

AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ANGOLA  
1835-1867

BY

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## INTRODUCTION

"There are many books about Angola and several histories of Angola, but the History of Angola, in the proper sense of the term, remains to be written. None of the books written thus far have taken sufficient cognizance of the economic factors involved whereas a history of Angola is no history at all if not an economic history."<sup>1</sup> In no period of Angolan history is Child's hypothesis more valid than in the period following the abolition of the slave trade (1836). During the ensuing three decades the history of Angola centered around one crucial question: What economic policies could be instituted to recreate a viable economy? The major aim of this study is to examine and evaluate the policies implemented by the Portuguese, as well as to discern what economic forces were prominent within Angola itself and how they were effected by these policies. It is hoped, however, that this paper will also serve as a case study of a non-western society whose commercial system was completely reorganized, a phenomenon particularly common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>2</sup>

Implicit in a study of this nature is the availability of a complete and reliable set of economic data. The available records in the United States do not contain even the most basic statistical citations, export and import figures. Correspondence with the Colonial Archives in Lisbon has also proved fruitless. Apparently, complete lists of exports and imports were not sent back to the home government until the end of the period under study.<sup>3</sup> Through a close examination of the available government publications and other primary sources of the nineteenth century, I have been able to obtain a set of incomplete statistics. These have been buttressed by two contemporary studies which relied heavily on documents in Portugal and Brazil. My attempts to extrapolate data by statistical methods and by examining other complementary data (i.e., import charts of Portugal and Brazil who were the principal receivers of Angola's exports) have also proved unsuccessful.

Where export quantities but not prices were available, I have taken the liberty of applying the prices from Mossamades (a Southern province of Angola) for the given products in the given year without regard to possible price variations throughout Angola. Although some differences exist, the written evidence suggests that they were relatively small, and there is no reason to believe that they would alter the results of this study.

Because of these differences and of my inability to accurately measure the significance of the contraband trade in certain items, many of the statistics can only be considered as estimates. Those which are estimates are clearly marked. While the quantitative data is incomplete, they do provide a useful and valuable complement to the written sources dealing with Angola in this period. Before proceeding to the problem, it is necessary to examine briefly the economic history of Angola in the preceding centuries, for it was in this period that the nineteenth century economic patterns were molded.

## CHAPTER I

### ANGOLA'S ECONOMY IN THE 18TH CENTURY

In Portugal Em Angola Dias characterizes the 17th and 18th centuries as the "Segunda Epoca - Dependencia do Brazil Desenvolvimento do Traffico." If there is doubt as to Dias' suggestion that Angola was a mere political appendage of Brazil, there is no question that the dominant economic theme was the "Desenvolvimento do Traffico." Initially begun to satisfy the limited demands of the sugar plantations in Brazil, the slave trade rapidly expanded into a booming industry which sustained Angola's economy until it was forcefully subdued after 1845.<sup>4</sup> During these two and one half centuries the slave trade dominated almost every aspect of life in Angola.

By the 18th century Angola had developed a monocultural character in that it relied solely on the export of one commodity. The rapid growth of the plantation system in the South Atlantic basin coupled with the prosperous economic development of Brazil created a continual demand for slave labor. The spiraling price levels provided new incentives to the Brazilian and Portuguese slave traders in Angola.

A number of mechanisms were employed to secure the large quantities of slaves demanded. In the early part of the 17th century military expeditions,<sup>5</sup> taxes, and trading agreements with inland peoples provided the principle means of obtaining slaves. However, with the increased demands of the 18th century a more systematic trading network was required. This was facilitated by a number of factors. Newly acquired knowledge of bookkeeping and credit systems plus the greater availability of capital (attracted by high profits) aided the development of a Luanda-based trading complex which stretched far into the interior. The rise of the Ovimbundu in the Benguella Highland and the accessibility of large numbers of slaves in the Cassange region provided important incentive to the evolving high volume trade system.

A number of wealthy merchants of Luanda and Benguella established relatively complex trading companies. The principle figures were the numerous trading agents or sertanejos who were sent into the interior to purchase slaves, as well as ivory and wax. Once in the interior the sertanejo established himself at strategically located trading points and proceeded to develop trading relations with the indigenous population. It was not uncommon for a sertanejo to adopt many of the characteristics of the Africans. This process of acculturation was often highlighted by the bearing of mulatto sons who tended to

enter their fathers' occupation. Over time, this led to the "darkening" of the trading class.

In their relations with their agents the merchants were at a distinct disadvantage. They had to supply the agents with a substantial amount of working capital, and had no guarantee that it would be used to their benefit. They were thus vulnerable to swindling or even outright thievery by the agents. According to the 18th century historian Silva Correia it was very common for the sertanejo to cheat his employer by using the capital to secure slaves for himself.<sup>6</sup> Even with this built-in deficiency the high returns and the increased quantities permitted the merchants to prosper.

Paralleling and often working hand in hand with the merchant class were the government officials who actively participated in the slave trade. From governors down to the captains of the local presidios, all were reaping benefits from the trade. One of the unwritten gratuities of the Governorship of Angola was the expected wealth which could be accrued from the slave trade. The laws which forbade government officials from participating in the trade were virtually ignored, and the growing autonomy of local officials in the 18th century negated any possibility of their enforcement.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, as a silent partner receiving almost 8000 reis per head, it was in

the interest of the home government (at least in the short run) to close its eyes to these malpractices.

Enough quantitative data is available to suggest the size of the trade and its significance for Angola's economy. Official statistics for the latter part of the 19th century, when the slave trade had already passed its highpoint, clearly indicate its prominent position. In the three year period from 1780-1783 the total revenue of Angola was 490:205:000 reis. Receipts from the slave trade amounted to 432:000:000 reis or more than 90% of the total national revenue.<sup>8</sup> By the turn of the century revenue from the slave trade had diminished slightly but still provided 85% of the capital in the budget.<sup>9</sup> This near total dependence continued right up to the abolition when it was estimated that 80% of the government's receipts were accrued from the tax on slaves.

Another indicator of the significance of the slave trade can be ascertained by examining the export charts of Angola shortly before the abolition. The average annual export for the period 1823-1825 was 829:000:000 reis of which 744:000:000 resulted from the sale of slaves.<sup>10</sup> Thus, almost 90% of the total value of exports came from the slave trade, lending credence to the concept of monocultural economy. Undoubtedly, the dependency on the slave trade was even greater in the

middle of the 18th century when the number exported was larger and the economy less diversified.<sup>11</sup>

Interconnected with the slave trade was the trade in wax and ivory, which were the other principle export commodities.<sup>12</sup> The sertanejos were always anxious to purchase these products as supplements to their dealing in slaves. Wax was of particular interest since it could be purchased at a very low price and exported at a very high rate of profit. Ivory also was attractive because of its low price and the availability of free labor in the form of slaves to transport it to the coast. However, the state monopoly which froze the price at an incredibly low rate<sup>13</sup> reduced the incentive to bring the ivory down to the Luanda and Benguella and led to increased contraband trade through the northern ports of Ambriz and Cabinda. A smaller trade also existed in gum and other wild products which yielded a high return.

The preoccupation with the slave trade meant that all other sectors of the economy were undeveloped. As late as 1840 industry was limited to two lime foundaries, a small shipyard, a tannery, a furniture factory and a number of unworked mines. Occasionally these mines would yield a small return over a short run period. Typical was the case of the sulphur mine at Dombe where 220,600 pounds were extracted in 1823 and it was closed down two years later.<sup>14</sup>

Agriculture was in a similarly backward condition. The only farming was done by the Africans who grew manioc, corn, and wheat for their own consumption. The failure to establish an agricultural base had serious repercussions. In the short run, it meant that Angola was continually faced with the threat of food shortages. In at least three years (1783, 1789, and 1816) Angola could not obtain the needed staples and suffered major famines.<sup>15</sup> In the long run, it meant that the economy remained totally dependent on Brazil which purchased the bulk of the slaves and in return supplied all the basic commodities. The extent to which Angola's welfare hinged on Brazil is reflected in the fact that Angola imported more goods from Rio De Janeiro than did any other city of Brazil.<sup>16</sup> The decline of the gold and diamond mines at Minas Geras led to substantial reduction in the total number of slaves Angola exported<sup>17</sup> and clearly revealed how integrally she had been woven into the Brazilian economy. Right to the eve of the abolition Angola remained an appendage of Brazil.

Throughout this period several conscientious and enlightened governors pointed out the inherent weakness of the Angolan economy and attempted to reorganize it. The most famous of these was Sousa Coutinho. Coutinho's main goal was to diversify the economy and gradually replace the slave trade with legitimate commerce.

Agricultural development received a very important priority in Coutinho's economic plans. By creating an agricultural base, he hoped to alleviate the pressing food shortage and at the same time develop an environment conducive to the attraction of European immigrants. Reports of rich mineral deposits intrigued Coutinho, and he allocated large sums of capital in the hope of making the quick discovery which would bring Angola out of her economic decadence. He continually attacked the preferential treatment given to Brazil and was very disturbed at the failure of the home government to invest in Angola. In 1775 he angrily wrote that "It is best to spend money as events dictate and attract trade . . . what good is a sordid economic policy?"<sup>18</sup> Although none of Coutinho's programs were ever more than partially successful, sixty years later many were employed as the Portuguese desperately sought to sustain Angola's faltering economy.

A number of other governors, most notably Albuquerque, and Mello, were able to institute some minor reforms but, like their predecessors, proved ineffectual in fostering the growth of legitimate commerce. Mello admitted the futility of the task and correctly assessed that the prevalent economic psychology was a deterrent to any economic reform. He wrote that it was rare for anyone to lose money in the slave trade, and

therefore it is not surprising that few people abandon such a lucrative trade for another business where the risks are great and the profits less.<sup>19</sup> Thus on the eve of the abolition Angola was nothing more than a commercial factory, populated largely by exiles, convicts and professional soldiers, who were only interested in cashing in on the high returns of the slave trade. It was this obsession for quick wealth which inadvertently led to the economic disintegration with abolition of the slave trade. "The large profits from the slave trade had impeded the development of all the other branches of industry . . . keeping her (Angola) in a state of perpetual infancy."<sup>20</sup> It was from this retarded economic state that an economy had to be rebuilt.

## CHAPTER II

### THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, 1836-1845

The period between 1836 and 1845 can best be viewed as a period of trial and error in which policies were continually being altered both in Lisbon and in Luanda to meet the needs of Angola.<sup>21</sup> Handicapped by an unrealistic economic plan and internal opposition to reform, the accomplishments of this period seem meagre at best. However, by its end a subtle change had taken place within Angola and a climate more suitable for economic growth prevailed.

Since the government's economic program, or lack of one, was a principal factor in prolonging Angola's dislocation, it is necessary to examine the basic components of this policy before turning to conditions within Angola.

The abolition decree proclaimed by the newly formed Liberal government<sup>22</sup> had left Angola in a virtual state of bankruptcy. The Liberals, overly confident after their recent victory over the Royalists, were convinced

that they could easily bolster Angola's sagging economy. Prime Minister Sa Da Bandeira warned against an unhealthy pessimism, declaring that the economic dislocation was largely the result of a misguided colonial policy which could easily be remedied.

To appreciate the true value of Portuguese Overseas Dominions we must take into account not only what they are today, but what they are capable of becoming. This present condition is due not only to bad government in the mother country, but also to the almost exclusive attention which the government paid to Brazil.<sup>23</sup>

Although the Liberals optimistically spoke of Angola's eminent recovery, there is little evidence to suggest that they possessed the long-range program capable of achieving this end. Historians like Chaggas who write of an established economic program are on very tenuous grounds. Much of their evidence is drawn from Liberal pronouncements, but it is questionable whether this policy went much deeper than these public statements. To speak of an established economic program is to imply that the Liberals possessed the necessary economic knowledge to define the future course of recovery for Angola and that they were able to allocate time and energy toward the solution of Angola's problems. The available evidence suggests that neither was the case. The leadership of the Liberal government was drawn primarily from humanists and a number of dissatisfied

military leaders, neither of whom were likely to have an economic background. The continual political and economic instability within Portugal did not permit the government to spend more than a minimal amount of time on this African colony. Rather than developing a clearly defined economic program, the Liberals were forced to rely on the broad outlines of a policy dating back to 1765, modifying a number of the particulars in response to the existing conditions within Portugal and Angola. In effect, then, this policy was little more than a set of abstract goals.

The essence of the Liberal "program" was large-scale capital investment coupled with substantial European colonization. The injection of these two European components into Angola's potentially favorable geo-economic environment was to create a multiplier effect leading to a revitalization of the economy. Sa Da Bandiera predicted, "If European settlement is promoted, industry developed and capital employed, if new members of colonization are undertaken, it will take only a few years to produce great results."<sup>24</sup> A particular emphasis was placed on European immigration, for as the Overseas Ministry bluntly stated, only those uncorrupted by the slave trade could be expected to develop the great resources of agriculture, commerce and industry.<sup>25</sup>

While external stimuli were viewed as the crucial element, the Liberals realized that they would be meaningless unless the "uneconomic" vestiges of the slave trade were destroyed. Slave traders were encouraged to shift to legitimate commerce, and the abolition of the state's ivory monopoly was a serious attempt to make legitimate trade more appealing. Orders were sent to colonial officials to immediately curtail any slave trading in their districts and to dismiss state officials who would not enforce these regulations or who were themselves in any way involved in the slave trade.

At best the economic "program" proposed by the Liberals was naive. Closer examination reveals its lack of depth and real preparation. On paper this plan appeared feasible provided that all the variables fell into place. In reality, however, there was no reason to expect that any one, much less all, of the factors could be realized. Portugal was undergoing a protracted period of instability highlighted by a civil war which had dislocated her economy. According to one Portuguese economic historian writing about this period, "Agriculture, industry and commerce were dead."<sup>26</sup> In such economic turmoil it is not likely to find a large amount of surplus capital and it is even more unlikely to attract it to an undeveloped and unstable area such as

Angola. Large-scale immigration was in many ways just as unthinkable. Although it might be argued that the political instability provided a powerful push factor, there is no reason to believe that Angola exerted any pull whatsoever. On the contrary, it seems logical to conclude that the economic dislocation brought about by the abolition of the slave trade, coupled with the unhealthy environmental conditions, would dissuade immigration. Without these two foreign elements the "mixing process" leading to a multiplier effect was untenable.

Before the Portuguese could hope to initiate any important economic reforms, they had to reaffirm their political control over the country. Angola's economic dependence on Brazil in the 17th and 18th centuries had led her to look to Brazil for political guidance as well. Certainly, after the liberation of Luanda in 1648 by a Brazilian armada, there was little doubt whose influence was dominant. Indeed, for a forty year period in the 17th century Portugal unofficially abdicated political responsibility of Angola to Brazil.<sup>27</sup> Although Portugal reasserted her political domination in the 18th and first quarter of the 19th century, much of southern Angola remained only nominally loyal. In 1822 a direct overture from Brazil to join with her in a Federation led to an open revolt in Benguella, and a declaration declaring their loyalty to the Confederacao Brazilica. Although

the revolt was abortive, it clearly indicated the tenuous position of the Portuguese in the south. The abolition of the slave trade rekindled the hostility toward Portugal.

The Portuguese position was not much more secure throughout the rest of Angola. The gradual decentralization of the Portuguese administrative system which took place in the 18th century had drastically reduced the effective power of the Governor General and his advisors. Orders transmitted to the interior were often disregarded by the local officials. Even within the central region the power of the central authorities was being continually challenged. In 1823 a popular uprising in Luanda supported by the local militia easily disposed of the Governor.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, when the Liberals came into power they found Angola in a virtual state of anarchy. Their early attempts to establish control met with opposition from all segments of the population. The powerful merchant class, for whom, according to Lopes De Lima, Angola had served "as a fattening pen" refused to comply with the new regulations. In the interior, African sobas (chiefs) who had prospered as middle men in the slave trade, expressed their opposition by disobedience and, in some cases, open revolt. Even within the highest levels of the Portuguese colonial administration the Liberal proclamation was largely disregarded. In 1836 the Governor General of Angola, Bernardo Vidal, refused to

suppress the slave trade, in which he had a direct interest.<sup>29</sup> The fact that Vidal was not replaced until 1838 suggests the tenuous position of the metropolitan power.<sup>30</sup>

It was only with the dismissal of Governor Vidal that the Portuguese began to make their first real effort to reaffirm their control. Governor Noronha and his successors issued a series of proclamations which were aimed at strengthening the central government and reducing corruption. The meager salaries of government and custom officials were raised in an attempt to curb their participation in the contraband trade. In an effort to reassert their suzerainty over the Africans, as well as to boost the state's receipts, a series of taxes were levied. While the political reforms were only beginning, they do mark the first significant attempt to redress the political power in Angola.

In this politically unstable environment it is not surprising that the government was unable to implement even a small part of its grandiose economic scheme.

In the agricultural sector the government policy was reduced to granting several large tracts of land to Portuguese nationals and to sponsoring a commercial company. The idea of ceding large areas of land to stimulate the development of plantations was borrowed from Cape Verde where it had proved quite effective.

However, the policy did not meet with similar results, as few Europeans could be induced to do any type of manual labor. A similar fate was met by the *Compania Mercantil* whose initial aim was ". . . to promote the cultivation of cotton, sugar cane, coffee, indigo, and other agricultural products which are of recognized utility."<sup>31</sup> Within three years the company had disbanded because of disinterest among the European community. The only other incentive to agriculture was in the form of a modified tariff policy which permitted the free entrance of agricultural machinery and implements.<sup>32</sup> Needless to say, these had little effect on a nonfarming population.

Mineral development was limited to several unsuccessful mining operations near Luanda and Benguella. A government sponsored expedition in search of oil north of Luanda ended tragically when the Swiss engineer fell ill and died. In the south two years of intensive exploration failed to locate the rich copper mines which had been reported since the middle of the 17th century. By the end of the period the government-owned mineral company had exhausted its initial capital outlay and had entered into a state of bankruptcy. These two unsuccessful ventures reveal a set of ecological and financial problems which were to hamper future attempts.

Only the trading sector of the economy showed a substantial increase during this period. Here, a prudent government policy did play a substantial role. The abolition of the government monopoly on ivory meant that the merchants no longer had to smuggle it out of the northern ports to secure an equitable return. The average price paid at the port of Luanda increased 300% above the previously regulated government rate.<sup>33</sup> In response to this sharp upswing in prices legal annual exports increased from 3,000 pounds in 1832 to 105,000 pounds in 1844.<sup>34</sup>

Enforcement of the abolition, although by no means complete, was becoming more efficient and served as a strong deterrent to slavers. With the aid of the British Fleet and the establishment of the Mixed Commission in Luanda the Portuguese had successfully begun to choke the slave trade. By 1843 it had been effectively curbed throughout most of the region of Luanda. As the curtailment of the trade became more complete, a number of merchants, seeing that high profits could be obtained from the tropical products, shifted to legitimate commerce.

Another factor which increased the trading sector was the discovery and marketing of new tropical goods. The most important new product was urzella, a perfume

obtained from the moss on elephant's tusks. Within seven years of its discovery in 1837, it had become the second largest export commodity, accounting for one-third of the total value of exports.<sup>35</sup> The export of gum also increased during this period. Although discovered in 1807, it had never had more than a very minor economic significance until the early 1840's.<sup>36</sup> While there is no evidence to suggest a causal relationship between the abolition and the development of new, high profit trade goods, this hypothesis seems reasonable.

In 1845 the economy was still in critical condition. The two external stimuli which the Liberals foresaw as supplying the necessary catalyst for economic development never materialized. There is no evidence of any substantial capital investment entering Angola either from Portugal or from any other foreign sources. The Portuguese government, facing internal dislocation, was only able to invest a very limited amount. Immigration was minimal; between 1824 and 1844 only 54 Portuguese established permanent residency in Angola, an average of a little more than three a year.<sup>37</sup>

Although exports had doubled since the abolition, they still remained only one-fifth of what they had been in the period from 1823 to 1825. The economic base had not been substantially widened, agricultural exports were only .009% of the exports, and mining and

industry were completely undeveloped. (See Table 1) The impoverished conditions are reflected in the net decline of the European population in Benguella, from 57 in 1799 to 39 in 1843.<sup>38</sup>

Yet in spite of, and partially because of, her tenuous economic position, Angola had undergone a subtle transition by 1845. Politically, the appointment of Governor Norohna marked the end of twenty years of instability characterized by the lack of any real governing force. The reforms instituted by Norohna and his successors, although only partially successful, had halted the anarchy and strengthened the central administration. The arrival of Governor Pedro Da Cunha heralded a new period of enlightened government committed to rehabilitating Angola.<sup>39</sup>

The political transformation was accompanied by a complete reorientation of the economy. By 1845 the slave trade had been largely destroyed and trade in tropical products had replaced it as the principal export commodities. The decline of the slave trade also resulted in a change in Angola's economic relations with Brazil. Angola's economy was being completely redirected from Brazil to Portugal, with the latter supplying all the foreign commodities as well as serving as a market for Angola's exports. The building of a fort at Huila in 1845 indicated the beginning of the real development of

the region of Mossamedes and the first serious attempt to attract immigrants.

The year 1845 also marked the beginning of a vigorous policy of economic development. Although the framework of the policy clearly traces back to the early Liberal program, it was substantially modified both in emphasis and substance to meet the needs of Angola more realistically. The following four chapters examine the principle components of this policy--expansion of legitimate commerce, development of mineral wealth, attraction of immigrants, and creation of an agricultural base--and their implementation.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE ATTEMPT TO CREATE A TRADING EMPORIUM

The most significant departure from the original economic policy was the great emphasis on expanding the trading sector of the economy, a development caused by the inability to attract capital or labor during the transitional period.

In purely economic terms, at least over the short run, this seemed to be the most feasible approach. Angola was in an excellent position to exploit the growing world demand for tropical products. In the interior there existed an almost unlimited supply of ivory, wax, gum, etc. which could be sold at a very substantial profit. The trading mechanism which had successfully provided millions of slaves could easily be modified and re-adapted to meet the growing external demands. This policy of economic development was also the most likely to gain the support of the European community within Angola, since it offered high returns with a minimal amount of labor. The program seems to have been well received by the Europeans. Writing in

1848 Livingstone observed that "Both the Portuguese and their descendants turn their attention almost exclusively to ivory and wax . . . ." <sup>40</sup> The plan offered a final advantage in that it could conceivably be instituted with a limited capital investment by the Home Government who itself was suffering from a severe capital drain.

Portuguese officials believed that the establishment of a trading emporium required that a minimal number of prerequisites be satisfied. The most important of these were: (1) the abolition of the enormous contraband trade, (2) the establishment of military control over the principal routes to the coast and the inland fairs, (3) the elimination of those indigenous powers which menaced the trade, and (4) the expansion of Angola's exporting power, either by committing a larger number of Portuguese ships to the Lisbon-Luanda trade route, or by opening Angola's ports to foreign vessels. During the succeeding fifteen years Portuguese military and political power in Angola were largely directed to achieve these needs. <sup>41</sup>

In this period there were two principal trade networks in Angola. In the north <sup>42</sup> there was the Luanda-Cassange axis which had both a northern and southern component. The northern route went east from Luanda to the Dande, then south to Ambaca and Pungo Adongo where it connected with the southern route and

went to the fair at Cassange. The southern passages extended from Luanda south to Quissama and then cut back north to Pungo Adongo. Although the principal trade was between Cassange and Luanda, a substantial trade existed between Luanda and the intermediate points.

The southern nexus is more difficult to define geographically, since its terminal point was not fixed as in the north. Roughly, it stretched from Benguella to the Benguella highlands, most often terminating at the Ovimbundu kingdom of Vye. Here European traders would have dealings with caravan traders returning from the interior. It is the southern network to which I will first turn my attention since it provided the least difficulties for the Portuguese and therefore was of less importance in terms of policy.

The emergence of the Ovimbundu in the 19th century as the most successful traders of Central Africa<sup>43</sup> provided the Portuguese with an excellent opportunity to increase legitimate trade in the southern region. A combination of favorable geographic factors and the establishment of a sophisticated caravan system enabled the Ovimbundu to compete favorably with their Portuguese and African rivals.<sup>44</sup> Until the 1830's the Ovimbundu traders dealt primarily in slaves. With the abolition, however, they successfully shifted to legitimate trade which suggested a degree of flexibility and foresight

uncommon in the European community. Indeed, the period of their greatest commercial success began in 1840. In the following twenty years the Ovimbundu were able to destroy the Imbangala monopoly in Cassange as well as to penetrate the region of the southern Lunda, and, on occasion, to move as far inland as Katanga.<sup>45</sup>

For the merchants of Benguella the inland triumphs of the Ovimbundu resulted in a period of unheralded prosperity. The Ovimbundu caravans returned to the highlands loaded with great supplies of ivory, wax and gum which would be passed on to the port of Benguella. The Portuguese historian Delgado characterized Benguella as going mad with business and delirious with competition.<sup>46</sup> Although statistical data is unavailable, Valdez, who visited Benguella in the 1850's, provided an important indicator when he wrote that there were twenty-four to thirty extensive warehouses, many of them recently constructed.<sup>47</sup> In a short time Benguella challenged Luanda as the principal port of Angola.

In such a favorable economic environment the Portuguese did not have to implement any major policies. A number of minor programs were introduced to make the trading system more efficient and to insure its continued success. In 1838 the presidio of Catumbella was established just north of Benguella. Its primary function was to serve as an appendage to the larger

trading complex at Benguella, and, thus, to insure a more systematic collection of trade goods. Catumbella's close proximity to Lobito Bay, a favorite hideout for contrabandists, enabled the Government to reduce smuggling. Throughout the rest of the southern region smuggling was not a major problem and with the establishment of the Portuguese-controlled ports of Lobito and Mossamedes the problem became insignificant. Plundering was not nearly as serious a threat to trade as it was in the north, and the existing danger was sufficiently removed in the 1850's when Silva Porto established a new road from Vye to Catumbella which was properly patrolled. The limited Portuguese policy in the south was thus directed toward effectively enforcing the status quo and to reaping the rewards of historical chance.

While the Portuguese were prospering in the South, their attempts to establish a trading emporium in the North were being seriously challenged. As has been previously mentioned, the Luanda-Cassange axis was the most important trading route in Northern and Central Angola. The enormity of the trade is suggested by Livingstone, "As we came along the path we daily met long lines of carriers bearing large square masses of beeswax each about a hundred pounds weight and a number of elephants' tusks . . . ."48

This trading network was jeopardized by the three impediments which the government felt had to be eliminated before an efficient trading emporium could be established, namely smuggling on the coast, plundering on the inland routes and the presence of a hostile people at Cassange. Since the trade moved from the interior to the coast I will examine these three factors in reverse order. At the terminal point at Cassange, Portuguese traders and their agents were totally dependent on the Jaga for their safety as well as for the necessary trading goods.<sup>49</sup> The uneasy truce threatened to disrupt the trade at the slightest provocation. The routes to the coast remained unprotected leaving trading parties at the mercy of marauders. Not only did this mean that robbery was a constant threat, but it also reduced the incentive among many Africans to bring their goods to the coast.<sup>50</sup> The inability to secure the inland routes had a debilitating effect on trade and on occasion even threatened to paralyze it. Even when trading parties went unhampered, there was no guarantee that they would arrive at the coast. The higher prices offered at the contraband port of Ambriz annually diverted millions of reis worth of trade from Luanda.

These problems were not peculiar to the Luanda-Cassange axis. Throughout all of northern Angola stretching into the Southern Congo (which Portugal claimed as a suzerainty) a similar set of problems

threatened Angola's economic recovery. Trade relations with the Kingdom of Kongo had been so effectively disrupted that even after the Portuguese removed the obstructions the Governor of Angola had to relay a long list of assurances to the king before he would send his traders down to the coast.<sup>51</sup>

The situation in the north in 1845 seemed intolerable to the government. If Angola's economy was to be rejuvenated by expanding her legitimate trade, those factors which tended to constrict this trade had to be removed. The consensus among government officials, which was adamantly supported by the powerful merchant class, was that only a military solution could relieve the pressures which threatened the trade. Thus, in a very real sense the expansive military policy which followed was an indirect result of the abolition.<sup>52</sup>

Portuguese military intervention aimed at controlling the crucial trading zones began in 1848 when troops were dispatched to Bondo and Cassange.<sup>53</sup> However, it was not until 1855 that the home government was willing to commit itself to large scale military action. Why the Portuguese waited until then is a question that has not been satisfactorily answered. Historians have suggested a number of factors including the lack of real success in the 1848-1852 campaigns, increased British pressure to end the slave trade, growing contraband trade from

Ambriz, the impoverished conditions of Portugal, and the declining economic conditions within Angola. The latter has been severely underestimated. The sketchy statistical data suggests that the upward trend in exports had ceased by 1855 while the national debt was increasing.<sup>54</sup> Angola's unfavorable position is clearly illustrated by the fact that the Governor General was forced to raid the fund established for orphans to pay the salaries of officials and soldiers.<sup>55</sup>

The major military assault was directed at Ambriz. Located just north of Portugal's sphere of effective control, Ambriz had long served as haven for contrabandists. Monteiro reports that American, English and Dutch traders were exporting quantities of ivory, wax and coffee brought north from Angola prior to the Portuguese occupation. In addition, these merchants were flooding Angola with British and French textiles which were successfully competing with those of the Portuguese. Thus, not only was Portugal's national industry being hurt, but Angola was losing a substantial amount of revenue through the loss of tariff receipts. One additional factor helped to motivate this invasion; Ambriz was judged by the Portuguese as the logical "beachhead for future military operations into the Congo region" in their future plans to reassert political and economic control of the Congo.<sup>56</sup>

Under the humanitarian guise of abolishing the existing slave trade, Portuguese forces moved north and took control of the port of Ambriz and its southern regions. The moral justification for occupying Ambriz is clear in Valdez's vindication of this act. "In 1855 the Portuguese Government, desirous to terminate the nefarious slave trade, founded [Ambriz] there a military post."<sup>57</sup> However, even the Government could not hide its real motives. In his justification of the military occupation Sa Da Bandeira clearly suggests the economic significance of the intervention when he lists as his third point "Proteger e promover o commercio licita."<sup>58</sup> The importance of Ambriz in the future plans of Angola is illustrated by the fact that almost immediately she attained the legal status of district, joining Benguella and Luanda as the principal territorial zones.

An integral part of their plan to eliminate smuggling, as well as to increase their overall commercial position, was their attempt to reassert their control over the Central Kongo. Since the early 16th century this region had been considered by them as a Portuguese sphere of influence. As early as 1512 the Portuguese King Manuel I sent the famous regiment which can be interpreted as an attempt to create some sort of loosely defined protectorate. However, with the growing slave trade in the 17th century Portuguese attention shifted south to Angola.

During the eighteenth and first half of the 19th century the once powerful kingdom of Kongo fragmented into a series of petty states loosely tied to the King of Kongo.<sup>59</sup> This decentralization left Kongo virtually defenseless against a Portuguese attack. The re-establishment of Portuguese hegemony in 1860 had as its primary goal the regulation of trade from Quissembo (just north of Ambriz) north to Punta Lilunda. Foreign merchants who were formerly based at Ambriz had moved north establishing themselves along the coast and continued to attract large quantities of goods from Angola. The Portuguese intentions are quite evident in the report of Governor Amaral. "An occupation of the Zaire [Congo] is called for because of the security of the trade. Is not this alone sufficient to justify it, independent of the question of sovereignty?"<sup>60</sup>

The entire Central Kongo was reorganized into administrative districts. However, the Portuguese control never extended much beyond the paper on which it was printed. They had based their power on the legitimacy of an unpopular king whose influence had been reduced as a result of 150 years of fragmentation. Internal opposition, coupled with the limited resources available to administer the Kongo, further doomed their hopes. The inability to establish even a modicum of effective control

meant that they were virtually helpless to curtail the contraband smuggled out of the Congolese ports.

At the same time that the government sought to eliminate smuggling it also exerted military pressure to reduce the plundering of traffic coming down to the coast. With the successful occupation of Ambriz the Portuguese were in a favorable position to end the pillaging in the region. The principal culprit was the chief of Ambriz, although a number of smaller chieftains were also involved. The threat of force enabled the Portuguese to gain a limited suzerainty over these chieftains. In return for their virtual autonomy the chieftains promised to refrain from trading with the United States and British merchants who had moved north to Ambrizette, and interfering with trade passing down to the coast.<sup>61</sup> A similar offer was made to the King of Ambriz who immediately rejected it. The Portuguese responded with military intervention aimed at dethroning the King and replacing him with an heir who was predisposed to meeting their demands. The invaders encountered little opposition and they quickly established a puppet government.

Throughout the rest of northern Angola the Portuguese were unable to obtain control over the trade route. At the very best they were able to extend their

authority to the region surrounding their trading centers. Thus regular military patrols were instituted on the outskirts of Colungo Alto and Pungo Adongo. The expansive area which would have had to be patrolled and the limited amount of men and capital available made this goal unfeasible. The periodic raids and the constant threat of paralysis still jeopardized the major trade routes throughout this entire period. The concern over this failure is reflected in the over-exaggerated view of one government official; "until the traders of Cassange could be guaranteed . . . security for their trade goods coming to Luanda, the entire balance of finance in Angola would be upset."<sup>62</sup>

The failure to gain control over the inland routes was compounded by the increasingly precarious position of the merchants at Cassange. Increased tensions resulting from the shady dealings of the avaricious Portuguese merchants threatened to disrupt the trade.<sup>63</sup> However, it was the blunder of the local military commander which destroyed the existing stability. In a formal decree in 1859 he ordered the Jaga to pay an annual tithe tax, which in effect, challenged the very concept of their independence. Jaga soldiers responded by sacking the fair. resulting in losses valued at 50,000 £.<sup>64</sup> The Portuguese made a determined effort to affirm their control over this region and to remove any future threat

of the Jagas. More than 5,000 troops were dispatched to Cassange and placed a friendly king on the throne. However, three years of continued warfare had created a great drain on the treasury and clearly suggested the futility of their mission. Less than a year later Portuguese army and administrative personnel were recalled as part of a contractive policy. The treaty signed with the new king was thus left unenforced and soon became a dead letter. Trade to Luanda continued although it remained in the same precarious position as it had been before the Portuguese action.<sup>65</sup>

At the end of eight years of intensive military action the Portuguese had failed to achieve their predetermined goals. Indeed, only a partial success at Ambriz prevented their military action from being a total failure. In return Angola had contracted an enormous debt.

The attempt to expand the trading sector was not limited merely to securing trading zones by military force. In Lisbon and Luanda officials were re-evaluating mercantilist ideology since its application to Angola was questionable. Mercantilism presupposed that the Portuguese had effective control of the coastal zones and were thus able to prevent smuggling. The enormous expanse of coast negated even the remotest possibility of achieving this aim. Secondly, the mercantile policy,

in effect, deprived Angola of badly needed revenues which could be expected if foreign ships were permitted to trade in her ports. However, the most important argument was that it had a constricting effect on the economy, and thus undermined the whole policy of economic development. Entrance into a free world market with no artificial impediments would undoubtedly increase economic incentive, lead to greater production, and thus result in higher profits.

The accession of the Liberals to power marked the beginning of the gradual development of a new trade policy. They moved cautiously at first, passing a number of minor laws<sup>66</sup> which prepared the way for their major reform of 1844. The opening of the ports of Luanda and Benguella to all foreign vessels had consequential effects that were felt almost immediately. The available statistical data suggests the powerful stimulus this had on commerce. In 1844 total exports were valued at 201:000:000 reis, in a seven month period just four years later exports on foreign ships alone accounted for almost one half this amount.<sup>67</sup> Total exports tripled between 1844 and 1848, and although the bulk was carried on Portuguese ships, foreign merchants provided an important supplement. Furthermore, this lends credence to Lima's claims that this new competition stimulated Portuguese merchants and resulted in greater activity within Angola.

Examined from another perspective the significance of the open port policy can be seen even more clearly. The increased tariff rates, which had in the past been principally limited to slaves, provided a badly needed source of revenue for the national treasury. Whereas in 1846 port duties provided 65% of the national revenue by 1852 they had increased to almost 90%.<sup>68</sup>

In the fifties the open port policy was extended to the newly acquired Portuguese territories of the north and south. Pinda and Zaire were opened in 1854 and Ambriz and Mossamedes in the following year. The only port where this did not prove advantageous was Ambriz where the Portuguese instituted a set of differential tariff rates which taxed foreign imports four times as heavily as those from Portugal.<sup>69</sup> Unwilling and unable to meet these steep demands the foreign merchants moved north to Ambrizette where they successfully competed with Ambriz, reducing her trade substantially. Monteiro who was visiting Ambriz at this time chided the Portuguese for this irrational tariff policy. "The Portuguese followed their usual blind and absurd policy, at once established a custom house and levied high duties on all imported goods."<sup>70</sup>

In the following decade new commercial reforms were instituted primarily to attract foreign commerce. In 1863 preferential tariffs which favored Portuguese

products were cut in half, and in 1867 they were completely abolished. In this year entrance and anchorage fees placed on foreign vessels were also abolished. Since 1837 the legislative policy of the Liberals had gradually destroyed the last vestiges of a once powerful mercantile policy.<sup>71</sup>

During the period under examination the trading sector of the economy had expanded significantly. Between 1845 and 1859 the total value of exports from this sphere had gone up by 40% with ivory and wax showing the most significant increases. However, it would be completely fallacious to attempt to hypothesize a cause and effect relationship between Portuguese policy and the increased commerce. In fact, one can argue, especially for the northern region, that these gains were achieved not as a result of, but in spite of, Portuguese action. Although the opening of the ports and the reduction in the tariff schedules did play a fundamental role in increasing trade, it was only a minor segment of a larger policy, which presupposed continual, and, indeed, a growing, supply of goods reaching the coast. The major Portuguese efforts were in the military sphere, where there is evidence that rather than insuring stability, they exacerbated the existing instability. Yet, in spite of this instability and lack of Portuguese

control, exports of tropical goods were increasing substantially. This suggests that the northern trading system, although constantly jeopardized and, on occasion, even disrupted, was a self-sustaining system in which both Africans and Portuguese were responsive to the laws of supply and demand.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MINERAL MYTH

The exploitation of the supposedly rich mineral deposits had obsessed every Governor of Angola since the 16th century when Paul Dias traveled up the Cuanza in search of copper. Persistent reports indicating the existence of large undeveloped veins dated back to this period. The occasional discoveries, although never economically significant, gave credence to this "mineral myth" and, in effect, tended to perpetuate it. The potency of this myth is reflected in the writing of a 19th century geographer. "The mineral reign in Angola does not lack wealth. There are mines of precious metals, and of copper, iron, tin, saltpeter . . ."72 Altogether he proceeded to list more than a dozen minerals which he "knew" to be abundant in Angola. Administrators, whose future might be secured for life with a successful discovery, were especially susceptible to these rumors and ancient reports. The Governor of Benguella justified to his superior the outfitting of unsuccessful expeditions on the basis of reports made in 1620 of the existence of extensive copper mines.<sup>73</sup>

At the time the Liberals entered office the existence of these deposits was still accepted as common knowledge. No one seriously questioned the validity of these early reports, and the numerous failures in the past had all but been forgotten. The Liberals, with their overconfident nature, were particularly vulnerable to any suggestions of the existence of such wealth. They hoped to capitalize on a big strike which would pull Angola out of her depressed economic state and transform her into a prosperous colony.

A policy aimed at systematically locating the principal mineral deposits was undertaken between 1839 and 1845. In 1846 the government hired two mineralogists to examine some of the impressive sites discovered in the preceding years. However, as a result of the civil war in Portugal all non-essential aid to Angola was terminated and their services were discontinued. Other expeditions at Rio Cuba, Dembo and Benguella which were carried out on a limited scale proved unsuccessful. Frustrated by these numerous failures the Governor of Angola ordered all territorial officials to begin immediate projects of locating and mapping all the mines in their district and to report the results directly to him. In 1855 Prime Minister Sa Da Bandeira even suggested the use of force if necessary to establish

the mines which were "known" to exist on the banks of the River Cubo.<sup>74</sup>

Ironically it was through the use of force and not by scientific exploration that the only successful mineral complex was acquired. The mines of Bembe, which lie just inland from Ambriz, had been yielding relatively large quantities of copper sporadically for over two centuries. The Africans who worked the mines often brought as much as three hundred tons of copper per year down to Angola.<sup>75</sup> This reinforced the Portuguese desire for the mines and convinced them that substantially larger quantities could be extracted with modern equipment and European supervision. Legally the Portuguese in Angola could make a vague claim to the mines as a result of a draft treaty with the King of Kongo in 1649 giving them to the Portuguese.<sup>76</sup> In practice the Africans at Bembe had complete control and the Portuguese based in Luanda were in no position to enforce their claims.

The invasion of Ambriz drastically altered the existing power relationship to the detriment of the peoples of Bembe. The arrival of a large Portuguese force on the nearby coast left them virtually defenseless. Indeed, there is enough evidence to imply that the annexation of the mines was one of the principal factors for the invasion of Ambriz. Valdez mentions

in passing that the Portuguese occupied the north "for the above reason [to end the smuggling] and in consequence of the value of the rich copper mines in the mountains of Bembe. . . ."77 In 1856 the Overseas Ministry ordered the Governor "to move . . . a respectable force to compel this and other chiefs into the submission we lack absolutely."78 By the end of 1856 these recommendations had been carried out and Bembe was firmly secured, satisfying a century old Portuguese ambition.

A Brazilian slave dealer Francisco Flores obtained an extremely favorable concession to operate these mines. The advantageous terms coupled with the fact that the concession was awarded to a notorious slave trader clearly indicate a lack of interest among any of the legitimate Portuguese traders. Flores' only obligations were to build a road from Bembe to the Rio Dande and to provide housing and jobs for thirty European immigrants and their families, neither of which he fulfilled. In return he received a concession for an unlimited number of years, a free hand in the running of the mines, and the waving of duties on any products needed for their operation.

Lisbon counted on the successful exploitation of these mines to provide a base for future industrial development and to serve as an example to local and foreign capitalists of the large profits that could be

made in Angola. However, the mines at Bembe turned out to be a mirage. Monteiro, who visited the mines in the late 1850's, was appalled by the incompetence and negligence present.<sup>79</sup> By 1862 the mines had achieved their maximum output, and their production level steadily declined until 1865 when they were forced to close.<sup>80</sup>

The annexation of Bembe had one further consequence. The peoples of Ambrizette, fearing a similar occupation, intentionally closed their mines in 1856. These mines remained shut for more than twenty years, further reducing the mineral production within Angola. In effect, the Portuguese annexation had retarded mineral development, which was the very antithesis of its original aim.

A number of smaller mining operations were begun in the 1860's but none achieved any noticeable success. In Benguella and later at Mossamedes Flores received similar concessions to the one he had obtained at Bembe, but both ended in failure. In 1866 gold was discovered in the rivers running through Golungo Alto, but the miners (working for Flores) were unable to extract more than a couple of pounds of gold in several months and the project was abandoned.

By the end of this period Angola's mineral production was as negligible as it had been before the Liberals came into power. In many cases unreliable

reports originating in the previous centuries convinced the Portuguese to spend a great deal of time, energy, and capital on what proved to be worthless sites. Over-optimistic reports, often submitted by incompetent officials during this period, reinforced this myth and, in effect, intensified the inefficient utilization of scarce capital. This seems to be the case at Bembe where the state engineers concluded that ". . . from the extent of the mines and the large quantities of malachite found there, they may be looked upon as the most valuable hitherto discovered."<sup>81</sup> In the few cases where substantial deposits were actually located, the lack of private capital and skilled labor, coupled with the unhealthy climates mitigated their exploitation. As a result, minerals never composed more than 2% of the total exports and these were derived primarily from the short-lived mines at Bembe which had been acquired by force.

## CHAPTER V

### IMMIGRATION: AN ATTEMPT TO REPOPULATE ANGOLA WITH A PRODUCTIVE LABOR FORCE

The idea of attracting European immigrants traces back at least as far as the Governorship of Sousa Coutinho, but it was not until the time of the Liberals that any serious attention was paid to this suggestion. Early in his career Prime Minister Sa Da Bandeira became convinced that the introduction of a substantial number of Europeans was essential for the long-range economic rejuvenation of Angola. On one occasion he emphatically stated that ". . . the progress of the African colonies depends, to a great extent, on increasing the European population."<sup>82</sup>

This thesis of the interrelationship between foreign immigration and economic development was reinforced by the influential writings of Lopes De Lima. Lima widened the concept of European immigration to include Asian immigrants as well. He was especially interested in attracting Indians from the Malabar Coast who could transmit the skills they possessed to the

African, thus creating a skilled labor force which was a necessary prerequisite for the agro-industrial society that he envisioned.<sup>83</sup> Although Lima's idea was never employed, his writings clearly defined the necessity of luring immigrants and as such strengthened the Liberals' commitment to a long-range policy of economic recovery through immigration.

In any migratory movements there are always two forces at work labeled by sociologists as the "push" and the "pull." The basic assumption is that man is naturally conservative and, except under extremely adverse conditions, prefers the known to the unknown. While these two forces are interdependent, the "push" is the more important one. Where dissatisfaction is not present the "pull" has little appeal.

In Portugal internal conditions engendered a strong push force. The political and economic instability of the 1830's had not been alleviated, if anything it had become aggravated. The period of the forties and early fifties was characterized by a rapid turnover in the government with no party able to acquire sufficient power to halt this progression. The army which, in the past, had served as a force for stability added to the anarchy by bringing down two governments through successful coups. The political instability had important economic repercussions. The increased national debt, due largely

to the political turmoil, had soared to 150:000:000 reis by 1846, forcing the government to immediately implement an austerity program. As a result of this policy all public works programs were disbanded creating thousands of new cases of unemployment.<sup>84</sup> In conjunction with this austerity policy the existing taxes were raised and new ones added. The political instability which recurred periodically prolonged the industrial and commercial dislocation and often exacerbated it.

Although the protracted dislocation effected all segments of society, it was most acutely felt by the marginal classes. This, in turn, fostered a certain receptivity to suggestions of emigration. While statistics are unavailable for this period, reliable data from the following decade, when there had been some economic recovery, indicates the presence of a powerful push factor which suggests that one existed during the period under examination.<sup>85</sup>

The major problem of the Liberals was to create a set of artificial pull factors which would induce future Portuguese immigrants to migrate to Angola instead of to Brazil and the United States. The term "artificial" is used because Angola had shown in the transitional period that it exerted no natural pull force. It is not surprising that her power of attraction was negligible. The unhealthy climate, the lack of fertile soils in

disease-free zones outside the highlands, the political instability, and her traditional image as a penal colony all combined to deter immigration.

The immediate concern of the government was to locate a malarial-free zone whose soils were rich enough to support a new colony. Before any artificial forces would even have the remotest chance of luring Europeans these two prerequisites had to be satisfied. The order from the Overseas Ministry was emphatic on this point; "this location must be the most healthy possible . . . with conditions most appropriate in order that they can form large establishments for the cultivation of sugar, coffee, cotton, and other products which they must ultimately be able to cultivate in the Province."<sup>86</sup>

Until 1840 there was no area within the colony of Angola which satisfied these requirements. In this year two expeditions were sent south from Benguella to explore the little known region of Mossamedes. Although Portuguese maps placed Mossamedes within the Portuguese sphere, her actual control was virtually non-existent. The only Portuguese to have ventured out into this region were some traders, and they were generally insignificant in number. The initial reports from these expeditions were quite favorable. The temperate climate and the rich natural vegetation indicated that this would be a suitable region for a new colony. Valdez who visited the region in

the following decade wrote that "the ground is very fertile, producing with little labor not only every description of cereal, but almost all the fruits of Portugal."<sup>87</sup> In addition, the natural harbor at Mossamedes Bay facilitated transportation and communication, and provided an abundant supply of fish. By the end of 1845 the Portuguese had firm control over the coastal region and the prosperity achieved by a small fishing and agricultural colony supported the optimism of the 1840 reports. Immigration and the development of this southern region were to be inextricably intertwined throughout the following century.

The home government was prepared to employ far-reaching methods to curtail emigration not directed toward her overseas colonies. Not only was Portugal losing the labor and capital of the emigrants, but their refusal to migrate to Angola and Mozambique retarded their economic recovery. Within the government there was a sense of urgency regarding the population drain which was illustrated by a proposal in the Overseas Ministry to forcibly terminate emigration to Brazil.<sup>88</sup>

Calmer officials realized that only by "outbidding" Brazil and the United States could they hope to encourage a substantial immigration to Angola. Large gratuities had to be offered to counteract the appeal exerted by the Americas. Throughout the 1850's a whole series of legislation attempted to foster this artificial pull.

The initial legislation offered free transportation, maintenance for a year, a substantial plot of land, and the necessary tools and seeds.<sup>89</sup> This offer was later expanded to include a temporary home, exemption from taxation for ten years, free education for their children, and the free use of liberatadors who were to be paid by the state.<sup>90</sup> To meet these expenses the government appropriated a substantial sum exceeding 400:000:000 reis, enough to subsidize more than five thousand immigrants. Even before this legislative activity, groups of immigrants had arrived at Mossamedes. Since this was the first and only major immigration throughout this period it is necessary to look at it in some detail.

The newly arrived colonists came from Pernambuco, the north eastern province of Brazil. They had come to Brazil only a few decades earlier hoping to capitalize on the sugar boom. Hostilities immediately developed between them and the indigenous population, with racial and economic factors the principal causes. Throughout the 1820's and the 1830's an uneasy truce, marred by occasional flareups, characterized the relationship between the two communities. In an attempt to head off an explosion and at the same time remove this undesirable element, a bill was presented at the Provincial Assembly in 1845 which called for the immediate expulsion of all

the Portuguese and the nationalization of their property.<sup>91</sup> Although the recommendation failed in the Assembly, the Portuguese continued to face growing pressure from the indigeneous community. They were constantly vilified in the press, and they were boycotted economically and discriminated against socially. Attempts to rectify the problem, and reduce the growing hostilities proved unsuccessful. In 1848 a number of small incidents sparked large-scale violence in which a number of Portuguese were severely hurt and much of their property destroyed. Legislation was again introduced calling for their forcible expulsion. It was in this precarious situation, as a small alien community facing increased hostility which jeopardized their physical existence, that the Portuguese first thought of Angola.

Although the Portuguese Government, through its overseas agents, quickly capitalized on the unrest by exaggerating the potential wealth of Angola and even offering financial inducements, the evidence clearly indicates that the internal factors were the prime determinant. In effect, there was a double, or reinforced, push factor operating. The original incentives to leave Portugal which remained unsatisfied were compounded by the external pressures and threats of the larger community. On the other hand, Angola exerted the only noticeable "pull," since there was little desire to stay in the Americas.

The first boatload of settlers arrived with a great deal of optimism. They had been convinced by Portuguese officials that with hard work they would be able to transform the fertile soils into prosperous sugar plantations. However, a combination of poor planning and unfavorable ecological conditions quickly disenchanting the new colonists. There is evidence that from the outset the plan was hastily organized and lacked any serious thought. The ship that brought the first settlers was completely inadequate. Accommodations were crowded and the food supply was insufficient which helps account for the fifty-six cases of smallpox and eight deaths among the two hundred passengers.<sup>92</sup> The agricultural site was anything but fertile. One 19th century Portuguese historian characterized it as a dry and sterile chunk of land.<sup>93</sup> In addition, a severe drought further reduced the agricultural production of the new immigrants. They were forced to subsist on low quality flour from manioc and rotten beans. As a result, illnesses developed which were compounded by their reaction to the new climate. Many of the men became totally disillusioned, joined the army, and soon became corrupted by the *degradados*.<sup>94</sup>

The repercussions of this early failure were enormous. Rather than infusing a new moral and economic spirit many of the new colonists were engulfed into the

decadence which characterized life in Angola and was especially prominent in the army. More important was the fact that the colonists sent back bleak reports of the conditions in Angola to Pernambuco. For all practical purpose this news aborted any pulling power which Angola may have been fostering.<sup>95</sup> It would be nothing more than conjecture to suggest how many hundreds or thousands might have immigrated to Angola had the early reports been different. However, there is no doubt that the possibility of a large scale migration clearly existed. This contention is supported by a letter from the Overseas Ministry to the Governor of Angola, prior to this fiasco. "I have a large number of Portuguese Citizens, residents of the Province of Pernambuco, in the Kingdom of Brazil, having applied to his majesty the king, who desire to go to some other Portuguese possession where they can comfortably establish themselves."<sup>96</sup> In light of the later contributions made by the original immigrants it is not unlikely that had only a portion of the "large numbers" immigrated to Angola, her economic history would have been drastically altered.

A number of smaller groups of immigrants came to Angola in the ensuing period. In 1857 twenty-seven German colonists arrived at Mossamedes at the expense of the Portuguese Government. Like their counterparts from Brazil they were given a plot of land and the

necessary provisions to sustain themselves. This original group was followed by a second shipload bringing the number of immigrants of German descent to more than eighty. However, the Government viewed these immigrants suspiciously and passed legislation which fixed the number of Germans who could enter Angola.<sup>97</sup> This mistrust of foreigners, although irreconcilable with the ultimate aim of economic development, seems to have been a common practice. Reflecting on the Portuguese failure to attract many immigrants Livingstone concluded that discriminatory land legislation which he felt was ". . . anything but a straightforward license to foreigners to become bona fide landholders and cultivators of the soil,"<sup>98</sup> was one of the principal factors.

A small number of colonists from Madeira settled in the region of Golungo Alto where some of them became successful plantation owners. A few Portuguese immigrated to Angola periodically, but their effect on the demographic patterns was negligible.

The Government-sponsored immigration was a total failure. In 1846 it was estimated that the European population was 1,800. By 1868 it had only increased to 2,700. If it is assumed that birth rate and death rate cancel each other out and that the military force remained constant, then the sum total of new immigrants was 900 or roughly forty five per year. Subtracting the

four hundred who came from Brazil and Germany leaves five hundred or twenty five a year who emigrated from Portugal. When one considers that Portuguese emigration was estimated at roughly 10,000 a year, it becomes perfectly obvious how ineffectual the policy was.

It is not difficult to discern the principal causes for this failure. In the largest sense, the plan was probably doomed from its inception. There was no reason to believe that even given a substantial inducement the Portuguese emigrants would prefer Angola to Brazil, the United States, or even Portugal. Only in the 20th century when the Salazar Government exerted political pressure has there been any substantial movement to Angola. However, even if there was a remote possibility of the policy's success, the "Pernambuco fiasco" and the intransigent attitude toward foreigners destroyed it.

## CHAPTER VI

### AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Although Angola possessed an ecology which was favorable to farming, agriculture remained almost totally undeveloped.<sup>99</sup> The incentive to enter agriculture was small; greater profits with less work could be obtained through trade. This antipathy toward agriculture was expressed not only within the Portuguese community. Many Africans who were part of the trading network also displayed their disdain for farming. As a result even the cash crops that grew wild were largely ignored. Lima reported that less than one quarter of all the wild coffee was picked, and much of it spoiled before reaching the coast.<sup>100</sup> At the same time Angola was importing coffee to meet her internal needs.<sup>101</sup> In this unfavorable milieu where manual labor was held in contempt and quick profits were revered, the Portuguese attempted to establish an agriculture base.

Before examining the methods employed to stimulate agricultural development, it is necessary to ascertain the existing conditions within the world agricultural market. The basic questions which I have attempted to examine are: (1) whether the agricultural market was expanding or contracting, and (2) whether prices were rising or declining. The basic hypothesis is that agricultural development within in Angola is in part at least a function of world demand (and prices). Stated another way, if the world agricultural market were contracting, Angola would have little hope of displacing one of the traditional producers even if the Portuguese were successful in implementing agricultural production. (This presupposes that Angola's agricultural sector was not completely remodernized with railroads, advanced heavy machinery, etc. in which case she might be able to displace one or more of the traditional producers) The converse of this hypothesis is that an expanding world agricultural market would favor the entrance of a relatively inefficient producer like Angola. A similar argument can be made for prices. A depressed price is not likely to attract new producers while a rising one is. This price factor is particularly important in the case of Angola where production costs were increased as a result of transportation to the European market.

Statistical data is very sketchy. Many countries did not keep complete import and export statistics and when kept are generally unavailable. Therefore, I was forced to extrapolate and draw inferences from data on the United States and Great Britain. Together they represent a somewhat reliable indication of world demand for most goods, since the United States was one of the principal exporters of agricultural products and Great Britain a principal importer.

The evidence suggests a growing world demand for those products which Angola was most suited to export, namely cotton, sugar, coffee and palm oil. (See Figures 2-10 Appendix) The limited data offers no clear indication of the world demand for rice, and the substantial and sudden decline in the demand for maize makes it impossible to infer any meaningful trend. The price data is very sketchy, especially for England. (See Tables 6 and 7 Appendix) Furthermore, there are some important differences between those of the United States and England. Export prices from the United States suggests a general upward trend with some large fluctuations. The data from England implies a rather constant set of prices with minor downward trends. To make the statistics from England more meaningful a longer run of years would be needed.

The best that can be inferred from these limited statistics is that price would not deter any country interested in a reasonable rate of return nor attract any desiring unusually high profits. From all the available data I have concluded that conditions seemed favorable for Angola's entrance into the world agricultural market. This hypothesis is reinforced by evidence from other nonwestern countries such as the Philippines, Java, Cuba, and Brazil, each of which during this period began exporting a number of agricultural products to Europe.<sup>102</sup>

To stimulate interest in farming the Portuguese Government promoted a policy of "preferential agricultural development." The main objective of this plan was to artificially create an economic situation which would guarantee a profit to the participants. These conditions, it was hoped, would then motivate a substantial movement into the agricultural sector, leading to increased production. The mechanisms necessary to insure the profits were to be temporary, being removed as soon as the agricultural base was established. At the same time that agricultural incentive was being fostered within Angola, external stimulation in the form of immigrant farmers was being sought.

In order to guarantee a reasonable rate of profit, what amounted to a state-subsidized agricultural system

was evolved. At its highpoint in the mid 1850's, the home government promised to buy all the cotton and tobacco grown in Angola no matter how small her own internal needs.<sup>103</sup> The amount paid was fixed irregardless of world price at a level high enough to insure a profit.

Portuguese assistance was not limited to providing a favorable market situation. Millions of reis were invested in the indirect and direct promotion of agriculture. Geographical studies of all the districts were undertaken to determine which locations were best suited for agriculture. Sugar and cotton seeds imported from the United States and tobacco plants from Cuba were distributed by the government to anyone who desired them. A number of heavy machines, including sugar mills and cotton reapers, whose cost would have been prohibitive for the average farmer, were purchased by the government and lent to them. The government was particularly anxious to promote cotton as a result of the impending crisis in the United States. To achieve this goal millions of reis were appropriated annually. In 1861, for example, this amounted to 200:000:000 reis.<sup>104</sup> In one case, where the home government was unable to induce any private investment, it undertook the entire cost of establishing palm tree plantations.

Although the government spent a great deal of time and money to motivate the Portuguese within Angola, it

was the arrival of the Brazilian colonists which was ultimately responsible for the major agricultural gains. While the government's policy helped to facilitate this development, it did not create the incentive for these traditional farmers.

The early misfortunes of the colonists quickly subsided. By the second year the draughts had ended, and most had shifted to more favorable farming lands. The Pernambucites, under government orders,<sup>105</sup> at first turned to the production of food crops intended to relieve Angola from the threat of famine which traditionally jeopardized her existence. Within two years the new colonists had produced an abundant surplus of staples and their emphasis shifted to the cultivation of cash crops.

The mixing of three interdependent factors made Mossamedes an agricultural success almost over night. Ecological conditions favored agricultural development, and in turn stimulated production. The predisposition of the colonists to agriculture and their willingness to work long, hard hours meant that the ecological conditions were maximized. The government, aware of these two factors, invested heavily in this region and, as a result, furthered agricultural development. Heavy machinery, a new road system, and increased protection all played a significant role. By 1855 her agricultural

exports, which seven years ago were nonexistent, were valued at just under 50 million reis.<sup>106</sup> She was the principal exporter of cotton and sugar in Angola. Export statistics are only a partial measure of her economic importance. Mossamedes also became the bread basket of Angola and, as a result, removed any future threats of famine. Her economic significance was translated into increased political status. In 1856 she was raised to the level of Villa and in 1859 Mossamedes became the equal of Luanda.

Although Mossamedes was one of the few significant achievements of the Liberals, its prominence must not be overemphasized. While Mossamedes' early record is quite impressive, after 1857 she underwent a protracted leveling-off period climaxed by a number of failures. Periodic raids, coupled with severe drought, led to the eventual decline of the inland agricultural centers at Gumba, Humbe, and even the military colony of Huila.

Aside from Mossamedes, agricultural development in the south remained spotty. A few plantations existed in the Benguella region. Slaves obtained from Luanda and from small groups of Ovimbundu traders, provided the principal source of labor. With the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States, a number of new plantations were organized to take advantage of the spiraling cotton prices. However, these plantations

were short-lived, gradually declining after the war when prices were stabilized at a much lower level.

Throughout the rest of Angola agriculture was limited to small pockets of intensive farming. These inland regions were generally located in the healthy plateaus of Pungo Adonge, Golungo Alto, Malange, and Encoge. Aside from these there were a number of scattered plantations throughout the interior. Relative to the availability of farmable land, the total under cultivation was insignificant.

Agricultural development in the highland regions traces back to the early Jesuit missionaries. Although they ceased their agricultural activities by the beginning of the 18th century they left a legacy which drew a small number of potential farmers to this region in the following century. The Jesuits had brought coffee plants with them from Brazil, and long after they ceased farming the plants continued to grow. Natural coffee plantations dotted the hills of Cazango, Encoge and Golungo Alto. Yet even under such favorable economic conditions, the Portuguese showed very little interest until the 1830's. It was not until 1837 that the rich plantations at Cazango were exploited, and only then by a Brazilian. In the 1840's a small number of Portuguese moved inland attracted by the coffee plantations and the healthy climate. They often failed to find these natural

plantations, but they utilized the rich virgin soils to establish prosperous farms. Even when coffee was discovered, the owner rarely sat back and exploited it; capital investment in the form of labor, fencing, housing and even machinery was still required. In order to increase production periodic planting was also necessary. In a number of cases these farmers began to diversify into other cash crops. In some cases they did evolve into farmers in the widest sense of the word and must be clearly differentiated from gatherers.

Other agriculturalists evolved from petty traders who had originally moved to the highland zones because of their central location on the trading axis. Originally agriculture was only of secondary importance but the effective abolition of the slave trade and the realization that substantial profits could be obtained by cultivating wild coffee and, later, cotton motivated them to enter agriculture. Military officials also became plantation owners, employing forced laborers to plant and pick the wild coffee.<sup>108</sup> In most cases they remained essentially gatherers, exploiting the rich coffee trees without any concern for their continued propagation.

The importance of wild coffee and, to a much lesser extent, wild cotton was that they served as a vehicle to draw men into the agricultural sector. Once committed to agriculture, they were often motivated by the

government's policy and favorable prices to diversify and expand their production to meet growing demands. This is especially true with the development of a large number of cotton plantations and a smaller number of tobacco farms in the 1850's. These transformed farmers were occasionally buttressed by a handful of immigrants, especially from Madeira.

The failure to establish a suitable transportation system between these inland zones and the coast hampered production and reduced the interest of many potential farmers. The principal form of transportation was the *carregador* (forced porter system). Although this system proved suitable enough for high value, low bulk trade, such as ivory or wax, it was totally inconsistent with an agricultural economy. Unlike slaves, the *carregador* had to be paid in salary and kind at a fixed rate in addition to a fee paid to the state. The implication for bulk agricultural trade were enormous. Since the *carregador* was only allowed by law to carry sixty pounds and his average rate was eight to ten miles a day, it would often take ten to twenty days to reach the markets. Even though the *carregador's* salary was relatively low, the prolonged period meant that expenditures were substantially raised. The increased cost was only one aspect of the system's inefficiency. Agricultural production required a reliable and rapid transportation

system to prevent spoilage and bring the produce to the market at the time when the demand was greatest. Neither of these factors could be guaranteed with a forced labor system. The government's attempt to improve the roads and employ carts drawn by animals was largely unsuccessful. Travelers passing through the northern region never failed to comment on the detrimental effects resulting from the poor transportation system. Monteiro wrote that "Several important coffee plantations have been established, principally in Cazengo . . . but they undergo great disadvantage, owing to the want of roads and means of conveyance. . . ." <sup>109</sup> Livingstone was more direct in his criticism, "The first great want of a country (transportation system) has not been attended to, and no development of its resources has taken place. . . ." <sup>110</sup>

The government's policy had failed to induce interest in agriculture in northern Angola. Trade and the spirit of quick profit still captivated the minds of most Portuguese. The undeveloped transportation system retarded development in the cases where there was visible intent. In the zones where agriculture was practiced, the wild products seemed to have served as the principal drawing force. Even in these areas it is impossible to quantify what percent were farmers as opposed to modified gatherers. With a few noticeable exceptions agricultural development in the north remained in an immature state.

A serious attempt was made to draw Africans into the agricultural sector. At the center of the plan was the abolition of the carregador system in 1856. The abolition was a crucial facet of Liberal policy which had been debated since the 1840's. The opponents of its abolition argued that it would disrupt the already strained transportation system. However, Sa Da Bandeira was able to present such a strong moral and economic argument that it was ultimately abolished. The economic case was basically that the Africans possessed an enormous productive capacity which could not be efficiently utilized in a forced labor situation. "The black refuses to work when he is not paid his salary, or when it is insufficient, or when he is maltreated and in these situations he conducts himself as a European would."<sup>111</sup> They believed that a free wage system would ultimately benefit the entire colony by providing a reliable and eager labor force at a very minimal cost.

Their commitment to a free labor system was only on paper. The inconsistencies in their policy were revealed shortly after the abolition when Governor Amaral declared that "the government would not tolerate any inactivity which was harmful to the state and its aims of economic growth."<sup>112</sup> In order to motivate the Africans in a "constructive direction" a series of hut and head taxes ranging from 200 to 1600 reis per annum were established.

In addition, smaller river, road and fishing taxes were created. In essence this was a crude prototype of a more sophisticated forced labor system than they had formerly employed.

This policy was incredibly naive and shortsighted. It presupposed sufficient military control over the Africans to enforce tax collection. Even on paper, however, their power was too limited to accomplish this task. The number of rebellions increased after 1857, often reducing what nominal power the Portuguese might have possessed. Even where the policy could be enforced, the Portuguese were unable to prevent African migrations into that part of the interior which was out of the area of Portuguese control. As a result, their limited territorial control was reduced while their military expenditures were increased substantially.

The abolition of the carregador system was also opposed by the white settlers. Traders lost their porters, and farmers were forced to pay for their labor, but most of all they resented any policy which was aimed at eventually abolishing slavery. In the final analysis this policy created internal upheavals and new tensions without increasing agricultural production.<sup>113</sup> In 1863 the tax was substantially reduced in an unsuccessful attempt to placate the African population, and in 1872 it was officially abolished.

The Portuguese attempts to establish a well-developed agricultural sector had met with only limited success. The most substantial and lasting achievements were in the southern region, Mossamedes, where the government was aided by the arrival of Brazilian colonists. Throughout the rest of Angola the Portuguese failed miserably. The government was unable to attract many Europeans into agriculture, and although it did provide extensive capital for those who were willing to become farmers, almost all those who took advantage of this were the immigrants in Mossamedes.

The general success of agricultural development in Mossamedes is reflected in the statistics which show an increase in agricultural production for the entire colony. In 1832 agricultural produce comprised .005% of the total value of exports; in 1845 it had increased to .09%. However, by 1859 it had shot up to 14%, an increase of 2800% as compared to 1845, five years before the arrival of the first immigrants. While the real value of agricultural exports remained insignificant, the beginning of a permanent agricultural base had been established and was to play an important role in the future economic history of Angola.<sup>114</sup>

## CHAPTER VII

### A CONTRACTIVE POLICY (1859-1867)

The year 1859 marked the beginning of a radical shift in the Portuguese master plan for Angola. Ten years of gradual economic reform and fifteen years of intensive application of the Liberal program had failed to produce the desired results. Many of the basic concepts of this policy had been totally discredited. Their limited military power had been unable to secure the strategic trade points, much less establish their suzerainty over the interior peoples. Immigrants spurned the most lucrative inducements to settle in Angola. Geological expeditions had proved fruitless. As a result of these overambitious programs Angola had accrued an enormous debt. The average annual deficit from 1852 to 1855 increased tenfold.<sup>115</sup> Related military expenditures had increased from 230 million reis in 1859. Thus, not only did the chronic problems remain unsolved, but new fiscal problems had been created.

It is not surprising that this new contractive policy was a reaction to the expansive policy of the Liberals. The central thesis of this new program was that the future prosperity of Angola could only be achieved by maximizing the coastal resources, the logical corollary being that the interior, which was unproductive and wasteful, had to be abandoned. Within this coastal core zone all the available capital should be intensively utilized to exploit the untapped wealth which existed. This policy of withdrawal and consolidation was the underlying force that determined official action until 1867 when the rubber boom destroyed it in one sweeping blow. On the eve of the rubber boom Governor General Garrido still adamantly held to his belief "that only the coast was worthwhile and productive for revenue."<sup>116</sup>

Although a number of expansionists vehemently opposed the withdrawal from the interior, they could give few substantial arguments to buttress their case. The expansive policy had proved unsuccessful both financially and militarily. The armies in the interior were badly demoralized and in many places just barely able to defend themselves. In 1862 the governor of Angola frankly admitted that "the government finds itself in most critical circumstances because of these very distant occupations . . . without possessing any force to support them in the midst of more or less constantly hostile

natives."<sup>117</sup> Under Governor Andrade a series of military withdrawals were consummated. In the east a treaty was completed at Cassange ending whatever nominal control the Portuguese possessed. In the south the military garrisons at Huila and Humbe were abandoned after a series of attacks had shown that these positions were untenable. Portuguese paper control over the Central Kongo remained until 1866 when fiscal factors forced withdrawal. Not only did they relinquish their "suzerainty" over many of their vassals, but they also abandoned some highland regions such as Encoge which had been an integral part of the colony. By 1867 they had withdrawn from the interior zone restricting their control to the coast and nearby inland regions.

At the same time that the government tried to reduce the military and administrative expenditure, it also initiated a policy of economic reform within the core area. The principal fiscal reforms were directed at the institutionalized corruption in the Alfandegas, or custom houses. It was common knowledge that custom officials were supplementing their meager salaries by accepting bribes and allowing smuggling. In an attempt to redress their grievances and to attract honest and competent inspectors, the wage level of port officials was increased substantially. Since Angola's exports and imports were increasing, a rigid execution of the

tariff policy could be expected to add a substantial amount to the national revenue, many times the amount of the increased salaries. More efficient bookkeeping and auditing systems were also implemented in an attempt to reduce embezzling.

Governor Calheiro and his successors also cracked down on local merchants who were smuggling goods through the ports and then reselling them to the government at an enormous profit. Since the latter faced an acute capital shortage, many products had to be bought on time, permitting the merchants to add all sorts of additional charges. In a report to the Overseas Ministry, Governor Calheiro cited one occasion when an arroba of flour (approximately 2 lbs) had cost the government 426 reis as compared to 276 reis when bought outright.<sup>118</sup> Not only was the government being robbed twice, but the robberies perpetuated the system by depriving it of the capital needed to buy goods outright. Stiffer penalties were established to discourage smugglers and more reliable methods were employed to enforce them. In addition, government agencies were severely restricted as to what could be purchased and from whom. The real significance of these relatively minor reforms is not what they did or did not accomplish, but that they set important precedents for future fiscal reforms.

The major emphasis of this new policy was to develop a viable economy within the core area. This did not preclude abandoning the rich trade of the interior, but was rather an attempt to redirect European attention to the coastal zone, leaving to the African and sertanejo the principal responsibility for bringing goods down to the coast.

The first problem was to effectively delineate what comprised the core area of Angola. Early in his term Governor Calheiro set the pattern by opposing the heavy expenditures which were being allocated to the District of Mossamedes. He argued that it was sheer folly to expect any substantial European immigration and that the early successes were ephemeral. He concluded that Mossamedes was a poor investment and would continue to require large subsidies and thus perpetuate Angola's tenuous position.<sup>119</sup> Mossamedes was thus placed on the periphery of the core area and was marked for future abandonment. As a result, the southern region was severely neglected and it was only because of the cotton boom that her economy was not impaired. The core zone as defined by Calheiro and his successors was to stretch from Benguella north to Ambriz with the highest priority given to the region surrounding Luanda.

At the focal point of their program was the re-establishment of a slave labor, or neo-slave labor,

economy. Calheiro was unrestrained in his criticism of the abolition law of 1856. "It is an imprudent, untimely and thoughtless act," he declared.<sup>120</sup> He felt that slavery was the only alternative to a chronically unstable economy, and without it the agricultural base would be retarded. "In order to develop valuable agriculture in our Africa . . . there will be an unquestionable necessity to establish a broad method of organizing the labor of the indigenous population, adopting, for example a convenient system of servitude. . . ." <sup>121</sup> His successor Governor Andrade was far more blunt about the future role of the African. "The Black is, and will continue to be for many years, the only means the government and commerce can use for the transportation of supplies, war materials, baggage and merchandise."<sup>122</sup>

With the avid support of the commercial organizations and the agricultural associations the government initiated a series of rigorous native labor codes. These para-legal codes were aimed at the Libertos and those recently freed by the abolition of the carregador system who had not voluntarily sought "employment" from Europeans. This set of para-legal mechanisms, i.e., vagrancy acts, in effect kept the majority of these Africans although legally free, in a position "neo-servitude." In the middle 1870's Sa Da Bandeira observed that "these abuses (forced

labor) which were expressly prohibited by law, are still not extinct, rather they have taken other dimensions."<sup>123</sup>

A concerted effort was made to establish a badly needed transportation and communication system which would integrate the core area. This was a sharp departure from the previous policy which had made only a half hearted attempt to establish an infrastructure. The program was premised on the possibility of luring the necessary capital from three independent sources-- local investors, the government, and foreign capitalists. The greatest emphasis was placed on attracting local capital, since it was argued that the wealthy merchants would benefit most. Utilizing local capital would also be beneficial because it would reduce the capital drain from Angola and motivate investors to firmly establish their roots there. In an attempt to achieve these ends, Portugal established a capital fund of 100 million reis which was made available on long-term loans to anyone interested in investing in transportation or communication facilities. The stipulations of the loan made it possible for any interested party to commit only small sums of capital at any given time. The interest rate was  $\frac{1}{2}\%$  per annum and the rate of amortization was fixed at 6% with options to reduce it further.<sup>124</sup> Even under such favorable conditions, the local propertied class was unwilling to invest in any venture from which

large-scale profits over a short period could not be guaranteed.

At the same time the government allocated substantial amounts of capital for an expanded public works program. Government expenditures within this sphere tripled between 1844 and 1862. The 360:000:000 reis represent a substantial amount for a 19th century colonial power to invest in public works. However, most of the money was used for non-essential public works, including the Governor's Mansion and the Bishop's home.<sup>125</sup> Less than 3% of the total expenditures ended up being spent on transportation and communication systems. These totals barely doubled between 1844 and 1864 which meant that the percentage of the public work funds expended on them had declined.

The Government was equally unsuccessful in attracting foreign capital. Its negotiations with an American firm in 1858 to construct a railway system were terminated when the difficulties and the cost became apparent. Their only important success was in convincing an American businessman to establish steam boat service on the river Cuanza which proved quite beneficial to Luanda. By 1867 it was apparent that the Portuguese had failed to transform the undeveloped transportation system of the coastal region.

In an effort to widen the agricultural sector the government sought to promote the establishment of large mechanized plantations. Since the white community in Angola was generally unwilling to supply the capital or the labor required, the government sought to attract foreign interests. Capitalizing on the inflated agricultural prices and the availability of a cheap labor force, the state sought to entice investors by offering enormous tracts of choice land for a nominal fee.<sup>126</sup> The only requirement was that the individuals or company be heavily capitalized. In some cases these requirements were in excess of 300,000 £ sterling.<sup>127</sup> This steep demand was included to insure that the most modern equipment and techniques would be utilized. Unlike earlier attempts to attract foreign capital, this policy seemed to have been moderately successful, at least in the initial stage, the dispensing of land. More than a dozen large grants, some exceeding 300,000 hectares were issued in this period. However, the plantations had little chance to get rooted before the discovery of rubber abruptly terminated their growth.

In reaction to the wild expansive policy of the Liberal period a series of governors sought to promote a more cautious approach to economic development. In some respects they fared well. They managed to initiate

some much needed fiscal reform, to end the senseless commitment to the interior region, and to increase government receipts. However, unlike the Liberals their program was essentially negative and was at best a stop gap which failed to really come to grips with the problem. The re-establishment of neo-slavery revealed the outdated framework in which they operated. Their neglect of Massamedes was unrealistic and completely irrational in lieu of the emphasis on agriculture. Their austerity measures failed to reduce the debt.

The chronic economic problems which had plagued Angola were still present. Industry and mining were undeveloped, an infrastructure was nonexistent, the balance of trade remained unfavorable and the national debt was rising.<sup>128</sup> Although agriculture had increased, its position was still tenuous since much of the gains were artificially created by the American Civil War. Only the trading sector had shown a substantial increase and even here the Portuguese were not firmly entrenched since they could control neither the supply nor the demand. This problem becomes more acute because this sector depended on two products one of which was prone to sharp price fluctuations. (See Table 2)

In short, while Angola had made some ostensible strides

toward recovery, i.e., increased exports, they were only significant when compared to her previously bankrupt position.<sup>129</sup> A whole series of critical problems remained unsolved and had it not been for the sudden rubber boom there is reason to believe Angola might have entered a prolonged period of contraction.<sup>130</sup>

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

The inability of the Portuguese to affect the direction of economic change in Angola is the central theme of this study. In a sense, Angola was passing through a transitional period during which time the choice of alternatives never offered a real solution to the problem. However, granting the complexity of the task, it is still necessary to evaluate the factors which aborted whatever success the Portuguese might have achieved and then focus on the forces at work within Angolan society.

When the Liberals came to power certain factors were already operating to the detriment of their future program. Among the most important of these were adverse ecological conditions, unfavorable demographic patterns, an unstable political situation, and an inauspicious self image.

Angola's environment was anything but favorable to economic development. With the exception of the scattered

plateau regions of the interior, the Benguella Highlands, and portions of Mossamedes, Angola was peculiarly unsuited to any economic transformation. The soils tended to be laterite, mountainous, and dry except near the banks of the rivers which often were endemic malarial zones. The 17th century historian Cadornegra wrote "the climate was an enemy for him the European since the interior was very sickly so that many died and others sickened into pure misery."<sup>131</sup> To make matters worse Angola was a breeding ground for endemic malaria as well as for a number of less important tropical diseases. Recent studies indicate that malaria was hyperendemic along the coastal plains from the Congo to the Cuanza. Scattered statistical data from the period 1870-1871 support these studies. Of the 183 exiles who came to Angola during this period 80 died, a mortality rate of forty-two per hundred which would make it the highest in all of Africa.<sup>132</sup>

The debilitating ecological factors adversely effected the demographic patterns. The only Europeans who settled in any substantial numbers were the degradados or exiles who were sent to Angola because Portugal and Brazil wanted to rid themselves of this lowly element. Since this policy was limited in most cases to males, a tremendous imbalance of the sexes existed. This, coupled with unwillingness of other Portuguese to migrate to Angola and the endemic conditions within Angola, tended

to freeze the populations at a low ceiling. In fact, between 1773 and 1845 the estimated European population decreased by ninety-nine.<sup>133</sup> When the Liberals entered power, Angola was little more than a fugitive society with a few scattered population centers, none having more than seven hundred Europeans, which collectively could hardly be termed a real colony.

The political fiber also challenged the use of the term "colony." The growing decentralization and corruption left the government in Angola with little power. The chain of authority stretching from Lisbon ended abruptly in Luanda and often was ignored even there. Corruption had long before been institutionalized, and from top to bottom government officials were interested only in making their fortunes. The governors tended to be ". . . overseas adventurers, men of an avariciously nature . . ., men without any education or preparation."<sup>134</sup> In such a political milieu it is not surprising that revolution and anarchy characterized Angola when the Liberals came to power.

The bleak situation within Angola projected an inauspicious self-image to the rest of the world. It was known as wretched and hostile country, infested with disease, and populated by a fugitive society. The 18th century Brazilian historian Silva Correia characterized Angola as "a monster of inequity."<sup>135</sup> In turn, the image became a powerful force in perpetuating the society it

depicted, since it discouraged capital investment and immigration.

Despite the optimism of the Liberals the problems they inherited were almost insurmountable, and their actions often aggravated the situation. The economic blueprints sent from Lisbon were rarely reconcilable with the existing situation in Angola, Portugal, or, for that matter, the rest of the world. The original plans called for the injection of foreign capital and immigration which would create a multiplier effect leading to economic recovery. However, there was no reason to expect that either element could be attracted as long as the unfavorable conditions persisted. The endless search for minerals and the dismal failure at establishing a free African labor force suggest how removed from reality their policy really was. Prime Minister Sa Da Bandeira even went so far as to predict that Angola's growing wheat production would soon cut out California as one of England's principal suppliers of wheat.<sup>136</sup>

Not only was their program based on a number of unrealistic premises, but in many cases it was self-contradicting. The high priority placed on trade, while trying to convince the European community to enter other less lucrative sectors, is a clear case in point. The most glaring example, however, is illustrated by their immigration policy. On the one hand, they allocated

millions of reis to attract immigrants from Portugal, Brazil and Madeira, and, on the other, they limited the number of German immigrants and discriminated against those already settled. A similar duality can be seen in their labor policy. By establishing the "carregador system" and later the tax-buttressed free labor system, the government hoped to end the critical labor shortage. Yet at the same time thousands of slaves and libertados were exported to Sao Thome with the wholehearted consent of the government.<sup>137</sup>

If the Liberal program was grounded in inconsistencies and illusions, much of it can be excused as honest errors by a government groping for alternatives to an unsolvable situation. However, they are vulnerable to harsh criticism on the actual administration of Angola. Dishonesty seeped down to all levels of government, as it had in the past. The British traveler Cameron wrote in 1875 of a European who "was openly engaged in the slave traffic, notwithstanding his holding a commission from the Portuguese government as a district judge. . . ." <sup>138</sup> Few attempts were made to terminate the wide-spread corruption, and the available evidence suggests that these cases ended in failure. Livingstone cites a number of examples where military personnel flagrantly violated the law and were tried by a Council of War which was ". . . composed of men equally bad, who will

laugh and sentence them to three weeks suspension from military duty only."<sup>139</sup> No efforts were made to get at the crux of the problem which was the incredibly low pay scale. This schedule which provided a captain with an annual salary of six pounds invariably forced those but the highest paid officials to supplement their earnings by extra-legal or illegal means.

Corruption was not limited to the lower stratum. Higher officials, including some governors, continued to enjoy the privileges of their position, which included slave trading, smuggling and other profitable ventures. Three years after the abolition, the governor was still dealing in slaves.

The corruption naturally engendered inefficiency at all levels of government. However, the lack of continuity and the low quality of the leadership undoubtedly reinforced this tendency. Between 1836 and 1866 no less than thirteen governors were appointed to Angola, an average of one every two and a third years. Of these only one remained in office for more than four years, while five governors served roughly one year each. Even under the most stable political conditions, it would be virtually impossible to initiate major economic reforms with such a rapid turnover of administrators.

A biographical analysis of twelve of the thirteen governors reveals some very interesting data as to their qualifications.<sup>140</sup> (See Table 4) Of these, eleven were drawn from the military, eight of whom had no previous administrative experience, and two of the others only a limited amount. No less than nine, however, had fought on the side of Liberals during the civil wars, and eight had been cited for bravery. Their educational qualifications are not nearly as impressive as their military records. Of the ten on whom information was available, four had not gone beyond secondary school, four had attended military academies, and only two had gone to the University. Based on the criteria of formal training, education, and previous experiences, it seems that the governors generally lacked the necessary qualifications to help Angola during this difficult transitional period. It is interesting to note that some of the most important on-the-spot economic reforms were initiated by Laurence Possello, the only professional administrator.

Thus, during the most critical period in Angola's history she was governed by an administration that lacked honesty, continuity, and cohesion, as well as a far sighted economic program. Coupled with the adverse internal conditions they inherited it is not

surprising that the Liberals (and their successors) was so unsuccessful in implementing economic reform.

Even if the Portuguese had been able to establish the most efficient administrative system, they would have still been faced with a problem which could only be solved by a complete re-population of the country. The European community in Angola was endowed with a peculiar economic psychology which had evolved over time out of a combination of local conditions and a psychological feeling of self-exile.

The exile psychology could be seen in all segments of the European community. At the lowest level the "degradados" resented being banished to the ghastly penal colony. Their indignation was shared by many state officials who were bitter about their assignment to Angola, traditionally considered the most insignificant of the Portuguese colonies. Needless to say, the environmental conditions did not help relieve this political snub. The merchants, who did retain a modicum of choice, begrudgingly resigned themselves to stay, at least temporarily, in order to terminate their business arrangements. All these groups, then, shared two common goals, a desire to leave Angola and a need to find some form of compensation which would relieve their frustration as long as they remained.

Only wealth could serve as some modicum of compensation for their frustrations. In the short run, it could make their exile in this hostile land less painful by providing some of the luxuries of European life. For the future, it held out the possibility of ensuring a more comfortable life once they returned to Europe. For the "degradados," financial success might help to shorten their forced exile by giving them respectability.

Thus, what evolved was a money-oriented European community which placed the highest priority on obtaining material possessions and wealth. Within all classes these were used to satisfy their sensual drives in order to make this life more bearable. One observer commented that "notwithstanding the great mortality the inhabitants seem to be influenced by the sensualist motto, 'Let us eat and drink for tomorrow we may die.'"<sup>141</sup> Correia wrote that the "white society dies off as much through over-drinking as through climate."<sup>142</sup> Their norms and mores were readjusted to permit acquisition of wealth through any means. Livingstone reports one case where an official was indicted for a number of fraudulent actions but "even this public mention of his crime attached no stigma to the man's character."<sup>143</sup>

The growing world demand for slaves and the incredibly high rate of profit gave the European community an opportunity to fulfill its desires.

Every segment of the population was integrated into the slave economy. The "degradados" usually became agents and petty merchants. Government officials, depending on rank were able to obtain substantial wealth, either by dealing directly in the slave trade, i.e., as backers or agents, or by ignoring certain illegal practices. The small merchant class, whose *raison d'etre* was wealth, profited most from the increased trade in the 17th and 18th centuries and became the most important economic and political interest group in Angola. Thus, if the exile psychology engendered an obsession for wealth, the existing slave trade helped satisfy and perpetuate it.

By the time the slave trade was abolished, a powerful economic psychology had become firmly rooted within Angola. Its major premise, which emanated directly from the slave trade, was that with a relatively small amount of capital and a minimal amount of labor, a high profit could be accrued. This unsound attitude stifled the economic growth of Angola in the decades following the abolition.

Viewed from this perspective, the economic history of Angola becomes infinitely more clear. During the transitional period (1836-1845) the European community tenaciously clung to the slave trade to the detriment of the rest of the economy. Thus, nine years after the abolition legitimate exports were only  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the pre-abolition level. The only item which increased substantially was

ivory, and that was because the Government removed its monopoly. Thus, prices rose by 300%. The potential profit of ivory increased accordingly, luring the Europeans into this area of trade.

Once abolition was successfully enforced, Angola was compelled to re-orient her entire economy. A number of alternatives were offered. The government's policy was to establish as wide an economic base as possible, thus removing any future possibility of total dislocation. Millions of reis were allocated to all sectors of the economy with a special emphasis on agricultural development. In addition, by establishing long term loans and other capital funds, Lisbon hoped to lure local, as well as foreign, capital essential for the establishment of industry.

Yet, in spite of the government's policy, the economy remained undiversified. Merchants and traders, realizing by 1845 that the slave trade was becoming impractical as well as less profitable, shifted into legitimate trade which most closely satisfied the rigid economic requirements they had established. The tropical goods which were available in substantial quantities and at very low prices in the interior could be quickly converted into substantial profits at Luanda and Benguella. Although they might not provide as high a profit as the slave trade, the returns were still substantial. Livingstone

and Valdez give examples of 200% profits realized from this trade.

Since legitimate trade proved such an acceptable alternative, there was very little incentive to enter agriculture, and no reason to invest in industry. In fact, the only significant agricultural developments prior to 1859 took place in Mossamedes. There, Portuguese peasants, accustomed to hard labor without thoughts of high profits, were able to make important achievements in agriculture. It is interesting to note that the only other significant agricultural development occurred between 1859 and 1867 which roughly corresponded to the years of the American Civil War. During this period Angola had a great cotton boom; cotton exports increased from 29,000 kilograms to 274,000 kilograms.<sup>144</sup> Since, in the preceding five years, cotton production had remained relatively constant, it is fair to believe that there was a causal relationship between increased production and the dislocation of the cotton plantation system in the United States. This dislocation created a greater demand, which in turn drove prices up substantially, and only then were the Angolan settlers interested. In short, the evidence suggests that the same economic forces which motivated the European community to enter legitimate trade also induced them to produce cotton. This

hypothesis is buttressed by statistical data which indicates a drastic reduction in cotton production shortly after the end of the Civil War. By 1889 Angola's cotton exports were less than 67,000 kilograms, which was  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the 1867 figure.<sup>145</sup>

During the period under examination Angola's economy remained trade-oriented. Between 1836 and 1859 the trading sector provided from 87% to 99% of the total value of exports. Within the trading sphere ivory and wax were the two most important commodities, and throughout this period their importance was continually increasing. (See Table 2) While in 1844 ivory and wax comprised roughly 40% of the total exports, by 1859 they comprised almost 77%. Although the relative significance of tropical trading goods declined as a result of the cotton boom, they probably retained their primary role in the economy.

The rubber boom which began in 1867 drastically altered the economy in the sense that rubber replaced ivory and wax as the principal export commodity. However, in another sense, the rubber trade was just a logical extension of a pattern which had begun with the arrival of the first Portuguese in the 16th century and had continued until 1914. During these two and one-half centuries the Portuguese sustained their economy by

exploiting the pre-existing resources--slaves, ivory and wax, and rubber--without making any substantial contributions to the development of a firm economic base in Angola. In this respect the years 1575-1914 can be viewed as the period of Economic Decadence.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1  
VALUE OF EXPORTS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Absolute Value</u>	<u>Real Value</u> <sup>1</sup>
1823-1825	829:879\$890	?
1830-1832	105:629\$345 (2)	105:628\$345
1844	201:440\$000	140:000\$000
1845	219:000\$000 (3)	201:320\$000
1848	606:648\$000	?
1856	610:000\$000	?
1857	673:274\$319 (4)	621:941\$34
1858	774:628\$675 (5)	418:899\$379
1859	1:017:150\$771 (6)	581:415\$494
1867	1:119:116\$000	? (7)

1. The base year used is 1830. The only products deflated were those that were exported in the base year and the year under examination. Thus, it was impossible to deflate urzella or any of the agricultural products except coffee.
2. This figure is only for legitimate trade and does not include slavery for which the figures are unavailable. However, it does serve as a good base to compare growth of legitimate trade.
3. Value of exports only for first 10 months.
- 4-6 Estimations based on Mossamedes prices.
7. Probably would expect a high price index because the evidence suggests that cotton prices increased substantially.

Sources:

- Lopez De Lima. Ensaio Sobre A Statistica Das Possessoes No Ultramar.
- Conselho Ultramarino. Boletim Do Ultramarino. Parte Official, 1834-63.
- J. M. Cerquiera, Azevedo. Angola, Exemplo De Trabalho.
- Sousa Montiero. Diccionario Geographico das Possessoes Portuguezas No Ultramar.
- Gerardo Pery. Geographica E Estatistica Geral Portugal E Colonias.

TABLE 2

## THE SIGNIFICANCES OF IVORY AND WAX 1844-1859

Year	Wax		Ivory		Total value of ivory & wax exported	Total Legit. exports	% Exports ivory & wax
	P. <sup>1</sup>	Q. <sup>2</sup>	P.	Q.			
1844	611	52,690	719	105,600	108:000\$000	201:440\$000	54%
1845	603	81,300	703	48,380	83:000\$000	219:000\$000	40%
1857	220	1,698,248	1800 <sup>3</sup>	114,596	580:309\$914	673:284\$675	86%
1858	399	1,021,983	1836 <sup>4</sup>	148,146	664:248\$114	774:628\$319	85%
1859	429	1,354,386	1870 <sup>5</sup>	181,953	845:935\$783	1:017:150\$771	83%

1. P - Price in Reis
2. Q - Quantity in pounds.
3. Based on Mossamedes prices in 1857.
4. Based on Mossamedes prices in 1858.
5. Based on Mossamedes prices in 1859.

Sources:

Lopez De Lima. Ensaioes Sobre A Statistica Das Possessoes No Ultramar.  
 J. M. Cerqueira Azevedo. Angola, Exemplo De Trabalho.  
 Conselho Ultramarino. Boletim Do Ultramarino. Parte Official, 1834-63.

TABLE 3  
 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF EXPORTS ALL PERCENTS  
 (ALL %s APPROX.)

Year	Total Legitimate Exports	% Agric.	% Mining	% Indust.	% Trade Goods
1830-2 ave.	105:628\$345	.005	0	0	99.995
1844	251:620\$000	.009	0	0	99.991
1845	361:331\$000	.03	0	0	99.97
1857	673:284\$675	8.2	1.0	0	90.8
1858	774:628\$319	9.4	1.3	0	89.3
1859	1:017:150\$100	10.6	2.0	0	86.4

Sources:

Lopez De Lima. Ensaio Sobre A Statistica Das Possesoes Portugueses No Ultramar.  
 J. M. Cerqueira. Angola, Exemplo De Trabalho.  
 Conselho Ultramarino. Boletim Do Ultramarino. Parte Official, 1834-63.

TABLE 4

## BACKGROUND OF TWELVE OF THE GOVERNORS OF ANGOLA

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I.	Higher Education	
	A. University	2
	B. Military Academy	4
	C. No Higher Education	4
	D. Unknown	2
II.	Background Prior to Appointment as Governor	
	A. Military	11
	B. Colonial Administrator	1
III.	Previous Colonial Experience	
	A. No Experience	8
	B. Some Experience	4
IV.	Role Played in Civil War	
	A. Fought on Side of Liberals	9
	B. Cited for Bravery	5

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Source:

Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa E Brasileira.

TABLE 5  
 PRODUCTIVE EXPENSES OF GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA

Year	Education	Colonization	Scientific Exploration	Public Works
1843	880\$000	None	188\$000	11:000\$000
1853	1:899\$000	3:200\$000	722\$000	21:056\$325
1855	2:524\$000	5:210\$000	1:520\$000	21:051\$850
1856	2:253\$000	4:800\$000	1:000\$000	24:412\$000
1857-				
1862	3:742\$000	6:400\$000	3:800\$000	30:495\$000
Average				
1862-				
1865	3:751\$000	7:350\$000	3:240\$000	34:700\$000
Average				

Source

Jose de Macedo. Autonomia De Angola.

TABLE 5 (Continued)

## PRODUCTIVE EXPENSES OF GOVERNMENT IN ANGOLA

Year	Transportation & Communication	Total Productive Expenditures	Total Expenditures	% Allotted to Pro- ductive Sphere
1843	468\$000	12:468\$000	338:000\$000	4% (App.)
1853	1:025\$000	27:520\$000	241 408\$877	11% (App.)
1855	1:360\$000	31:670\$000	251:543\$000	11.5% (App.)
1856	1:141\$000	33:120\$000	251:541\$000	13%
1857- 1862 Average	1:212\$000	46:129\$000	327:058\$400	14%
1862- 1865 Average	1:505\$000	50:530\$000	351:061\$000	14%

Source:

Jose de Macedo. Autonomia De Angola.

TABLE 6  
 UNITED STATES EXPORT PRICES, 1845-1859  
 (CENTS/POUND)

Year	Sugar	Cotton	Maize
1845	8.2	5.9	3.1
1846	9.5	7.8	3.3
1847	7.7	10.1	3.9
1848	8.1	7.6	3.2
1849	6.9	6.4	3.5
1850	10.3	11.0	4.1
1851	7.9	15.1	3.4
1852	7.1	8.1	5.1
1853	7.3	9.5	4.3
1854	4.3	8.0	4.2
1855	7.3		
1856	8.8		
1857	11.5		
1858	9.6		
1859	16.1		

Source:

Commissioner of Patent. Reports of the Commissioner of Patent. 1840-65.


TABLE 7  
 ENGLISH IMPORT PRICES 1852-1856  
 (In £s)

Year	Cotton per cwts.	Coffee per lb.	Palm Oil per cwts.	Sugar per cwts.
1852	4.01	.077	1.2	1.42
1853	3.7	.061	1.0	1.3
1854	3.7	.062	1.0	1.39
1855	3.8	.063	1.0	1.39
1856	3.6	.062	1.0	1.40

Source:

House of Commons. British Sessional Papers, 1840-1850.


FIGURE 1

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF ANGOLA 1852-1865  
(in 100:000 reis)

Source: Macedo, Jose. Autonomia De Angola.

FIGURE 2


BRITISH IMPORTS OF COTTON 1845-1861  
(in 1,000 cwts.)



Source: House of Commons. British Sessional Papers.

FIGURE 3


UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF COTTON 1835-1855  
(in 1,000 lbs.)



Source: Commissioner of Patent. Report of the Commissioner of Patent.

FIGURE 4


BRITISH IMPORTS OF SUGAR 1845-1861  
(in 1,000 lbs.)



Source: House of Commons. British Sessional Papers.

FIGURE 5


UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF SUGAR 1845-1860  
(in 1,000 lbs.)



Source: Commissioner of Patent. Report of the Commissioner of Patent.

FIGURE 6


BRITISH IMPORTS OF MAIZE 1845-1861  
(in 1,000 quarters)



Source: House of Commons. British Sessional Papers.

FIGURE 7


UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF MAIZE 1845-1860  
(in 1,000 bushels)



Source: Commissioner of Patent. Report of the Commissioner of Patent.


FIGURE 8

BRITISH IMPORTS OF PALM OIL 1845-1860  
(in 1,000 cwts.)



Source: House of Commons. British Sessional Papers.


FIGURE 9  
UNITED STATES EXPORTS OF RICE 1845-1855  
(in 1,000 tierges)




Source: Commissioner of Patent. Report of the Commissioner of Patent.

FIGURE 10

BRITISH IMPORTS OF COFFEE 1845-1861  
(in 1,000 lbs.)




Source: House of Commons. British Sessional Papers.



Angola in 1830.  
 • Ports and towns (presidios)  
 - - - Line of Portuguese Control and Trade

Scale: 1:6,000,000



Angola in 1861.  
 • Forts and towns, fairs  
 - - - Line of Portuguese Control and Trade

Scale: 1:6,000,000

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Gladwyn Childs, Umbundu Kinship and Character, p. 191.

<sup>2</sup>The Philippines are a classic example of non-Western nation who completely renovated their economy during this period. (William Shurz, Manila Galleon, pp. 55-60). Other countries include Cuba, Batavia and to a lesser degree Brazil.

<sup>3</sup>As late as 1858 the Overseas Ministry sent a portario asking for these statistics.

<sup>4</sup>Even in the late 1840's the slavery trade was not completely subdued. As late as the 1880's there are still reports of slaves being exported from Angola in the 1880's.

<sup>5</sup>Duffy states that as early as 1607 Governor Manuel Forjaz sent a military expedition in search of slaves. However, this is questionable. James Duffy, Portugal In Africa, p. 52.

<sup>6</sup>Silva Correia, Historia De Angola, p. 82.

<sup>7</sup>One of the earliest laws forbidding Portuguese officials from participating in the slave trade was passed in 1725. Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanah, p. 184.

<sup>8</sup>Official Receipts 1780-1783.

Tithe tax	29:780:000
Salt tax	4:800:000
Sale of ivory	23:525:000
Tax on Exported slaves	<u>437:000:000</u>
Total	495:105:000

Silva Correia - Historia De Angola, p. 176.

<sup>9</sup>In 1801 total receipts were 191:000:000  
 Receipts from tax on slaves 162:000:000  
 Marquez De Sa Da Bandiera, O Trabalho Rural Africano, p. 18.

<sup>10</sup>Lopez De Lima, Ensaïos Sobre A Statistica Das Possessoes Portuguese No Ultramar: De Angola E Benguella, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup>The average number of slaves exported in the period 1823-1825 was 11,457 as compared to the estimated 16,000 exported annually between 1750-1780.

<sup>12</sup>In the period 1823-25 they made up almost 9% of the totally exports with slavery adding another 90%.

<sup>13</sup>The average government price paid for ivory was 200 reis a kilogram. In some cases reported the government only paid 50 reis.

<sup>14</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Annaes Do Conselho Ultramarino series 1, part 2, p. 186.

<sup>15</sup>Vansina, p. 184.

<sup>16</sup>J. Rodriques, Brasil E Africa, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup>Charles Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, p. 92.

<sup>18</sup>Douglas Wheeler, Portuguese Administrative Policy 1830-1896, p. 53.

<sup>19</sup>Vansina, p. 185.

<sup>20</sup>Sousa Dias, Portuguese Em Angola, p. 325.

<sup>21</sup>Many historians including Vansina and Wheeler mark this transition from the administration of Trovar in 1823. Certainly a good case can be made for this date, since Trovar did institute a number of important economic reforms. However, while these reforms were significant, their immediate effect on the economy was not too great and they were not continued by Trovar's successors.

<sup>22</sup>The Liberal came into power in 1835. They immediately issued a number of internal reforms which they then tried to apply to the colonies. H. Livermore, A History of Portugal, p. 424.

- <sup>23</sup>F. Egerton, Angola In Perspective, p. 64.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Boletim Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, p. 39.
- <sup>26</sup>Joao Moura, Historia Economica De Portugal, p. 343.
- <sup>27</sup>For an interesting study of Brazilian influence on Angola see Charles Boxer, Salvador Da Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola.
- <sup>28</sup>Pinhiero Chagas, Os Colonias Portuguesas No Seculo XIX, pp. 46-47.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup>Their insecure position is reflected in the treaties made with Britain, whereby Britain promised to aid the Portuguese in the case of a revolt by Europeans or Africans who opposed the abolition.
- <sup>31</sup>Ralph Delgado, A Famosa E. Historia Benguella, p. 120.
- <sup>32</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Boletim Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, p. 144.
- <sup>33</sup>The price was 270 reis per pound as compared to 725 reis per pound in 1845. Lima, pp. 73 and 76.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup>Total exports for the first ten months of 1844 were valued at 201,000,000 reis. The value of urzella exports 70,000,000 reis. Lima, p. 76.
- <sup>36</sup>In the period 1823-25. Gums exports were 26,000 reis - in 1845 they were 48:800:000 reis. Lima, pp. 73 and 76.
- <sup>37</sup>Lima, p. 55.

<sup>38</sup>Ralph Delgado, O Reino Do Benguela, p. 76.

<sup>39</sup>Wheeler, p. 100.

<sup>40</sup>David Livingstone, Missionary Travel and Research In South Africa, p. 401.

<sup>41</sup>See Wheeler, pp. 137-190.

<sup>42</sup>Traditionally the Cuanza River has been used to distinguish northern and southern Angola. I will follow this approach with one minor modification. The southern part of the Luanda Cassange axis crosses the Cuanza at one point yet I have still viewed it as part of the northern Angola.

<sup>43</sup>Childs, p. 191.

<sup>44</sup>The caravan system was characterized by a high rate of mobility and fire power and was backed by an efficiently organized political and economic system.

<sup>45</sup>Vansina, p. 200.

<sup>46</sup>Delgado, O Reino Do Benguela, p. 115.

<sup>47</sup>Francisco Valdez, Six Years of a Traveler's Life in West Africa, v. 2, p. 318.

<sup>48</sup>Livingstone, p. 467.

<sup>49</sup>Valdez reported that the Jaga had effective control over the interior, and prevented the peoples of the Luanda and Cazembe region from trading directly with the Portuguese at the Faire. Instead these people had to sell to the Jaga who in turn resold the goods to the Portuguese. Valdez, p. 148.

<sup>50</sup>I. Schapera, Livingstone's African Journal 1853-1856, p. 117.

<sup>51</sup>Museu De Angola, Arquivos De Angola, series 2, v. 12, p. 41.

<sup>52</sup>Wheeler, pp. 133-138.

<sup>53</sup>Vansina, p. 187. Earlier military activity, such as the attack at Duque de Braganza, were defensive in nature.

<sup>54</sup>Between 1848 and 1855 exports remained at about 600 million reis. Assuming even only a slight inflation it meant that real value of export decreased.

<sup>55</sup>Egerton, p. 67.

<sup>56</sup>Wheeler, p. 137.

<sup>57</sup>Valdez, v. 2, p. 79.

<sup>58</sup>Marquez Sa Da Bandeira, Factos E. Consideracoes, p. 48.

<sup>59</sup>Beside for the political fragmentation the kingdom of Kongo suffered a net decrease in their population as a result of wars, slavery, famine and disease. Vansina, p. 193.

<sup>60</sup>Wheeler, p. 137.

<sup>61</sup>Museu De Angola, p. 25.

<sup>62</sup>Wheeler, p. 140.

<sup>63</sup>Valdez, p. 171.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

<sup>65</sup>Wheeler, pp. 160-170.

<sup>66</sup>Among their earlier tariff reforms were:

- 1836 Ordinance - foreign merchandise shipped directly from Lison could enter Angola without paying duties.
- 1837 Ordinance - Free admission of European manufactured goods, necessary for trade in the interior, which were not produced in Portugal.

<sup>67</sup>Sousa Montiero, Diccionario Geographico Das Provincians E Possessoes Portuguezas No Ultramar, p. 107.

<sup>68</sup>1846 - 119:000:000 out of 183:000:000  
1852 - 210:000:000 of the total 237:000:000  
Lima, p. 186, and Chaggas, p. 150.

<sup>69</sup>Tariffs were levied on foreign products at 12% of their value as compared to a 3% tax on national goods imported into Angola.

Joao Azevedoo, Subsidios para O Estudo da Economia de Angola Nos Ultimos Cem Anos, p. 42.

<sup>70</sup>J. Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo, p. 34.

<sup>71</sup>In conjunction with this policy the Portuguese also abolished the state monopoly on salt and urzella. Neither, however, had an important effect. Urzella which was a significant export commodity in the early 1840's became insignificant by 1859.

<sup>72</sup>Monteiro, p. 106. Monteiro was by no means the only scholar to subscribe to this myth. Charles Vogel wrote in 1857 "Les plateaux eleves de l'interieur riches en mines de toute espices. . . . Le regne mineral offre du ciuvre, du fer, du plomb, de l'etain et du mercures, du sel, du salpetre, du soufre, du petrole. . . ."  
Charles Vogel, Le Portugal et ses Colonies, p. 541.

<sup>73</sup>Azevedo, p. 111.

<sup>74</sup>Chaggas, p. 132.

<sup>75</sup>J. Monteiro, p. 105.

<sup>76</sup>Helio Felgas, Historia Do Congo Portuges, p. 82.

<sup>77</sup>Valdez, p. 81.

<sup>78</sup>Museu de Angola, Arquivos De Angola, vol. 2, series 2, p. 107.

<sup>79</sup>J. Monteiro, p. 88.

<sup>80</sup>Production Figures 1858-1863

1858	5,122 Arrobas (an arrobas is approximately two pounds)
1859	10,493 Arrobas
1860	3,240 Arrobas
1861	13,544 Arrobas
1862	16,656 Arrobas
1863	10,192 Arrobas

Azevedo, p. 164.

Thus under European control they never reached the production levels which Monteiro claims the Africans achieved.

<sup>81</sup>Valdez, p. 82.

<sup>82</sup>Bandeira, O Trabalho Rural Africano, p. 145.

<sup>83</sup>Lima, p. 56.

<sup>84</sup>Livermore, p. 426.

<sup>85</sup>For example, Portuguese emigration to Brazil between 1866 and 1876 was 49,131. Sociedade De Geographica De Lisbon, Boletim Da Sociedade De Geographica De Lisbon, No. 3, p. 341. Immigration from Madeira to the United States 1843-1872 was 34,364. Bandeira, O Trabalho Rural Africano, p. 147.

<sup>86</sup>Museu de Angola, Arquivos De Angola, series 2, vol. 6, p. 31.

<sup>87</sup>Valdez, p. 345.

<sup>88</sup>Museu de Angola, vol. 6, series 2, p. 19.

<sup>89</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Annaes Do Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 8.

<sup>90</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Annaes Do Conselho Ultramarino, series 2, pt. 1, p. 79.

<sup>91</sup>Manuel Torres, O Distrito De Mocamedes, p. 117.

<sup>92</sup>Albuquerque Felner, Angola, Apontamentos Sobre A Colonisacao Dos Planaltos E Litoral Do Sul De Angola, p. 20.

<sup>93</sup>Chagas, p. 101.

<sup>94</sup>Museu De Angola, Arquivos De Angola, vol. 6, series 2, p. 17.

<sup>95</sup>A second boatload arrived from Pernambuco, however, they left before the full reports of the misery in Angola had been received.

<sup>96</sup>Museu De Angola, Arquivos De Angola, vol. 6, series 2, p. 23.

<sup>97</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Annaes Do Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, pt. 1, p. 439.

<sup>98</sup>Livingstone, p. 439.

<sup>99</sup>There is some evidence to suggest that the little agricultural development had decreased as a result of the abolition. In the 18th century a substantial amount of grain and other staples were grown to feed the slaves crossing the Atlantic. For statistical data see Silva Correia, p. 117.

<sup>100</sup>Lima, p. 12.

<sup>101</sup>Gerardo Pery, Geographica E Estatistica Geral Portugal E Colonial, p. 357.

<sup>102</sup>Sugar and Coffee Production from Java (in Pikols)

Year	Coffee	Sugar
1830	288	108
1835	466	438
1840	1182	1028
1845	1006	1454
1850	818	1383

Furneval, Netherland Indies, p. 129.

<sup>103</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Annaes Do Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, pt. 1, p. 215.

However this does not seem to have been much of a gamble since Portugal could always re-export the surplus agricultural products, although sometimes at a loss.

<sup>104</sup>The Allotment for cotton production was especially high since the Portuguese Government hoped to take advantage of the American Civil War.  
Azevedo, Cem Anos, p. 44.

<sup>105</sup>The Overseas Ministry wrote to the Governor of Angola stressing that only "After the cultivation of the most necessary staples, can there follow the growth of sugar, coffee and cotton."  
Conselho Ultramarino, Boletim Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, p. 665.

<sup>106</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Boletim Conselho Ultramarino, v. 2, pt. 1, p. 201.

<sup>107</sup>Oliveira Martin, O Brasil E As Colonias Portuguese, p. 216.

<sup>108</sup>Livingstone reports that at Tombetu (West of Golungo Alto) a sub commandant owned a plantation with 900 coffee trees.

<sup>109</sup>J. Monteiro, p. 215.

110 Livingstone, p. 418.

In one case Livingstone reported that cotton was destroyed because there was no way of getting it to the coast.

111 Bandeira, p. 111.

112 Wheeler, p. 153.

113 There are a few exceptions where this new labor policy functioned well. The Governor of Golungo Alto reported in 1859 that free African labor had helped to increase production.

Bandeira, O Trabalho Rural, p. 67.

114 For example, in 1895 when Angola was going through the rubber boom, exports from coffee had a higher value than did rubber.

Rubber	433:150:460
Coffee	459:285:180

Ernesto Carvalho, As Colonias Portugezas, p. 161.

115 Annual Deficit.

1852	35:912:807
1857	354:710:970

Jose Macedo, Autonomia De Angola - Estudo De Administracao Colonial, p. 47.

116 Wheeler, p. 227.

117 Ibid., p. 140.

118 Sebastio De Calherios, Relatorio Do Governador General Da Provincia De Angola, p. 24.

119 Ibid., p. 62.

120 Bandeira, O Trabalho Rural Africano, p. 59.

121 Calherios, p. 187.

<sup>122</sup>Wheeler, p. 198.

<sup>123</sup>Bandeira, O Trabalho Rural Africano, p. 48.

<sup>124</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Boletim Conselho Ultramarino, v. 1, p. 364.

<sup>125</sup>Macedo, p. 62.

<sup>126</sup>The usual amount was 10 reis per hectare.

<sup>127</sup>Conselho Ultramarino, Boletim Conselho Ultramarino, v. 3, p. 713.

<sup>128</sup>The deficit from the period 1857-1862 was 354:710:970. In the following four years the deficit was 630:854:405. Macedo, p. 49.

<sup>129</sup>Even exports did not increase as much as they might appear. Their real value was far less than their absolute value. In addition most of the increase in the value of ivory was artificial.

<sup>130</sup>Up to 1867 Angola's economy was built largely on ivory and wax. During the following twenty years the exports of these products diminished drastically. This can be partially accounted for because of the emphasis on rubber but also because of decreased demand for ivory and wax.

<sup>131</sup>Wheeler, p. 129.

<sup>132</sup>Martin, p. 225.

<sup>133</sup>In 1775 the estimated population was 1700, in 1845 it was only 1601.

<sup>134</sup>Marques Do Lavarido, Portugal Em Africa Depois De 1851, p. 132.

<sup>135</sup>Wheeler, p. 133.

<sup>136</sup>Bandeira, O Trabalho Rural Africano, p. 80.

137 By 1865 there were almost 7,000 Africans from Angola in Sao Thome. Most were slaves but there were some freemen who voluntarily went there.

Ibid., p. 75.

138 Vernon Cameron, Across Africa, p. 450.

139 Schapera, p. 185.

140 The Biographical data is drawn primarily from the Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa a Brasileira.

141 Valdez, p. 314.

142 Wheeler, p. 62.

143 Livingstone, p. 455.

144 Carvalho, p. 141, and Pery, p. 358.

145 Carvalho, p. 57.

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