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ALBIZU CAMPOS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY, 1922-1932

by

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Dedicated to:

Dolores Alejandra Faerber Smith

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INTRODUCTION

Puerto Rico is today a territory of the United States which has the status of "Commonwealth," called a "Free Associated State" ("Estado Libre Asociado") in Spanish. The island became a U.S. possession when it was ceded to the U.S. as war booty following the Spanish American War of 1898. As a Commonwealth, Puerto Rico has limited political and economic autonomy, but has enjoyed material prosperity greater than that of most of its Third World neighbors in Latin America. United States citizenship, free trade with the U.S. and special tax advantages have been granted to Puerto Rico. A major development effort since World War II has greatly improved the standard of living of the average islander. Public education, housing projects, the development of transportation and communication systems, and the proliferation of consumer goods are all testimony to the prosperity of the last four decades.

On the other hand, Puerto Rico has paid a price for this development. A massive out-migration since the 1940s was required as a "safety valve" to relieve population pressures which would have undermined the development process by spreading resources too thin. The island has no control over the location of U.S. military installations in Puerto Rico, over setting environmental standards or

over immigration policy. Puerto Ricans resident on the island, although they are free to re-locate to the North American continent, do not vote for the U.S. President or have any voting representatives in the U.S. Congress. The exact extent to which civil liberties apply to the population has never been clearly defined. Huge transfer payments from the U.S. in the form of food stamps, veteran's benefits, medicaid and tax benefits have been required to maintain the insular economy. At present, the island faces a brain drain as skilled professionals and workers move to the United States, but there is growing evidence of a return migration of unskilled workers who are being squeezed out of U.S. jobs as the continental economy contracts. The island's government has had to continue to extend tax advantages to investors in an effort to prevent corporations from moving capital to other Third World areas where labor costs are lower and there are fewer restrictions on physical plant development. The Puerto Rican economy is almost totally dependent upon the United States, and without the approval of Washington the insular government has little control over re-directing economic policy. Many critics feel that decolonization represents the only possibility for resolving the island's current social and economic crises.

Because Puerto Rico has an ambivalent national status—it is neither independent nor a U.S. state—the "status" issue has long dominated the local political scene. The island's political parties have repeatedly put pressure on U.S. administrations to grant

independence or to make Puerto Rico a state. One political party, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, entered the political arena in the early 1920s to mobilize the population around a program of national independence. The leader of this party, Pedro Albizu Campos, became an outspoken critic of U.S. colonial policy on the island and is today a symbol of the Puerto Rican independence movement.

The symbolic importance of Albizu is best illustrated by a well-known anecdote about him coming to speak at a meeting held in April 1925 to commemorate a famous Puerto Rican patriot. When he rose to speak, he proceeded to the podium, which was draped with a large Puerto Rican flag and had small American flags decorating the handrails. Before speaking, Albizu removed all of the American flags and stuffed them into his pockets.¹ Four years earlier, E. Montgomery Reily, the newly appointed Governor of Puerto Rico, had included the following statement in his inaugural address:

"There is no place on this island, my friends, for any flag other than the stars and stripes and there never will be. While "Old Glory" floats over the United States, she will continue to fly over Puerto Rico."²

To the Nationalists, the prominent display of the American flag became a symbol of U.S. domination. Governor Reily had made an attack against all supporters of Puerto Rican independence. It took place on a symbolic level but mirrored real colonial policy. The Nationalist reaction was in turn symbolic and real. For Albizu and

his followers, the battle lines were clearly drawn: "What is under discussion is the supreme definition: Yankees or Puerto Ricans" ("Está sobre el tapete la suprema definición: yanquis o puertorriqueños.")³

Who was Albizu Campos, and what is his significance to Puerto Rican history? A large literature describing his life and the turbulent events in the history of the Nationalist Party has emerged since the late 1960s and early 1970s. The timing of this interest in Puerto Rican nationalism coincided with the growing disillusionment which government officials, the public and the academic community in the U.S. and Latin America have experienced over the problems of Latin American development and inter-American relations. The military coup which toppled the Allende government in Chile in 1973, the international oil crisis which began to disrupt the world economic system in the early 1970s, the slowing of the economic "miracles" in Mexico and Brazil and the proliferation of repressive, right-wing regimes in Central and Latin America are events which have led to a re-examination of political and economic strategies for development.

The Reagan administration, exhibiting renewed fear of leftist movements which may strengthen Communist influence in the hemisphere, faces a dilemma when it tries to impose new policy alternatives. Puerto Rico, although not the major focal point for U.S. foreign policy, is an example of the changes which the U.S. government must

take into account when dealing with Latin America in the 1980s. In the Cold War era of the 1950s Puerto Rico could be seen as a beacon toward which other development efforts would look for guidance as an alternative to socialism; today, in contrast, the island is perceived by many scholars to be yet another example of how liberal optimism for peaceful change in the world order has been dashed on the rocks.

Scholarly literature which has examined the history of the Nationalist Party reflects this change in attitude to a startling degree and is a manifestation of general dissatisfaction with the development process that has been applied in the Puerto Rican case. The Nationalists, until recently seen simply as an insignificant group of protestors, are today being re-examined by radical scholars who are highly critical of U.S. policy toward Puerto Rico and view the Nationalist defeat as one aspect of U.S. domination and the penetration of international capital in Third World areas.

There is very little material on the Nationalist Party written prior to the 1960s. Only one major work, Paulino Castro's Historia sinóptica del Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico,⁴ published in 1947, is devoted to describing events in the history of the party up until that time. Castro is very pro-Nationalist, and presents an often biased account, but does include enough data to be somewhat informative. Bolivar Pagán, in his history of Puerto Rican political parties published in 1959,⁵ provides very basic data on Nationalist meetings, programs, leadership and electoral

participation, but makes little effort to analyze the significance of the party's influence, and in general has a negative attitude toward the Nationalists. In the 1960s, several scholars (most notably Robert Anderson, Gordon Lewis and Thomas Mathews)⁶ conducted very thorough research on Puerto Rican development, but relegated the Nationalist Party to the back shelf of political history, dismissing Albizu Campos and the Nationalists as a quasi-fascist splinter group which had effectively, and appropriately, been rejected by the Puerto Rican electorate.

Also appearing in the 1960s were the first studies of the party, focusing on Albizu himself, which began to tell the "other side" of the story, casting the Nationalists and their leader in a much more sympathetic light than had been seen until this point. Some of the writings of Juan Antonio Corretjer, as well as the work of Ramón Medina Ramírez, Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos and Roberto F. Rexach Benítez⁷ fall into this category. Many of these accounts about Albizu are biased, undoubtedly in reaction to the completely negative view of Albizu presented in existing, "official" sources. These authors paved the way for a virtual explosion of interest in the Nationalists beginning in the 1970s.

Two significant currents run through the literature on the Nationalists which has appeared since the 1970s. First, several scholars have begun the task of compiling a large body of data about

Albizu Campos and the party. Reece B. Bothwell González, Juan Antonio Corretjer, Carmelo Delgado-Cintrón, Manuel Maldonado-Denis, Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, Federico Ribes Tovar, R.R. Rivera Correa, Juan Angel Silén, J. Benjamín Torres and others have all made contributions toward telling the previously unknown story of the Nationalist Party.⁹ The work of these authors reflects an awakening of Puerto Rican interest in their own history and an effort to grapple with the question of why Puerto Rico never became independent. Unfortunately, some authors, like Federico Ribes Tovar and J. Benjamín Torres, have tried so hard to emphasize the seriousness of Albizu's contributions to Puerto Rico that they have distorted and/or withheld facts and have tended to eulogize the Nationalist leader. Nevertheless, they have gathered a vast amount of data. Other authors, like Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, have been highly critical of Albizu Campos, and have given interpretations attributing the failure of Nationalism to the peace-loving nature of Puerto Ricans. The work of all these authors, whatever their biases, has provided the groundwork for further research.

Only one study, conducted by Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, has given an in-depth factual account of the chronology of the Nationalist Party.¹⁰ Little else exists in secondary literature giving details about the party itself. Studies about Albizu Campos have provided only a broad overview of his life, and are often biased because, as mentioned above, authors have tried to eulogize or condemn

him. Almost nothing has been written about Albizu's childhood or family; there is only limited data about his years at Harvard (Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo¹¹ has provided the best account of influences upon Albizu during this period); little is known about his trip to Latin America or about the details of his relationship to his wife, Laura Meneses, and how she might have affected his political activity; no study has been made of his trial or that of the Nationalist leaders in 1936, nor is there any follow-up about their years in prison in Atlanta or about Albizu's parole in New York City. There has been almost no investigation of alleged U.S. surveillance of Albizu or repression of the Nationalists in either the 1930s or the 1950s. Last, although preliminary study of Nationalist links to the labor movement has begun, little solid information is available about the details of the 1934 strikes in Puerto Rico or the class background of members of the Nationalist Party. In spite of the fact that an examination of class alliances may best explain the failure of Puerto Rican Nationalism, theories about the Nationalists' class links will remain conjecture until more data is available.

At the outset, then, a study of Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party based primarily upon secondary sources is bound to be hampered by the many gaps in available data and the controversial nature of the topic. The national question is still unresolved in Puerto Rico, and it is linked to other international development issues facing the United States and Latin America today. This study

examines the existing literature about the Nationalist Party and Albizu Campos, and seeks to evaluate what lay behind the Nationalist attacks upon the colonial government of Puerto Rico.

CHAPTER I

PEDRO ALBIZU CAMPOS AND THE BACKGROUND TO THE PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Don Pedro Albizu Campos, "El Maestro," was the most outstanding leader of the Puerto Rican independence movement in the twentieth century. As President of the Nationalist Party, he challenged the right of the United States to dominate the lives of the Puerto Rican people. Knowing Albizu Campos is not easy because he was surrounded by controversy for most of his life. Those who have written about him often saw either a saint or a dangerous fanatic. The truth lies somewhere in-between.¹ Many of his followers were driven to bare their souls in an outpouring of poetic and artistic creativity inspired by the magnetic force which drove Albizu himself. Some were shot and killed by police while exercising what should have been their right to peaceful assembly. Others became terrorists and assassins, finding death or imprisonment to be the pay-off for their extreme self-sacrifice. Don Pedro, who began his life as a brilliant youth full of promise, died a paralytic old man, martyr to a cause which never succeeded. His story, and the stories of others like him, will continue to provoke controversy so long as the twin questions of Puerto Rican status and international inequality remain unresolved.

A. The Philosophical Heritage of Pedro Albizu Campos:

Pedro Albizu Campos was born in Ponce, Puerto Rico, on June 29, 1893.² His mother, Doña Juliana Campos y Campos, was a native Puerto Rican of mixed Indian, black and white ancestry.³ His father, Don Alejandro Albizu y Romero, was a Basque merchant⁴ who had been one of the founders of the 19th century Liberal Party in Puerto Rico.⁵ Although born an illegitimate child, Albizu was later recognized by his father. His biographers have provided almost no information about his childhood.

Albizu received his primary and secondary education in public schools in Ponce, and the Logia Aurora de Ponce⁶ then sent him to the University of Vermont on a Freemasonry scholarship.⁷ After a short period of undergraduate study there, he went on to enroll at Harvard in 1913.⁸ He earned his Bachelor of Arts in 1916 and entered Harvard Law School that same year.⁹ His studies there were interrupted by some training in the U.S. Army Reserves¹⁰ and a period of military service.

During World War I, Albizu left the university to enlist in the U.S. army. He was assigned to an all black batallion as a private.¹¹ The U.S. system of racial discrimination according to a color line meant that a Puerto Rican like Albizu, who had a

dark-hued complexion, was classified as "black," although by Latin American standards he would not have been defined this way. It is possible that he considered this to be a social affront. By the time of his discharge, he had gained the rank of First Lieutenant, but he refused to rejoin the reserves because he had apparently come to believe that Puerto Ricans and blacks were badly exploited by the army.¹²

Albizu returned to his studies at Harvard in 1919. He temporarily withdrew from school in 1920-21, but he eventually earned a Bachelor's degree in law in February 1923.¹³ Many writers who support Puerto Rican independence claim that Albizu was an ardent supporter of independence even in his high school years,¹⁴ but Juan Angel Silén is probably correct that there appears to be little hard evidence for this in existing biographical sources.¹⁵ Albizu Campos married Laura Meneses while he was a student at Harvard. She was a Peruvian woman through whom he later developed ties to the APRA movement in Peru and to some of the anti-imperialist movements in Latin America. In her account of their life at Harvard, Laura Meneses says that Albizu was a victim of racial prejudice and had a difficult time financing his studies. He supplemented his scholarship in various ways, tutoring other students, doing translations, writing for the Christian Science Monitor and mowing lawns.¹⁶

It was during his years of study at Harvard that Albizu expanded his intellectual universe, became politically active and deepened his commitment to the goal of Puerto Rican independence. Albizu's world-view was in later years to exert so much influence over the Nationalist Party that a study of the sources of his intellectual inspiration is essential to an understanding of Nationalist ideology. Three important intellectual currents developed in Albizu while he studied at Harvard. First, he rejected Latin American positivism, converted to Catholicism and studied Spanish Scholasticism. Second, he identified strongly with the Irish and Indian independence movements against Great Britain. Third, he accepted the law as the legitimate institution through which individuals and nations should seek justice.

His interest in Scholasticism was encouraged by a Catalan priest, Father Luis Rodes, who introduced Albizu to the works of Jaime Balmes, Francisco Victoria, Francisco Suárez, and Juan de Mariana.¹⁷ Albizu also was probably exposed to the work of some of the turn of the century Spanish writers who re-examined Scholastic thought in their attempt to grapple with Spain's loss of its empire. Another priest, Father Ryan, introduced Albizu to the work of James Connolly, a leader in the Irish independence movement. Albizu met Rabindranath Tagore, the Indian writer and intellectual who explained the work of Ghandi to Western audiences. Tagore visited the United States on a lecture tour during 1916-1917, and he stopped at Harvard

where he delivered a lecture on nationalism which Albizu Campos was chosen to rebut.¹⁸

Living in the United States during the era of World War I, Albizu came into conflict with many value systems which he rejected. As one of his biographers has stressed,¹⁹ it was a time of intellectual crisis for many Americans--the World War, the Mexican and Russian Revolutions, and the turmoil within the British Empire shook the world and threatened U.S. faith in democracy, order and prosperity. It was also a time in which there was a resurgence of nationalism--a new faith in modernization and the "American way" grew in the U.S. To Albizu, whose education in Puerto Rico had given him a background in Latin American positivism, the acceptance of utilitarian, pragmatic philosophies from the United States meant "...the inevitability of North American dominance."²⁰ Believing that he saw through the American Dream, Albizu rejected liberalism and positivism and became a self-styled Neo-Scholastic.

Several concepts from the works of the Scholastics emerge in Albizu Campos's political discourse. Jaime Balmes, an early 19th century Catalan priest, believed that Protestantism and positivism were disrupting forces which brought conflict to society; he sought a return to the harmony of Catholicism and the Golden Age of Spain. Albizu Campos, in his leadership of the Nationalist Party, adopted an extremely Hispanophilic position, identifying Anglo-Saxon

Protestantism as the force which exploited and destroyed Catholic nations. Here, he saw a common bond between Ireland and Latin America. He romanticized Puerto Rico's Spanish past, believing that a developing prosperity and harmony had been interrupted by the arrival of the U.S.

Francisco Vitoria was a 16th century professor at the University of Salamanca, who wrote Relectiones Teologiae, a treatise which, according to Juan Antonio Corretjer, fascinated Albizu.²¹ In this work Vitoria tried to resolve ethical questions which arose over the Spanish conquest of the Indies. He set forth several principles, including the following: (1) The territorial integrity of the Indies must not be violated and the culture must be unchanged. Force gave the King no rights. (2) The caciques (Indian chieftans) were to be treated as true sovereigns.²² Albizu based his belief structure on the assumption that Vitoria's principles had actually been followed by the Spaniards. He glorified Spain for its enlightened rule. Under the influence of Vitoria, Albizu created a philosophy which held that under international law Puerto Rico was a sovereign territory, and he vilified the United States for its use of force to deny sovereignty to Puerto Ricans.

Francisco Suárez, a 16th century Jesuit theologian and philosopher, is considered one of the founders of international law,

and his writings exerted a strong influence on the development of political thought in Latin America. In an essay on the philosophical roots of Spanish America's political heritage, Richard M. Morse outlined some of the elements of Suarezian philosophy which are reflected in the region's political institutions:

1. "Natural law is clearly distinguished from conscience. ...Natural law is never mistaken... Society and the body politic are therefore seen as properly ordered by objective and external natural-law precepts rather than by consensus sprung from the promptings of private conscience.
2. Sovereign power originates with the collectivity of men.
3. The people do not DELEGATE but ALIENATE sovereignty to their prince. Although the people are in principle superior to the prince, they vest power in him without condition that he may use it as he deems fitting. By contract, then, the prince is superior to the people.
4. In certain cases the law of the prince loses its force: (a) if it is unjust; (b) if it is too harsh; (c) if the majority has already ceased to obey it.
5. The prince is bound by his own law. He cannot, however, be punished by himself or by his people, and is responsible only to God..."²³

As Morse stresses, these precepts offered a "...sophisticated theoretical formulation of the ideals and many sociological realities of the Spanish patrimonial state."²⁴ To Suárez, majority rule, while it was an important element in democratic government, could not "make right" that which was objectively wrong. Albizu Campos incorporated three aspects of Suárez's philosophy into his own political thought. First, even though Albizu attempted to obtain the support of a majority of the Puerto Rican electorate, he did not believe that the island's legitimate right of sovereignty was granted

by that majority. Albizu insisted that Puerto Rico was a sovereign state according to international law. Whether or not the U.S. or the Puerto Rican electorate recognized that sovereignty, it was legitimate and inviolate. A second important concept which Albizu got from Suárez was that the nation consisted of a unified social body in which sovereignty originates. The theme of the unity of the Puerto Rican people and the Latin "race" was a key factor in Albizu's interpretation of his own society. Last, Albizu incorporated the concept that "unjust" laws lose force.

Juan de Mariana was a 16th century Jesuit who wrote about the nation-state and tyrannical rule. He, like Suárez, believed that society could rebel against unjust laws. He believed that when a tyrant ruled unjustly a people had the right to revolt. In Mariana's scheme, however, the purpose of revolt was to convince the tyrant to do good. Only if the threat of revolt failed to alter tyranny was assassination justified. For this reason he held that it was only legitimate to overthrow a tyrant after publicly declaring the intention of the citizenry to rebel. Mariana also believed that it was important to act with "valor," especially in defense of the nation.²⁵ This is particularly helpful in understanding the public assassination threats which Albizu Campos made, and the open sacrifice which was practiced by Nationalists. The Nationalists, when they abandoned electoral politics, did not engage in clandestine or random terrorism, but targeted public figures who represented U.S.

tyranny. Albizu and his followers could justify violence only through public acts of heroism and sacrifice.²⁶

The causes of Indian and Irish liberation also absorbed Albizu Campos during his student days. From the Indian struggle, he apparently accepted some of Ghandi's ideas about passive resistance, but he allowed for a point at which armed struggle became morally correct. According to J. Benjamin Torres, Albizu not only had met Tagore, but also knew M. Tylak, an Indian leader who opposed Ghandi's approach and advocated armed struggle.²⁷ Albizu must have combined Ghandi's ideas about passive resistance with Tylak's militancy. Incorporating these views with those of Juan de Mariana, he created an eclectic philosophy to guide the use of violence in Puerto Rican politics.

Albizu was active in the Irish liberation movement, and founded several student organizations in support of Irish independence.²⁸ Both Corretjer and Stevens Arroryo report that he was heavily influenced by James Connolly.²⁹ From Connolly, Albizu deepened his belief in the importance of the family. He began to link the fate of Puerto Rico (like that of Ireland) to the fate of other oppressed nations. It is possible that Albizu modeled his Army of Liberation on the Irish Citizen Army created by Connolly in 1913, although Corretjer believes that Albizu based his army upon Pearse's volunteers.³⁰ Whichever was the case, Albizu's model for armed

revolt was undoubtedly derived from the Irish experience and given its philosophical underpinnings from the work of the Scholastics.

Albizu thus took the various intellectual and political currents to which he had been exposed and applied them to the Puerto Rican case. His Catholicism became "a conscious act of conserving what Puerto Rico ha(d) been, in the face of the North American policy of forcing Puerto Rico to stop from being itself."³¹ His views on sovereignty, national unity, harmony, valor and revolt grew out of his study of Spanish Scholasticism and lent the aspect of an almost medieval chivalry to his political style.³² His models for action were based on the Irish independence movement. And his faith in the law came from both the Scholastic concepts of heirarchy and justice and his own legal studies at Harvard. As a political leader in Puerto Rico, he would employ these concepts to develop an ideology and liberation strategy for the Nationalist Party.

In 1921, Albizu Campos returned to Puerto Rico and began to practice law in Ponce. He soon became involved in island politics, moved to action by his desire to end Puerto Rico's colonial status. The views which Albizu developed about participation in the electoral system must be evaluated not only in terms of his Latin American philosophical heritage, but also through the study of the conditions which characterized Puerto Rico in his day. Albizu returned to a colony in which political bossism, electoral fraud, economic crisis

and social conflict had created conditions of turmoil.

B. Puerto Rico—Responses to Colonial Status:

The overriding issue in Puerto Rican politics when Albizu Campos returned was the "status issue." Puerto Rico was forcibly ceded to the United States by Spain through the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish American War in April 1899. For one year the U.S. held the island under military rule. A civil government was established in April 1900, extending limited legislative control to Puerto Ricans, but retaining executive, judicial and some legislative power in Washington. Although the U.S. made many liberal changes in the structure of the insular government, complete executive, judicial, and legislative power has never been extended to the colony. The "status issue" has dominated Puerto Rican politics throughout the twentieth century, and is still unresolved.

There are three choices of status for the citizens of a colony: (1) to maintain and/or strengthen political, economic and cultural ties between the colony and the metropole; (2) to seek independence; and (3) to search out some "middle ground" such as home rule with continued close association with the dominant nation. In the Puerto Rican case, the first alternative has been the main characteristic of "statehood" parties, the second position has been

pursued by pro-independence parties (independentistas), and the third option has been called the "autonomist" strategy. Since 1900, autonomist and pro-statehood parties have traditionally commanded the greatest number of votes, and pro-independence parties have wielded so little electoral strength that it has been difficult for them to maintain recognition as officially registered parties.

The clarity of this model, however helpful for analytical purposes, obscures the fact that all Puerto Rican parties have cultivated votes on the basis of what might be called "latent" nationalism. Autonomist parties have included independence planks in their platforms — calling, for example, for "eventual" independence, or masquerading what is de facto autonomous status as though it were equivalent to independence. Statehooders have assured islanders that statehood would not bring an end to national "identity." Both statehood and autonomist parties have tended to be more "pro-American" when addressing U.S. audiences or lobbying in Washington, and have assumed decidedly "pro-nationalist" positions before the Puerto Rican electorate. Meanwhile, independence parties have often pursued strategies of non-cooperation and electoral boycott, making measurement of party strength difficult. Electoral results, therefore, have never succeeded in "resolving" the status issue because after each election all parties have been able to offer interpretations showing that their particular status position was favored by the voters.

1. The Electoral System of Puerto Rico, 1900-1932:

Because Albizu Campos became so deeply involved in party politics, a careful look at how the electoral system evolved is needed in order to understand what his options for political action were. Between 1900 and 1917 Puerto Rico was governed by the Foraker Act, an "organic law" passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President McKinley on April 12, 1900 to establish a civil government for the island. Under the Foraker Act, a Governor and an eleven member Executive Council were appointed by the U.S. president. The Council filled the dual role of cabinet and upper legislative house; five of its members had to be Puerto Ricans. (The President had the option of nominating more than five islanders to the Council, but in practice he always appointed continentals to the other six seats.)³³ The Governor served as the personal representative of the U.S. president; his position was comparable to that of a British colonial governor.³⁴

An elected Chamber of Deputies served as the lower house, but the Governor and the U.S. President had absolute veto power over all legislation, and the U.S. Congress could annul any legislation passed by the Puerto Rican house even if the Governor had not vetoed it. (In theory "the reserve powers of the Federal government" over Puerto Rico were "unlimited." In practice, however, the use of these powers was limited "by constantly strengthening precedent."³⁵ The President usually exercised his power primarily through his

appointees to insular posts rather than by use of the veto.³⁶ Congress never used its veto power.³⁷ The legislature was not completely without power to balance against the strength of the executive. In the early years under the Foraker Act the lower house frequently refused to vote for appropriations unless the Governor granted concessions.)³⁸ Members of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court were appointed by the President with Senate approval, and District Judges and Municipal Judges were appointed by the Governor.³⁹

Puerto Ricans, in short, had access to 5 appointive cabinet seats and could only be elected to their lower house.⁴⁰ This was a political system in which power did not reside with the electorate and all Puerto Rican politicians and parties were dependent upon federal patronage for access to high government posts. The major parties maintained affiliation with U.S. parties, sent delegates to party conventions, and were recognized in the patronage following continental elections.⁴¹ "The Foraker Act was designed to assure the people of Porto Rico full opportunity to express their will in all public matters through regularly elected representatives, but to prevent their political inexperience from provoking crises or engaging them in unwise public projects."⁴²

In 1917, shortly before the American entry into World War I, the Foraker Act was replaced by a new organic law, the Jones Act, a

move which "...savored strongly of a bid for Porto Rican loyalty during the coming conflict."⁴³ Under the Jones Act, Puerto Ricans were given U.S. citizenship, and the insular legislature was re-organized. An elected Senate was established, and four of the cabinet members of the Executive Council were to be appointed by the Governor (rather than directly by the U.S. president), subject to the approval of the insular Senate. This represented an increase in the power of the insular government, but did not substantially modify Puerto Rico's colonial status. Even after a reform of the Jones Act in 1927, the American Civil Liberties Union, in a study of civil rights in U.S. territorial possessions, was moved to comment that "...while the legislature is in native hands, the executive and judicial branches are controlled from Washington. In spite of a liberal organic act and Bill of Rights, the degree of self-government and civil liberties enjoyed by Puerto Ricans depends on the inclination of the particular administration in office."⁴⁴ The exact degree to which U.S. constitutional protection extends to Puerto Rico has still not been explicitly defined by the Federal government, the island today has no voting representation in the U.S. Congress, and islanders do not vote for the President.

When the Nationalist Party entered the political arena during the 1920s, Puerto Rican elections were regulated by the electoral law of 1919 which created an insular Board of Elections (Junta Insular

de Elecciones). The board members included a General Supervisor (Superintendente General), usually a continental, who served as chair and was appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and a regular and an alternate member from each of the "principal parties." ("Principal parties" were the two parties which had received the greatest number of votes in the preceeding election. The principal parties gained certain advantages, such as favored positions on the ballot and equal voting representation on the electoral boards.) Minority parties did not have voting representation on the electoral board. They were represented by "observers" who had the right to challenge ballots. In order to gain a place for their candidates on the ballot a minority party had to present petitions to the Board of Elections, a procedure not required of the principal parties.⁴⁵ These petitions had to have the signatures of at least 10 per cent of the total votes tabulated in the previous election.⁴⁶ Members of the electoral board were appointed by the Governor, but in practice they were selected by the central directing bodies of their respective parties who submitted their names to the Governor. Local election boards (las juntas electorales) were created to administer elections at the precinct level.

The election boards supervised voter registration, the preparation of voter lists, and the reporting of election results, as well as the preparation of registration cards, tally sheets,

challenges, ballots, etc. Appeals from the local boards could be made to the insular board; appeals from the insular board were referred to the Supreme Court. The insular board supervised the local boards. This system placed control of elections in the hands of the major parties, and allowed for a great deal of manipulation of the electoral process. Monopoly control over elections led to many fraudulent practices. Citing an investigation reported in the Congressional Record during the 1930s, Mathews reported that in the town of Coamo there were 9,775 inhabitants over the age of 21, but 14,144 registered voters.⁴⁷ The practice of padding registration lists apparently included placing dead people on the record.

Electoral fraud reached a height in the 1924 election, when the parties of a coalition known as "The Alliance" (La Alianza) enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the electoral boards, and excluded other parties from fair representation at polling places.⁴⁸ In some towns other parties asked their membership to abstain from voting to protest the fraud which was countenanced by Government officials, including judges, district attorneys and police officers. Their efforts proved fruitless, and the Alliance leaders literally bought the votes to put themselves into office.⁴⁹

Vote buying was practiced openly. Temporary party offices were set up near polling places, and ballots were printed on thin

paper. When it was ascertained by the electoral "judges" of the principal parties that a voter had cast his ballot for the appropriate candidate, he was given a slip of paper which he then turned in at the party's nearby office for cash. Often the parties paid less than the amount promised, but the voters had no recourse in such cases.⁵⁰ Party faithful were grouped together in locations known as corrales. These were areas where voters were given food and drink, and from which they were transported to polling places (where their ballots were checked by the party controlling their votes). Frequently voters were taken to vote at several different polling places.⁵¹

One of the ways in which parties harrassed the opposition was to "challenge" their voters at the polls. The provision of the electoral law which allowed ballots to be challenged was originally intended as a safeguard against illegal registration because there was so much over-registration. In practice, it became a weapon to use against one's political opponents. In the 1924 election, 10,000 voters were challenged; this figure rose to 30,000 in the 1928 election, and to 72,000 in 1932.⁵² In order to challenge a voter, a legal oath was filed; the challenged voter could then sign a counter-affidavit, and the question would be resolved by the electoral board, or the insular courts if a decision could not be reached. It cost considerable time and money to "prove" one's legal registration, the boards were rarely impartial since they were

controlled by the majority parties, and most voters simply did not bother to contest challenges.⁵³ This suggests that the ballots were never counted for most of those voters who were challenged in 1928 and 1932, and this represented a significant proportion of the total vote in both of those years. (See table on p.30.)

More research is needed to clarify the exact effects which the manipulation of elections had on each of the parties, but it is clear that minority parties, splinter parties trying to appear alone on the ballot, and new parties were placed at a considerable disadvantage to the principal parties. Many Puerto Rican leaders launched efforts at electoral reform, but were generally unsuccessful in removing power from the entrenched parties. One letter of protest, prepared by the Puerto Rican Elections Protest Committee and submitted to the U.S. Congress in December 1924, offers a sad testimony. According to this letter, "...the worst kind of political bossism" had developed on the island. The "advice and consent" of the Senate generally meant that the president of the Senate (who was also the president of the majority party) exerted heavy influence with the Governor over most insular appointments. Before vacancies occurred in key posts, aspirants attempted to win the favor of the Senate president, who had created "an office-holding class" which was used "as the backbone of the political party that kept him in power."⁵⁴

This petition demonstrates that top party leadership wielded considerable strength even though by the letter of the law their power was completely subordinate to that of the Governor. Federal power became concentrated in an insular sub-structure which was controlled by a political elite who balanced cooperation with Washington against limited use of their demand for concessions. Members of this group had an interest in opening up the political system only in so far as it might help one's own party to gain the advantage over its opponents or to maintain the balance of power. In addition, special interest groups were able to control members of the legislature by participating in behind-the-scenes deals. This system is reminiscent of U.S. political institutions, but in the colonial government of Puerto Rico the abuses of power were intensified.

Conflicts of interest among office-holders were common. José Tous Soto was leader of the Republican Party, a Senator, and at the same time served as attorney for several large sugar corporations, including the South Porto Rico Sugar Company.⁵⁵ Such conflicts of interest cut across party lines: Antonio Barceló, leader of the Unionists and later the Liberal Party, was the brother-in-law of the vice president and general manager of the Fajardo Sugar Company.⁵⁶ According to Jose Coll y Cuchí, a well-known Puerto Rican politician and at one time a Nationalist Party leader, by 1910, 11 of the 35 members of the Puerto Rican House of Representatives were in the control of sugar corporations.⁵⁷ Such connections

raise major questions about how links between private industry, the Puerto Rican government and the Federal government were established and to what extent opposition to control by political bosses was possible.

Little information about the exact composition of the Puerto Rican electorate during the elections between 1920 and 1932 is available. The table below lists the number of registered voters.

VOTER REGISTRATION & BALLOTS CAST: 1920-1932

<u>Year</u>	<u>Registered Voters</u>	<u>Ballots Cast</u>
1920	268,643	249,431
1924	326,093	253,520
1928	321,113	256,335
1932	452,738	383,722

SOURCE: Bolivar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 1: 199, 245, 312; 2: 45.

In 1919 the new electoral law cancelled all previous registrations and initiated a new voter registration which became permanent. Suffrage in the 1920 election extended to all literate adult males and to illiterate males who had voted in the two previous elections. Property ownership requirements were formally dropped, but since indigent persons ("mendigos") were denied voting rights this part of the law may have been used to prevent many poor people from voting. In 1929 suffrage was extended to literate women, but

illiterate women and illiterate men who had not voted in the two previous elections were still not given the vote. Santiago Iglesias, the head of the Socialist Party, estimated that as many as 300,000 women and 150,000 men did not have the right to vote as of 1929.⁵⁸ (The total population was 1,299,809 in 1920 and 1,543,013 according to the 1930 census.)⁵⁹ While it is likely that his figures were inaccurate, Santiago Iglesias made a legitimate point when he stressed that many people were still denied voting privileges. Nevertheless, the trend was toward greater electoral participation, and by the 1930s a significantly larger proportion of the population enjoyed voting rights than had been the case prior to 1920.

2. Political Parties of Puerto Rico, 1900-1932:

During the U.S. military occupation, there were two dominant political parties: the Puerto Rican Republican Party (which constituted itself out of the old Autonomy Party and presented a program of eventual statehood) and the American Federalist Party (formed from the 19th century Liberal Party and more or less autonomist in its position). There was also a small Socialist Party. During the election of 1900, the Federalists boycotted the polls in protest against electoral fraud, and the Republicans won the election. The Federalists then re-organized themselves under a new name, the Union de Puerto Rico, or Union Party. The Unionists

defeated the Republicans in the 1904 election on a program demanding greater autonomy. The century opened, therefore, with ambiguous electoral results over status. The first party to win (the Republicans in 1900) was pro-statehood, but in that election the opposing party had boycotted the polls. The second party to win (the Unionists in 1904) was ambivalent: their platform demanded greater autonomy but also included eventual independence as one of its political goals.

Until the 1920s the Union Party won all elections. During this period, a newly organized Socialist Party began to gain strength. The Socialists were a labor party associated with the labor movement headed by Samuel Gompers in the United States. Because they believed that ties to the U.S. would succeed in gaining "bread and butter" demands for workers, the Socialist Party became a pro-statehood party. A small Independence Party was formed by a splinter group of the Union Party in 1912, but did not gain enough votes to continue as an official party. In 1922, because the Unionists dropped independence from their platform, an independentista group split away to form the Nationalist Party. The Nationalist platform called for unconditional independence. The Republican party also split into two wings before the 1924 election. One group joined forces with the Unionists, forming an electoral pact known as the Alliance (La Alianza). The other wing, known as the "Pure Republicans," joined into a coalition with the Socialists. The

Alliance parties won the 1924 election.

A dissenting group of Republicans from the Alliance re-joined the Pure Republicans of the Republican/Socialist coalition before the 1928 election. The Alliance again won in the election of 1928, but cracked afterwards. A Unionist group from the Alliance formed a new party, the Liberal Party, before the election of 1932. Another coalition, called La Coalición, was made at this time between the Socialists and a group of Republicans who had formed the Union Republican Party. (For a table showing the parties and coalitions, see Appendix, p. 131.)

The above summary of political alliances makes it clear that coalitions and pre-election deals were frequently arranged to guarantee political survival for the parties involved. Some pacts were purely expedient: "The Alliance" had represented an effort on the part of the Unionist leadership to prevent defeat in the 1924 race. (Fearing the loss of a large bloc of independentista votes after the Nationalists left the party in 1922, the Unionists had formed this alliance with a wing of the Republican party amidst rumors of an impending electoral pact between the Republicans and Socialists.) Some electoral deals, however, were the result of underlying forces which served to unite parties that at first appear to have been natural antagonists. For example, the Republican Party (representing urban businessmen and professionals who sought alliance

with U.S. investors) and the Socialist Party (representing organized Puerto Rican labor and wishing to strengthen links to the American Federation of Labor and to attract votes from the growing Puerto Rican sugar proletariat) were both parties that were threatened by the Unionists (representing the old hacendado class). A Republican/Socialist coalition, which would make no sense in terms of a U.S. perception of the political spectrum, was a logical development given the internal dynamics of Puerto Rican politics.

A clear correlation between party affiliation and class origin has not been established, but preliminary research indicates that as the electoral system opened up in the 1920s the agricultural working class employed by the large sugar corporations was gaining electoral strength and probably formed the rapidly growing base of the Socialist Party.⁶⁰ The Republican Party, according to Mathews, was the party of "the small urban middle class... As commercial relations with the United States grew, this group grew in numbers and influence."⁶¹ "The Union Party was generally looked upon as the political organization of the well-to-do classes of the town and country. The owner of a coffee hacienda, the proprietor of cane with a small ingenio (mill), or a colono (small independent sugar grower) who sent his cane to an American-owned central."⁶² The Nationalist Party apparently attracted many middle class professionals, but detailed information about the class composition of its membership is not available.

It is not clear from this information whether or not party divisions fell along class lines in the 1932 election. The main contenders were: the newly formed Liberal Party (an outgrowth of the Union Party); a Republican/Socialist coalition (La Coalición); and the Nationalist Party. The Liberals had included an independence plank in their platform, although the party was moderate, or autonomist in position. The Coalition favored statehood, although it accepted autonomy as an interim solution. The Nationalists supported independence.

The results of the 1932 election were disastrous for the Nationalist Party. They polled only 5,257 votes. (See Appendix, p.133 for a comparison of the total votes cast by political parties from 1900 to 1932.) The Socialists received 97,438 votes; the Republicans, 110,794; and the Liberals, 170,168.⁶³ The combined total for the Republicans and Socialists was greater than the total Liberal vote, so the Coalition, benefiting from its electoral pact, won the election. But because the Liberal Party platform included a pro-independence plank, the results of the election did not entirely resolve the status question -- the voters had not clearly rejected independence even though the Nationalist Party was soundly defeated.

The Nationalists withdrew from electoral politics after 1932, and turned toward a strategy of violent confrontation beginning in

the mid 1930s. Further examination of Puerto Rico's colonial status and the early history of the Nationalist Party before this crucial turning-point in their history will help to interpret the reasons for their electoral defeat and explain their later use of violence.

3. The Puerto Rican Economy, 1898-1930:

Also highly relevant for understanding Albizu Campos and the growth of the Nationalist movement is the condition of the Puerto Rican economy. During the late 19th century coffee, sugar and tobacco were the three leading Puerto Rican exports. In 1897, coffee accounted for 66% of the value of exports, sugar for approximately 21%, and tobacco for about 4.4%.⁶⁴ Approximately 41% of cultivated land was devoted to the coffee crop, only about 15% of cultivated land was devoted to sugar production, and tobacco accounted for roughly 1% of cultivated area.⁶⁵ The island had suffered under very restrictive, mercantalistic policies during four hundred years of Spanish rule.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, during the 19th century Puerto Rico had gradually expanded the number of its trading partners, in spite of the Spanish tariff policy of preferential rates which levied much higher charges on goods coming from foreign countries.⁶⁷ A large trade developed between Puerto Rico and the United States, and in 1897 Spain supplied only slightly more than 40% of Puerto Rico's imports, while 21% of Puerto Rican imports came from

the U.S.⁶⁸

The Tariff and Shipping Laws:

The Puerto Rican tariff was revised on January 2, 1899,⁶⁹ substantially reducing duties between the United States and the island. A Presidential proclamation of July 25, 1901 made Puerto Rico an integral part of the U.S. commercial system.⁷⁰ This meant that Puerto Rico was included under the U.S. tariff: Puerto Rican products entered the U.S. duty free, any products entering the island were subject to the same tariff duties paid on products entering the mainland from foreign countries, and Puerto Rican products began to pay the same rates charged on U.S. goods exported to foreign markets. Under this arrangement a great many products which Puerto Rico did not produce, and which had previously been imported from Spain, Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America, were subject to high U.S. import duties. Imported items in this category included food, forrage for livestock, raw materials and parts for small industries and manufacturing operations, machinery and fuel. Conversely, many Puerto Rican exports, which previously had been able to enter European and Latin American markets under Spain's reciprocal trade agreements, became subject to the higher tariffs charged on U.S. goods when entering these countries. The full impact of the U.S. tariff can best be evaluated by studying its effects on coffee, sugar and foodstuffs.

Coffee: Coffee was Puerto Rico's main export crop during the late 19th century. In response to rising world demand, particularly in the first quarter of the century, Puerto Rican coffee growers had greatly expanded production. Coffee exports jumped from 200,000 quintales (1 quintal = 100 lbs.) in 1873-77 to 500,000 quintales in 1893-97, growing from 20% of island exports in 1875⁷¹ to 66% in 1897, as mentioned above. Puerto Rican coffee, which received tariff protection in the Spanish and Cuban markets, and which benefitted from Spain's reciprocal trade agreements with European nations, found expanding markets in Spain, Europe and Cuba, and became an extremely profitable export.⁷² Expansion of coffee production had a multiplier effect on other areas of the Puerto Rican economy, contributing to increases in the standard of living and to the development of a criollo elite in the towns and cities -- merchants, professionals, hacendados and intellectuals.⁷³

In the early 20th century, Puerto Rican coffee production declined due to three factors. In 1899, the hurricane San Ciriaco severely damaged the coffee crop, causing millions of dollars worth of damage and killing many of the trees, including the shade trees which sheltered the type of coffee trees grown in Puerto Rico. Since coffee is a crop which takes 5 to 7 years to mature, and the shade trees have an even longer recovery period of about 15 years, this represented a major setback to the Puerto Rican growers.⁷⁴

Second, the Puerto Rican currency was devalued in 1899 at the rate of 60 cents U.S. for one peso.⁷⁵ The change in currency increased the debt burden of the coffee growers, who had heavily mortgaged their properties during the period of coffee expansion, and who needed new loans to recover from the hurricane damage. Third, under North American occupation the U.S. tariff structure was extended to Puerto Rico.

The new tariff meant that products from Puerto Rico could enter the U.S. duty free, but coffee received no additional special protection against coffee imports from other coffee producing nations. (The U.S. tariff system had not been designed to offer any protection to coffee; Puerto Rico was the first U.S. possession where coffee was produced in substantial quantity.)⁷⁶ After the Spanish-American War Puerto Rico lost its favored status with Spain, so the island's products began to pay high import duties in Spain and to Spain's favored trading partners. This caused an immediate and precipitous decline in Spanish, European and Cuban demand. Prior to the U.S. takeover, Puerto Rican coffee had never enjoyed a large North American market; it was relatively high-priced and had a distinctive flavor which was popular in Spain and Europe but strange to U.S. tastes. Puerto Rican coffee sold in U.S. markets at more than twice the price of Brazilian and Colombian coffees, making it non-competitive in the North American market. Under U.S. control, Puerto Rico lacked the power to make commercial treaties to help

replace lost trading partners. At a time when the coffee estates had been badly damaged and growers were facing a deep financial and credit crisis, the island had lost its main coffee markets without gaining another outlet.⁷⁷ By 1901, coffee accounted for only 19.5% of the value of exports.⁷⁸

Sugar: Sugar presented a very different picture. Under the U.S. tariff, sugar received substantial protection against foreign growers because no duties had to be paid on imports of Puerto Rican sugar into the U.S. Puerto Rican sugar received significant protection against Cuban sugar as well.⁷⁹ One of the most important reasons for the tremendous growth in Puerto Rican sugar was this protection offered by the U.S. tariff, without which it would have had no comparative advantage over competitors such as Cuba. By 1901, sugar had risen to 54.9% of the value of Puerto Rican exports.⁸⁰ North American corporations were investing heavily in the sugar industry, and sugar had become the most tangible manifestation of U.S. economic penetration.

Far-reaching changes in social patterns and class relationships resulted from the transition to a sugar economy. The technology of sugar cultivation brought about land concentration, a concentration of ownership, an influx of U.S. investment capital, the growth of huge centrales (cane-processing plants) and the breakdown

of the old hacienda system which had characterized coffee production. Workers left the mountain coffee estates to settle in lowland areas where they became wage laborers and lived in company towns. Spanish and Puerto Rican owners were displaced by U.S. corporations to such an extent that by 1930, 4 major U.S. sugar corporations produced more than 50% of the crop and only 6 major mills were owned by Puerto Rican families.⁸¹

Food: The expansion of sugar caused important changes in food production as land was put into sugar cultivation and the social structure of the haciendas, where rural islanders had grown a variety of domestic crops, broke down. In 1899, 42% of Puerto Rico's total crop production was grown for local consumption; in 1929, only 28% of crops were produced for domestic consumption, while 72% of crops were cultivated for export.⁸² Between 1901 and 1935, foodstuffs accounted for the largest portion of total imports, reaching about one-third of total imports during the period 1930-35.⁸³ In 1929, approximately 60% of Puerto Rico's total food supply had to be imported.⁸⁴ Land use mirrored this trend: in 1899, 58% of cultivated land was in export crops; in 1929 this figure had risen to 72%.⁸⁵ The growth of commercial export crops was steadily replacing domestic food production.

The staples of the Puerto Rican diet were rice, beans and pork, chicken, or fish. Fish tended to be the main protein on the

coast, while pork and chicken or salted cod were consumed by those who lived in the mountains of the interior. Other important items included wheat flour, lard, dairy products, potatoes, peas, corn meal, onions, cocoa and chocolate, garlic, canned and preserved fruits, edible oils, nuts, and beverages.⁸⁶ Fruit and vegetables had traditionally been grown in sufficient quantity for local consumption. Many of these food products had to be imported. Under the U.S. tariff, Puerto Ricans had to pay more for most imported food items than they had paid before 1898.

The case of rice, the main staple grain, is illustrative of this process. Puerto Ricans had to purchase rice on the U.S. market, where they paid approximately \$2 to \$3 more per hundred pounds than they would have paid on the open world market if they had been able to buy without paying U.S. customs duties.⁸⁷ This pattern was repeated in the case of other food items because Puerto Ricans used many food products which paid high tariffs when imported into the U.S. In addition to the high tariff, there were re-export costs for shipment of imported products from the continent to the island. For foods such as wheat which were grown in the U.S. as well as in other countries, Puerto Ricans became captives within the U.S. market, forced to buy where food prices were very high compared to third world areas. Tariff costs, re-export costs and the costs of purchasing within a protected market were all passed along to the Puerto Rican population, causing a rise in the cost of living.

Shipping: Another serious drain on the island's economy was the application of U.S. coastal shipping laws to Puerto Rico. In order to ship to foreign markets, Puerto Rican producers were legally obligated to use U.S. merchant ships, paying some of the most expensive freight charges in the world. On a product-by-product comparison, the Diffie report found that Puerto Rico was paying more to ship to New York than to Europe, and that its freight rates to almost all destinations were consistently much higher than those of competitors such as Cuba, Jamaica, Haiti, Honduras, Colombia and even distant Brazil.⁸⁸ Puerto Rican shipping was controlled by only four major American shipping lines, each of which had a virtual monopoly over one product.⁸⁹

The imposition of U.S. policies, such as the application of the tariff, had far-reaching economic and social consequences in Puerto Rico. As the Diffie report pointed out, not all of the resulting changes were negative.⁹⁰ The expansion of the sugar industry was indeed accompanied by tremendous economic growth. But much of the benefit of this growth did not reach the majority of Puerto Ricans, and the tariff laws of the U.S., not designed with the needs of the Puerto Rican nation in mind, often caused arbitrary results over which the Puerto Ricans had no control. The side-effects of the U.S. tariff system soon became the object of political protest for many island leaders.

In 1913, for example, José De Diego (Speaker of the House of Delegates), Martin Travieso, Jr. (President of the Executive Council), Antonio Barceló (then President of the Porto Rico Association), Carlos Cabrera and Hector Scoville formed a delegation "representing the Economical Interests of Porto Rico." They travelled to Washington to petition for: continued tariff protection for sugar and fruits; inclusion of coffee among most favored products in U.S. reciprocity agreements; placement of food items and items of general consumption on the free list "to compensate...for the impoverishment of the country;" the declaration of Puerto Rican ports as free ports and the development of port facilities with the aim of stimulating commerce when the Panama Canal opened; and economic independence (i.e., the right to pass customs laws and establish commercial alliances with other nations).⁹¹ The tariff was seen as the root cause of Puerto Rico's multiplying economic and social problems.

4. Americanization:

Another issue which generated heated debate when Albizu Campos was beginning his political career was whether or not the official language of instruction in the schools would be English. This issue held significance beyond the the level of educational policy itself because, like the presence of the Amerian flag, it was

symbolic of Americanization. To be critical of the official use of English was "...to expose oneself to charges of sedition and 'un-American' attitudes."⁹²

The level of education in Puerto Rico at the turn of the century was quite low: in 1899, 23% of the population over age 10 could read and write and only 14% of the children between the ages of 5 and 17 attended school.⁹³ Substantial gains were made between 1900 and 1930. As of 1898 there were 380 public schools for boys and 138 public schools for girls with a total island-wide enrollment of 45,000 students. As of 1930, there were 221,000 students enrolled in co-educational public schools, 7,000 of them in high school courses. Public expenditure for primary and secondary education rose from \$186,000 in 1898 to \$5,834,468 in 1928.⁹⁴ Between 1899 and 1940 the proportion of the population who could read and write tripled.⁹⁵ But these figures mask the inequality between rural and urban areas, and tend to downplay the severe limitations which remained in the educational system.

As of the late 1920s, approximately 97% of children between the ages of 5 and 14 were registered in urban areas, but only 40% of children in this age group were registered in rural areas. (School attendance presumably was lower than official registration figures.) Since classroom space in rural districts was more limited than in towns, about two-thirds of rural children attended school for only

half days. Only about 84% of rural children completed third grade.⁹⁶ In 1928, 27% of the population was classified as urban,⁹⁷ so the repercussions of the inadequacy of the educational system were serious, especially in rural schools: the census of 1920 showed that 61% of rural children over age 10 were illiterate, and 71% of the adult rural population was illiterate.⁹⁸

Official policy regarding the language of instruction during the first four decades of the century is described in the table below.

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION, 1900-1940

<u>Years</u>	<u>Official Language of Instruction</u>
1900-1903	Spanish, grades 1-8 English, high school
1903-1915	English, grades 1-12
1917-1934	Spanish, grades 1-4 English, grades 5-12
1934-1937	Spanish, grades 1-8 English, high school
1937-1940	Spanish, grades 1-2 Spanish & English, grades 3-6 English, grades 7-12

SOURCE: Rafael de Jesús Toro, Historia económica de Puerto Rico (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1982), p.125.

Frequent reversals reflect difficulties in policy implementation. It was impossible to supply enough teachers able to give instruction in English, especially during a period when a rapid expansion in educational services and facilities was also taking place. The absurdity of the situation was apparent. In 1915, for example, even though English was supposedly the official language of instruction throughout all grades, it was in fact taught in only 47% of urban schools and 15% of rural schools because there were nowhere near enough teachers who knew English.⁹⁹ The effort to install English reduced the over-all quality of instruction by diverting educational resources from other areas.

Rexford Tugwell, who served as Governor from 1941-1946, said that "One of the first and most characteristic programs of the early occupation was the expansion of educational facilities, and the re-organization of teaching methods. The benefits of this effort have been obscured by the ultranationalist claims that it was an attempt at cultural imperialism."¹⁰⁰ In spite of Tugwell's interpretation, altruistic motivations on the part of U.S. policy-makers are called into question in the Puerto Rican case. This is clearly revealed in the Brookings report prepared by Victor Clark in 1930. One goal behind the English literacy campaign was an attempt to install North American values on the island: "English is the chief source of democratic ideas in Puerto Rico."¹⁰¹

Another reason for the literacy campaign was the U.S. perception that literacy would facilitate the process of industrialization:

"While education is an imponderable factor and its general significance difficult to measure, it cannot be doubted that economic progress is conditioned at every stage by the knowledge possessed by the masses of the people."¹⁰²

"Factory hands cannot be made in the public schools; but the schools may train factory-minded graduates who comprehend the primary requisites of successful manufacturing."¹⁰³

"The possibility of extensive manufacturing development has long been discussed in Porto Rico. Indeed, industrialization is regarded by many as the only solution for the pressing problems of underemployment and low wages. Accordingly, we have attempted in this survey to appraise the industrial possibilities of the Island."¹⁰⁴

"...It might be wise...to direct this instruction to the specific object of helping pupils who may eventually find employment on the mainland to qualify for work in an English-speaking country."¹⁰⁵

Whatever the motivation behind U.S. policy, the attempt to rapidly create a new educational system, with instruction in a foreign language, was bound to cause repercussions in Puerto Rican society.

The Nationalists, along with other parties, were quick to protest the use of English in the schools. But while the English question became a major focus of Nationalist concern, it represented only one aspect of a larger fear that the hispanic culture of Puerto Rico was disappearing as the U.S. deepened its political and economic

control. The Nationalist reaction, unlike that of other parties, went beyond criticism of educational policy and, under the direction of Albizu Campos, extended into the realm of accusing the U.S. of planning to systematically eliminate Puerto Rican culture. Albizu began to vilify U.S. institutions, policies and culture, while glorifying Puerto Rico's Spanish heritage.

On all fronts--political, economic and cultural--the Nationalists stood in opposition to U.S. policies. Their early attempts to combat colonialism took place within the channels of the Puerto Rican party system.

C. The Formation of the Nationalist Party:

The Nationalist Party was founded on September 17, 1922 by members of the Asociación Nacionalista, an independentista group within the Union Party which opposed the removal of the independence plank from the Unionist platform. Jose Coll y Cuchí was elected President of the new party. Hoping to attract other Unionists, the Nationalists approved the following declaration of principles:

The Nationalist Party aspires to make Puerto Rico into a free, sovereign and independent Republic in accordance with the principles of nationhood. It will employ the ballot box with the aim of commanding the interests of the Puerto Rican people and making our supreme aspiration possible.

We declare that the Nationalist Party of Puerto

Rico exists in order to insure a responsible government and to carry out the will of the people.

Whereas, all the Ibero-American republics are united with us by indestructible ties of blood and language;

Whereas, since the birth of all those republics the supreme ideal was the establishment of a free motherland;

Whereas, our common origin and history is a bond that makes us share the glory of triumphs and the sorrow of setbacks;

Therefore, Be it Resolved by this Assembly:
That a message be sent to all the Ibero-American republics that on this date there has been constituted in Puerto Rico a party designated as the Puerto Rican Nationalist [Party] whose essential goal is to work for the establishment of the Republic of Puerto Rico.¹⁰⁶

The Nationalists did not immediately sever all ties with the Unionists, but remained affiliated until some time after 1922. Activist groups from Ponce, Caguas, Santurce and Yabucoa pressured for change within the Union Party. According to Silén, the Nationalists did not completely separate themselves until approximately 1925, when Albizu Campos began to rise to prominence within the Nationalist group.¹⁰⁷ Castro places this date even later, in 1928.¹⁰⁸

The large secondary literature on the Nationalist Party has focused upon Albizu Campos, and surprisingly little attention has been given to the history and organization of the party itself. Albizu's personalist and centralized leadership so dominated the

party that Jaime Ramírez-Barbot was moved to state that "...there is no question that after 1930 Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party were one and the same."¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, Albizu was not one of the party founders. His positions on many key issues, such as the demand for Puerto Rican independence, the willingness to participate in electoral politics and the support for Pan-Americanism had already been incorporated into the Nationalist position.

The Ponce Nationalists, under the leadership of Ramón Mayoral Barnés, were the moving force behind party activity.¹¹⁰ By 1930 the Nationalists had built up an island-wide organization. The party was headed by a Directorate (Directiva), including a President, First Vice-president, Second Vice-president, Treasurer, and Secretary, and a Junta Nacional del Partido consisting of two representatives from each party district.¹¹¹ The party was sub-divided into a network of locals (Juntas Locales) which received directions from the Junta Nacional to carry out acts of protest and to disseminate propaganda.¹¹² The number of party districts or locals is nowhere mentioned in public sources. This may have been dictated by the Puerto Rican electoral law. Both Pagán and Delgado Cintrón list a total of 14 vocales elected in 1933, to include 2 from each district. This would suggest that the party was divided into 7 districts on the island.¹¹³ Parliamentary procedure was observed in the conduct of party meetings.

Information about party activities was distributed in the weekly newspaper, El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (sometimes known as El Nacionalista de Ponce), published in Ponce. The paper began publication in 1922 and continued in print until December 1930. El Nacionalista was financed largely by Ramón Mayoral Barnés, the Ponceño Nationalist leader.¹¹⁴ It began as a single page flier, growing to be a 12-page weekly by 1928. Income from subscriptions never matched expenses, and Mayoral Barnés reported the sacrifice of considerable sums to keep the publication going. Part of the publication costs were covered by advertising. Among the regular advertisers were local businesses such as a typewriter company, a construction company, a pharmacy, a printer, and a brush company; the Shell Oil Company took out large ads on several occasions. In 1928, the party sold stock to raise a small fund to maintain the paper.

El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico reported on party meetings, demonstrations, Nationalist ceremonies, the activities of party leaders, etc. It also regularly included articles about the island's economy, politics, history and culture. The paper featured poetry and essays which presented Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans in a positive way, articles sympathetic to liberation movements in other Latin American countries, and reprints from the Latin American press which would not normally appear in major Puerto Rican newspapers. (For example, several reprint articles in support of Sandino's struggle in Nicaragua were published during 1927-28.) Reprints from

radical U.S. papers were also given prominent coverage.

Across the top of the front page of each issue of El Nacionalista the following creed was printed (original Spanish text in parentheses):

1. The independence of Puerto Rico (La independencia de Puerto Rico) ;
2. The confederation of the Antilles (La confederación antillana) ;
3. The Ibero-American union (La unión ibero-americana) ;
4. The continental hegemony of the Latin American nations (La hegemonia continental de los naciones latino-americanos) .

The paper regularly printed a small directory of professionals (doctors, lawyers, notary publics, etc.) sympathetic to the Nationalist position; readers were encouraged to take their business to these professionals. The paper was both the party organ and a vehicle to promote a small-scale economic and cultural nationalism. El Nacionalista contains nothing ultra-radical. It was published by a group of middle class citizens, supported by a small segment of the business community, who were attempting to band together to support their "own" interests. The number of registered party members is not reported, but could not have been large -- even by the 1932 election the Nationalists obtained only slightly more than 5,000 votes (see p.35).

Reports printed in El Nacionalista reveal a significant amount of information about the kind of party functions which took

place during the late 1920s. The paper gives very complete coverage of the Nationalist Party's General Assembly which was held at the Ateneo de Puerto Rico in April 1928.¹¹⁵ Party representatives passed several resolutions and made amendments to the by-laws. One of the changes limited the term of office on the Directorate to a two-year period, indicating concern over the control of power within the party. The assembly also voted to send cables to General Augusto Sandino expressing the solidarity of the Puerto Rican Nationalists with his cause, and to send votes of "sympathy and gratitude" to "Juntas Nacionalistas" in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Colombia. Another message of solidarity was sent to the "Unión Centro Sud Americana y Antillana," an organization headquartered in Mexico City. (A description of this organization does not appear in the paper; it may have been an organization to promote pan-American unity.)

The Assembly gave a vote of approval to Albizu Campos for his work in the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Mexico. In June 1927 he had been sent as special Nationalist envoy before the American nations to gain support for the cause of Puerto Rican independence. Trip reports appeared frequently in El Nacionalista. On his travels in Latin America Albizu visited the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The "vote of approval" seems to indicate that the Nationalist Party could not provide any strong institutional support for Albizu.

The Assembly also sent cables to President Coolidge and to the United States Congress petitioning for the "absolute emancipation" of Puerto Rico.¹¹⁶ The Nationalists were not alone among Puerto Rican parties in petitioning the U.S. government and President for changes in Puerto Rico's status or the legislation governing insular affairs. Protests were so numerous that President Coolidge, in February 1928, had been moved to respond to complaints. In a letter addressed to Governor Towner, the President had given what he considered to be an adequate rebuttal to criticisms of U.S. policy.¹¹⁷ The Nationalists remained unsatisfied with the administration's policy, and continued to voice their protest.

One of the minor resolutions discussed at the 1928 General Assembly concerned the decision to send a Puerto Rican flag to a society in Spain. A party member was to hand-carry the flag to Spain, but his unexpected death had interrupted these plans. The flag had to be shipped to a Puerto Rican who was living in Spain so that he could present it to the society's president. The discussion surrounding the donation of this flag was lengthy--three columns of print were devoted to describing the resolution.¹¹⁸ The donation of this flag was an act of symbolic importance to the Nationalists, and the act was typical of party business at this time. The closing acts of the assembly were: (1) to ratify the party's declaration of principles (not listed in the paper); (2) to agree to participate in Puerto Rican elections; and (3) to elect the new Directorate.¹¹⁹

Party activity at the local level during this period seems to have been quite routine. One article from El Nacionalista describes an evening meeting held in the office of a local doctor to form the Junta Nacionalista de Humacao.¹²⁰ A representative from the Caguas branch presided, and he explained that he had been assigned the task of organizing various local juntas in the Humacao district. Officers of the local were elected (president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, and three district representatives). After a general discussion, members of the new local promised to dedicate themselves to disseminating Nationalist propaganda in Humacao and the neighboring villages.

These accounts demonstrate that Nationalist Party functions in the 1920s were utterly routine. The Humacao Junta must have been formed by a small group of middle class individuals--the meeting was in a doctor's office, one might assume an attendance of not more than 20 or so people, and 3 out of 7 of the officers elected held the title of Licenciado or Doctor (at a time when illiteracy was high in Puerto Rico). Local initiatives were encouraged by the central, activist branches of the party--Caguas had sent in a representative. The aims of the group were modest--to disseminate propaganda. No mention was made of violent or military activity. There was nothing unusual about the way the Humacao local constituted itself, nor in what it envisioned as its goals.

Island-wide Nationalist activity was equally routine: revision of by-laws; election of officers; passing of resolutions. Party resolutions often did little more than express solidarity with other movements. They were not "action-oriented." El Nacionalista did not report, for example, on whether the party had plans to establish lobbying groups to deal with sugar interests or to bargain in Washington (strategies which the other parties regularly employed). Many articles reported on disseminating propaganda, but there was little tactical discussion of how to recruit new party members or raise funds. Electoral strategies were not discussed in El Nacionalista at all, even though the party affirmed its belief in elections.

Expressions of solidarity with foreign political organizations established and maintained Nationalist Party links outside Puerto Rico and the Nationalists devoted considerable energy to developing such communication. Groups with whom pledges of solidarity were exchanged included sections of the Junta Nacionalista Pro-Independencia de Puerto Rico in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Colombia, and Mexico. The Nationalists had ties to an organization called the Unión Centro Sud Americana y Antillana, and to a pro-independence society in Spain. The party maintained a New York local which supported U.S. political candidates according to directives from Puerto Rico.¹²¹

The Juntas for Puerto Rican independence were established by Pedro Albizu Campos during his trips to other Latin American countries. They did not represent self-generated outside support, but were little more than one or two individuals in other countries who had agreed to stand in solidarity with the Nationalist leader. The small network of organizations outside Puerto Rico attempted to mobilize foreign support for Puerto Rican independence. A Spanish organization presented the case of the Nationalist Party before the League of Nations in Geneva.¹²² The Unión Centro Sud Americana y Antillana sent a letter protesting Puerto Rican status to President Coolidge on behalf of the Puerto Rican Nationalists.¹²³ These efforts remained on a modest scale.

Albizu Campos returned from his Latin American propaganda trip in January 1930 to find a shake-up within the party. José S. Alegría, the party's honorary President, and Angel M. Villamil, the Second Vice-President, had resigned from their positions, renounced the Nationalist Party, and re-joined the Unionists in late 1929. Their move was prompted by a change in the Unionist declaration of principles. In September 1929, Antonio Ayuso Valdivieso replaced Alegría and Antonio Velez Alvarado replaced Villamil.¹²⁴ Both Ayuso and Jose Coll y Cuchí opposed the presidential candidacy of Albizu Campos at the upcoming Nationalist Assembly of May 1930. According to J. Benjamín Torres, some of the party leaders opposed Albizu because they did not feel that a black man (Albizu was a

mulatto) should be president. It is not clear from public sources if Ayuso and Coll y Cuchí were among this group, but they lobbied against Albizu's election, and Albizu Campos denounced Ayuso for trying to hold on to the interim presidency which he had been elected to fill when Alegria left the party.¹²⁵

After the Nationalist Assembly elected Albizu Campos, Coll y Cuchí walked out of the assembly and withdrew from the party. Ayuso also resigned. The incident stirred up enough public interest that statements by Albizu Campos and Coll y Cuchí appeared on the front pages of the major papers. In his letter, Coll y Cuchí claimed that Ayuso had asked Albizu to present a written report about his Latin American trip to the Junta Nacional. He said that Albizu had refused to do so, indicating his intention to report instead directly to the party assembly. According to Coll y Cuchí, Albizu then used the pretext of giving a trip report to launch into a "chain of insults," in strongly worded language, against Cubans, the Cuban government, the United States, several European nations, the Red Cross, Mother's Day and the Junta Nacional of the party itself! He claimed that one of the attacks Albizu made against the party's leaders was that they had not sent him all the funds necessary to continue his trip. Albizu's speech met with loud applause, and Coll y Cuchí took this as the Assembly's endorsement of Albizu Campos's extremist statements.

Coll y Cuchí was greatly angered by Albizu Campos' remarks, and addressed the assembly himself, saying that the Ponce Assembly, which had commissioned Albizu's Latin American trip, did not commit funding to it at all. The party had nevertheless contributed money toward Albizu's visit to the Dominican Republic. His strongest reaction was that Albizu had really accomplished very little on the trip except for establishing Nationalist groups in the Dominican Republic and Cuba which he said were already inactive. In Coll y Cuchí's view, the process of island-wide organization which the party had undergone in Albizu's absence was being captured and mis-directed toward a policy of hatred.¹²⁶ If Coll y Cuchí is to be believed, Albizu's financial sacrifices for the trip were less than some of his supporters have made them out to be, and his diatribes reached hysterical heights. What is most significant about Coll y Cuchí's statement is that it does not concentrate on Albizu as a "violence-monger," but portrays him as irresponsible within the party and indecorous in his behavior. Coll y Cuchí seemed to be as enraged with the audience for its positive response to Albizu as he was with Albizu himself for his vehement speech. He said that he could not continue to belong to a party with "...a politics of hatred and insults" ("...una política de odios y de insultos.")

In his response, Albizu denied most of Coll y Cuchí's accusations, but did admit to having attacked the U.S. in his speech to the Assembly. He did not give a point-by-point response to the

accusations, but in turn accused Coll y Cuchí of paying homage to the U.S. and accused Ayuso and Coll y Cuchí of attempting to use the assembly for their own political ambitions.¹²⁷ This incident marks one of the first times that Albizu Campos's speeches were taking on an extremist tone. His exhortations had met with enough support to enable him to wrest control from his opposition. The Assembly ended with the Nationalist Party under the firm control of Albizu Campos.

CHAPTER II

THE NATIONALIST RESPONSE TO COLONIAL POLICY

As leader of the Nationalists at the beginning of the 1930s, Albizu began to develop a strategy for the independence struggle. The most fundamental element in Nationalist thought was their belief in the right of Puerto Rican sovereignty. They held that the United States had no right to control Puerto Rico. This concept was clearly expressed in the declaration of principles which was drawn up by the party's founders, but it was Albizu Campos who elaborated upon this idea and justified Puerto Rico's right to independence through a precise legal argument. In what is known as his "Null and Void Thesis," Albizu argued that Puerto Rico had been granted sovereignty under the Autonomous Charter from Spain in 1897. He contended that the Treaty of Paris, which was signed by representatives from Spain and the United States, but not by a plenipotentiary from Puerto Rico, was null and void (nulo y sin valor) so far as Puerto Rico was concerned. Under international law Spain had no legal right to "cede" Puerto Rico to the United States, regardless of U.S. demands and use of force, because according to the terms of the Autonomous Charter only Puerto Rico had the power

to ratify treaties in its own behalf.¹ Based upon this argument, Albizu and the Nationalists did not recognize U.S. jurisdiction over Puerto Rico.

Albizu's background in law and his studies of the Scholastics here converged with the mainstream of Nationalist thought. He took the basic premise of the Nationalist declaration of principles—the legitimacy of Puerto Rico's claim to independence—and gave it a legal and philosophical justification. Since the issue of sovereignty could not be questioned, the Treaty of Paris had violated international law. Albizu drew from other currents in Puerto Rican Nationalism as well. The Nationalists were outspoken supporters of non-intervention in Latin American affairs and of Latin American unity. These party goals reinforced Albizu's Hispanophilic world-view. He began to elaborate upon the concepts of the Puerto Rican "family" and Latin American unity in the face of North American imperialism.

One aspect of Albizu's concept of the "national family" was that an individual owed devotion to the nation as though it were a real family. Just as a husband must defend his wife or a mother her children, so citizens must defend the nation. Perhaps going back to Juan de Mariana's ideas of valor in defense of the nation, Albizu called upon his followers to be willing to sacrifice everything for their country. When he was elected party president in 1930, he made

party members swear the following oath of honor: "We hereby solemnly swear that we will defend the Nationalist ideal and sacrifice our property and our lives if necessary for the independence of our country."²

To this, Albizu added the Christian belief in redemption through sacrifice:

"...Courage is the supreme virtue of man... It is worth nothing to a man that he be full of knowledge and of physical vitality if he lacks courage. That is the supreme asset of the individual and of the nation... Only courage allows man to tread firmly and serenely through the shadows of death; and when man passes serenely through the shadows of death, it is then that he enters into immortality... I have wanted to descend to the tomb free of the corrupting gold of men, and of the blood of my fellow man; but independence requires, as does all supreme good, the sacrifice of those who are the wisest, the noblest and the purest of the nation... The Motherland is founded on the emulation of heroism. It belongs to no one. Not even to the patriots. It belongs only to those who have earned her by dying for her. It is they who bequeath her to posterity."³

A. Albizu Campos and the Electoral Process:

Albizu Campos' ideas about an electoral strategy for the independence struggle had begun to emerge clearly as early as 1923.⁴ During this year he gave an interview for El Mundo and a lecture in Ponce ("La Resolución Conjunta Numero Dos"⁵) in which he outlined his position that Puerto Rico must use its legal right

to decide its own status and that the means to accomplish this would be to hold a constitutional convention at which all of the political groups in Puerto Rico would be represented. This lecture was given shortly after the Puerto Rican legislature had approved a resolution to create a committee, composed of legislators from all the political parties, to go to Washington to petition the U.S. Congress for a solution to the status problem of Puerto Rico.⁶ Albizu Campos reacted to this petition by saying that it was an anomaly to ask Congress for a definition of Puerto Rico's status when the power to make that decision already resided exclusively with Puerto Ricans.⁷

Typically, he chose a legalistic approach in an effort to address the problem of Puerto Rican status, arguing that (1) American citizenship was not an obstacle to the complete sovereignty of Puerto Rico, and (2) the American constitution had been in force in Puerto Rico since the signing of the Treaty of Paris. To support his first point, he gave the example of the British Commonwealth, which recognized local sovereignty in spite of British citizenship. He believed that the British empire had maintained its power by means of democratic principles of equality and voluntary cooperation. (This brings out one of the contradictions in his thinking, because he also identified strongly with the Irish independence struggle, whose supporters would hardly have considered Ireland's ties to Great Britain to be based on equality.)

Addressing the second point, Albizu argued that the U.S. constitution had given Puerto Ricans the opportunity, if they chose to use it, to define their own collective status. "The Jones Act...left the Puerto Rican people free to acquire their sovereignty and reject incorporation."⁸

He went on to argue that the military side of the constitution, rather than the civil side, was in force in Puerto Rico because the U.S. had acquired the island during an act of war. The military regime still continued, and the President held power in Puerto Rico as Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces. Because of the military occupation, status as an "incorporated territory" had been denied. The only good Albizu Campos saw in all this was that Puerto Rico was still a separate national entity: since the U.S. was faithful to its own constitution, it had not absorbed Puerto Rico. Albizu did not argue that the U.S. had any right, under international law, to occupy Puerto Rico. He admitted only that the United States had not violated its own constitution.

In this lecture Albizu Campos also developed many other themes, including the idea that status as an incorporated territory had been denied, not just because of military occupation, but also because the U.S. did not want a state which was populated by a people of different race, traditions and institutions. He wryly described how odd it would be for a Puerto Rican Senator in the U.S.

Congress to sanction the kinds of policies which had been pursued in Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo and Central America. He also called for complete judicial, legislative, and executive power at the insular level, stating his belief that independence could be demanded if all Puerto Ricans would declare themselves ready to participate in a constitutional assembly.

During March 1924 Albizu Campos wrote an open letter to Antonio Barceló, then President of the insular Senate, in which he laid out a plan for the formation of a new Puerto Rican alliance. In this letter Albizu suggested that Puerto Ricans establish a transitional government, via the electoral process, which would include:

- (1) an elected governor;
- (2) the elimination of the U.S. Federal Court;
- (3) the creation of a Supreme Court with final jurisdiction in insular matters except in those cases involving the interpretation of the North American constitution or international law;
- (4) a formal agreement among all parties to approve a resolution to petition the U.S. Congress that a constitutional convention be convened.⁹

In 1926 Albizu Campos gave an interview in the Dominican Republic in which he spoke out against the Puerto Rican electoral

system, calling it nothing more than a distribution of spoils among the major parties. He declared his belief in a policy of open opposition to the colonial government, and described the restrictive electoral law, saying that true suffrage did not exist in Puerto Rico.¹⁰

During January 1927 Albizu said he believed a policy of non-cooperation with the North-American government coupled with passive resistance was needed in Puerto Rico.¹¹ In July of the same year he again recommended a program of absolute non-cooperation. He attacked the electoral law because it restricted the formation of new parties and allowed the existing major parties to make electoral pacts to ensure joint control over the insular budget. Even though the Nationalists went to the polls, he said they knew in advance that they would suffer electoral defeat because of the injustice and corruption in the system.¹²

As early as February 1930, in an interview for El Mundo, Albizu said that so long as the other parties continued to limit themselves to fighting for colonial posts, the Nationalist Party had reason to maintain itself as a separate, pro-independence, party. He claimed that popular disillusionment with the political system would make itself felt in the next election (i.e., in 1932).¹³ A Nationalist manifesto issued by the party after its general

assembly in May 1931, and signed by Albizu Campos, challenged that "...the Nationalist Party will put to the test whether or not the right to vote exists in Puerto Rico, and will place the regime decisively on trial when it calls for the Constitutional Convention of the Republic upon obtaining the majority vote."¹⁴

On May 23, 1930, in an interview for El Mundo, Albizu Campos, as the newly elected president of the Nationalist Party, stated the Nationalist position on elections and patronage. The goal of the party was to bring an immediate end to North American colonialism, and to hold a Constitutional Convention which would establish a sovereign government in Puerto Rico. To achieve this goal the party would seek to place candidates in elective office in accordance with the electoral law then in effect. The party would accept only those positions which were dependent upon "the sovereignty of the people" but would never seek posts in the colonial administration which were appointed by the U.S. President or his representative, the Governor of Puerto Rico.¹⁵ In addition, the Nationalist Party would not enter into alliances or pacts of any kind with other parties because the party considered this to be a violation of public trust.

In June 1931, Albizu clearly stated that the party intended to go to the polls as an independent party: "The Party firmly believes that the electoral path will be effective for the

realization of its program and for more than a year has foreseen this in its tactics. The events which recently have rocked the Mother Country, Spain, with the removal of a ruling government by means of the vote, have corroborated the correctness of our methods. ...Nationalism must keep itself pure..." (i.e., the party would not form an electoral alliance).¹⁶ During that same month Albizu indicated that when the Nationalists had obtained a majority vote they would form a Republic and proceed, via diplomatic means, to seek recognition of their new government, taking their case before international courts if the United States denied recognition.¹⁷

In December 1931, Albizu attacked the Radio Corporation of Porto Rico, a subsidiary of the International Telegraph and Telephone Company, for refusing to transmit Nationalist Party publicity. He charged the company with complicity with the U.S. government to impose a media blackout.¹⁸ Albizu presumably was concerned that lack of publicity would hurt his party's chances in the upcoming election, although he does not explicitly make this allegation in his letter of complaint. During July 1932, in open letters to the Puerto Rican legislature, Albizu Campos accused the Senate of interfering with the right of the Nationalist Party to appear on the ballot. He also raised the question of whether or not the Senate had entered into a conspiracy with North American interests in order to prevent the peaceful demonstration of pro-independence sentiment at the polls.¹⁹ Finally, he

re-iterated the Nationalist intention to declare a Republic as soon as the party received a majority vote and to use peaceful means to bring about this anticipated change of government.²⁰

Albizu Campos and the Nationalists went to considerable effort to ensure the party a place on the ballot. In spite of the fact that the Nationalists did not want to make deals with other parties, they faced the problem of having to obtain enough signatures to equal 10 per cent of the vote in the previous election if they wanted to appear on the ballot. Since in the election of 1928 they had only received 329 votes, they stood little chance of obtaining the 25,634 signatures which would represent 10 per cent of the 1928 vote count. The Nationalists first tried to have the electoral law amended so that they could simply appear on the ballot by law, but this move was blocked by the Liberal Party. The Nationalists then accepted help from the Union-Republican Party to obtain over 30,000 signatures in a very short period of time. The Republicans were hoping that if they could put the Nationalists on the ballot, the independentista vote would be split between the Liberal Party and the Nationalists, thus making victory for the opposition more likely.²¹ This compromise on the part of the Nationalists represents one of the few instances when the party acted in a manner inconsistent with its stated ideology. It is indicative of the Nationalists strong desire to participate in the 1932 election.

During the Nationalist Party's General Assembly in September 1932, Albizu reported to party members on the history of their struggle to appear on the ballot.²² And on the eve of the election, in a party manifesto signed by Albizu Campos and Rafael Rivera Matos, General Secretary, the party went so far as to declare that Nationalism had "...taken control of the elections from the governor and again placed it in Puerto Rican hands. That is the reason for the official persecution of our movement... The nation for the first time has the privilege of choosing independence or the continuation of slavery."²³

The Nationalist Party Platforms of 1930 and 1932 (the authorship of which is generally attributed to Albizu Campos) stated that the party would limit itself to accepting only elective offices with the goal of ending foreign intervention.²⁴ Whatever levels the fiery rhetoric of Albizu Campos had reached until this point in time, the Nationalists, as of 1932, intended to use electoral means to gain enough support to call a constitutional assembly and declare a sovereign republic. The nationalist tactic was to try to break the unity of the traditional colonial parties and the federal patronage system by means of re-grouping all Puerto Ricans around a new program of national unity and non-cooperation with the colonial administration which would defend domestic interests against the United States.²⁵

How did Albizu Campos and the Nationalist leadership view the 1932 election? Party strategy up until this point had emphasized non-cooperation with the regime and Albizu Campos had repeatedly expressed cynicism over the colonial electoral process. The statements he gave before the elections indicate that he did want his party to participate, even though he considered the elections a "farce." The acceptance of assistance from the Republicans, as mentioned above, gives weight to the hypothesis that Albizu wanted to go to the polls. Nevertheless, Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos, Juan Antonio Corretjer, and Federico Ribes Tovar all report that the Nationalists only went to the polls against the advice of Albizu Campos.

Juan Antonio Corretjer suggests that Albizu only agreed to enter the election because at that time he realized that a consensus of revolutionary thought had not yet gained "hegemony" within the party. Corretjer, however, believes that there was enough anti-electoral sentiment within the Nationalist rank and file to have supported a policy of electoral boycott, and that this would have been a preferable tactic for the Nationalists to pursue. He also insinuates that there is information about the 1932 election which has not yet come to light, but he does not elaborate.²⁶

Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos claims that during 1931

Albizu was approached by other politicians seeking his support for behind-the-scenes pre-election deals. Among them were Antonio R. Barceló, President of the Liberal Party, and Jose Luís Muñoz Marín. She says that Albizu refused to attend any of the secret meetings in which his participation was solicited, and that he refused to make any political pacts.²⁷ According to her account, the results of the election proved that fraud was evident, in spite of the weakness of the party's electoral organization. She concludes that Albizu Campos had been correct to advise his party not to participate.²⁸

Federico Ribes Tovar also claims that the Nationalists entered the elections over Albizu's objections.²⁹ Paulino Castro simply claims that many felt it was a mistake for the Nationalists to go to the polls because there was already much anti-nationalist pressure from the colonialist administration, including the giving of bribes to members of the electoral boards.³⁰

Manuel Maldonado-Denis has offered an explanation which is more in keeping with Albizu's own statements. He believes that Albizu's decision to participate was influenced by the recent triumph of the republican forces in Spain, making him decide to throw his party into the electoral contest. Maldonado-Denis also points out that the party was already very skeptical by May of 1931

about any possibility of electoral success.³¹ Albizu's statements about Spain in June 1931, and several of his comments about the nature of colonial elections, support this interpretation. It is of course entirely possible that the Nationalist leader acquiesced to the wishes of a majority of party members, but given the extreme amount of influence which he exercised over his party, it seems unlikely that he would have had to assume such a weak position within his own organization.

Given the belief which Albizu Campos held that it was necessary to "shock" the colonial administration if the island were to progress toward independence,³² it also appears likely that he felt participation in the election would gain widespread publicity for the Nationalist cause and would serve as a tool to expose colonialism. Electoral defeat may have been perceived as a way to gain new followers whose consciousness had been awakened. And there was always the chance that electoral success in some districts would have established a political foothold in the insular government which had not been achieved via political deals. A showing of enough strength, even if in defeat, might have forced other parties to deal with some of the issues raised by the Nationalists. Whatever reasons lay behind the party's decision to participate in the 1932 election, Albizu Campos entered the race with a disclaimer given in advance, indicating that the party must have considered defeat to be a possible outcome and leaving the

Nationalists with a rationale to explain their defeat.

Under Albizu's leadership the party mobilized for the electoral campaign of 1932. Several incidents which occurred during the campaign demonstrate the radicalism of the Nationalist position. Late in 1930 Albizu and other Nationalist leaders decided to issue bonds in small denominations ranging up to \$100. to raise funds for the Republic of Puerto Rico. The first public sale took place in San Juan in April 1931 for an issue \$200,000. Governor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. advised the U.S. War Department to take no action against the Nationalists, apparently because he suspected that the sale would not be very successful. During the summer of 1932 a second bond sale took place in New York. General Blanton Winship, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate, recommended prosecution but was overruled, so no charges were filed. The amount raised by the sales is not reported, but was presumably quite small.³³ The sale was the kind of a move designed to gain publicity and challenge U.S. authority.

On April 16, 1932 the Nationalists staged a protest demonstration against a bill pending before the Puerto Rican legislature which would have eliminated the use of the Puerto Rican flag as the official island banner. Albizu Campos delivered a vehement denunciation of the plan, and then led a crowd of protestors to the capital to defend the flag. Police were unable to

control the demonstration, and the crowd surged into the building. When inside, the protestors began to climb the stairs to the legislative chambers while police tried to force them back. A balustrade on the staircase broke, several persons were injured in falls to the floor below, and one of the demonstrators, Manuel Rafael Suárez Díaz, was killed. Albizu Campos and José Portilla, a member of the San Juan Municipal Council, were both arrested on charges of inciting a riot, but were acquitted at their trial two months later.³⁴ This incident, known as the "Flag Day Riot," was, according to Ramírez-Barbot, "...but a mere prelude to what would become a continuous campaign of disruptive acts undertaken by the Nationalists."³⁵

On July 9, 1932, the Nationalists held a public meeting in San Juan at which Albizu Campos delivered a speech accusing the Governor (then Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.) of issuing orders to the police to do physical violence to the Nationalists. Albizu swore that if any Nationalist lost his life at the hands of the police, the chief of police would pay with his life.³⁶ This meeting ended quietly. There were a few other incidents which occurred during the months of the campaign that singled out the Nationalists as the extreme wing of the pro-independence groups. Although these demonstrations may indeed be considered "disruptive acts," they did not involve planned violence on the part of the Nationalists.

To what extent is a trend toward violence evident in Nationalist thinking? In the 1930s party members were involved in many violent incidents, but prior to 1930 the Nationalists did not use terrorism or assassination. The resignations of Coll y Cuchí and Ayuso give some indication that party leaders feared moving toward violent confrontation. Was violence the path that Albizu was choosing?

Evidence on this hypothesis comes from Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu's friend and political associate, who stressed that Albizu wished to imitate the Irish model.³⁷ This would certainly suggest that the Nationalist leader planned to use armed rebellion to achieve his party's goals. Albizu's propaganda trip to Latin America (1927 to 1930) did establish a small network of organizations, however weak, which would support the Nationalist cause. Since Irish immigrants in the U.S. funneled arms, money and supplies to the Irish rebels, and the North American Irish vote exerted considerable pressure on U.S. policy decisions, Albizu could very likely have been attempting to re-create this for the Puerto Rican Nationalist movement. In the absence of more evidence to support Corretjer's interpretation, no definitive answer to what Albizu had in mind is possible.

If the initiation of an Irish-style uprising was already in the minds of Albizu Campos and other Nationalist leaders in the

1920s, this was not yet revealed in Nationalist Party activity. Although much party rhetoric contained a tone of militancy, and although its members were radical independentistas within the context of Puerto Rican politics, there was no pattern of violent confrontations nor any arms build-up prior to the 1932 election.

The idea that the Albizu Campos presidency per se was the primary factor leading the Nationalists toward violent activity³⁸ is questionable for several reasons. First, Albizu was elected Vice-President in 1925, but his position among the party's top leadership did not turn the party toward violent tactics between 1925 and 1930. Second, although Albizu claimed the right to defend Puerto Rican sovereignty by force of arms, demanded an oath of sacrifice from party members and made one public threat of violence in July 1932, his statements and the party platform up until 1932 repeatedly set out the Nationalist desire to participate in the electoral system. Third, a pattern of organized Nationalist violence did not emerge until after the 1932 election. (In fact, the most serious incidents of violence occurred between 1935 and 1937, and then erupted again in the 1950s.) Since Albizu had captured control of the party by 1930, the question of why terrorism was not immediately employed must be raised. If Albizu had considered political violence to be the only effective tactic with which to begin the drive for independence, the Nationalists would have used terrorism or assassination in the 1932 campaign. Albizu's

belief structure, as discussed above, posited the use of force only after "reason" failed.

B. The Influence of Albizu Campos on the Nationalist Economic Platform:

During his years of political activity prior to the 1932 election, Albizu Campos expressed the concern which he shared with other island politicians over the deteriorating economic and social conditions in Puerto Rico. He felt that the U.S. administration had a policy aimed at the elimination of the Puerto Rican landowner, industrialist, merchant and financial community. He saw Puerto Rican wealth, under what he considered to be the guise of "help" from the U.S., passing into North American control.³⁹

Albizu Campos proved himself to be an astute critic of United States economic policy toward Puerto Rico and as a spokesperson for his party he demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the economic problems faced by the island. In spite of the fact that many critics have judged him harshly, an examination of his public statements about the Puerto Rican economy between 1924 and 1932 shows that he gave carefully thought out responses to questions of economic policy relating to tariffs, external trade, commercial treaties, shipping, taxation, or banking and credit.

One of Albizu Campos's most important beliefs was that economic development depended upon domestic control of material resources.⁴⁰ This concept appears repeatedly in his speeches and writings: "The nation cannot exist without possessing all its material wealth."⁴¹ To Albizu Campos, political sovereignty thus became a key factor in the achievement of economic prosperity.

Albizu Campos linked U.S. economic penetration of Puerto Rico not only to his nation's lack of political sovereignty, but also to the deterioration of Puerto Rican culture and to what he considered the resulting moral decay of the Puerto Rican people. He felt that only by maintaining hispanic values and a national cultural identity could foreign economic and political domination be halted and eventually reversed: "With the loss of that feeling of personal and common dignity...spiritual strength was sapped, and the native, reduced to being a lackey, became an agent of the invader and transferred all the nation's wealth to him. It is inevitable: moral decadence is the cause of material ruin."⁴² His desire to resurrect the Hispanic past in an effort to displace the encroaching U.S. presence led him to unrealistic attacks on the United States and blinded him to racial discrimination, class cleavages and other internal problems faced by his own society. His extreme and almost xenophobic position with respect to Puerto Rican culture left him open to attack by political enemies who discredited his political and economic views as well. A re-examination of his positions

preceding the 1932 elections will demonstrate that the Nationalist platform represented a significant potential challenge to U.S. colonial policy in Puerto Rico.

In 1924, in a letter to Antonio R. Barceló, then President of the Puerto Rican Senate, Albizu Campos set forth a proposed economic, political, and cultural program for Puerto Rico. He called for the return of lands to Puerto Rican hands, the industrialization of the country and the development of external trade and a Puerto Rican merchant marine.⁴³ The cultural part of this same program called for orienting the nation's youth toward the origins of their own civilization.⁴⁴ In January 1927, he told an interviewer that Puerto Rico needed intense economic organization and to conserve its culture and hispanic civilization.⁴⁵ Later that year he spoke against the colonial government which only served to deplete Puerto Rican resources.⁴⁶ During an interview given in the Dominican Republic, Albizu Campos attacked the U.S. for "collective dispossession" of Puerto Rican wealth through: (1) the systematic absorption of the best Puerto Rican lands by latifundia; (2) giving tax advantages to large U.S. corporations; and (3) a system of compulsory public instruction, in English, aimed at destroying Puerto Rico's hispanic culture.⁴⁷ Implicit in these criticisms was his belief that only through the achievement of national sovereignty would Puerto Rico gain the necessary political control

to set economic policies in its own self-interest and to prevent cultural obliteration. The juxtaposition of cultural concerns with economic issues typifies his perception of insular dilemmas.

Albizu Campos' most articulate statements about the penetration of the U.S. into the Puerto Rican economy appeared during 1930, the year in which he was elected President of the Nationalist Party. During this year he generated considerable publicity in Puerto Rico: many articles about him were published, and he wrote a series of articles about the Puerto Rican economy which appeared in El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico, El Mundo, and other island newspapers. In an interview for El Mundo in February 1930,⁴⁸ Albizu Campos was asked about whether the pro-statehood and pro-independence positions in Puerto Rican politics could be reconciled. Albizu stressed in his answer that whichever status solution was chosen, the lands, communications, merchant marine and all real wealth must belong to Puerto Ricans: control of resources was the sine qua non of nationhood.⁴⁹

Albizu Campos generally referred to both the insular government and the U.S. government as "irresponsible". By this term he meant that these governments did not set economic policy which would be in the best interests of the people they governed. On this, Albizu never lost sight of the fact that Puerto Rico was a colonial state, whatever other terms politicians chose to apply to

the island's status. He sought a government that would be controlled by, and responsible to, the people it governed, particularly in the arena of setting economic policy aimed at development of agriculture, industry, shipping, financial institutions, etc. His view is summed up as follows: "Under the North American Constitution... the federal government... has the power to govern without any responsibility at all to the territories or nations which fall under the U.S. empire."⁵⁰ He further pointed out that in Puerto Rico, as in all colonial situations, there were many natives whose interests had become linked to those of the metropole. He saw them as morally corrupt because they derived their material prosperity from the exploitation of their own country.⁵¹

Albizu Campos traced the destruction of Puerto Rico's coffee industry, the rise of the sugar latifundia, and the increasing monopoly which the U.S. had over Puerto Rican trade to tariff and shipping policies which placed Puerto Rico inside the U.S. market. He also felt U.S. credit and banking policies had hastened the deterioration of the Puerto Rican economy by devaluing the Puerto Rican peso, putting interest rates beyond the reach of Puerto Rican investors, and forcing defaults on mortgaged agricultural properties.

Writing for a column called "Economic Independence" in El

Nacionalista,⁵² Albizu Campos argued that "power to make tariffs regulates the most vital national interests."⁵³ He believed that under the U.S. constitution it would not be possible for Puerto Rico to be autonomous because the constitution gave the power to establish tariffs to the Congress, and all U.S. tariffs are uniform for all states.⁵⁴ He was critical of the political factions within Puerto Rico which expected that the U.S. would amend the constitution to permit Puerto Rico commercial independence. They were dreaming, he claimed, because such power would not be extended to a territory when it was denied to the states. He concluded that for Puerto Rico to exercise both tariff control and power to make commercial treaties it would have to become an independent republic.⁵⁵

In these articles Albizu repeatedly made a strong link between political independence and commercial autonomy. In his analysis, political power controlled commercial activity, which in turn could be directed to bring about economic and industrial development. Since he attributed insular economic decline to U.S. tariff and trade policies, he saw no advantage for Puerto Rico in the economic integration of the two nation's economies. He felt that political independence was the only logical alternative for the island to seek if it was to survive economically.

Albizu attacked "free trade" because it meant that Puerto

Ricans were obligated "to sell to the Yankee at the price that he saw fit to set," and to "buy at the price which he stipulated."⁵⁶ "The trade and industry of the United States have an absolute monopoly over the Puerto Rican market. This monopoly exists because of the tariff law imposed on the country and also because the Puerto Rican nation lacks the power to defend itself from it" (i.e., the tariff).⁵⁷ He was outspokenly critical of the idea that access to the American market had been a benefit. As his main example he used sugar, showing that the market advantage of Puerto Rican sugar in the U.S. had merely accelerated U.S. penetration of the sugar industry, hurt other agricultural enterprises and trade, and that the profits from the sugar industry never reached Puerto Rico.⁵⁸ Not only had the sugar corporations acquired cheap lands by buying up the dissolving estates of Puerto Rican landowners, but these corporations paid extremely low taxes in spite of their high profits.⁵⁹

In his criticism of "free trade" one of the interesting observations Albizu Campos made was that he considered such a trading arrangement to be of benefit to industrialized nations only. These nations, he contended, exported manufactured goods and a small number of surplus primary products; they imported those primary materials needed for manufacturing, a few needed food supplies, and a small quantity luxury manufactures for their elites. Maldonado Denis, editor of a small collection of Albizu's writings, did not

fail to note that Albizu's analysis, given in 1930, was similar to the work of dependency theorists later developed by Raul Prebisch and the ECLA group in the post-World War II period.⁶⁰

Albizu was not making wild allegations. Many of his criticisms were also raised by the relatively conservative Brookings report,⁶¹ were highlighted in the Diffie report,⁶² and were voiced by other Puerto Rican politicians. Furthermore, as many of his followers and students of his writings have since pointed out, his statements from this period had a prophetic ring. Even today, supporters of statehood have to stipulate "special" conditions which might apply to Puerto Rico if the island were to become integrated into the U.S. They might do better to seek, as Albizu suggested, the reasons why some groups wish to see a continuation of the status quo. "They are tenaciously against a change in the political situation, whether it be with the establishment of the Republic or the conversion of Puerto Rico into one of the provinces (states) of North America because either one of these political solutions would bring down the present irresponsible government, and they unite themselves with the interests of the invader, under pretty little banners like autonomy, in order to maintain the status quo." ⁶³

The conclusion which Albizu Campos drew from his views on the inherent dangers of free trade was that domestic control of

national wealth and tariff protection were essential to economic development. He advocated nationalization in order to prevent foreign control of national wealth, but said that this could come only after political independence. He said that the use of arms might be needed to gain political independence.⁶⁴

Independence, for Albizu, was always the first step toward national development. "Where political powers do not exist, as is the case within the colonial system in force here, the nationalization of foreign properties is not possible because this requires sovereignty in the strict sense of the term: legislative, executive and judicial. ...Only an independent Republic can resolve these problems."⁶⁵ Once sovereignty was attained, the Nationalist program would "...demand the nationalization of foreign wealth as the greatest and most urgent need of the nation. Without material resources the individual does not exist. Without control over all its material riches no nation survives."⁶⁶

A few days before the elections of 1932 the Nationalist Party issued a manifesto stating its position. Authorship of the document is generally attributed to Albizu Campos himself, although of course the manifesto was a public statement by the party. The manifesto laid out the following economic program:

- (1) The workers shall be organized so that they can demand of the foreign, or invading, interests the share in profits to which they are entitled, taking over their administration immediately and appointing responsible and patriotic men to direct

them.

(2) Every effort shall be made to see that the burden of taxation falls upon non-residents, so as to eliminate absentee landlordism and divide real estate among the greatest possible number of landowners.

(3) Every possible step shall be taken to reverse the effect of free trade between the United States and Puerto Rico, because in reality what exists is a monopoly which the North American invador has over our market, imposing the conditions for the sale of U.S. products and for the purchase of our products.

(4) Native trade shall be favored exclusively where it exists and developed where it has disappeared.

(5) The consumption of Puerto Rican agricultural and industrial products shall be favored exclusively, seeking by all means to see that they satisfy domestic demand.

(6) Exports and the establishment of a merchant marine shall be encouraged.

(7) Native banks shall be exclusively favored, and where there are none steps shall be taken to establish them.

(8) A responsible native banking system shall be organized in such a way that national deposits are made only in domestic banks, and steps shall be taken to free the country of foreign loans, both public and private, so that agriculture, commerce, and industry may re-develop in Puerto Rican hands.⁶⁷

This economic program for 1932 touches upon the major economic problems faced by Puerto Rico in the 1920s and 1930s. It centers upon ownership of resources, regulation of trade, control of financial institutions, and concern for the declining living standards on the island. It represents the development of the

Nationalist Party position on the Puerto Rican economy on the eve of the critical election of 1932, and, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, it presents what was in its day a sophisticated understanding of economic issues. It also was not an extremist position within the context of the Puerto Rican party system. A comparison of the Nationalist Party platform with that of the Liberal Party reveals large areas of agreement. (See Appendix, p.151, for the text of the Liberal Party platform.)

C. Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Reaction to Americanization:

Even during the early period of his political career, during the 1920s, Albizu Campos's attacks on U.S. cultural encroachment were more militant than his attacks on the impact of colonialism on insular political and economic structures. His admiration of Spanish culture was intense, and this led him to conclude that Puerto Rico would have fared better under a continuation of her alliance with Spain. He regarded U.S. society as genocidal and racist, believing it to be on the verge of social and economic collapse because of the corrupt nature of Anglo-Saxon culture, the inequality of income distribution within the United States and the inherent flaws in the economic system which depended upon drawing wealth from underdeveloped areas. The difference between his straightforward criticism of U.S. policy and his exaggerated attack can be traced in Albizu's statements about Spain, educational

policy, racism and imperialism. Nationalist exaggeration did not invalidate the legitimacy of their reaction to North American cultural imperialism, but a recognition of the extreme lengths to which they took their criticism serves to highlight why the party was perceived to be fanatical both in its own day and by critics of later years.

Several authors believe that the hatred which Albizu Campos unleashed at the United States resulted from his mistreatment as a black man at Harvard and during his military service, and that this experience was what turned him toward radical nationalism. Juan Antonio Corretjer, a colleague and close friend, discounts this view, as does Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo in his very thoughtful essay about Albizu's political philosophy.⁶⁸ To have experienced the brunt of U.S. racial prejudice and to have observed the ill treatment of many minority and immigrant groups in the U.S. must have left an imprint on Albizu's personality, but it is too simplistic to assume that this became the basis for his political beliefs. Albizu's public statements reveal that he had a very complex set of attitudes toward the United States, not all of them negative. He admired and put great faith in the U.S. legal system and advocated industrialization, but vehemently opposed North American military, political, economic and social policies toward Puerto Rico. Albizu chose to overlook racial prejudice in his own society and to highlight U.S. racism because this fit with his very

Hispanophilic world-view. He portrayed Latin society as one in which all races lived harmoniously. The U.S. was quite vulnerable to criticism for its system of racial discrimination based upon a "color line," and Albizu did not hesitate to evoke images of U.S. oppression toward blacks when addressing Puerto Rican audiences. It is unlikely, however, that a reaction to U.S. racism was the primary motivation behind Albizu's political activism.

In 1923, Albizu Campos, in a statement written in Ponce, spoke out against the imposition of a colonial regime upon a country with "a civilization older than that of those who govern it and a culture which is at least equal." He went on to add that statehood was unacceptable because Puerto Ricans were a people who "tenaciously defend their history and civilization."⁶⁹ Later that same year, in the speech entitled "Joint Resolution Number 2" ("La Resolución Conjunta Número 2"), he spoke against Anglo-Saxon expansionism, claiming that they had not learned the human significance of discovery and that they had exterminated the Indian race, separated themselves from the African race, imported black laborers to exploit conquered territory, and had operated in a way which was false because it was in opposition to the natural unity of humanity. He felt that Anglo Saxons had betrayed humankind because civilized people ("pueblos cultos") lived in harmony with their fellow beings.⁷⁰ He further stated that he thought the U.S. had pursued expansionist policies with nations to the south unlike the

policies it followed toward Canada. He decried this on the grounds that the penetration was directed against peoples who were linked because of their common race, culture and history.⁷¹

In a 1927 interview, Albizu Campos expressed the opinion that in both Europe and America there was a civilization with Greco-Roman roots, and that Puerto Rico, by virtue of its link to Spain, had inherited this cultural tradition. In the case of the U.S., he felt that the civilization had degenerated because the North American goal was solely to pursue material wealth, and they exploited immigrants and blacks to reach this end. Here, Albizu Campos moved toward an identification with catholicism and the denunciation of North American imperialism and the Protestant Ethic. He considered the U.S. uncivilized, and added with a note of dark humor that the North Americans had nothing to offer the world except for the destruction of their own empire.⁷² In Albizu's vision of the world, racial discrimination and ill-treatment of lower classes existed only in the U.S., but not in his own society.

Coupled with this sense of outrage at the violation of hispanic culture by a culture which was at best equal to Latin civilization and at worst inferior, Albizu Campos developed a romantic vision of the kind of prosperity and harmony in human relations that had existed in Puerto Rico under Spanish domination. He felt that the Nationalist program should seek to return Puerto

Rico to the "moral situation" which prevailed in 1868, when the great Puerto Rican patriots of the 19th century had developed a revolutionary position against colonial domination.⁷³ By 1930 he had developed this line of thinking to the point of claiming that his own generation did not have even physical strength equal to that of their ancestors, whom he perceived to have had "a physical and moral strength greater than ours."⁷⁴ He felt that there was a decay among his own people, a force which sapped them of their will and power to become independent: "The force which weighs upon our people is the feeling of impotence. It is therefore necessary to evoke countervailing forces—forces of wisdom and beauty which are inherent in the nature of man."⁷⁵

If, as Silén has argued,⁷⁶ Albizu Campos reflected the interests of Puerto Rico's declining 19th century bourgeoisie, then his idealization of Spanish tutelage reflects the fact that his own class was materially better off before U.S. arrival. This idea is supported by many of Albizu's own comments. For example, in his series of articles on the Puerto Rican economy (published during 1930 and referred to above) Albizu stresses this very point: "...in '98 we were masters of our own wealth. It was almost totally in our hands. That was the base of the old collective happiness which has been extinguished."⁷⁷ The roots of his fear of moral decay are closely linked to his concern for the loss of material wealth from Puerto Rican hands: "To fuse our nationality into the North

American union, whether the latter be good or bad, is not a matter that can be seriously considered by those who have a clear concept of what nationality means. Its existence defines our spiritual life, which spontaneously looks toward that larger civilization to which we belong, and it is the only guarantee of the material well-being of our people."⁷⁸ Another reason which Albizu Campos gave for preferring Puerto Rico's link to Spain over its domination by the U.S. was that under Spain the island had been able to make its own treaties.⁷⁹ This is very consistent with his attacks on U.S. economic policy toward the island. It is a reflection of his concern for economic decay, but does not allow for the fact that "Puerto Rican wealth" in "native hands" had never included the Puerto Rican worker or the romanticized jíbaro (peasant). His vision was limited and paternalistic.

It is difficult to see how Albizu Campos was able to reconcile his glorification of a Spanish past with his equally positive attitude toward 19th century Puerto Rican revolutionaries. Part of the explanation lies in Albizu's belief that under Spain any suffering had been shared by islanders and peninsulares alike: "If under Spain we suffered under despotism, this was nothing but a reflection of what was suffered on the peninsula itself; the same men who governed there were also sent to Puerto Rico. Under the present regime, on the other hand, we must put up with functionaries having the lowest level of political skill."⁸⁰ Another way in

which Albizu dealt with this contradiction, as Antonio Stevens Arroryo has written, was to say that "...since the ethos of Spain was congruent with that of Puerto Rico, the colonial institutions were preparatory to, rather than detriments of, national independence."⁸¹

For Albizu, Puerto Rican culture represented the apogee of the development of hispanic civilization in the Western Hemisphere. "In the American unions there does not exist a state comparable to ours in ethnic homogeneity, in culture, or having a history with pages so richly filled."⁸² He saw Puerto Rico as a bastion to be defended against U.S. domination of Latin races: "Fortunately the personality forged by these men of culture has not disappeared and now serves as a barrier to defend us from the conquest of the invader. Puerto Rico presents the finest case in America, because here in the waters of the Caribbean the plans and attitudes of the United States toward peoples of our race will be revealed."⁸³

Knowing Albizu's commitment to his culture, it is easy to follow his views about the educational policy which was dominant on the island. This policy generally favored using English as the language of instruction and opponents were open to persecution for being "un-American." During an interview in the Dominican Republic in 1927, Albizu claimed that the U.S. imposed the use of English in Puerto Rican schools with the intention of destroying hispanic

culture on the island.⁸⁴ He of course opposed the use of English as the language of instruction, justifying this because he wished to see the preservation of Puerto Rico's heritage, which could only be accomplished by the use of the Spanish language: "All instruction should be in the native language... because the first ideas we receive are in Spanish and a complete understanding of one's culture is only possible in one's own language."⁸⁵

When criticizing the Brookings report of 1930, Albizu pointed out that teaching English was really just an excuse to use the language of the invader, which he felt served to make the nation's youth less well educated and well trained.⁸⁶ In fact, he went so far as to say that one of the great virtues of the Puerto Rican jíbaro was his illiteracy, which meant that the language of the invader could not reach him.⁸⁷ This is a very significant point, because it illustrates that Albizu may indeed have had middle and upper class youth in mind when he expressed his concern over their lack of culture due to the use of English. One of the points made in the Brookings report was that the use of English opened opportunities for upward mobility for the lower classes--a possibility which Albizu's program ignored, but which North American reformers considered an obvious need.⁸⁸

Albizu Campos coupled his reaction against English with

strong support for the educational system that had existed under Spanish influence, and an attack on the educational practices which had been introduced by the U.S. He felt that in the U.S. there was one system of education for the "dominant class" and another for the "dominated class,"⁸⁹ although he failed to acknowledge that even greater educational inequality had prevailed in Puerto Rico. He also attacked education which placed boys and girls in the same classes; it was his belief that such a system was implemented by the U.S. in order to economize, and that it led to a narrow vocational orientation which separated students from a full understanding of their cultural heritage. He believed that girls and boys had different educational needs and should therefore be kept in separate groups. He said that in the U.S. educational system the sexes were kept separate in those schools where future national leaders were trained, and he asked why the form of education for U.S. elites had not been the one implemented in Puerto Rico.⁹⁰ Once again, his class orientation, here accompanied by an anti-feminist bias, is revealed. One wonders if the Albizuan educational system would have been "separate but equal" for the sexes, and would have given little consideration for the 175,000 children who entered school after the arrival of the U.S., however misguided the colonial policies on instruction were. His concern was for the education of an elite leadership.

The Nationalist position on the issue of cultural

imperialism is summarized by the identically worded plank which appeared in the party platforms of both 1930 and 1932: The party "...shall abolish by all the means at its disposal the compulsory system of instruction in the language of the invader, which confuses and brutalizes our youth, to the grave detriment of our cultural personality." ⁹¹ The Nationalist position on this issue put the party (along with many other political groups, including the Liberal Party) on the "un-American" side of the debate over English use.

The Nationalist concern over cultural imperialism went well beyond criticism of educational policy. Economic and cultural issues were interconnected in their analysis of current events, and they exhibited paranoia over the physical, as well as the moral well-being of the Puerto Rican people. Their blending of issues is best represented by a much publicized incident which occurred during the 1932 electoral campaign. In November 1931, a letter written by Dr. Cornelius P. Rhoads, who had been working in Puerto Rico under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation in the Presbyterian Hospital in Santurce, was found (apparently in a wastebasket) by an employee and given to Albizu Campos. This letter read as follows:

"Presbyterian Hospital,
"San Juan, P.R.

"Dear Farchi:

"The more I think about the Lorry Smith appointment, the more disgusted I get. Have you heard

any reason advanced for it? It certainly is odd that a man out with the entire Boston group, fired by Wollard and, as far as I know, absolutely devoid of any scientific reputation, would be given the place. There is something wrong somewhere, probably with our point of view.

"The situation is settled in Boston. Farles and Vega are to run the laboratory together and either (illegible) and Uras (illegible) to be assistant; the chief to stay on. As far as I can see, the chances of my getting a job in the next ten years are absolutely nil. One is certainly not encouraged to attempt scientific advances when it is a hardship, rather than an aid to advancement. I can get a darn fine job here and am tempted to take it. It would be ideal except for the Porto Ricans—they are beyond doubt the dirtiest, laziest, most degenerate and thievish race of men ever to inhabit the sphere. It makes you ill to inhabit the same island with them. They are even lower than Italians. What the island needs is not public health but a tidal wave or something to totally exterminate the population. It might then be usable. I have done my best to hasten the process of extermination by killing off 8 and transplanting cancer into several more. The latter has not resulted in any fatalities so far. The matter of consideration for the patient's welfare plays its role here—in fact, all physicians take delight in the abuse and torture of the unfortunate subjects.

"Do let me know if you hear any other news.

"Sincerely,
"Dusty"92

The Nationalist Party publicized the contents of the letter widely, sending copies to the presidents of the various political parties, the insular newspapers, the League of Nations in Geneva, the Pan-American Union in Washington, the pro-Nationalist juntas in Latin America, and the headquarters of the American Civil Liberties Union in New York.⁹³ According to Mathews, Governor Beverly contacted Dr. Rhoads for an explanation of the letter and ordered an

investigation. Rhoads acknowledged that he had written the letter, but claimed that it was "a fantastic and playful composition written entirely for my own diversion and intended as a parody on supposed attitudes of some American minds in Porto Rico."⁹⁴ Rhoads could not be charged with libel because he had not personally made his statements public, and no patient deaths could be traced to malpractice or negligence on his part. Rhoads was not prosecuted formally. He later became director of the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Research Center.

Whether or not Rhoads's explanation was accurate, he had certainly acted in an unprofessional manner and had blundered in writing such a letter, and the Nationalist Party made every effort to capitalize upon the anti-American sentiment it generated. A letter of response to Rhoads's comments was issued by the party, and although it was signed by Jose Lameiro, authorship is generally attributed to Albizu Campos himself. The contents of the Nationalist letter were:

"San Juan, P.R.,
"January 24, 1932

"Dr. Rafael Bernabé, President,
"Medical Association of Porto Rico,
"San Juan, Porto Rico

"Sir:

"By direction of the President of the

Nationalist Party of Porto Rico, Mr. Pedro Albizu Campos, the undersigned has the honor to inform the President of the Medical Association of Porto Rico of the serious matter prompting this communication.

"Under the pretext of helping our people to solve public health problems, some time ago there was established in the San Juan, P.R., Presbyterian Hospital a staff of doctors from the Rockefeller Institute, a United States institution working in close cooperation with the government of its country, the United States of North America. Although apparently engaged in the treatment of anemia and malaria patients, it has in fact been working out a plan to exterminate our people by inoculating patients unfortunate enough to go to them with virus [sic] of incurable diseases such as cancer.

"At the time of the North American invasion, thirty-three years ago, we were a strong and healthy community. Wealth was well distributed, there was work, as well as an abundance of the necessities of life. The country produced almost all it needed. There was practically no public debt. The general government and the municipalities had substantial money reserves to face any crisis. We were in fact a rich people, and happiness was the common heritage of all Porto Ricans and foreigners who had settled here. These facts were recorded in the official reports of the first chiefs of the North American military occupation.

"The invading power has ousted Porto Ricans by its own North American nationals. Over 50,000 native landholders have disappeared and at present four North American corporations possess over sixty percent of the total wealth of the country. Scarcely twenty percent of the national heritage remains in the hands of the natives.

"The system set up is simple: all public burdens fall on the natives; North Americans and their business are practically exempted from all public taxes and enjoy a monopoly of privileges. The United States imposed upon Porto Rico their tariffs and practically destroyed our external commerce with other nations. Ours is the sixth largest world market of the United States, averaging nearly \$200,000,000 annually. By virtue of this commercial monopoly North

Americans impose terms for the buying of our products and the conditions for the sale of their own products.

The mercantile monopoly is backed by the financial monopoly. There is practically no credit for Porto Ricans. Any wealth in their hands becomes immobile to force its sale to North Americans or to destroy it if no North American wishes to acquire it. The United States have mortgaged the country to their own financial interests. The military intervention destroyed agriculture. It changed the country into a huge sugar plantation, compelling it to buy in the most expensive market in the world, namely, the North American market, which forces upon us merchandise not accepted anywhere else, on conditions and prices fixed by the monopoly it enjoys in our country. We depend upon the food the North Americans sell to us. They swamp our market with many products unfit for human consumption and the source of serious diseases. There are no health regulations prohibiting the importation of foodstuffs of such quality and epidemics increase.

"The last chief of the military occupation has just reported to his government that over sixty percent of the population is chronically unemployed, without any means for subsistence; that the average wage in the chief industry, to wit, the sugar industry, is \$180 a year. This means that sixty percent of the population is doomed to starve. Some cases have already been reported of persons starved to death. This is the first time this happens in our history. The same North American official states that there are 600,000 cases of hook-worm and 30,000 cases of tuberculosis in a population of one and a half million.

"The North American government evidently looks approvingly upon this triumph of its policy to exterminate our people. Of course, it does not do and will not do anything to remedy the evils it has deliberately created and counsels such measures as will finish the work of extermination and displacement: emigration and birth control.

"Emigration is cynically advised while the immigration of its own nationals from the continent and the Virgin Islands is stimulated by all means. More than 6,000 people from those islands have established their homes in Porto Rico, according to

the figures furnished by the North American officers themselves, but undoubtedly the number is much higher. The old imperial policy of breaking national unity by displacing the natives with foreigners by culture and tradition to strengthen foreign occupation is repeating itself. The North American government has published the records and figures we have just given above to appear before the world as the protector of its own victims. In this wise it pretends to exhibit us as a mass of hungry beggars unable to survive without North American charity, which, by the way, has never existed for this people.

"Although the number of hospitals and doctors has increased there are more epidemics of malaria, anemia, tuberculosis and other fatal infectious diseases. This is no paradox whatever for impartial observers.

"The North American government is repeating in Porto Rico the method of extermination it carried on in the continent against the Indian. It overcame their resistance with arms and deprived them of their means of subsistence. When, towards the close of the nineteenth century, there arose some humanitarian feelings towards the Indians, which made these tactics repugnant, it happened that the Indian race contracted tuberculosis and other devastating diseases. The Hawaiian nation, which has been under the North American empire about as long as we have, is already practically extinct. At the present moment their number is no more than 20,000 and their death rate is the highest on record. Within a short time it will inevitably have disappeared. Evidently unsubmitive people coming under the North American empire, under the shadow of its flag, are taken ill and die.

"The facts confirm absolutely a system of extermination. It was hard to believe, however, that resort would be had to the direct inoculation of the virus of incurable diseases, such as cancer, as admitted by Dr. Cornelius P. Rhoads, a prominent member of the Rockefeller Institute, on a mission in Porto Rico with other fellow doctors from the same Institute. This mission was established, as already said, in the Presbyterian Hospital in this city of San Juan, for the avowed generous purpose of treating persons afflicted with anemia and malaria, when the chief purpose, according to Dr. Rhoads' own

confession, was 'to hasten the process of extermination.'

"In this connection we are enclosing herewith a photographic copy of the autographed letter written by Dr. Cornelius P. Rhoads, and sent from this city of San Juan to a friend of his residing in the United States of North America, and we are also attaching a photographic copy of the instructions signed by the same physician, upon entering the aforesaid hospital, for patients under treatment by the Rockefeller mission. The letter is signed with the nickname 'Dusty.' The handwriting in the instructions and the letter is the same.

"We are likewise appending copy [sic] of the affidavit of Luis Baldoni, Jr., who had the privilege to discover this criminal conspiracy against our people.

"As these means to impose its empire may be applied by the United States of North America against any other nationality it may want to destroy, the whole world should know them, and for these reasons we denounce them before all nations.

"Your obedient servant avails himself of this opportunity to express to the President of the Medical Association of Porto Rico his most distinguished consideration.

(Seal)

"(Signed) Jose Lameiro
"Secretary to the President"⁹⁵

The Nationalist response to the Rhoads letter is illustrative of the extremes to which the party began to reach. Coupled with a rose-colored picture of prosperity during the past is the transformation of U.S. economic, political and social penetration into a plot to exterminate the Puerto Rican people. The Nationalists made a jump from legitimate and well-founded attacks on imperialistic U.S. policies to an attack which was probably out of

proportion with the facts. Mathews has suggested that the Nationalist Party intended to use the incident to launch a strong independentista campaign for the 1932 elections.⁹⁶ The party certainly generated much publicity, but it failed to capture votes. The reason for that failure may be due as much to a popular rejection of Nationalist views on cultural imperialism as to the structure of electoral politics within a colonial state or economic penetration by the U.S.

EPILOGUE

The Nationalists campaigned hard against the Liberals, hoping to attract the independentista vote. Their staggering defeat in the 1932 elections effectively ended the party's hopes for calling a constitutional convention to declare the Republic of Puerto Rico. The party immediately announced its decision to boycott future colonial elections. Little information is available in secondary literature about the party's structure in the 1930s. Pagán reports that the party was re-organized in 1933, but from his description it is unclear what the exact nature of the change was.¹ According to Anderson, party control became increasingly centralized and totalitarian.² El Nacionalista ceased publication and was replaced by La Palabra, a more militant party paper. In December 1932, right after the election, the Nationalists formed an army of liberation. A report written in 1937 described the quasi-military organization of the party during the mid 1930s:

"The party is composed, to a large extent, of young men. They use militant fighting language and threaten to accomplish their ends by force and revolution. They form groups and committees which bear the names of Municipal and State Councils, Ministers of State-Councils, Ministers of State and War, and even name foreign Plenipotentiaries. Some of the Nationalists belong to a so-called 'Army of Liberation,' in connection with which they teach military technique. The members of the so-called 'Army of Liberation' wear uniform in parades, the uniform consisting of black

shirt and white pants, with a small cloth cap, cocked on the head in jaunty style. They carry the Puerto Rican, not the American flag, and sing 'La Borinquena,' not the 'Star Spangled Banner.' These men are fired with the demand of self determination for Puerto Rico. They do not request freedom as a gift, but demand it as a right."³

Between 1933 and 1936 members of the party were involved in several acts of violence and terrorism. Whether these acts were ordered by party leaders is in doubt. The two best known events were a violent clash between police and Nationalists in October 1935 near the University of Puerto Rico's Río Piedras campus which left 4 Nationalists and one bystander dead, and the assassination of Colonel E. Francis Riggs, the Chief of Police, in February 1936 by two young Nationalists. Because of public threats made by Albizu beginning before the 1932 election and repeated at the funerals of the 4 Nationalists killed in the Río Piedras incident, the Riggs assassination was seen as an act of Nationalist retribution. Riggs' assassins were shot by the police while attempting to escape arrest. The police account of the incident, was widely believed to be fraudulent, and the murdered Nationalists became martyrs, generating much sympathy for the movement.

In 1936, Albizu Campos served as the defense attorney for Dionisio Pearson, the only Nationalist to survive the Río Piedras incident. The trial generated much publicity and sympathy for the Nationalist cause. Albizu used it as a forum to challenge U.S.

jurisdiction in Puerto Rico. Pearson was eventually acquitted.

Also in 1936, before the Pearson trial had concluded, Albizu Campos and the top party leadership were indicted for conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government on charges documented by the use of violent rhetoric, political assassination, the use of arms, and the training of an army. After highly publicized and controversial trials, they were found guilty and sentenced to long terms in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta. Their sentences provoked demonstrations and acts of violence by Nationalist Party members. These were met with repression from U.S. and insular authorities.

A massacre of Nationalists and bystanders during a parade held in Ponce on March 21, 1937 is the most notorious example of brutality against this political party.⁴ In this incident, the Nationalist Party had been given a permit to hold a parade, but it was revoked at the last minute when the marchers had already begun to assemble. The parade went forward, but police opened fire on the marchers. Over 100 persons were wounded and 19 were killed by the police. Many of the victims were women and children, and many were spectators having no link to the Nationalist Party. The Nationalists who participated in the parade were unarmed.

Other events besides the Nationalist challenge absorbed the attention of U.S. administrations during this period. Strike activity

increased sharply in the 1930s. Between 1932 and 1936 the number of workers in all occupations who were involved in strikes and other labor controversies rose from 6,566 to 68,578, peaking in 1934 when a total of 72,675 workers were involved in labor disputes.⁵ Chauffeurs, dockworkers, needleworkers, bakers and sugar workers all went on strike at various times. There were also consumer protests against high electric rates and gasoline prices. Nationalist militancy coincided with this labor unrest, but existing documentation does not indicate any causal relationship.

In December 1933 and January 1934, Puerto Rico was rocked by a bitter, island-wide strike of sugar workers. Thousands of workers had begun a wildcat strike against their own union, the Federación Libre de Trabajadores. They were protesting the labor contract which the union leaders had signed because it gave them fewer benefits than the previous year's contract had provided. Workers closed down the mills, demanding higher salaries and an 8-hour work day. The newspapers were filled with strike reports, and at several centrals there were confrontations between mill owners, backed up by the police, and striking workers. After several weeks of confrontation, the strike began to lose momentum, and workers began to return to their jobs. At this point in the strike, a group of workers from Humacao refused to return to work, and wrote to Albizu Campos asking him to intercede on their behalf. Their letter, published in El Mundo, read as follows:

Dear Sir:

The undersigned, workers of Humacao, ask for your immediate intervention in the strike which we have today begun in demand for more just and reasonable salaries than those stipulated in the labor contract of the mill owners.⁶

The letter was signed by several hundred workers. Albizu did respond to the workers' request, but he and the Nationalist Party were unable to gain control over the labor movement. The incident is significant because it indicates that a large number of workers identified Albizu Campos as a potential leader for their movement, but the Nationalist Party could not mobilize the workers.

More research is needed to determine what directives came from the Nationalist Party leadership during the 1930s, and to document the nature and extent of the repression against the party. Nationalist protests, demonstrations, threats of violence and use of assassination co-incided with the strike activity, widespread public dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions, the world economic crisis and the beginnings of unrest in Europe. In spite of the 1932 electoral defeat, latent support for the Nationalists continued. This support cannot be measured in terms of votes or party membership. The Nationalists never did gain a large registered membership. Judging by the election results of 1932,⁷ the party had approximately 5,000 to 6,000 members. According to Corretjer, attendance at party meetings and membership levels rose sharply after 1932, but he does not give any figures to substantiate this claim.⁸ Party

membership certainly could not have been encouraged by the Nationalist demand for sacrifice and valor from all its members or by the obligatory service in the liberating army which was demanded beginning in 1935.⁹

In March 1936, when the Nationalist leaders were indicted on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government, bail was set at an unusually high level, but the necessary funds were raised immediately by supporters of the prisoners.¹⁰ When the Nationalists were indicted, the Puerto Rican National Guard was called into service throughout the island, an indication that the insular government feared possible outbreaks of violence.¹¹ During the spring and summer of 1936, as the Nationalists came and went from the court and their jail, huge crowds gathered at the entrances--on many occasions Albizu Campos responded by making brief speeches to his supporters.¹²

The first jury at the trial of the Nationalist leadership, made up of 7 Puerto Ricans and 5 North Americans, was dismissed by the presiding judge because they were unable to reach a verdict. A second jury, made up of 2 Puerto Ricans and 10 North Americans found the Nationalists guilty.¹³ Three members of this jury reported threats to their lives and were given permission to carry handguns in self-defense because public passion was so inflamed when the motion for a re-trial was denied in August 1936.¹⁴ The businesses of

jurors were boycotted to protest the verdict which they had delivered.¹⁵

In August 1936, after the top Nationalist leadership was convicted, island-wide committees were formed to raise funds for their defense appeals. Columns listing persons who had made donations ran daily in the papers. The "Congreso Nacional Pro Liberación de Presos Políticos" was organized in August 1936, and attracted wide support.¹⁶ The Nationalist appeal was not successful, and the prisoners began to serve their terms in 1937. In spite of the convictions, the American Civil Liberties Union claimed that the trials were in violation of the prisoners' civil liberties.¹⁷

Nationalist activism declined after 1937 and did not re-emerge until 1950. From 1937 to 1943, Albizu Campos served in Atlanta Penitentiary. In 1943 he was taken to Columbus Hospital in New York City for treatment for a heart attack. Apparently in precarious health, he was kept hospitalized under guard until 1945, when he was released on parole. He was confined to New York City on parole until 1947, when he returned to Puerto Rico and resumed active leadership of the Nationalist Party.¹⁸ Outbreaks of violence, including an assassination attempt against President Truman, an attack on the U.S. Congress and an organized armed revolt in Puerto Rico occurred in the 1950s. This resulted in the imprisonment and surveillance of Nationalist Party leaders and members, many of whom were accused of

being Communists. Albizu Campos himself was imprisoned after each of the Nationalist outbreaks.

Continued "latent" popular support for the Nationalists, even after these events, is evidenced by the pardons offered to Albizu Campos by Muñoz Marín between 1947 and 1965. There must have been enough pro-Nationalist sentiment to make the Governor and U.S. authorities feel it would be politically wise to publicly express sympathy for Albizu. The pardons were probably motivated more by fear of the growth of support for Albizu than by a belief in his innocence. One of the saddest expressions of popular support for Albizu came at his funeral in April 1965, which a record-breaking crowd of approximately 50,000 persons attended.¹⁹

A final evaluation of Puerto Rican support for Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party remains elusive. Electoral results show insignificant Nationalist power, but other indicators, from pre-election street corner rallies in 1932 to a deathbed gubernatorial pardon in 1964, suggest that not only did a potentially large Nationalist constituency exist, but that it still had considerable strength decades after the 1932 election had been lost.

CONCLUSION

This study has focused upon the influence of Pedro Albizu Campos on the development of the Nationalist Party platform, ideology and political strategy prior to the 1932 election. It has attempted to underscore the validity of many Nationalist claims, to illustrate the complexity of Albizu Campos's philosophy, to place the party's activities within the spectrum of the "normal" range of Puerto Rican politics at that time and to raise questions about the early history of the party and the reasons for its defeat. To demonstrate the Nationalist viewpoint, the party's positions on participation in elections, tariff policy and the use of English in the schools were examined. In each of these cases the Nationalists put forth a public program which contained many valid criticisms of the colonial system that dominated Puerto Rican life in the 1920s. While some of their claims were exaggerated and their proposals for change reactionary (this is most notable in their attacks upon the educational system), in general Nationalist criticisms of U.S. colonial policy were substantiated by evidence from such non-partisan and authoritative North American sources as the Brookings Institution report of 1930¹ or the Diffie report of 1931.²

The Nationalists called for political independence as the

first step toward control of economic policy. Between 1922 and 1932 they participated in elections but refused to accept federal patronage. The economic program which the Nationalists proposed would have reversed the free trade between the U.S. and Puerto Rico by controlling tariff policy to protect native agriculture and industry. It also called for equitable distribution of profits to workers, a land reform to eliminate absentee ownership, the support of domestic industry and the diversification of agriculture, and native control over shipping and banking. (To achieve their economic goals, the Nationalists supported nationalization of foreign owned corporations.) It developed in reaction to the deepening control by U.S. corporations over agriculture, industry, shipping and credit institutions.

The Nationalist reaction to the effects of U.S. policy on political, economic and social institutions was colored by an ideology which encompassed several very specific beliefs, many of which were articulated by Albizu Campos. The most important components in Nationalist ideology were: their belief in the authority of national and international legal institutions, and in Puerto Rico's inalienable right to sovereignty; their glorification of Puerto Rico's Hispanic past; their belief in the homogeneity of the Puerto Rican people and the harmony among nations of Latin origin; and their faith in the Christian ethic of redemption through valor and sacrifice. These beliefs were probably encouraged by the influence of Neo-Scholastic thought on Albizu Campos. The Scholastic view that a nation had the

right to revolt to remove tyrannical governments was particularly important. Their ideology led the Nationalist Party to adopt certain strategies and models for revolt: their program began with participation in elections; making appeals for justice from the U.S. and the international community; engaging in symbolic and ceremonial acts (such as visiting the sites of past rebellions and honoring the Puerto Rican flag); and supporting pan-American unity. Ultimately, Nationalist ideology led members to heroic acts of extreme self-sacrifice involving public threats of violence, demonstrations of valor, assassination and the adoption of an Irish-style program of armed rebellion.

The methodology used in this study has relied primarily upon examining the public record of Albizu Campos's speeches and written statements in order to define the platform and ideology of the Nationalist Party. The use of one person's views as a "proxy" for the views of an entire group has undoubtedly led to inaccuracies in the interpretation of Nationalist Party history that has been presented here. On the other hand, Albizu Campos so dominated the leadership of the party that his views seem to have been the moving force behind party activity. Further study of the composition and beliefs of party membership will be necessary to corroborate the hypothesis that Albizu Campos indeed set the tone for party behavior.

This study has presented a re-examination of the chronology of

events in the history of the Nationalist Party and the development of Albizu's thought over time. It has opened to question the idea that the Nationalist defeat in the 1932 election was simply due to a repudiation of a program of violence by the Puerto Rican electorate. Although there were a few incidents which led to violence before the election, and although Albizu used much militant rhetoric, a pattern of organized violence did not emerge until 1935, three years after the election, five years after Albizu was elected party President and ten years after he became a prominent party leader. It is therefore hard to justify the Nationalist defeat solely on the grounds that the voters feared this party would lead Puerto Rico toward violent confrontation. Albizu Campos consistently stated his intention to go to the polls in 1932. This suggests that the Nationalists turned to violence not just because Albizu dominated party activity or because they lost the 1932 elections, but because other forces also put pressure upon the party. The alleged surveillance and persecution of Nationalist Party members beginning during the 1932 campaign, the events of the sugar strike of 1934 and the trials of the Nationalist leaders in 1936 must all be examined if an accurate understanding of party militancy is to be reached. Albizu Campos did not burst upon the political scene in the early 1920s advocating violence and leading his party toward armed revolt at that time. His position changed over time, growing more militant during the 1932 campaign. Nationalist violence peaked in 1935-37 and again in 1950-54, and the reasons for the timing of that violence may be crucial in understanding the

eventual defeat of Puerto Rican Nationalism and the success of the Popular Democratic Party of Luis Muñoz Marín. The hypothesis which emerges from this study—that Nationalist violence was the result, rather than the cause, of direct repression by U.S. administrations—must receive careful scrutiny in the future.

By closely reviewing the secondary literature about the Puerto Rican electoral system between 1930 and 1932, this study also opens questions about the conduct of 1932 election. More research is needed to define the exact extent to which machine politics, bribery, threats of physical violence and other forms of political fraud may have influenced the outcome of that election. Since the results were so overwhelmingly against the Nationalists, it seems obvious to conclude that they had little chance of winning. But they themselves, as well as many observers, were surprised by the extent of their defeat. It is possible that many of the approximately 70,000 challenged voters were Nationalists, that the vote counts were not accurately reported and that many voters who would have been pro-Nationalist were barred from the electoral process because they were ineligible to vote. The review of the election which has been presented here gives enough evidence to open these issues to re-examination, although the sources used for this study do not provide enough information to answer all the questions which still surround the election of 1932.

Questions about class-party alliances are also raised by this

study. Existing literature provides little information about the class composition of the major parties in the period between 1922 and 1932. As mentioned in the section on the Puerto Rican electoral system, each of the parties has been seen as the representative of a particular class, and the Nationalists, primarily because of their party platform, are generally seen to be a petit bourgeois party.³ The question of the party affiliation of different classes is quite important in Puerto Rican history because the failure of the independence movement in the twentieth century is frequently attributed to the inability of the Nationalist Party to establish strong ties to the working class during the crucial decade of the 1930s. One of the reasons given for this is that the party did not reflect the interests of the working class, but rather became a mouthpiece for middle and upper class concerns.

The information about Nationalist membership presented in this study (obtained primarily from El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico and other island newspapers) indicated that the Nationalist Party indeed attracted urban professionals and small businessmen in the 1920s, but existing public sources give no indication of what percentage of the membership came from these groups. Albizu himself was a lawyer and the son of a merchant. There is no direct evidence that the party attracted members of the declining hacendado class. By 1934, however, thousands of sugar workers were calling upon the Nationalists for leadership, which suggests that the working class was not entirely

alienated by the program of the Nationalist Party. If the class background of a party's leadership is to be used to define what classes the party represented, then the Nationalists can be classified as a party with an urban middle class base. But the methodological problem of trying to define a group through the study of its leaders again arises here. In fact, the exact composition of the Nationalist membership is not known. A more detailed examination of the nature of the Nationalist membership and the class bases of the other parties is needed to substantiate the hypothesis that it was because of the bourgeois orientation of its leadership that the party failed to attract a mass base. This study therefore opens the issue of class-party alliances to further study.

The question of why the Nationalists did not obtain wide popular support is complicated by the fact that the Liberal Party, which attracted the largest single bloc of votes in 1932, had an economic program and position on the status issue which were similar to the Nationalist program. If voters rejected a petit bourgeoisie platform from one party, then why did they accept it from another? In rejecting the Nationalists, the voters did not reject independence because the Liberals had an independence plank in their platform. Neither were they reacting against the Nationalist economic program, because both parties had programs which called for extensive reforms and attacked U.S. tariff policies, latifundia, etc. This study suggests that the electorate rejected the Nationalist "package"

because it juxtaposed moral and Hispanophilic issues with economic and political ones. In other words, the voters did not react favorably to the Nationalist call for valor, sacrifice and a return to the Spanish past or to the Nationalist accusations about U.S. cultural imperialism.

Inconsistencies within the Nationalist program may also have contributed to the party's defeat. With respect to the electoral process, the Nationalists sought radical change through conventional means—they hoped to overthrow a government by using the political institutions of that government. This approach proved unworkable. If the authority of the United States was indeed "null and void" in the Puerto Rican case, then it was strange for the party to accept the legitimacy of the electoral process in the hope of gaining enough support to call a constitutional convention. When it came to electoral participation, the Nationalists compromised themselves by accepting the assistance of the Republican Party to secure a position on the ballot. The circumstances surrounding the Nationalist participation in the 1932 election indicate that they were ambivalent about whether or not they were "in" or "out" of the political game. Puerto Rican history has numerous examples of parties losing power by refusal to participate—the Federalist boycott of the election in 1900, for example, gave victory to the Republicans. The Nationalists did not have enough power to mobilize an electoral boycott in 1932; such a strategy could only have been effective if all parties had

united and refused to go to the polls. The Nationalists therefore attempted to use a strategy of limited non-cooperation, but this also failed because it eliminated all hope of a solid victory by removing the traditional sources of power (control of electoral boards, pacts with other parties, access to communication networks, etc.) which could have led to electoral victory.

Since he believed in the existence of Puerto Rican sovereignty, it was also strange for Albizu Campos to use U.S. legal institutions as a vehicle for arguing the Nationalist position, yet he repeatedly participated in trials in Puerto Rican and U.S. courts to bring up the issue of U.S. jurisdiction. He also devoted much attention to analyzing the U.S. constitutional system (as demonstrated by his speech, "La resolución conjunta número dos") even though he did not recognize the authority of the U.S. constitution in Puerto Rico. In spite of his rejection of that authority, Albizu put considerable faith in the U.S. legal system. After their defeat in 1932 it is surprising that the Nationalists continued to use the U.S. courts. Ironically, it was through the manipulation of the legal system that the Nationalist leadership was eventually removed from power by the U.S. government. The Nationalists failed to recognize that the issues of morality and legality carried little weight with Washington in the face of a perceived threat to national security or in the setting of U.S. foreign policy, even though an appeal to morality might often have been used to defend foreign policy before public opinion.

The Nationalist Party, in the end, cannot be easily dismissed as a party which failed to gain power because a peace-loving electorate could not identify with violent fanatics who existed on the lunatic fringe of society. The Nationalists carefully articulated programs for the re-structuring of Puerto Rico's political and economic institutions, and both before and after 1932 they presented a serious challenge to the political power of the other parties and the U.S. government by keeping the Puerto Rican status issue in the public eye. The Nationalists always had enough latent support to force their way into the political equation. They were catalytic in forcing the U.S. to initiate a program of far-reaching reform in its Caribbean colony out of fear of losing control over an increasingly restless populace.

The very existence of the Nationalist Party in Puerto Rican history is cause for embarrassment to U.S. administrations. Today the unresolved status issue allows independentistas to mock the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as it grapples with the results of a development pattern that has produced a welfare state woefully unable to control domestic problems, make Puerto Rico an autonomous political force in the Caribbean or carry any real weight in Washington. The United States has now lost its battle to make Puerto Rico a "showcase" of development and faces the problem of decreasing control over the Caribbean and Central America, just as it faced a

challenge to North American hegemony in this region during the 1930s. Unless a new model for economic and social development can be incorporated into U.S. foreign policy, the outcome of the current crisis may result in a further erosion of U.S. power rather than in greater national security.

Albizu Campos is long dead and the Nationalist Party has ceased to be a significant force in Puerto Rican politics. With a political strategy that was romantic and impractical the Nationalists seem to have been destined for defeat. Looking back through the pages of El Nacionalista there is an element of pathos surrounding this party which put untold energy into flag ceremonies, sent endless numbers of petitions to the U.S. President and Congress and attempted to mobilize a nation by appealing to the non-existent glories of the past. Even if they had succeeded in achieving political independence, there is little reason to believe that internal divisions would not have continued to manifest themselves within the political system or that the island would have been able to halt the process of economic penetration by the United States. The histories of the other Caribbean islands are a grim reminder of this fact. The Nationalist Party can only be viewed with a critical eye by those who seek a peaceful resolution to the problems of inequality between developed countries and the Third World. Nevertheless, even to their detractors Albizu Campos and the Nationalist Party continue to stand as a symbol of resistance to the abuses of U.S. power and to represent the right

of all people to determine the terms on which they will face their own futures.

APPENDIXChronology for Pedro Albizu Campos
by J. Benjamin Torres

- 1893 June 29. Born in the city of Ponce. His parents were Juliana Campos y Campos and Alejandro Albizu y Romero. He attended the public elementary schools in the town of Juana Diaz and in Ponce.
- 1912 He attends the University of Vermont in the United States with a scholarship from the Aurora Lodge of Ponce.
- 1913 Transfers to Harvard University upon the recommendation of two professors in order to continue his studies.
- 1916 Receives his Bachelor's degree; goes on to do graduate studies; enters Harvard Law School.
- 1921 Finishes his studies. Receives diplomas in the fields of Chemical Engineering, Liberal Arts, Military Science, and Law.
- 1922 He marries Dr. Laura Meneses in the town of Juana Diaz. She is a Peruvian whom he met at Harvard. On September 17, 1922, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico is founded in Río Piedras, but Albizu Campos does not take part in the organization of this group.
- 1923 Albizu Campos formally joins the Union Party of Puerto Rico.
- 1924 March 26. His son, Pedro Albizu Meneses is born in Ponce. In May Albizu Campos breaks with the Union Party and joins the Nationalist Party. On May 18 he is elected first vice-president of the Nationalist Party.
- 1925 August 30. His daughter, Rosa, is born in Ponce. On September 6 the Nationalist Party commissions him to visit the Latin American countries to campaign in favor of nationalist ideals.
- 1927 June 20. He starts out on his journey throughout Latin America. He first visits Santo Domingo, then Haiti, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. On October 16 his daughter, Laura Esperanza, is born in Peru.
- 1930 January 4. He returns to Puerto Rico. He takes up residence in the section of Santurce called Barrio Villa Palmeras. On May 11 he is elected president of the Nationalist Party at the assembly which the party held in the Ateneo meeting hall and he undertakes a huge campaign to raise the level of education and consciousness of the people throughout the countryside, the neighborhood "barrios" and the

- public plazas of Puerto Rico. His rallying cry: "Nationalism is the Motherland organized in order to regain its sovereignty."
- 1932 April 16. The Legislature in Puerta de Tierra submits a proposal to change the flag of Puerto Rico, with its single star, to become the standard for the colony. Albizu Campos, together with the large crowd that was commemorating, in San Juan, the birthday of José De Diego, take over by assault the Capitol building in order to protest the intended profanation of the national symbol by the colonials. As the crowd surged into the Capitol, the handrails gave way and various persons fell and a young man was killed, Manuel Rafael Suárez Díaz, the first martyr of the Nationalist struggle.
- 1934 January. Albizu Campos directs the strike of the agricultural workers. The sugar corporations are alarmed at the involvement of Albizu Campos in the conflict and they conspire to paralyze his activities through bribery or assassination.
- 1935 August. The Nationalist Party receives confidential data from the very centers of North American power in Puerto Rico which reveal the firm intention of the North American regime to have the leaders of the Nationalist Party, and its president, Albizu Campos, assassinated under any pretext. Mr. Ramón S. Pagán was one of the men who corroborated the existence of the plan which was directed by the North American secret police in Puerto Rico. The police, led by Colonel Elisha Francis Riggs, assassinate the Nationalists Ramón S. Pagán, Pedro Quiñones, Eduardo Rodríguez Vega and José Santiago Barea. Another Nationalist, Dionesio Pearson, was gravely wounded. This event is known as: The Río Piedras Massacre. October 25. Albizu Campos pronounces a funeral ovation and enjoins a vow upon those present that the assassination not remain unpunished: "We come here to take a vow so that this assassination not remain unpunished. Raise your hands all those who consider themselves free. We swear that assassination will not last long in Puerto Rico."
- 1936 February 23. In San Juan, the young Nationalists Hiram Rosado and Elias Beauchamp condemn Colonel Elisha Francis Riggs for being responsible for the Río Piedras Massacre. Rosado and Beauchamp were arrested, imprisoned in the General Headquarters of the police in San Juan and assassinated right there by the police themselves. February 24. Albizu Campos once again gives the eulogy: "We have already brought here the ashes of other heroes. Nationalism has brought to the Motherland the transmutation of its being because man was not born to vegetate or to be fat and brawny; man was born to elevate himself upon supreme principles in keeping with his immortality. To reach immortality there is but one entranceway: the doorway of courage that leads to sacrifice over a supreme cause. One must sacrifice oneself for the independence of the Motherland." March 4. The United States District Court in Puerto Rico issued an

order for the arrest of Albizu Campos and other Nationalist leaders accusing them of "conspiring to overthrow by force the government of the United States in Puerto Rico." July 14. The trial against the Nationalist leadership starts. On trial are: Pedro Albizu Campos, Juan Antonio Corretjer, Erasmo Velázquez, Juan Gallardo Santiago, Julia H. Velázquez, Pablo Rosado Ortiz, Clemente Soto Veléz and Luís Florencio Velázquez. Acting as defense lawyers are: Pedro Albizu Campos, Gilberto Concepción de Gracia, Julio Pinto Gandía and J.M. Toro Nazario. The prosecuting attorneys who took part in the process were: A. Cecil Snyder, Marcelino Romani, Jorge Ortiz Toro, James E. Ruffin and Amos W.W. Woodcock. Judge Robert Cooper presided. July 20. The jury, made up of seven Puerto Ricans and five North Americans, could not come to an accord and was dissolved by Judge Cooper. The five North Americans voted Guilty and the seven Puerto Ricans voted Not Guilty. July 27. The second trial against the Nationalist leadership begins. This time the jury was made up of ten North Americans and two Puerto Ricans with ties to North American interests. July 31. At 12:12 after midnight the jury brought in a verdict of Guilty. The sentence was six to ten years imprisonment and they were taken to La Princesa prison pending an appeal.

- 1937 February 12: The Supreme Court of the United States confirmed the sentence imposed upon the Nationalist leadership by the Federal Court in San Juan. March 21. In Ponce the Nationalist Municipal Junta organized a march of Cadets and a meeting in the Ponce plaza in protest against the imprisonment of the Nationalist leadership. The police were opposed to these actions and mobilized hundreds of well-armed agents, with orders to shoot to kill. When the Nationalists were organizing the march on the corner of Marina and Aurora streets, the police began the shooting, killing 19 people and seriously wounding about 200 people. This event is known as: The Ponce Massacre. June 7. Albizu Campos and the other seven Nationalist leaders are transferred to the Atlanta Penitentiary, Georgia, in the United States.
- 1943 June. Albizu Campos, deathly ill, is taken from the prison in Atlanta and is interned in Columbus Hospital in New York City.
- 1945 After two years of treatment at Columbus Hospital, he decides to return to Puerto Rico but the North American authorities prevent him from returning to his native land. He is obliged to remain in New York and to keep the federal authorities informed as to his place of residence. The city was his prison.
- 1947 December 15. Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico after six years wasted in the dungeons of Atlanta and two years of hospitalization plus two years of probation in New York. At the reception ceremony held by the Puerto Rican people and the Nationalist Party in the Sixto Escobar Park in San Juan, Albizu reaffirms his open and frank struggle

against despotism and colonialism. He pronounces his famous words: "I was never away..." He begins the total reorganization of the Nationalist Party and prepares to deal a revolutionary blow against the colonial regime.

- 1950 October 30. The Nationalist Insurrection breaks out. Albizu Campos is arrested after a dramatic battle in front of his home on the corner of Sol and Cruz streets in San Juan, the Capital city.
- 1951 February. Albizu Campos is tried and condemned to 80 years in prison.
- 1953 September 30. Muñoz Marín grants him amnesty as a result of pressure by the Latin American countries in favor of setting free the Nationalist leader. The amnesty coincides with a delicate condition of his health.
- 1954 March 1. The Nationalist heroes Lolita Lebron Soto, Rafael Cancél Miranda, Irvin Flores and Andrés Figueroa Cordero attack the House of Representatives in the Capitol of the United States with firearms. Muñoz Marín rescinds the amnesty granted to Albizu Campos five months before and orders his immediate arrest. After another dramatic shooting struggle in front of his home in San Juan, Albizu Campos was taken out, unconscious, and imprisoned again.
- 1956 April. In prison Albizu Campos suffers a thrombosis which leaves him semiparalyzed and without speech. He is transferred to the Presbyterian Hospital where he is furnished with a sickroom-cell heavily guarded.
- 1964 November 15. Muñoz Marín, aware Albizu Campos is on the verge of death, pardons him a second time. Muñoz Marín did not wish Albizu Campos to die in prison.
- 1965 April 21. Albizu Campos, called "The Last Liberator of America," dies in San Juan. His widow, Dr. Laura Meneses, declared: "The assassination is consummated. Albizu Campos died in prison. Albizu Campos did not die in his house; when he arrived there he was already dead."

SOURCE: Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:pp.8-11. (Translated from Spanish.)

<u>Puerto Rican Political Parties from 1869 to 1946</u>		
1869 ¹	Liberal	Conservador
1870-1874	Liberal Reformista	Incondicional Español
1883	Asimilista	
1887	Autonomista	
1897	Liberal Fusionista	Puro (ortodoxo) Asimilista
1898	Unión Autonomista	Liberal
1899	Federal (Americano)	Republicano Puertorriqueño Obrero-Socialista
1902	Unión de Puerto Rico	
1912		Socialista
1920		Republicano Puertorriqueño
1922	Partido Nacionalista	
1924	Unión de Puerto Rico	Republicano Puertorriqueño
1928	Alianza Puertorriqueña ²	Socialista Constitucional Histórico
1932	Coalición: Unión Republicana Partido Socialista	Partido Liberal ³
1936		
1938		Partido Popular Democrático ⁴
1946		Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño ⁵

¹The information covering 1869-1898, 1902-1920, and 1924-1936 was taken from Miller, Historia de Puerto Rico, p.321; Pagán, Partidos políticos puertorriqueños, vol. I, pp.11-15, also contains the information covering 1869-1899.

For detailed information on the foundation of the Republican party, the Federal party, the Socialist worker's party (Partido Obrero Socialista), the Union of Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, see Pagán, Partidos políticos puertorriqueños, vol. I.

²The "Alianza Puertorriqueña" was formed by the alliance of the Union of Puerto Rico and the Republican party (Partido Republicano).

³This was the new name used by the old Union of Puerto Rico beginning in 1932.

⁴Luis Muñoz Marín, who was stymied in his attempt to wrest control of the Liberal party from aging Romero Barceló, created this party in this year. See Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics, pp.257-267, 288-309, where the story is excellently documented.

⁵If it is considered that after its ineffectual showing in 1932 the Nationalist party engaged exclusively in direct and militant action outside the electoral system, then the Puerto Rican Independence party was the first political agrupation based wholly on the ideal of independence. For a full account of the story of the Puerto Rican Independence party, see Anderson, Party Politics in Puerto Rico, pp.95-117.

SOURCE: Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), Appendix A, pp.219-20.

STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF THE TOTAL VOTE CAST BY POLITICAL PARTIES
DURING THE GENERAL ELECTIONS FROM 1914-1956

	1914 ¹	1917 ²	1920	1924	1928	1932
Union of Puerto Rico	107,619	90,155	126,446	132,255	--	--
Republican Party	82,574	60,319	63,845	30,286	--	--
Socialist Party	--	24,468	59,140	56,103	--	97,438
Statehood Republican Party	--	--	--	--	--	110,794
Liberal Party	--	--	--	--	--	170,168
Nationalist Party	--	--	--	399	329	5,257
Independence Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
Popular Democratic Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
Registered voters	273,116	244,530	268,643	326,093	321,113	452,738
Total votes cast ³	204,233	175,006	299,431	253,520	256,335	--

	1938	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956
Union of Puerto Rico	--	--	--	--	--	--
Republican Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
Socialist Party	144,294	87,841	68,107	64,121	21,655	--
Statehood Republican Party	152,739	134,582	101,777	88,189	85,172	172,838
Liberal Party	252,467	--	38,630	28,203	--	--
Nationalist Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
Independence Party	--	--	--	66,141	125,734	86,386
Popular Democratic Party	--	214,857	383,220	392,033	429,064	433,010
Registered voters	764,602	714,960	--	--	883,219	873,842
Total votes cast ³	--	--	--	--	--	--

¹Taken from Pagán, Partidos políticos puertorriqueños, vol. I, pp.163-164.

²The data covering from 1919-1956, with the exception of total votes cast was taken from Hunter, Puerto Rico, A Survey, p.105.

³The information concerning total votes cast was taken from Pagan, Partidos políticos puertorriqueños, vol. I, pp.163-164, 199.

SOURCE: Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), Appendix B, pp.221-23.

Resolution approved by the Nationalist Party Assembly, April 1928, to send the following cable to President Coolidge:

President Coolidge
Washington

We affirm we enjoy less political liberty than in time Spanish government and that Congress seized us perpetuating here colonial government Russian imperialist type. At present, here exists tolerance and not liberty.

We accept material progress during the North American domination at the cost of large loans that weigh upon us for the benefit of your capital and plans.


We affirm that the Island is becoming impoverished; our lands and industries are taken over by Yankee corporations; fifty-two thousand landowners disappeared, increasing the proletariat class by more than half a million; we are obliged to sell our products and buy yours at prices set by you; according to Governor Towner's report, eight thousand natives emigrate annually and ex-Attorney General Butte affirms Congress that half a million lack sufficient food; tariff system is against development of Island's riches. We demand you act immediately concede independence to Island.

Island desires your friendship, your guidance. We reject imperialist colonialism. We appeal to the principles supported by Abraham Lincoln.

Federico Acosta Velarde
President, Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico

SOURCE: El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 21 April, 1928, p.10.
(Translated from Spanish.)

The Literary Digest for March 31, 1928



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THIS SEA IS PRETTY ROUGH FOR A FELLOW IN A ROWBOAT
—Hanny in the Philadelphia Inquirer.

The President Rebukes Porto Rico

The plea of Porto Ricans, address to the American people and expressing a desire for self-government, which was entrusted to the care of Colonel Lindbergh early in February, was answered by President Coolidge on March 15 in what the Washington News calls "one of the most remarkable State papers in all the annals of the White House." In their message, the President of the Porto Rican Senate and the Speaker of the House did not ask that the ties of common citizenship be severed; they "aspire, above all, to a government of our people, by and for our people." In other words, they wish to elect their own Governor, instead of having him appointed by the President, altho there is no specific complaint against the present Executive, Horace M. Towner. They wish, as a "Free State," to have the right, subject to Presidential approval, to reduce or raise tariff schedules. They would retain the privilege of sending their products duty-free to the United States, while retaining all revenues.

Porto Rico, the President points out in his letter to Governor Towner, pays no taxes into the Federal Treasury, yet it reaps enormous benefits from free trade with the United States. The Island has a Senate of nineteen members, explains the Brooklyn Eagle, and a House of thirty-nine members, altho legislative acts are subject to the Governor's veto. If, however, such acts are passed over the Governor's veto, they must be submitted to the President of the United States for approval or disapproval. In order that its readers may understand the President's reasons for refusing Porto Rico's plea for greater freedom, the Indianapolis Star explains:

"Porto Rico, it will be recalled, came under control of the United States in 1898 as the result of the Spanish war. The right of citizenship was conferred in 1917. The Island has been practically self-governing for ten years."

By the Organic Act of 1917, observes the Manchester Union:

"All the guaranties of the American Constitution were extended to the Island, and a legislature was granted, making those guaranties effective.

"During the past year, however, there has been considerable complaint in Porto Rico against this relationship, and at the time of the Havana Conference a request was made for a status similar to that of Canada in the British Empire. One of the chief objects of complaint was the income tax, and the internal revenue collected on Porto Rican products purchased in the United States.

"The facts are that out of an annual government expenditure of approximately eleven million dollars, over none million accrues from income taxes, United States internal revenue, and customs on Porto Rican imports; and that without these provisions, resources for the support of the Island government would not be available.

"In the meantime, tariff advantages granted to the Island have not only promoted trade, so that in the thirty years of American occupation, imports and exports have multiplied none times; but these advantages have occasioned an actual annual saving of approximately fifty-seven million dollars in duty. These advantages in trade are not less than those along the line of health, education, and sanitation. This record, the President believes, justifies America's program in Porto Rico."

To quote a part of President Coolidge's letter:

"The Porto Rican Government at present exercises a greater degree of sovereignty over its own internal affairs than does the government of any State or Territory of the United States. The people of Porto Rico are citizens of the United States, with all the rights and privileges of other citizens of the United States.

"Prior to the American occupation, the Porto Rican people had received practically no training in self-government or the free exercise of the franchise. We found the people of Porto Rico poor and distressed, without hope for the future, ignorant, poverty-stricken, and diseased, not knowing what constituted a free and democratic government. We have progressed in the relief of poverty and distress, in the eradication of disease, and have attempted, with some success, to inculcate in the inhabitants the basic ideas of a free, democratic government. Perhaps no Territory in the world has received such considerate treatment in the past thirty years as has Porto Rico, and perhaps nowhere else has progress been so marked and so apparent as in Porto Rico.

"There is no disposition in America, and certainly not on my part, to discourage any reasonable aspiration of the people of Porto Rico. The Island has so improved and its people have so progressed in the last generation as to justify high hopes for the future, but it certainly is not unreasonable to ask that those who speak for Porto Rico limit their petition to those things which may be granted without a denial of such hope. Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that the people of Porto Rico, who

are a part of the people of the United States, will progress with the people of the United States rather than isolated from the source from which they have received practically their only hope of progress."

"In this letter," believes the New York Evening Post, "the President has effectively disposed of the Porto Rican arguments." The Troy Record is of the opinion that a "Free State" is desired because it will create more offices for the party leaders in the Island to fill. To them, maintains the Philadelphia Inquirer, "the President has administered a richly deserved rebuke."

The New York Herald Tribune finds it "hard to take seriously the plea of the Senate and House leaders for nationality and independence." Continues this paper:

"President Coolidge has had the courtesy and patience to consider the Porto Rican petition calmly and objectively. He does not stand on the legal record alone. He takes pains to show that, so far as autonomy and political privileges are concerned, Porto Rico fares better than any organized Territory of the United States has ever fared, and enjoys commercial and economic favors not even granted to our States. The Porto Ricans are American citizens. They are secured against disorder and invasion. They pay no Federal taxes and benefit from services from the Federal Government which cost about \$5,000,000 a year. In addition, the Federal Government turns back into the insular treasury the income taxes collected in Porto Rico, the customs duties levied there, the internal revenue duties collected there, and also the internal revenue duties collected on Porto Rican products entering the United States. The commodities sent to the mainland in the last fiscal year, valued at \$97,000,000, would have had to pay \$57,000,000 in duties if they had come from a foreign country.

"There are always politicians to whom unrestricted power is a goal to which all other goals should be sacrificed. There are some such in Porto Rico who prefer that political and economic conditions, whatever they are, shall be of their own making. That they represent the masses in this densely populated Island is far from probable."

Every word of the President's letter is true, admits the New York Telegram and other Scripps-Howard papers. "But," it goes on, "we can not help wondering whether Mr. Coolidge's extreme candor will do more good than harm." To The Telegram, his message "is somewhat like the superintendent of an uplift institution refusing an inmate's request for a more comfortable

bed by telling her what she was before she came to that particular place. People seldom like that sort of thing." Comparison with the powers of other States in the Union, remarks the Baltimore Sun, "is rather flat." As the Cleveland Plain Dealer explains:

"The people of Porto Rico are not of our blood, and our traditions and theirs have had nothing in common. Our institutions, some of them wholly underivable from the Porto Rican view-point, are forced upon them. They are very literally a subject people, governed by a mighty nation so big and busy that it scarcely has time to notice them.

"Undoubtedly Porto Rico has improved and prospered immensely under American rule. But the fact remains that it is under American rule, and this fact alone is sufficient to cause discontent."

From the tone of his letter to Governor Towner, Mr. Coolidge, thinks the New York World, "appears to be incapable of understanding why the Porto Ricans should seek a larger measure of control of their own affairs." In the opinion of The World:

"The trouble is that the Porto Ricans have been taught to believe in the principles of free, democratic government as inherited through the United States, and it rasps them to have an alien Governor and certain restraints, however slight in fact, imposed upon them from Washington.

"They have learned by experience that they are fitted for far better things than Spain in the old days ever permitted them to know, and with freedom and self-rule has been stimulated the natural desire for greater freedom and self-rule, just as our own Territories, one after another, hoped to rise to Statehood as their rightful destiny.

"If it was the purpose of the United States to hold them in check permanently as undependable, it was a mistake from the start to loosen the reins and let them take their own gait."

The startling statement that the Porto Rican masses are as poor to-day as they were before the United States took over the Island is made by Luis Munoz-Marin, Economic Commissioner of the Porto Rican Legislature, in a New York World interview. Says this Porto Rican:

"That the United States Government is generous to the Government of Porto Rico no one would wish to deny, but the Government of Porto Rico, after all, is not the most

important thing in Porto Rico. What is important is the people.

"The American tariff compels Porto Rico to buy necessities in the American market at monopoly prices. In exchange for this imposition of high prices on a very poor population, the sugar and tobacco industries obtain certain privileges. The sugar and tobacco industries are largely absentee-owned. Their profits, which are often enormous, leave Porto Rico never to return.

"It is this flow of wealth out of the Island and the high cost of living imposed by the monopoly market that keep the bulk of Porto Rican population in the same economic state of thirty-one years ago.

"The American people as a whole do not benefit by this exploitation. Nor, we believe, would they wish to benefit by it if they could. We demand a form of government that shall give us ample power to deal with our internal affairs, unhampered by documents and policies not made for Porto Rico and not decently applicable to Porto Rico.

"We want the American Government to stop picking our pockets in the name of the American people."

SOURCE: The Literary Digest, 31 March 1928, pp.13-14.

Mr. Jose Coll y Cuchí Explains the Reasons He Had for Leaving the Nationalist Assembly on Sunday.

Because of the extensive coverage we published yesterday our readers are informed about the withdrawal of Don Jose Coll y Cuchí from the Assembly of the Nationalist Party held in the Ateneo last Sunday night. We have visited him in his residence in Santurce in order to obtain an interview about this affair, and thus to make this information public.

Mr. Coll y Cuchí gave us the following information:

"My decision yesterday evening has not been solely in self-defense, but also in defense of the National Junta and above all in defense of the ethics of the Nationalist Party's politics.

"My statement was as follows: 'I cannot belong to a party that adopts a politics of hatreds and insults.' I immediately justified this statement, in front of the Assembly, and now I am going to say more completely, in writing, what I said last night with the spoken word.

"Our Assembly was called to order in the morning, in an atmosphere of pleasant cordiality, and everything suggested that the session was going to result in a resounding success for our Party. The unfortunate incident, provoked out of all context, ruined our noble undertaking. The cordial atmosphere had been so general, that present here were dignified representatives from the other political parties of Puerto Rico and from the Association of Women Voters. They had been invited by us and were attending our meeting courteously. This was the first time that such a rewarding sight could be seen in Puerto Rico. That's what I said in my speech answering the speeches of the invited representatives and foreseeing that this fraternal gathering might produce happy results.

"The turn came, in order of business, for the reports. The President of the Party, Mr. Antonio Ayuso, read his, relating the work realized by him personally and together with the national Junta during his presidency. In the brief span of a few months this Junta did a brilliant job. The best proof was there, being that out of the disastrous disorganization to which the Party had been reduced, two local Juntas, Mr. Ayuso and the National Junta had rapidly organized Juntas in half the Island, whose representatives were present. Upon finishing the reading of his report, he received a just and warm ovation.

"The chairman of the Assembly, Mr. Miguel Marcos Morales, then gave the floor to the Vice President of the Party, Mr. Pedro Albizu Campos, so that he could present the report of his trip to some countries in South America. I should mention that when Mr. Albizu Campos returned some months ago, the President of the Party officially asked him to submit in writing his report to the National Junta. Mr. Albizu refused, declaring that he would report to the Assembly; the Assembly was at hand and with it, the opportunity. Mr. Albizu did not have a written report, not even a document that might support his work. He was, let us say, going to relate a story. Up to now the whole thing wasn't important, if it were a case of taking up an hour, because in reality, this matter, although it would have been immensely important for its own sake, was not at present politically crucial. But Mr. Albizu wanted, not to give a report, but to use the pretext of a report in order to carry out the plans he had and which then came into view. So it was: for two and a half hours Mr. Albizu talked, and by the way, his insistence on repeating that he had already talked too much was a bother, when what he was doing was a required report, and he kept going in circles about Santo Domingo and Cuba. All this would have been tolerable, although Mr. Albizu did not tell about, or even less, justify, any sort of work. He was relating a story. But it doesn't matter: I declare in deference to what is just that he was not compelled to have been successful, just to have tried, and if he had done the latter, and was able to offer some proof, he deserved our gratitude. The terrible thing was, and here is the crux of the matter, that that unfortunate report turned into a chain of insults and a sermon of frightening hatreds, often expressed with intemperate words. Be it noted that I remember all the phrases and I am ready to make them public. Insults to the Spaniards in Cuba, and, in passing, to those of Puerto Rico; insults to the Cubans, and to the government of Cuba and even to Jose Marti; insults to the United States; insults to some European nations; a sermon of hate against the Red Cross, against Mother's Day, and even concerning the matter of race; and finally, a terrible castigation of the National Junta of the Nationalist Party because it had not sent him all the money he needed to continue travelling throughout America.

"Well, now; I, personally, would have followed the example of the chairman of the Assembly, Mr. Marcos Morales: absolute tolerance and not paying attention overly to the matter, a sacrifice which I would have made as a burnt offering for the sake of the good it might have resulted in, for the Assembly. But that lighted firebrand brought about the doleful consequence of the Assembly's approving the speech with a formidable ovation. I shall not say how or by whom this ovation was initiated, dragging with it the rest of those in the audience, although I said it in my speech last night, so that Mr. Albizu Campos could take note there of his destructive tactics. But anyway, the reality was that the Assembly, with its applause, approved that conduct.

"Faced by this situation, and taking advantage of the recess that was granted in order to continue in the evening, I reflected serenely and made my resolution. On the one hand I took into account an Assembly, which, mistaken or not, taken or not taken by surprise, convinced or not, nevertheless was an Assembly that I should respect; on the other hand, there was my conscience, whose voice I cannot be deaf to. The evening session convened and I, with the equanimity to which I am accustomed, announced to the Assembly that I was going to fulfill a duty, submitting my assigned report concerning my work in the United States, and that afterward I was going to exercise a right. I gave my report, rapidly, precisely, citing facts, presenting the documents which supported it and offering the Party a written paper which could later be made into a book. After I finished my report, I made a statement which appears at the head of this interview and I gave my reasons before the Assembly itself. I told Mr. Albizu that he had been cruel and unjust with the National Junta; cruel, because of the cutting form of his expressions; and unjust because he was not in the right. I reminded him that the Ponce Assembly which had entrusted to him the mission of going to America did not commit itself to underwrite any expense nor to send him money and even authorized him to raise funds everywhere; therefore he did not have the right to demand and even less did he now have the right to reproach anyone because it had not been sent to him; nevertheless, before sailing, he asked the National Junta for some money for his trip to Santo Domingo; and the Junta, generously and voluntarily, took upon itself the painful task of raising money for him, and collected and handed over to him \$700., that Junta that he now spoke to offensively. He went to Santo Domingo. There, he either didn't know how or was unable to earn money. When I began to speak, I said, and I now repeat, that I only know two ways of having money: either it is given to one, or one earns it honestly. While he was in Santo Domingo he received economic aid from that country. Later, the National Junta again raised money for him, voluntarily and generously. Afterward he again asked for money, which he had no right to ask for, nor did he give an account of any work which in some fashion might justify his request. And now, when he returns to Puerto Rico, after being away for three years, during which his constructive work reduces itself to the formation of a National Junta in Cuba and in Santo Domingo, both completely inactive, he appears before an Assembly of the Party, does not submit an official report of the fulfillment of his mission because he has nothing to put in it nor to substantiate what he relates, and to cover up that failure he weaves a network of insults and he even suddenly turns against those very men who solicited money for him, who gave it to him without any obligation to do so, and he offends them with the most terrible accusations because they didn't continue sending it to him.

"And the audience applauded. Horrors!

"Who made up the audience? Representatives from the local Juntas and spectators among whom were some interested in seeing the Nationalist Party fall. How many of the representatives applauded and how many were silent? In truth I do not know. But in the face of an ovation, which was formidable, it had to be accepted that the politics of hatreds and insults outlined in the report was, at least apparently, adopted.

"I should point out here with pride and as a gesture of acknowledgement to the character of a man who knows how to preside that Mr. Marcos Morales, chairman of the Assembly, said these words when there was silence: "I congratulate Mr. Albizu Campos for the report insofar as it concerns his efforts to fulfill his mission; but I cannot congratulate him in connection with his offensive expressions."

"This was a repudiation, formal, harsh and deserved; but coming only from one man, even though he was just and worthy and chairman of the Assembly and a prestigious figure. But the Assembly, which yielded when presented with this censure, did not take any action to repudiate what the chairman had correctly repudiated. In my speech I said to that Assembly that it had done wrong because it was there to judge; and God has given us two ears; the right thing would have been that after hearing an accusation, the voice of the defense should have been heard so as to judge correctly and calmly. Instead everything had been precipitous, resulting in havoc. I wish to point out again that I don't know whether everyone approved of the insults. At that moment the Assembly was not a responsible audience; it was a jury; while, in a way, as an audience it could be moved with rhetorical effects, the person on the speaker's podium should have maintained the respect that was due the high moral tone of that jury and his own sense of responsibility. A speaker may use rhetoric but the phrase must correspond to an idea, or to a good intention. For example, I remember that Mr. Albizu, in speaking against "Mother's Day," said that in Puerto Rico there were 365 mother's days. Well, it seems to me that no one is unaware that there are mothers in all the countries and that everywhere the years have 365 days. That rhetoric was used to suggest a disparagement of a good custom. In other words, a politics of hatred and insults.

"The Nationalist Party had entered upon a period of enthusiastic reorganization. By expounding our ideals, and defending our rights in Puerto Rico and in the United States, with simultaneous firmness and correctness, one obtains the support of the Puerto Rican forces in order to strengthen our efforts, and one gains respect, which is the first step on the road to justice. To adopt stances without reflection that lack thoughtfulness and are unjustified is to act foolishly. If we bring about an atmosphere of insults and hatreds

the Country will not come near us; and then, instead of defending our ideal we damage it.

"I am a champion of politics that incorporate the following terms: firm ideals and correct procedures."

SOURCE: El Mundo, 13 May 1930, pp.1,6. (Translated from Spanish.)

The Response of the President of the Nationalist Party to the
Declarations of Don José Coll y Cuchí

The President of the Nationalist Party, Lcdo. P. Albizu Campos, sent us the following article:

"Mr. Coll y Cuchí has left the Nationalist Party definitely. That is what he roundly declared before the Assembly that the Party has just held. He slighted the commission that sought him out to afford him a chance to recant. He refused in the most absolute terms.

"I can assure Mr. Coll y Cuchí that the Nationalist Party has most definitely gotten rid of an enormous headache.

"In answer to his insidious remarks, addressed to the National Assembly (which applauded what I said prior to his speech), I will limit myself to the rebuttal of his declarations, all false, in which he affirmed that my statements were offensive to Cuba, to Santo Domingo, to foreigners, especially to Spaniards, and to others.

"I have maintained here and everywhere, and not for the sake of convenience, the following postulates:

- "The independence of Puerto Rico.
- "The confederation of the Antilles.
- "The Ibero-American Union.
- "The world-wide hegemony of the Ibero-American nations.
- "The prestige of each one of those nations has been and is, for me, sacred.

"He accuses me of having attacked the United States because of the policies imposed by the invader upon our land. Against that I do not defend myself nor ever will defend myself.

"He honors me.

"I grant to Mr. Jose Coll y Cuchí the privilege of continuing to sing to the flag of the United States, as he did in my presence at the first Nationalist meeting that we held in Baldorioty Plaza in the year 1924, something which he obliged me to censure from the speakers stand and in his presence.

"That same tribute to the flag of the United States he repeated at the assembly of the Alianza which was held in Mayaguez last year. Such is the information, which I consider reliable, and which I have received from respected gentlemen who attended the

aforesaid meeting.

"We defenders of liberty all venerate the glorious name of Jose Marti.

"That is why, in the speech I gave in the Assembly, I called him the Apostle, the Teacher, the martyr for the ideals of liberty.

"I do not know if Mr. Coll y Cuchí is known in Cuba. Everyone there is aware of my pro-Cuban work.

"However, in the Dominican Republic, by good luck both he and I are known. I leave it to Quisquaya [i.e., the people of the Dominican Republic] to pass judgment on his rash statements, so full of ire at having had taken away from him the means of imposing his will on the Nationalist Party.

"The entire Press was represented in the grand purifying act which has just been celebrated by authentic Nationalism. I recall perfectly the presence of the representatives of all our newspapers and of the Associated Press.

"Up to now the reports given by the Press condemn all the invidious assertions of Mr. Coll y Cuchí.

"Justice must be done and toward that end the truth must be told, hurt whom it may.

"It is not true that Mr. Ayuso and Mr. Coll y Cuchí were the organizers of the Assembly.

"The truth is that they opposed its being organized by all possible means, until the last hour, when they clamored to jump onto the bandwagon, which was already in motion, evidently in order to take over its direction. That intention was revealed before the Assembly by the quiet insistence of Mr. Ayuso, who wanted to continue as chairman in charge of the Assembly when that body desired a provisional executive committee in which it could have confidence.

"It was necessary to force the chairman of the National Junta, Mr. Ayuso, to name a Commission that would carry out the organization of the Assembly. Mr. Cándido Martínez presided over it, and after much unpleasantness, the resounding success, which surprised us all, came about.

"Insidiousness and insincerity are twins.

"Since we are speaking of harmony among all, I ask Mr. José Coll y Cuchí, who was it that dared alter, according to his whims, the

invitation, approved by the National Junta, that was to be extended to all political parties?

"Why were Mr. Ayuso and Mr. Coll y Cuchí opposed to inviting the Union Party of Puerto Rico to the Assembly?

"Why did these gentlemen endeavor to invite only the Alianza Puertorriquena?

"Why did they alter the text of the invitation sent out to all the Parties with the aim of insulting the Union Party? An effrontery that harmed us a lot.

"And finally, why didn't Mr. Jose Coll y Cuchí wait for the reply which his outpouring of ill temper deserved, and in place of facing up to a response in front of the Assembly, he ran down the stairs upon finishing his speech, and he refused to return to the Assembly when a Commission, designated by the chairman of the Assembly, went to his house to fetch him. There is no doubt, Mr. Jose Coll y Cuchí. The temple has been cleansed. The Puerto Rican nation is delighted. You cannot continue harming Puerto Rican Nationalism with your ill-omened shadow."

Pedro Albizu Campos

SOURCE: El Mundo, 14 May 1930, pp.1,8. (Translated from Spanish.)

Program of the Puerto Rican Liberal Party, 1932

Political Program

The Puerto Rican Liberal Party considers:

That when, without any intervention on Puerto Rico's part, the sovereignty over it ceased which had been held by the nation that created its personality as a people, then, morally speaking, Puerto Rico could not have any other sovereignty over it other than its own, since according to natural law, colonies may be founded but not taken over.

That therefore, Puerto Rico, regardless of the regimen imposed by the United States, has been and is morally sovereign and under the inherent law of nations, is lord and master of its own destiny. And that the authority in effect exercised by the United States in Puerto Rico, and which Puerto Rico has had to respect out of practical necessity so that some government would function in the country, has violated, and while it exists will continue to violate, the sacred and indestructible and inalienable reality of its sovereignty.

The Puerto Rican Liberal Party therefore declares:

That it is its intention to demand the immediate recognition of Puerto Rico's sovereignty and to make it effective by the most rapid, most practical and most direct means, thus establishing the absolute Independence of Puerto Rico in the confraternity of nations.

That, pending recognition of the sovereignty, the Liberal Party will consider admissible and negotiable all those economic, social and cultural measures, and will consider admissible those political measures, which are inherent to the moral sovereignty of Puerto Rico but which the latter lacks effective power to establish since authority is temporarily in the hands of the power that de facto controls sovereignty.

The Puerto Rican Liberal Party affirms, in addition:

That its aim, as a government party and as long as the de facto authority prevails, is to dedicate its strength, using all the functions and prerogatives of the Government, to create the economic independence of Puerto Rico, to decolonize and nationalize the Puerto Rican economy, adapting it likewise to the moment in which, the colony disappearing, Puerto Rico enters into its full functions of a sovereign and independent nation.

Socio-Economic Program

The Puerto Rican Liberal Party, desirous of affirming the personality of the Puerto Rican people in its economic, social and cultural aspects, will, within the present state of things, argue for the realization of the following program:

Economic Independence: To free Puerto Rico from the regimen of economic exploitation that now prevails in it, arguing for the reversion to Puerto Rican ownership of all the native sources of wealth which are now monopolized by foreign corporations, pointing our best efforts toward the formation of a national type of economy, and to that end laying down the necessary foundation for our complete economic independence.

Customs duties: We shall argue for our own tariff duty in place of the one that today weighs upon our country; the latter makes us completely subsidiary to the agricultural and industrial might of the United States and amounts not to just a mere trifle in terms of fiscal policy, but has the effect of crushing the native sources of production, with the absolute consequences of tending to reduce to poverty the Puerto Rican populace.

Present customs duties increase the cost of living, raise an insurmountable barrier to our commercial interchange with other nations, condemn us to do our importing from the North American market at the price which best suits the United States producer, and impede our country from progressing industrially; they deprive the Treasury of Puerto Rico of a sizable income, which by itself would be sufficient to support to a large extent the expenses of our budgets and to satisfy, consolidating it, our national debt; and which would enable us to establish the immediate lowering of the taxes now in force that today weigh like an insupportable burden on the commerce, the agriculture, the small businessmen and the consumer public.

Large estates: We denounce the sad condition to which our country has been reduced under the present state of affairs, with more than forty thousand landowners having already disappeared. Large estates, the financial backing by large corporations of an almost feudal nature, and the lack of protection for the crops that are genuinely Puerto Rican, explain that violent shift from landowner to field worker which defines with graphic brevity, the tragedy of a people like ours, who from being masters of their lands, have passed, under a regimen of absorption into large estates, to the category of day laborers working on lands once theirs.

Absenteeism: All the sources of wealth of our country are subject to an exploitative system based on large land holdings.

Capitalists residing in foreign lands control 60 percent of our sugar industry, 85 percent of our tobacco production, 31 percent of our citrus fruit yields; likewise they monopolize the banks, the railroads, the shipping lines and the public utilities companies.

Coast to Coast Trade: The regulations of coastal trade that rule us, in virtue of which all merchandise is transported between the ports of this country and those of the United States in ships of North American registry, impose a tribute from our commerce amounting to some ten million dollars a year, to the grave detriment of our consumer public; we shall argue, consequently, for having Puerto Rico exempted from the present regulations of North American coastal trade.

Financing of Agriculture and Industry: We argue for the encouragement of native capital suitable for industrial investment; for ample protection of agricultural products that are genuinely Puerto Rican; for the acquisition of better markets for our products; for the protection of native credit institutions and for the establishment of a people's bank, created by our own laws, that will facilitate agricultural, industrial and commercial loans at moderate interest rates and with reasonable installment payments.

Revision of the Tax System: We argue for revision of the present tax system, which weighs with unjust severity upon agriculture, commerce and Puerto Rican productive classes, precisely those native sources of wealth that are least able to cope with the fiscal burden; and we shall argue that all those taxes now collected by arbitrary judgments be collected instead through customs, thus making collection of the tax easier, less costly and less oppressive for the tax payer; limited to arbitrary judgments, of internal character, should be those taxes such as patents and licenses, of a permit nature, easily collectible, and which at the same time are absolutely essential for supplementing the income needed by the country for the development of political services. The tax on alcohol, when the country is free from the Prohibition law, so impractical and counterproductive and with such negative moral results, should be handled by customs as totally as is possible.

Prohibition: We shall argue for the repeal of the prohibition laws of Puerto Rico. Experience has shown that Prohibition is a complete failure, having encouraged the vice of alcohol rather than diminished it, and creating, besides, a veritable army of cheaters of the public treasury and violators of the penal laws with grave danger for the social order, since the daily commission of transgressions that remain unpunished and which enrich the delinquent is the main source of disorder in the public life of the community.

Working Class Questions: The assistance of the worker is inestimable in all work of national reconstruction. His problems

require dispassionate study and judicious solution. The absurd system of economic exploitation that weighs directly on the working masses condemns them to poverty that depresses the body and to drudgery that denigrates the mind. It is necessary to dignify the worker as an important element of the country. We argue for the complete and efficient carrying out of all the laws concerning workers that have been voted upon and approved by previous legislatures, in fulfillment of the program started in the Assembly of the Union of Puerto Rico in the year 1912, and specifically submitted by this party in the year 1920. In accordance with the preamble of this program, the Union of Puerto Rico will not lend its support to anarchist doctrines nor to systems that disturb the community and harmony among the social elements, but does declare that the proletarian classes need, more than any others, the protection and solidarity of the country. The Puerto Rican worker should enjoy a larger salary, have his own home, have enough food to eat, be decently clothed and shod, have his daily toil reduced to a reasonable and humane level and be able to enjoy in his humble condition, all the physical and moral satisfactions of life. We need laws that will establish, without capricious limitations, indemnization for accidents in the workplace, cooperative societies, sanitary conditions in workshops, rewards for perseverance and intelligence in the manual trades; pensions or those disabled at work, regulation and protection of the work of women and children, and amplification and greater efficiency of the home insurance laws. Without any more formulas, but with tangible acts, we want to create a closer bond within the social brotherhood that obligates leaders of the people to feel the grievances of the people and to remedy them up to wherever possible in this way living up to the new era of the world in the sentiment of the human fraternity.

Municipal Rule: We shall give the municipalities the greatest leeway in their local government, respecting the principle of their autonomy, thus providing them with the authority they need, and making them both feel and at the same time live up to their due responsibilities.

Language: The defense of the Castilian language is one of the most vital problems that our people face. We condemn with all the force of our spirit the present system of English instruction, because it retards, when it doesn't destroy, the development of the mental capacity of our youth; because it dislocates, when it doesn't break, the thread between our historic racial experience and the future that awaits us, and because such a system contains a serious peril and an imminent threat for our native culture.

University: We aspire to make of the University of Puerto Rico a great center of spiritual culture and of polytechnic research. We are in favor of granting it complete economic, administrative and cultural autonomy. The University of Puerto Rico should be the

vehicle of development of our particular national culture, always sensitive to our native problems and always encouraging our native personality.

We shall argue for a system of primary instruction that will develop the personality of the Puerto Rican child, completely articulated with the centers of secondary instruction and our University, and we shall endeavor that our rural schools prepare the future generations in harmony with our economic circumstances.

SOURCE: Bolivar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), pp.23-8. (Translated from Spanish.)

Nationalist Party Chronology

SEPTEMBER 7, 1922: Nationalist Party founded at Teatro Nuevo, Rio Piedras.

*** Formed by members of Nationalist Association (Asociacion Nacionalista), a group of independentistas within the Union Party. (Unionists included both independentist and autonomous wings. Members of the Nationalist Association left the party because the Unionists removed the independence plank from their party platform. Founding officers: José Coll y Cuchí, President; José S. Alegría, Vice-President; Federico Acosta Velarde, Secretary; Rafael Bernabé, Treasurer. Vocales (district delegates): M. Marcos Morales, Antonio Velez Alvarado, J.P. Berríos, Antonio Ayuso Valdivieso, Angel Manuel Villamil, P. Rivera Collazo, Ramón Mayoral, A. López Faut, L.R. García, Dr. L. Villalón, M. Velez Ramírez, Laureano Pagán, J. Hernández, and José M. Guevara.)

1922: Jose Coll y Cuchí elected President.

1924: Lic. Miguel Marcos Morales elected President.

NOVEMBER 1924: Nationalists participate in elections.

*** Election results for Nationalist Party: Ponce, 96 votes; Cayey, 57 votes; Caguas, 183 votes; Yabucoa, 61 votes (total: 399 votes).

APRIL 16, 1925: Albizu Campos removes American flags from podium at a public event in Plaza Baldorioty, San Juan.

1925: General Assembly, Teatro Havana, Ponce.

*** Federico Acosta Velarde elected President. Pedro Albizu Campos elected Vice-President.

JUNE 1927-JANUARY 1930: Albizu Campos trip through Latin America.

***He travelled to Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Panama and Venezuela to seek support for the Puerto Rican independence movement.

APRIL 15, 1928: General Assembly. Federico Acosta Velarde re-elected president.

*** Officers: Pedro Albizu Campos, Vice-President; Julio Medina, Treasurer; M. Marcos Morales, Honorary President; José S. Alegría, Honorary President.

NOVEMBER 1928: Nationalists participate in elections.

*** Election results for Nationalist Party: Caguas, 329 votes. (No candidates participated in other districts.)

SEPTEMBER 1929: Resignations of José S. Alegría (Honorary President) and Angel M. Villamil (2nd Vice-President).

*** Alegría and Villamil renounced the Nationalist Party and rejoined the Union Party. Antonio Ayuso Valdivieso replaced Alegría and Antonio Velez Alvarado replaced Villamil.

MAY 11, 1930: General Assembly, San Juan. Albizu Campos elected President.

*** Ayuso Valdivieso and José y Coll Cuchí resigned from party. Officers: Cándido Martínez, 1st Vice-President; Manuel Fernández Máscaro, 2nd Vice-President; Abelardo Ruíz Morales, Treasurer; Manuel Rivera Matos, Secretary; district delegates: Rafael Rojas Lozano, Ramón H. Vicente, Eduardo G. Ramú, Juan Augusto Perea, Fernando Sierra Berdecía, José G. Cardé, Pedro Pérez Pimentél, José P. Berrios, José M. Gil Cabassa, Severiano Lecaroz, M. Guzmán Rodríguez, and Modesto Gotay.

1930-1932: Sale of bonds to establish the Republic of Puerto Rico.

*** The bonds were issued in Puerto Rico and sold by the Nationalists in Puerto Rico and on Wall Street. First public sale: April 1931 in San Juan. First public sale on U.S. continent: summer 1932.)

MAY 1931: General Assembly.

NOVEMBER 1931: Rhoads letter publicized in Puerto Rico.

*** This was a letter written by a U.S. doctor, Cornelius Rhoads, who was practising in Puerto Rico under the auspices of the Rockefeller Roundation at one of the hospitals on the island. The letter contained many racist statements against Puerto Ricans. It was much publicized by the Nationalists.

1931: Strike of Federacion Nacional de Estudiantes Puertorriquenos (FNEP).

*** 200 students were suspended. (The FNEP functioned as the student wing of the Nationalist Party.)

APRIL 16, 1932: Flag Day Riot.

*** On this date there was a meeting sponsored by the Nationalist

Party in the Plaza Baldorioty, San Juan, to honor the memory of José De Diego, a pro-independence patriot. Albizu Campos spoke against a bill pending in the legislature which would have eliminated the use of the Puerto Rican flag as the national banner and made it into a colonial symbol. He then led the crowd to the capitol. En route, some of the demonstrators tore down a picket fence and armed themselves with slats and stones. Police attempted to prevent demonstrators from entering the capitol building, but the crowd got through. When inside, a staircase balustrade collapsed, killing one demonstrator (Manuel Rafael Suárez Díaz) and injuring several others who fell about 25 feet to the floor below. Albizu Campos and José Portilla, a member of the San Juan Municipal Council, were both arrested on charges of inciting to riot. At a trial held two months later, both were found innocent.

JUNE 1932: Emilio del Toro, Chief Justice of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court, assaulted by Luís F. Velázquez, a Nationalist Party member.

*** Velázquez publicly slapped the Judge in the face, claiming that Del Toro had dishonored Puerto Rico by participating in a ceremony honoring the American flag.

JULY 1932: Albizu Campos publically threatens the life of the Chief of Police if any Nationalists are killed by police.

*** This statement was made during a campaign speech in San Juan.

JULY 1932: Clash between U.S. sailors and Nationalists attending a Nationalist Party meeting in Ponce.

*** The Nationalist speakers were jailed after this incident.

SEPTEMBER 25, 1932: General Assembly, Municipal Theater, San Juan.

*** Albizu Campos nominated as candidate for senator at large. Francisco Vicenty nominated as candidate for representative at large.

NOVEMBER 1932: Electoral defeat.

*** Union-Republican/Socialist Coalition won election. Liberal Party received largest number of votes but less than Coalition's total. Coalition received 208,232 votes, of which 110,794 were for the Union Republican Party and 97,438 were for the Socialists. The Liberals received 166,235 votes. The Nationalist Party received 5,257 votes, less than 2% of a total of 383,722 votes cast. Albizu Campos polled, 11,882 votes for senator at large.

DECEMBER 17, 1932: "Liberating Army of the Republic" established.

*** Army divided into two units: "Cadets of the Republic" (men); "Daughters of Liberty" (women).

OCTOBER 1933: Bombing of Governor Robert H. Gore's summer home at Jajome Alto.

*** The home was bombed shortly after Gore and Police Chief Riggs had left the house.

OCTOBER 1933: Bomb found at La Fortaleza (the governor's official residence).

*** The governor also received a letter stating that his family would be poisoned. This bombing attempt and the bombing of the house at Jajome were allegedly committed by Nationalists, but there was not enough evidence to bring charges against anyone.

DECEMBER 13, 1933: General Assembly, Victoria Theater, Humacao.

*** The party ratified a platform stating that it would take an "active and militant attitude" to reach its goals. Party designated a commission to draft constitution of the future Republic of Puerto Rico.

JANUARY 13, 1934: Albizu Campos asked to lead strike of sugar workers.

*** Workers on strike in Guayama sent letter to Albizu Campos requesting that he come and direct their strike.

JANUARY 1934: Asociación de Trabajadores founded.

*** This was a Nationalist Party labor organization founded at the time of the sugar workers' strike.

OCTOBER 1935: Río Piedras incident.

*** Clash between Nationalists and police near University of Puerto Rico resulted in 4 Nationalists and 1 bystander killed. (Names of the Nationalists who were killed: Ramón S. Pagán; Pedro Quiñones; Eduardo Rodríguez Vega; José Santiago. The bystander was José Muñoz Jiménez. Dionisio Pearson, the only Nationalist to survive, was brought to trial.)

OCTOBER 1935: funeral for 4 Nationalists killed at Río Piedras.

*** Albizu delivered funeral oration in which he claimed that a continental would lose his life for every Nationalist killed. He also spoke against the police and the chancellor of the university, and against the Liberal Party, whose leaders he believed were part of a plan to assassinate the Nationalist Party directors.

DECEMBER 8, 1935: Nationalist meeting at Campo Alegre Theater, Caguas.

*** Call for more militant action: (1) The boycott of elections was again ratified; (2) The peaceful withdrawal of the U.S. was demanded, or the Nationalists would resort to arms; and (3) Albizu Campos decreed that all party members had to serve in its military.

FEBRUARY 1936: Assassination of E. Francis Riggs, Chief of Insular Police.

*** Riggs was unarmed, on his way home from church. Elías Beauchamp and Hiram Rosado, both members of Cadets of the Republic, claimed that his assassination was in revenge for the 4 Nationalists killed in October 1935 at Río Piedras. The police took the two into custody, and shot them, claiming that they had tried to seize weapons and escape. It was widely acknowledged that the police had acted unlawfully, and that there was a cover-up of police actions.

FEBRUARY 1936: Clash between police and Nationalists in Utuado.

*** In an incident between Nationalists and police, District Chief of Police Francisco Velez Ortíz was killed, as was Angel Mario Martínez, a Nationalist. This occurred on the same day on which Riggs was assassinated.

1936: Albizu Campos serves as defense lawyer for Dionisio Pearson.

*** Albizu used this trial as a public forum to contest U.S. jurisdiction in Puerto Rico. Pearson was acquitted.

MARCH 14, 1936: Albizu Campos' house searched; no arms found.

MARCH 17, 1936: Nationalist headquarters searched during daylight raids. Nationalist leadership charged with sedition.

*** Searches were ordered by Governor Winship. Arms were discovered. Albizu Campos and several Nationalist leaders were arrested. Charges: sedition; illegal recruitment of soldiers; conspiracy to incite a rebellion. (Names of those arrested: Albizu

Campos; Juan Antonio Corretjer, the Secretary-General of the party; Julio Velázquez; Rafael Ortíz Pacheco; Clemente Soto Veléz; Erasmo Velázquez; Juan Gallardo; Pablo Rosado Ortíz.) ACLU investigated these arrests, and Robert Baldwin of the ACLU charged that there was not enough evidence for a murder conviction in the Puerto Rican criminal courts, so the administration filed charges of sedition instead, thus placing the defendants under the direct jurisdiction of the federal court.

MARCH 1936: Imprisonment of the arrested Nationalists.

JUNE 1936: Dismissal of 1st jury; retrial of Albizu Campos and the Nationalists.

*** the first jury, made up of 5 North Americans and 7 Puerto Ricans, failed to reach a verdict and was dismissed. There were 10 U.S. and 2 Puerto Rican jurors on the second jury.

JULY 31, 1936: Nationalist leadership convicted for sedition.

*** defendants were convicted on July 31, 1936, and sentenced for from 2 to 10 years each.

AUGUST 9, 1936: National Congress for the Liberation of the Political Prisoners formed. ("Congreso Nacional Pro Liberación de Presos Políticos") *** Non-partisan organization formed to support work for the release of the Nationalist prisoners.

OCTOBER 1936: A Nationalist youth attempts to assassinate Santiago Iglesias, the leader of the Socialist Party.

*** Domingo Saltari Crespo, a member of the Cadets of the Republic, shot Santiago Iglesias in the arm during an appearance in Mayagüez.

DECEMBER 1936: Murder of Antonio González Cortés, a police officer.

*** He was killed by Arturo Hernández, a Nationalist.

JANUARY 31, 1937: General Assembly, Caguas.

FEBRUARY 12, 1937: Sentences against Nationalists upheld in U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.

*** The court cited several of Albizu Campos' speeches in which he made death threats and called for the use of arms.

MARCH 1937: Domingo Crespo trial.

*** He was convicted for the 1936 attack on Santiago Iglesias and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

MARCH 21, 1937: Ponce Massacre.

*** On Palm Sunday a group of Nationalists had planned a march in the city of Ponce. At the last minute, the parade permit was revoked, but the Nationalists marched anyway. The marchers were surrounded by police, who fired upon the crowd, killing both marchers and spectators. In all, there were 19 dead, 100 wounded, including several children. The incident became known as the "Ponce Massacre." Although there were several Nationalists brought to trial over the incident, they were acquitted.

JUNE 1, 1937: Orlando Colón, a policeman, shot and killed.

*** The Chief of Police, Colonel Enrique Orbeta, accused the Nationalists of the murder.

JUNE 1, 1937: U.S. Supreme Court upholds conviction of Albizu Campos and other imprisoned Nationalists.

JUNE 7, 1937: Albizu Campos and convicted Nationalists sent to Atlanta Penitentiary.

JUNE 8, 1937: An unidentified man fires 12 shots at U.S. District Judge Robert A. Cooper.

*** Cooper had tried and sentenced the Nationalists to Atlanta the day before, on June 7. About 6 months later, 8 conspirators stood trial for the attack on Cooper and were sentenced to 5 years each in Atlanta Penitentiary.

JULY 25, 1938: Nationalists meeting at Guanica banned.

JULY 25, 1938: Assassination attempt on Governor Winship.

*** Nationalists fired several shots at his reviewing stand at a parade in Ponce commemorating the U.S. landing in Puerto Rico. In the exchange of shots between Nationalists and police, 2 persons were killed and 1 wounded.

1938: Government charges against 11 Nationalists dropped.

*** The Nationalists had been accused of murdering policeman Ceferino Loyola during the Ponce Massacre.

JANUARY 17, 1939: 7 nationalists convicted for attempt to kill Governor Winship.

*** They received life sentences.

1940: Ramón Medina Ramírez, Acting President of the Nationalist Party, urges all Nationalists not to register for military service.

1941: Albizu Campos refuses to accept release on parole for good behavior.

1941: Many Nationalist Party members arrested and sentenced for failure to register for draft.

*** Ramón Medina Ramírez and Rafael López Ríos, the Secretary of the party, were found guilty of conspiracy to prevent operation of the selective service law. They received suspended sentences.

JUNE 26, 1943: Congreso General de Trabajadores passes resolution asking that Albizu Campos be released from jail.

1943: Albizu Campos released on 4-year parole.

*** He stayed in New York City from June 8, 1943 until December 17, 1947. Immediately after his release from Atlanta, he was treated in Columbus Hospital, N.Y.C., for a heart condition and for partial paralysis of his right arm. (He was required to remain in New York until his parole ended in 1947.)

DECEMBER 17, 1947: Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico and resumes active leadership of the Nationalist Party.

APRIL 1948: Student protest, University of Puerto Rico.

*** Jaime Benítez, Chancellor of the university, refused to allow Albizu Campos to speak to students. A protest followed, in which 100 students stormed his office. The university had to be closed for the rest of the term, and there were many outbreaks between Nationalist supporters and police.

1948-49: Albizu Campos re-elected President.

*** The post had been officially vacant while he was in jail; it had been filled by Acting Presidents only.)

FEBRUARY 23, 1950: Meeting in Utuado at which Albizu Campos initiates a new strategy of violent resistance against Washington.

MARCH 1950: Representative of Nationalists asks Attorney General Vicente Geigel Polanco, serving as Acting Governor of Puerto Rico in Muñoz Marín's absence, to declare the Republic of Puerto Rico.

*** The spokesperson for the Nationalists was the wife of a "prominent" Nationalist; she asked Geigel that he "cover himself with glory" in Muñoz's absence. He did not comply. Shortly after this incident, Geigel made public statements in support of Muñoz Marín's position on the status issue. In February 1951, however, Geigel was expelled from the PPD.

JULY 1950: Nationalist Party opposes referendum on status issue scheduled for June 1951.

*** Voter registration for the referendum was to begin on November 4, 1950; the Nationalists urged people not to register to vote.

OCTOBER 26, 1950: Group of Nationalists arrested for illegally transporting arms.

*** Reports on incident vary, but a car driven by Nationalists was followed by police, and the occupants detained. The car contained a machine gun, 2 pistols, fire bombs, and a small amount of ammunition. Another car in which Albizu Campos reportedly was riding, drove off before being stopped by police.

OCTOBER 28, 1950: Prison break from insular penitentiary near Río Piedras.

*** 112 prisoners escaped. Police forces had to be concentrated in the San Juan area. Although there is no evidence that the break was related to Nationalist Party actions, links between the break and the October revolt of the Nationalists have been suggested.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: Attacks on police stations and U.S. post offices in the following cities and towns: Quebradillas; Arroyo; Mayagüez; Naranjito; Utuado; Jayuya; San Juan.

*** Muñoz Marín called out the National Guard, which patrolled major government posts in key towns. Muñoz and many U.S. observers saw the revolt as being Communist led.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: Capture of Jayuya (a mountain town of about 1,500) by Nationalists.
*** The Nationalists set fire to the police station, and shot and killed 6 policemen who tried to flee.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: Nationalists take control of Utuado.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: Confrontation between Nationalists and police at Arecibo.
*** Nationalists shot at police station and at police car; 1 Nationalist and 4 policemen were killed.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: La Fortaleza attacked.
*** 5 Nationalists drove into the main entrance and attacked the residence; 4 Nationalists and 1 policeman killed.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: Clash between Nationalists and police in barrio Macana de Penueles.
*** Police had warrant to search a house for arms. The Nationalists within opened fire on police, and remained barricaded inside house. 3 Nationalists killed, 8 persons wounded. Confrontation lasted all day.

OCTOBER 30, 1950: Police corporal killed in La Plaza, Ponce.
*** Nationalists also attacked police station in Ponce and tried to set it on fire.

OCTOBER 31, 1950: Jayuya and Utuado re-taken by National Guard.
*** The Arecibo unit of the National Guard moved on Jayuya with tanks, heavy automatic weapons, and 2 fighter planes. They moved against the 2 Nationalist strongholds in the town and captured 18 Nationalists. The town was badly damaged after about 24 hours of fighting. Elío Torresola and Carlos Irizarry were the Nationalist leaders in Jayuya. Utuado was taken before Jayuya, and with less struggle.

OCTOBER 31, 1950: Vidal Santiago, a Nationalist, badly wounded in shoot-out with police in San Juan.
*** Vidal Santiago was a barber in San Juan. During the shoot-out, in which he barricaded himself in his shop, several police and

guardsmen were wounded.

NOVEMBER 1, 1950: 2 Nationalists attempt to assassinate President Truman.

*** Griselio Torresola (the brother of Elío in Jayuya incident) and Oscar Collazo travelled from New York City to Washington D.C. to kill Truman at Blair House (his temporary residence while repairs were being made on the White House). Torresola killed 1 policeman and was fatally wounded. Collazo wounded a policeman and was shot in the chest but not killed. (The assassination attempt may have involved a conspiracy between Nationalists in New York City and those in Puerto Rico.)

NOVEMBER 2, 1950: Round-up of Nationalists and Communists and capture of Albizu Campos ordered.

*** After the attempt on Truman's life, Munoz Marin ordered the National Guard to close in and capture Albizu Campos. He refused to surrender, and the guardsmen tear-gased his house, causing Albizu and Alvaro Rivera Walker, his body guard, to give themselves up. Nearly 1000 persons were arrested in the aftermath of the Nationalist revolt, including most known Puerto Rican Communists. The Communists were not held. The Puerto Rican and U.S. governments had compiled a list of 4,257 alleged Nationalist Party members and sympathizers. About 100 persons were proven to be directly involved. Police gathered information by infiltrating Nationalist meetings to compile a list of members. Anyone who joined one of the other political parties was dropped from the list. Approximately 500 individuals were active Nationalists at the time of the revolt.

NOVEMBER 3-5, 1950: Registration of new voters with no violent incidents.

NOVEMBER 5, 1950: National Guard demobilized.

NOVEMBER 11, 1950: Griselio Torresola buried in Puerto Rico.

*** His body was flown back from New York.

NOVEMBER 11, 1950: Oscar Collazo charged by federal grand jury with first degree murder, attempted assassination of the U.S. President, and two counts of assault with intent to kill.

FEBRUARY-AUGUST 1951: Albizu Campos tried and convicted 3 times.

*** Charges included: attempted assassination; unlawful possession of firearms and explosives; and subversive activities and conspiracy to overthrow "the legally constituted government of Puerto Rico." Trial of 2/15/51—Albizu found guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to 15 years on 3/17/51. His two co-defendants, Doris Torresola and Juan Jose Munoz Matos, were found innocent. The trial may have been unfairly weighted against him according to ACLU reports. Trial also found him guilty of unlawful possession of firearms, and for this he received a 10-year sentence. In August Albizu Campos was found guilty and sentenced to 54 years.

FEBRUARY 27, 1951: Collazo trial in Washington, D.C.
 *** Collazo was found guilty of first degree murder, attempted assassination, and two counts of assault with intent to kill. This carried a mandatory death sentence. A new trial was denied, and he was sentenced to death in the electric chair. (This sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment; see entry of 7/25/51.)

JULY 25, 1951: Collazo's death sentence commuted by President Truman.

*** This occurred 1 week before the scheduled execution. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

JUNE 4, 1951: Referendum for PL 600 was held.
 *** 506,185 out of 777,675 registered voters (nearly 65%) participated in this referendum to establish the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 387,016 voted for it; 119,169 voted against.

MARCH 3, 1952: Constitution ratified.
 *** 374,649 for; 82,923 against.

JULY 3, 1952: Joint Resolution 430, accepting the Puerto Rican constitution, signed into law by President Truman.

MARCH-APRIL 1953: Puerto Rican status debates in United Nations.
 *** "Women's Committee for the Liberation of Puerto Rico's Political Prisoners," led by Lolita Lebrón, picketed U.N. Headquarters, New York City, and demanded a hearing before the U.N. committee.

OCTOBER 1, 1953: Albizu Campos pardoned by Governor Muñoz

Marín.

NOVEMBER 1953: Nationalist assassination attempt against Eisenhower stopped.

MARCH 1, 1954: Terrorist attack on U.S. Congress led by Lolita Lebron.

*** Lolita Lebrón, Andres Figueroa Cordero, Irving Flores Rodríguez, and Rafael Cancel Miranda attacked House of Representatives while legislature in session. The following congressmen were wounded: Clifford Davies, George H. Faloan, Kenneth Roberts, Ben Jensen, and Alvin Bentley. Both Julio Pinto Gandía (a Nationalist Party leader in New York City) and Pedro Albizu Campos made statements in favor of the act. Albizu called it "sublime heroism."

MARCH 6, 1954: Crack-down on all Puerto Rican Nationalists and on all Nationalists in the U.S.

*** Albizu Campos was seized, after a gunbattle, with José Rivera Sotomayor, Isabel Rosado Morales, Carmen María Pérez, and Doris Torresola. Communists in Puerto Rico were also arrested during a one-week period. A total of 44 Nationalists were detained, as well as 11 leaders of the Puerto Rican Communist Party. (Note that figures vary; some sources indicate that 91 Nationalists were subpoenaed.)

MARCH 7, 1954: Albizu Campos jailed after revocation of his pardon.

JUNE 1954: 17 Nationalists indicted in New York City for attack on Congress.

OCTOBER 1954: 13 of the Nationalist co-defendants found guilty.

*** Each received a 6-year sentence. (Lolita Lebron and the group which attacked Congress received the 6 years concurrently with longer sentences.)

OCTOBER 30, 1954: 12 Nationalists arrested in connection with charges stemming from the October 1950 events.

*** 6 were arrested in New York, 4 in Chicago, and 2 in Puerto Rico. In March 1955 they were tried and found guilty.

JUNE 5, 1956: Albizu Campos taken to Presbyterian Hospital

in San Juan.

NOVEMBER 6, 1964: Albizu Campos given full pardon by Munoz
Marin

APRIL 21, 1965: Albizu Campos dies.
*** His funeral attended by record crowds in Puerto Rico.

SEPTEMBER 7, 1979: President Carter orders immediate
release of Oscar Collazo, and approves release of Rafael
Cancel-Miranda, Lolita Lebrón and Irving Flores Rodríguez.

Notes: Introduction

¹Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.34.

²Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 1:205.

³Pedro Albizu Campos, La conciencia nacional puertorriqueña 4a ed. (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979), p.43.

⁴Paulino Castro, Historia sinóptica del Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (San Juan: 1947).

⁵Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959).

⁶See entries in bibliography.

⁷See entries in bibliography.

⁸See entries in bibliography.

⁹See entries in bibliography.

¹⁰Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism: 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973).

¹¹Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]).

Notes: Chapter I

¹Biographical sources about Albizu Campos have tended to be quite biased. Federico Ribes Tovar, Juan Angel Silén, and Juan Antonio Corretjer have each written full length biographies about Albizu, but both Corretjer and Silén have concentrated upon his intellectual development and do not focus upon the events in his life. Silén has given what appears to be an honest account of Albizu, from a Marxist perspective. Corretjer has been very sympathetic to Albizu, and has occasionally withheld information. Federico Ribes Tovar has provided a biography which is so biased in favor of Albizu that its usefulness is limited. See Juan Antonio Corretjer, El líder de la desesperación (Guaynabo: 1978); Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1969); Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971); and Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976).

Two very thoughtful short pieces discuss both the events in Albizu's life and his philosophies, and are relatively unbiased in their presentation of data: Roberto F. Rexach Benítez, Pedro Albizu Campos: Leyenda y realidad (San Juan: Editorial Coquí, 1961); and Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice. Occasional Papers No. 13. (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]).

In addition, two compilations of Albizu's writings and speeches provide much insight into his political thought: Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972); and Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936. (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975).

The work of J. Benamín Torres, although also very biased in favor of Albizu, has contributed invaluable data about his life. (Included in the Appendix to this study is a chronology of Albizu's life written by J. Benjamín Torres which is illustrative of the kind of bias shown by Nationalist supporters.) See Hablan sobre Albizu Campos. Recopilación, introducción y notas por J. Benjamín Torres. (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1979); J. Benjamín Torres, Pedro Albizu Campos y la cuestión nacional (New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, 1978/??); and J. Benjamín Torres, El Proceso judicial contra Pedro Albizu Campos en el 1936. 2a ed. (Editorial Jelofe: 1974).

²Juan Antonio Corretjer, El líder de la desesperación (Guaynabo: 1978), p.71. (Some sources give the date of Albizu Campos's birth as September 12, 1891. Corretjer reports that the

earlier date recorded the birth of a brother by the same name who died in infancy. Albizu Campos himself used both dates on different occasions, thus contributing to the confusion.)

³See Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:8; and Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.17.

⁴Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra 1971), p.17.

⁵Ramón S. Pagán, "Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos," in Hablan sobre Albizu Campos, recopilación, introducción y notas por J. Benjamín Torres. (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1979), p.1.

⁶Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:8.

⁷Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos and the Ponce Massacre (New York: World View Publishers, 1965), p.12.

⁸Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.20.

⁹Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976), p.18.

¹⁰Ibid. p.17.

¹¹Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.20.

¹²Ibid. pp.20-21.

¹³Roberto F. Rexach Benítez, Pedro Albizu Campos: Leyenda y realidad (San Juan: Editorial Coqui, 1961), p.21.

¹⁴Manuel Maldonado-Denis, Semblanza de 4 revolucionarios /Arecibo(?): 1970(?), p.18; and Ramón S. Pagán, "Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos," in Hablan sobre Albizu Campos, recopilación, introducción y notas por J. Benjamín Torres. (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1979), p.2.

¹⁵Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976), p.17.

¹⁶Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos, Albizu Campos y la independencia de Puerto Rico (San Juan: Partido Nacionalista de Puerto

Rico, 1961), p.21.

¹⁷See Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]) for a detailed discussion of the influence of Catholicism, Scholasticism and the Irish and Indian liberation movements on Albizu Campos. The material presented here about these influences on Albizu summarizes many of the points raised by Stevens Arroryo.

¹⁸Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), p.7.

¹⁹Ibid. pp.2-6.

²⁰Ibid. p.4.

²¹Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1969), p.47.

²²Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), p.13.

²³Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in The Founding of New Societies, ed. Louis Hartz. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), p.154.

²⁴Ibid. p.155.

²⁵Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), pp.18-21.

²⁶Ibid. p.20.

²⁷J. Benjamín Torres, Marisa Rosado, and José Manuel Torres Santiago, eds. Imagen de Pedro Albizu Campos (San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, 1973), p.16.

²⁸Ramón S. Pagán, "Dr. Pedro Albizu Campos," in Hablan sobre Albizu Campos, recopilación, introducción y notas por J. Benjamín Torres. (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1979), p.4.

²⁹See Juan Antonio Corretjer, El lider de la desesperación (Guaynabo: 1978), p.64; and Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), pp.21-29.

³⁰Juan Antonio Corretjer, El lider de la desesperación (Guaynabo: 1978), p.63.

³¹Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13 (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), p.28.

³²Ibid. p.19.

³³Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.94.

³⁴Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.13.

³⁵Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.97.

³⁶Ibid. p.97.

³⁷Robert W. Anderson, Party Politics in Puerto Rico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p.13.

³⁸Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.94.

³⁹Ibid. p.100.

⁴⁰Manuel Maldonado-Denis, Puerto Rico: A Socio-Historic Interpretation (New York: Vintage, 1972), p.92.

⁴¹Trumbull White, Puerto Rico and Its People (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1938) p.295.

⁴²Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.94.

⁴³Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A

Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931), p.40.

⁴⁴American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberties in American Colonies (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1939), p.8.

⁴⁵Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959) 1:198.

⁴⁶Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.35.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p.263.

⁴⁸Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959) 1:244.

⁴⁹J. Enamorado-Cuesta, Porto Rico, Past and Present: The Island After 30 Years of American Rule. (New York: Eureka, 1929), p.141.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p.142.

⁵¹Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), pp.299-301.

⁵²The figure of 70,000 challenges represents expanded suffrage in the 1932 election. No data about which individuals or parties filed these challenges is available in secondary sources.

⁵³Truman R. Clark, Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p.159.

⁵⁴"A Grievance of the Porto Ricans," The Literary Digest 27 December 1936, p.19.

⁵⁵J. Enamorado-Cuesta, Porto Rico, Past and Present: The Island After 30 Years of American Rule (New York: Eureka, 1929), p.139; and Roberta A. Johnson, Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony? (New York: Praeger, 1980), p.19.

⁵⁶Roberta A. Johnson, Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony? (New York: Praeger, 1980), p.19.

⁵⁷ Ibid. p.19.

⁵⁸"More Votes for Women," The Nation, 26 June 1929, p.755.

⁵⁹Truman R. Clark, Puerto Rico and the United States, 1917-1933 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), p.115.

⁶⁰Juan Angel Silén, Apuntes: Para la historia del movimiento obrero puertorriqueño (Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1978), p.81.

⁶¹Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.15.

⁶²Ibid. pp.14-15.

⁶³Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.221.

⁶⁴Arthur David Gayer, Paul T. Homan, and Earle K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.36.

⁶⁵Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931), p.140.

⁶⁶Ibid. p.137.

⁶⁷Ibid. p.139.

⁶⁸Ibid. p.139.

⁶⁹U.S. Treasury Department. Report on the Island of Porto Rico, by Henry K. Carroll, Special Commissioner for the United States to Porto Rico. Document No. 2118. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), pp.385-449.

⁷⁰Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.410.

⁷¹Rafael de Jesús Tro, Historia económica de Puerto Rico (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1982), pp.46-50.

⁷²Ibid. pp.50-1.

⁷³Ibid. pp.76-9.

⁷⁴Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal

(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), pp.7-8; and Rafael de Jesus Toro, Historia economica de Puerto Rico (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1982), p.99.

⁷⁵Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos and the Ponce Massacre (New York: World View Publishers, 1975), p.2; and U.S. Treasury Department. Report on the Island of Porto Rico, by Henry K. Carroll, Special Commissioner for the United States to Porto Rico. Document No. 2118. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1899; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), pp.449-498.

⁷⁶Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), pp.6-7.

⁷⁷Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931), p.140.

⁷⁸Arthur David Gayer, Paul T. Homan, and Earle K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.36.

⁷⁹Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931), pp.141-43.

⁸⁰Arthur David Gayer, Paul T. Homan, and Earle K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.36.

⁸¹M. Morley, "Dependence and Development in Puerto Rico," in Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society Adalberto Lopez and James Petras, eds. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p.217.

⁸²Arthur David Gayer, Paul T. Homan, and Earle K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.32.

⁸³Ibid. p.30.

⁸⁴Ibid. p.32.

⁸⁵Ibid. p.36.

⁸⁶Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931), p.152.

⁸⁷Ibid. p.151.

⁸⁸Ibid. pp.123-26; and Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico

and Its Problems. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), pp.411-12.

⁸⁹Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931), p.127.

⁹⁰Ibid. p.143.

⁹¹Porto Rico. Official Economic Commission, Porto Rico's Case and the Tariff Bill (A Memorial to the President and the Congress of the United States). (Washington, D.C.: 1913), pp.47-9.

⁹²Gordon Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963), p.443.

⁹³Rafael de Jesús Toro, Historia económica de Puerto Rico (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1982), p.124.

⁹⁴Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.73.

⁹⁵Rafeal de Jesús Toro, Historia económica de Puerto Rico (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1982), p.126.

⁹⁶Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.77.

⁹⁷Ibid. p.9.

⁹⁸Ibid. p.77.

⁹⁹Rafael de Jesús Toro, Historia económica de Puerto Rico (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1982), p.125.

¹⁰⁰Rexford Guy Tugwell, "Foreword," in Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal, by Thomas Mathews. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.vi.

¹⁰¹Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), p.82.

¹⁰²Ibid. p.72.

¹⁰³Ibid. p.477.

¹⁰⁴Ibid. p.454.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p.82. (Note that the roots of the U.S. immigration policy toward Puerto Rico in the post-World War II period are also found in this report.)

¹⁰⁶ Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 1:214-6. (Translated from Spanish.)

¹⁰⁷ Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Cultural, 1976), p.24.

¹⁰⁸ Paulino E. Castro, Historia sinóptica del Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (San Juan: 1947), p.13.

¹⁰⁹ Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.92.

¹¹⁰ Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976), p. 24.

¹¹¹ El Mundo 13 May 1930; and Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 1:216. There was some inconsistency in designating leadership posts within the party and in naming the governing body of the party. According to Pagan, the original governing body of the party was called the Supreme Council (Consejo Supremo). The party offices are not always reported the same way in public sources.

¹¹² Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 1:216.

¹¹³ Ibid. 2:54; and La Gran enciclopedia de Puerto Rico, s.v. "Política: Historia política de Puerto Rico," by Carmelo Delgado Cintrón. 2:191.

¹¹⁴ El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 21 April 1938, p.10.

¹¹⁵ El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 21 April 1928, p.10; 28 April 1928, p.10; and 5 May 1928, pp.9-10.

¹¹⁶ For complete text of the Nationalist letter see Appendix, p.136.

¹¹⁷ For partial text of Coolidge letter see Appendix, p.139.

- 118 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 5 May 1928, p.9.
- 119 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 21 April 1928, p.10.
- 120 Ibid. p.10.
- 121 Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:210.
- 122 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 5 May 1928, p.10.
- 123 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 26 May 1928, p.7.
- 124 J. Benjamín Torres, "Albizu Campos y el Partido Nacionalista," in Hablan sobre Albizu Campos, recopilación, introducción y notas por J. Benjamín Torres. (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1979), p.43.
- 125 Ibid. p.43.
- 126 For complete text of Jose Coll y Cuchí's statement to the press see Appendix, p.143.
- 127 For complete text of Pedro Albizu Campos's statement to the press see Appendix, p.148.

Notes: Chapter II

¹R.R. Rivera Correa, The Shadow of Don Pedro (New York: Vantage Press, 1970), pp.46-53; "La Ciencia jurídica y la cesión de Puerto Rico," in El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 15 August 1930, pp.2,14; and "El Derecho positivo y la cesión de Puerto Rico," in El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 5 September 1930, pp.2,15.

²Reece B. Bothwell González, Puerto Rico: Cien años de lucha política (Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1979), p.395. (Translated from Spanish: "Juremos aquí solemnemente que defenderemos el ideal Nacionalista y que sacrificaremos nuestra hacienda y nuestra vida si fuera preciso por la independencia de nuestra patria.")

³Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1969), p.22. (Translated from Spanish: "...El valor es la suprema virtud del hombre... De nada vale al hombre estar lleno de sabiduría y de vitalidad física si le falta el valor. Ese es el supremo bien del individuo y de la nación... El valor es lo único que permite al hombre pasearse firme y serenamente sobre las sombras de la muerte; y cuando el hombre pasa serenamente sobre las sombras de la muerte es que entra en la inmortalidad... He querido bajar a la tumba limpio del oro corruptor de los hombres y de la sangre de mi prójimo; pero la independencia requiere, como todo supremo bien, el sacrificio de lo mas sabio, de lo mas noble y puro de la nacionalidad... La Patria se funda en la emulación del heroísmo. No es de nadie. Ni aún de los patriotas. Solo es de los que la han ganado muriendo por ella. Son ellos los que la llegan a la posteridad.")

⁴Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976), p.43; and Roberto F. Rexach Benítez, Pedro Albizu Campos: Leyenda y realidad (San Juan: Editorial Coquí, 1961), p.9.

⁵For the complete text of the lecture, see Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:16-22.

⁶Paulina Castro, "La Resolución Conjunta Número 2," in La Resolución Conjunta Número 2 (Junta Nacionalista de Nueva York, no date.)

⁷Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:20.

⁸ Ibid. 1:19. (Translated from Spanish: "El Acta Jones...dejó libre al pueblo de Puerto Rico para obtener su soberanía y rechazo la incorporación.")

⁹ Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:26.

¹⁰ Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), pp.37-49.

¹¹ Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:35.

¹² El Mundo 12 July 1927, p.7.

¹³ Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975) 1:67.

¹⁴ El Mundo 19 May 1931, p.4. (Translated from Spanish: "El Partido Nacionalista pondrá a prueba si existe o no el sufragio en Puerto Rico y colocará a prueba el régimen en forma definitiva cuando decreta la Convención Constituyente de la República al obtener el voto de las mayorías.")

¹⁵ Reece B. Bothwell González, Puerto Rico: Cien años de lucha política (Río Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1979), p.402.

¹⁶ Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:200. (Translated from Spanish: "El partido cree firmemente que la vía electoral será eficaz para la realización de su programa y así lo ha previsto en su táctica hace mas de un año. Los acontecimientos que recientemente han estremecido a la madre patria España, al derrocarse un régimen por la vía electoral, han venido a corroborar la certeza de nuestros procedimientos. ...El nacionalismo tiene que mantenerse puro...")

¹⁷ Ibid. 1:203.

¹⁸ Ibid. 1:213-14.

¹⁹ El Mundo 2 July 1932, p.1.

²⁰ Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:217-19.

²¹Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.35.

²²Ibid. 1:226.

²³Ibid. 1:234. (Translated from Spanish: El Nacionalismo "...ha arrancado al gobernador el control de las elecciones y lo ha puesto otra vez en manos puertorriqueñas. Esa es la razón de la persecución oficial contra nuestra movimiento politico... La nación tiene por vez primera el privilegio de optar por su independencia o de optar por la continuación de su esclavitud.")

²⁴Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), pp.62-70.

²⁵Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976), p.43.

²⁶Juan Antonio Corretjer, El Líder de la desesperación, 2a ed. (Guaynabo: 1978), p.90.

²⁷Laura Meneses de Albizu Campos, Albizu Campos y la independencia de Puerto Rico (San Juan: Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico, 1961), pp.33-5.

²⁸Ibid. p.37.

²⁹Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), pp.46-7.

³⁰Paulino E. Castro, Historia sinóptica del Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico (San Juan: 1947), p.15.

³¹Manuel Maldonado-Denis, "Semblanza de 4 revolucionarios," conferencia pronunciada en el Colegio Regional de la Universidad de Arecibo el 31 de marzo de 1970, pp.34-5.

³²In his 1926 interview for Los Quijotes, the Dominican journal, Albizu had said, "Una nación como la norteamericana... no tiene tiempo para atender a hombres sumisos y serviles. Se requiere la formación de una organización rebelde... para poder lograr la reconstrucción de la mente norteamericana sobre nuestra situación." SOURCE: Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), p.46.

³³See Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos and the Ponce Massacre (New York: World View Publishers, 1965), pp.12-13; Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.97; and Federico Ribes Tovar, Pedro Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.48.

³⁴See Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 2:31; Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), pp.108-110; and Federico Ribes Tovar, Pedro Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), pp.49-50.

³⁵Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism, 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.110.

³⁶Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.39.

³⁷Juan Antonio Corretjer, El Líder de la desesperación, 2a ed. (Guaynabo: 1978), pp.63-4.

³⁸Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.32; Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), pp.331, 333; and Jaime Ramírez-Barbot, "A History of Puerto Rican Radical Nationalism: 1920-1965" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.89.

³⁹Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), p.76.

⁴⁰Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976), p.45.

⁴¹El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 1 November 1930, p.2. (Translated from Spanish: "La nación no puede existir sin la posesión de toda su riqueza material.")

⁴²Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:96. (Translated from Spanish: "Con la pérdida de ese sentido de dignidad personal y colectiva... se agotan las fuerzas espirituales, y el nativo, reducido a lacayo, pasa a ser agente del invasor para entregarle todas las riquezas del

país. Es inevitable: La decadencia moral es causa de la ruina material.")

43 Ibid. 1:25.

44 Ibid. 1:26.

45 Ibid. 1:35.

46 Ibid. 1:38.

47 Ibid. 1:54.

48 Ibid. 1:68.

49 Ibid. 1:69.

50 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 22 August 1930, p.2.
(Translated from Spanish: "Bajo la Constitución norteamericana... el gobierno federal... tiene el poder de gobernar sin responsabilidad alguna a los territorios o naciones que caigan bajo el imperio de Estados Unidos.")

51 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 15 August 1930, p.2.

52 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 15 August 1922 and 29 August 1930.

53 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 15 August 1930, p.14.
(Translated from Spanish: "El poder arancelario regula los intereses más vitales de la nacionalidad.")

54 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 29 August 1930, p.2.
(Original Spanish text: "El frente arancelario es uniforme, lo mismo en las provincias, 'estados,' que en los territorios.")

55 Ibid. p.2.

56 Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), p.96.

57 Ibid. p.104. (Translated from Spanish: "El comercio y la industria de Estados Unidos tienen un monopolio absoluto del mercado de Puerto Rico. Monopolio que existe en virtud de la ley arancelaria impuesta al país y también porque la nación puertorriqueña carece de poderes para defenderse de él.")

58 Ibid. p.106.

59 Ibid. p.106.

60 Ibid. pp.146-7.

61 Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975).

62 Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Perss, 1931).

63 Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), p.107. (Translated from Spanish: "Se oponen tenzamente a un cambio de la situación política, ya sea a la constitución de la República o a la conversión de Puerto Rico en una provincia norteamericano <estado>, porque cualquiera de estas soluciones políticas terminaría con el régimen irresponsable imperante, y se unen a los intereses invasores, bajo banderillas atractivas como la autonomía para mantener el status quo.")

64 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 1 November 1930, p.2.

65 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 15 November 1930, p.2. (Translated from Spanish: "Donde no existen poderes políticos como pasa dentro del coloniaje que aquí impera, no es posible la nacionalización de la riqueza extranjera, porque para ello se necesita gozar de soberanía en el sentido estricto del termino: legislativa, ejecutiva y juridical. ...Solamente la República independiente puede resolver estos problemas.")

66 El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 13 December 1930, p.2. (Translated from Spanish: "Nuestro programa exige la nacionalización de la riqueza extranjera como necesidad mayor y más perentoria de la nacionalidad. Sin recursos materiales no existe un individuo. Sin ser dueña de toda su riqueza material no sobrevive ninguna nacionalidad.")

67 Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriqueña. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), pp.64-5; and Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), pp.42-3.

68 Juan Antonio Corretjer, Albizu Campos and the Ponce Massacre (New York: World View Publishers, 1965), p.12; and Antonio

Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13. (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), p.3.

⁶⁹ Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan, Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:15. (Translated from Spanish: Puerto Rico had "...una civilizacion mas antigua que las de sus gobernantes y de una cultura por lo menos igual a la de estos." and, Puerto Ricans were a people who "defiende con tenacidad su historia y su civilizacion.")

⁷⁰ Ibid. 1:17.

⁷¹ Ibid. 1:21.

⁷² Ibid. 1:35-6.

⁷³ Ibid. 1:50.

⁷⁴ Ibid. 1:172.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 1:172. (Translated from Spanish: "La fuerza que gravita sobre nuestro pueblo es el sentido de la impotencia. Hay que evocar, pues, las fuerzas contrarias, las fuerzas de la sabiduría y de la belleza inmanentes en la naturaleza del hombre.")

⁷⁶ Juan Angel Silén, Pedro Albizu Campos (Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana, 1976).

⁷⁷ El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 1 November 1930, p.12. (Translated from Spanish: "...en el 98 eramos dueños de nuestra propia riqueza. Estaba en nuestras manos casi totalmente. Esa era la base de la vieja felicidad colectiva que se ha extinguido.")

⁷⁸ Pedro Albizu Campos, La Conciencia nacional puertorriquena. Selección, introducción y notas de Manuel Maldonado-Denis. (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1972), p.112. (Translated from Spanish: "Fundir nuestra nacionalidad en la unidad norteamericana, sea esta última buena o mala, no es cosa que pueda considerarse seriamente por los que tienen un concepto claro de lo que es la nacionalidad. Su existencia defina nuestra vida espiritual orientada espontáneamente hacia la civilización superior a que pertenecemos, y es la única garantía del bienestar material de nuestro pueblo.")

⁷⁹ El Nacionalista de Puerto Rico 22 August 1930, p.2.

⁸⁰ El Mundo 20 December 1930, p.6. (Translated from

Spanish: "Si bajo España sufrimos despotismos ellos no fueron sino un reflejo de los que se sufrían en la península; los mismos hombres que gobernaban allá eran enviados también a Puerto Rico. Bajo el regimen actual, en cambio, padecemos funcionarios de ínfima categoría política.")

⁸¹Antonio Ma. Stevens Arroryo, The Political Philosophy of Pedro Albizu Campos: Its Theory and Practice, Occasional Papers No. 13. (New York: New York University, Ibero-American Language and Area Center, [1974]), p.27.

⁸²Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:74. (Translated from Spanish: "No existe en la Unión americana un estado comparable a nosotros en homogeneidad étnica, en cultura, y con una historia tan rica en páginas luminosas.")

⁸³Ibid. 1:74. (Translated from Spanish: "Afortunadamente la personalidad creada por estos hombres de cultura no ha desaparecido y ésta es una barrera que nos defiende contra los planes de conquista del invasor. Puerto Rico plantea el caso más hermoso de América, porque aquí en las aguas del Caribe se dilucidará cuales son los planes y la actitud de Estados Unidos hacia los pueblos de nuestra raza.")

⁸⁴Ibid. 1:54.

⁸⁵Ibid. 1:68. (Translated from Spanish: "Toda la enseñanza debe ser en la lengua vernácula... porque las primeras nociones... recibimos en español y la total comprensión es solo posible en el propio idioma.")

⁸⁶Ibid. 1:100. (The term which Albizu Campos used was "embrutecer," literally, to make the youth "brutish.")

⁸⁷Ibid. 1:78. (Translated from Spanish: For the Puerto Rican peasant, English "no ha mutilado su mentalidad.")

⁸⁸Victor S. Clark, ed. Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975), pp.81-2.

⁸⁹Pedro Albizu Campos, Obras escogidas, 1923-1936 (San Juan: Editorial Jelofe, 1975), 1:188.

⁹⁰Ibid. 1:189.

⁹¹La Gran enciclopedia de Puerto Rico, s.v. "Política: Historia política de Puerto Rico," by Carmelo Delgado Cintrón,

p.168. (Translated from Spanish: The party "...abolirá por todos los medios a su alcance el sistema obligatorio de enseñanza en la lengua del invasor, que desorienta e embrutece a nuestra juventud, en grave perjuicio de nuestra personalidad cultural.")

⁹²R.R. Rivera Correa, The Shadow of Don Pedro (New York: Plus Ultra, 1974), pp.59-60; and Trumbull White, Puerto Rico and Its People (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1938), pp.207.

⁹³Trumbull White, Puerto Rico and Its People (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1938), p.207.

⁹⁴Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.34.

⁹⁵Trumbull White, Puerto Rico and Its People (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1938), pp.201-4.

⁹⁶Thomas Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p.34.

Notes: Epilogue

¹Bolívar Pagán, Historia de los partidos políticos puertorriqueños (1898-1956) 2 vols. (San Juan: Librería Campos, 1959), 2:54.

²Robert Anderson, Party Politics in Puerto Rico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p.45.

³Commission of Inquiry on Civil Rights in Puerto Rico, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Civil Rights in Puerto Rico, by Arthur Garfield Hays, Chairman. (New York: 1937)., p.1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵Arthur D. Gayer, Paul T. Homan and Earle K. James, The Sugar Economy of Puerto Rico (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.223.

⁶ El Mundo 22 January 1934, p.14. (Translated from Spanish.)

⁷ See p. 35 .

⁸Juan Antonio Corretjer, La lucha por la independencia de Puerto Rico 4a ed. (Guaynabo: Puerto Rico, 1974) pp.61,67.

⁹J. Benjamin Torres, Albizu Campos y la cuestión nacional (New York: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños, 1978?), pp.5,10.

¹⁰Federico Ribes Tovar claims that bail was set at 1 million dollars and raised overnight. El Mundo however, reported that bail was set at \$70,000. This sum was raised immediately by Nationalist supporters. See Federido Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.64; and (El Mundo 6 March 1936, p.1.

¹¹ El Mundo 6 March 1936. p.1.

¹² Ibid. p.6.

¹³ La Gran enciclopedia de Puerto Rico, s.v. "Política: Historia política de Puerto Rico," by Carmelo Delgado Cintrón, p.197.

¹⁴ El Mundo 5 August 1936, p.12.

¹⁵ El Mundo 6 August 1936, p.4.

¹⁶ La Gran enciclopedia de Puerto Rico, s.v. "Política: Historia política de Puerto Rico," by Carmelo Delgado Cintrón, p.198.

¹⁷ American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Liberties in American Colonies (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 1939).

¹⁸ Federico Ribes Tovar, Albizu Campos: Puerto Rican Revolutionary, (New York: Plus Ultra, 1971), p.94.

¹⁹ R.R. Rivera Correa, The Shadow of Don Pedro (New York: Vantage Press, 1970), p.13.

Notes: Conclusion

¹Victor S. Clark, ed., Porto Rico and Its Problems (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930; reprint ed., New York: Arno, 1975).

²Bailey W. Diffie and Justine W. Diffie, Porto Rico: A Broken Pledge (New York: Vanguard Press, 1931).

³Taller de Formación Política, La cuestión nacional: El Partido Nacionalista y el movimiento obrero puertorriqueño (Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán, 1982), p.109.

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