in the course of the January Revolution, the Commune itself cannot be understood. For these issues are intimately related to the origins of the Shanghai Commune, and particularly to the question of whether it was formed on the basis of the demands of the people of Shanghai to reorganize their government according to the Paris Commune model. This thesis will attempt to deal with that question through a close examination of the period of the January Revolution.

CHAPTER ONE: ORIGINS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN SHANGHAI

Shanghai is credited with being the birthplace of the Cultural Revolution. An article entitled "On the New Historical Play Hai Jui Dismissed From Office," which appeared in the Shanghai daily newspaper Wen Hui Pao on November 10, 1965, marked the official beginning of the Cultural Revolution. It was written by Yao Wen-yuan, a member of the propaganda department of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, and editor of Wen Hui Pao. This attack on Wu Han, the author of the play, which itself was a critique of the Great Leap Forward era, the people's communes, and the dismissal of Peng Teh-huai, revealed the extent to which the party's leadership was split on basic policy issues. It also revealed the depth of the opposition to both Mao and the policies he promoted.

Yao's article marked the beginning of a counterattack against Mao's opponents. Wu Han, the vice-mayor of Peking, was chosen as the immediate representative of the opposition, but it was obvious that the attack went deeper. It clearly extended to P'eng Chen, the mayor of Peking, who at times had resisted some of Mao's policies. Indicative of the gravity of the threat this critique posed was the fact that it was not until three weeks later that the article was reprinted in People's Daily. This delay was probably caused by opponents of Mao, who were quite strong in the Peking government, and also widely acknowledged to be in control of the national press.

The eventual publication of the article intensified the debate over Maoist policies, although at first the debate took place primarily in the universities. At the time, P'eng Chen was named chairman of the so-called "Group of Five," who were given the task of directing the Cultural Revolution. The Group issued a report in February, 1966 which stressed that the discussion and attacks currently being made on various writings were primarily academic in nature. As a later criticism of the report put it: "His (P'eng Chen) purpose was to channel the political struggle in the cultural sphere into so-called pure academic discussions, as frequently advocated by the bourgeoisie."[1]

It was at this critical point in the discussion of the correct ways to proceed with the Cultural Revolution that an important series of articles appeared in Red Flag, the major theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party. Among them was Chen Chih-ssu's article commemorating the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Paris Commune entitled "The Great Revelations of the Paris Commune," which offerred an alternative form of political power based on the organizational principles of the original Marxist model of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[2]

But it did not become clear how important this alternative might be until the Maoist critique was extended directly to the existing state apparatus. Such a critique was made by Maoists as early as May 1966. In a circular issued in the name of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on May 16, 1966, but not

released publicly in China at the time, it was decided to officially revoke the February report made by the Group of Five.[3] In explaining the reasons for doing this, the Maoist purposes of the cultural revolutionary struggle became more clearly defined. The circular stated:

> In particular, it (the February report) obscures the aim of this great struggle, which is to criticize and repudiate Wu Han and the considerable number of anti-Party and anti-socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie (there are a number of them in the Central Committee and in the Party, government, and other departments at the central as well as at the provincial, municipal and autonomous region level.)[4]

Thus far, the conduct of the Cultural Revolution was described as inadequate:

> ... at a time when the new and fierce struggle of the proletariat against the representatives of the bourgeoisie on the ideological front has only just begun--in many spheres and places it has not even started, or if it has started, most Party committees concerned have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle and their leadership is far from conscientious and effective...[5]

But the report was clear as to the source of the problem, for it was explicitly laid down that the origins of revisionist tendencies were to be found within the Communist Party itself:

> It (the report) is a reflection of bourgeois ideology in the Party; it is out and out revisionism. Far from being a minor issue, the struggle against this revisionist line is an issue of prime importance having a vital bearing on the destiny and future of our Party and state, and on the world revolution... To achieve this, it is at the same time necessary to criticize and repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and all spheres of culture, and to clear them out or transfer some of them to other positions... Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government,

> the army and various spheres of culture are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.[6]

The bourgeois elements within the party and other spheres were thus identified as the main targets of the Cultural Revolution. As the circular ominously concluded: "Some are still trusted by us, and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev, for example, who are nestling beside us. Party committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter."[7]

It is important to note that the party was originally called on to make the necessary rectification, to take the lead in pursuing the Cultural Revolution, even if it involved criticism of members of the party. But the impetus for the revolution was to come from the universities, not the party itself. On May 25, seven members of the philosophy department at Peking University, including Nieh Yuan-tzu, a philosophy instructor, posted a ta-tzu-bao attacking Lu P'ing, the university's president, and P'eng P'ei-yun and Sung Shao, two members of the Peking government responsible for university affairs.[8] All three were high-ranking party officials and closely tied to P'eng Chen. The poster also denounced the attempt to divert the Cultural Revolution into a purely academic debate and further talked of the need to mobilize the masses.[9]

The poster gained nationwide importance when at Mao's instruction it was broadcast over Peking radio on June 1. The next day it

was reprinted in the newspapers with favorable commentary. Mao was later to describe the poster as "China's first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster."[10] Reaction to the poster in Peking was immediate. On June 3, the municipal party committee was reorganized, without the presence of P'eng Chen. Nationwide, the result was to encourage debate, criticism and poster-writing in other areas. An editorial in People's Daily on June 8 enthusiastically commented on the new movement: "The fact that '700 million people are critics' is stupendous, it is an epoch-making event. This in itself shows that the thinking of our 700 million people has been emancipated, that they have risen to full height and that they are no longer slaves of the old culture and old ideas of imperialism and the exploiting classes."[11]

But the attack that was growing in the universities, and through the vehicle of the wall poster was resisted by the party apparatus. Fearful that attacks on party members would get out of hand, the party moved to influence the nature of the attacks made, if not to control the Cultural Revolution in general. The method used was that of the work teams. This eminently Leninist method was not new, for it had been used in the Socialist Education Movement and in earlier campaigns. Theoretically, the team was to be made up of trusted cadres who would be sent into a unit--a school, factory, or an office. The team was to make an investigation, suggest what needed to be changed and how these changes

should occur. The problem with the work teams was that they often operated as a secret group that would make a closed report. Also their composition was decided from above, not by those within the unit they were investigating. In practice the work team influence was extremely deceptive. While they were enthusiastically identifying targets for the Cultural Revolution, and thus giving the impression that they were in the forefront of the struggle, in many places they tried to divert the struggle to an attack on more usual kinds of targets, such as people of bourgeois social backgrounds. The work teams were also later accused of operating essentially as spies on the people in the units to which they were sent. In fact, it was this charge of spying that became the major criticism of the work teams made by the Red Guard groups in Shanghai.[12]

During the months of June and July, when the work teams were first sent to the Shanghai university campuses, the radical students and the views they represented were in the minority. The party, through the work teams, was quite successful in limiting the targets of criticism. In the universities this meant that those chosen for attack were bourgeois academic authorities, rather than "those in the Party taking the capitalist road."[13] Some of the more radical students argued that this was precisely the way in which the real targets of the struggle were trying to suppress the revolution. As a Shanghai Red Guard newspaper charged:

> The suggestion that the President of the Conservatorium should be denounced was a perfect example of the phony revolution! The man in question was an old Party member, to be sure, and titular head of the Conservatorium, but he had no power; he was merely a bourgeois reactionary academic who had sneaked into the Party. The question to ask was whether there were any Party officials at the Conservatorium who were actively taking the road back to capitalism. But that never arose.[14]

Thus the radical students centered their attacks on those that they felt were trying to suppress and restrain the movement. Their immediate targets were two high level party officials, Ch'ang Hsi-p'ing, head of the education department, and Yang Hsi-kuang, acting chief of the propaganda department. They had not yet extended their attack to the higher level party officials in Shanghai, the mayor, Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, and the head of the East China Bureau, Ch'en P'ei-hsien, but they did make the attempt to identify "those in the Party that were taking the capitalist road."[15]

The students also leveled serious charges against the party's conduct of education in Shanghai. They charged that the party was trying to train a class of specialists concerned only with professional and not ideological matters, thereby fostering a non-political, professionalized elite. Further, the students charged that this elite was biased against the working class. They provided data to show that educational officials prevented the children of working class families both from entering schools in the proportion that they should, and then from playing a political role in the schools once they entered. A wall poster from the Shanghai Foreign

Languages Institute charged that the authorities wanted to "ensure that the successors to the Revolution would be bourgeois."[16]

As these charges increased, and became increasingly vehement, the Shanghai municipal party committee became more concerned with the problem of controlling the mass movement. Instructions were issued to the work teams to classify all students and teachers into the categories of left, middle of the road, or right wing. The radical students, of course, suspected that they were classifies as rightists, while those students who remained politically passive were classified as leftists. In any case, it was seen as a further attempt to repress the students, and it resulted in growing criticism of the work teams. It proved to be an issue over which large student groups began to form, thus laying the foundation for the Red Guard organizations.[17]

The growing demand among radical groups of students for the removal of the work teams was soon to be answered by events in Peking. Mao had returned to the capital on July 18, following his historic swim across the Yangtze River on July 16. A meeting of the central committee was called, at which several important issues regarding the conduct of the Cultural Revolution were discussed. Mao is reported to have described Nieh Yuan-tzu's poster as a "declaration of the Chinese Paris Commune for the sixth decade of the twentieth century. Its significance surpasses the Paris Commune."[18] He thus linked the Cultural Revolution directly with the

radical model of the dictatorship of the proletariat set forth by Marx. He went on to criticize the conduct of the party in trying to suppress and control the revolution:

> The task of this meeting is to attend to our documents, and primarily to change the method of sending out work teams so that revolutionary teachers and students in schools, as well as some middle-of-the-road people, can organize school Cultural Revolution Groups to lead the Great Cultural Revolution. Only they understand the affairs of the schools. The work teams do not understand. There are some work teams who made a mess of things... The work teams had the effect of obstructing the movement... The work teams won't do.[19]

Accordingly, Mao called for the immediate removal of the work teams from the universities.

Maoist policies were defined and stated more clearly at the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which convened in Peking on August 1. On August 5, Mao posted his own big-character poster in the meeting hall. Entitled "Bombard the Headquarters--My First Big-Character Poster," it called for a new direction in the Cultural Revolution. Mao praised the poster that Nieh Yuan-tzu had written and then offerred this criticism of the way the party had been conducting the Cultural Revolution:

> But in the last fifty days or so some leading cadres from the central down to the local levels have acted in a diametrically opposite way. Adopting the reactionary stand of the bourgeoisie, they have enforced a bourgeois dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural revolution of the proletariat. They have encircled and suppressed revolutionaries, stifled opinions differring from their own, imposed a white terror, and felt very pleased with themselves. They have puffed up the arrogance of the

> bourgeoisie and deflated the morale of the proletariat. How poisonous![20]

This clearly voiced Mao's challenge to those party leaders who had tried to limit or confine the movement.

But the proposed plan for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution was discussed more thoroughly in the document issued at the conclusion of the plenum, the "Sixteen Points." This declaration offerred the Paris Commune model for cultural revolutionary groups and congresses, which were described as "organs of power of the proletarian cultural revolution."[21] The "Sixteen Points" also contained a statement of approval for the students who had led the rebellion and a guarantee of their right to participate in the revolution:

> In certain schools, units and work teams of the cultural revolution, some of the persons in charge have organized counterattacks against the masses who put up big-character posters criticizing them. These people have even advanced such slogans as: opposition to the leaders of a unit or a work team means opposition to the Central Committee of the Party, means opposition to the Party and socialism, means counter-revolution. In this way, it is inevitable that their blows will fall on some really revolutionary activists. This is an error on matters of orientation, an error of line, and is absolutely impermissible.[22]

The immediate result of the issuance of the "Sixteen Points" was to give public Maoist sanction for the organization of the Red Guards, which were based on the groups of high school and university students that had been organized over the previous months. On August 18, a huge Red Guard rally held in Peking was attended by Mao who demonstrated his support for the movement by wearing a red

armband like the ones the Red Guards wore. Two days later, the students in Shanghai planned a similar rally to celebrate the formation of their Red Guard groups. But the Shanghai movement was divided from the beginning. One of the divisive factors was the arrival of Red Guard contingents from Peking. The Peking Red Guards, coming to Shanghai to "exchange revolutionary experiences," immediately tried to channel the student movement into an attack on the local party hierarchy. While the Shanghai Red Guards hitherto had been directing their criticisms mainly against teachers and the education department, the students from Peking recognized that the struggle had to aim at higher authorities.[23]

Soon after their arrival, the Peking Red Guards tried to set up a liasion center. To do so, they asked for office space and broadcasting, press, and propaganda equipment, such as other Red Guard groups were receiving. The municipal party committee, which was less than happy about having the Peking group in the city, refused. The Red Guards countered by holding a demonstration of more than 1,000 outside of the party committee headquarters, demanding to see the mayor of the city. The Peking students remained there for two days, despite attempts by local students and workers to persuade them to leave.[24] But on the second day, September 4, when the Peking group had grown impatient, they entered the building by force. They were eventually expelled, but not before they had given the party committee and the mayor a chance to show

how calm they had remained in the face of Red Guard "violence."[25]

The incident was widely debated in Shanghai. The radical groups that supported the Peking Red Guards had to rely mainly on wall posters and small pamphlets to state their side of the story. But many of the student groups were opposed to the Peking students and their actions, still not convinced that the party hierarchy was revisionist. But another reason for their loyalty was that one of the major Red Guard groups was closely tied to, if not effectively controlled by the local party apparatus. This was the First Headquarters of the Red Guard Regiment. Formed after the municipal committee issued a call for Red Guard organizations, it was the largest of the student groups. A second, more radical group, the Red Revolutionaries, was formed in resistance to the first, for fear that the party would dominate the whole movement. Its leadership was made up primarily of those who had been most persistent in attacking the authorities during the previous summer. Its members were the younger students, those admitted to schools after 1964 when the policy change to admit more working class children had been implemented.[26]

This more radical Red Guard organization began to direct its struggle against the party hierarchy as a whole, rather than just against the education officials. They increasingly defined the struggle in terms of the overthrow of the two highest party officials in Shanghai, the mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, and the head of the East China Bureau, Ch'en P'ei-hsien. The issue that incited the

students to stronger action was the existence of the so-called "black files." These contained information of the kind that was collected by the work teams during their stay in the universities: the classification of the students according to how they stood on the issues of the Cultural Revolution, what kinds of activities they were involved in, and any other previous information that had been collected on their political views and activities. The existence of these files, which could effectively stifle rebellion because of fear of later retribution, was taken as contrary to the spirit and intent of the Cultural Revolution.[27]

The students demanded the release and destruction of the files. The response from Peking came in the form of an "Urgent Directive" issued on October 5 by the central military commission and general political department of the party's central committee. It accused the school authorities of "suppressing democracy" and "causing listlessness of the movement," thereby "seriously violating the 'Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' of the Party's Central Committee, i.e. the Sixteen-Point Decision."[28] It declared the labelling of students as "counter-revolutionaries," "rightists," or "anti-Party elements," was incorrect, and that those that had been so branded "must be restored in reputation in public, while the previous verdicts must be declared invalid."[29] It further stated that, "material concerning them prepared by the Party committees, work teams and other persons should be dealt with in consultation with the masses; with the approval of the masses and rectified

persons, these may be destroyed in public."[30]

The Shanghai Red Guards charged that Mayor Ts'ao was denying the existence of these files so that he could have them secretly destroyed or hidden. To prevent this removal of the evidence of the party's action against them, some of the students staged raids on party committee offices to seal the official files. The use of force in entering the offices sometimes resulted in violent struggle with party cadres. The issue was not really settled at this time, for another directive was issued from Peking forbidding the use of violence in the seizure of files. Despite the lack of any resolution of the problem, the incident had the effect of damaging the reputation of the party officials through the very revelation of the existence of such files.[31]

The Shanghai Workers' Movement—November and December

The student movement had begun to mount an effective attack on the Shanghai party hierarchy. But the main thrust of the attack was to come from working class organizations. The Shanghai proletariat entered the Cultural Revolution at a very early stage. Some workers had heeded the call to rebel and to criticize during the summer of 1966. They did so at greater risk to themselves than did the students, for their positions were more permanent, and they were more susceptible to reprisals. This nucleus of rebel workers also expressed concern about evaluations that work teams might have made of them in the factories. In fact, it was this issue that impelled

them to organize their own cultural revolutionary groups outside of the party and factory organizational structures.

The rapid appearance of a city-wide workers' organization on November 9 indicated the extent to which a base for revolutionary activity existed in Shanghai.[32] But the Shanghai proletariat was marked by divisions. There were distinctions between the older, more skilled and established workers and the younger workers who were at a disadvantage both on the wage scale and the bonus system. Divisions existed between the skilled and unskilled workers in general, with the skilled workers earning up to 25 times as much as the lowest level employees, as well as benefiting from a more generous welfare system.[33] But perhaps the most significant division was between the permanent workers and those who were classified as temporary or contract workers. The temporary workers were called "worker-peasants"; they worked in the country or city as they were needed on a seasonal basis.[34] This left them without stable employment and a permanent home. Not only did they work for significantly lower wages, but the worker-peasant had no job security and received none of the worker welfare benefits such as pensions, medical care, and sick leave.[35] These workers also sufferred a disadvantage in housing since they had to move from place to place and rent whatever housing was available at each job they went to. Further, there were more subtle forms of discrimination practices against this lowest stratum of the proletariat. They could not obtain credit for loans in times of emergencies from the mutual aid funds of unions, since

they were barred from membership in workers' unions. They lacked the advantage of more established workers for asking for time off work during which they could receive up to 40% of their regular salary, for they had neither regular jobs nor regular salaries.[36]

The economic advantages of the system of contract labor went to the factories and enterprises. The importance of this practice was stated by Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu in 1964 when he was deputy mayor of Shanghai: "Factories and enterprises must employ fewer workers who are permanent. More workers should be temporary..."[37] Workers, he declared, should be "recruited from the peasants so that latent labor can be tapped. The relationship between town and country, and the worker-peasant alliance, can further be strengthened."[38] Official encouragement of the contract labor system in Shanghai coincided with a similar national policy. An article by Chang Ho-wei in the magazine Hsin-chien-she (New Construction), early in 1966, described the system as an "inevitable tendency in the sector of the socialist economy."[39] Some of the advantages that he attributed to the practice were the resolution of the "contradictions between busy and slack seasons, between busy and leisure hours, and between labor and rest."[40] Further, under the worker-peasant system, "the number of permanent workers may be decreased and labor efficiency raised."[41] But perhaps most interestingly, the worker-peasant system was ideologically rationalized by associating it with the Marxist goal of eliminating the distinction between town and countryside:

> To sum up, the worker-peasant system is favorable to the general policy of "developing economy and insuring supply", to the consolidation and development of the worker-peasant alliance and to the gradual elimination of the difference between workers and peasants and between town and country.[42]

Such policies, which tended to increase the divisions within the working class, contributed to the strength of the workers' rebellion in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution. Shanghai workers later blamed the "contradictions between different kinds of workers, which had been exacerbated by revisionist managers" for causing internal conflicts.[43] The divisions later formed not only the base for rebellion in the sense that among some workers there was a growing consciousness of being unfairly treated, but also in that there were in fact many groups with differing interests within the working class. Thus it is not surprising that the permanent workers who benefited from close contacts with the party cadres in the factories opposed the organizations of contract workers that grew up in opposition to the labor system under which they worked and to the party hierarchy that promoted this system. But conflicts also existed among various groups within the category of permanent workers. The large wage differentials as well as the differences in social benefits created a gap between the older, skilled and better paid workers and the younger, lesser paid workers.[44] These differences were reflected in the creation of a multitude of worker organizations that expressed the differing demands of the various groups. And the demands expressed were not

always economic ones. Important questions were also raised about the nature of management and the chain of command in the factories that prevented worker input and control. And the call of the Cultural Revolution for the masses to rebel, to voice their criticisms, and to create their own cultural revolutionary groups outside the normal party organizational channels struck responsive chords among those who felt they did not have the means to control their lives. Thus, the workers, and especially those with little influence in the party structure, were quick to organize their own cultural revolutionary groups.

The official policy toward the entrance of the workers into the Cultural Revolution was first stated in the "Sixteen Points." The fourteenth point was entitled "Take Firm Hold of the Revolution and Stimulate Production." It read, in part:

> The aim of the great proletarian cultural revolution is to revolutionize people's ideology and as a consequence to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in all fields of work. If the masses are fully aroused and proper arrangements are made, it is possible to carry on both the cultural revolution and production without one hampering the other, while guaranteeing high quality in all our work.[45]

And earlier, point nine had discussed the need to establish cultural revolutionary groups and congresses based on the principles of the Paris Commune, and had stated that these new organizations were suitable for "factories, mines, other enterprises, urban districts and villages."[46]

The theme of promoting production while maintaining the eight

hour work day remained the dominant one during the months of September and October. But another directive was issued on November 17, partly in response to the growing involvement of the workers in the Cultural Revolution as exemplified by the formation of the Workers Headquarters in Shanghai on November 9. This directive was important because it applied the same principles of the Cultural Revolution stated in the "Sixteen Points" specifically to the workers. The directive read:

> The leading organs of the cultural revolution are the cultural revolution committees, cultural revolution leading groups, and cultural revolution congresses. These organs must not be manipulated from behind the scenes, but must be elected according to the system of the Paris Commune, after full consultation and repeated discussions of the masses, in the practice of a general election, and with the members being capable of being changed and re-elected at any time.[47]

This directive did not ignore the importance of production, but it did place a greater emphasis on the revolutionary activities of workers by stressing the need for workers' groups organized in accordance with the Paris Commune model. Workers were to remain at their production posts, but were also to take part in revolutionary political action. The mistake made by some of the party leaders, it was charged, was to "erroneously put the cultural revolution in opposition against production."[48] Worker "responsibility" should be "fully appreciated," but revolution should not be ignored under the pretext of "grasping production."[49] This directive urged the party leaders to actively go to the masses to

promote the revolution. It stressed the point about not "doing all things for the masses, suppressing the masses, adhering to set patterns, and being afraid of the masses."[50] Thus there was the need for the establishment of "all kinds of cultural revolution organizations," organized in accordance with democratic principles:

> Within the various revolutionary mass organizations and among the revolutionary masses, democracy must be fully advocated; differences in opinion and disputes on different opinions should be settled through democratic means.[51]

While the organizations were to be democratic, the role of these cultural revolution groups remained vague, although it was partly defined later in the same directive. There was to be the practice of essentially "dual leadership."[52] The two leading organs were to be the existing system of management in the factories and the new cultural revolutionary groups. Ideally, so that the "revolutionary movement of grasping revolution and promoting production might develop smoothly, there should be organized two mutually cooperating leaderships, which should be laid down solidly at each level."[53] The leading organs of the Cultural Revolution were to be based on the Paris Commune model. But these were not organs of political power generally. For example, they were not to interfere in certain critical areas:

> The production command system of the factories must not be interrupted. Where the original administrative organs and Party committees have not been paralyzed, the leadership should be reorganized with experienced and politically reliable old workers as the bulwarks, and with the participation of technicians in order to command the production.[54]

This is an unusual application of the Paris Commune model--valid for conducting the Cultural Revolution, but not meant to interrupt the "production command system." There were workers who later took the model offerred to them more literally and tried to implement the principles of the Paris Commune in their places of work.[55] But it is clear that this was not being advocated by the center in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The article just discussed comes closest to making the connection between forms of organization based on the principles of the Paris Commune and organization within the factory, but it does not explicitly tie change in the factory management structure with the conduct of the Cultural Revolution.

The directive, it should be noted, came after the workers had already become involved in the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai, and to a certain extent legitimized their actions. The Shanghai workers had formed a city-wide organization of rebel groups, the Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters, also known as the Workers Headquarters, on November 9. The inaugural rally of this group was attended by some 20,000 workers, even though the municipal committee tried to prevent workers from attending this meeting held during working hours.[56] A day earlier, the representatives of the Workers Headquarters had presented a list of demands to the mayor that included a demand for his presence at the rally. When he refused to attend, they again dispatched representatives with their demands. The Workers Headquarters asked for three things: to be recognized

as a legal organization under the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; a complete and public account of the mayor's administration; and the supply of funds and propaganda equipment to enable the organization to gain a foothold in the factories.[57] Mayor Ts'ao refused to meet the demands. Moreover, he refused to meet with the workers. After receiving this news, the workers decided to bypass Ts'ao and take their demands directly to Peking.

On November 10, 2,500 workers went to the railway station and commandeered a train bound for Peking. They planned to go directly to the Central Committee or Chairman Mao himself to expose the attempt of the Shanghai party apparatus to suppress the workers' movement. Another group of 500 left Shanghai by way of Soochow, with the same plan in mind. At the instruction of the municipal party committee, the Shanghai-Peking train was stopped at Anting, a station a few miles outside the city limits. The workers were then ordered to return to their production posts. The order to go back to work went unheeded by about 1,000 of the workers at Anting. They defiantly remained in the train for the next three days. They were supplied with food and water by Red Guard groups and refused to leave until their demands were met by the mayor.[58]

The municipal committee was uncertain as to how to handle the crisis. They appealed to Peking for help, and received two conflicting responses. One was a telegram from Ch'en Po-ta that urged the workers to return to work. It read, in part:

> There are two principles involved here, and the minor one must be subordinate to the major one. As workers, their main job is to work. Joining in the Revolution is only secondary. They can take part in the Revolution outside working hours. They should go back immediately. It is a serious matter to disobey Party instructions.[59]

But before Mayor Ts'ao was able to use the telegram to convince the workers to return to work, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, a member of the central Cultural Revolution Group, arrived from Peking on November 14 and signed the workers' demands. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had been both secretary of the Shanghai municipal party committee and a member of its propaganda department before he went to Peking for the Central Committee meeting held in August. He had remained there as a member of the group directing the Cultural Revolution. When he signed the workers' demands, he did so as a member of the central group, not by virtue of his role in the Shanghai party hierarchy. It is unclear whether he acted with the support of the Peking group or on his own initiative. In any case, after Chang signed the demands, declaring the Workers Headquarters to be a legitimate revolutionary organization, Mayor Ts'ao was also forced to agree to them. A problem still remained with the group that had gone by way of Soochow. Under the leadership of Keng Chin-chang, a Shanghai worker, this group, called the Second Army Corps of Shanghai Workers, also demanded that it be recognized as a legitimate organization. They threatened to continue to Peking to speak to Ch'en Po-ta about his "repressive" telegram. Again Mayor Ts'ao was forced to sign the demands under Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's threat

that otherwise he would sign them.[60]

Thus two major worker groups were officially approved as revolutionary organizations. The split between them, almost at their very inception, foreshadowed the divisions that were later to surface in the movement. But the rapid growth and increasing militancy of these worker organizations also had another result. The party encouraged the formation of a third worker organization comprised of workers who were still loyal to the party. This new organization, called the Scarlet Guards, grew very rapidly. By the end of the year, it claimed to have some 800,000 members, making it the largest of the worker organizations.[61] It was generally considered to be more moderate than the Workers Headquarters.

The first clash between the rebel workers and the workers who remained loyal to the party came as a result of the fight for control of the city's party newspaper Liberation Daily. The Red Revolutionaries, a Shanghai Red Guard group, demanded that an issue of their own newspaper be distributed together with Liberation Daily to ensure its wide circulation. The issue in question contained a critique of the municipal party's conduct of the Cultural Revolution, charging that the party had obstructed the revolution from the start. Liberation Daily was also criticized for suppressing leftist ideas. The newspaper refused to comply with this demand, a decision which the municipal party committee endorsed. But the students were not

satisfied with a simple refusal. They went to the newspaper office to prevent distribution of Liberation Daily until their own paper accompanied it. The students' takeover of the newspaper on November 30 was described as follows in a Red Guard newspaper:

> After 2 hours, it became clear that the authorities were still refusing to send our paper out with Liberation Daily. To break this hopeless deadlock, we entered the building. The operation was carried out in an orderly way. Some comrades occupied the loading-ramp to stop the day's issue from going out. Others stood guard at the entrance to prevent any incursion by misguided opposition forces who might have tried to confuse the issue, as well as to make sure no hooligans broke in and damaged state property.[62]

There was an immediate uproar in the city. Criticism of the students' action was widespread. Critics used a speech made by Chou En-lai on November 27 on the need to avoid disrupting the publication of party newspapers as evidence that the takeover was illegal. The situation became serious when a large crowd gathered around the newspaper office, chanting "The occupation of Liberation Daily is a counterrevolutionary act!... We want to read Liberation Daily!"[63] This growing opposition to the Red Guards prompted the workers to join the struggle. On December 2, they sent a group of reinforcements into the building. Outside, the force of moderate workers protesting the takeover continued to grow. On December 4, they made repeated attempts to enter the building, and upon failure to do so concentrated on speaking in loudspeakers outside.

A Red Guard newspaper estimated the force outside the office

to be more than a million people, covering two or three blocks.[64] Inside, the rebels numbered some 5,000 to 6,000.[65] During the period of the six day siege, negotiations continued with representatives of the party. The students now demanded not only the publication of their newspaper, but also that the party committee turn over all "black materials" to the masses.[66] This was extended to include all the drafts of editorials that appeared in Liberation Daily, which the rebels also demanded to see. To these demands, the workers added several of their own. They openly declared their opposition to the Scarlet Guard organization, and insisted that the party act to restrain the Scarlet Guards from interfering with the rebels. Their final demand indicated the extent to which they feared reprisals for their actions:

> When the workers return to their jobs, the Party authorities and Work Teams must not make life difficult for them. They must not be harassed or forced to debate. They must not be repressed or persecuted. Otherwise, the Municipal Committee will answer for the consequences.[67]

The rebels were finally persuaded to leave the building when two secretaries from the party committee signed their demands. Although they left the building, the incident was not over. There was an uproar in the city over what was considered by many to be capitulation to a small group of rebels. The moderate workers who had gathered outside especially felt betrayed. They decided to counter with demands of their own and on the next day, December 6, formally organized themselves as the Scarlet Guards. On the same

day they printed the first and only issue of their own newspaper. The rapidity with which it appeared only increased suspicions among the more radical groups that the support for the Scarlet Guards came from within the party structure. Meanwhile, the Scarlet Guards kept up their criticisms of the workers who had been involved in the Liberation Daily incident. They pointed out that these workers and those who had gone to Anting were guilty of leaving their jobs and disrupting production.[68]

The propaganda war continued until December 23, when the Scarlet Guards held a rally of 100,000 in People's Square to approve a set of demands to be made to the mayor. They included recognition of their organization and the right to "take whatever revolutionary action may be necessary against those who infringe the discipline of the Party or the laws of the state."[69] Mayor Ts'ao signed these demands immediately. This prompted the rebel groups to action, and they forced Ts'ao to void his signature. The Scarlet Guards angrily demanded that Ts'ao come and explain his actions. They realized that if he abandoned them now they could be branded as a counter-revolutionary organization. On December 28 they went to the East China Bureau Secretariat to see Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu. As they explained: "If Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu gives his support to the left-wingers, we Scarlet Guards will automatically become right-wingers and even counter-revolutionaries overnight. We are not going to let anyone brand us as counter-revolutionaries! That's why we've come to settle our account with Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu."[70]

As they waited, the rebel workers came to "prevent violence" and to make sure that the Scarlet Guards returned to work. Minor fighting between the two groups went on for the next two days. It reached a peak on December 29 when, according to an "Urgent Appeal" issued by the Scarlet Guards, "at least eight Scarlet Guards were beaten to death and untold numbers wounded."[71]

The Scarlet Guards decided to take immediate action in a "Salute to the martyrs of the December 29th incident!" They organized a delegation to Peking. Many of them received travel expenses and wages from their factories; ostensibly, their purpose was to make revolutionary liasions to exchange experiences as the students had done. Some 70,000 to 100,000 people started off in trucks and on foot.[72] When they had gone about 30 miles to the town of Kunshan, the rebel forces caught up with them. They tried to persuade the Scarlet Guards to return to Shanghai. Again there was fighting between the groups, with the rebels eventually gaining the upper hand. The unity of the Scarlet Guard organization was broken after this battle, and by January 4 most members had returned to Shanghai.[73]

Meanwhile, another important protest movement had grown up in Shanghai. On December 27, a huge rally was held in People's Square. It was attended by representatives of more than 100 organizations. Many of them were groups composed of young people from Shanghai who had been sent to work in surrounding countryside areas after graduation. They demanded the right to return to live

and work in the city. Since their petitions of protest had not been answered, they decided to sit down in the middle of the city until their demands were heard. The mayor eventually came to talk to them, but his power was now so eroded that his promise to look into the matter meant little. The protest lasted until January 6, ending without any apparent resolution of the problem.[74]

This protest coincided with the formation of another group which had similar grievances about the unfairness of the labor system. This was the contract workers' organization. Their movement had received its first official approval in Peking on December 26 when some of the members of the central Cultural Revolution Group, including Chiang Ch'ing and Ch'en Po-ta, approved their organization and their participation in the Cultural Revolution. Their complaints centered around their lack of the basic rights that permanent workers possessed. Chiang Ch'ing echoed their criticisms at a meeting with representatives of the organization, the All-China Red-Worker Rebels General Corps:

> The whole thing (the contract labor system) is capitalist--to keep a number of hired workers, so as to cut down expenses on the part of capital... Even the feudal system could not be more ruthless than this system...[75]

Therefore she suggested that: "All contract labor and temporary labor must be permitted to take part in the great cultural revolution and must not be discriminated against."[76] But despite this encouragement from some leaders in Peking, support for the rights of the contract workers was rather limited. Indeed, they were seen as

too radical in the eyes of other members of the central Cultural Revolution Group and by the end of January the center had outlawed the contract workers' organization, making it one of the few mass organizations officially designated as "counter-revolutionary."[77] But that came later when the contract workers extended their criticism to what they called the "seventeen years of revisionism," with conditions worse than those under the Kuomintang rule.[78] For the moment, however, their existence as an organized force added a distinctively radical slant to the workers' movement. In Shanghai, they often took stands that were opposed by many of the workers in the Workers Headquarters, since these workers were generally permanent state employees. This is hardly surprising, for the two groups had opposing interests regarding the survival of the present system. Workers in the Workers Headquarters may have been critical of "those in the party taking the capitalist road," but they generally did not seem willing to attack the system in its entirety. This changed for some of the workers when they later realized that an attack on a few leaders was not sufficient and thus broadened their attack to include the whole labor system.

The expansion of the workers' participation in the Cultural Revolution prompted the central Cultural Revolution Group to re-evaluate their role and responsibility in the revolution. The actions of the workers had obviously gone beyond the November 17

directive. The program of dual leadership was not working; the difficulties of party cadres and the new cultural revolutionary groups existing as "mutually cooperating leaderships" were apparent.[79] Attacks and criticisms of the cadres in the factories led in many cases to a wider attack on the system of management in the factories. In response to demands for the masses to rebel, so that nothing might be done in their stead, the workers easily extended their concept of the revolution to a demand for greater worker participation and control in the factories.

The issue of the nature of the role that the worker organizations would play in the Cultural Revolution was still being discussed in the national press at the end of December. An article entitled "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," appeared in the 15th issue of Red Flag.[80] It continued to emphasize that the Cultural Revolution was a struggle between the two lines in the party that reflected the class struggle in society. But it also stressed an interesting point about "extensive democracy."[81] This term was used to describe the movement of the Cultural Revolution to encourage the "free airing of views, putting up big-character posters, carrying out great debates and going to other units and places to exchange revolutionary experiences."[82] It also included the right of the masses to "criticize and raise suggestions about Party and state policies and every aspect of the state apparatus."[83] To ensure this, it was stated that "The masses have the right to criticize

leading cadres at all levels, no matter how high their position or how senior their qualifications."[84] The need to implement the Paris Commune model was also stressed:

> A system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune, is introduced without exception for all organs of power leading the cultural revolution. The masses have the power to replace through election or recall any elected member at any time.[85]

While this extensive democracy was to be carried out under the authority of "the dictatorship of the proletariat," it was also considered to be a crucial factor in the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat:

> Without extensive proletarian democracy it is impossible to effect a great revolution in the very souls of people, impossible to conduct the great proletarian cultural revolution in a penetrating and thoroughgoing way and impossible to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without such extensive democracy, without hundreds of millions of people paying attention to state affairs, supervising the organs of the Party and the state and supervising leading cadres at all levels, it is impossible to prevent the usurping of leadership of the Party and the state by counterrevolutionary revisionists and impossible to prevent the changing of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.[86]

The last part of this passage is particularly important, for it makes an explicit connection between the mass organizations of the Cultural Revolution that were to act in a supervisory function and the existing state and party apparatus. In many documents of the Cultural Revolution this connection is not made. But in the passage just quoted, the use of the Paris Commune election system is explicitly suggested for "organs of power leading the cultural

revolution." To be sure, the position of the other organs of power that already existed, and the relationship of the masses to them, remained ambiguous. But the passage clearly stated that the masses should be involved in party and state affairs--and indeed should be in a supervisory position. This is a more literal application of the principles of the Paris Commune model to actual organs of power than those passages that refer to the model only in terms of groups being formed for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, in a sense, this is an application of the "Sixteen Points" in a way that would make these organizations "permanent, standing mass organizations."[87]

An editorial that appeared in People's Daily on December 26 was somewhat clearer on the relationship between making revolution in general and making revolution within the factories. It charged that the revolution needed to be carried out in the factories where there were revisionist tendencies:

> ... many of our industrial and mining enterprises, to various degrees, are seriously influenced by capitalism, revisionism and even feudalism in political ideology, organizational leadership and in production management. Such influences not only shackle the workers' revolutionary enthusiasm and hinder the development of the productive forces, but also breed the seeds of revisionism and are potential hotbeds of capitalist restoration.[88]

The editorial also stressed that there were persons in the factories following the bourgeois line. These were the people who talked about taking hold of production as a "pretext to suppress the revolution."[89] Actually, they feared that if the revolution extended

into the factories they themselves might be overthrown:

> It is not a fall-off in production that worries these people, what they are really afraid of is that the masses will overthrow them in the revolution. Some of the workers have said: "They are afraid of the masses, afraid of revolution, afraid of being dismissed from office--the only thing they are not afraid of is to fail in fufilling the production plan."[90]

Thus revolution was tied directly to practices within the factory, specifically to those who were obstructing the revolution. It was stressed that the workers should elect cultural revolutionary groups to represent themselves according to the principles of the Paris Commune. But again, these organizations were not directly linked to control of the factory. The editorial only discussed the groups within the context of the conduct of the Cultural Revolution in general:

> In the great proletarian cultural revolution, the masses of workers have the right to set up every kind of revolutionary organization. All workers' organizations should maintain the working-class characteristics of industriousness and thrift and should not set up bureaucratic apparatus or acquire a mass of equipment which divorce them from the masses. In general, the working staff of these workers' organizations should not leave production.[91]

Nonetheless, this emphasis on the establishment of workers' groups based on the Paris Commune, with its decidedly anti-bureaucratic thrust, is noteworthy, for it expanded significantly the right of workers to manage their own organizations. Even if these new organizations were not discussed specifically as the basis for reorganization of power within the factories, it could

be argued that the promotion of this organizational model on any level implied a fundamental shift in conception of how power was to be exercised in society. Yet it seems that the emphasis was primarily on the use of this model for mass organizations. The question of whether it was conceived more broadly, as an alternative model for the general reorganization of social, political and economic relationships remains unclear. On this matter, the editorials and directives are ambiguous. Discussions of the Paris Commune usually center on the organization of groups to conduct the Cultural Revolution in particular, not on the reorganization of state and society in general. On the other hand, an explicit connection may not have been necessary, for the very principles of the model, and the ideals it symbolizes, themselves present and suggest alternative forms of the organization of power that are incongruous with that of party government. And as we shall see in the following chapter, there were workers who were to take this model literally and attempt to reorganize political power and factory relationships during the period of the "January Storm."

CHAPTER TWO: THE JANUARY REVOLUTION

The January Revolution marks the beginning of a distinctively new phase in the history of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai. In many respects, it is a revolution that grows out of an emergency situation, for the entry of the workers into the political arena created critical problems in Shanghai. The problems stemmed from two sources. First the workers who were engaged in revolutionary activities often left their production posts, resulting in disruptions in the factories and transportation systems as early as December. These workers had also caused further disruptions by challenging the authority of the municipal party organization. The challenge to the party proved quite effective. By the beginning of January, the party's power largely had been undermined, contributing further to the chaotic situation in the city. But another development now became a more serious problem: the attempt of the former party officials to disrupt the Cultural Revolution through the means of "economism." The official explanation of economism is that it was an attempt to buy off the workers through the use of monetary incentives and increases in welfare benefits, thus diverting the struggle to primarily economic ends. Furthermore, old party officials were accused of inciting massive walkouts from the factories by offering workers subsidies to go out and "exchange revolutionary experiences."[1]

In any event, these two factors, both the workers who were trying to make revolution and the party officials who were trying to prevent it, resulted in a crisis in Shanghai. The trains were not running, work at the harbor had stopped entirely, many factories were forced to close down because of worker walkouts or lack of supplies, and many essential items were in short supply due to the breakdown of the transportation system.[2] Blame for the situation is hard to assess. The official explanation that the disorder was caused by party officials attempting to sabotage the Cultural Revolution cannot be accepted as uncritically as some writers have been inclined to do. There is evidence that the disruptions began early in December, long before the downfall of the party in the early days of January.[3] Furthermore, there are indications that workers left their jobs for reasons other than the encouragement of former party officials, such as the need to effectively express revolutionary demands outside of the party's factory organizational structure (which remained quite strong in many areas.) It is also questionable whether "economism" explains why workers left their jobs; the logic of this argument is not as clear-cut as it may at first seem to be. These problems will be discussed more thoroughly in the following sections. Here it is sufficient to note that the "January Storm" period of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai was a very complex time, with many contradictory currents at work.

Before discussing the period itself, it might be useful to note

that on the official level in Peking a January 1 People's Daily editorial still was promoting the slogan of "extensive proletarian democracy."[4] It is ambiguous whether this referred directly to the Paris Commune model that had been presented earlier, for the Paris Commune is not explicitly mentioned. But it clearly contains elements of that model. The need for "extensive proletarian democracy" is presented as one of the main political tasks of the revolution. Moreover, the editorial exhorts the masses to "fully develop extensive democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat."[5] Significantly, in the description of what "democracy" means, one of the important features of the Paris Commune model, popular supervision of leaders, is stressed:

> This extensive democracy means mobilizing hundreds of millions of people under the command of Mao Tse-tung's thought to launch a general attack on the enemies of socialism and, at the same time, criticize and supervise leading organs and leading cadres at all levels.[6]

Further, "extensive democracy" is described as necessary to guarantee the dictatorship of the proletariat, and vice versa. The "organs of proletarian dictatorship" are to "guarantee that free airing of views, the posting of big-character posters, great debates, and the large-scale exchange of revolutionary experience proceed in a normal way."[7] Thus the dictatorship of the proletariat (here presented with at least one major element of the Paris Commune model--the necessity of mass supervision of leaders), is conceived in terms of guaranteeing the rights of the masses. This

is important to note, for it stands in direct contradiction to the interpretation that was given to the concept less than a month later. But that change in both official policy and in the policy of the rebel groups in Shanghai was largely a result of the disruptions and problems that occurred during the "January Storm." This period thus merits closer examination.

The attacks levelled against the Shanghai party hierarchy during the previous four months finally proved successful. The breakout of open warfare between the rebel workers and the Scarlet Guards at the battle of Kunshan,[8] followed by the massive demonstration in People's Square on December 27, demonstrated the inability of the party to function normally. Its power had been eroded, and its prestige fundamentally undermined. Its inability to deal with the crisis and to defend itself against rebel attacks signalled its impending downfall. On January 3 a mass rally was held in Culture Square to conduct a public criticism and humiliation of Mayor Ts'ao.[9] This ignited a movement to criticize leading cadres at all levels over the next few days. The intensity of these criticism and accusation sessions is described by Neale Hunter in his book Shanghai Journal. The sessions would go on all day, with anyone who wanted to make a criticism having the right to take the stage:

> The people ran the inquest, and the people got the answers they wanted. As happens in the democratic process elsewhere, mass sentiments prevailed over

> individual opinions, but everyone felt that he had really participated.[10]

The result of this city-wide movement was the effective overthrow of the old party hierarchy. This was completed when the party newspaper, Wen Hui Pao, was seized on January 3.[11]

With the rebels' attack on the party finally successful to the point where leading members of the party had been publicly criticized and removed from office, the Cultural Revolution moved to a new stage. The problem now was to restore order and set up new organs of power. The task was framed in the context of the New Year's editorial that still called for "extensive proletarian democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat."[12] How the rebels in Shanghai would interpret that goal, and what forms of government they would try to establish, is the crux of the story of the January Revolution.

The contradictory elements of the revolution were apparent from the start. On January 4, the "Message to All Shanghai People," also titled "Take Firm Hold of Revolution, Promote Production, and Utterly Smash the New Counterattack Launched by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," was issued by eleven revolutionary organizations in Shanghai.[13] The Workers Headquarters was the major force behind it. Of the ten other signers, four of the groups were liasion centers of organizations from other cities. Another three were Shanghai student groups. This meant that only four worker groups signed the document. And the Workers Headquarters, which originally

represented many of the worker groups in Shanghai, was becoming increasingly divided. Thus the extent of popular support for the message is hard to gauge.

The message itself, which was a call for workers to unite and restore production, was followed by open disputes among the worker organizations. A rally of hundreds of thousands of contract and temporary workers in Shanghai was held on January 5, the day after the message was issued.[14] Two days later, on January 7, a large faction of several hundred thousand workers broke away from the Workers Headquarters to form the Workers Third Headquarters under the leadership of Ch'en Hung-k'ang, a worker from a Shanghai radio factory.[15]

The seriousness of the situation in Shanghai was reflected in the message. It was charged that "the handful of persons in authority taking the capitalist road" had attempted to sabotage the revolution.[16] They were accused first of overemphasizing production by blaming the workers who wanted to participate in revolutionary activities of "sabotaging production."[17] But the capitalist-roaders were said to have now changed their tactics to attempt to sabotage production themselves:

> With high-sounding revolutionary words, giving the appearance of being ultra "Left", they incited large numbers of members of the Workers' Red Guards (the Scarlet Guards), whom they hoodwinked, to undermine production and sabotage transport and communications under the pretext of going north to "lodge complaints." Their aim was to undermine the great proletarian cultural revolution and the dictatorship of the prole tariat.

> More recently, a handful of reactionary elements even plotted to cut off water and electricity supplies and bring public transport to a standstill.[18]

The revolutionary workers were called upon to respond to this situation by making every effort to become models of "taking firm hold of the revolution, and promoting production." This was essential, since "in many factories and plants, a few, sometimes even the majority of the members of the Workers' Red Guards, have suspended production and deserted their posts in production."[19]

The rebel groups that issued this message thus mainly defined "making revolution" as "promoting production." One's attitude toward "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production" became the criterion to judge whether a worker was right or wrong on the issue of the Cultural Revolution. Other concerns that were originally part of the cultural revolutionary program were not mentioned in the message. Further, the rebel organizations now criticized many of the very activities that they had undertaken during the previous months, such as leaving their production posts in order to make revolution.[20]

The attempt by the workers of Shanghai to bring chaotic conditions under control was soon reinforced by Peking. Two days after the message was issued, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao arrived from the capital with assurances of Mao's approval for the rebels' actions. On that day, January 6, another rally was held to further denounce high level party officials, including Mayor Ts'ao and Ch'en P'ei-hsien,

head of the East China Bureau. With the overthrow of the old party apparatus now accomplished, the rebels were forced to assume responsibility for getting the city back to work. The "Message to All Shanghai People" had been the first step. But the arrival of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao foreshadowed stronger measures.[21] On January 7, the day after his arrival, Chang issued a set of security regulations. The regulations warned that the police would be used in support of the "revolutionary left" against anyone who tried to sabotage the Cultural Revolution.[22] The statement was far more authoritarian than any the old party officials had dared to make, for fear of being accused of suppressing the masses. The quickness with which Chang made this threat to use the security forces is indicative of Chang's mentality and of his determination to impose discipline on the movement.

Chang's eagerness to organize and unify the mass movement in Shanghai was by no means unwarranted. The serious divisions that existed in the Shanghai working class were now beginning to emerge openly. As mentioned earlier, the day after the "Message" was issued, several hundred thousand contract workers formed a new revolutionary organization. A radio broadcast the following day described the rally of the "temporary workers and workers supplied by out-of-town contractors" as follows:

> A great rebel red army of hundreds of thousands of these workers held a rally in the People's Square on 5 January to pledge to the party Central Committee and Chairman Mao that they would smash the unreasonable

> system under which they were employed and set up a new labor system in line with Mao Tse-tung's thought.[23]

The contract workers clearly were demanding a wholesale reorganization of the existing labor system. For them, it was not enough to restore and stimulate production; they were expressing the need for a radical transformation of the whole organization of labor. They were not just criticizing leaders that had taken "the capitalist road," but rather placed the blame on the entire system. "The system of hiring temporary and outside workers is a remnant labor system of capitalism," it was declared.[24] This charge was significantly more radical than the call to eliminate those in authority taking the capitalist road. Capitalist influences and relationships, it was suggested, were inherent in the very system, not simply the fault of some leaders in the system. The contract workers thus raised the call of the Cultural Revolution to rebel against the bourgeois and capitalist influences to a critique of society in general.

The contract workers made another significant point in their critique of the existing economic system. They argued that the system of contract labor was used to encourage divisions within the proletariat:

> In the course of the great proletarian cultural revolution the handful of persons within the party taking the capitalist road and a few persons who are stubbornly pursuing the bourgeois reactionary line have used this unreasonable labor system as a trump card to suppress the workers from rising in rebellion.[25]

The contract workers felt they were used as a threat to keep the regular workers at their jobs and prevent them from becoming involved in the Cultural Revolution. The permanent workers were less likely to voice their complaints if they knew that there was a "surplus army" of workers ready to replace them.

If the charges of the contract workers were accepted as legitimate, then the sytem stood condemned as one which intentionally divided the interests of the proletariat to enable the state to better control production. The threatened use of contract workers to replace permanent workers could also have the effect of discouraging worker input in the factory by making workers afraid to express their opinions. Thus the charge of the contract workers constituted a much more direct attack on the entire labor system than the attack mounted by other worker organizations, as the example of the "Message to All Shanghai People" illustrates.

The contract workers' charges are further interesting because they illustrate the diverse elements that comprise the Shanghai proletariat. A regular worker, especially one that was highly skilled and well paid, hardly would have had a similar perspective on the labor system in general. Even less favored workers under the old system had very different views than the contract workers. It is important to note here that the charge of "economism," or the use of economic benefits to lure the workers from the main political thrust of the revolution, cannot be applied to the contract worker in the same way that it was applied to a permanent worker. First

of all, there is no evidence that contract workers were offerred wage incentives during this period.[26] Also, since they did not hold regular jobs in the first place, their leaving of production posts was unlikely to be a major factor in the disruption of industrial production. But further, their disadvantaged position within the system forced them into making economic demands for the basic rights that other workers possessed. It is difficult to determine how they specifically formulated these demands, for their activities were not usually reported in the official press. Moreover, their interests were so removed from most other worker organizations that regular rebel organizations cannot be said to have spoken for them. They were to show their independence again in February, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the divergent interests of the Shanghai proletariat already were apparent in the early days of January.

These divisions became even more glaring on January 7, the day after Chang Ch'un-ch'iao arrived from Peking, and the same day that he issued the new security regulations. Chang proved unable to maintain the unity of the Workers Headquarters. No sooner had Chang arrived in Shanghai, than Ch'en Hung-k'ang, head of the Workers Third Headquarters, one of the largest groups in the Workers Headquarters, decided to split his group off from the main organization. His organization was not inconsequential; by the Workers Headquarters own estimate it contained "several

hundred thousand" workers.[27] But the opposition to Chang's attempt to control the Workers Headquarters went deeper. The Anting incident, which had earned Chang the loyalty of much of the Workers Headquarters, had also produced an important rival faction.[28] The group of workers that had gone on to Soochow, forcing Chang to sign another set of demands, never accepted Chang's leadership. Under their leader, Keng Chin-chang, they formed a formidable force. From the nucleus of 500 that made the trip to Soochow, they had grown into an organization of over 500,000.[29] The First, Second, and Third Regiments of Workers in Northern Expeditions, as they called themselves, were joined by eleven other worker organizations to form a significant opposition to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao.[30]

One of Chang's first acts upon arrival in Shanghai was to try to bring the opposition under his own control. He quickly called upon Keng Chin-chang to urge him to unite his organization with the Workers Headqurters. Keng refused the offer. This open split is illustrated by the fact that when the next message was issued by the Shanghai workers on January 9, rival organizations demanded separate signatures. In light of these divisions, Chang's issuance of the security regulations on January 7 take on a greater importance, demonstrating that he was willing to resort to using the organized forces of violence to achieve "unity" should it prove necessary.

Five days after the first "Message to All Shanghai People" had been issued, another call to fight the "evil wind of economism"

was put forth. Thirty-two groups signed the "Urgent Notice" of January 9. It is important to note that among these thirty-two signers, the contract workers' groups were not included. Also the increase in the number of signers reflects the fact that many groups that originally considered themselves part of the Workers Headquarters now felt independent enough to sign on their own. Further, six of the signers were representatives of liasion centers of organizations from outside Shanghai, and seven represented student groups.[31]

The "Urgent Notice" attributed continuing chaotic conditions in the city to "economism" and placed the blame on capitalist-roaders in the old Shanghai party hierarchy. Their "scheme" was described as follows:

> Colluding with the capitalist forces in society, they are making use of economic benefits to divert the general orientation of the struggle and to incite one group of people against another, causing breakdowns in factory production and railway and road traffic. They have even incited dockers to stop work, causing difficulties in running the port and damaging the international prestige of China. They are making free with the state's money and property, arbitrarily increasing wages and material benefits, and granting all kinds of allowances and subsidies without limit, stirring people up to take over public buildings by force.[32]

It is interesting to note here that many of the things that the party officials were accused of doing to sabotage the Cultural Revolution, such as causing workers to leave their jobs and take over public buildings, were activities that the rebels themselves

engaged in during the months of November and December.

The "Urgent Notice" went on to propose the immediate implementation of a ten-point plan, which included the following injunctions: all revolutionary workers were to remain at their production posts and try to persuade workers who had left their jobs to return; travel funds were to be cut off; state funds were to be frozen; the question of wages and welfare was to be deferred to a later date; students working in factories were not to be paid high wages; people must move out of illegally confiscated buildings.[33] In addition to these detailed instructions, the notice ended with the warning that anyone who committed crimes, opposed Chairman Mao or Lin Piao, or who tried to sabotage production would be punished by the Public Security Bureau. The document thus threatened to deal firmly with those that might oppose the call to go back to work. The connection between the maintenance of production and the revolution was made crystal clear:

> We must firmly implement the policy of "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production" put forward by Chairman Mao and, on the one hand, take an active part in the great proletarian cultural revolution while on the other hand remain fast at our posts of production and construction, persist in the eight-hour workday, strive to fufil and overfufil production plans, and do our best to turn out high quality products.[34]

The linkage of revolution and production may have been made necessary by the chaotic conditions that had developed in the

city. With many workers off their jobs, and many industries paralyzed, students were brought in to help maintain production. But neither the "Message" nor the "Urgent Notice" succeeded in restoring the normal functioning of the city.

Both on the national level and within Shanghai, the success of the revolution was being more defintively tied to the promotion of production. A Shanghai radio report from January 11 indicated that a Red Guard group had realized, after studying a January 9 People's Daily editorial, that "to grasp the revolution so as to stimulate production is the key issue in the current great proletarian cultural revolution."[35] And this message was being increasingly stressed in Peking. A telegram of greetings from the central Cultural Revolution Group had been sent to the revolutionary rebels in Shanghai following the publication of both their notices, describing them as "models in creatively studying and applying Chairman Mao's works." The rebels were said to have "taken firmly in your hands the destiny of the socialist economy." Special approval was expressed for their correct policy in "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production."[36]

In fact, the theme of struggling against economism was becoming the dominant one in the Cultural Revolution. An editorial that described economism in detail appeared in both People's Daily and Red Flag on January 12, 1967. Entitled "Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," it repeated many of the points made in the "Urgent Notice." The

editorial credited the Shanghai workers with exposing the reactionary plot of the bourgeoisie of "using the sugar-coated bullets of economic benefits to lure a part of the masses."[37] The reactionaries were charged with inciting violence, the takeover of buildings, and the desertion of production posts. Again, it might be recalled that the rebels were involved in these very same activities in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The takeover of the Liberation Daily building was a takeover of a public building. The wokers that participated in this takeover, and also in the Anting and Kunshan incidents, were guilty of leaving their production posts. Thus it is hard to understand why the same action might be revolutionary in one instance and not in another. It is also difficult to determine exactly which workers left their jobs during this period of massive worker walkouts. Earlier, it was clear that the more radical workers walked off their jobs to participate in incidents like Liberation Daily, and the Anting affair, in order to make their demands heard. Possibly, they were now responding to the call of production first, but their previous actions cast doubt as to whether this was necessarily the case.

In addition to this, it might be noted that those workers who were at an economic disadvantage may have included economic demands along with other social and political demands. The elimination of wage inequities and differential welfare benefits could well have been a demand not only of the contract workers, but also of the relatively unprivileged regular workers. This

goal would, in fact, be in keeping with the Paris Commune model which aimed at eliminating both special privileges and salaries for those who served as representatives of the people. Demands for salary increases and a more egalitarian wage structure do not necessarily fall under the rubric of "counter-revolutionary economism." An attempt to eliminate aspects of the economic system which allowed some to have more advantages and to become "bosses" over others is in keeping both with the Paris Commune model and with the original anti-bureaucratic goals of the Cultural Revolution.

It is significant that the question of wage differentials and inequalities is not mentioned in the editorial. Rather, the payment of higher wages is described as "a form of bribery that caters to the psychology of a few backward people among the masses."[38] It is said to have led the masses down the road of economism, "inviting them to disregard the interests of the state and the collective and the long-term interests, and to pursue only personal and short-term interests."[39] Workers are therefore accused of being influenced by the desire for higher wages only because of short-term interests. The fact that some might have demanded higher wages out of egalitarian principles is not considered. And the demands of the contract workers are denied entirely.

Another part of the argument is especially puzzling. If the party was trying to buy off the workers by paying them higher wages

and by answering their demands for more benefits, then why would this encourage workers to leave their jobs? To be sure, that well might be the result of providing workers subsidies to go on trips to "exchange revolutionary experiences." And it is also possible that the wage benefits were used selectively to intensify divisions among the workers. But it is hard to understand how increased economic benefits in general would cause worker walkouts.

The editorial also dealt with the problem of material incentives. Economism is said to encourage material incentives: "It promotes the tendency toward the spontaneous development of capitalism and encourages revisionist material incentives in a vain attempt to destroy the economic base of socialism."[40] By this way of reasoning, those who benefited from such practices as the extensive use of material incentives and wage differentials before the Cultural Revolution were now trying to buy off the rest of the workers. Thus those workers who may have objected to the system in the first place, and tried to remedy it during the Cultural Revolution by making wage demands that would equalize the structure, were now vulnerable to the charge of economism by virtue of their egalitarian demands. The people formerly in charge were not blamed for allowing the system to exist, but were accused of trying to buy off the disadvantaged stratum of the working class.

Any economic demand now became classified as "economism." But under an unequal wage structure, demands for higher wages by lower paid workers cannot be interpreted simply as economist

demands. This is especially true when the demands are made as part of a revolutionary movement where one of the stated goals of the revolution is to eliminate capitalist influences. Economic demands were often combined with demands for reorganization of the power structure in the factory. This goal is in keeping with the Paris Commune model. The need for worker self-rule, both in government and in the work-place, is a crucial component of that model. Workers demanding this kind of fundamental transformation may have felt it necessary to leave their production posts, even if it meant disrupting production, in order to achieve this goal. It is conceivable that they left their jobs precisely for this reason, just as the workers left their jobs to begin the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai in November and December.

A further problem with the analysis of "economism" made in the January 12 editorial is that it does not explain how so many workers could be bought off if there was not widespread discontent in the factories. How were the workers to express this discontent and make changes in the factories? Was the only solution to maintain production? The slogans of the Cultural Revolution urged the masses to rebel, to form their own revolutionary organizations, to decide matters on their own. Mao, after all, had proclaimed that: "In the last analysis, all the truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: 'To rebel is justified!'"[41] This was not qualified to say that rebellion and production should be reconciled within a production schedule. Indeed, at times it might have been necessary

to disrupt production in order to make revolutionary demands. This was especially true when the demands involved the very nature of work organization. If the structure of leadership in the factories was such that it discouraged mass input, and furthermore encouraged material incentives, the reasons for interrupting production may have been revolutionary. The danger was that the power of the authorities might have been sufficiently strong to prevent changes within the factories. And where the party authorities still had enough power to mount the economist attack they are accused of directing, the possibility that they would act to prevent change was very real.

Thus it seems likely that many workers left their jobs for reasons other than economist appeals from old party authorities. Their own economic and political demands against the injustices of the system appear to have been centrally involved. The movement of the contract workers is the best example—a section of the proletariat demanding a legitimate place in the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Nonetheless, it is evident from the January 12 editorial that the central government was no longer going to tolerate what it began to call "ultra-democracy." The need for "proletarian unity" rather than the need for the independence of mass organizations was now being stressed. This in turn involved a corresponding emphasis on the need to exercise "proletarian dictatorship" in the sense of authority from above rather than in terms of proletarian self-

rule.[42]

The shift to the emphasis on proletarian unity soon was made explicit and became all-pervasive. In an editorial that appeared in the second issue of Red Flag in mid-January, entitled "Proletarian Revolutionaries Unite," the following argument was made:

> Shanghai's experience proves that extensive democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat is absolutely not ultra-democracy nor "small-group" mentality. Only by giving effect to democratic centralism and the great unity of proletarian revolutionaries under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought can there be extensive democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat.[43]

It was emphasized that the struggle had to be waged against the problems of anarchism and liberalization. It was said that only through revolutionary unity could democracy under the dictatorship of the proletariat be achieved. The familiar theme of the importance of "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production" in order to struggle against the bourgeois line was also repeated.[44]

But an even stronger indication of the desire of Peking to exert stronger control over the mass movement appeared in a directive issued on January 13. It concerned the "strengthening of public security work in the great proletarian cultural revolution."[45] It discussed the need for "extensive democracy"--but only under the "command of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship."[46] The emphasis shifted to the exercise of the proletarian dictatorship through its so-called "tools"--the public security forces:

> Without the dictatorship of the proletariat, it is not possible to enforce extensive democracy among the masses of people. The public security organs are one of the important tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They must... strengthen the dictatorship against the enemy...[47]

There was good reason for these calls emphasizing unity and the need to counter ultra-democracy. The problems of disruptions in production, aggravated by divisions within the working class, were particularly evident in Shanghai. Neither the "Message to All Shanghai People" nor the "Urgent Notice" had been successful in persuading the workers to return to work. Both these documents had received official approval and publication in Peking. On January 12, a rally of several hundred thousand people was held in Shanghai to celebrate the receipt of the message of approval from Peking.[48] Both Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan were present and made speeches at the rally. The main result of the rally was the adoption of a resolution hailing Chairman Mao. The resolution praising Mao for his "personal decision" to broadcast to the whole country the "Message to All Shanghai People" and the "Urgent Notice" tells a great deal about the importance of Mao's approval:

> Your most brilliant decision will continuously light the burning flames of the unfolding nationwide all-embracing class struggle... We will resolutely implement your correct policy of grasping revolution and stimulating production and completely sweep away the evil influence of counterrevolutionary economism. We will never let you down and further unite the revolutionary rebel groups and the great majority of the masses together; we will firmly grasp the leadership of the great cultural revolution and production in Shanghai.[49]

Beyond emphasizing the crucial importance of Mao's approval, the tie between production and revolution was further cemented in the resolution. Revolution was now explicitly defined in terms of promoting production, for this was the "correct policy" put forth by Mao. Emphasis on this point was total. There was no concern with reorganizing either the political power structure in the city or power relations within the factory. The creation of new institutions controlled by and responsive to the masses was no longer part of the revolutionary message. In short, the kinds of problems and solutions that make up the essence of the Paris Commune model were ignored in the documents issued by the Shanghai rebels.[50]

Regarding the critical question of the situation in the individual factories, there is evidence (which will be discussed shortly) that some workers did in fact conceive of the revolution in terms of reorganizing their factories.[51] There were efforts made to restructure the way decisions were made and the way managers functioned in the factories through implementation of the Paris Commune model. Although there was no unified movement to achieve this goal, the fact remains that the attempt was made in some factories, suggesting that some workers took seriously the original command of the Cultural Revolution to form mass organizations that would become permanent organs of power. The revolutionary rebels in Shanghai who published the "Message" and "Urgent Notice" did not include these more radical demands in their declarations. While the editorials that appeared in the Shanghai press mention in

passing the establishment of a revolutionary committee in a Shanghai glass machinery plant based on the principles of the Paris Commune, they did not suggest this as a model to be followed generally. In short, there was no public call for either the reorganization of political power or of power within the factories by the major Shanghai working class organization, despite the fact that experiments were being made in the city with the Commune model in mind.[52]

CHAPTER THREE: THE PERIOD OF THE POWER SEIZURES--MIDDLE JANUARY

Contrary to the views of many observers, there is little evidence (either in documents issued by the rebel groups at the time or in any further material that has since come to light) of a widespread movement in Shanghai to reorganize political power and factory control structures into organs of proletarian self-rule based on the Paris Commune model. The principles that comprise that model--the demand for direct elections, the power of immediate recall, the arming of the workers--were not goals openly or widely promulgated. In this respect, the goals of the cultural revolutionary movement in Shanghai were often unclear or only vaguely formulated. What was emphasized most consistently and clearly by the Workers Headquarters, the group that attempted to control and lead the movement, was the need to restore and stimulate production and to counteract the evil wind of "economism." Little consideration was given to the question of how the evils of economism had originated and had been permitted to grow under the previous regime. With the exception of a few factories, there was little recognition of the need to change the existing system of managment and control. Thus the movement in general did not demand the reorganization of management in order to deal with the problems revealed by the Cultural Revolution. The only call made was to seize power within the factories. The seizure of power was

justified not because productive relations were deemed unequal and unfair, but rather because production had been disrupted and needed to be restored if the revolution was to succeed.

Analyses of this type thus defined a successful power seizure essentially in terms of success in restoring production. While changes in factory relationships occassionally were mentioned, power seizures usually were described as necessary or desirable because they helped to restore production. As a news release issued by the New China News Agency on January 17 typically noted:

> Since having been taken over by the revolutionary rebels, many units and departments in Shanghai have a new appearance. The north railway station, the gate to Shanghai is in perfect order. Traffic is moving smoothly along the Shanghai-Hangchow and Shanghai-Nanking railways. With the support of revolutionary college students, dockers at Shanghai port have resumed regular loading and unloading work to insure proper cargo handling. The local branch of the people's bank has been taken over by six revolutionary rebel organizations. With the revolutionary rebels in overall control, the whole production command at the Chiushin shipyard is operating well.[1]

As this description suggests, the main purpose of the power seizure was to restore production. The question of how and if there was to be an attempt to change factory relationships is nowhere clearly posed. For example, the NCNA dispatch goes on to point out that the takeover of power was only the first step. In order to consolidate the victory, "it was essential to refute, overthrow, and completely discredit those in authority within the party taking the capitalist road."[2] And it is precisely on this point that the goals

of the movement become so ambiguous. Does the consolidation of the power seizure involve only the overthrow of those people who were "taking the capitalist road"? Or does it involve reform of the productive system that allowed such "capitalist-roaders" to exercise power and influence? What, in short, is the ultimate purpose of "seizing power"? Is it just to restore production, or are there further goals to be pursued? From both official statements and the notices issued by Shanghai worker groups it is apparent that a fundamental reorganization of productive relations and political power was not conceived to be a major part of the movement. Yet some workers did think reorganization was an important part of the Cultural Revolution and did attempt to apply the principles of the Paris Commune model directly in their places of work. This effort was in keeping with the early encouragement given to the workers to establish their own permanent mass organizations as set forth in the "Sixteen Points."[3]

Nonetheless, the primary emphasis for many of the leaders of the Cultural Revolution had shifted during the period of the January Revolution. Production and unity became the key calls. The slogan, "to rebel is justified!" was still heard, but it was directly tied to the idea that to make revolution one must promote production. The political question of the nature of power exercised over the masses, and the lack of mass participation in government, were no longer crucial questions. The justification for the Cultural Revo-

lution became the need to maintain production against the economist threat. In fact the economist threat had prompted this redefinition of the goals of the Cultural Revolution. The major problem was now seen to be party officials attempting to disrupt production and combatting this tendency increasingly became the major concern. It was not the nature of their power or control, or even their apparent continued influence over the workers, that was criticized, but rather the use of that power to undermine production. The problem was formulated not in terms of the nature of power, but rather its use. The solution was thus to dismiss those misusing power and thereby restore production. The attack centered on a few specific people, not on the political system in general. The question of the need to reorganize political power, once it had been seized, no longer received serious consideration.

This re-evaluation of the goals of the Cultural Revolution was reflected in the events in Shanghai. On January 16, the power seizure was defined simply as the takeover of industry. The article stated that political power was crucial and that the "fundamental issue of revolution" was state power, but failed to discuss the way in which power was to be exercised. As such, a successful takeover is described as follows:

> On the evening of 1 January, the Shanghai workers revolutionary rebel general headquarters took over the Shanghai railway bureau and thus recovered control over the railway transport system. On that evening and the next day, those workers who had been deceived and had moved into public buildings, moved

> out again of their own accord. Some of them were able to expose those people behind the scenes who, at public meetings or by putting up big-character posters, had been inciting them to take over public buildings. Those workers who had received 'supplementary wages' or 'subsidies' threw the money in the faces of those who had attempted to bribe them.[4]

It should be noted that the actions described in this passage, such as the takeover of public buildings and the writing of big-character posters, had not always been considered contrary to the spirit and methods of the Cultural Revolution. The rebel workers had used the same tactics just a few weeks earlier and their actions had been hailed as revolutionary. It might also be observed that the subsidies mentioned were not always interpreted as bribes. Rebel groups from the start had demanded subsidies for travel and propaganda purposes. And it was then considered counter-revolutionary not to provide them with the money. The fluid definition of "counter-revolutionary" made it difficult to determine what constituted genuine revolutionary activity and also what genuine power seizures were to be.

Other editorials and radio broadcasts from Shanghai during the month of January do not make these inconsistencies any more understandable. The fight against economism and bourgeois influences continued to be equated with the effort to stimulate production and restore services. Victory as not defined by success in reorganizing political power, even though the question of political power was still stated to be the major question of the revolution. The struggle against "economism" had become the major task of the Cultural

Revolution. While it might be argued that the elimination of "economism" was a matter of crucial importance, as an end goal of the revolution it seems to fall far short of the original aims of the movement. For example, the practical problem of getting a train to run from Shanghai to Peking came to be presented as a principal revolutionary goal, the successful completion of which was termed a "new victory of Mao Tse-tung's thought" and a "great triumph for the principle of grasping revolution and stimulating production."[5] This is not to imply that the two parts of the production/revolution formula were theoretically incompatible. It is rather to point out that the convergence of the two is not essential. And to a degree, combining the two into a single goal has the effect of altering each of them. The concentration on the need to restore production during the period of the power seizures illustrates this, for the consideration of the nature of political power was now almost entirely ignored.

In addition to this crucial linkage of production and revolution during the January Storm, a new emphasis on "proletarian unity" began to appear. And "unity" was often invoked to insist that disparate groups with diverse demands contain their rebellion within a framework of order. Originally, the Cultural Revolution aimed to have these diverse opinions and criticisms expressed. The opinions of the masses were deemed important and were to be heard, even if they did not conform to official views. Now there was a

subtle shift from the early Cultural Revolution tenet that only through the rebellion of the masses could the revolution succeed to the view that it was "only through the great alliance of revolutionary rebels that a strong and valiant cultural revolution force (could) be organized" to gain the "final victory in the great cultural revolution."[6]

Revolutionary unity was now a main goal of the revolution and as the revolution progressed the need for unity became even greater. Indeed, it was stated that "anything that is detrimental to this unity must be opposed."[7] Differing views had to bow to the collective will. The desired unity was described in a January 15 Wen Hui Pao editorial "Revolutionary Rebel Groups, United Under the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought!" in the following manner:

> The great alliance of the revolutionary rebel groups has a deep and strong class sentiment and intense viability. Each and every revolutionary rebel group in the great alliance will have differing views and will take different actions on this problem. But, first of all, consideration must be given to the collective and prominence must be given to the cause of general orientation, accompanied by a grasping of actual situations and unity of action and procedure. To present a united front to the enemy, any remarks detrimental to unity, any action that may affect unity, and any situation that is harmful fo unity should be avoided... The process of the great alliance and unity is also the process of destroying the bourgeoisie and promoting the proletariat.[8]

Thus the achievement of "unity" was tied to the primary goal of the revolution—the destruction of the bourgeoisie. The question as to whether the demand for unity was not also a demand for the workers

to silence their grievances. Who was going to decide which demands (among the many being made at this time) were legitimate proletarian ones? The need for, and the desirability of, unity was widely realized, but the problem was that the price of unity might be silencing the masses and ignoring the important social differences among them. For example, contract workers could hardly be expected to withdraw their demands for equal wages and working conditions out of the need to present a united front.

The call for "proletarian unity" did not of course diminish the attention given to the problem of "economism." In fact, in the continuing discussion of "economism" some interesting points were added in mid-January. A January 19 radio broadcast indicated that the problem of "economism" began as early as mid-December in Shanghai.[9] This is interesting for it raises serious problems with the official interpretation that "economism" originated with the downfall of the Shanghai party hierarchy in early January. For if both factory disruptions and the raising of economic demands were acknowledged to have begun well before the officially defined period of the party's "economist plot," then the impetus for these actions may have come from the workers' movement. The important question then becomes which workers left their jobs and why. In fact, an "economism" analysis which concentrates primarily on the actions of the party hierarchy ignores the question about what types of demands the Shanghai workers were actually raising. And in reality, this is the crucial area of inquiry. Why did workers

leave their jobs, well before the party's downfall and its "economist bribes"? What demands did these workers make? What was their economic status? What was the economic position of those workers who responded to the party's bribes? How many workers were actually affected by the party's actions? And again, why would higher wages induce workers to leave their jobs?

These questions remain unanswered and unconsidered in the official analysis of "economism."[10] But a close examination of the workers' movement does suggest two relevant points. First of all, workers at times found it necessary to leave their jobs (and to a certain extent disrupt production) in order to effectively raise both political and economic demands. Worker actions in November and December amply illustrate that. And secondly, economic demands and reforms were by no means beyond the scope of the goals of the Cultural Revolution. While not the major focus of the movement, reforming wage scales and reducing inequities naturally accompanied some of the aims of the revolution. Raising economic demands is not necessarily counter-revolutionary, and many workers included economic reforms and wage increases within their concept of revolutionary change. Here it is essential to distinguish between different social groups that were making or responding to demands that were labelled "economist." Contract workers, and other workers who were disadvantaged under the old system, may well have seen the demand for equal wages to be critical component

of a movement for equality in the spirit of the Cultural Revolution. The demand of a highly paid technician, on the other hand, would be an entirely different matter.

The analysis that simplistically describes the January Revolution as a period during which the rebels attempted to defeat the party's "economist plot" cannot be uncritically accepted. In the first place, the extent to which the chaotic situation in Shanghai was caused by a party plot remains unclear. Secondly, the workers did not present a united movement in the fight against "economism." A diversity of conceptions of the role of economic reform in the Cultural Revolution characterized the Shanghai working class. And finally, it is the diversity of goals and aims of the workers' movement that crystallizes during this period. It is the divisions within the Shanghai proletariat, rather than the unity of that class, that characterizes the January Storm.

The critically divisive question centers around the content of power seizures. The workers coalition that had come together early in January to issue the January 4 "Message" and the "Urgent Notice" finally proved able to restore some semblance of order to Shanghai. By the third week in January, the communications and transportation systems had resumed more or less normal functioning, and most of the factories were operating again.[12] In addition, power seizures occurred in many of Shanghai's industries. The important question is whether the power seizures were to involve fundamental political

and economic reorganization. The different answers workers gave to this question, and the divisions that were growing in the workers' coalition, soon became critical.

On the one hand, workers united in a massive denunciation of former party officials being carried on throughout the city. Beginning on January 15, the "guilty" officials were paraded around the city in the backs of trucks.[13] This public humiliation was the culmination of the overthrow of the former party hierarchy. But some workers had more radical ideas about what a power seizure should yield. The differences that emerged were later described in detail by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao who noted that the problems of factionalism were especially prominent during the period of the power seizures:

> ... at the mention of "seizure of power," we found the resultant evils of factionalism, such as selfishness, obsession with personal gain, the "mountain stronghold" mentality, the "small group" mentality, sectarianism, and so forth. This is because when those people were subjected to oppression or branded as "counter-revolutionary," they hardly noticed these evils. But once the moment for the seizure of power came, some people became obsessed with selfishness and the "mountain stronghold" mentality. The seizure of power in Shanghai was not just plain sailing because once petty bourgeois factionalism came to the fore, it was detrimental to the proletarian Party spirit and upset the general orientation of the struggle.[14]

He also made it quite clear who was to determine the general orientation of the struggle in Shanghai. Power seizures that took place without his and Yao Wen-yuan's approval were considered to be "false" power seizures.[15]

Chang and Yao had arrived in Shanghai on January 4, the same day that the first "Message to All Shanghai People" was issued.[16] On their arrival, they found that the party committee was "paralyzed" and work stoppages were widespread. Chang claimed that power was not the question that motivated them: "At the time, we were not motivated by factionalism nor did we think of recapturing power (from the powerholders). What was uppermost in our minds was what we were going to do (about the widespread dislocations)."[17] The solution was to put vital departments under his control. To do so, it was necessary to mobilize "troops and students and the rebels of industrial plants and railway stations to assist the revolutionary workers."[18] From Chang's account it is clear that he conceived power seizures primarily in terms of measures to restore production.

Ideally, Chang felt that the rebel workers should consult him and Yao Wen-yuan on matters concerning power seizures. As Chang described the way he envisioned the process:

> At first, I consulted with Comrade Yao Wen-yuan to first seize control of the key departments to ensure the people's lives and property against destruction. We should seize the power of the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee and the Shanghai Municipal People's Council later on... At that time, we had adopted the form of joint conference; on any matter we would ask the rebels to come over to our conference for consultation...[19]

From this assumed position of authority, Chang set guidelines as to how the Shanghai revolution was to be conducted and continued.

The method of "consultation" with him became all important, so important that power seizures taking place without his approval were not to be considered genuine. And because this consultation was not always made, power seizures in Shanghai occurred several times. Chang attributed this to "petty bourgeois factions" that were trying to undermine "proletarian Party consciousness." As Chang described these false power seizures:

> The first seizure of power took place on January 15 when two organizations, one of workers and the other of Red Guards, without our knowledge and also without consulting us, went straight to the Municipal Party Committee and Municipal People's Council, rounded up their personnel, announced a notification and seized the powers of both organs... At the moment we began to have the feeling that factions had appeared... (we talked to the workers)... and told them: "You have seized power so easily. Why didn't you consult with us? We should seize power jointly..." The comrade we talked to was very good. He explained that they had only announced their notification without posting it up and that they could take it back. Consequently, this seizure of power was considered null and void.[20]

From this description, it is clear that Chang conceived the power struggle at the grass roots level to be of lesser importance than the process of consultation with himself and Yao. The objection he had to this first power seizure, one that necessitated its being declared null and void, was that it took place without his prior approval. Why his approval should be the critical factor in distinguishing between "true" and "false" power seizures was not a matter that he deemed necessary to explain. His self-imposed leadership of the Shanghai workers' movement was merely to be accepted a priori.

In Chang's description of the second "false power seizure," it is interesting to note that the Workers Headquarters, comprising the groups most commonly thought to be under his control and influence, also participated in political struggle that he did not approve of. According to his own analysis:

> Two days later (January 17) four other organizations representing a great many people including the great majority of rebels in Shanghai, namely, the Workers' General Headquarters, the Red Revolutionary Committee, the Government Organs Liasion Center and the Suburban Peasant Organization, suddenly sent out their people in a small car during the night and collected all the seals of the Municipal Party Committee, the Municipal People's Council, the Ward Party Committees and the East China Political Bureau, giving us no information beforehand the seizure of power was complete... We consulted with each other and came to the conclusion that such kind of power seizure was useless and we should resolutely disapprove it.[21]

Despite the fact that the rebel groups included the "great majority" of the rebels (by Chang's own admission), the power seizure again was not accepted because it had occurred without his prior approval. Chang's statements concerning the conception he had of power seizures thus calls for further evaluation of the widely-accepted contention that the January Revolution was a grass roots movement that culminated in the Shanghai People's Commune. Clearly, the most important consideration for Chang was the attempt to establish a coherent, unified movement under his control, not the need to let the masses express themselves. He used the January 11 telegram of greetings from Peking which stressed the need for a "great alliance" to support his efforts to unify the movement.[22] And he made it

crystal clear that he was to head the "great alliance."

While Chang's description is useful to illustrate the notion of a "false power seizure," throughout the period the concept of "power seizure" remains an ambiguous one. In the documents issued by the revolutionary rebels in Shanghai, as has been noted, the question of what a power seizure should be is not discussed. Further, in the official pronouncements and editorials of the same period, there is little specific discussion of the need for, or the nature of, power seizures; rather, arguments are directed against economism and toward persuading the workers to return to work. Thus in most cases the content of the power seizure is impossible to determine. There are two separate questions here--the content of power seizures on the localized, individual factory level and the type of reorganization proposed for the city government. During much of January, efforts were directed to getting the city back to work. The question of what kinds of political and economic reorganizations should be carried out was not seen to be an urgent one. Successful power seizures were defined almost solely in terms of the restoration of production. There were no city-wide calls for the reorganization of the factories according to the Paris Commune model. A January 21 Wen Hui Pao editorial discussing the period of the power seizures typically quotes the passage from the "Sixteen Points" that states that the masses must liberate themselves and that nothing must be done in their stead;

the power seizure in Shanghai is then taken as evidence that the masses have in fact liberated themselves.[23] But again the content of the power seizure is left exceedingly vague. As typically described:

> In accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, the revolutionary rebel groups who have united the overwhelming majority of the revolutionary masses and supported by other units, have fought their way out from their own departments and seized leadership.[24]

Which principles were involved in the power seizure, and how it came about, are not discussed. The source of legitimacy for seizing power is derived from Chairman Mao's instructions. The article further credits the great alliance of rebels with a "great revolution in which one class overthrows another."[25] The bourgeoisie is said to have been overthrown, but the question of who and what came in its place is left unanswered.

The dimensions of power seizures are therefore often difficult to determine. Official descriptions do not go beyond statement that a power seizure has taken place, leadership has been seized, and production has been restored. The evidence, however, indicates that power seizures often involved goals other than the change of leadership and the restoration of production made in the spirit of "unity" that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao desired. This is illustrated first of all by the two power seizures that Chang disapproved of. Both of these seizures were direct attempts by the masses to remove party control over them. Again, Chang did not consider them

to be legitimate power seizures since they did not conform to his idea of "unity." And secondly, there is the contrast offerred to Chang's conception of a power seizure by the efforts of workers to push power seizures to the point of fundamental transformation in the factories.

Before analyzing these more revolutionary changes that were promoted in some Shanghai factories, it is useful to note that the diversity of opinion regarding the content of power seizures had important implications for the re-establishment of a city-wide government. How closely was the movement for reorganization in the factories related to the movement for the political reorganization of the city? Were the goals of a new city government reflective of what was happening at the individual factory level? Was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's attempt to unify the city and establish a new municipal government based on the power seizure movement? These questions are difficult to answer, for the content of power seizures is known in only a few cases. However, the available evidence suggests that the movement was far more radical at the grass roots level in demanding fundamental change in the organizational structures. Although these radical efforts were not supported or attempted on a city-wide level, many genuine power seizures based on the masses taking control of their places of work and reorganizing relations within them, often on the basis of the Paris Commune model, apparently did take place, even though these events were not widely heralded. Among the better documented cases

is the power seizure that took place at Shanghai Glass Machinery Plant, No. 3 Workshop.

The first report of the power seizure at Shanghai Glass Machinery Plant, No. 3 Workshop appeared in Wen Hui Pao on January 10.[26] The report quoted an announcement made by the new "revolution and production committee" organized in the factory:

> "We suggested that we the broad revolutionary employees and workers should come forward, and, through a completely new 'revolution and production committee' of the Paris Commune type organized from general election, shoulder the two sets of burdens of the revolution and production at the factory. This revolutionary suggestion immediately won the warm support of all revolutionary masses in the factory."[27]

In this case, we know a great deal about the power seizure. The Paris Commune model, including the election of officials, was clearly the source of inspiration. Moreover, the organizers of the movement in the glass machinery plant went on to explicitly state the purpose of the reorganization they attempted to bring about:

> "As we were elected by the revolutionary masses, we were not going to be officials and bureaucrats. We were the servants of the people and we participated in labor in the same way as all worker comrades in the factory..."[28]

Crucial elements of the Paris Commune model were involved in the establishment of this workers' committee. First, it was stipulated that the committee was to manage the factory was not to be made up of officials and bureaucrats. The problem of bureaucracy was thus directly confronted. Secondly, the elected

officials were to be the servants of the people, not masters over them, and they were to remain regular workers. The discussions of the need to implement these measures indicate that the Paris Commune model was perceived as relevant and applicable by at least a portion of the Shanghai proletariat.

In addition to the Shanghai report, a NCNA dispatch discussed the innovations attempted in the glass factory. It described the revolution and production committee as "an organ of power elected by the revolutionary workers," which was to be in charge of "political, production and trade union work." Again the anti-bureaucratic aspects of the committee were stressed: "...members of the committee hold no official titles and call themselves 'servants'... They do not divorce themselves from productive labor, sit in office rooms or act as high and mighty bureaucrats."[29]

An interesting point revealed in the article is that preparation for this committee began as early as December 27, 1966. On that day, a ta-tzu-pao was posted in the factory calling for the reorganization of the factory. This would place the attempted reorganization before the downfall of the party and the problems of economist-inspired strikes said to have resulted from that downfall. It would also indicate that the official explanation for the origin of power seizures, i.e., the disruptions caused by economism, may not be adequate. The impetus for power seizures

obviously also came from other sources. In any case, after the poster appeared, an election was said to have been held on the "Paris Commune principle." The committee that was elected was said to consist of "staunch revolutionaries" who were also "outstanding in production." Another important aspect of the Paris Commune model that was stressed was that "the masses retain full power to recall or replace them (elected officials) any time if they are found to be incompetent."[30]

The radical nature of the reforms proposed by these workers is shown by the fact that after discussion they decided not to allow former managers to retain their positions, despite the fact that their skills were still needed. It was declared that a new path had to be forged, "former functionaries were relieved," and "any idea of reconciliation and compromise must be rejected." The workers proclaimed that with the establishment of this committee, "bureaucracy has been wiped out," and the "servants are really serving the masses in every sphere." In addition to information on the nature of this new proletarian power organ in the glass factory, the article also reveals another interesting point about the nature of the workers' movement in Shanghai. Some workers were not content to simply emphasize the production half of the "grasp revolution and promote production" formula. The committee was explicitly concerned with both politics and production. This was described not just as a struggle for increased production, but

rather as a political struggle in which the goal was a "completely new, communist-style revolutionary factory."[31]

Another example of an attempted power seizure based on the Paris Commune model occurred at the Shanghai railway station. This power seizure took place in response to widespread disruptions. A NCNA report of February 10, 1967 described the railway station as "paralysed for the first ten days of the year because of sabotage by a handful of reactionaries."[32] Now, the trains were running on schedule, following a takeover by rebel forces. This takeover was engineered by the "railway joint command of the Shanghai workers' revolutionary rebel general headquarters." They planned to seize control of the departments crucial to restoring train service. The final result was that "the eight rebel groups elected a leading body by a general election modelled on that of the Paris Commune, and set up a command office to direct the labour force..." Train service was said to have been restored the next day.[33]

There is not further description of the elction, or what kind of committee was actually set up. But there are interesting insights to be gained about what this cultural revolutionary struggle for power actually involved:

> When we have political power, we have everything. When the revolutionary rebels took power at the Shanghai station, the railway service was restored to normal... But the estbalishment of the new, revolutionary order required an enormous amount of organization and this was all done by those formerly looked upon as 'nobodies' such as train conductors, engine drivers, switchmen, signalmen,

> lathe-turners and ticket inspectors. The leader of the railway rebel organization is an ordinary bench worker, who was branded a 'counter-revolutionary' for writing the first poster to expose the party people in authority in his factory.[34]

It is thus stressed that ordinary workers are the basis of this new form of organization. The article states that this is in keeping with Chairman Mao's views that people are the most important factor in world history. But even more importantly, the struggle at the railway station is set forth as an example of how the "revolutionary rebels and people have become masters of their own destiny."[35]

This concept of the masses becoming masters of their own destiny is signficant because it is clearly inspired by the Paris Commune model of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The goals proclaimed in these two power seizures are noticably lacking in most descriptions of other power seizures, which emphasize the importance of the fight against economism. The call for the masses to become masters of their own destiny is in striking contrast to the more commonly heard call to restore production. And there is more than a difference in emphasis. The official announcements and editorials of the time no longer concerned themselves with the need for political reorganization. The struggle for political power was no longer the primary thrust of the movement. No mention is made of the need for the masses to claim their own destiny on the basis of the Paris Commune model. For those who have made the struggle

against economism the exclusive focus of the Cultural Revolution, the political questions of the revolution had long since faded into the background. Unity, consolidation and alliance were now the key goals, and they stood in striking contrast to the original idea of revolution based on organization of proletarian organs of self-rule. Although there were sections of the proletariat that moved toward goals of reorganization on the basis of the Paris Commune model, this movement did not become a city-wide program which had the support of the rebel groups. These goals were not included in the call issued by many of the Shanghai worker groups that signed the "Urgent Notice" in an effort to restore production. The omission of these political goals, and the omission of examples of attempts to apply the Paris Commune model, are even more glaring in light of the existence of a significant movement calling for more radical measures derived from that model.

Not only was the Paris Commune type of power seizure ignored in the official press and documents, but it was also actively opposed. We have already seen from Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's description of this period that he sanctioned only power seizures that took place under his aegis. The essence of such power seizures involved the restoration of production, not a concern to promote greater worker participation in the management of the work-place. Indeed, attempts to reorganize factory management were seen as detrimental to the priorities of production and thus the policy of the rebel groups headed by Chang became one of opposition to fundamental

changes in productive relationships. The new policy was officially announced in the January 16 "Message to All Shanghai People," that was subtitled "Firmly Support the Revolutionary Peasant Movement." It was issued and signed by 27 rebel groups, with the Workers Headquarters being the major force behind the document.[36]

Of the 27 groups signing the message, five were liasion centers of groups from outside Shanghai, and eight were Shanghai student groups. Notably absent were the signatures of the main groups in opposition to Chang. Neither the Second Regiment of Keng Chin-chang nor the Workers' Third Headquarters, headed by Ch'en Hung-k'ang signed the notice. Also missing were the signatures of several other important worker groups, such as the Rebel Revolutionary Committee of Apprentices in Shanghai, the Third Corps of the Rebel Army of Revolutionary Shanghai Apprentices, the Shanghai Workers' Rebel United Committee and the Anting Corps of Shanghai Workers. These omissions are significant, for these groups formed the core of the opposition to Chang. The difference in the content of this message from the earlier messages that <u>were</u> signed by these opposition groups reflected the growing divisions within the workers' movement. One manifestation of these divisions was a new and novel analysis of economism. The critical change made in the definition of economism can be seen in the following passage:

> With the intention of sabotaging the great proletarian cultural revolution, the handful of persons in the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road and the few diehards

> in the Municipal Party Committee who cling to the bourgeois reactionary line signed away things indiscriminately and squandered the sweat and blood of the working people. They tried to sabotage the great proletarian cultural revolution and shift the general orientation of the revolutionary struggle by increasing wages and material benefits, altering the enterprises' administrative systems, and merging factories and changing the nature of their ownership.[37]

In what begins as a typical description of economism, one notes the addition of a new element: the problem of "altering the enterprises' administrative systems." A connection now was made between change in the management structure and counter-revolutionary economism. Not only was there no concern for the need for worker control of management in the factories, but there was also criticism of attempts to change the existing system of management in any fashion. Thus the revolutionary rebel groups under the direction of the Workers Headquarters not only lacked interest in the reorganization of management in the factories, but actively opposed it.[38]

The passage also indicates that the question of how much real social change and reform was to result from the Cultural Revolution was a matter of great debate within the workers' movement. Not all rebel groups felt the need to reorganize their factories and establish committees based on the Paris Commune model to control production in the factories. But other workers considered it a matter of primary importance. This clearly was one of the major issues that split the rebel movement. But the use of the term "counter-revolutionary economism" to describe this phenomenon (as well as such

practices as wage increases) shows how easily this label could be applied as a political and ideological weapon against anyone who differed from the official line.

It is difficult to accept the assertion that those who were interested in "changing the chain of command in the factories" were guilty of economism.[39] This charge seems in direct contradiction to the original injuction of the Cultural Revolution that called for workers' organizations and cultrual revolutionary groups based on the Paris Commune model. Those who wanted change in the management of the factories cannot simply be relegated to the category of counter-revolutionary economism. The same point should be made about the economist charges that were levelled against any wage demand made by workers. Demands for wage increases and welfare benefits were often motivated by worker grievances over existing inequities. Again, the identity of the signatures on this notice is important, for it indicates the extent to which this new description of economism was a point of contention.

The notice on the peasant movement provides another hint about the kinds of questions that split the workers' movement. Describing economist actions by "those in authority taking the capitalist road," the notice charged:

> They have stirred up conflicts and broadened differences between half-worker half-peasant commune members and (assigned) workers of rural enterprises under collective ownership to start a struggle within the masses and impede the yearend distribution. This has seriously undermined the production enthusiasm of commune members.[40]

Thus raising the question of the plight of the contract workers was now also associated with counter-revolutionary economism. Encouragement of their struggle to reform the wage and distribution system was branded as "economist," thus precluding any change in the distribution and management systems. In the case of the contract worker, or the half-worker half-peasant person, the demand for equal rights and benefits was labelled "counter-revolutionary." The charges made against the demands of the contract workers for a more equal place in the society in which they lived and worked are hard to understand, especially in light of the definition of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat as it was expressed in the Paris Commune model.

The question of the reorganization of political power and productive relationships thus had become secondary matters on the agenda of the Cultural Revolution. It was replaced by the concern for the economic disruptions caused by the revolution. This concern resulted in a corresponding lack of enthusiasm for the political goals that originally motivated the movement. A change in government might still be advocated, but nothing approaching the Paris Commune model was to be sanctioned. As this shift occurred, it further disrupted rather than unified the workers' movement. The attempt by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to moderate and control the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai was resisted by many of the rebel workers. They realized exactly what he was trying to do in curtailing the original goals of the revolution. His policies, however, were

fully in accord with those then being advocated by the central Cultural Revolution Group in Peking. His support within this group became crucial, for he eventually had to base his authority on his membership in that group, and especially his relationship with Mao, to try to convince the people of Shanghai to accept his modified version of the goals of the Cultural Revolution.

Another important factor in Chang's favor was the support of the army. Quite early in the sequence of events, Chang was willing to call upon the security forces and the PLA for support.[41] Needless to say, this brought a further outcry of opposition to him and his policies. As we shall see, the students made an immediate challenge to his threats. But beyond this, attacks on the PLA (primarily coming from the demobilized soldiers' organization) continued into the period of the Shanghai People's Commune.[42] This, it might be noted, was after the army had played a critical role in the formation of that government. The attacks will be discussed in detail shortly, but here it is useful to consider the implications of Chang's threats to use the security forces immediately upon his arrival in Shanghai in early January.

It should be remembered that when Chang arrived in Shanghai on January 4, the workers' movement was already organized under its own leadership. That did not prevent him from issuing a series of security regulations warning that the police would be used to support the "revolutionary left" the day after his

arrival.[43] He tried to give the impression that his authority was based on the fact that he had been dispatched by the central Cultural Revolution Group (and even by Mao himself) to deal with the situation in Shanghai. But his attempts to restore order in the city, and to try to bring unity to the workers' movement, met with widespread resistance. Most important among the working class organizations that actively opposed Chang was the Second Regiment, led by Keng Chin-chang. This organization, and its close allies, consisted of 520,000 men, according to a Workers Headquarters newspaper report.[44] Another opposition group, considered one of the most radical of the workers' groups, was the Workers Third Headquarters, under Ch'en Hung-k'ang's leadership, whose memebership was reported to be "several hundred thousand."[45] The opposition also included the largest and most radical student group, the Red Revolutionaries, which had some 100,000 members.[46] Another active force in the opposition was the Red Guard Army, a group of demobilized soldiers that was part of a nation-wide organization. The Shanghai branch had become quite powerful and participated in both the battle of Kunshan and in the signing of the "Urgent Notice."[47] Together these groups constituted a massive force that was not only beyond the control of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, but also actively opposed his actions, especially, as will be seen, when he moved to set up the Shanghai People's Commune. And they were groups, as even the Workers Headquarters acknowledged, that were

of vital importance in defeating the old party hierarchy. But Chang was soon to move to discredit these groups in order to consolidate his power. He made his first move against the student group.

On January 21, a few days before he planned to hold the preparatory meeting for the formation of the Shanghai People's Commune, Chang met with representatives of the Red Revolutionaries. Speaking for Chairman Mao and Lin Piao, Chang gave the students a list of instructions that they were to follow. The points included the direction from Mao that, "The Red Guards must be spartan and simple. They should model themselves on the People's Liberation Army."[48] Lin Piao was quoted as saying that the rebels should both carry the revolution through to the end and also that they "should strengthen their organization and discipline."[49] The students resented this session with Chang, especially his stress on discipline. They also disliked the fact that Chang claimed to speak to them on behalf of Chairman Mao. They did not trust his right to give them orders. The dispute reached a head a few days later. On January 27, the day after Chang's first attempt to organize the preparatory committee to form the Shanghai Commune, the students again met with Chang and Yao. In a six hour meeting, the students demanded that Chang and Yao denounce the "Trotskyist and anarchist tendencies" of their own supporters.[50] Both refused to give in to the students' demand, and the students came out of the meeting with nothing.

The same evening the students resorted to more drastic action. A group of Red Revolutionaries organized a raid on the Shanghai Writers Union. They arrested, and took with them for questioning, three men who they accused of writing propaganda against their group. On their way back to their headquarters at Futan University the students were met by armed guards. Acting on orders from Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the soldiers first released the Director of the Writers Union, the students' main prisoner. They then entered the student headquarters to carry out an investigation that was to last most of the night. The students tried to reason with the soldiers, reminding them that the army was to intervene only on the side of the revolutionary left (a policy formulated four days earlier by the central Cultural Revolution Group).[51] The students felt that their position in the forefront of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai had left no doubt as to whether they were genuine leftist. But they had little success, for the soldiers remained until morning, by which time Chang and Yao and other members of the Workers Headquarters had arrived to continue the talks with the students. When most of the soldiers left early that morning, a political commissar and staff officer remained behind. This became a matter of dispute later that same day when the students were accused of detaining the men, despite the students' insistence that the two voluntarily remained for discussion.[52]

For the moment, the students still felt confident that their

position as the revolutionary left would be acknowledged. They assumed that Chang would be condemned for using military force against the masses of the revolutionary left. But the students soon learned that their actions, not those of Chang, were to be condemned. On January 29, a telegram from the central Cultural Revolution Group was publicly posted in Shanghai. It read, in part:

> Some Red Revolutionary leaders have recently turned the spearhead of the struggle against Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yuan, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group instead of against Ch'en P'ei-hsien and Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, the Shanghai representatives of the bouregois reactionary line and the main party authorities taking the road back to capitalism. This is quite wrong... The action of the People's Liberation Army in defense of a mass revolutionary organization was entirely correct; that of the Red Revolutionary leaders, who forcibly detained a political commissar and a staff officer, was completely mistaken and will certainly not be tolerated.[53]

The students could not believe the telegram was genuine. They suspected it had originated in Shanghai, with Chang using his position as a member of the central group to sign the telegram. They therefore sent a delegation to Peking to check on its authenticity. When word arrived that the telegram was genuine, the students were stunned. An effective and intense propaganda campaign was mounted against them over the next few days, completing the process of disintegration that had come with the disillusioning news. Faced with the fact of the extent of Chang's power, individual members of the group either participated in the

denunciation of their former leaders, or were vulnerable to the charge of counter-revolution. This ended the unity of the student organization and thereby largely removed from the political stage one of the largest groups in opposition to Chang.[54]

Chang was careful to choose just this time to demonstrate that he had the support of the military forces in the city. His use of the military was in direct response to a new policy being formulated in Peking concerning the role of the PLA in the Cultural Revolution. The central Cultural Revolution Group had gradually shifted to the view that the security forces and the military should play a greater role in the revolution. The first hint of this change appeared in the mid-January editorial entitled "Proletarian Revolutionaries Unite!"[55] But by the end of January, following the period of extensive disruptions that had occurred in many of the cities of China, an official call was made for the entry of the PLA into the Cultural Revolution.

CHAPTER FOUR: INTERVENTION OF THE PLA

On January 23, 1967, an important notice was issued concerning the "Resolute Support of the People's Liberation Army for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left."[1] It was signed by both the CCP Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group, as well as the State Council and the Military Commission, indicating that it was a major policy document. It marked the official call for the PLA to actively enter the cultural revolutionary struggles in society as a whole, rather than confining their activities to internal military problems. The announcement stated that the PLA was to act according to the following directions from Mao:

> The PLA should support the broad masses of the Left. From now on, the demands of all true revolutionaries for support and assistance from the army should be satisfied. The so-called "non-involvement" is false, for the army was already involved long ago. The question, therefore, is not one of involvement or non-involvement. It is one of whose side we should stand on and whether we should support the revolutionaries or the conservatives and even the rightists. The PLA should actively support the revolutionary Leftists.[2]

Thus the PLA was to enter the Cultural Revolution in active support of the "proletarian revolutionary Leftists." The problem, of course, was how to determine who actually represented the genuine proletarian leftists. These competing claims had to be weighed by the PLA. Potentially, the declaration gave the PLA a crucial role in the conduct of the Cultural Revolution. In deciding which group it would support as the proletarian left, the PLA was in a position to

decide which groups would be allowed to participate in the Cultural Revolution.

In attempting to explain why such extensive power was delegated to the PLA, the declaration characterized the PLA as a "proletarian revolutionary army." It was said to have been "personally created by Chairman Mao." Further, it was the "most vital tool" of proletarian dictatorship. A major problem with this description is that the label "proletarian army" did not change the fact that the PLA was a standing army organized according to a hierarchial authority structure. And a standing army, however described, is a far cry from the concept of an armed proletariat as envisioned in the Paris Commune model of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[3]

It might be noted that this feature of the Paris Commune model had been recognized as vital in earlier Chinese Marxist discussions of the Paris Commune. Chen Chih-ssu, in the article "The Great Revelations of the Paris Commune" that appeared in Red Flag in March, 1966, argued that:

> It is only by taking up weapons that the proletariat will achieve the right of self-liberation; the first article of faith for proletarians not willing to be slaves is to hold firmly the weapons in their hands... The right of the proletariat to self-liberation should be won by the proletariat taking its arms to the battle field... Chairman Mao has said: "For thousands of years the working people have been deceived and frigthened by the reactionary ruling classes, and it has not been easy for them to realize the importance of taking weapons in their own hands."[4]

Chen lauded the communards establishment of "their own independent

military organization," and described how the workers dismantled the existing state apparatus:

> In the face of the bourgeois state machinery, the Parisian proletariat established a military organization in direct opposition... Based on its own class capabilities and government experience, the revolters of the Paris Commune understood that the standing army and the bureaucracy were important organs of the bourgeois state machinery. After the uprising had succeeded, they immediately dismantled these organs.[5]

The importance of the abolition of the standing army was further shown by the fact that the "first decree of the commune was the 'decree to destroy the standing army and replace it by the national self-defense army.'"[6] Chen's recognition of the need to do away with the standing army and replace it by the armed proletariat is a concept that is particularly emphasized by Marx in his analysis of the Paris Commune:

> Paris could resist only because, in consequence of the siege, it had got rid of the army, and replaced it by a National Guard, the bulk of which consisted of working men. This fact was now to be transformed into an institution. The first decree of the Commune, therefore, was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people.[7]

But the difference between the concept of the armed proletariat and the established bureaucratic institution of the PLA was not a problem confronted in the writings of the time. The contradiction remained and was not explained away by calling the organized army the "army of the proletariat," when the actual proletariat had no access to arms. In this case, the distinction between the people and the army remained. It was precisely this distinction that the

organizers of the Paris Commune sought to eliminate by demanding the abolition of the standing army in favor of the armed people. The failure of the leaders of the Cultural Revolution to deal with this fundamental concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat was to become more glaring and obvious when the PLA was officially incorporated into the structure of the Shanghai People's Commune.

Before turning to this curious development, however, a few more observations might be made about the January 23 declaration on the necessity of the PLA's participation in the Cultural Revolution. In the official explanation of the role of the PLA, the source of legitimation comes from two sources: first, it was "personally created by Chairman Mao"; and secondly, it is the "most vital tool of the proletarian dictatorship."[8] It was not the armed proletariat, it should be noted, but rather a "tool" of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was created not by the proletariat, but rather by Chairman Mao.

Other editorials appeared late in January which further discussed the relationship between the PLA and the dictatorship of the proletariat. A January 25, 1967 article "The People's Liberation Army Firmly Backs the Proletarian Revolutionaries," made the following observation:

> The political power of the proletariat seized by the people's army with the gun has to be defended by the people's army with the gun, too. Active counter-revolutionaries and counterrevolutionary organizations sabotaging the great Proletarian Cultural Revolution must be resolutely suppressed and the dictatorship of

the proletariat exercised over them.[9]

Here, the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been given an entirely new meaning. First of all, the principle of abolishing the standing army, and replacing it with the armed proletariat, has been directly reversed. There is no discussion of the need for the armed proletariat. Instead, the argument is made that the "people's army" defends the "political power of the proletariat." In this case, the standing army still exists, to defend different power elements in society. The problems that arise with the organization of a standing army itself (a problem that the founders of the Paris Commune were quite concerned with) are not considered here. The armed proletariat in the Paris Commune was to be a guarantee against the possibility of the army becoming the arbiter in society. Here, the army is encouraged to become a decisive factor in society.[10]

The new injuction to the PLA to enter the Cultural Revolution on the side of the "proletarian revolutionary Left" coincided perfectly with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's efforts to bring order out of the chaotic situation in Shanghai. And he was quick to display the military force under his command to indicate which side the PLA would support as the "proletarian Left" in Shanghai. On January 24, a public demonstration was held in which ninety trucks carrying members of the local air force paraded through the streets of Shanghai to urge the people to "join the revolutionary masses,"

and "show their strength to the reactionaries."[11] This message was repeated two days later when air force squadrons dropped leaflets over the city declaring their support for the "true revolutionary leftists."[12] Also on January 26, a parade of military officers rode through the city in open cars providing further evidence of the PLA's increasing visibility in Shanghai.[13] The widespread publicity given to the presence of the military was not without significance, for the first active participation of the army came the next day. It was on January 27 that Chang used the military forces against the student group, the Red Revolutionaries.[14] It was thus clear to the residents of Shanghai which side the military would support. A major rally of 10,000 PLA members was then held on January 30 to pledge support for seizures of power by the "revolutionary leftist masses."[15] In light of the support the military had given just a few days earlier for the position of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, this cannot have been anything less than an ominous warning to his opposition.

The PLA also participated in the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai in other ways. To a limited extent, PLA members were used in factories and other areas where order had broken down and a large number of workers had gone on strike. They helped to restore order at the docks and the railroad freight terminals.[16] Not only did they help to restore normal functioning in critical industries, but they also acted to encourage the regular workers to

return to their production posts and repay back wages. Here the PLA acted to restore order, standing against those who had left their jobs, and making those workers liable to the charge of counter-revolution. The importance of this factor in determining the outcome of diputes in factories cannot be overestimated. The workers who left their jobs in order to bring about industrial reorganization were forced to return to work or else make themselves vulnerable to charges of counter-revolution.[17]

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was quick to take advantage of the PLA's new role to augment his control in Shanghai. And he was soon to attempt to further consolidate his power by forming a new government that would exclude many of the worker groups that opposed him. On January 26, Chang decided that it was time to move toward this new form of government. On that day, the preparatory meeting for the formation of the Shanghai Commune was held. It did not go smoothly.[18] Chang's major rival, Keng Chin-chang, opposed the formation of a commune under Chang's leadership. On the same day, Keng called a meeting of the fourteen organizations that were loyal to him. The meeting turned into a criticism session of Chang and the Workers Headquarters. The following charges were made against Chang: "They say we are reactionary organizations. They arrest our people and parade them through the streets, sometimes for as long as 10 hours at a stretch!... Chang Ch'un-ch'iao has admitted that the First Regiment is a part of the revolutionary left wing,

yet Workers Headquarters has arrested at least fifty of our members!... Since Chang Ch'un-ch'iao took over in Shanghai, why has there been so much fighting among the workers and students, so many instances of revolutionary organizations trying to shut down each other's headquarters?"[19] After an outpouring of complaints, organizations under Keng Chin-chang moved to take over the Workers Headquarters, breaking in on the meeting being held to discuss the formation of a Shanghai Commune. The interruption of the meeting, and the ensuing argument with Wang Hung-wen, caused the meeting to be ended, and the commune delayed. But Keng was not satisfied with merely delaying Chang's plans. He immediately moved to form a new rival political coalition. According to a Workers Headquarters report, he was able to gather a group of at least 48 organizations to form the "Shanghai Revolutionary Committee of Broad Unity."[20] The extent of the opposition was later acknowledged by Chang himself. In his October, 1967 speech made to the Anhwei delegation, Chang stated that at the time that 38 organizations were meeting to form the Shanghai People's Commune, "25 other organizations were found also holding a meeting for the establishment of a 'New Shanghai People's Commune.'"[21]

Chang claimed that the organizations under his own control were "indisputedly the rebels," and tried to convince the other groups to join the alliance. But this proved a difficult task, as Chang later conceded: "Of course, it was also not so very easy to convince

them... We had to again carry out long consultation with them. At that time, we had a 'trump' in our hands to play, the Party Central Committee appointed Comrade Yao Wen-yuan and me to join the 'Shanghai People's Commune.' In Shanghai there should be only one political power not two, and we could join only one not two. At the same time, the Three Armed Forces could give support to only one political power not two."[23] This still did not fully convince the other rebel groups to join the Commune, as Chang candidly acknowledged. But his description is of particular interest for what it reveals about how he perceived the sources of his power. It was his special relationship to, and support in, Peking that he acknowledged to be the basis of his authority in Shanghai. It was because he had the approval of Peking that Chang felt able to confer legitimacy on one rebel group over another. And further, it was because of this support that he could threaten the use of military force to impose "proletarian unity."[24]

It is noteworthy that in his later evaluation of the late January events in Shanghai, Chang did not address the major questions of the Cultural Revolution as they were originally posed. He did not discuss the content of the power seizures nor did he justify the criteria employed to determine their genuine or false character. Rather, judgments were made solely on the basis of who was in charge of a specific power seizure. The assumption that genuine power seizures occurred only when they had the approval of the two repre-

sentatives of the central Cultural Revolution Group (neither of whom were part of the indigenous workers' movement that developed in Shanghai), raises serious questions regarding the description of the January Storm as a spontaneous seizure of power by the masses. It further raises questions about the most fundamental principles and goals of the Cultural Revolution as they were originally conceived and set forth in terms of the Paris Commune model. The so-called "power seizures" were not conceived in terms of bringing workers' control over their political and economic lives. Rather as Chang described it: "The essence of the 'January Revolution' was the struggle for power for the interests of the Party and the State, for the interests of the proletariat, for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, for socialism, and for making a success of the great proletarian cultural revolution."[25] Thus power seizures, as they were perceived by the founders of the Shanghai People's Commune, were not concerned with the need to establish organs of government based on the concept of proletarian self-rule.

The question of what the founders of the Shanghai People's Commune did perceive to be important in organizing a commune form of government will be discussed in detail shortly. Here it need only be noted that the Commune did not grow out of a movement for worker self-government in Shanghai. Instead, the incongruous situation existed where the workers who were demanding reforms in

factory management were in the opposition to the Commune, while Chang and the Workers Headquarters opposed changes in the management structure. The incongruity is related to a theoretical shift that had been made at that time by the central government, moving away from the more radical proposals for proletarian self-rule based on the Paris Commune model to the view that parts of the existing governmental structure should play a greater role in the Cultural Revolution. A January 30 Red Flag editorial "On the Proletarian Revolutionaries Struggle to Seize Power" reflected the ambiguous policy that was now being promoted by the center. To be sure, parts of the editorial still echoed aspects of the Paris Commune model. But the thrust of the article was in a different direction. The "January Storm" of power seizures in Shanghai was now explicitly tied to the need for assistance from the PLA. Accordingly, Chairman Mao was said to have supported the revolutionary movement in Shanghai during January, but he also:

> ... called on the workers, peasants, revolutionary students, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary cadres to study the experience of the revolutionary rebels of Shanghai and he called on the People's Liberation Army actively to support and assist the proletarian revolutionaries in their struggle to seize power.[26]

Thus the army officially became part of the January Storm as a result of a personal call from Mao.

In addition to emphasizing the role of the PLA in the Cul-

tural Revolution, the editorial stressed the need to build an alliance of proletarian revolutionaries and unite the broad masses. This alliance was described as the "most important condition for victory in the struggle to seize power..."[27] The earlier calls of the Cultural Revolution for the masses to rebel were now supplanted by a call for unity, for "without a great alliance of proletarian revolutionaries, the struggle to seize power cannot be completed successfully..."[28] The essential condition for the success of the revolution was thus no longer the liberation and activism of the masses, but rather the formation of a "great alliance."

How was this alliance to be formed? First, Mao's works were to be applied in a creative way to "straigthen out the ranks ideologically and strengthen the sense of organization and discipline."[29] Specifically, the revolutionaries were to correct the errors of "departmentalism, 'small group' mentality (considering the interests of a particular group rather than the overall interest), excessive decentralization, the disregard of organizational discipline, ultra-democracy, liberalism, subjectivism, and individualism in people's minds and in their organizations."[30] Organization and discipline were now to be the key concepts in forging the revolutionary alliance. Again, this is in striking contrast to the original call of the Cultural Revolution for the formation of organizations elected by the masses to enable the

masses to liberate themselves. Then the injunction was: "Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative. Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder."[31] Now, the "disregard of organizational discipline" was seen as a serious threat to the revolution.[32]

Another component of the struggle to seize power that now became important was the "role of revolutionary cadres."[33] Indicative of a trend that was soom to become national policy, moderation in the criticism of cadres was advocated: "To regard all persons in authority as untrustworthy is wrong."[34] The rebels were to respect the experience and political and organizational skill of the cadres. Further, the "overwhelming majority of the ordinary cadres... are good and want to make revolution."[35]

Following this discussion of these essentially new concerns of the Cultural Revolution, the editorial considered the subject of political organization following power seizures. The discussion is contradictory. It is first stated that the movement must come from the masses, but the purpose of the movement is to regenerate the "leading organizations of our Party and state, enterprises and undertakings, cultural organizations and schools..."[36] At the same time, it is argued that new "provisional organs of power must be set up: this is essential and extremely important."[37] Yet these organs are to perform the familiar role of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. Nonetheless they are described as new

political forms:

> Through a period of transition, the wisdom of the broad masses will be brought into full play and a completely new organizational form of political power better suited to the socialist economic base will be created.[38]

Thus the same section of the article could be used to support both the need for completely new organizational forms, and also the view that the purpose of the revolution was to regenerate the old political structure.

But the contradictions in the editorial go further. The "completely new organizational form" referred to was not explicitly tied to the Paris Commune model. The Commune was mentioned, but not in the context of the need to implement its essential forms. Implicitly the argument made was that a strict interpretation of the Paris Commune model (that is, institution of the actual forms of the Commune) was not necessary. Rather, the Commune experience simply was to be "enriched."[39] In this process of "enrichment," implementation of the principles of the Commune such as direct election, immediate recall, and the armed proletariat (which were deemed important earlier in the Cultural Revolution) now were no longer considered relevant.

The critical part of this analysis is in its conception of the new form power would take. Did this conception reflect the content of the Commune, even if it did not retain its forms? The Commune experience was still obviously thought to be relevant, for

its lesson on the need to smash bourgeois organizational forms was repeated. But what about the relevance of the principles of the Paris Commune model that were to ensure that the proletariat remained master of their own society? Were these principles adhered to, if not in content, then at least in purpose? On this point, a definite departure was made both in the actual organizational form that was advocated, and also in the spirit and intent of that form of organization.

For example, the editorial described the new proposed provisional power organs as follows:

> Experience proves that in the course of the struggle for the seizure of power, it is necessary, through exchange of views and consultations among leading members of revolutionary mass organizations, leading members of local People's Liberation Army units and revolutionary leading cadres of Party and government organizations to establish provisional organs of power to take up the responsibility of leading this struggle. These provisional organs must, "take firm of the revolution and promote production," put the system of production into normal operation, direct the existing set-ups in administrative and professional work (they should be readjusted where necessary) to carry on with their tasks, and organize the revolutionary masses to supervise these set-ups.[40]

The only aspect of the Paris Commune model that remained in this description was a brief and vague mention of the organization of the masses in a supervisory capacity for administrative and professional work. The need for election of officials who would remain the servants of the masses, the principle of immediate recall, and the abolition of special privileges and wages were not included.

The organs were not to be formed by popular demand and election, but rather by consultation of the "leading members" of three specific groups. And one of these groups was the PLA. The original Commune model not only excluded the military as a political force in the new society, but also demanded the abolition of the standing army and its replacement by the armed proletariat. Also, the cadres, another of the groups that was to participate in the formation of the new government, were part of the former power structure that had proven susceptible to bourgeois influences and revisionism. What was proposed as a new form of political organization clearly was very different from the original Paris Commune model of the self-government of the producers.

One other difference between the two models might be noted. The Marxian model, as originally conceived, was concerned with the liberation of the proletariat--"the political form at last dicovered under which to work out the emancipation of Labour."[41] The new Chinese version, by contrast, was largely concerned with more immediate problem of promoting production. While the editorial gave lip-service to the notion that the Paris Commune could be a relevant model for the reorganization of political power, in reality, the model had become so distorted as to have lost its original meaning. The basis for the three-in-one alliance was already present. The Commune itself was still praised, but serious consideration was no longer given to its essential forms. Instead,

what was proposed was consultation of leaders of three important groups in society (only one of which was representative of the masses), rather than the principle of the self-government of the producers. The contrast with the original model is striking. References to the Commune continued even when its content was no longer deemed relevant.

The question of the continued relevance of the Commune model becomes important when considered in light of the attempt in Shanghai to set up a government called the Shanghai People's Commune. This movement was led by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan, and the workers' groups that supported them, the Workers Headquarters, the very forces that had tried to prevent reform, reorganization, and change within the factories. Their opposition to reform at the factory level reflects their view of what they envisioned as the goals of the Cultural Revolution, and also of the role they saw for the Paris Commune model in Shanghai. They had opposed changes in the system of management, both in their lack of support for those factories in which the attempt was made to employ the Paris Commune model of reorganization, and also by explicit ideological opposition to the kinds of changes workers proposed.[42] Thus what they envisioned for the government of the city is ambiguous at best. The choice of the title "Shanghai People's Commune" is not necessarily indicative of a form of organization based on the Paris Commune. In fact, a closer look at the actual organization of the Shanghai Com-

mune shows that it bore little resemblance to the original Marxist model.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE SHANGHAI PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

The opposition to the January 26 preparatory meeting to form the Shanghai People's Commune did not deter Chang Ch'un-ch'iao from his plans. Propaganda for the Commune began to appear in Shanghai. A ta-tzu-bao reported that Chairman Mao had "personally selected Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to be first secretary of the Shanghai Commune and Yao Wen-yuan to be second secretary."[1] Accordingly, the Commune was officially declared on February 5, 1967.[2] Although nothing is known about the selection of members of the Commune, a rally attended by a million people said to have included "revolutionary rebels, revolutionary people, and commanders and fighters of the PLA in Shanghai," was held that day to celebrate the founding of the Commune.[3] A radio report described the new form of government that was announced at the rally as follows:

> Under the illumination of Mao Tse-tung's thought, a new form of proletarian dictatorship—a local, national organization called "The Shanghai People's Coomune"—has been born. It is a "New Paris Commune" in the sixties of the 20th century, conforming to the conditions of proletarian dictatorship. It is an outstanding contribution made by Chairman Mao to international communism.[4]

The founders of the Shanghai Commune thus clearly claimed the Paris Commune and its model of the dictatorship of the proletariat as their heritage. Moreover, they proclaimed the Shanghai Commune to be a "new form," and it is the extent of this "newness" that emerges

as the critical question in determining the real content of the Commune.

The radio report of the rally also included speeches that were made at the founding day celebration. The selection is interesting, for although speeches made by peasants and students were mentioned, along with quotations from a speech made by Wang Hung-wen, a leading member of the Commune, most time and emphasis was given to a speech made by Liang Cheng-kuo, commander of the Shanghai PLA unit. The speeches of Wang and Liang deserve consideration for what they reveal about the philosophy of the founders of the Commune.

Wang Hung-wen was one of the leaders of the Workers Headquarters, the workers' organization that was the earliest and major group to support Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. This early and loyal support had earned Wang a position of prominence in the new government formed by Chang. His speech on the day of the founding of the Commune is significant primarily because he failed to mention any of the matters that one might expect to be important to the founders of the Commune. He did not discuss political or economic reorganization or the priniciples of the Paris Commune--which would have involved such crucial matters as the abolition of the standing army, the election of officials, and the institution of immediate recall. Instead, his speech was a celebration of the thought of Mao:

> "Since the start of the proletarian cultural revolution, the workers of Shanghai have given full play to our

> glorious revolutionary tradition. We have waged gigantic struggles against those in the party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road; we have exposed them, and seized their power. At every crucial moment, we received the strongest and the most (sacred?) support and encouragement from Chairman Mao. Long live our most, most respected and beloved great leader Chairman Mao!"[5]

He went on to attribute all victories to Mao's thought. But more importantly, he explicitly acknowledged the importance of the PLA: "We must learn from the PLA, carry out the revolutionization of our thinking, make revolution through the practice of economy, and become good examples of 'taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production.'"[6] His concern for both the need to learn from the PLA and also the need to promote production foreshadowed where the priorities of the Commune were going to be placed.

The speech made by Liang Cheng-kuo left no doubt that the PLA had decided which side in Shanghai represented the "proletarian leftists." After congratulating the rebels on their success, Liang presented the PLA as "the army of proletarian dictatorship personally founded by Chairman Mao. It is the tool of proletarian dictatorship."[7] Calling the PLA the army of the dictatorship, or a tool of that dictatorship, does not of course change the fact that it is a standing army, and not the armed proletariat as called for by the Paris Commune model. Nonetheless, the PLA's decision as to which group represented the proletarian left was crucial in the revolutionary process. Rather than being based on the demands of

of the people of Shanghai, the Commune was based on the support of the PLA. And the importance of that backing to the Commune was openly stated by the PLA commander. In a warning to those who opposed the Commune, Liang stated:

> We will certainly protect the Shanghai People's Commune. We pledge to support the revolutionary left. Fighting friends and comrades of the Shanghai proletarian revolutionaries, please rest assured that the PLA army, naval and air units will take any necessary action to help you. We will only permit the left to seize power, but not the right to stage any comeback. As long as you need us, we will support you with our whole strength. We will resolutely and ruthlessly suppress anyone who dares to undermine the Shanghai People's Commune, or the proletarian cultural revoltuion.[8]

These harsh and ominous words reflect the philosophy of the civilian founders of the Commune as well as that of Commander Liang. The Commune was not a government formed by popular demand that aimed to ensure control of the government by the masses. It was rather a government formed by one part of the revolutionary movement in Shanghai, one that did not hesitate to use the army to back up its efforts. And the very use of the army should end the misconception that the Commune, even in its ideal conception, was based on the Paris Commune model. For nothing is further from the ideals of that model than allowing the standing army, a hierarchial institution that is not representative of the people, to become the force to determine which groups of people are genuinely "revolutionary." And then, for the army to threaten the ruthless suppression of anyone who disputes their decision, further betrays

the principles of the Paris Commune. Not only was the standing army not abolished, it was elevated to a decisive and repressive role in the newly conceived society.

The commander of the army was not the only one to hold this view of the Commune. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao also clearly indicated his lack of interest in any of the substantive issues or measures that comprise the Commune model. His speech at the founding rally also neglected the key questions of exactly what the Commune concept meant to its founders. Chang described the founding of the Commune as evidence of the collapse of the former party hierarchy and the municipal people's council, events which took place long before the formation of the Commune. He further said that the Commune indicated that "the proletariat of Shanghai, joined by the broad masses of people, have seized power and taken charge of the government." But he did not reveal what the new form of government might be, or what principles it might be based on.[9]

Chang also found in the Commune evidence "that the Shanghai proletariat has a unified fighting headquarters, and is able to follow more effectively the order of our supreme commander Chairman Mao and continue to carry on our arduous struggle, to seize power, and to consolidate it."[10] The Commune, according to this statement, was not founded because of the demands of the people to take control of their own government, but rather on the instructions of Chairman Mao. The "central and focal point" of the revolution, as Chang saw

> ... therefore the foremost task of our revolutionary rebels and our revolutionary people of Shanghai is to resolutely implement and carry out, under the leadership of the provisional committee of the Shanghai People's Commune, the instructions of Chairman Mao expounded in the third issue of Red Flag Journal: "On the struggle for seizure of power by the proletarian revolutionary rebels."[11]

Chang continued with an ominous warning to both "counter-revolutionaries" and any other opponents of the Commune:

> Here and now let us tell the bourgeois overlords: We have already learned this trick of yours. We revolutionary rebels have already made preparations. We also have the strong PLA on our side. We will break the head of anyone daring to carry out counterrevolutionary activities.[12]

What precisely was to be the content of the power seizure that Chang claimed had just been made? The clearest answer Chang gave to this question was again framed in terms of the promotion of production:

> To continue the seizure of power and the consolidation of it, we must "take firm hold of the revolution and promote production." In the great struggle against economism, we have used the iron fist of "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production," to defeat the enemy. Let us celebrate the birth of the Shanghai Commune with new achievements in "taking a firm hold of the revolution and promoting production!"[13]

Thus power was both seized and consolidated through the promotion of production. The birth of the Commune was to be celebrated in that fashion and for that reason. The goals of power seizure and the Commune were expressed in terms of production--rather than in any demands for social, political or economic reorganization. Making revolution was equated with promoting production, rather

than with promoting revolutionary change and reorganization.

Presumably the choice of the name Commune had some meaning to the founders of the Shanghai Commune. What the meaning was, however, remains ambiguous. The declaration of the Shanghai People's Commune, "Long Live the Victory of the January Revolution!," issued on February 5, 1967, the day the Commune was founded, does not shed much light on the question. It was stated that the Commune, "under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought" was a creation of a "new form of organisation of a local state organ of proletarian dictatorship." The basis of this new form was not the Paris Commune model, but rather the "system of Centralized Democracy taught by Chairman Mao." This meant that it "carries out the broadest proletarian democracy among the people and the most merciless proletarian dictatorship towards class enemies."[14] The specifics of the actual form of this new government show that the major concern was indeed not with the implementation of the Paris Commune model. In the only reference to the Paris Commune in the ten page declaration, it was stated that: "Its members of leadership, after the victory in the all-out seizure of power from below to above in Shanghai, were elected by the revolutionary masses according to the principles of the Paris People's Commune."[15] Despite this reference to one element of the Paris Commune model, the declaration later reveals that this ideal was actually devoid of content. For the elections referred to here are not mentioned

elsewhere and, in fact, the Commune leadership was not formed by popular election. As the declaration itself acknowledged: "At present, a Provisional Committee for the Shanghai People's Commune has been formed through negotiation and recommendation by various revolutionary rebel organisations. It is a provisional and transitional power organ of '3-in-1' alliance of the revolutionary mass organisations, the responsible persons of the PLA stationed in Shanghai and the revolutionary leading cadres who persist in the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao."[16] Thus a process of negotiation, not election, was the basis of the Commune. And, significantly, this was not negotiations among the masses, for both the PLA and the former cadres participated. Furthermore, the question of elections was not only sidestepped, for the election of the committee that was formally to be in charge of the Commune was deliberately delayed until the time "when conditions are ripe."[17]

The thrust of the declaration was primarily to encourage the "alliance of proletarians" to both continue the fight against counter-revolutionary economism and to promote production:

> Under the great banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought, further unite together and shoulder the two-fold responsibilities of revolution and production in a better way, further promote the great proletarian cultural revolution, do well in industrial production, communications and transport, market supply and inflow and outflow of goods, and strive for the fufilment and overfufilment of the state production plans for 1967.[18]

Thus the shift in emphasis of the revolution from a concern for

political and economic reorganization, already apparent during the January Revolution, was reinforced by the Shanghai People's Commune. From their own declaration's omission of concern for reorganization, and from the Commune's organization itself, it is clear that there was no real attempt by the leaders of the Shanghai People's Commune to implement the principles of the Marxian model. Again, the Commune not only ignored questions about the self-government of the producers that the Paris Commune stressed, but even further contradicted that model in the role it gave to the standing army. The declaration urged the army to "prepare to suppress mercilessly the class enemies in making trouble and carrying out sabotage in the country at any moment, and make new and great achievements in defending the proletarian dictatorship, the great proletarian cultural revolution and the socialist economy!"[19]

The glaring differences from the concepts of the Paris Commune model demonstrate beyond doubt that the Shanghai People's Commune was not an attempt to reorganize political power according to the original Marxist precepts. The principles of the model were contradicted on the point of the participation of the army, the method of election or institution of a Commune, and the lack of concern for the right of popular recall to insure mass control of government. There was no mention of officials receiving workmen's wages. Rather, the declaration indicates that the leaders of the Commune were concerned with "continuing the revolution" and "pro-

moting production" so that eventually they could "turn the Shanghai People's Commune into a big school of Mao Tse-tung's thought, push the mass movement of creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works to a new tide, and let the light of Mao Tse-tung's thought shine all over Shanghai!"[20]

Even in its rhetorical acknowledgement of the need for the leaders of the Commune to "trust the masses, rely on the masses, mobilize the masses, respect the creative spirit of the masses, accept the supervision of the masses and listen to the opinion and advice of the masses, a crucial distinction is revealed.[21] The personnel of the Commune were to "serve the people," having "no right to be officials or squires." This in no sense, however, meant government by the masses; it rather meant government for the masses. For there is a difference between the Paris Commune form of government, which stressed the need for direct election and immediate recall with the intention of ensuring that the people gained control of their affairs, and the Shanghai Commune form of government, which stressed the need for serving the masses, but instituted no forms to insure mass input and control. The leaders of the Shanghai Commune clearly opted for government for the masses, being content to wait until "conditions are ripe" before granting the masses electoral rights.[22]

This distinction between government by the masses and government for the masses is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the fact

of strong working class opposition to the formation of the Commune. The short life of the Commune was marked by an active and effective opposition, so much so that the history of the Commune is characterized more by popular opposition to the new government than by popular demand for it. An indication of the strength of the opposition is the repeated emphasis on the PLA's active participation in the Shanghai Commune. Warnings like the one sounded in the Commune declaration, to the effect that any opposition would be crushed, were repeated daily in Wen Hui Pao editorials. A military rally and armed parage to pledge support for the Shanghai Commune made the same point.[23]

But this did not deter the opposition. Neale Hunter reports that active opposition to Chang continued after the founding of the Commune. He described the Workers Third Headquarters attempt to further extend their control down to the grass roots level in district branches as evidence that "Keng Chin-chang's network was far superior."[24] Since support at this level would be crucial in the success of a government based on Commune principles, Keng's influence here was significant. On January 30, shortly after the first attempt to organize the Shanghai Commune was made, Keng organized a raid on a district branch of the Workers Headquarters that lasted for two days. A Workers Headquarters report accused Keng of trying to smash the local branches in an effort to take over the whole organization. It further reported that he esti-

mated that in addition to the fourteen groups he had organized as the "United Committee of Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels" (the rival to the Shanghai Commune), he could count on "200,000 men in reinforcements from the Red Guard Army alone."[25] This last group is important, for it was one of the most militant of the groups opposing both Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and the influence of the PLA.[26] The Red Guard Army, an organization of demobilized soldiers, had been responsible for protests against the intervention of the PLA in the revolutionary process in January. The opposed the PLA takeovers of the airports and radio stations at the end of January, actions which even caused Mao some alarm.[27] They also carried out attacks on the public security bureaus in Shanghai and the offices of Wen Hui Pao.[28]

The alliance of these two groups posed a serious challenge to Chang's authority. Indeed, they had made another bid for power on February 3. In an attempt to forestall the announcement of the Commune, they organized parades and posted posters announcing that "All power belongs to the United Committee!" and "Welcome to the new United Committee!"[29] But Chang had two crucial forces on his side in this power struggle. He was able to claim, as wall posters in his support did, that Chairman Mao had "personally selected Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to be First Secretary of the Shanghai Commune and Yao Wen-yuan to be Second Secretary."[30] Also, as the slogan "'All power belongs to the Shanghai Commune! Long live the Peoples'

Liberation Army!'" indicated, he could count on the support of the PLA.[31]

It was not clear where the rest of Chang's support in Shanghai was located. This was one of the major complaints voiced by Keng Chin-chang to Chang's leadership:

> "There are more than thirty organizations in the proposed Shanghai Commune. Of these, more than twenty are liasion centers from outside Shanghai! This is perfectly ridiculous!"[32]

Of the workers organizations in Shanghai, the only one backing Chang was the Workers Headquarters, and it had split into many smaller organizations. Indeed the numbers given by the Workers Headquarters itself of the members of the opposition groups are the best indication of the strength and numbers of the working class movement outside of the Workers Headquarters.[33]

The delay in the establishment of the Commune that the opposition had forced by interrupting the preparatory meeting on January 26 proved costly to Chang. For in the time between that dsy and February 5, the day the Commune was finally announced, another power seizure had taken place in Heilingkiang. The three-way power seizure effected there soon was praised in the national press as a model to be followed elsewhere.[34] The establishment of the Shanghai Commune was not followed by such favorable publicity. The opposition to Chang was quick to add this to their list of objections to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. They noted that the Heilungkiang model demanded that the "left wing" be included in the new power

structure, whereas in Shanghai the major part of the left had been excluded from the Commune.[35] The opposition also used the tactic of trying to take advantage of their greater influence at the grass roots level. They instigated a movement to attack lower level cadres, who hitherto had escaped the brunt of criticism. This attack proved enormously disruptive, and resulted in disputes throughout the city. Chang was quick to react. He had Wen Hui Pao publish a strong criticism of this attack on the cadres. This editorial was protested by thousands of people who gathered outside of Wen Hui Pao offices for a three day siege. They accused the newspaper of trying to suppress the mass movement and demanded that all those in authority be criticized. The similarity of their objections and actions to those of the rebels who earlier participated in the struggle to seize control of Liberation Daily (a movement that was praised as being genuinely revolutionary) is striking. The difference here is that the group that now controlled Wen Hui Pao, under Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, claimed to be the leading rebel force.[36]

Active clashes between the two major factions of the rebel movement continued. In the days following the founding of the Commune, the supporters of the Commune paraded through the streets of Shanghai. They were met by protesters from the Second Regiment, and several skirmishes resulted.[37] On February 7, Keng Chin-chang protested Chang's exclusion of his groups from the new government, stating: "We control no less than seven municipal departments and

four whole districts of the city, yet Chang Ch'un-ch'iao carries on as if we did not exist!"[38] Later that day, he demanded the dissolution of the Shanghai Commune. At a meeting of representatives from the fourteen groups supporting him, he denounced Chang in the following terms: "The Shanghai People's Commune was set up without the knowledge of the Central Cultural Revolution Group. That is why People's Daily has not mentioned it. This means one thing and one thing only: Chang Ch'un-ch'iao is suspect!"[39] He went on to warn: "So long as there is a Workers Headquarters, our Second Regiment cannot survive; and so long as there is a Second Regiment, Workers Headquarters cannot survive!... We must close their General Headquarters and their district branches; only then will the Shanghai Commune topple."[40] Chang responded the next day with a bulletin criticizing Keng's regiments.

The center of the dispute was soom to move to Peking. Keng had sent a delegation to the central Cultural Revolution Group with his criticism of Chang and also a copy of the document Chang had issued criticizing Keng as proof of "Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's suppression of the famous Second Regiment."[41] In the meantime, he continued his public attacks on the Workers Headquarters. In speeches to his own followers, his attacks on Chang were even more devastating: "They want to brand all of us, several hundred thousand people 'counter-revolutionaries'...Doesn't this mean we will share the fate of the Scarlet Guards?... They are imposing

a reign of white terror on us. They are using the tactics of fascism..."[42] These attacks on Chang finally had their effect. On February 12, soon after Keng's delegation arrived in Peking, Chang and Yao flew there themselves, at the urgent invitation of Mao, who anxiously awaited their arrival "in the doorway."[43]

Chang and Yao remained in the capital for most of the duration of the Commune. They did not return until February 23, with plans for the dissolution of the Commune and its replacement by the three-in-one committee. While he was in Peking, Chang's opponents took advantage of his absence. They surmised that the length of his visit indicated that he was having problems gaining support for his program. Keng continued his attacks, describing the situation as follows: "Chang Ch'un-ch'iao set up the Shanghai Commune on his own authority... Now the Central Committee has called him to the capital, where he's going to have to eat a piece of humble pie..."[44] But in addition to the vocal criticisms, both he and Ch'en Hung-k'ang, leader of the Workers Third Headquarters, chose this time to make their attack on the local Workers Headquarters' organizations. Both groups moved on February 15-17 to close the district branches, where they met with violent opposition. Counterattacks and skirmishes were common. The Public Security Bureau became involved on February 17 on the side of the Workers Headquarters. It moved to close down the offices of the Second Regiment on that day.[45] Further, the Public Security Bureau also officially

abolished the Red Guard Army, which had proved to be the source of the most violent opposition to Chang. Its offices were closed and its leaders arrested. The Public Security forces also acted against an organization of "sent down" workers that had carried out a siege at the Commune's office. These actions, and the continuing propaganda attack that the newspapers poured forth in criticism of Chang's opponents, began to take their toll. The rebel groups showed signs of splitting apart entirely, with some of their leaders now eager to try to make some kind of compromise so that they could be included in the new government, whatever its form. The prolonged absence of Chang added to the confusion, as no one really knew what would happen.[46]

Despite the feeling of uncetainty that pervaded the city, and also the erosion of one of his major groups of support (the Red Guard Army), Keng Chin-chang made one final attempt to seize power. On February 22, he organized a mass demonstration in People's Square to promote his alternative to the Shanghai Commune, the United Committee of Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels. The rally was held, and the supporters paraded through the streets of Shanghai denouncing the Workers Headquarters. But this was the last breath of a dying opposition movement. For the next day Chang returned to Shanghai, with authoritative instructions from Mao and the central Cultural Revolution Group, which insured his control of the city.[47]

It is important to consider the extent of popular opposition to Chang and his plans, for it shows that there was potential within the working class of Shanghai to develop its own movement, its own leaders, and its own government. If that movement ultimately proved unsuccessful, as it did in the case of Shanghai, it nevertheless indicated that popular responses to calls for revolution were great. The imposition of Chang's order on Shanghai certainly was not an easy task. He was opposed until the very last by large segments of the Shanghai proletariat, despite his control of the organized means of repression, the army and the police. The crucial turning point came when Chang returned to Shanghai and was able to claim personal approval from Mao. Whether this proved decisive, or whether the critical factor was the failure of the rebel leaders to offer an effective alternative, is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it is clear that the forces of revolution were present, and their opposition to the institution of Chang's order was significant.

Exactly what happened during the course of the negotiations in Peking is not known. The seriousness of the struggle is indicated by the length of the visit; Chang did not return until February 23.[48] The next day he reported on his meetings with Mao at a Shanghai rally that was to mark the end of the Commune. The rally was broadcast over all television and radio stations. Mao had told Chang that Shanghai should establish a three-in-one

alliance based on the Heilungkiang model in place of the Commune, stressing the necessity of authority:

> The slogan "doubt everything and down with everything" is reactionary. Those who want to doubt everything and overthrow everything are bound to head in the opposite direction, and will be overthrown in a matter of days. We have here some units which don't even have deputy section chiefs. People who don't want deputy section chiefs cannot last more than a few days.[49]

The rebels would have to be more willing to accept those who already had experience in administration:

> It would be very difficult for a college student who has just graduated or one who hasn't yet graduated to lead a municipality or to manage Shanghai municipality. I don't think he would be qualified to be a college president either... A few persons should be selected from among the original leadership cadres. We cannot completely dispense with the old personnel.[50]

Although Mao's comments were probably directed at the problems the rebels had in organizing and running the city, they also reflected an increasing emphasis on the need for authority and leaders, in contrast to the earlier emphasis on mass spontaneity and popular decision-making.

Mao raised other objections to the Commune, including its name. He argued that it was not good to change names too often, for "the main thing is which class seizes political power. That is the fundamental question, not what its name is."[51] But, as Mao correctly observed, the Commune form of government (if the Paris Commune model was followed) would have serious implications

for the role of the party:

> If everything were changed into a commune then what about the party? Where would we place the party? Among commune committee members are both party and non-party members. Where would we place the party committee? There must be a party somehow! There must be a nucleus, no matter what we call it. Be it called the Communist party or the social democratic party, or Kuomintang, or I-kuan-tao, it must have a party. The commune must have a party, but can the commune replace the party?[52]

Obviously, it was not yet time for a Commune to replace the party.

Mao thus suggested that the name of the Commune be changed, if it wouldn't undermine the enthusiasm of the masses. It was clear that this change meant the reaffirmation of the role of the party in the power structure, for the chaotic conditions in Shanghai had raised grave concerns in Peking. And Mao speculated that the Commune was too feeble a political structure for re-establishing authority:

> Communes are too weak when it comes to suppressing counter-revolution. People have come and complained to me that when the Bureau of Public Security arrest people, they go in the front door and out the back.[53]

Moreover, Mao realized that the power struggle in Shanghai was by no means over. He noted with concern the activitites of the Red Revolutionaries, and the attempts to oppose military takeovers of the radio stations and airfields.[54] He also questioned Chang about the First, Second, and Third Regiments which had come to Peking "making accusations" against Chang.[55] But in his talk with Chang, Mao clearly came out on the side of Chang. He noted with

approval Wen Hui Pao's stand against the attack on neighborhood cadres which had been initiated by Chang's opposition. And he singled out the critical telegram that had been sent to the Red Revolutionaries for special approval:

> I have read it and it is very well-written--it is imbued with the spirit of rebellion. The last point says, "We will take the necessary steps." If that meeting is held to bombard Chang Ch'un-ch'iao we will certainly take the necessary steps and arrest people.[56]

With this clearcut support from Mao, Chang had won the crucial battle in his struggle to consolidate power in Shanghai. Upon his return to Shanghai, the reorganization of the Commune into the revolutionary three-in-one committee went very smoothly. One might speculate as to whether he was forced to make some concessions and compromises with his opposition while he was in Peking. However that may have been, it is clear that the meeting clarified both the leadership of Chang and the organizational form of the three-in-one alliance. The opposition to Chang following the February 24th establishment of the revolutionary committee was random and disorganized.

In retrospect then, the Commune can be seen as the period during which the cultural revolutionary struggle for power in Shanghai was decided. It is of course significant that the important and decisive choices were made in Peking, not Shanghai. And these decisions were accepted by a large part of the popula-

tion in Shanghai, if one can judge by the lack of a popular movement against them. It is further significant that the indigenous leaders that grew out of the workers' cultural revolutionary struggle in Shanghai were not the ones to survive the power struggle. The new leaders of the Shanghai government were both members of the former party hierarchy.

The new form of organization stood in stark contrast to the original goals and ideals voiced for the Cultural Revolution. Instead of the masses governing themselves through their own organizations based on the Paris Commune, they were now to join in a three-way alliance with the party and the army. The Commune model would not have permitted a standing army, nor would it have allowed the continued dominance of the party. But the Commune model had clearly been rejected, and that rejection was manifest in the very establishment of the Shanghai Commune.

In fact, the three-way alliance that was formed to consolidate power on February 24 looked very much like the organizational format of the Shanghai Commune. The three-in-one alliance of representatives of the mass organizations, leading revolutionary cadres, and members of the PLA was a definite compromise with the party hierarchy and a direct acknowledgement of the importance of the army. It marked the end of the active promotion of the Paris Commune model, and also the end of the emphasis on the importance of self-governing mass organizations. Stress was now placed on

the correct treatment of cadres and recognition of their leadership abilities. The consolidation of a new order was beginning. Although the failure of the Shanghai People's Commune can be seen as the final symbolic blow to the concept of government by mass organizations, this does not mean that the Commune failed because it tried to implement these principles. It is true that genuine mass organizations did arise in Shanghai, and that they were able to seize power in many of Shanghai's industries. But the Commune did not grow out of this movement. The Commune, in fact, opposed this movement toward change in an attempt to impose order on the chaotic situation in the interests of restoring production.

CONCLUSION: AN EVALUATION OF THE SHANGAHI PEOPLE'S COMMUNE

The Shanghai People's Commune was not the result of the consolidation of the various workers' organizations that had grown up during the course of the Cultural Revolution, as many observers have misinterpreted it. Many of the most radical worker groups actively opposed Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and the establishment of the Shanghai People's Commune. There were no direct and free elections by the masses to chose Chang as leader of the Commune. Chang himself acknowledged, as has been noted,[1] that his position was based on his support in Peking, not on the support of the proletariat in Shanghai. Indeed it was Chang who had pointed out that "the three services of the Army could not possibly support two organs of power because if they were asked to support both organs of power they would certainly lose heart."[2]

It was clear from the beginning that the PLA was going to support the Shanghai People's Commune. Indeed, the army was an integral part of that governmental organization. And Chang had shown his willingness to use military force even before the Commune was instituted in countering both student and worker opposition. It was the army, not the workers, who had decided which side in Shanghai represented the "genuine proletarian left."

The outcome of the workers' movement in Shanghai indicated

that ultimately the sources of power were located outside the city, not within the workers' movement itself. This result began to become clear with the establishment of the Shanghai People's Commune, whose leaders were primarily interested in restoring order to the city and in pormoting production. Those workers who attempted to push the movement further, and who attempted to reorganize management in the factories, soon came to be described as obstacles to the newly defined cultural revolutionary goals. Chang was part of this trend, initiated in Peking, that tried to bring order and discipline to a workers' movement that brought chaotic conditions and seriously threatened production. The problems were especially serious in Shanghai where there existed particularly strong indigenous worker organizations. Chang, in his attempt to establish a "people's Commune" in Shanghai, did not hesitate to exclude many of the most radical rebel groups in the city from the new government. The forces that placed production first were in the vanguard of the Commune, including many party cadres who were originally the main focus of the cultural revolutionary attack, but who were now placed in leadership positions in the Commune. Thus the Commune in no sense expressed the direct demands and sentiments of the Shanghai working class. It rather tried to silence these demands. As such, it was an attempt not to express and define the workers' demands in a government by the

workers, but rather an attempt to bring order and unity to a workers' movement that had moved beyond the acceptable political revolutionary goals to an attack on the system of productive relationships.

An evaluation of the Shanghai Commune should first address itself to the question of what the leadership of the Commune was trying to accomplish. Then, insofar as the goals of the Commune can be determined, they should be compared to the ideals of the Paris Commune, the proclaimed inspirational heritage of the Shanghai Commune. In terms of political change and reorganization, the intent of the Commune was clear. It was to be a "new form of organisation of a local state organ of proletarian dictatorship."[3] Its members were to be "elected by the revolutionary masses according to the principles of the Paris People's Commune."[4] In the meantime, until "conditions are ripe," the "power of leadership" of the Shanghai Commune was to be the Provisional Committee. The composition of this committee was crucially important, for it determined how the Commune was actually to be organized. The Provisional Committee was the direct precedent of the three-in-one committee that was to replace it. It was described as a "provisional and transitional power organ of '3-in-1' alliance of the revolutionary mass organisations, the responsible persons of the P.L.A. stationed in Shanghai and the revolutionary leading cadres who persist in the revolutionary line

of Chairman Mao."[5]

Thus in terms of political organization, the Commune did two things. It incorporated the representatives of the mass organizations (or at least some of the mass organizations) and local representatives of the PLA into the official government structure. This may well have decreased the influence of some of the "party people in authority taking the capitalist road," although it did not reject their influence altogether. But it fell far short of the ideal of mass organizations that would become "permanent, standing mass organizations" and "organs of power of the proletarian cultural revolution."[6] In fact, the Commune had already denied its heritage of government by the masses in that it was deemed necessary to set up an organizational form to oversee and control the process of increased mass involvement in government. The masses, according to the founders of the Shanghai Commune, were not yet ready to form their own government; a transitional period with input from the party and the army was needed first. Secondly, in advocating this transition period, the Commune delayed the only aspect of the original Paris Commune model that its leaders chose to mention as a relevant concept--the election system of the Paris Commune--to a future time when conditions were more appropriate. In effect then, the declaration of the Shanghai Commune was a statement that it was not yet possible to implement the political forms of the Paris Commune model in Shanghai.

Rather than being a serious attempt to apply the goals of the model from which the Commune took its name, the Commune was offered as an explanation and rationalization for why these goals were to be postponed.

The problem of the political organization of the Commune was critical. As it was conceived, and as plans proceeded to implement the Commune, it was obvious that the impetus for the Commune came not from the rebel worker organizations in Shanghai, but rather from Chang Ch'un-ch'iao. The Commune was not the result of massive worker demands for the reorganization of their government in a Commune form, much less with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao at its head. The workers had demands of their own that included changes and reforms that went well beyond the scope of the movement as Chang envisioned it. Chang opposed extensive reform of management systems in Shanghai factories. He concentrated on the need for order and unity so that production could be maintained, rather than on the need for continued revolutionary change. But there were many workers who disagreed with Chang's concept of what the priorities of the revolution should be, and they formed the backbone of the opposition to him and to the Commune. Rather than reflecting the sentiments of the rebel workers in Shanghai, the Commune was actually in opposition to many of them. Thus in its very conception, the Shanghai Commune denied the basic principle of "the self-government of the producers," the principle that

forms the most critical component of the model whose name it claimed.

In the realm of economic change, the Commune set forth "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production" as its primary task. When the goals of the revolution and production were perceived to be in conflict, the goal of production took priority. But beyond this, Chang and the Workers Headquarters he led, had spoken out against the efforts to change management relations in Shanghai industries. Nowhere were the goals of worker self-management stated in the program of the Shanghai Commune.

The Commune cannot be seen as a serious application of the Paris Commune principles to Shanghai, much less as an "enrichment" of those principles. For not only were the key elements of the model omitted, but the spirit and aspirations of the Paris Commune were ignored. The ultimate aims of the Marxist model of the dictatorship of the proletariat were to be achieved through the self-government of the producers in society, but the Shanghai Commune instead dictated to, and organized the masses from above.

Perhaps the most telling commentary on the nature of the Shanghai Commune is that it chose to reaffirm the position of the two most hierarchial institutions in Chinese society, the party and the army. As Mao was quite right to point out in his talk with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the concept of the Commune offerred

a basic challenge to the role of the party. Indeed, this was precisely the challenge that was raised in the early phases of the Cultural Revolution when cultural revolutionary organizations based on the Paris Commune model were advocated as permanent mass organizations. But the Shanghai Commune's inclusion of the party, the institution whose bourgeois tendencies were originally the focus of attack in the Cultural Revolution, can be seen as nothing other than a direct reupudiation of the ideal of direct popular government by the masses. The PLA's governmental role in the Commune was an equally serious defect. The Paris Commune model is based on the belief that the standing army poses an ever-present threat to the freedom of the people, and therefore must be abolished. Nothing, of course, could be more incongruous with this ideal than the decision to incorporate the PLA within the formal structure of the Commune.

The Shanghai People's Commune then, despite its name, marks a clear and definite break with the tradition, goals, and ideals of the Paris Commune. It also marks the official rejection of that model as an alternative way of organizing political power in China. In fact, the very founding of the Commune (under the organizational form it was given by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao) coincided with the end of the active promotion of the Paris Commune model. In this sense, rather than being in the forefront of the Cultural Revolution, the Shanghai Commune actually began the process of

retreat from the original goals of the Cultural Revolution. A critical ideological and political change--from promoting goals of mass input and criticisms to promoting goals of production, unity, and order--had taken place during the months of January and February, 1967. The Commune reflected and epitomized that changing conception of the Cultural Revolution.

Many Western scholars have misunderstood the cultural revolutionary process precisely on this point. The Commune often has been hailed as an example of the most radical trends in the Chinese working class movement, while the establishment of the three-in-one committee is seen as the beginning of the process of retreat. Charles Bettelheim, for example, describes the Shanghai Commune experience in terms of its significance to the Chinese revolution, despite current and past attempts to ignore it, for "it possesses considerable importance, both theoretical and practical."[7] He connects the downfall of the Commune, and the ideology he believes it represented, with the beginning of the process of the victory of the revisionist line over the original goals of the Cultural Revolution, a process he sees as culminating with the official ending of the Cultural Revolution by the present leadership in China:

> The substitution of revolutionary committees for the commune form in Shanghai, the role accorded to the PLA in chosing the representatives of the masses, and the way in which these representatives were appointed to the revolutionary committees, all implied abandonment of the orientation which had been explicitly adopted in August, 1966.[8]

Bettelheim is correct in his conception of the process that was at work, and its signficance, but he errs in his view of the place of the Shanghai Commune in the story of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, for the Commune was a reflection of the process of retreat from the original principles of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, not the culmination of the revolutionary movement of the workers in Shanghai.

FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION

1. For example, Maurice Meisner in Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 318, writes that, "the events in that city of 11,000,000 in the early months of 1967 were to prove decisive in determining the future course of the nationwide struggle, revealing both the objective limits that the Cultural Revolution confronted and the subjective limitations of the cultural revolutionaries."

2. Charles Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Backward," Monthly Review, July-August, 1978, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 38-39.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1. "Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party," May 16, 1966, Peking Review 10: 21, May 19, 1967, pp. 6-9.

2. Chen Chih-ssu, "The Great Revelations of the Paris Commune," Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), 1966 No. 4, March 24, 1966, in Joint Research Publications Service, (JPRS), No. 35137, April 21, 1966, pp. 5-18.

3. "Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party," May 16, 1966, pp. 6-9.

4. Ibid., p. 6.

5. Ibid., p. 8.

6. Ibid., p. 9.

7. Ibid.

8. David Milton and Nancy Dall Milton, The Wind Will Not Subside: Years in Revolutionary China--1964-1969 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 127.

9. Ibid., p. 128. See also the translation in Peking Review 9: 37, Sept. 12, 1966.

10. Mao Tse-tung, "Bombard the Headquarters--My First Big-Character Poster," August 5, 1966, Peking Review 10: 33, August 11, 1967, p. 5.

11. "We Are Critics of the Old World," People's Daily, June 8, 1966, in The Great Socialist Cultural Revolution (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), pp. 18-21.

12. For further discussion of the work teams see Jean Daubier, A History of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 51-56; Jean Esmein, The Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 81-82, 95-105; David Milton and Nancy Dall Milton, The Wind Will Not Subside, pp. 162-68, 172-75; Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 27, 39-43, 62-63.

13. Hunter, p. 36.

14. "This Is the Kind of 'Party Organ' It Was," Hongwei Zhanbao (Red Guard Dispatch), No. 11, Dec. 30, 1966, cited in Hunter, p. 36.

15. Hunter, pp. 32-37.

16. Ibid., pp. 57-61.

17. Ibid., p. 61.

18. Mao Tse-tung, "Chairman Mao Talks to Central Committee Leaders," July 21, 1966, Current Background, No. 891, Oct. 8, 1969, pp. 58-59.

19. Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at a Meeting with Regional Secretaries and Members of the Cultural Revolutionary Group of the Central Committee," July 22, 1966, in Stuart Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People—Talks and Letters: 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p. 256.

20. Mao Tse-tung, "Bombard the Headquarters," p. 5.

21. "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," ("Sixteen Points"), August 8, 1966, in CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966-1967 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 42-54, esp. p. 50.

22. Ibid., p. 48

23. Hunter, pp. 88-110.

24. Later Red Guard reports accused the party committee of organizing this delegation from Shanghai.

25. Hunter, pp. 96-98.

26. Ibid., pp. 114-15.

27. Ibid., pp. 118-19.

28. "Urgent Directive of the Military Commission and the General Political Department Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Military Academies and Schools," Oct. 5, 1966, in CCP Documents, pp. 89-92, esp. 89.

29. Ibid., p. 90.

30. Ibid.

31. Hunter, pp. 123-25.

32. Daubier, p. 120; K. S. Karol, The Second Chinese Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974), pp. 209-210.

33. Lynn T. White III, "Workers' Politics in Shanghai," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, Nov. 1976, pp. 99-116. On p. 114, White contrasts the 12 yuan monthly salary of a beginning apprentice with a basic rate of 335 yuan for first-grade engineers.

34. Ibid., pp. 111-13. See also Miltons, pp. 186-87.

35. Miltons, p. 186.

36. White, p. 113.

37. Ibid., p. 111.

38. Ibid.

39. Chang Ho-wei, "The Worker-Peasant Labor System in Finance and Trade Departments," Hsin-chien-she (New Construction), Nos. 1-2, Feb. 20, 1966, in Survey of China Mainland Magazines, No. 534, July 25, 1966, pp. 24-38.

40. Ibid., p. 31.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 35.

43. White, p. 115. The quote is taken from interviews conducted by Bruce MacFarlane in Shanghai Diesel Pumps and Engines Factory, on April 21, 1968, recorded in Visit to Shanghai (stenciled notes, Sydney, 1968).

44. White, pp. 114-15.

45. "Sixteen Points," p. 53.

46. Ibid., p. 50.

47. "Twelve-Point Directive of the Central Cultural Revolution Group Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Factories and Mines (Draft)," Nov. 17, 1966, in CCP Documents, pp. 116-19, esp. p. 118.

48. Ibid., p. 117.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., pp. 118-19.

52. Ibid., p. 118. See also Karol, p. 208.

53. "Twelve-Point Directive," p. 118.

54. Ibid.

55. See following pp. 81-86.

56. Karol, p. 209-10; Hunter, pp. 136-37.

57. Hunter, p. 137.

58. Karol, pp. 210-11; Hunter, pp. 138-39.

59. Hunter, p. 140.

60. Ibid., pp. 141-44.

61. Ibid., pp. 167, 194.

62. Ibid., p. 158.

63. Ibid., p. 160.

64. Ibid., p. 164.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., p. 167.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., pp. 168-70.

69. "Ch'en P'ei-hsien and Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu Are the Ringleaders of the Fighting Among the Masses," Hongwei Zhanbao (Red Guard Dispatch), No. 15, Jan. 4, 1967, cited in Hunter, p. 189.

70. Ibid., p. 192.

71. "Urgent Appeal," Dec. 31, 1966, cited in Hunter, pp. 194-95.

72. "The Truth About the Kunshan Incident," Dongfanghong (The East is Red), No. 6, Jan. 19, 1967, cited in Hunter, pp. 197-98.

73. Hunter, pp. 197-202.

74. Ibid., pp. 205-206.

75. "Minutes of Talks with Leading Comrades of the Cultural Revolutionary Group at Interview Granted Representatives of the All-China Red-Workers Rebels' General Corps," Dec. 26, 1966, in Chung Hua-min and Arthur Miller, Madame Mao: A Profile of Chiang Ching (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 234-41, esp. p. 236.

76. Ibid., p. 240.

77. Miltons, pp. 186-90.

78. "Culprits in'Shanghai Mansion' Incident Hit," Feb. 26, 1967, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Daily Reports (FBIS), Feb. 28, 1967, p. DDD 4.

79. See above p. 24 and "Twelve-Point Directive," pp. 116-19.

80. Wang Li, Chia Yi-hsueh and Li Hsin, "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No. 15, 1966, in Peking Review 9: 52, Dec. 23, 1966, pp. 18-23.

81. Ibid., p. 21.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. See above p. 14.

88. "Welcome to Upsurge of Great Cultural Revolution in Industrial and Mining Enterprises," People's Daily, Dec. 26, 1966, in Peking Review 10: 1, Jan. 1, 1967, pp. 20-21.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER TWO

1. Economism is discussed in detail on pp. 52-59.

2. The extent of the crisis in Shanghai can be gauged by the pronounced emphasis in the press on combatting the serious problems caused by economism. See, for example, Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 3894, Feb. 28, 1967, p. 4, for a description of the state of paralysis in Shanghai; FBIS, Jan. 6, 1967, pp. DDD 1-DDD 2 for details of the run on a Shanghai bank; and FBIS, Jan. 17, 1967, p. DDD 2. for a look at the problems at the Shanghai harbor.

3. "Revolutionary Rebels Suppress Shanghai Strife," Peking NCNA service, Jan. 16, 1967, in FBIS, Jan. 19, 1967, pp. DDD 1-DDD 4. See also the following discussion on pp. 46-47, 74.

4. "Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End," People's Daily, Jan. 1, 1967, Peking Review 10: 1, Jan. 1, 1967, pp. 8-14.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. The Kunshan incident is discussed on pp. 31-32.

9. Hunter, p. 207.

10. Ibid., p. 208.

11. Ibid.

12. "Carry the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Through to the End," p.

13. "Take Firm Hold of the Revolution, Promote Production and Utterly Smash the New Counterattack Launched by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line--Message to All Shanghai People," Wen Hui Pao, Jan. 5, 1967, in China Reconstructs, April, 1967, pp. 14-15.

14. "'Great Rebel Army' Holds Rally in Shanghai," Shanghai Radio, Jan. 6, 1967, p. DDD 5. One of the complaints of the contract workers is recorded as follows: "The system of hiring temporary and outside workers is a remnant labor system of capitalism.

For the past 17 years a handful of persons in authority within the party that are taking the capitalist road have been desperately clinging to this remnant in order to hinder the socialist revolution and socialist construction."

15. "See the Gruesome Features of a Few Workers Headquarters Leaders!" Hongse Zaofan Bao (Red Rebl News), Feb. 28, 1967, cited in Hunter, pp. 228-29.

16. "Message to All Shanghai People," p. 15.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

21. It is important to note that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's arrival in Shanghai on Jan. 6, 1967, was two days after the workers' groups had joined together and issed the "Message to All Shanghai People." The rapid disintegration of this coalition soon after the arrival of Chang is an indication of the disputes he precipitated.

22. Hunter, p. 215.

23. "'Great Rebel Army' Holds Rally in Shanghai," p. 115.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. White, "Workers' Politics in Shanghai," p. 115.

27. "See the Gruesome Features of a Few Workers Headquarters Leaders!" cited in Hunter, p. 228.

28. For a discussion of the Anting incident, see above pp. 25-27.

29. Hunter, pp. 225-28.

30. Ibid.

31. "32 Shanghai Revolutionary Rebel Organizations Issue 'Urgent Notice'," Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 29, 1967, pp. 7-9.

32. Ibid., p. 8.

33. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

34. Ibid., p. 8.

35. "Messages, Demonstrations Emerge in Shanghai," Shanghai Radio, Jan. 10, 1967, FBIS, Jan. 11, 1967, p. DDD 1.

36. "Message of Greetings to Revolutionary Rebel Organizations in Shanghai--From the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Party's Central Committee," Jan. 11, 1967, Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 20, 1967 p. 5.

37. "Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," People's Daily and Red Flag editorial, Jan. 12, 1967, Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 20, 1967, pp. 12-15.

38. Ibid., p. 14.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. "A Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-tung," Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 20, 1967, p. 5. See also, Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Rally of People of All Walks of Life in Yenan to Celebrate the Sixtieth Birthday of Stalin," in David Milton, Nancy Milton, and Franz Schurmann, eds., The China Reader: People's China (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 239.

42. "Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," p. 14.

43. "Proletarian Revolutionaries, Unite," Red Flag, No. 2, 1967, Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 20, 1967, pp. 15-17.

44. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

45. "Some Regulations of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council Concerning the Strengthening of Public Security Work in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," Jan. 13, 1967, in CCP Documents, pp. 175-77.

46. Ibid., p. 175.

47. Ibid.

48. "Shanghai Mass Rally Salutes the Central Committee," Peking Radio, Jan. 12, 1967, in FBIS, Jan. 13, 1967, p. DDD 3.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. See discussion on pp. 80-86.

52. "Revolutionary Workers of Shanghai Factory Set Up 'Revolution and Production Committee'," Hsinhua, Peking, Jan. 23, 1967, in Hsin hua t'ung hsun zhe (Hsinhua Weekly), Tuesday, Jan. 24, 1967, pp. 4-6; "Revolutionary Production Committees," Peking NCNA, Jan. 15, 1967, in FBIS, Jan. 16, 1967, pp. DDD 3-DDD 4.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1. "Shanghai Revolutionary Rebels Forge Closer Proletarian Alliance," Hsinhua, Shanghai, Jan. 16, 1967, in Hsinhua Weekly, Tuesday, Jan. 17, 1967, p.6.

2. Ibid.

3. See discussion on p. 14.

4. "Revolutionary Rebels," Peking Radio, Jan. 16, 1967, FBIS, Jan. 17, 1967, pp. DDD 3-DDD 4.

5. "Shanghai Press Comment on Current Activities," Liberation Daily, Jan. 13, 1967 on Shanghai Radio, Jan. 13, 1967, FBIS Jan. 16, 1967, pp. DDD 4-DDD 6.

6. "Revolutionary Rebel Groups, United Under the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought!," Wen Hui Pao, Jan. 15, 1967 on Shanghai Radio, Jan. 15, 1967, FBIS, Jan. 16, 1967, pp. DDD 9-DDD 10.

7. Ibid., p. DDD 10.

8. Ibid.

9. "Revolutionary Rebels Suppress Shanghai Strife," Peking Radio, Jan. 16, 1967, FBIS, Jan. 19, 1967, pp. DDD 1-DDD 4.

10. "Oppose Economism and Smash the Latest Counter-Attack by the Bourgeois Reactionary Line," People's Daily and Red Flag editorial, Jan. 12, 1967, Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 20, 1967, pp. 12-15.

11. "Further Disclosures Made in Shanghai Situation," Peking NCNA service, Jan. 16, 1967, in FBIS, Jan. 17, 1967, pp. DDD 1-DDD 3; Hunter, p. 223.

12. "The Experience of the Shanghai 'January Revolution'— Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Talk," Canton, Kwang-yin Hung Ch'i (Canton Printing Red Flag), No. 3, Nov. 23, 1967, in Union Research Service, Vol. 50, No. 2, Jan. 5, 1968, pp. 17-28, esp. p. 19.

13. Hunter, pp. 223-24.

14. "The 'January Revolution' Experience in Shanghai," in Canton Kuang-ying Hung-ch'i (Canton Printing Red Flag), No. 2, Nov. 23, 1967, in SCMP 4145, March 25, 1968, pp. 1-8. This is a translation of a speech made by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to the anhwei delegation at a reception held at the People's Congress Hall in Peking on Oct. 22, 1967.

15. Ibid., p. 3.

16. Ibid., p. 2.

17. Ibid., p. 3.

18. Ibid.

19. "The Experience of the Shanghai 'January Revolution'--Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Talk," Union Research Service, p. 19.

20. Ibid., p. 20. Emphasis added.

21. Ibid. Emphasis added.

22. See above p. 54.

23. "'Wen Hui Pao' Coomentary on Seizing Power," Hsinhua, Peking, Jan. 25, 1967, in Hsinhua Weekly, Wednesday, Jan. 25, 1967, pp. 21-23.

24. Ibid., p. 22.

25. Ibid.

26. "Forbid Disruption of Production and Suppression of Revolution," Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 3, in Union Research Service, Vol. 46, pp. 287-88.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., p. 288.

29. "Revolutionary Workers of Shanghai Factory Set Up 'Revolution and Production Committee," Hsinhua, Peking, Jan. 23, 1967, in Hsinhua Weekly, Tuesday, Jan. 24, 1967, pp. 4-6, esp. p. 4.

30. Ibid., p. 5.

31. Ibid.

32. "Struggle for Power at Shanghai Railway Station," Hsinhua, Shanghai, Feb. 9, 1967, in Hsinhua Weekly, Friday, Feb. 10, 1967, pp. 11-12.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. "Firmly Support the Revolutionary Peasant Movement, Thoroughly Smash Counter-Revolutionary Economism--A Message to All Shanghai People," Wen Hui Pao, Jan. 20, 1967, Peking Review 10: 5, Jan. 27, 1967, pp. 14-16; Hsinhua Weekly, Sunday, Jan. 22, 1967, pp. 3-5; FBIS, Jan. 24, 1967, pp. DDD 1- DDD 4.

37. "Firmly Support the Revolutionary Peasant Movement," Hsinhua Weekly, p. 4.

38. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

39. "Pro-Mao Rebels Issue New Message to Shanghai," Peking Radio, Jan. 20, 1967, FBIS, Jan. 24, 1967, pp. DDD 1- DDD 4, esp. p. DDD 3.

40. Ibid.

41. See above p. 47.

42. See discussion on p. 126.

43. See above p. 47.

44. Worker Rebel News, No. 6, March 13, 1967, cited in Hunter, pp. 225-26. This newspaper was an organ of the Workers Headquarters, Chang's main base of support. It would have been to their disadvantage to inflate the numbers of the opposition groups.

45. Hunter, pp. 226-28. See also above pp. 50-51.

46. Hunter, p. 232.

47. Ibid., pp. 229-30.

48. Ibid., pp. 233-34.

49. Ibid., p. 234.

50. Ibid., pp. 237-38.

51. Policy toward the PLA, and its role in the Cultural Revolution, will be discussed in detail on pp. 97-103.

52. Hunter, pp. 238-40.

53. Ibid., p. 240.

54. Ibid., pp. 241-43.

55. "Proletarian Revolutionaries, Unite," Red Flag, No. 2, 1967, Peking Review 10: 4, Jan. 20, 1967, pp. 15-17. See also above p. 60.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FOUR

1. "Decision of the CCP Central Committee, the State Council, the Military Commission of the Central Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group Under the Central Committee Concerning the Resolute Support of People's Liberation Army for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left," Jan. 23, 1967, in CCP Documents, pp. 195-97.

2. Ibid., pp. 195-96.

3. Ibid., p. 195.

4. Chen Chih-ssu, "The Great Revelations of the Paris Commune," pp. 6-8.

5. Ibid., p. 10.

6. Ibid.

7. Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels--On the Paris Commune (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), pp. 48-101, esp. p. 71.

8. "Decision of the CCP... Concerning the Resolute Support of People's Liberation Army for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left," p. 195.

9. "The People's Liberation Army Firmly Backs the Proletarian Revolutionaries," Liberation Army Daily, Jan. 25, 1967, in K.H. Fan, ed., The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 203-205.

10. Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune stressed the importance of the abolition of the standing army. He wrote, in the second outling of "The Civil War in France": "Through the siege Paris had got rid of the army which was replaced by a National Guard, with its bulk formed by the workmen of Paris. It was only due to this state of things that the rising of the 18th of March had become possible. This fact was to become an institution, and the National Guard of the great cities, the people armed against governmental usurpation, to supplant the standing army, defending the government against the people... The public functions would cease to be a private property bestowed by a central government upon its

tools. With the standing army and the governmental police the physical force of repression was to be broken." This description is found in Marx and Engels, On the Paris Commune, pp. 206-207.

11. Lynn T. White III, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69," in Robert Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 302-77, esp. p. 351.

12. "Revolutionary Leaflets Fly in the Sky--A Report of Shanghai Air Force Supporting Power Seizing of the Revolutionary Leftists," Chieh-fang-chun Wen-i (Liberation Army Literature), Peking, No. 2, 1967, pp. 27-29, in JPRS, No. 42, 129, Oct., 1967, pp. 22-25.

13. Ibid.

14. See above pp. 93-96.

15. "Armed Forces in Shanghai Pledge Support for Proletarian Revolutionary Rebels," Hsinhua, Peking, Feb. 3, 1967, in Hsinhua Weekly, Friday, Feb. 3, 1967, pp. 27-28.

16. "The Experience of the Shanghai 'January Revolution'-- Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Talk," Union Research Service, Vol. 50, No. 2, Jan. 5, 1968, p. 19.

17. Ibid.

18. Hunter, pp. 235-36.

19. "Worker Rebel News," No. 6, March 13, 1967, cited in Hunter, p. 236.

20. Ibid., p. 237.

21. "The Experience of the Shanghai 'January Revolution'-- Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Talk," pp. 21-22.

22. Ibid., p. 22.

23. Ibid., p. 23.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 25.

26. "On the Proletarian Revolutionaries Struggle to Seize Power," Red Flag, No. 3, 1967, Peking Review 10: 6, Feb. 3, 1967, pp. 10-15, esp. p. 10.

27. Ibid., p. 11.

28. Ibid., p. 12.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. "Sixteen Points," CCP Documents, p. 45.

32. "On the Proletarian Revolutionaries Struggle to Seize Power," p. 12.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 13.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Marx, "The Civil War in France," in Marx and Engels, On the Paris Commune, p. 75.

42. See above pp. 87-90.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

1. Hunter, p. 246.

2. When and whether another preparatory committee meeting was held is not known.

3. "Shanghai People's Commune Holds Mass Rally," Shanghai Radio, Feb. 6, 1967, FBIS, Feb. 8, 1967, pp. DDD 15-DDD 17, esp. p. DDD 15.

4. Ibid., p. DDD 15.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. DDD 16.

8. Ibid.

9. "Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Speech," Shanghai Radio, Feb. 6, 1967, FBIS, Feb. 8, 1967, pp. DDD 16-DDD 17, esp. p. DDD 17.

10. Ibid., p. DDD 17.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. "Long Live the Victory of the January Revolution!--The Declaration of the Shanghai People's Commune," Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, Feb. 7, 1967, p. 1, in "The Short-Lived Shanghai People's Commune," Union Research Service, Vol. 47, No. 7, April 25, 1967, pp. 88-101, esp. p. 95.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 96.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., p. 94.

21. Ibid., p. 95.

22. Charles Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Backward," Monthly Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, July-August, 1978, pp. 37-130, esp. pp. 104-07.

23. Shanghai Radio, Feb. 9, 1967, cited in Andrew Walder, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Shanghai's January Revolution, Michigan Papers In Chinese Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1978), p. 61.

24. Hunter, pp. 244-45.

25. Ibid., p. 245.

26. The Shanghai People Commune Declaration specifically labels this groups as a counter-revolutionary organization that must be guarded against. See "Long Live the Victory of the January Revolution!," p. 96.

27. Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at Three Meetings with Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan," in Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p. 278.

28. Ke-ming Lou, March 10, 1967, SCMP (S), No. 184, pp. 20-22, esp. p. 20.

29. On February 4, the next day, the supporters of the Commune put up similar posters welcoming the Commune. Neale Hunter describes the resulting confusion on p. 246.

30. Hunter, p. 247.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., p. 237.

33. See above pp. 50-51.

34. "Basic Experience of Heilungkiang Red Rebels in the Struggle to Seize Power," Peking Review 10: 8, Feb. 17, 1967, pp. 15-17.

35. From a wall poster cited in Hunter, p. 248.

36. Hunter, p. 249.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., p. 250.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. "Workers Rebel News," No. 6, March 13, 1867, cited in Hunter, p. 250.

42. Ibid., p. 251.

43. Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at Three Meetings with Comrades Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan," February, 1967, in Schram, ed., Chairman Mao Talks to the People, pp. 227-279, esp. p. 277.

44. "Workers Rebel News," No. 6, March 13, 1867, cited in Hunter, p. 251.

45. Hunter, p. 255.

46. Ibid., p. 257.

47. Ibid., p. 259.

48. Ibid.

49. "Directive on Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Shanghai," Feb. 12, 1967 in "Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought, 1949-1968," JPRS, No. 61269-2, Feb. 20, 1974, pp. 451-55, esp. p. 452. This article is based on the tape recording of Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Feb. 24 speech at Shanghai People's Square.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., p. 453.

52. Ibid., pp. 453-54.

53. Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at Three Meetings with Comrades Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yuan," p. 278.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 277.

56. Ibid., p. 278.

FOOTNOTES: CONCLUSION

1. See above pp. 104-105.

2. "The 'January Revolution' Experience in Shanghai--Comrade Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's Talk," SCMP, No. 4145, March 25, 1968, p. 7.

3. "Long Live the Victory of the January Revolution!--The Declaration of the Shanghai People's Commune," Union Research Service, Vol. 47, No. 7, April 25, 1967, p. 95.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. "Sixteen Points," CCP Documents, p. 49.

7. Bettelheim, "The Great Leap Backward," p. 100.

8. Ibid., p. 106.

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