

A COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF ASIAN AMERICAN
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

by

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines how Asian Americans form political identities under the simultaneous pressures of socioeconomic integration and racial marginalization. Despite their growing visibility in competitive electoral contexts, Asian Americans remain understudied in political science, where prevailing models often treat racial identity and immigrant status as distinct or peripheral factors. This study proposes a theoretical framework that captures the dual pressures of partial incorporation and exclusion, offering a more context-sensitive interpretation of party identification and presidential vote choice. Drawing on data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES) across multiple election cycles, the analysis investigates how education interact with racial resentment, ideological orientations, economic perceptions, and presidential approval in shaping party identification and presidential vote choice. Using multivariate model with interaction terms, the study explores how these relationships shift across electoral contexts, particularly during periods of heightened racial salience, such as the 2020 election. The findings reveal that, in terms of party identification, three attitudinal factors—racial resentment, symbolic ideology, and operational policy preferences—consistently correlate with Republican party identification. Other variables show little meaningful connection in most electoral contexts. Regarding presidential vote choice, racial resentment, party identification, and operational

preferences remain the most stable predictors, while self-reported ideology and other characteristics demonstrate limited or inconsistent effects. Across election cycles, there is little evidence that education systematically alters these relationships. However, in 2020, individuals with higher levels of education reported weaker associations between conservative orientations and Republican identification. Even in that context, no corresponding effect is observed in presidential vote choice. These results diverge from patterns observed in other racial groups and remain consistent across Asian American subgroups, regardless of national origin or nativity. Overall, this research advances both theoretical and empirical understandings of racialized political behavior among Asian Americans by foregrounding the dual processes of integration and exclusion. It contributes to the broader literature on immigrant political development, public opinion, and racial politics by presenting a framework adaptable to other communities experiencing conditional inclusion and contested belonging within American democracy.

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1. Introduction

Asian Americans have become increasingly visible in recent electoral environments, particularly within states that frequently determine national outcomes. In the context of the 2024 presidential election, New York Times underscored this growing significance, describing Asian Americans as “the quintessential swing voter group” (Qin, 2024). Although they comprised just 4% of the national electorate in 2020, their turnout rose by approximately 40% compared to 2016—reportedly the largest increase across racial categories (AAPI Data, 2022). In Georgia, the runoff election that shifted control of the U.S. Senate occurred during a period of heightened Asian American political participation, including a notable share of first-time voters.

Similar trends have been recorded in Nevada, where Asian Americans make up roughly 10% of eligible voting population. Vice President Kamala Harris launched a voter engagement initiative targeting this community in Las Vegas during the 2024 campaign. The Republican Party previously operated outreach centers in Asian American neighborhoods, including Las Vegas’s Chinatown (Knowles, 2024). In Southern California, particularly in Orange County, constituencies with substantial Asian-origin populations have drawn sustained attention from both parties.

Despite these developments, gaps in voter contact remain. According to a recent national survey conducted by AAPI Data (2022), approximately 56% of Asian American respondents reported receiving no contact from the Democratic Party, while 60% reported no contact from the Republican Party. This lack of consistent engagement continues even as turnout increases.

Even so, limited outreach and uneven incorporation cannot be understood in isolation from the broader racialized environment in which Asian Americans engage politically. Between March 2020 and March 2022, Stop AAPI Hate recorded nearly 11,500 reported hate incidents, encompassing physical assaults, verbal harassment, and civil rights violations (Stop AAPI Hate, 2022). One of the most widely publicized episodes occurred in March 2021, when eight people were killed at three Atlanta-area spas, including six women of Asian descent (Knowles et al., 2021).

Racialized harm has also shaped local political responses. In Sunset Park, Brooklyn—a neighborhood with a significant Chinese immigrant population—Republican Lee Zeldin drew considerable support in the 2022 New York gubernatorial race, as concerns over crime became increasingly salient (Campanile & Li, 2022). In San Francisco, where residents of Chinese descent constitute over 20% of the population, civic groups have expanded their advocacy in response to both interpersonal violence and what many characterize as institutional neglect (Carlton & Mai-Duc, 2023; Chen, 2023).

However, these experiences remain largely absent from dominant frameworks in political science, which frequently overlook the racialized conditions under which Asian Americans navigate public life. Scholarship has frequently positioned them at the periphery of racial politics, often aggregating their responses into broader “nonwhite” or “other” categories. This practice has limited empirical clarity and contributed to the conceptual flattening of one of the most internally diverse racial groups in the United States. Meanwhile, comparable sustained attention to Asian American political development remains lacking, even as a growing body of work has focused on Latino and Black political attitude and behavior (Griffin & Keane, 2006; Keele & White, 2019; Pérez & Cobian, 2024; Ramírez, 2013).

Moreover, existing studies tend to treat immigrant status and racial identity as discrete variables (Kuo et al., 2016; Lee, 2002; Junn & Masuoka, 2008; Le et al., 2020), failing to capture their interaction in shaping political learning and behavior. Few models account for the dual experiences of incorporation and exclusion that structure Asian American political decision-making. As a result, dominant frameworks often fail to account for the simultaneity of incorporation and marginalization. There remains a critical need for theoretical approaches that address these cross-pressures—approaches that can accommodate intra-group variability, context sensitivity, and the evolving nature of Asian American political identity within a system of conditional inclusion.

Given the limitations identified in existing scholarships, this study develops a theoretical framework centered on the dual pressure of integration and marginalization as the basis for analyzing Asian American political orientations. This approach recognizes that Asian Americans occupy a complex social position—marked by upward mobility through education and employment, yet simultaneously constrained by persistent racialization. These intersecting forces do not resolve neatly; instead, they generate political ambiguity rooted in both partial belonging and repeated reminders of exclusion. The framework thus provides a foundation for interpreting how Asian Americans navigate an environment in which socioeconomic incorporation does not ensure full civic inclusion.

This tension yields political responses that are fluid, context-sensitive, and often unsettled. Asian Americans frequently recalibrate their positions in response to external signals, shifting public narratives, or crisis events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and surges in anti-Asian hostility (Le et al., 2020; Wong & Liu, 2022; Wong & Ramakrishnan, 2023). Their political stance is neither automatic nor static, but responsive to how they are positioned in

specific historical or institutional contexts. Instead of following fixed partisan paths, their choices emerge from an ongoing negotiation between social incorporation and the constraints of racialization.

This framework is essential for interpreting Asian American political orientations precisely because it accounts for the ambivalence that existing models often overlook. Traditional approaches that rely on assimilationist narratives or racial threat perspectives tend to reduce Asian American behavior to either linear incorporation or reactive group cohesion. Such models offer limited explanatory value in an era when Asian Americans demonstrate both increasing participation and significant partisan variability (Wong & Ramakrishnan, 2023; Lee, 2002).

By centering the dual pressures of integration and marginalization, the framework introduced here accounts for the contingent and context-sensitive nature of Asian American political behavior. It clarifies why political responses may shift in response to contingent events, targeted outreach, or perceived threats, rather than remaining stable across time or uniformly across subgroups (Wong & Ramakrishnan, 2023). In recent electoral cycles, especially during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, these fluctuations have become increasingly visible, with Asian Americans resisting singular partisan classification and responding instead to issue salience, racialized messaging, and evolving institutional relationships (Wong & Liu, 2022). Thus, this approach renders Asian American political behavior neither inconsistent nor underdeveloped, but reflective of a layered political identity—one shaped by contradictory pressures and attuned to context. The framework thus offers a more empirically grounded and conceptually flexible means of analyzing political engagement in this population.

In other words, this study addresses a long-standing omission in the discipline: the disconnect between Asian Americans' increasing electoral relevance and their marginal position in theory-building. Their political behavior has too often been appended to existing models without sufficient attention to the structural distinctiveness of their experience. This study responds by offering a conceptual model that is not only specific to Asian Americans, but also adaptable to the study of other racialized immigrant populations. In doing so, it provides a replicable, theory-informed foundation for future scholarship that investigates political behavior in contexts where formal inclusion remains incomplete and political identity is shaped by contingent and unsettled conditions.

Moreover, this study also bridges multiple subfields that have frequently operated in isolation. It connects literatures in racial and ethnic politics, immigrant incorporation, and public opinion to develop a more integrated account of how political attitudes take form under politically and socially contingent forms of inclusion. The framework contributes to comprehensive political behavior scholarship by showing that partisan variability, selective participation, and responsiveness to political messaging are not signs of incoherence, but reflections of a layered political existence. It refines existing models by emphasizing how identity, belonging, and trust emerge from—and remain sensitive to—the dual pressures of structural access and racialized exclusion.

Viewed as a whole, this study constructs a theoretical and empirical framework to better understand Asian American political behavior as formed by the intersecting pressures of socioeconomic incorporation and racialized exclusion. Amid heightened volatility, racialized public discourse, and inconsistent institutional outreach, Asian Americans represent a revealing case through which to examine the fluidity and contextual sensitivity of political identity. The

analysis focuses specifically on party identification and presidential vote choice, using original data analysis drawn from the Cooperative Election Study (CES), formerly known as the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), spanning multiple electoral cycles.

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of Asian American voters, using descriptive statistics and visualizations to illustrate key demographic and political features. Chapter 3 elaborates the theoretical framework, and Chapter 4 outlines the hypotheses. Chapter 5 introduces the data and explains the analytic approach. Chapters 6 and 7 show the results of conditional relationship analyses, with Chapter 6 demonstrating the distinctiveness of Asian Americans in comparison to other racial groups, and Chapter 7 focusing on internal coherence within the Asian American population. Chapter 8 concludes with implications for political attitude and behavior under conditions of partial inclusion.

2. Basic Information on Asian American Voters

Asian Americans constitute a diverse category that includes individuals tracing their ancestry to East, South, or Southeast Asia. In recent years, this population has drawn greater attention in public discourse, especially within electoral contexts where narrow margins elevate the significance of relatively small groups. Despite growing visibility, Asian Americans continue to occupy a marginal position in both popular and academic narratives about race and politics.

Within this category, national-origin subgroups differ in histories of migration, community development, and socioeconomic access. East Asian Americans—such as those of Chinese, Korean, or Japanese descent—often enter public discourse through narratives of educational attainment or occupational success. South Asian Americans, including Indian and Pakistani populations, navigate a distinct trajectory shaped by professional migration and post-1965 immigration reform. Southeast Asian groups, such as Vietnamese or Filipino Americans, trace different pathways shaped by refugee resettlement and colonial ties. These historical and structural distinctions have shaped patterns of incorporation and political socialization in ways that resist generalization.


In political science, Asian Americans have received inconsistent attention and often appear as residual categories within frameworks designed to capture the experiences of Black and White Americans. This treatment overlooks the specific constraints and contingencies that influence political behavior among Asian Americans. Studies that center this population have highlighted racial triangulation, conditional inclusion, and the absence of consistent partisan anchors. Research by scholars such as Lien, Wong, Junn, and Masuoka has urged a reevaluation

of how race and political identity interact in this context, focusing on ambiguity, variability, and contestation.

2.1. The Rise of Asian American Voters: Trends in Demographics

Asian Americans, although not the largest minority voter group in the U.S., are experiencing the rapid growth within the voting population. Based on the Current Population Survey from the Census Bureau in the U.S., from 1998 to 2022, there has been a marked increase in the Asian voting-age population. In 1998, the estimated number was approximately 7,327,000 individuals, which grew steadily each year. By 2022, the voting-age population had more than doubled to an estimated 16,510,000, indicating significant demographic growth. This trend suggests a strong upward trajectory in the number of potential Asian American voters over the 24-year period. The citizen population among Asian Americans has also seen a substantial increase. In 1998, the number was slightly lower than the voting-age population at about 4,344,000. By 2022, the number of Asian American citizens within the voting-age group rose to approximately 12,111,000. This growth indicates not only a rise in the number of Asian Americans reaching voting age but also a substantial increase in naturalization or birthrate within the demographic. Despite these increases, Asian Americans still make up only 5.4% of the Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP), a smaller share compared to the Latino population.

The data shows the percentage of the voting-age population who are citizens. This began at 62.4% in 1998, fluctuated slightly over the years, and reached its peak at 73.4% in 2022. There are slight dips in the percentage around 2002 and 2010, but the overall trend is upward, suggesting an increasing proportion of Asian American voting-age population is becoming



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration

Figure 2-1. Change in Share of Total Citizen Voting-Age Population by Race

citizens, which could imply higher naturalization rates and/or second-generation Asian Americans coming of age.

The data suggests not only growth in raw numbers but also in the potential political capital of Asian Americans. With a growing segment of this demographic being eligible voters, their collective voice and impact in political matters are likely increasing. The data points toward a demographic that is becoming more politically significant and, potentially, more active and engaged in the American political process.

While the overall trend is upward, there are nuances in the growth patterns. The steady growth in both voting-age and citizen populations suggests that the increases are not just due to


immigration but are bolstered by higher birth rates within the community and the maturing of second-generation Asian Americans to voting age. The periods of slower growth or slight decreases in the percentage of citizens within voting-age population could correspond to shifts in immigration law, policy changes, or even socio-political events that either inhibited naturalization or affected immigration flows.

The Asian American population has experienced significant growth in both the number of individuals of voting age and the number of citizens eligible to vote. This growth is likely to have profound effects on political participation and representation for Asian Americans. The increasing percentage of citizens within the voting-age population points to enhanced civic engagement and the potential for increased influence in elections and policy-making.

The interplay of these demographic trends reflects a diversifying American electorate. The increasing shares of Hispanic and Asian populations within the CVAP suggest a future political landscape that will be more ethnically diverse, with the potential for these groups to wield greater influence on election outcomes and policy decisions. In contrast, the declining share of the White population indicates a diminishing proportion of the electorate, which could have significant implications for political strategies and priorities.

The data from U.S. Census Bureau also presents estimated numbers of native and naturalized Asian American citizens from 1998 to 2022. It shows two layers for each year, one for native citizens and one for naturalized citizens, allowing us to examine the composition and growth of the Asian American citizen population.

The total number of Asian American citizens has seen a substantial increase over the 24-year span. Starting with an estimated total of around 4,344,000 in 1998, the population grew to



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration

Figure 2-2. Share of the American Voters by Race

just under 12,111,000 by 2022. This more than twofold increase reflects significant demographic changes, including natural population growth and immigration.

The population of native Asian American citizens—those born as U.S. citizens—shows a gradual increase. In 1998, native citizens constituted approximately 1,768,000 individuals—40.7% of the Asian American citizen population. By 2022, this number rose to 4,967,000, accounting for 41% of the population, which indicates a consistent and steady increase in the birthrate within the Asian American community or the maturing of the second generation to an age where they are counted as part of the voting-age population.

The naturalized citizen segment—those who have become U.S. citizens through the naturalization process—has grown more pronounced. Starting at 2,576,000 individuals in 1998—59.3% of the Asian American citizen population—, it expanded to 7,144,000 by 2022—59.3% of the population. The growth in naturalized citizens outpaced that of native citizens in absolute numbers, showing the significant impact of immigration and naturalization on the Asian American demographic.

The percentage of naturalized citizens in the total Asian American population has seen minor fluctuations but remains the majority. Starting at 59.3% in 1998, it peaked at 64% in 2008 and has since decreased to 59% in 2022, which could suggest that while naturalization remains significant, the increasing number of native citizens—as a result of births and aging into the voting demographic—is balancing the proportion of the naturalized population.

This increase in both native and naturalized Asian American citizens has implications for political participation and representation. A growing electorate means that the Asian American community holds increasing sway in elections and political advocacy, which can translate into greater influence on policy-making and representation. The growth patterns suggest that the Asian American population is not only integrating into U.S. society through naturalization but is also establishing deeper roots through generational growth. The most stable ratio of native to naturalized citizens in recent years suggests a maturing community with robust ties to both their heritage and their American identity.

It illustrates significant growth in the Asian American citizenry, driven by both naturalization and natural population increase. It highlights the important role of immigration and family growth in shaping the demographic, which has important ramifications for political

mobilization, electoral politics, community representation, and the broader narrative of American multiculturalism.

At the beginning of the period, in 1998, the White population made up the largest proportion of voters at 81.9%, followed by the Black population at 11.1%, the Hispanic population at 4.9%, and the Asian population at 1.7%. These figures set the stage for observing changes over time. From 1998 to 2022, the White share of American voters shows a declining trend, decreasing to 73.3%. This gradual decline suggests a diversification of the electorate, as other racial groups begin to make up a larger share of the voting-eligible citizenry. The Black population's proportion of voters remains relatively stable, with minor fluctuations. It starts at 11.1% in 1998, experiences a slight increase, and peaks at 13.4% in 2012, after which it slightly recedes to 11.4% in 2022. The steadiness in the Black voting share suggests a consistency in their presence within the electorate relative to the other groups. The Hispanic share of voters sees the most significant growth among all groups, increasing from 4.9% in 1998 to 13.7% by 2022. This near-tripling of the Hispanic share underscores the growing importance of this demographic in American politics, which can be attributed to both natural population growth and an increase in naturalization rates among Hispanic immigrants.

When comparing the trends, several key points emerge. First, the White population's share decreases, yet it remains the largest group among voters. The consistent decline points towards a more racially and ethnically diverse American electorate over time. Second, the Hispanic population displays the most substantial growth in share, which aligns with broader demographic trends of a growing Hispanic population in the U.S.

It is important to consider that the increase in the Asian American share, although smaller in absolute terms than that of Hispanics, is nonetheless substantial given its starting point. This


growth in Asian American eligible voters reflects broader immigration trends and an increase in civic participation among Asian American communities. It may also signal changes in naturalization rates and demographic shifts within the Asian American population itself. The political behavior of Asian Americans, against the backdrop of these demographic changes, could be influenced by a variety of factors. These include the aforementioned rates of naturalization and citizenship acquisition, increased political mobilization, and shifts in party affiliation and political preferences within the group.

In summary, Figure 2-2 paints a picture of an evolving electorate, with declining White dominance and rising shares of Hispanic and Asian populations. The implications of these shifts are profound, indicating changes in political representation, issue prioritization, and the broader American political landscape. Asian Americans, while starting from a smaller base, show a consistent upward trajectory in their share of eligible voters, suggesting their growing potential influence in the American political process.

2.2. Asian American Voter Turnout

2.2.1. An In-Depth Analysis of Two-Decade Trends in Presidential Elections (2000-2020)

In comparison, the turnout among Hispanic American voters aligns closely with that of Asian Americans—both being prominent immigrant groups and the two fastest-growing ethnic populations in the United States. Their turnout has similarly climbed from 45.1% in 2000 to 53.7% in 2020. The parallel paths of these groups' voter participation are particularly



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration

Figure 2-3. Turnout Rates by Race: Presidential Elections, 2000-2020

noteworthy; in the 2020 election, however, Asian Americans slightly outpaced Hispanic Americans in turnout for the first time in twenty years, signaling a shift in the electoral landscape as these burgeoning groups assert greater influence in the voting booth.

The steady climb in Asian American voter turnout relative to other racial groups provides fertile ground for sociopolitical analysis. The data suggests an evolving electoral landscape wherein the traditional gap in voter participation between Asian Americans and whites is gradually contracting, culminating in a narrower difference of 11.2 percentage points in 2020, a stark contrast to the 13.5 percentage point gap observed in 2000. This contraction suggests an

alignment of Asian American voter participation rates with the national average, potentially indicating an increase in political integration and influence.

The surge in Asian American turnout post-2016 also poses an interesting counterpoint to the trends observed among black Americans. While the latter group showed a distinct peak in turnout during 2012, there was no corresponding spike for Asian Americans, who displayed a more linear progression until their own significant increase in the 2020 election cycle. This difference underscores the unique factors that energize different racial communities, highlighting the individualized nature of political engagement within these groups.

The turnout trends between Hispanic and Asian American voters, two of the most rapidly expanding minority groups, enhance our understanding of electoral dynamics. Historically considered together for their parallel growth rates, these demographics show a divergence in the recent election data. The fact that Asian American voter participation has recently surpassed that of Hispanic Americans may reflect a wider trend of increased political engagement and awakening within the Asian American community.


In sum, the analysis of voter turnout rates by race for presidential elections from 2000 to 2020 reveals a compelling story of increasing political agency among Asian Americans. The graph is not merely a representation of numbers but a tapestry of participation that has evolved significantly over the years. With the Asian American community now engaging in the electoral process at nearly 60%, there is a clear indication that this demographic is rapidly becoming an influential force in American politics. This trend warrants close observation, as it indicates a potential shift in future election dynamics and the political landscape at large.

2.2.2. An Examination of Asian American Voter Turnout in Congressional Elections (1998–2022)

Beginning at the tail end of the 20th century, the turnout rate for Asian Americans in congressional elections was recorded at 32.3% in the year 1998. This initial figure places Asian Americans at the bottom of the voter turnout hierarchy when compared to their white, black, and Hispanic counterparts. Over the next 16 years, the trend for Asian American turnout shows little variation, with rates gently wavering but largely remaining anchored in the low 30% region. This period suggests a phase of political quiescence within the Asian American community, characterized by a level of consistency that, while stable, indicates a potential for growth and mobilization that was yet to be realized.

In stark contrast, the subsequent surge in voter turnout in the 2018 midterms is nothing short of remarkable. Asian American turnout vaults up to 40.6%, a leap that indicates a vibrant re-invigoration of political engagement within the community. This abrupt and significant uptick raises questions about the stimuli that galvanized such a collective movement toward the ballot box. The increase in participation during this period can potentially be attributed to heightened political awareness, a response to the political climate, or effective voter mobilization strategies that resonated with the community.

The 2022 midterm, while slightly retracting to 37.9%, still represents a relatively high level of engagement compared to the turn of the century, suggesting that the increase in participation may be part of a longer-term trend rather than an anomaly. Whites, as illustrated in the data, have consistently maintained the highest turnout rates in Congressional elections. Their rates of participation begin at 47.4% in 1998 and exhibit a generally increasing trend over the



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration

Figure 2-4. Turnout Rates by Race: Congressional Elections, 1998-2022

years, peaking at 57.6% in 2022. This demographic’s turnout serves as a comparative benchmark for analyzing other racial groups. For Blacks, the voter turnout has demonstrated notable variability. Starting at 41.8% in 1998, it fluctuated throughout the years, with significant peaks at 51.6% in 2002 and an all-time high of 57.5% in 2018, paralleling a period of increased overall voter turnout. These variations hint at the potential influence of the political landscape and specific electoral stakes resonating with the black community.

Hispanics share a more similar journey with the Asian American electorate. Their voter turnout rates have shown a wave-like pattern, with a dip in 2014 akin to that observed in the Asian American turnout. The simultaneous increase for both Hispanic and Asian Americans in

the 2018 midterms points to a possible shared experience or response to the broader political environment during that election cycle.

The growth of Asian American participation in Congressional elections from 1998 to 2022 is a multidimensional story intertwined with political activism, community-driven initiatives, and demographic shifts. A comparison of Asian American and White voter turnout rates reveals a persistent but declining gap, indicating a slow but steady progress toward closing the civic participation gap. Concurrently, the synchronized growth in turnout among Asian Americans and Hispanics, particularly in the 2018 elections, suggests underlying commonalities that may affect these populations. These could include coordinated outreach efforts by political entities, shared concerns or policy implications, or a collective response to overarching themes in the political arena.

The Figure 2-4 of voter turnout rates by race for congressional elections over a 24-year span presents an insightful view into the evolving political behavior of the Asian American electorate. The marked engagement observed in the 2018 elections signals a possible turning point for the community, reflecting a new era of political activism that could reshape their role in the American electoral process. While the slight decline in 2022 suggests a reversion to a degree of pre-2018 participation levels, the overall heightened engagement relative to the start of the century speaks to a more politically active Asian American populace.

The findings show that, while each racial group's election participation is driven by different reasons, certain trends and periods of increased engagement might reflect broader societal movements and changes in the political environment. For Asian Americans, the trends depicted in this graph provide concrete proof of their expanding political presence, a phenomenon that should be examined in future cycles.

2.3. Shifts in Presidential Election Voting Patterns Among Asian Americans

2.3.1. Party Identification among Asian Americans

Similar to various minority populations, it has been a common perception that Asian American voters tend to favor the Democratic Party. However, historical voting trends have not consistently aligned with this belief, as evidenced in our earlier discussion. Notably, it was only after the year 2000 that the Democratic Party saw a substantial increase in support from Asian American voters. Furthermore, current surveys indicate that over the last eight years, the preference for the Democratic Party among Asian American voters has diminished even more.

The data from the Pew Research Center provided depict party identification by race over nearly three decades, from 1994 through 2023. These visual data track the political leanings of four racial groups—Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic—towards the Democratic and Republican parties. The data include registered voters who identify with or lean towards either party, noting that Asian estimates represent English speakers only. This detail is crucial as it likely excludes a segment of the Asian American population that is less acculturated or newly immigrated and may not be fluent in English. It is also noted that telephone survey data were adjusted for survey mode and that, for Hispanic voters, the data are shown only for years with interviews conducted in both English and Spanish.




Figure 2-5. Party Identification by Race: Net Democrat (Pew Research Center Data)

Starting with Asian Americans, we see that their identification with the Democratic Party begins at 42% in 1998—the first year data for this group is available—while Republican identification starts at 13%. Over the subsequent 25 years, Democratic identification peaks at 65% around 2008 and generally hovers in the 60% range, with slight fluctuations but no dramatic changes, ending at 63% in 2023. On the Republican side, identification amongst Asian Americans shows more variability, with a low of 12% in 2012 and peaks around 2000 and 2016 at 53% and 38%, respectively. By 2023, Republican identification settles at 35%.

The ‘net Democratic identification’ among Asian Americans clearly indicates their predominant party preference, offering a straightforward method to assess changes in political allegiance over time. Figure 2-5 illustrates the net Democratic identification across four racial groups—Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic. The net Democratic score is calculated by subtracting the percentage of each racial group that identifies or leans Republican from the

percentage that identifies or leans Democratic. Thus, a positive net score indicates a Democratic lean, while a negative net score indicates a Republican lean within a racial group.

For Asian Americans, the story begins in 1998, as no data is provided for the years before. The net Democrat identification starts at a moderate positive value of 17%, indicating a Democratic leaning. However, this is the lowest positive value among all the races at this point. This initial number suggests that while there was a Democratic preference, it was not as pronounced as in other racial groups. Over the subsequent years, Asian Americans show significant fluctuations in party identification. In 2012, a dramatic peak occurred, with a net Democrat identification soaring to 65%. This spike might reflect responses to political climates or specific events that resonated strongly with Asian American voters at the time. Following this peak, there is a notable decline, with a return to levels around the 26-28% mark by 2023. This reduction indicates a less pronounced but stable Democratic leaning that has remained relatively consistent.

The party identification among Asian American voters has experienced considerable change over the last three decades, reflecting both their unique political evolution and their response to the broader American political landscape. Compared to other racial groups, Asian Americans have demonstrated a notable range of fluctuation in their political allegiances, with distinct shifts that suggest a community responsive to the changing political context.

Asian Americans' party identification reveals a community that, while showing general Democratic preferences, is not as consistently aligned with the Democratic Party as Black voters and shows more openness to Republican affiliation than might be expected. The trajectory of Asian American party identification stands out for its volatility, particularly when compared to the more stable trends observed in other racial groups. The swing towards a strong Democratic

preference in 2012, followed by a decline, suggests a responsiveness to political developments that may not be as pronounced among other groups. This responsiveness indicates potential flexibility in party affiliation that parties could address through targeted political strategies and policies.

The political fluidity speaks to the diversity within the Asian American community, which encompasses a wide range of nationalities, cultural backgrounds, and socioeconomic statuses, each contributing to the complex mosaic of Asian American political behavior. The overall trend for Asian Americans shows a shift towards the Democratic Party, peaking in 2012. However, the subsequent decline suggests a complex interaction with the political system, which could be influenced by a variety of factors, such as policy preferences, socio-economic changes, and generational shifts within the Asian American community.

In sum, Asian Americans display a distinctive pattern of party identification compared to other races, marked by variability and change. The data points to a community whose political allegiance has evolved and suggests that neither party can take the Asian American vote for granted. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for political parties and candidates as they develop strategies to engage with this increasingly influential voting bloc within the American political landscape.

2.3.2. Vote Choice among Asian Americans

In this part, we delve into the evolving political landscape as it pertains to the Asian American electorate and its vote choice in U.S. presidential elections from 1992 to 2020. We analyze exit

poll data which details the percentage of votes garnered by Democratic and Republican candidates within major racial groups: White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian.

The exit poll data presents a fluctuating yet significant inclination towards Democratic candidates among Asian American voters. In 1992, approximately 31% of Asian Americans supported the Democratic nominee, which was notably lower than the support from Black (83%) and Hispanic (61%) communities, and marginally lesser than White voters (44%).

However, the trend demonstrates a pivotal upswing in favor of the Democratic Party over subsequent elections. A marked surge was observed in 2008, where the support leaps to 62%, aligning with a historic election cycle. This peak aligns with a broader trend of minority groups expressing increased Democratic support, perhaps reflective of demographic shifts and party strategies.

By 2012, the support briefly plateaued but remains robust at 73%. It is important to note that this surge is not an anomaly but rather an indication of a deeper political realignment within the Asian American community. By the 2020 elections, 87% of Asian Americans voted for the Democratic candidate, solidifying their status as a key constituency within the Democratic voter base. Also, the exit poll data indicating support for the Republican candidate in Presidential elections shows a contrastingly divergent pattern. Initially, in 1992, 41% of Asian Americans voted for the Republican nominee. Figure 2-6 marginally surpasses the White electorate's support (41%), underscoring a period where Asian Americans exhibited a significant bipartisan split in their vote choice. The trajectory for Republicans in the Asian American community shows a decline in support over the years, dipping to a low of 12% in 2020. It is imperative to analyze the factors contributing to this decline, such as policy positions, campaign outreach, and broader national sentiment, which may influence the political leanings of Asian Americans.




Figure 2-6. Vote Choice in Presidential Elections: Net Democratic Candidates Vote (Exit Poll Data)

Analyzing the ‘net Democratic candidate vote’ provides a distinct insight into the voting preferences of Asian Americans, facilitating a comparison of their political support trends over time. The concept of the net Democratic candidate vote in presidential elections is pivotal to comprehending the political orientation of various racial groups, including Asian Americans. This metric is calculated by subtracting the percentage of votes for Republican candidates from those for Democratic candidates, within each racial group. A positive value indicates a Democratic preference, while a negative value signifies a Republican inclination. By examining the net Democratic vote, we gain insight into the extent of partisan preference among voters.

Figure 2-6 shows that the highest Democratic preference among Asian Americans occurs in two election years, 2008 and 2012, which may correlate with the campaign’s focus on issues

such as immigration reform and healthcare. This preference aligns with the political atmosphere of those periods, suggesting a deep-seated response to the political climate and candidate platforms. By 2020, although there is a decline in the net Democratic vote for Asian Americans to +27%, this figure still reflects a notable Democratic preference. This sustained Democratic tilt is consequential for political strategists and policymakers, as it highlights the importance of understanding and addressing the preferences of the Asian American community.

Comparing support for both party nominees, a stark contrast in the political allegiance of Asian Americans is evident. The shift towards Democratic candidates is pronounced and sustained, suggesting a realignment of Asian American voter preferences over the past three decades.

The political implications are far-reaching. The shift in partisan dynamics among Asian Americans is influenced by a range of factors, including Democratic policy positions on economic opportunities, education, civil rights, and immigration, as well as enhanced mobilization efforts by political parties and community organizations aimed at engaging this voter demographic. Especially the upward trend in Democratic support could be attributed to several factors, including party stances on immigration, minority rights, and economic policies. Moreover, the mobilization and outreach efforts of the Democratic Party may also resonate more effectively with the values and concerns of Asian American voters.

As the fastest-growing racial or ethnic group in the U.S., Asian Americans are becoming an increasingly influential voting bloc. Their shifting allegiance towards the Democratic Party may be indicative of a larger trend in American politics where minority groups are reshaping the electoral landscape. The increasing number and political influence of Asian Americans serve as critical indicators for political parties, suggesting that addressing the diverse needs of this demographic is essential for shaping future electoral outcomes. It is also essential to consider the

heterogeneity within the Asian American community. This demographic is composed of individuals from various national origins, cultures, and languages, which may contribute to diverse political priorities and ideologies.

In summary, the exit poll data illustrates, while once exhibiting a strong Republican preference, a significant and growing affinity for the Democratic Party among Asian American voters, while support for Republican candidates has waned. This trend is a telling sign of the shifting political dynamics within the Asian American community and signals the importance of this demographic in future electoral strategies. As the U.S. continues to diversify, understanding the vote choice of Asian Americans will be increasingly crucial in predicting and interpreting election outcomes.

3. Between Incorporation and Exclusion: A Framework for Asian American Political Identity

3.1. Integration into Mainstream American Society

Political assimilation refers to the process by which immigrants adopt the political attitudes, behaviors, and values of the broader society. For Asian Americans, political assimilation often involves navigating the balance between maintaining cultural identity and integrating into the political mainstream. This process is influenced by various factors including educational and occupational assimilation, the degree of neighborhood integration, social networks, and experiences with discrimination and marginalization.

The process of constructing, shaping, and adopting mainstream political attitudes and behaviors is central to understanding the political engagement of Asian Americans. There are multiple pathways to political assimilation for Asian Americans. Through their experiences with educational and occupational assimilation, neighborhood integration, and social networks, Asian Americans navigate the complexities of acculturation, gradually aligning their political orientations with broader American values. This section examines how these factors collectively shape the political behavior of Asian Americans, offering insights into the broader process of political socialization among immigrant communities.

3.1.1. Educational and Occupational Assimilation and Its Influence on the Political Orientation of Asian Americans

One of the most significant ways in which Asian Americans construct and adapt their political attitudes is through educational and occupational assimilation. Education provides the knowledge and critical thinking skills necessary for engaging with the political landscape, while occupational integration offers the economic stability that facilitates active participation in political life.

Educational attainment is often the first step in this process. As Asian Americans pursue higher education, they are exposed to a wide range of political ideologies and perspectives, which influence their political beliefs and behaviors. For instance, studies have shown that higher levels of education are associated with increased political participation and a tendency toward liberal political ideologies (Gimpel & Lay, 2008; Wong et al., 2011). This exposure to diverse viewpoints in academic settings plays a crucial role in constructing political attitudes that align with mainstream American values. Occupational success further reinforces this process by providing Asian Americans with the economic resources and social networks necessary for political engagement. As they achieve upward mobility through professional success, they are often introduced to new political ideas and behaviors through interactions with colleagues and peers.

Indeed, educational and occupational assimilation has long been a key factor in the integration of immigrant groups into American society. Thus, the relationship between educational and occupational assimilation and political orientation is not unique to Asian Americans; it is a common experience shared by many immigrant groups in the United States.

Educational and occupational assimilation can be understood through the lens of segmented assimilation theory, which suggests that immigrants do not assimilate uniformly into a monolithic mainstream culture but rather follow divergent paths based on their socioeconomic status, race, and available community resources (Portes & Zhou, 1993). For Asian Americans, educational attainment often serves as a key driver of upward mobility, positioning them within higher socioeconomic strata. This, in turn, influences their political behavior, as higher education levels are typically associated with increased political participation and a tendency toward liberal political ideologies (Gimpel & Lay, 2008).

Human capital theory further elucidates the role of education and occupation in shaping political attitudes. According to this theory, the skills and knowledge acquired through education and professional experiences equip individuals with the tools necessary for effective political engagement (Becker, 1993). For Asian Americans, the emphasis on education as a means of upward mobility often translates into a strong investment in the political process, particularly among those who have achieved higher levels of education and occupational success (Wong et al., 2011).

However, the specific historical contexts, cultural backgrounds, and socioeconomic conditions of different immigrant communities lead to distinct patterns of political behavior. By comparing the experiences of Asian Americans with those of other immigrant groups—such as Latinx, African, and European immigrants—we can better understand the unique and shared challenges they face in the process of acculturation and how these experiences shape their political attitudes and behaviors.

For instance, European immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly those from Southern and Eastern Europe, faced significant barriers to educational and

occupational advancement. Over time, many of these groups were able to achieve upward mobility through access to education and the labor market, leading to greater political participation and a tendency to support policies that promoted their economic interests (Alba & Nee, 2003).

In contrast, Latinx immigrants, particularly those from Mexico and Central America, have faced more persistent challenges due to factors such as lower levels of initial educational attainment, undocumented status, and language barriers. These challenges have resulted in varied political orientations within the Latinx community, with some segments advocating for progressive policies that address social and economic inequalities, while others align with more conservative views, particularly on social and religious issues (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010).

African immigrants, though often arriving with higher levels of education than other immigrant groups, face unique challenges related to racial discrimination and cultural differences. These experiences can lead to a complex political orientation, where support for policies that address racial inequality and social justice coexist with conservative views on issues like taxation and entrepreneurship (Rong & Brown, 2001).

Asian Americans, similarly, experience a distinct trajectory of educational and occupational assimilation. While many Asian immigrants, particularly those from East Asia and India, arrive with high levels of education and professional skills, they also face significant barriers, including racial discrimination and the pressures of the model minority stereotype. These factors contribute to a complex and sometimes contradictory political orientation, where support for both progressive and conservative policies can be found within the community (Wong et al., 2011; Park, 2017).

Building on the comparison with other immigrant groups, it is clear that the historical and sociopolitical context of Asian American assimilation is unique. The trajectory of Asian American assimilation is complex, shaped by waves of immigration, shifting legal statuses, and the evolving American political landscape. Early Asian immigrants, particularly those from China and Japan, faced significant barriers to educational and occupational advancement due to restrictive immigration policies such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907. These laws limited the number of Asian immigrants and restricted their opportunities for upward mobility. Consequently, many early Asian immigrants were confined to low-wage jobs with limited access to educational opportunities (Daniels, 1997).

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 marked a significant shift, leading to an influx of highly educated Asian immigrants. This legislation abolished the national origins quota system, allowing more Asian professionals, especially from countries like India, China, and the Philippines, to immigrate. These new immigrants often came with high levels of education and were able to navigate the American educational and occupational systems more effectively, leading to higher rates of professional success and integration (Takaki, 1989).

In recent years, the impact of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 has continued to resonate, with Asian Americans achieving remarkable educational and professional success. A notable example is the increasing representation of Asian Americans in prestigious universities and high-skilled professions. According to a report by the Pew Research Center in 2017 (Anderson, 2017), Asian Americans are the most highly educated racial or ethnic group in the United States, with a significant proportion holding advanced degrees in fields such as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). This educational attainment has translated into substantial professional achievements, with Asian Americans excelling in sectors such as

technology, medicine, and finance. For instance, a significant number of Asian Americans hold leadership positions in major technology companies in Silicon Valley, reflecting their strong presence in this critical industry. These successes demonstrate the community's ability to leverage their educational qualifications to achieve upward mobility, reinforcing their role as key contributors to the American economy (Pew Research Center, 2017).

Empirical evidence underscores the significant impact of educational and occupational assimilation on the political orientation of Asian Americans. Studies have consistently shown that higher levels of education are correlated with increased political participation and a greater likelihood of supporting liberal policies, particularly on issues related to social justice and economic inequality (Gimpel & Lay, 2008; Wong et al., 2011). For instance, Asian American college graduates are more likely to vote, engage in political discussions, and participate in community organizations compared to their less-educated counterparts (Lien, 2004).

Occupational success also plays a crucial role in shaping political attitudes. Asian Americans who achieve higher-status occupations, particularly in professional fields, often experience a shift toward more conservative political positions, aligning with their socioeconomic interests (Tam, 1995).

3.1.2. The Importance of Neighborhood Context in Political Behavior

Neighborhood integration is another key factor in the adaptation and adoption of mainstream political behaviors. The integration of Asian Americans into American society is significantly influenced by their residential patterns, particularly their migration to suburban areas and ethnoburbs. Unlike the traditional urban enclaves, these suburban communities, often

characterized by a mix of ethnicities, provide a unique environment for Asian Americans to engage with diverse social networks. This migration pattern is not merely a reflection of economic mobility but also a strategic choice that influences their political attitudes and behaviors.

The movement of Asian Americans to suburban areas, particularly to ethnoburbs, is not merely a passive response to socioeconomic opportunities; rather, it is a deliberate and strategic choice that fundamentally shapes their political attitudes and behaviors. This suburbanization, often driven by a desire for high-quality education and economic advancement, places Asian Americans in environments that are uniquely conducive to political socialization. By choosing to settle in ethnoburbs—suburbs where they constitute a significant portion of the population—Asian Americans are not just preserving their cultural identity but are actively engaging in the broader political fabric of American society (Li, 1998; Zhou & Logan, 1991).

The very act of moving to these areas signifies a commitment to both integration and the retention of ethnic identity, a duality that directly influences how Asian Americans engage with politics. These ethnoburbs serve as cultural and economic hubs, where Asian Americans maintain strong ties to their heritage while also navigating the complexities of American civic life. This dual engagement fosters a unique political consciousness, one that blends traditional values with the realities of life in a diverse, multicultural society (Li, 2009).

Furthermore, by settling in these suburban environments, Asian Americans position themselves within networks that are inherently political. The interactions with co-ethnics and members of other racial and ethnic groups within these neighborhoods are not just social exchanges; they are critical moments of political socialization. Through these interactions, Asian Americans are exposed to a variety of perspectives, which in turn shapes their own political

views and behaviors. For instance, in ethnically diverse areas like Flushing, New York, and Cupertino, California, the political mobilization of Asian Americans is driven by a collective understanding of the issues that affect their community, such as education, housing, and immigration reform (Hum, 2014; Wong et al., 2011).

Moreover, the integration into these suburban communities encourages a form of political participation that is both reflective of and responsive to the multicultural environment in which they live. In places like Sugar Land, Texas, the increasing involvement of Asian Americans in local politics—whether through running for public office or participating in voter drives—demonstrates how their residential choices are not just a backdrop to their political behavior but a driving force behind it (Saito, 2023). The very nature of these communities, where cultural retention and civic engagement coexist, shapes a political identity that is both unique and influential in the broader American political landscape.

Empirical studies highlight the significance of these processes in shaping the political behaviors of Asian Americans. For example, research by Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) and Wong and Ramakrishnan (2023) demonstrates how neighborhood context and social networks influence political participation. Asian Americans in integrated neighborhoods are more politically active, participating in elections, community organizing, and public demonstrations at higher rates than those in segregated areas. The role of social media in expanding social networks beyond physical neighborhoods also plays a crucial role in this process, enabling the exchange of political ideas across different ethnic and cultural groups.

Furthermore, the integration of Asian Americans into these neighborhoods can lead to a blending of cultural values, which in turn influences political attitudes. The exposure to different cultural and political norms within these communities challenges and reshapes the political

identities of Asian Americans, pushing them towards greater participation in the American political system (Zhou, 1997). As they interact with neighbors from various backgrounds, Asian Americans are more likely to engage in political discussions, attend community meetings, and participate in local elections, thereby solidifying their role as active participants in American democracy.

In essence, the movement of Asian Americans to suburban areas and ethnoburbs is a powerful determinant of their political attitudes and behaviors. It is within these spaces that they negotiate their dual identities, engage in political socialization, and ultimately, contribute to the American democratic process. This strategic suburbanization not only facilitates their integration but also empowers them to shape their political futures in ways that are both culturally grounded and civically engaged.

3.1.3. The Impact of Social Networks on Political Socialization

Social networks, including interethnic friendships and marriages, are critical in the process of political socialization and the adoption of mainstream political attitudes. These relationships serve as conduits for the exchange of political ideas and values, facilitating the adaptation of political behaviors that align with broader societal norms.

Interracial and interethnic marriages, in particular, play a significant role in this process. Asian Americans have one of the highest rates of interracial marriage in the United States. According to a Pew Research Center report on newlyweds in 2010, 28% of Asian Americans married someone of a different race, compared to 9% of whites, 17% of blacks, and 26% of Hispanics (Wang, 2012). The prevalence of intermarriage, especially between Asians and whites,

is often seen as an indicator of the weakening of ethnic boundaries and a sign of the assimilation of Asian Americans into broader American society.

These high rates of intermarriage are not just a reflection of social integration but are also deeply intertwined with the processes of acculturation and political socialization. For instance, Asian Americans in interethnic marriages often engage in political discussions that challenge traditional cultural norms, leading to a more nuanced understanding of issues like race relations and social justice (Masuoka, 2006). These interactions encourage the adoption of political attitudes that reflect broader American values, promoting greater political engagement and participation in civic activities. Social networks also provide the support and encouragement needed to engage in political activities, such as voting or community organizing, further integrating Asian Americans into the political mainstream (Wong, 2018).

Moreover, the dynamics of interracial and interethnic marriage reveal how assimilation processes differ across generations within the Asian American community. While first-generation immigrants may marry within their ethnic group as a way to preserve cultural traditions and maintain a sense of community in a new country, second- and third-generation Asian Americans are more likely to marry outside their ethnic group. This shift reflects a broader trend of acculturation, where later generations are more integrated into American society and less tied to the cultural norms of their ancestral homeland. The blending of cultural practices in these marriages often results in hybrid identities that foster a more complex and inclusive understanding of American political and social issues.

3.1.4. The Multifaceted Pathways of Political Assimilation among Asian Americans

The political assimilation of Asian Americans is intricately shaped by their educational achievements, occupational advancements, and integration into diverse neighborhoods. Education, particularly the high levels attained by many Asian Americans, provides a critical foundation for understanding and engaging with the political system. This emphasis on education, rooted in cultural values, equips Asian Americans with the necessary tools to navigate the complexities of the American political landscape, fostering a sense of civic responsibility and participation (Lee & Zhou, 2015). However, education alone does not fully account for their political assimilation. Occupational success, often a direct outcome of high educational attainment, further integrates Asian Americans into the socioeconomic fabric of the United States, prompting more active political engagement through voting, advocacy, and even holding public office (Wong et al., 2011).

Neighborhood integration, particularly the movement to suburban areas and ethnoburbs, plays a crucial role in shaping the political behavior of Asian Americans. These residential patterns place them in environments where they are exposed to diverse perspectives and are more likely to participate in civic activities. Living in ethnoburbs not only allows Asian Americans to maintain their cultural identities but also fosters interactions with a broader spectrum of society. These interactions facilitate a unique form of political socialization, where traditional cultural values intersect with the norms and practices of American civic life (Li, 1998; Zhou & Logan, 1991). The dynamics within these neighborhoods contribute to a political identity that is both reflective of cultural retention and responsive to the demands of a multicultural society.

Collectively, these processes—educational, occupational, and neighborhood integration—contribute significantly to the political assimilation of Asian Americans. While these pathways facilitate their integration into American society, they also introduce new challenges that shape their political identity. The dual pressures of maintaining cultural heritage while adapting to mainstream political norms create a political identity that is both complex and dynamic. This identity, characterized by a blend of traditional values and modern political engagement, highlights the unique and evolving nature of the Asian American experience. Understanding these dynamics is essential for comprehending the broader patterns of political behavior among Asian Americans and their role in the American democratic landscape.

3.2. The Experiences of Being a Racial Minority

The political identity of racial minorities in the United States, including Asian Americans, is not merely a passive outcome of their marginalized status within a racially stratified society. Rather, it is actively shaped by their collective response to the discrimination, exclusion, and systemic inequality they encounter. These shared experiences create a consciousness that drives political behaviors and attitudes aligned with the broader struggle for civil rights and social justice. Racial minorities in the U.S., including Asian Americans, African Americans, and Latinos face persistent challenges that reinforce their marginalized status. These challenges, such as racial profiling, hate crimes, and pervasive stereotypes, are not just external pressures; they are catalysts that mobilize these communities to advocate for change. For instance, the model minority myth, which superficially praises Asian Americans, parallels other harmful stereotypes that have historically targeted African Americans and Latinos, such as the “welfare queen” or

“illegal immigrant” labels (Wu, 2014). These stereotypes impose narrow, often damaging, definitions on these groups, obscuring the diversity of their experiences and struggles, and undermining their efforts to address issues like economic inequality and social exclusion (Ngai, 2004).

The political attitudes and behaviors of racial minorities are thus not accidental but are consciously shaped by a shared recognition of these systemic barriers. This collective consciousness has historically manifested in various civil rights movements, where different racial and ethnic groups have fought for equal treatment, voting rights, and economic opportunities. The 1960s Civil Rights Movement, led predominantly by African Americans, did more than just secure rights for one group; it inspired and intersected with the struggles of Asian Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, creating a broad coalition aimed at dismantling systemic racism (Masuoka, 2017).

This shared political consciousness continues to influence the policy preferences of racial minorities today. There is a strong and deliberate tendency among these groups to support policies that promote social justice and protect minority rights. For instance, the widespread support for affirmative action across different minority communities is not merely a reaction to exclusion but a strategic effort to dismantle systemic barriers that impede access to education and employment (Wong et al., 2011). This support is rooted in the understanding that advancing the interests of one community contributes to the broader fight for racial equality and justice. Similarly, the consistent backing of policies like the Voting Rights Act and immigration reform by various minority groups underscores a collective commitment to dismantling the systemic barriers that affect all marginalized communities (Le Espiritu, 1992).

Moreover, the political behavior of racial minorities, particularly in voting patterns, reflects a strategic alignment with political parties and movements that champion civil rights and social justice. The Democratic Party, for example, has historically garnered significant support from Asian Americans, African Americans, and Latinos not because of ethnic loyalty but due to its consistent stance on issues such as civil rights, healthcare, and education (Masuoka, 2017). This pattern of support is a deliberate choice, reflecting a broader trend where racial minorities, regardless of specific ethnic or cultural backgrounds, align with parties and candidates that prioritize their collective interests and address the systemic inequities they face (Wu, 2014). The profound sense of solidarity that has historically developed among different racial and ethnic groups in the United States is not merely a product of shared experiences of discrimination and marginalization—it is also a strategic response to the systemic inequalities that pervade American society. This solidarity has driven the political attitudes and behaviors of Asian American, African American, Latino, and Native American communities, as they recognize that their struggles against racial profiling, police brutality, and economic inequality are deeply interconnected. This shared understanding has led to numerous collaborative efforts, where these communities have united to advocate for common goals, demonstrating that their political identities are shaped as much by their alliances as by their individual experiences.

One of the most significant manifestations of this cross-racial solidarity is the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, which emerged as a response to the systemic violence and police brutality faced by African Americans. The movement, sparked by the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the shooting death of Trayvon Martin in 2013, quickly evolved into a national and global campaign against racial injustice (Taylor, 2016). BLM became a rallying point not

only for African Americans but also for other minority groups who recognized the parallels between the African American experience and their own struggles with systemic oppression.

The involvement of other racial and ethnic groups in the BLM movement has been both vocal and visible, highlighting how these communities shape their political behaviors through solidarity. Latino and Native American communities, for example, have actively engaged in the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, demonstrating solidarity through their involvement in advocating for police reform and racial justice. Latino activists, particularly those affiliated with organizations like Mijente, have highlighted the similar patterns of racial profiling and police violence that affect their communities, especially in areas with large immigrant populations (Benjamin, 2024; Mijente, 2020; Rodríguez, 2017). Similarly, Native American communities, facing some of the highest rates of police violence in the United States, have aligned with BLM, with groups like the American Indian Movement (AIM) bringing attention to critical issues such as the high rates of missing and murdered Indigenous women—issues often neglected in mainstream racial justice discourse (Gould, 2002; Simpson, 2020). This cross-racial solidarity underscores the interconnected struggles of marginalized groups and their collective efforts to address systemic injustices.

Similarly, Asian American activists have shown strong support for BLM, despite the stereotype of the “model minority” that often isolates them from other racial justice movements. In cities like New York and Los Angeles, Asian American organizations have organized solidarity marches, educational forums, and fundraising events to support the goals of the BLM movement (Chen & Chan, 2025). The participation of Asian Americans in these efforts underscores a crucial recognition within the community: they, too, face systemic racism, albeit in different forms, such as the surge in anti-Asian hate crimes during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This solidarity is not merely a gesture of support but a strategic alliance that acknowledges the interconnectedness of their struggles with those of African Americans.

These cross-racial alliances have not only been symbolic but have also led to tangible legislative and social gains that benefit all marginalized communities. The push for police reform, which gained significant traction following the murder of George Floyd in 2020, resulted in several cities and states passing legislation aimed at increasing police accountability, banning chokeholds, and reducing the use of excessive force (Reny & Newman, 2021). These reforms, while driven by the African American community, have had broader implications, improving safety and justice for Asian American, Latino, and Native American communities as well (Hing, 2020).

The passage of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act serves as a powerful example of how cross-racial solidarity among racial minorities in the United States has been instrumental in addressing systemic racism in law enforcement. While African American leaders were at the forefront of championing this bill, the support it garnered from Asian American and Latino advocacy groups was crucial in its development and passage. These groups recognized that provisions in the bill, such as banning racial profiling and ending qualified immunity for police officers, would have significant positive impacts on their communities as well. This collaborative effort highlights the strategic alliances that have formed among racial minorities, rooted in a shared understanding that systemic racism affects them all and requires a unified response (Davies, 2022).

The solidarity among racial minorities extends beyond legislative advocacy and is vividly reflected in grassroots organizing and mutual aid efforts. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed and exacerbated existing inequalities, disproportionately affecting communities of color. In response,

these communities came together to provide essential services—such as food distribution, healthcare access, and financial support—to those most affected by the economic and health crises. These mutual aid networks often transcended racial and ethnic lines, demonstrating a collective commitment to well-being in the face of systemic neglect and discrimination. For example, in Oakland, California, Black and Latino community leaders collaborated on the “Undivided Families” initiative, which provided resources and support to undocumented families who were excluded from federal aid packages (González, 2022). Similarly, Asian American organizations partnered with Black and Indigenous groups to distribute personal protective equipment (PPE) and organize COVID-19 testing drives in underserved neighborhoods (Chen & Chan, 2025).

These collaborative efforts underscore the importance of cross-racial solidarity in advancing the rights and well-being of all marginalized communities. By recognizing the interconnected nature of their struggles, racial minorities in the United States have been able to build powerful coalitions that challenge systemic injustice and work toward a more equitable society. This solidarity is not merely a response to shared oppression; it is a proactive strategy that seeks to create a collective movement capable of driving significant social change (Masuoka, 2017).

The collaborative efforts between Asian American, African American, Latino, and Native American activists are a testament to the deep sense of solidarity that exists among racial minorities in the United States. These groups have recognized that their struggles are interconnected and have united in the fight against racial profiling, police brutality, and economic inequality. Through alliances like those seen in the Black Lives Matter movement, these communities have not only supported each other in times of crisis but have also achieved

practical legislative and social gains that benefit all marginalized people. This solidarity continues to be a critical force in the ongoing struggle for racial justice in America (Chen and Chan, 2025).

Consequently, the political identity of racial minorities in the United States is actively shaped by shared experiences of discrimination and systemic inequality. Their collective consciousness is reflected in their support for civil rights, social justice, and policies that address the broader issues of racial inequality in the United States. While each group has unique experiences, the overarching themes of marginalization and the fight for equality create a common foundation for their political behavior. Understanding these shared characteristics is crucial for appreciating the interconnected nature of minority political struggles and the broader fight for justice and equality in American society.

3.3. Unequal Pathways: Internal Variation in Asian American Political Development

3.3.1. The National Origin Lens

The “Asian American” category encompasses a diverse range of national-origin groups with distinct migration histories, pre-migration socioeconomic profiles, and trajectories of incorporation into American society. This heterogeneity is not peripheral but foundational to understanding how structural integration and racial marginalization are experienced. A unified theoretical account requires recognizing that these pathways are not equally accessible or

experienced across all subgroups. National origin, as a structuring dimension, fundamentally conditions exposure to resources, racialized meanings, and political opportunity structures.

Migration history reflects a crucial axis of differentiation. Certain groups, such as Indian, Chinese, and Korean immigrants, are disproportionately represented in skilled employment-based migration streams. These individuals often arrive with higher levels of education, professional training, and cultural capital, enabling relatively smoother incorporation into institutions such as universities, high-skill labor markets, and suburban residential zones (Poon et al., 2016; Walton & Truong, 2023). These structural achievements, however, do not eliminate marginalization. Instead, they often coincide with specific racialized expectations, such as the “model minority” narrative, which renders socioeconomic success compatible with continued political and cultural exclusion. Thus, for these groups, integration does not preclude marginalization, and it often obscures it (Chou & Feagin, 2015; Okamoto, 2014).

By contrast, other national-origin groups, particularly those from Southeast Asia, including Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hmong, and Laotian immigrants, frequently entered the U.S. through refugee resettlement programs or low-wage labor channels (Wong & Ramakrishnan, 2023). These pathways were marked by limited access to economic and institutional resources. Concentrated in underfunded school districts, linguistically isolated neighborhoods, and employment sectors offering limited upward mobility, these groups face enduring structural barriers. Their experience reflects a compounded condition of marginalization, in which the absence of integration is paired with a racialized narrative of deficiency and dependency.

English proficiency varies widely by national origin and has significant implications for political engagement. Limited English proficiency often reduces access to civic resources, voter information, and campaign outreach (Wong & Ramakrishnan, 2022). While some groups benefit

from robust ethnic infrastructures such as translated ballots, ethnic media, and community-based organizations, others face linguistic exclusion that reinforces perceptions of foreignness. In this sense, language operates as both a structural barrier and a symbolic marker of outsider status (Wong et al., 2021b).

Racial meaning also diverges by subgroup. South Asian Americans may be racialized through the lens of post-9/11 surveillance and Islamophobia; East Asian Americans have faced geopolitical suspicion, particularly in association with China and during the COVID-19 pandemic; and Southeast Asians are often rendered invisible in dominant narratives of Asian American success (Wong et al., 2022). These divergent forms of racialization influence how national-origin groups perceive their social position and relate to political institutions.

Thus, national origin functions as an organizing force in the integration–marginalization framework. It forms access to structural resources, exposure to linguistic and institutional barriers, and the form of racialized treatment encountered in public life. The national-origin lens is therefore essential to understanding the unevenness of Asian American political incorporation and the differentiated ways in which identity and belonging are constructed.

3.3.2. Immigrant Origins and Generational Variation

As of recent estimates, approximately two-thirds of Asian American adults are foreign-born, making them the most immigrant-heavy racial or ethnic group in the United States (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021). Among these, a substantial share are naturalized citizens who are eligible to vote and participate in American political life. At the same time, a growing segment of the Asian American population consists of U.S.-born citizens, particularly members of the 1.5 generation

(those who arrived in the U.S. as children) and the second generation (children of immigrants born in the U.S.). These internal distinctions are not trivial. They capture critical variation in political socialization, language fluency, racial meaning-making, and the interpretation of group identity, each of which conditions the balance between structural integration and racial marginalization.

Foreign-born Asian Americans, even when naturalized, often enter the political sphere with limited familiarity with U.S. civic institutions. Many face linguistic and institutional barriers and may engage in politics through co-ethnic networks or respond to politics in instrumental or strategic terms (Wong et al., 2005). Their pathways into citizenship often require significant economic and legal investment, which can deepen identification with individual effort and meritocratic values. However, these individuals may also be less sensitized to racialized political discourse, particularly if they arrived from societies where U.S.-style racial categories did not structure everyday life.

By contrast, U.S.-born Asian Americans, especially those in the second generation, are more likely to be politically socialized through public schools, English-language media, and peer environments structured by American racial dynamics (Rumbaut 2004; Kim et al., 2003). These individuals often develop a sharper awareness of their racial status and the contingent nature of their belonging, particularly as they encounter forms of symbolic exclusion or racial scapegoating. The 1.5 generation, who arrived in the U.S. during childhood or adolescence, may experience dual pressures: negotiating linguistic and cultural transition while being exposed to racial boundaries from an early age. This generational space can produce a hybrid identity, highly attuned to the conditional nature of inclusion, but also aspirational in orientation.

From a theoretical perspective, generational location and immigration status shape the form and salience of both integration and marginalization. While naturalized immigrants may view civic participation as a reward for economic assimilation or legal incorporation, U.S.-born individuals may interpret the same behaviors through a racial or oppositional lens, particularly when exposed to exclusionary rhetoric or systemic discrimination. In this way, generational status functions as a mediator of political identity: not only influencing access to civic knowledge or resources but also framing how individuals interpret their political experiences in relation to group identity, national membership, and racial hierarchy.

This intra-group variation is vital to understanding the fluidity and contextual sensitivity of Asian American political behavior. It also underscores the limits of treating the Asian American electorate as a singular political bloc. Instead, immigration generation must be theorized as a foundational source of variation in both political incorporation and the perception of civic exclusion.

3.4. The Ambiguity of Political Identity

3.4.1. The Duality of Integration and Marginalization

The political attitudes and behaviors of Asian Americans are fundamentally shaped by the complex and often contradictory forces of integration into mainstream American society and the persistent marginalization they experience as a racial minority. This duality—where Asian Americans find themselves both included and excluded—forces them to navigate a political

identity that is inherently ambivalent, resisting easy categorization within conventional frameworks (Le Espiritu, 1992; Masuoka, 2017).

As Asian Americans achieve notable success in education, employment, and socioeconomic status, their integration into the broader social and economic fabric of the United States becomes more pronounced (Zhou & Lee, 2004). This integration is not just a testament to their ability to seize opportunities within the American system; it actively shapes their political outlook. The narrative of achievement and upward mobility fosters a sense of belonging and visibility within mainstream society, encouraging Asian Americans to adopt political behaviors that align with mainstream values, such as supporting policies that promote economic stability and educational advancement (Wong, 2018). However, this inclination towards assimilation is not without complications.

Despite their successes, Asian Americans continue to face persistent marginalization, which profoundly influences how they engage politically (Tuan, 1998). The stereotypes that position them as perpetual foreigners—regardless of how long they have lived in the United States or how deeply they have integrated—serve as a constant reminder that their acceptance is conditional (Ngai, 2004). The model minority myth, while seemingly positive, exacerbates this tension by setting unrealistic expectations and ignoring the community's diversity and challenges (Wu, 2014). This myth doesn't merely confine Asian Americans to a narrow set of roles; it also reinforces their outsider status, making it clear that their integration is never complete. As a result, Asian Americans develop a critical awareness of the systemic barriers that continue to limit their full participation in society, which, in turn, informs a more cautious or oppositional stance towards political institutions perceived as perpetuating these barriers (Wong et al., 2011).

This push-and-pull between integration and marginalization gives rise to a political identity marked by profound ambivalence. On the one hand, Asian Americans may advocate for inclusion within the mainstream, seeking to solidify their successes by aligning with policies that reinforce their economic and educational gains (Liu et al., 2008; Lien, 2001). On the other hand, the marginalization they encounter fosters a sense of resistance against the very structures that limit their participation, leading them to support progressive policies on issues like immigration and civil rights while simultaneously favoring conservative approaches to economic policy (Hing, 1994). This duality is not merely a reflection of divided loyalties; it is a strategic response to the broader tension between their desire for acceptance and the recognition of the barriers that hinder their full integration (Ramakrishnan & Bloemraad, 2008).

Furthermore, the fluid and context-dependent nature of Asian American political identity is a direct result of these conflicting pressures. The varying political stances that Asian Americans adopt, depending on the specific issues at hand, highlight the complex and often contradictory nature of their experiences (Wong et al., 2011; Tichenor, 2002). In situations where their integration is affirmed, they may exhibit political behaviors that align with mainstream norms. However, when confronted with exclusion or discrimination, their political attitudes are likely to shift towards more critical or oppositional positions (Fraga et al., 2011).

In other words, the duality of integration and marginalization compels Asian Americans to shape a unique and ambivalent political identity. While their achievements in education, employment, and socioeconomic status encourage integration into mainstream society, the persistent marginalization they face as a racial minority tempers this integration with a critical awareness of the barriers that continue to limit their full participation. These dynamics shape their political attitudes and behaviors, leading to a complex and often contradictory political

identity that reflects the ongoing tension between inclusion and exclusion. To understand the nuances of Asian American political behavior, it is essential to recognize how these competing forces shape their engagement with the broader dynamics of minority political identity in the United States (Dhingra, 2007).

3.4.2. Ambiguity in Political Identity

The political identity of Asian Americans is inherently marked by profound ambiguity, which stems from the complex interplay between traditional values, cultural heritage, and the pressures to conform to mainstream American norms. This ambiguity is not simply a byproduct of external forces but a strategic response by Asian Americans as they navigate their dual identity. They shape their political attitudes and behaviors in ways that are fluid and highly context-dependent, making it challenging to define their political identity within conventional frameworks (Le Espiritu, 1992; Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

At the core of this ambiguity is the tension between preserving cultural heritage and adapting to the sociopolitical landscape of the United States. Asian Americans, with their diverse backgrounds rooted in various countries and cultures, bring with them a rich array of traditional values and practices. These values, which often emphasize community, respect for authority, and a strong work ethic, guide their integration into American society. However, this integration is not straightforward. As they immerse themselves in the American mainstream, Asian Americans must also confront the dominant cultural and political norms, which can sometimes conflict with their traditional values. This tension is not merely a challenge but a driving force behind the way Asian Americans shape their political identity (Ngai, 2004).

This complex interplay creates a political identity that defies easy categorization. For instance, while traditional values might align some Asian Americans with conservative views on social issues like family and education, their experiences of discrimination and marginalization often push them toward more progressive stances on civil rights and social justice. This duality is not indicative of confusion but rather reflects a strategic adaptation to their circumstances. Asian Americans navigate this terrain by shaping a political identity that can shift depending on the context, leading to a fluid and sometimes contradictory set of political attitudes and behaviors (Wu, 2014).

The ambiguity in Asian American political identity is further evident in their voting patterns, party affiliations, and policy preferences. Unlike other racial or ethnic groups that might show a more consistent alignment with a particular political ideology or party, Asian Americans often exhibit varied and unpredictable political behavior. For example, they might support Democratic candidates in national elections due to the party's stance on immigration and minority rights, yet align with Republican positions on economic policies that emphasize individual responsibility and entrepreneurship. This strategic ambiguity is not a sign of indecision but a calculated response to the broader challenges they face in balancing their cultural heritage with the demands of assimilation into American society (Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

The pressure to conform to mainstream norms leads Asian Americans to adopt a pragmatic approach to politics. Their decisions are often made based on the specific issue at hand rather than a consistent ideological framework. This pragmatism is a reflection of their broader strategy to maintain cultural distinctiveness while integrating into American society. It is visible in their policy preferences, where support for certain policies may vary depending on how they

impact the community's economic security, social mobility, or cultural preservation (Le Espiritu, 1992).

Moreover, the ambiguity in political identity among Asian Americans is further complicated by the internal diversity within the community. Differences in ethnic subgroups, generational divides, and varying levels of acculturation all contribute to a wide range of political attitudes and behaviors. For instance, first-generation immigrants might prioritize issues related to immigration and economic opportunity, while younger, U.S.-born generations may focus more on social justice and equality. This diversity adds another layer of complexity, making it even more challenging to define a unified political identity for Asian Americans. However, this complexity is not a weakness but a strength, as it allows Asian Americans to navigate multiple sociopolitical environments effectively (Ngai, 2004).

The fluidity and ambiguity in their political identity also led to a strategic approach to political engagement. Asian Americans may choose to align with different political ideologies or parties based on what is most advantageous for their community at a given time. This strategic ambiguity allows them to effectively navigate the complexities of their dual identity—integrating into American society while preserving their cultural distinctiveness. This approach is not simply reactive but a deliberate strategy to maximize their political influence in a society that often views them through a lens of marginalization (Wu, 2014).

In brief, the political identity of Asian Americans is characterized by significant ambiguity, shaped by the overlapping influences of traditional values, cultural heritage, and the pressures to conform to mainstream American norms. This fluid and context-dependent identity is not a sign of indecision but a strategic response to the unique challenges they face. It manifests in varied voting patterns, party affiliations, and policy preferences, making it difficult to

categorize their political attitudes in clear terms. Understanding this ambiguity is crucial for appreciating the complexity of Asian American political behavior and the broader challenges of navigating a dual identity in a diverse and dynamic society (Espiritu, 1992; Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

3.4.3. Influence of Racialized Experiences

The political identity of Asian Americans is profoundly shaped by their racialized experiences, which compel them to navigate a complex and often ambiguous relationship with mainstream American society. These experiences—including racial profiling, hate crimes, and the pervasive influence of the model minority myth—are not merely external pressures but active forces that Asian Americans must contend with, shaping a political identity that is simultaneously cautious, critical, and at times contradictory (Wu, 2014; Ngai, 2004).

At the heart of this complexity lies the reality of racial profiling and hate crimes, which serve as stark reminders of Asian Americans' outsider status within American society. Despite their efforts to integrate and succeed, Asian Americans are often subjected to suspicion, hostility, and violence based solely on their racial identity. These experiences of overt discrimination are not just incidents; they are formative events that instill a sense of vulnerability and caution in their political behavior. Knowing that they can be targeted simply because of their race, many Asian Americans develop a protective reflex in their political engagement, tempering their actions to avoid further marginalization or backlash (Lee, 2015).

The model minority myth adds another layer of complexity to the political identity of Asian Americans. This stereotype, which portrays Asian Americans as a uniformly successful

and compliant group, can be both a source of pride and a burden. On one hand, the model minority myth is celebrated as evidence of Asian American success and effective assimilation into American society. On the other hand, it imposes unrealistic expectations and minimizes the real struggles faced by the community, including economic disparities, mental health challenges, and social isolation. More critically, the myth reinforces a narrative that Asian Americans should be apolitical and uncomplaining, which can create internal conflicts when the community faces discrimination or injustice (Wu, 2014; Le Espiritu, 1992).

These racialized experiences generate a political identity marked by both a desire for assimilation and a resistance to it. On one side, the pursuit of acceptance and the benefits of full integration into American society can drive Asian Americans to conform to mainstream political norms and behaviors. This might manifest in a cautious approach to political engagement, where the emphasis is on blending in and avoiding actions that could be perceived as confrontational or divisive (Ngai, 2004).

However, the same experiences of discrimination and marginalization also inspire resistance to full assimilation. The awareness that, despite their successes, they are still seen as “the other” leads many Asian Americans to critically question the value of fully adopting mainstream political norms. This resistance is not merely reactive but a deliberate stance against the erasure of their unique identity. It manifests in political behaviors that challenge the status quo, such as supporting policies that address racial inequalities, participating in social justice movements, or advocating for minority rights. The dual pressures of wanting to be accepted while resisting the erasure of their identity create a political stance that is fluid and context-dependent (Chen, 2009; Lee, 2015).

The result is a political identity that is inherently contradictory. Asian Americans often find themselves navigating between the need to protect their communities from further harm and the desire to assert their rights and challenge systemic inequalities. This tension leads to a political behavior that is both strategic and adaptive, responding to the immediate demands of their racialized experiences while striving to achieve long-term goals of equity and justice (Le Espiritu, 1992).

In essence, the political identity of Asian Americans is deeply influenced by their racialized experiences, which create a complex interplay between the desire for assimilation and resistance to full integration. The impact of racial profiling, hate crimes, and the model minority myth fosters a cautious and critical approach to political engagement, resulting in a political identity that is both ambiguous and context-dependent. Understanding this dynamic is essential for comprehending the nuanced and often contradictory nature of Asian American political behavior as they navigate the challenges of maintaining their identity while striving for acceptance in a society that continues to view them through a racialized lens (Ngai, 2004; Wu, 2014).

3.4.4. Negotiating Visibility: Asian American Identity in Comparative Racial Context

Asian American political identity arises through a configuration that lacks direct parallels in the political development of White, Black, or Hispanic populations. White Americans, occupying the dominant racial category, typically engage the political system without facing challenges to their national belonging. Political expressions within this group often reflect responses to ideological cues or material interests, structured by assumptions of inclusion. In contrast, Black Americans

have developed a collective political identity rooted in historical exclusion and resistance. Political attachments frequently draw on the legacy of racial injustice, civil rights mobilization, and sustained efforts to obtain institutional recognition. Hispanic Americans, although internally diverse, often experience a dual constraint: navigating the demands of immigrant incorporation while confronting racialization shaped by language, legal classification, and cultural visibility. This dual experience has contributed to a more coherent political identity across national-origin lines, especially in response to enforcement regimes and exclusionary rhetoric.

Asian Americans do not follow either line. Their socioeconomic attainment often parallels that of Whites, yet public perception rarely confers unmarked belonging. Rather than benefiting from the protective dimensions of whiteness or the mobilizing traditions of Black political resistance, Asian Americans occupy an in-between status. The label of “perpetual foreigner” persists across generations and national-origin backgrounds, undercutting the presumed link between structural success and social acceptance. Whereas Black Americans often anchor political meaning in a shared historical experience of marginalization, and Hispanic Americans often mobilize around culturally and legally coded exclusion, Asian Americans face a diffuse marginalization that lacks a single narrative reference point. Racialization cuts across class strata and generational lines, and the absence of a unifying trauma or institutional focus contributes to weaker group cohesion in political terms.

As a result, Asian American political identity emerges not through full incorporation or organized resistance, but through a layered and often ambivalent orientation to the political system. It reflects proximity to institutional success but ongoing exclusion from the core of the national political imagination. Unlike groups whose political development draws from stable ideological traditions or collective historical memory, Asian Americans negotiate political

identity without a single organizing principle. Their political responses reflect partial recognition, constrained inclusion, and limited access to symbolic representation. This configuration, situated at the intersection of integration and marginalization, produces a form of political identity that remains fluid, fragmented, and contingent on broader racialized context rather than consolidated partisan or ideological scripts.

3.4.5. Policy Preferences and Their Contradictions

The policy preferences of Asian Americans offer a compelling illustration of the inherent ambiguity in their political identity. These preferences are not merely a collection of disparate beliefs but are actively shaped by the dual pressures of integration into mainstream American society and the persistent marginalization they experience as a racial minority. This duality—being both part of and apart from the broader society—manifests in a set of policy preferences that span the ideological spectrum, complicating any attempt to categorize Asian American political behavior within a single political alignment (Lien, 2001).

One of the most striking contradictions in Asian American policy preferences is the simultaneous support for conservative economic policies and progressive social policies. This contradiction is not a sign of confusion but a reflection of the complex realities that Asian Americans navigate. On one hand, many Asian Americans, particularly those who have achieved economic success and stability, tend to favor policies that promote free-market principles, low taxes, and limited government intervention in the economy. This preference is deeply rooted in cultural values that emphasize self-reliance, hard work, and the pursuit of economic opportunity—values that resonate with the broader conservative economic ethos. For many

immigrants who have overcome significant barriers to achieve financial success, these policies align with their lived experiences and their desire to protect the fruits of their labor (Wong et al., 2011).

On the other hand, the same community often exhibits strong support for progressive social policies, particularly those that address issues of civil rights, immigration reform, and social justice. As a racial minority, Asian Americans are acutely aware of the systemic inequalities that pervade American society. Their experiences with discrimination, both overt and subtle, foster a collective consciousness that is sensitive to the needs of marginalized groups. This awareness drives their support for policies that aim to protect minority rights, expand access to healthcare and education, and create a more inclusive society. The recognition that social equity is essential for achieving true integration and acceptance within the American mainstream underpins this progressive stance (Lien, 2001).

These contradictory policy preferences are not just abstract beliefs; they actively shape the voting patterns and political engagement of Asian Americans. For example, while a significant portion of the community may support Republican candidates for their economic policies, they may also advocate for Democratic positions on social issues. This dual allegiance is not an anomaly but a strategic response to the complex realities they face. It creates a political identity that is fluid and context-dependent, where alignment with a particular party or ideology shifts based on the specific policy issue at hand. This fluidity complicates any attempt to neatly categorize Asian Americans within the traditional political spectrum (Wong et al., 2011).

The contradictions in policy preferences are further compounded by the diversity within the Asian American community itself. Different ethnic subgroups, generational divides, and varying levels of socioeconomic status contribute to a wide range of policy priorities and beliefs.

For instance, first-generation immigrants might prioritize policies that enhance economic opportunity and stability, reflecting their recent experiences as newcomers to American society. In contrast, second-generation Asian Americans, who have grown up more integrated into American society, might focus more on social justice and equality. This internal diversity is not merely a complication but a reflection of the rich and varied experiences within the community, making it even more challenging to identify a unified political stance (Lien, 2001).

These contradictions in policy preferences are indicative of the broader tension between the desire for integration and the reality of marginalization. Asian Americans navigate a political landscape where they must balance the pursuit of economic success and security with the need to address the social and racial inequalities that continue to affect their lives. This balancing act leads to a political identity that is not easily defined by traditional ideological labels, as it is shaped by the unique pressures and challenges that come with being both integrated and marginalized (Wong et al., 2011).

In conclusion, the policy preferences of Asian Americans highlight the ambiguity and complexity of their political identity. The contradictions between conservative economic preferences and progressive social stances are not signs of inconsistency but reflections of the dual pressures of integration and marginalization. This dynamic leads to a fluid and context-dependent political behavior that defies easy categorization. Understanding these contradictions is essential for grasping the nuanced and sometimes paradoxical nature of Asian American political engagement, as they continue to navigate their place within the broader American political landscape (Lien, 2001; Wong et al., 2011).

3.4.6. The Evolving Nature of Political Identity

To sum up, the political identity of Asian Americans is not static; it is a dynamic and continuously evolving construct, shaped by the shifting social and political dynamics of American society. Recent events, such as the alarming rise in anti-Asian hate crimes and the increasing visibility of Asian Americans in political and public life, have played a pivotal role in reshaping how Asian Americans perceive themselves and their place within the broader political landscape. This evolution in political identity is not a passive response but a deliberate negotiation between the forces of integration into the mainstream and the persistent challenges of marginalization (Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

The surge in anti-Asian hate crimes, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, has not just exposed the vulnerability of Asian Americans as a racial minority—it has galvanized the community to redefine its political identity. These acts of violence and bigotry are not merely reminders of the community's outsider status; they have sparked a significant mobilization within the Asian American community to advocate for stronger protections against hate crimes, greater representation in public discourse, and more robust civil rights enforcement. This mobilization marks a critical shift from a position of relative political quiescence to one of active participation and advocacy, demonstrating how Asian Americans are reshaping their political identity in response to threats against their community (Wong, 2018).

This shift is also evident in the increasing visibility of Asian Americans in politics and public life. Figures such as Vice President Kamala Harris, Senators Tammy Duckworth and Mazie Hirono, and Congressman Andy Kim have not only challenged long-standing stereotypes that have limited Asian American representation in politics but have also inspired a new

generation to see themselves as active participants in the democratic process. This visibility is more than symbolic; it is a catalyst for change within the community, fostering a sense of empowerment and agency that is driving greater political involvement. As Asian Americans gain political prominence, they are actively reshaping their political identity, moving from the margins to a more central role in the American political landscape (Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

However, this evolving political identity is fraught with complexities. As Asian Americans become more visible and politically active, they must also navigate the ongoing tensions between their desire for full integration and the realities of systemic discrimination. The rise in anti-Asian sentiment, coupled with increased political engagement, has heightened awareness of the contradictions inherent in their political identity. On one hand, Asian Americans are making strides toward integrating into the political mainstream; on the other, they are continually reminded of their outsider status. This duality shapes a political identity that is both assertive and cautious, progressive and conservative, unified and fragmented—reflecting the community’s nuanced approach to engaging with a society that both includes and marginalizes them (Wong, 2018).

The evolution of Asian American political identity may bring clarity to certain aspects of their political attitudes and behaviors, but it may also introduce new layers of complexity. As the community becomes more politically engaged, a clearer alignment with specific political ideologies or policy priorities may emerge. For instance, a focus on civil rights, immigration reform, and social justice may solidify as central components of the Asian American political agenda. However, the inherent diversity within the community—spanning differences in ethnicity, generation, and socioeconomic status—will likely continue to complicate efforts to define a singular political identity. This internal diversity is not merely a challenge but a

reflection of the rich and varied experiences that shape Asian American political behavior (Masuoka & Junn, 2013).

Moreover, the evolving political identity of Asian Americans may lead to greater political fragmentation as different subgroups within the community prioritize different issues. The pressures of integration and marginalization, combined with the varied experiences of different Asian American communities, may result in a political identity that is increasingly fluid and context-dependent. This could lead to shifts in voting patterns, party affiliations, and policy preferences that reflect the diverse and sometimes conflicting priorities within the community. This fragmentation is not a weakness but a testament to the dynamic and adaptive nature of Asian American political engagement (Wong, 2018).

In a nutshell, the political identity of Asian Americans is in a state of evolution, actively shaped by the changing social and political dynamics of American society. The rise in anti-Asian hate crimes and the increased visibility of Asian Americans in politics are driving significant changes in how the community engages with the political process. While this evolution may clarify certain aspects of their political identity, it is also likely to introduce new complexities and contradictions. Understanding this evolving identity is crucial for grasping the future trajectory of Asian American political behavior and their ongoing negotiation between integration and marginalization in the United States (Masuoka & Junn, 2013; Wong, 2018).

4. Education as Contextual Filters: Rethinking Asian American Party Identification and Presidential Vote Choice

Recognizing political attitudes and behaviors among Asian Americans requires a framework that accounts for the intersecting forces of integration and marginalization. This section outlines conceptual foundations that link core explanatory variables to party identification and presidential vote choice, establishing on the broader theoretical foundations laid out earlier, and accordingly introduces the relevant hypotheses. At the heart of this analysis is a central question: how do Asian Americans construct political identity in a context where full inclusion is often conditional, and exclusion—though sometimes subtle—is a persistent reality (Masuoka & Junn, 2013; Wong et al., 2011)?




Figure 4-1. The Dual Process of Integration and Marginalization in Asian American Political Identity

4.1. Party Identification

One key dimension of the framework concerns ideological orientation, which is captured through two distinct but related indicators: symbolic and operational. Symbolic ideology refers to how

individuals describe their general political leaning, typically along a liberal–conservative spectrum, a common measure in political behavior research (Converse, 1964; Ellis & Stimson, 2012). Operational ideology, by contrast, reflects concrete policy preferences on issues such as immigration, abortion, gun control, environmental regulation, and public safety. While the two often move in tandem, they are not always making parallel (Stimson, 2004; Jessee, 2010). Symbolic self-placement captures affiliation with broad political labels, whereas operational measures speak to issue-based evaluations and substantive concerns (Carmines & Stimson, 1989).

The connection between ideological orientation and party identification does not manifest uniformly across the electorate. In populations navigating both structural incorporation and racial marginalization, these ideological indicators may yield divergent effects. Specially, ideological conservatism may serve as a signal of partial alignment with dominant political values for Asian Americans. Their relationship with conservatism—whether symbolic or policy-based—is mediated by experiences of upward mobility, patterns of civic participation, and exposure to dominant cultural norms (Lien, 2001; Wong et al., 2011). Accordingly, despite persistent underrepresentation in political institutions, I expect that many Asian Americans would report partisan identification consistent with their symbolic ideological orientation or issue-based conservatism

Alongside this integrative pathway is a second, more exclusionary axis: racialized marginalization. While racial resentment was originally conceptualized to explain White Americans' attitudes toward Black Americans (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Tesler, 2020), it also serves as a lens for understanding how Asian Americans relate to dominant racial narratives. High levels of racial resentment may signal identification with individualist or colorblind

ideologies—views that often downplay structural racism and associate with Republican partisanship (Valentino & Sears, 2005). These attitudes may not stem from direct experiences of discrimination but rather reflect how individuals interpret their group’s position in the racial hierarchy (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Junn & Masuoka, 2020). Media portrayals, political rhetoric, and local contexts all shape how racial resentment is adopted, contested, or ignored.

The expectation that ideological orientation and racial resentment predict Republican identification among all Asian American subgroups, whether East, South, or Southeast Asian, native-born or foreign-born, rests on the observation that group-specific trajectories do not override the broader racialized positioning of Asian Americans within U.S. politics. While subgroup differences exist in migration pathways, class background, and cultural reference points, these differences do not consistently introduce divergent partisan outcomes. The classification of Asian Americans as outsiders, often viewed as conditional members of the national community, produces a common experience of constraint in the civic arena. Within this context, ideological conservatism and acceptance of racial hierarchy do not arise solely from personal convictions or background characteristics. Instead, they function as political signals that emerge within the constraints imposed on the group as a whole. Subgroup variation exists but does not appear to generate meaningful shifts in how these two predispositions relate to party identification.

By contrast, characteristics such as age, gender, income, and religiosity fail to provide a reliable basis for Republican identification among Asian Americans. In other racial groups, especially White Americans, older individuals, men, those with higher incomes, and frequent worshippers often report closer ties to the Republican Party. These associations remain inconsistent among Asian Americans. For instance, gender roles also carry uneven political

implications, lacking the shared historical references found in other groups. Income increases do not uniformly correspond with conservative affiliation, particularly when social mobility does not ensure unqualified inclusion. Religious engagement frequently occurs within ethnic-specific or immigrant-centered congregations, where the political content diverges from the mainstream religious right. These irregularities suggest that conventional background traits provide limited structure to partisan identity in the Asian American case, where ideological views and racialized understandings take precedence.

By bringing together indicators of structural integration (symbolic and operational ideology) and racial alignment (racial resentment), this section offers a layered account of party identification. The empirical hypotheses associated with these mechanisms, which guide the analyses that follow, are presented separately for clarity and formal reference.

Hypothesis 1-A-1 (*Self-reported Ideology – Party Identification*) All Asian Americans—regardless of national origin or immigration status—who identify as conservative are more likely to report Republican party identification.

Hypothesis 1-A-2 (*Operational Ideology – Party Identification*) All Asian Americans—regardless of national origin or immigration status—who hold conservative policy preferences are more likely to report Republican party identification.

Hypothesis 1-A-3 (*Racial Resentment – Party Identification*) All Asian Americans—regardless of national origin or immigration status—who express higher levels of racial resentment are more likely to report Republican party identification.

Hypothesis 1-A-4 (*Background Characteristics– Party Identification*) All Asian Americans—regardless of national origin or immigration status—who differ by age,

gender, income, or religiosity are NOT consistently more likely to report Republican party identification, UNLIKE the patterns observed in White, Black, or Hispanic populations.

4.2. Education as Moderators of Party Identification

Specially, education operates not only as a measure of formal attainment but as a core indicator of structural integration into American political life. Access to higher levels of education often brings sustained exposure to institutional norms, civic vocabulary, and political pluralism—elements that mark incorporation into the broader political mainstream. For Asian Americans, however, the role of education must be situated within the broader contradiction between achievement and exclusion. Educational credentials may signal belonging in economic and civic spheres, yet they do not insulate Asian Americans from persistent racialization or outsider narratives. This disjuncture complicates the presumed relationship between education and partisan behavior. Rather than guaranteeing predictable ideological responses or partisan attachments, education in this context introduces a tension: it affirms institutional access while failing to secure full symbolic inclusion. As such, the function of education in shaping political identification must be evaluated not only in terms of informational access but also through the racialized lens that filters political interpretation for Asian American individuals.

Thus, to better understand how party identification develops among Asian Americans, this study emphasizes the moderating role of education. These factors are commonly treated as markers of political sophistication, yet their influence is far from uniform. Rather than acting in isolation, these resources operate within a broader tension between formal civic integration and the enduring realities of social exclusion. For Asian Americans in particular, political resources

do not simply equip individuals with the tools of political engagement—they also shape how individuals interpret, internalize, or resist partisan cues considering their racialized experiences.

Each resource—while interrelated—plays a distinct role in shaping how ideological or racial predispositions connect to partisan outcomes (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Federico & Hunt, 2013; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Zaller, 1992). Education functions as a structural asset, offering sustained access to institutional knowledge, exposure to elite discourse, and engagement with competing political perspectives. Importantly, the moderating effect of education is not only embedded in their content, but in the interpretive lens through which individuals process political information—lenses shaped by race, immigration, and visibility in the political environment.

While the political attitude literature has long recognized the importance of education in strengthening ideological coherence and partisan attachment among White Americans (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Zaller, 1992), their role within racially marginalized groups remains comparatively undertheorized. Political resources do not operate uniformly across racial groups because the informational environment and psychological meaning of partisan identity are fundamentally different for those navigating exclusionary boundaries.

Emerging research suggests that their effects may be more contingent—formed by group-specific experiences of exclusion and representation. Among populations historically situated outside the center of political power, these resources do not necessarily consolidate party identity. In some cases, they may produce ambivalence, skepticism, or even strategic disengagement, especially when dominant party messages conflict with group realities.

In this context, education among Asian Americans has both integrative and ambivalent potential. Education may serve to broaden policy understanding and foster civic engagement; Wong et al. (2011) found that education increases civic engagement among Asian Americans,

yet does not consistently lead to partisan cohesion. Similarly, Junn and Masuoka (2008) argue that in the absence of cohesive group messaging, education may exacerbate internal fragmentation rather than foster association.

That is, positioned between integration and marginalization, Asian Americans often experience structural incorporation (e.g., high levels of education and income) alongside cultural exclusion (e.g., perpetual foreigner stereotype, underrepresentation). This duality weakens the expected link between political resources and Republican identification. In other words, identity-based factors—such as racialization, perceived discrimination, and ambiguity of group belonging—may override the partisan effects of political resources under usual conditions.

Consistent with patterns observed among Black and Hispanic Americans, the political attitude of Asian Americans appears to be shaped less by increased access to political resources and more by the salience of group-based experiences. As a result, the moderating effects of education is frequently weak or non-significant. Therefore, I expect that for Asian Americans, greater education do not consistently strengthen the relationship between core political attitudes and Republican identification.

Hypothesis 1-B *Asian Americans, regardless of their education level, are likely to identify themselves as Republicans;*

Hypothesis 1-B-1 *(Education × Self-reported Ideology – Party Identification)*
when they consider themselves conservatives.

Hypothesis 1-B-2 *(Education × Operational Ideology – Party Identification)*
when they have conservative policy preferences.

Hypothesis 1-B-3 (*Education × Racial Resentment – Party Identification*) when they have racial resentment.

Hypothesis 1-B-4 (*Education × Economy Evaluations – Party Identification*) when they evaluate positively the national/personal economy.

Hypothesis 1-B-5 (*Education × Presidential Approval – Party Identification*) when they approve of the president from their own party.

4.3. Presidential Vote Choice

While party identification reflects long-term orientations shaped by socialization, presidential vote choice is more fluid—often responding to short-term stimuli such as candidate characteristics, campaign salience, and the national conditions (Campbell et al., 1960; Lewis-Beck, 2008). This distinction is particularly important for Asian Americans, a group whose partisan identities are comparatively less entrenched. Nonetheless, the connection between party identification and vote choice remains significant across racial groups—including Asian Americans—given the institutionalization of partisan cues and the long-standing role of party identity as a cognitive shortcut in electoral decision-making.

Presidential vote choice, in turn, offers a revealing prism into the ways individuals interpret and respond to political cues (Wong et al., 2011; Masuoka & Junn, 2013), specifically when those cues intersect with racial positioning and perceptions of inclusion or exclusion. For individuals balancing the tension between institutional incorporation and racialized marginality, the voting decision may convey not only party identification but also judgments about the extent

to which parties or candidates acknowledge and support their community's place within the national political order.

Firstly, in this study, Asian American presidential vote choice is conceptualized as an outcome emerging from the intersection of ideological predispositions and racialized group identity. As we discussed earlier, symbolic ideology—reflected in self-placement on a liberal-conservative spectrum—represents position with abstract political labels embedded in elite discourse (Converse, 1964). Operational ideology, in contrast, is grounded in concrete policy attitudes, including views on immigration, abortion, policing, environmental regulation, and gun control (Zaller, 1992). Alongside these ideological indicators, racial resentment is used to capture how individuals relate to racial hierarchies and group-based inequality (Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Tesler, 2016). Although originally developed to explain White attitudes toward Black Americans, this measure can be extended to assess how Asian Americans engage with dominant racial ideologies within a system historically structured around a Black–White binary (Hutchings & Valentino, 2004; Kim, 1999; Okamoto, 2014).

I hypothesize that symbolic ideology does not significantly predict presidential vote choice among Asian American respondents. Symbolic ideology shows broad political labels established in elite discourse rather than concrete issue positions. As such, its abstract and often ambiguous nature makes it a less precise guide for electoral behavior—particularly in the case of Asian Americans, whose partisan affiliations are still developing. This assumption ties with prior research suggesting that symbolic ideological labels may function as aspirational or cultural identifiers rather than as reliable predictors of political behavior—particularly among non-White voters (Sears et al., 2000). For this reason, symbolic conservatism or liberalism may express

social affiliation rather than partisan commitment, limiting its utility in accounting for presidential vote choice for Asian Americans.

By contrast, operational ideology might show a more consistent and statistically significant influence on presidential vote choice. An Asian American with conservative policy preference would be more likely to support Republican candidates, even in the absence of strong party identification. These results could suggest that issue-based orientations serve as more reliable heuristics for electoral decision-making among Asian Americans—especially when partisan ties are weak or still developing (Brader et al., 2008). Operational conservatism, in particular, appears to bridge the gap between political values and electoral behavior for this group.

Racial resentment can also be indicated as a salient association of presidential vote choice. Although originally used to assess White resistance to racial equity, racial resentment can reflect internalized narratives about meritocracy, individualism, and cultural assimilation among non-White populations (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Masuoka & Junn, 2013). Higher levels of racial resentment among Asian Americans, may signal position with “model minority” stereotypes and skepticism toward structural explanations of racial inequality—attitudes that often correspond with Republican rhetoric, especially during polarized election cycles (Chou & Feagin, 2015; Okamoto, 2014). For this reason, racial resentment functions as both an ideological filter and a signal of how individuals perceive their group’s position within the broader racial order.

Asian Americans who report Republican partisanship, support conservative policies, or hold higher levels of racial resentment tend to favor Republican presidential candidates. These tendencies remain consistent regardless of national origin or immigration status. Such outcomes

suggest a shared orientation toward political cues and racial narratives, shaped by the broader conditions of partial inclusion and ongoing marginalization within the American political order.

Similarly, variation in age, gender, income, or religiosity does not correspond with consistent Republican presidential support across Asian American respondents. These characteristics, while often predictive within White, Black, or Hispanic electorates, do not maintain comparable associations in this case. The conditions of partial incorporation and racial marginalization may dilute the partisan significance of such traits. Rather than anchoring vote choice through expected ideological or identity-based channels, these variables often yield uneven effects that resist generalization across the Asian American population.

Jointly, this line of reasoning generates the expectation that a notable asymmetry in the ideological foundations of presidential vote choice among Asian Americans. Therefore, I hypothesize that operational ideology and racial resentment show strong and consistent associations with Republican vote choice, whereas symbolic ideology does not. This divergence reinforces the importance of disaggregating ideological constructs and recognizing that not all ideological indicators carry equal weight in shaping political behavior—especially within racially marginalized groups. The formal hypotheses that test these relationships are presented separately to guide the empirical analyses.

Hypothesis 2-A-1 (Racial Resentment – Vote Choice) All Asian Americans, regardless of national origin or immigration status, who have higher racial resentment are more likely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate.

Hypothesis 2-A-2 (Party Identification – Vote Choice) All Asian Americans, regardless of national origin or immigration status, who consider themselves Republicans are more likely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate.

Hypothesis 2-A-3 (*Operational Ideology – Vote Choice*) All Asian Americans, regardless of national origin or immigration status, who have more conservative policy preferences are more likely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate.

Hypothesis 2-A-4 (*Self-reported Ideology – Vote Choice*) All Asian Americans, regardless of national origin or immigration status, who identify as conservative are NOT consistently more likely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate, UNLIKE the tendencies observed in White, Black, or Hispanic populations.

Hypothesis 2-A-5 (*Background Characteristics– Vote Choice*) All Asian Americans, regardless of national origin or immigration status, who identify as conservative are NOT consistently more likely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate, UNLIKE the tendencies observed in White, Black, or Hispanic populations.

4.4. Education as Moderators of Presidential Vote Choice

When examining presidential vote choice among Asian Americans, a similar dynamic emerges as with party identification—namely, the limited role of education in shaping electoral behavior. In theory, education should enable individuals to engage more critically with campaign messaging, evaluate candidate positions, and make informed choices (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin 1990; Zaller, 1992). However, for racially marginalized groups such as Asian Americans, these resources might fail to translate into differentiated voting behavior. One contributing factor is the strong influence of party identification on vote choice. For many Asian Americans, party identification serves as a primary heuristic, often overriding the potential moderating effects of education. This reliance on party identification may stem from a desire for group inclusion and

protection against perceived threats, leading individuals to prioritize collective identity over individual policy preferences.

In this context, even Asian Americans decisions are often shaped less by fresh evaluations of each election cycle and more by previously held party identification. This is particularly salient during presidential elections, where media coverage, elite polarization, and voter mobilization efforts strengthen partisan cues. These dynamics can limit the space for critical reflection, even among politically sophisticated individuals. As a result, the expected moderating effects of education—such as weakening or altering vote choice based on cognitive engagement—remain weak or inconsistent. This reinforces the idea that vote choice among Asian Americans, like other racially marginalized groups, is shaped more by stable group-based links and structural forces than by the individual-level variation captured by political resources.

Namely, while education is considered as essential components of political behavior, their moderating effects on presidential vote choice among Asian Americans are often overshadowed by identity-based factors and the overriding influence of party identification. Thus, political resources do not function uniformly across racial groups. Among White Americans, they often facilitate ideological sorting and partisan clarity; but for Asian Americans, they interact with identity, context, and exclusion in ways that render their moderating influence far less consistent. Therefore, I expect that for Asian Americans, greater political resources do not consistently strengthen the relationship between core political attitudes and Republican vote choice.

Hypothesis 2-B *Asian Americans, regardless of education level, are more likely to vote for the Republican presidential candidate;*

Hypothesis 2-B-1 (*Education × Racial Resentment – Vote Choice*) when they have racial resentment.

Hypothesis 2-B-2 (*Education × Self-reported Ideology – Vote Choice*) when they consider themselves conservatives.

Hypothesis 2-B-3 (*Education × Operational Ideology – Vote Choice*) when they have conservative policy preferences.

Hypothesis 2-B-4 (*Education × Economy Evaluations – Vote Choice*) when they evaluate positively the national/personal economy.

Hypothesis 2-B-5 (*Political Resources × Presidential Approval – Vote Choice*) when they approve of the president from their own party.

4.5. Conditional Effects Vary by Context and Election Cycle

In most contexts, the moderating effects of education among Asian Americans mirror those observed among other racial minority groups, such as Black and Hispanic Americans. These communities often face structural marginalization, and their political attitude and behavior tends to be structured around more by group-based identity and experiences of exclusion than by individual-level political sophistication. As a result, political resources in these cases often do not produce clear or consistent party identification.

However, the relationship between education and political attitude or behavior is not fixed across electoral cycles. Instead, their influence varies with the surrounding political climate, especially during moments when race becomes a pivotal point in public discourse. For racial and ethnic minorities, these short-term dynamics can carry outsized influences, especially

when accompanied by targeted appeals, symbolic gestures, or exclusionary rhetoric (Sanchez et al., 2019; Hajnal & Lee, 2011). Therefore, we need to examine Asian American political resources, most visibly when electoral contexts amplify group identity concerns or threaten perceptions of inclusion.

The 2020 presidential election exemplifies this dynamic. Held amid intersecting national crises, the 2020 election unfolded against the backdrop of a global pandemic, mass mobilizations for racial justice, and an alarming rise in anti-Asian discrimination. The rhetoric of then-President Donald Trump, including repeated references to COVID-19 as the “China virus” and “Kung flu,” drew widespread condemnation and was widely cited as contributing to a surge in racial hostility toward Asian communities (Chan et al., 2022). Survey data from the Pew Research Center indicate that these narratives had tangible effects: over 40% of Asian American respondents reported experiencing social unease due to their race, and nearly one-third had encountered racial slurs or demeaning jokes during the early months of the pandemic (Ruiz et al., 2023). Such conditions were not merely symbolic; they had direct consequences for political attitude and behavior. Previous research has shown that highly racialized contexts can trigger reassessments of group identity and reshape patterns of political engagement, especially among communities that include the line between inclusion and exclusion (Masuoka & Junn, 2013; Pérez, 2015).

Unlike other racial minorities, whose political attitudes are often more directly shaped by group-based identity and longstanding experiences of exclusion, Asian Americans’ experiences in 2020 were distinctively intensified and highly visible. As a result, their political responses during this period were more conditioned by individual-level political resources than to traditional identity-based commitments. Consistent with this framework, the 2020 election

reveals a context in which the moderating effects of political resources among Asian Americans became more noticeable. Amid a political environment saturated with racialized discourse and explicit threats to group inclusion, these resources functioned less as neutral tools of civic engagement and more as critical filters—mechanisms through which individuals evaluated the alignment between partisan messages and group-based concerns.

Therefore, the 2020 election represents a critical departure from this trend for Asian Americans. Despite experiencing acute racialization—particularly through the surge in anti-Asian sentiment and racially coded rhetoric during the COVID-19 pandemic—Asian Americans with higher education were less inclined to identify as Republicans. These dynamics parallel the post-2016 trajectory among White Americans, where political resources acted as filters rather than reinforcers.

White Americans with higher levels of education tended to process partisan messages more critically during the Trump era. These individuals often evaluated political appeals through the lens of democratic values, institutional norms, and coherent policy positions. Importantly, they were also more likely to view Trump’s racialized and anti-immigrant rhetoric as inconsistent with core democratic principles and norms of inclusion (Mutz, 2018; Thompson, 2021). Higher-resource Whites often interpreted such rhetoric not just as partisan signaling, but as a threat to pluralism and civil rights protections—especially when it targeted racial minorities and immigrants. Studies have shown that college-educated White voters increasingly shifted away from the Republican Party, particularly when party rhetoric conflicted with principles of inclusion and institutional legitimacy (Doherty & Kiley, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2024). This trend suggests that political resources among Whites did not merely reinforce existing partisan

loyalties but prompted reevaluation when elite cues clashed with broader democratic commitments (Thompson, 2021).

Conversely, White Americans with limited education maintained or even intensified their Republican identification following the 2016 election. Lacking the cognitive tools to critically assess complex political messaging, these individuals were more susceptible to emotionally charged appeals centered on status threat and cultural anxiety. As Mutz (2018) argues, feelings of status threat, rather than economic hardship, played a significant role in mobilizing White voters behind Trump. Trump's rhetoric—emphasizing protectionism, anti-immigrant narratives, and the restoration of traditional social hierarchies—resonated deeply with voters who perceived themselves as losing ground in an increasingly diverse society (Newman et al., 2021). This alignment underlines how, in the absence of education, affective and identity-based appeals can directly form partisan affiliation (Jones, 2019).

A similar pattern appeared among Asian Americans in 2020. Despite intensified group-based marginalization, those with higher levels of education showed lower levels of Republican identification. This suggests that, like their White counterparts, politically sophisticated Asian Americans used their resources to critically evaluate the political environment, filtering out cues that conflicted with group interests or inclusive democratic norms. Instead of translating symbolic conservatism, policy preferences, or racial resentment into consistent Republican identification, many Asian Americans in 2020 appeared to disengage from partisan attachment when confronted with exclusionary or racialized rhetoric. Even those who identified as ideologically conservative or expressed attitudes traditionally associated with Republican alignment did not uniformly gravitate toward the party. Rather, these predispositions were

filtered through a comprehensive evaluation of group inclusion and political belonging, leading some to withhold affiliation or adopt a more ambivalent stance.

These dynamics may continue to employ influence in the 2022 midterm elections. While anti-Asian hate crimes declined from their peak levels as the COVID-19 pandemic subsided, the extensive effects of racial scapegoating and political exclusion have not fully receded. The residual impact of targeted rhetoric—particularly from Republican figures who continued to invoke themes of electoral fraud or cultural threat—may still shape how Asian Americans interpret party cues. Even if the moderating effects of political resources were less obvious than in 2020, they may remain relevant, especially for those who remain attuned to questions of belonging and legitimacy within American political life.

In this way, education among Asian Americans functioned less to reinforce partisanship and more to encourage critical distance in 2020. Higher education enabled individuals to question party cues that conflicted with group inclusion and democratic values rather than strengthening Republican identification. This reflects the context-dependent nature of Asian American political identity shaped by both integration and marginalization and highlights how, in moments of racial threat, political sophistication may lead not to association, but to disengagement. This moderating effect of education shaping the relationship between attitudinal dispositions and partisan identification or vote choice, was not uniformly present across all groups. Among White Americans, education consistently moderated partisan orientation across election cycles. Some variation appeared in Black and Hispanic populations, though not systematically. However, for Asian Americans, this effect emerged only in 2020. That year, marked by heightened anti-Asian discrimination during the COVID-19 pandemic, produced a

unique political environment in which educational attainment appeared to sharpen critical responses rather than promote partisan alignment.

2020-specific Hypothesis

Hypothesis 3-A *Only in 2020 did Asian Americans who have higher levels of education show less inclination to identify with the Republican Party, a relationship not found consistently in other racial groups or in other years;*

Hypothesis 3-A-1 *(Education × Racial Resentment – Party Identification) when they have racial resentment.*

Hypothesis 3-A-2 *(Education × Self-reported Ideology – Party Identification) when they consider themselves conservatives.*

Hypothesis 3-A-3 *(Education × Operational Ideology – Party Identification) when they have conservative policy preferences.*

Hypothesis 3-B *Only in 2020 did Asian Americans with higher levels of education show less inclination to support the Republican presidential candidate, a relationship not found consistently in other racial groups or in other years;*

Hypothesis 3-B-1 *(Education × Racial Resentment – Vote Choice) when they have racial resentment.*

Hypothesis 3-B-2 *(Education × Self-reported Ideology – Vote Choice) when they consider themselves conservatives.*

Hypothesis 3-B-3 *(Education × Operational Ideology – Vote Choice) when they have conservative policy preferences.*

5. Research Design: Data and Method

Chapter 5 presents the results of an in-depth empirical investigation into the political identities and behaviors of Asian Americans, based on data from the Cooperative Election Study (CES) conducted between 2014 and 2022. The analysis focuses on trends in party identification and presidential vote choice, demonstrating the contingent nature of political attitudes within this population. Consistent with the theoretical emphasis on the tension between integration and marginalization, the findings demonstrate that Asian American political attitudes and behaviors are neither monolithic nor static, but shaped by shifting political contexts, individual-level characteristics, and broader structural forces. By systematically linking theory and data, this chapter provides a detailed account of how Asian Americans respond to, and participate in, the U.S. political system amid competing pressures of belonging and exclusion.

5.1. Data

The data utilized in this study is derived from the CES, a nationally representative survey conducted annually. The CES provides detailed information on political attitudes, voting behavior, and demographic characteristics, making it an invaluable resource for understanding the subtle dynamics of Asian American political identity.

This study uses data from the CES, which provides extensive coverage for both comparative and time-series analysis. Unlike datasets focused exclusively on Asian Americans—such as AAPI Data, the National Asian American Survey (NAAS), or the Collaborative

Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS)—the CES includes consistent samples of Asian American, White, Black, and Hispanic respondents across multiple election cycles. This breadth supports systematic comparisons across racial groups, which are necessary for assessing whether observed political patterns are group-specific or shared. Since 2016, the CES has incorporated questions on national origin among Asian American respondents, while immigration status has been included since earlier waves. More than two percent of respondents in each survey identify as Asian American, which provides sufficient coverage to distinguish respondents by origin and generational background.

In contrast to AAPI Data, NAAS, and CMPS—which are limited to presidential election cycles—the CES includes midterm election respondents. This feature enables the study of political orientation across varying electoral contexts, an important consideration given the widely acknowledged differences between midterm and presidential environments (Campbell, 2009; Jacobson & Carson, 2019; Weber, 2024). Although the CES does not track individuals over time, its time-series design facilitates a year-by-year analysis that identifies both continuity and divergence in political attitudes. These attributes position the CES as a valuable resource for evaluating the cohesiveness and variability of Asian American political behavior in relation to both temporal change and intergroup comparison.

5.1.1. Dependent Variables

The analysis centers on two primary outcomes: party identification and presidential vote choice. The former is measured on a continuous scale, ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating

a stronger identification with the Republican Party. The latter is a binary measure, coded as one if the respondent voted for the Republican presidential candidate—Donald Trump in 2016 and 2020—and zero otherwise.

5.1.2. Independent Variables

The models assess variation in the outcomes by incorporating a comprehensive set of explanatory variables that reflect demographic characteristics, ideological orientations, attitudinal predispositions, and contextual factors. Main independent variables include age, gender, household income, educational attainment, nativity (foreign-born status), religiosity, two distinct measures of ideology—self-identified ideological position and operational ideology—presidential job approval, racial resentment, evaluations of both national and personal economic conditions, political interest, and political knowledge. Regional context is captured through binary indicators for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.

Operational ideology is measured as an index derived from five policy attitude items: immigration, abortion, gun control, environmental protection, and crime (the crime item was not available in the 2018 wave). Each item is coded as a binary indicator of support or opposition to a conservative position, and the scale reflects the average of the available items for each respondent. Higher scores indicate more conservative policy preferences. This approach allows for the construction of a consistent, interpretable measure of issue-based ideology across years.

National origin is incorporated as an additional classification within the Asian American population. This includes East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese), South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani), and Southeast Asian (e.g., Filipino, Vietnamese) respondents.

All continuous predictors are rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to enable comparability across variables and models. Categorical variables such as gender and geographic region are incorporated using dummy coding.

5.2. Method

To evaluate the relationship between individual-level characteristics and the two central outcomes—party identification and Republican presidential vote choice—this study employs two different regression techniques, selected based on the nature of the dependent variables.

For party identification, which is measured on a continuous scale ranging from 0 (strongly Democratic) to 1 (strongly Republican), Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is used. This method allows for estimating linear associations between the variables and the degree of Republican identification, offering interpretable coefficients that represent shifts in party identification across the full spectrum of the scale.

For presidential vote choice, a binary variable coded as 1 for respondents who reported voting for the Republican candidate (Donald Trump in 2016 and 2020) and 0 for all other responses, logistic regression is the appropriate method. Logistic regression estimates the probability of a respondent voting Republican as a function of the explanatory variables, generating log odds ratios reflecting each association's strength and direction.

Across all models, main explanatory variables are entered simultaneously to assess their independent contributions to the outcomes. To examine the moderating effects of education, interaction terms are included between these moderators and core predictors such as ideological self-placement, operational ideology, economic evaluations, presidential job approval, and racial

resentment. This approach provides a framework for understanding how individual-level education may condition the effect of ideological and racial attitudes on both party identification and vote choice.

The inclusion of moderating effect is theoretically grounded in the broader framework of political identity formation among Asian Americans, which emphasizes the dual pressures of integration and marginalization. Education serves as a main mechanism through which individuals engage with the political environment and interpret their ideological or racialized experiences. Higher levels of education is often associated with increased cognitive engagement, enabling individuals to evaluate political information more critically and potentially resist simplistic or emotionally charged appeals. At the same time, education may also deepen alignment with existing ideological positions, depending on how individuals internalize messages about race, inequality, or national belonging. In the context of a racialized political climate—especially during the Trump era—these individual-level factors are likely to condition how Asian Americans navigate conflicting pressures: affirming or questioning party identification, reassessing ideological commitments, or distancing from parties that fail to reflect their complex identities. Accordingly, examining these moderators is essential for capturing the conditional nature of political behavior within a community at the intersection of socioeconomic success and racialized exclusion.

6. Distinctiveness: Conditional Nature of Asian American Party

Identification and Presidential Vote Choice

Chapter 6 explores how core political predispositions relate to party identification and presidential vote choice across racial groups, with particular attention to Asian Americans. The chapter begins by estimating baseline regression models that compare Asian Americans with White, Black, and Hispanic respondents. This comparison identifies the distinct partisan positioning of Asian Americans relative to other groups. These initial models incorporate key attitudinal variables, including self-reported ideology, operational conservatism, and racial resentment, while controlling demographic factors.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the role of education as a political resource and its capacity to condition the relationship between core attitudes and political outcomes. Education functions here as a proxy for structural integration, enabling an investigation into whether higher levels of educational attainment alter associations between ideological orientations, racial resentment, and party identification. Particular attention is paid to racial resentment, conceptualized as a key indicator of marginalization. By tracing how these associations vary by educational level, the chapter evaluates whether integration through education corresponds with predictable shifts in partisan orientation, especially within the Asian American electorate, whose formal incorporation does not always produce conventional partisan patterns. Through this approach, the chapter situates political identity within the broader structure of stratified incorporation and racialized boundary-setting.

6.1. Party Identification

6.1.1. Basic Model

Figure 6-1 shows the average party identification score for four racial groups—Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic Americans—measured on a 0 to 1 scale, where 0 indicates strong Democratic identification and 1 indicates strong Republican identification. The y-axis reflects each group’s mean partisan score, with vertical bars representing the standard error around each estimate. Narrower intervals indicate higher precision, while wider intervals reflect greater variability or smaller group sizes.

Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans report nearly identical mean values (0.36), positioning both groups near the center of the scale. Black Americans score the lowest (0.18), aligning closely with Democratic identification, while White Americans report the highest average (0.49), aligning more closely with Republican affiliation. The position of Asian Americans between these two ends suggests neither randomness nor neutrality, but rather a distinct location shaped by the dual pressures of integration through socioeconomic mobility and marginalization through racial classification. The similarity between Asian and Hispanic averages raises further questions about whether shared structural conditions such as immigration history or conditional access to institutional power, contribute to this proximity in partisan orientation. These questions guide the subgroup analyses that follow.




Figure 6-1. Mean Party Identification by Race

The analysis draws on a theoretical framework that emphasizes political orientation as a product of both structural incorporation proxied through variables such as education, and racialized exclusion, captured through racial resentment and related attitudes. To establish a foundation for subgroup analysis, this chapter begins with comparative regression models, contrasting Asian Americans with White, Black, and Hispanic respondents across multiple political and demographic variables. Tables 6-1-1 through 6-1-4 present the estimated associations between selected variables and party identification within four racial groups: Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic. These models place particular emphasis on the political positioning of Asian Americans in relation to other groups included in the analysis. The goal is to identify

whether Asian Americans follow similar partisan trajectories or reflect distinct patterns conditioned by their dual incorporation into and exclusion from American political life.

Across the models, only three variables—operational ideology, racial resentment, and presidential approval—consistently associate with party identification among Asian Americans. In contrast, other predictors such as age, income, gender, or religiosity do not show stable associations and, where significance appears, it tends to vary by election year. This inconsistent association stands in contrast to the more stable effects observed in the models for White, Black, and Hispanic respondents. While prior research based on datasets such as CMPS, NAAS, or AAPI often explores the political attitudes of Asian Americans, these studies have not engaged in direct year-by-year comparisons across multiple racial groups. By drawing on time-series data from the CES (2014–2022), including midterm years such as 2014, 2018, and 2022, this analysis provides a clearer basis to confirm which factors persist as core correlates of Asian American party identification, and how these associations compare with those in other racial groups across electoral contexts.

Firstly, self-reported ideology consistently associates with Republican identification across racial groups. Conservative identifiers in each group report higher Republican alignment. This association holds across survey years and racial categories, confirming the symbolic dimension of ideological orientation. Operational ideology—measured through policy preferences—shows similarly strong and consistent associations. In 2022, Asian Americans (coefficient = 0.48, $p < 0.05$) and Whites (coefficient = 0.50, $p < 0.05$) both show positive associations between conservative policy preferences and Republican identification. Although consistent across groups, the association for Asian Americans reflects slightly more variability, suggesting less fixed ideological sorting than among Whites. Black and Hispanic respondents

also display significant coefficients, affirming the broader salience of policy-linked conservatism in shaping partisan outcomes.

Racial resentment shows a positive association with Republican identification across all groups. In 2020, Asian Americans report a statistically significant association (coefficient = 0.30, $p < 0.05$). For Black respondents, the association appears weaker but remains statistically significant in select years. These consistent associations underscore the political relevance of racialized beliefs in shaping partisan identification across racial categories. For Asian Americans, who experience both incorporation and exclusion, racial resentment may express internalized beliefs about inequality or boundary-setting—making it a durable predictor of partisan orientation.

This comparative analysis indicates the distinctive partisan positioning of Asian Americans. While variables typically associated with structural incorporation—such as income and education—show meaningful associations with party identification in other racial groups, their relationships with partisanship among Asian Americans appear inconsistent or minimal. In contrast, ideological orientations and racial resentment retain more stable associations with partisan identity within this group. These results point to racialized exclusion as a more persistent structuring force than socioeconomic incorporation in shaping partisan affiliation. The next section evaluates whether educational attainment moderates these attitudinal associations, focusing on its role as an institutional resource linked to political incorporation.

Age shows minimal association with party identification in the Asian American sample, suggesting limited generational variation. In contrast, older White and Black respondents more frequently report Republican identification, a result that may trace back to long-standing partisan realignments and generational effects. For Hispanic respondents, older age associates with

Republican identification in selected years (2014, 2020, and 2022), though no consistent trajectory appears. The relative stability in age effects among Asian Americans points to group-specific dynamics that resist the clearer generational trends visible in other populations.

Gender shows inconsistent results for Asian Americans. Male respondents lean more Republican in some years, such as 2020 (coefficient = 0.03, $p < 0.05$), but display Democratic alignment in others, such as 2018. This instability contrasts with the more persistent Republican alignment observed among White men, even as that tendency moderates over time. Black men more frequently report Republican identification than Black women, though the gap remains modest. Among Hispanic respondents, partisan differences by gender emerge sporadically. For Asian Americans, gender-linked partisanship lacks regularity, reflecting political orientations less anchored in gendered partisan cleavages.

Income shows a positive relationship with Republican identification in earlier survey years for Asian Americans—particularly in 2016 (coefficient = 0.13, $p < 0.05$)—though the association weakens in later cycles. Hispanic respondents follow a comparable trajectory, while White respondents maintain a more stable positive link between income and Republican identification across cycles. Black respondents display no meaningful association between income and party identification. The declining salience of income for Asian Americans may suggest that economic position does not consistently translate into partisan identity, possibly due to shifting partisan meanings or racialized experiences that constrain conventional class-based alignments.

Education does not show statistically significant associations with party identification in the Asian American sample. This contrasts with White respondents, where education corresponds with stronger Republican identification in earlier cycles but reverses slightly by 2022. Among

Black and Hispanic respondents, education tends to align positively with Republican identification. The absence of such an association for Asian Americans indicates that education—often treated as a marker of political incorporation—does not predict partisan alignment in this group. This outcome invites further consideration of how racialized boundaries limit the integrative capacity of education in shaping partisan identity.

Foreign-born status does not show a significant effect on party identification within the Asian American sample. This absence of nativity-based differentiation suggests that shared racialization may operate more strongly than generational divides in structuring partisan affiliation. In the White sample, native-born respondents show higher levels of Republican identification in earlier cycles. Hispanic and Black samples reflect inconsistent nativity effects, with no clear directional trend.

Religiosity does not significantly predict party identification for Asian Americans. This may reflect the group's internal diversity in religious practice and the more pronounced role of racial identity in guiding political orientations. For Whites, religiosity aligns with Republican identification in earlier years, though this association diminishes by 2022. Hispanic and Black respondents show either null or negative relationships between religiosity and Republican affiliation. These contrasts suggest that religion operates with greater political clarity in other groups than in the Asian American context.

Table 6-1-1. Determinants of Party Identification among Asian Americans from 2014 to 2022

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.0005)	-0.001 (0.0005)
Male	0.001 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Income	0.10 (0.05)	0.13* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Education	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Foreign-born	0.01 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Religiosity	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Self-reported Ideology	0.55* (0.05)	0.44* (0.04)	0.44* (0.04)	0.46* (0.03)	0.43* (0.04)
Operational Ideology	0.21* (0.05)	0.43* (0.06)	0.34* (0.06)	0.21* (0.05)	0.48* (0.06)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.14* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.11* (0.03)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.19* (0.04)	0.14* (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.001 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Racial Resentment	0.19* (0.05)	0.15* (0.05)	0.18* (0.04)	0.30* (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Political Knowledge	0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.05* (0.01)
Midwest	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
South	0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)
West	0.03 (0.03)	-0.001 (0.02)	0.002 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	-0.17* (0.07)	0.12* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. * p < 0.05.

Table 6-1-2. Determinants of Party Identification among White Americans from 2014 to 2022

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Age	-0.001* (0.0001)	-0.001* (0.0001)	-0.001* (0.0001)	-0.001* (0.0001)	-0.001* (0.0001)
Male	0.02* (0.003)	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.01* (0.003)	-0.01 (0.003)
Income	0.08* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Education	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.01* (0.005)
Foreign-born	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Religiosity	0.04* (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.01* (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)
Self-reported Ideology	0.64* (0.01)	0.50* (0.01)	0.46* (0.01)	0.47* (0.01)	0.49* (0.01)
Operational Ideology	0.10* (0.01)	0.45* (0.01)	0.38* (0.01)	0.47* (0.01)	0.50* (0.01)
Presidential Job Approval	0.04* (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.17* (0.01)	0.08* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.21* (0.01)	-0.22* (0.01)	0.16* (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)	-0.17* (0.01)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Racial Resentment	0.15* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Political Interest	0.005* (0.002)	-0.01* (0.002)	-0.02* (0.002)	-0.01* (0.002)	-0.01* (0.002)
Political Knowledge	0.02* (0.002)	0.01* (0.002)	0.01* (0.002)	-0.01* (0.002)	-0.02* (0.002)
Midwest	0.001 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
South	0.03* (0.004)	0.03* (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)	0.02* (0.004)	0.02* (0.004)
West	0.03* (0.005)	0.01 (0.004)	0.01* (0.004)	0.01 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Constant	0.02 (0.01)	0.14* (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)	0.16* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. * p < 0.05.

Table 6-1-3. Determinants of Party Identification among Black Americans from 2014 to 2022

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Age	-0.003* (0.0003)	-0.002* (0.0003)	-0.002* (0.0003)	-0.002* (0.0003)	-0.002* (0.0002)
Male	0.06* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Income	0.02 (0.02)	0.07* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Education	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.06* (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)
Foreign-born	0.05* (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
Religiosity	-0.05* (0.01)	-0.09* (0.01)	-0.09* (0.01)	-0.09* (0.01)	-0.07* (0.01)
Self-reported Ideology	0.30* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.26* (0.02)	0.24* (0.02)	0.25* (0.02)
Operational Ideology	0.05* (0.02)	0.27* (0.03)	0.28* (0.03)	0.35* (0.03)	0.39* (0.03)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.11* (0.02)	-0.12* (0.01)	0.06* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.01)	-0.13* (0.01)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.12* (0.02)	-0.13* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	0.09* (0.02)	-0.09* (0.01)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Racial Resentment	0.11* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)	0.18* (0.02)
Political Interest	0.004 (0.01)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.01* (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
Political Knowledge	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.005)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.005)
Midwest	-0.0001 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
South	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
West	0.04* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
Constant	0.16* (0.03)	0.15* (0.03)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. * p < 0.05.

Table 6-1-4. Determinants of Party Identification among Hispanic Americans from 2014 to 2022

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Age	-0.001* (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0004)	-0.001* (0.0003)	-0.002* (0.0003)
Male	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Income	0.10* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.09* (0.02)	0.08* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Education	0.01 (0.02)	0.10* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Foreign-born	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Religiosity	0.02 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.07* (0.01)	-0.07* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)
Self-reported Ideology	0.50* (0.03)	0.39* (0.03)	0.37* (0.02)	0.43* (0.02)	0.41* (0.02)
Operational Ideology	0.09* (0.03)	0.44* (0.04)	0.48* (0.03)	0.41* (0.03)	0.49* (0.04)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.11* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.12* (0.02)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.25* (0.03)	-0.32* (0.03)	0.13* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	-0.15* (0.02)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Racial Resentment	0.16* (0.02)	0.15* (0.03)	0.15* (0.03)	0.16* (0.03)	0.19* (0.03)
Political Interest	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.0003 (0.01)
Political Knowledge	0.03* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)
Midwest	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
South	0.10* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
West	0.08* (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.22* (0.03)	-0.12* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. * p < 0.05.

National economic evaluation holds a statistically significant association with Republican party identification across racial groups. Among Asian Americans, this association fluctuates across years, with negative coefficients recorded in both 2016 ($-0.19, p < 0.05$) and 2022 ($-0.07, p < 0.05$). These shifts reflect variation in how national conditions correspond with partisan identification within the group. Personal economic evaluation does not reach statistical significance in the Asian American or Black samples, while the White sample displays a more consistent association in selected years, indicating differences in how individual-level economic perceptions relate to partisanship. Presidential job approval is statistically associated with party identification in most groups, though its strength varies across administrations and electoral cycles.

Political interest does not yield a statistically significant coefficient in the Asian American, Black, or Hispanic samples. In contrast, White respondents show a negative relationship beginning in 2016, where higher levels of political interest correspond with lower Republican identification. This directional shift may signal growing estrangement from the Republican Party among politically engaged individuals, particularly in periods characterized by heightened polarization and partisan conflict.

Political knowledge associates positively with Republican identification for Asian Americans in earlier years (e.g., $0.07, p < 0.05$ in 2018), but reverses direction by 2022 ($-0.05, p < 0.05$). This inversion mirrors results in the White, Black, and Hispanic samples, where higher knowledge levels coincide with lower Republican identification during the same cycle. These results point to a broader shift across racial groups in 2022, where politically informed individuals show increased distance from Republican affiliation, possibly in response to salient racialized events or perceived democratic erosion.

6.1.2. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

The influence of racial resentment on party identification varies significantly across racial groups, with education playing an inconsistent role as a moderating factor for Asian Americans. While racial resentment is positively associated with Republican identification for Asian Americans in multiple election years, the moderating effect of education is weak and only reaches statistical significance in 2020. This suggests that, unlike other groups, education does not consistently diminish the impact of racial resentment on partisan alignment. The lack of a stable moderating effect implies that racial resentment among Asian Americans is shaped by factors beyond educational attainment, such as immigration history, generational differences, or unique racialized experiences.

For White and Hispanic Americans, the moderating role of education is more prominent. Among White Americans, higher education consistently weakens the connection between racial resentment and Republican identification, supporting research that links education with more liberal racial attitudes. Similarly, for Hispanic Americans, education increasingly mitigates the effect of racial resentment, particularly in recent election years. This trend suggests that rising education levels may contribute to shifts in how racial attitudes influence partisanship, a observation less evident among Asian Americans. Meanwhile, Black Americans exhibit limited and inconsistent moderation, mirroring Asian Americans in that education does not significantly alter the relationship between racial resentment and partisan alignment in most years. However, the historical and structural racial inequalities that shape Black political behavior may explain the persistence of strong Democratic identification, making education a less decisive factor in

reshaping partisan attitudes. These findings underscore the distinct political pathways of Asian Americans, where the role of education in moderating racial resentment remains more variable compared to other groups.

Drawing on the regression estimates reported in Table 6-2-1, Figure 6-2 illustrates how racial resentment—measured along the horizontal axis—relates to the likelihood of Republican identification (vertical axis) among Asian Americans across five election years (2014–2022). Each panel corresponds to a separate year, allowing for temporal comparison. The two plotted lines distinguish between respondents with lower educational attainment (solid gray) and those with higher educational attainment (dashed black). Shaded bands denote 95% confidence intervals, capturing the uncertainty around the predicted values. Notably, the figure focuses on the interactive role of education in moderating the association between racial attitudes and partisanship. While most years do not display statistically significant differences (marked “n.s.”), a significant education-based divergence appears in 2020, indicated by $p < .05$.

Across most years (2014, 2016, 2018, and 2022), the effect of racial resentment on partisan identification remains relatively stable and statistically insignificant, suggesting limited variation by education level. However, in 2020, we observe a noticeable divergence: the relationship between racial resentment and Republican identification significantly varies depending on educational attainment. This marked contrast sets 2020 apart, pointing to a period in which racial attitudes, political polarization, and the salience of racial issues coalesced to produce meaningful differences in political alignment among Asian Americans.

In 2020, Asian Americans with high racial resentment and low education show a strong likelihood of identifying as Republican, with predicted probabilities exceeding 60%. Conversely, those with similarly high resentment but higher education are notably less likely to align with

Table 6-2-1. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	0.02 (0.10)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.04)	0.002 (0.05)
Racial Resentment	0.19 (0.13)	0.31* (0.13)	0.32* (0.09)	0.48* (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)
Education × Racial Resentment	-0.001 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.24* (0.10)	-0.09 (0.11)
Constant	-0.16 (0.10)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.18* (0.05)	-0.13* (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.53	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-2-2. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)
Racial Resentment	0.12* (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)	0.15* (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)
Education × Racial Resentment	0.04* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.01)	-0.12* (0.01)	-0.13* (0.01)
Constant	0.04* (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-2-3. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	0.01 (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.08* (0.02)
Racial Resentment	0.06 (0.04)	0.35* (0.05)	0.13* (0.04)	0.15* (0.04)	0.22* (0.04)
Education × Racial Resentment	0.08 (0.06)	-0.22* (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)
Constant	0.18* (0.03)	0.14* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.11* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-2-4. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.09 (0.05)	0.13* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.15* (0.03)	0.16* (0.03)
Racial Resentment	0.05 (0.05)	0.23* (0.06)	0.20* (0.05)	0.30* (0.04)	0.34* (0.04)
Education × Racial Resentment	0.18* (0.08)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.24* (0.06)	-0.28* (0.06)
Constant	0.10* (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.23* (0.03)	-0.17* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.48	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.55

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

the Republican Party, with probabilities around 46%. On the lower end of racial resentment, education had little effect: those with both low resentment and low education show a predicted Republican identification of 16%, while their highly educated counterparts show a modest increase to 22.7%. This asymmetry reveals that education moderates the impact of racial resentment, particularly among those holding conservative racial attitudes.

This trajectory reflects the central argument of my theoretical framework: Asian American political identity emerges from the ongoing tension between societal incorporation and exclusion. Instead of simply mirroring resentment-driven shifts, the data reveal how education shapes that trajectory, softening the connection between racialized attitudes and partisan leanings. Those with more schooling—exposed to broader worldviews and diverse sociopolitical conversations—appear less inclined to convert racial resentment into partisan loyalty. Where resentment might otherwise steer individuals toward conservative identification, education introduces hesitation, critical distance, and alternative evaluative lenses.

The sociopolitical atmosphere in 2020 adds further dimension. Amid the intensifying wave of anti-Asian discrimination tied to the COVID-19 crisis and inflammatory rhetoric from national leaders, many Asian Americans were thrust into a deeper awareness of their racialized status. For those with fewer educational resources, this context may have reinforced feelings of threat and led to a reactive embrace of political messaging rooted in cultural defense or law-and-order frameworks. Meanwhile, individuals with higher education levels may have approached these same experiences with more analytical scrutiny, resisting simplistic or racialized narratives and thereby dampening the direct effect of resentment on partisan identity.

The Effect of Racial Resentment on Asian American Party Identification (2014-2022)
Moderated by Education Level




Figure 6-2. The Effect of Racial Resentment on Party Identification for Asian Americans with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Educational Levels. The x-axis represents racial resentment, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). The y-axis shows the predicted probability of identifying with the Republican Party. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of education, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of education. Each panel represents a different election year from 2014 to 2022.

Looking across all subgroups, these findings indicate how education functions as a filtering mechanism—one that mitigates the influence of racially charged sentiment and underscores the layered, situational nature of Asian American political engagement. Rather than being driven by ideology or resentment in isolation, political orientations are shaped through the interaction of these factors with structural integration, personal experiences of marginalization, and the evolving political climate. This underscores the importance of viewing Asian American partisanship as dynamic and responsive, not fixed within conventional ideological categories.

6.1.3. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Self-Reported Ideology and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section examines how education moderates the relationship between self-reported ideological conservatism and party identification across racial groups, with a particular emphasis on Asian Americans. Party identification is measured on a scale from 0 (strong Democratic identification) to 1 (strong Republican identification). The analysis leverages interaction terms between education and ideological conservatism to uncover how education shapes the relationship between ideological preferences and partisanship within and across these groups.

The analysis of four tables examining the interaction between education and ideological conservatism across racial groups reveals multifaceted observations in shaping party identification during the years studied. Among Asian Americans, the interaction terms remain insignificant throughout the period, with coefficients ranging from -0.16 in 2020 to 0.01 in 2016. This consistent lack of significance indicates that education does not substantially moderate the

relationship between ideological conservatism and Republican identification for this group. Instead, factors such as racialized experiences, cultural diversity, and issue-based priorities likely play a more prominent role in shaping their partisan preferences. These findings underscore the unique sociopolitical dynamics of Asian Americans, where ideological and partisan behaviors are less directly tied to educational attainment.

Black and Hispanic Americans show empirical evidence more similar to Asian Americans compared to White Americans. In both groups, education initially strengthens the alignment between ideological conservatism and Republican identification, as seen in significant positive interactions in earlier years (e.g., Black Americans in 2014: 0.23, $p < 0.05$; Hispanic Americans in 2016: 0.26, $p < 0.05$). However, these effects diminish or reverse in later years, suggesting that other factors, such as collective experiences and identity-based concerns, take precedence over time. By contrast, White Americans display a markedly different trajectory, with education alternately amplifying and mitigating the conservative-Republican linkage, reflecting the increasing polarization and ideological fragmentation within the White electorate.

These findings demonstrate shared trends between Asian, Black, and Hispanic Americans, where education plays a relatively muted or inconsistent moderating role on ideological alignment. However, the distinct and evolving trends among White Americans demonstrate how educational attainment interacts with ideological conservatism under conditions of heightened political polarization. For Asian Americans, the results underscore the centrality of group-specific dynamics over educational influences, contributing to a broader understanding of their unique political behavior within a racially diverse electorate.

Table 6-3-1. The Effect of Education and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	0.03 (0.09)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Self-reported Ideology	0.56* (0.13)	0.44* (0.11)	0.55* (0.09)	0.57* (0.07)	0.44* (0.08)
Education × Self-reported Ideology	-0.02 (0.17)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)
Constant	-0.17* (0.09)	0.12 (0.07)	-0.16* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-3-2. The Effect of Education and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)
Self-reported Ideology	0.62* (0.01)	0.52* (0.01)	0.47* (0.01)	0.53* (0.01)	0.57* (0.01)
Education × Self-reported Ideology	0.05* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.12* (0.01)	-0.16* (0.01)
Constant	0.04* (0.01)	0.14* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-3-3. The Effect of Education and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.03	0.01	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Self-reported Ideology	0.17*	0.10*	0.14*	0.19*	0.23*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education × Self-reported Ideology	0.23*	0.18*	0.22*	0.09	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.22*	0.19*	0.01	0.07*	0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-3-4. The Effect of Education and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Self-reported Ideology	0.44*	0.26*	0.31*	0.42*	0.45*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education × Self-reported Ideology	0.11	0.26*	0.11	0.02	-0.07
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	0.06	0.11*	-0.19*	-0.11*	0.07*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.48	0.51	0.52	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

6.1.4. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Operational Ideology and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

The moderating effect of education on operational ideology for Asian Americans reveals both similarities and contrasts when compared to the interaction with self-reported ideology. Like the analysis of self-reported ideology, operational ideology is a robust predictor of party identification, but education as a moderating factor remains largely insignificant across years. The interaction term reaches significance only in 2020 (-0.24, $p < 0.05$), indicating that higher education weakens the relationship between conservative operational stances and Republican alignment in that year. This result may reflect the unique political and social climate of 2020, including rising anti-Asian sentiment during the COVID-19 pandemic and the heightened salience of racial and cultural issues among educated Asian Americans. However, the lack of consistent significance illustrates that education plays a limited role in shaping the connection between operational ideology and partisan alignment for this group, with racialized experiences and issue-specific dynamics likely taking precedence.

Asian Americans display an observation most like Black Americans, who also show minimal interaction effects between education and operational ideology. For Black Americans, operational ideology remains a less dominant predictor of party identification, as their strong Democratic alignment is driven by collective racialized experiences and historical loyalty to the Democratic Party. In contrast, White and Hispanic Americans show more marked and consistent moderating effects. Among Whites, the interaction between education and operational ideology evolves over time, starting as positive in earlier years (e.g., 2014: 0.06, $p < 0.05$) and turning negative in 2020 (-0.15, $p < 0.05$) and 2022 (-0.16, $p < 0.05$), reflecting the growing polarization

Table 6-4-1. The Effect of Education and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.08 (0.11)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.003 (0.05)
Operational Ideology	0.09 (0.14)	0.45* (0.15)	0.40* (0.13)	0.38* (0.09)	0.54* (0.10)
Education × Operational Ideology	0.17 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.15)	-0.24* (0.11)	-0.09 (0.12)
Constant	-0.10 (0.10)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.13* (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.53	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-4-2. The Effect of Education and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Operational Ideology	0.07* (0.01)	0.48* (0.02)	0.40* (0.01)	0.56* (0.01)	0.59* (0.01)
Education × Operational Ideology	0.06* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.15* (0.01)	-0.16* (0.02)
Constant	0.04* (0.01)	0.13* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-4-3. The Effect of Education and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)
Operational Ideology	-0.01 (0.04)	0.30* (0.06)	0.22* (0.06)	0.37* (0.05)	0.43* (0.05)
Education × Operational Ideology	0.11 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.08)
Constant	0.20* (0.03)	0.14* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.10* (0.03)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-4-4. The Effect of Education and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.03 (0.06)	0.10* (0.05)	0.08* (0.03)	0.15* (0.03)	0.18* (0.03)
Operational Ideology	0.05 (0.06)	0.44* (0.07)	0.55* (0.06)	0.55* (0.06)	0.68* (0.06)
Education × Operational Ideology	0.07 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.23* (0.07)	-0.32* (0.07)
Constant	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.24* (0.03)	-0.17* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.55

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

within the White electorate. Hispanic Americans exhibit a similar regression outcome in recent years, with significant negative interactions in 2020 (-0.23, $p < 0.05$) and 2022 (-0.32, $p < 0.05$), suggesting that higher education weakens the conservative-Republican alignment as liberal attitudes on social and cultural issues gain prominence.

In the aggregate, the interaction between education and operational ideology draws attention to the limited influence of education as a moderating factor for Asian Americans and Black Americans, contrasting with the more dynamic patterns observed among Whites and Hispanics. For Asian Americans, these findings emphasize the centrality of racialized experiences and group-specific concerns over educational attainment in shaping party identification. By contrast, the evolving effects for Whites and Hispanics underscore the interplay of educational attainment and ideological polarization, particularly in contexts where social and cultural issues are increasingly salient. These results provide a complex understanding of how education interacts with operational ideology across diverse racial groups.

Figure 6-3 presents the interaction between operational ideology and education level in shaping Republican Party identification among Asian Americans from 2014 to 2022 (based on results from Table 6-4-1). The x-axis represents operational ideology, ranging from liberal to conservative, while the y-axis shows the predicted probability of Republican identification. Each panel corresponds to a different survey year (2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022). The solid gray line indicates respondents with lower levels of education, while the dashed black line represents those with higher education. The shaded areas around each line reflect the 95% confidence intervals. Statistical significance of the interaction effect is noted at the bottom of each panel—only the 2020 panel shows a significant interaction, while others are marked as non-significant.

Across most years, both high- and low-education respondents exhibit a consistent pattern: as operational conservatism increases, so does the probability of identifying as Republican. However, in 2020, a statistically significant interaction emerges, distinguishing this year from others. While all years show a positive slope between operational conservatism and Republican identification, 2020 uniquely reveals a visible divergence between education levels. The slope for low-education individuals is steeper than for their higher-educated counterparts, indicating a stronger ideological pull toward Republican identity among the less educated. This gap between the solid and dashed lines is narrower or statistically non-significant in all other years, making 2020 a distinctive moment in moderating effect of education on the ideology-partisanship link.

In 2020, operational conservatism strongly predicts Republican identification among Asian Americans, but the influence is not uniform across education levels. Those with lower levels of education exhibit a sharper increase in Republican identification as conservatism rises, reaching close to a 56% predicted probability for strong conservatives. In contrast, individuals with similar ideological leanings but higher education show a more tempered pattern, peaking at around 39%. Among operational liberals, however, the difference is less stark—both education groups display relatively low Republican identification, with a slight but notable increase among those with more education (17.9% for low education vs. 25.3% for high). This reversal suggests that education may introduce complexities in liberal-leaning identification that are not as marked among conservatives.

These results resonate strongly with the theoretical emphasis on educational and occupational assimilation as drivers of political behavior among Asian Americans. Education—framed within segmented assimilation and human capital theories—equips individuals with the resources and exposure necessary to develop more context-sensitive political identities. Among

The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Party Identification (2014–2022)
Moderated by Education Level




Figure 6-3. The Effect of Operation Ideology on Party Identification for Asian Americans with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Educational Levels. The x-axis represents operational ideology, ranging from liberalism to conservatism. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of identifying with the Republican Party. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of education, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of education. Each panel represents a different election year from 2014 to 2022.

operational conservatives, higher education appears to temper ideological rigidity, perhaps by fostering exposure to diverse political discourses or increasing critical evaluation of partisan alignment. Meanwhile, the slight rise in Republican identification among liberal-leaning, highly educated Asian Americans may reflect the ambiguity of their political identity, shaped by both integration into professional elite environments and the lingering effects of racialized marginalization. Ultimately, the 2020 divergence underscores how education interacts with ideology to produce stratified political outcomes within the Asian American electorate, exemplifying the dual pressures of assimilation and marginalization.

6.1.5. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Economic Evaluations and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This analysis examines how education moderates the relationship between economic evaluations and party identification, focusing on Asian Americans and drawing comparisons with other racial groups under the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. Education had limited and inconsistent moderating effects across all administrations for Asian Americans. Under Obama, no significant interactions emerged, suggesting economic evaluations, whether national or personal, did not strongly influence partisan alignment. During the Trump administration, a significant negative interaction with national economic evaluations in 2018 ($-0.26, p < 0.05$) indicated that highly educated Asians were less likely to align with the Republican Party despite favorable economic conditions. This likely reflects alienation from Trump-era rhetoric and policies. By the Biden administration, these interactions disappeared, reinforcing that broader social and political concerns, rather than economic evaluations, shaped Asian American partisan preferences.

Table 6-5-1. The Effect of Education and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.10 (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.25* (0.11)	0.33* (0.08)	0.21* (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)
Education × National Economic Evaluation	0.18 (0.17)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.26* (0.10)	-0.17 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.16 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)	0.08 (0.08)	0.12 (0.09)
Education × Personal Economic Evaluation	0.22 (0.17)	0.07 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.11)
Constant	-0.10 (0.09)	0.15* (0.08)	-0.22* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-5-2. The Effect of Education and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	0.01 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.20* (0.01)	-0.23* (0.01)	0.25* (0.01)	0.18* (0.01)	-0.23* (0.01)
Education × National Economic Evaluation	-0.001 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.17* (0.01)	-0.16* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.003 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Education × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Constant	0.02 (0.01)	0.15* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.17* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-5-3. The Effect of Education and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	0.06 (0.04)	0.003 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.07* (0.02)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.15* (0.03)	0.10* (0.03)	0.12* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Education × National Economic Evaluation	-0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.002 (0.04)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Education × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.01 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
Constant	0.15* (0.04)	0.16* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-5-4. The Effect of Education and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.01 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.14* (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.27* (0.06)	-0.33* (0.05)	0.19* (0.04)	0.29* (0.03)	-0.22* (0.04)
Education × National Economic Evaluation	0.04 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.27* (0.05)	0.15* (0.06)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.04)
Education × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.14* (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
Constant	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.25* (0.03)	-0.16* (0.03)	0.10* (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.53	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

For Asian Americans, the moderating role of education on economic evaluations is limited and context-dependent, aligning most closely with Hispanic Americans during politically charged administrations like Trump's. This contrasts with Whites, who exhibit consistent educational effects, and Blacks, whose partisan alignment remains unaffected by these factors. These findings emphasize the importance of both group-specific dynamics and broader political contexts in shaping partisan preferences.

6.1.6. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Presidential Job Approval and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section explores how education influences the relationship between presidential job approval and party identification across racial groups, focusing on the unique trends observed within the Asian American population and drawing comparisons to Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. The analysis integrates insights from the interaction between education and economic evaluations to identify similarities and contrasts.

Within the Asian American population, education significantly moderated the relationship between presidential job approval and party identification only during the Trump administration. Negative interactions in 2018 ($-0.18, p < 0.05$) and 2020 ($-0.20, p < 0.05$) suggest that highly educated Asian Americans who approved of Trump's presidency were less inclined to align with the Republican Party. This trend parallels the role of education in buffering pro-Republican shifts under Trump in the economic evaluation analysis, revealing the influence of broader concerns such as racialized rhetoric and immigration policies. Under Obama and Biden, interactions remained insignificant, indicating that other factors, like racial identity and policy preferences,

shaped partisan alignment.

In comparison, Whites exhibited consistent and significant negative interactions across all administrations, with education consistently moderating their response to presidential job approval and economic evaluations. In contrast to Asians, whose education effects were administration-specific, Whites demonstrated a more persistent role for education in shaping their partisan alignment. Blacks showed minimal interaction effects in either analysis, maintaining strong Democratic loyalty regardless of education or presidential approval. Hispanics displayed dynamics most similar to Asians during the Trump administration, where education weakened pro-Trump alignments, though these effects dissipated under Biden.

In comparison, Whites exhibited consistent and significant negative interactions across all administrations, with education consistently moderating their response to presidential job approval and economic evaluations. In contrast to Asians, whose education effects were administration-specific, Whites demonstrated a more persistent role for education in shaping their partisan alignment. Blacks showed minimal interaction effects in either analysis, maintaining strong Democratic loyalty regardless of education or presidential approval. Hispanics displayed dynamics most similar to Asians during the Trump administration, where education weakened pro-Trump alignments, though these effects dissipated under Biden.

Ultimately, these results underscore the unique role of education as a moderating factor for presidential job approval and party identification within the Asian American population, particularly under Trump's presidency. The findings reveal contrasts with Whites' consistent education effects, as well as shared results with Hispanics during periods of heightened political polarization, illustrating the interplay of administration-specific policies and group-specific concerns.

Table 6-6-1. The Effect of Education and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.07 (0.08)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.22* (0.08)	0.18* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)
Education × Presidential Job Approval	0.22 (0.15)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.20* (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)
Constant	-0.11 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.17* (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.53	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-6-2. The Effect of Education and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.07* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.004 (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.22* (0.01)	0.17* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Education × Presidential Job Approval	0.08* (0.02)	-0.09* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.02)	-0.18* (0.02)	-0.08* (0.02)
Constant	0.03* (0.01)	0.13* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.14* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-6-3. The Effect of Education and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	-0.002 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.07* (0.02)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.17* (0.04)	-0.14* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.13* (0.03)
Education × Presidential Job Approval	0.11 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.003 (0.05)
Constant	0.18* (0.03)	0.16* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 6-6-4. The Effect of Education and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Education	0.03 (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08* (0.03)	0.10* (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.19* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.11* (0.04)
Education × Presidential Job Approval	-0.05 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)
Constant	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.25* (0.03)	-0.14* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

6.1.7. Subchapter Summary

This chapter explored how education condition the relationship between core attitudinal variables and party identification in the Asian American population. Across most election cycles, these resources do not show a consistent moderating role. This tendency displays a general trend observed in other racially marginalized groups, such as Black and Hispanic respondents, where education rarely change the association between ideological orientation or racial attitudes and party identification. In the case of Asian Americans, this limited presence is especially noteworthy, indicating that individual-level variation in resources often yields minimal differentiation in political attitude. By contrast, White respondents display more frequent interactions between political resources and core variables, though the specific ones involved shift across electoral contexts.

The results from 2020 for Asian Americans provide partial support for the proposed hypotheses. In 2020, higher levels of education appear to weaken the statistical relationships outlined in Hypotheses 1-B-2, 1-B-3, and 1-B-5—specifically those linking racial resentment, operational ideology, and presidential approval to Republican identification.

Education do not consistently correspond with increased support for Republican identity. Instead, their role varies across electoral cycles, influenced by the interaction of group identity, partisan signals, and the surrounding political climate. In the case of Asian Americans, this variation underscores ongoing tensions between institutional participation and experiences of racialized exclusion. These dynamics were especially salient during the 2020 election, when anti-Asian hostility intensified amid the COVID-19 pandemic and was exacerbated by political rhetoric linking the virus to China. Republican elites—including then-President Trump—

employed language such as “China virus” and “Kung flu,” contributing to a surge in racial blaming and public hostility. In this environment, political resources such as education, interest, and knowledge may have equipped individuals not straightforwardly to reinforce partisan dispositions, but to assess whether political parties recognized or ignored threats to their community. As a result, Asian American party identification during this period responded not only to internal attitudes, but also to perceived exclusion from the political system and the racialized terms of engagement it presented.

This chapter identifies three variables— racial resentment, self-reported ideology, and operational ideology—as the only consistent indicators of party identification among Asian Americans. Other variables do not show stable associations, and this limited significance contrasts with findings for White, Black, and Hispanic respondents. The analysis also examines the moderating effect of education in the relationship between these core variables and party identification. This conditional association appears in 2020 only. Such variation becomes visible with CES data from 2014 to 2022, which includes both presidential and midterm elections. Unlike other datasets that focus mainly on presidential contests and omit key midterm cycles, CES allows for a year-by-year comparison. Through this approach, the analysis confirms that Asian Americans, compared to other racial groups, show a distinct configuration: 1) only three variables consistently associate with party identification across election types, and 2) the year 2020 marks a point of intensified association, stressing the context-specific nature of political identity within this group.

6.2. Presidential Vote Choice

Chapter 6.2 introduces the analysis of how political resources—education, political interest, and political knowledge—condition the relationship between core political predispositions and presidential vote choice. Presidential vote choice captures one of the most concrete expressions of political behavior, shaped not only by long-standing orientations but also by contextual and racialized considerations. The discussion grounds on the earlier framework that examines political behavior within the dual pressures of institutional incorporation and racialized marginalization. The analysis places particular emphasis on Asian American respondents, whose political decisions reflect a complex position between structural access and social exclusion.

Thus, the central focus remains on the Asian American case, with the comparative component includes White, Black, and Hispanic respondents. Despite educational attainment and socioeconomic incorporation, this group does not consistently show vote choice patterns anticipated by traditional models of political behavior. The chapter considers whether political resources interact with attitudinal variables—such as party identification, ideological identification, racial resentment, economic evaluations, and presidential approval—under varying electoral conditions. By examining multiple cycles, this chapter explores the degree to which these resources correspond with shifts in electoral behavior and how those shifts differ across racial group contexts.

6.2.1. Basic Model

Figure 6-4 reports the average share of respondents who selected the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, across four racial groups: Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic

Americans. The vertical axis ranges from 0 to 1 and reflects the proportion of Republican votes in each group. Each point represents the group mean, while the accompanying vertical lines indicate the standard error. These intervals provide a gauge of estimation precision, with narrower bars indicating greater confidence and wider intervals suggesting sample variability or size constraints.

The racial distribution in Republican vote share marks clear differences. A majority of White respondents (0.51) reported support for Trump, followed by Hispanic Americans (0.32) and Asian Americans (0.27). Black Americans reported the lowest level (0.06). These group-level differences echo persistent disparities in partisan preferences across electoral cycles. Asian Americans fall between White and Black respondents, with vote shares that neither converge with high levels of Republican affiliation nor align fully with consistently Democratic trends. This placement reflects the group's ambiguous position within the American racial hierarchy—incorporated through markers such as high educational attainment and economic integration, yet still situated outside dominant racial narratives. The lower-than-average Republican support, despite these integrative characteristics, points to the persistent relevance of racialized experiences. This dual structure—socioeconomic incorporation on one hand and marginalization on the other—frames the Asian American partisan profile and sets the foundation for further subgroup analysis.

The factors associated with Republican vote choice reflect both continuity and variation when considered alongside the correlates of party identification in the Asian American context. In the case of presidential vote choice, three indicators—party identification, operational ideology, and racial resentment—consistently show significant associations for Asian Americans. Other variables do not show stable relationships across years and lack statistical




Figure 6-4. Proportion Voting Republican by Race

significance in most models. Notably, self-reported ideology fails to produce consistent associations with vote choice, despite showing strong connections to party identification from 2014 through 2022. This divergence suggests that symbolic ideological labels do not carry the same electoral weight within this group as they do for other racial populations. Prior research using CMPS, NAAS, or AAPI data tends to concentrate on presidential election cycles and does not incorporate a comparative racial perspective over time. These findings, grounded in a comprehensive sequence of elections, offer additional understanding when paired with the earlier analysis of party identification.

Operational ideology is consistently associated with both party identification and Republican vote choice across all racial groups, underscoring the role of issue-based preferences in structuring political responses. Within the Asian American sample, operational ideology yields significant and relatively stable coefficients across survey years, placing their response patterns closer to those observed in the White population, where issue positions demonstrate similarly strong associations in both party identification and vote choice models.

Racial resentment is positively associated with Republican presidential vote choice across all racial groups, particularly during the 2016 and 2020 elections. Individuals reporting higher levels of racial resentment are consistently more likely to support the Republican candidate in both cycles. Notably, the 2020 log odds ratio for Asian Americans exceeds that of other groups, indicating a stronger statistical relationship between racial resentment and vote choice in this population during that cycle.

National economic evaluations show a positive association with Republican vote choice across racial groups. However, this association is not consistent across electoral cycles. In 2016, positive evaluations of the national economy were linked to a lower likelihood of voting for the Republican candidate across all racial groups, including Asian, White, Black and Hispanic respondents. By contrast, in 2020, the direction of this association shifted: individuals who expressed satisfaction with the national economy were more likely to support the Republican candidate. This shift suggests that national economic perceptions are interpreted through the lens of presidential incumbency and prevailing partisan narratives, leading to temporal variation in their association with vote choice.

Table 6-7. Determinants of Republican Vote Choice Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.002)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Male	-0.03 (0.29)	0.41* (0.07)	0.76* (0.23)	0.46* (0.20)	-0.43 (0.35)	-0.46* (0.08)	-0.07 (0.27)	-0.24 (0.21)
Income	0.93 (0.77)	0.01 (0.18)	1.45* (0.57)	1.16* (0.55)	1.07 (0.82)	-0.29 (0.19)	-0.48 (0.66)	-0.36 (0.49)
Education	-0.54 (0.65)	-0.56* (0.13)	0.33 (0.45)	-0.51 (0.41)	0.04 (0.69)	-0.25 (0.14)	0.55 (0.52)	0.43 (0.42)
Foreign-born	-0.08 (0.29)	0.57* (0.16)	0.64 (0.36)	0.20 (0.22)	-0.19 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.20)	-0.82 (0.45)	-0.06 (0.24)
Religiosity	1.10* (0.40)	0.57* (0.10)	-0.15 (0.36)	0.09 (0.31)	0.78 (0.47)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.24 (0.30)
Party Identification	3.39* (0.49)	4.39* (0.12)	3.53* (0.36)	3.66* (0.32)	3.97* (0.62)	4.34* (0.13)	5.09* (0.41)	4.44* (0.34)
Operational Ideology	6.45* (1.30)	8.32* (0.28)	7.18* (0.92)	7.71* (0.83)	6.62* (1.27)	9.74* (0.29)	5.64* (0.93)	7.04* (0.75)
Self-reported Ideology	0.08 (0.80)	1.49* (0.19)	1.42* (0.48)	1.68* (0.50)	-0.82 (0.93)	1.18* (0.21)	2.32* (0.55)	0.98* (0.47)
Racial Resentment	3.95* (0.78)	3.12* (0.19)	3.00* (0.61)	4.27* (0.55)	7.08* (1.21)	3.31* (0.19)	3.83* (0.65)	3.83* (0.51)
Political Interest	-0.09 (0.17)	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.13)	0.30* (0.13)	-0.16 (0.22)	-0.18* (0.05)	-0.22 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.12)
Political Knowledge	0.30 (0.18)	-0.28* (0.04)	-0.20 (0.14)	-0.26* (0.12)	0.14 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.10 (0.17)	-0.23 (0.13)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.13 (0.62)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.94* (0.42)	-0.07 (0.40)	0.34 (0.72)	0.76* (0.16)	0.19 (0.49)	1.31* (0.43)
National Economic Evaluation	-2.77* (0.76)	-2.82* (0.17)	-2.23* (0.49)	-1.55* (0.48)	1.70* (0.64)	2.00* (0.15)	1.77* (0.46)	1.29* (0.37)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.42 (0.70)	-0.27 (0.16)	0.39 (0.46)	-0.44 (0.46)	0.48 (0.82)	-0.16 (0.18)	0.32 (0.60)	0.23 (0.46)
Midwest	-0.67 (0.56)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.26 (0.34)	-0.30 (0.46)	-0.35 (0.66)	-0.16 (0.11)	-1.00* (0.41)	0.03 (0.40)
South	-0.01 (0.45)	0.13 (0.09)	0.12 (0.28)	0.07 (0.37)	-0.06 (0.52)	0.07 (0.10)	-1.28* (0.35)	0.42 (0.31)
West	0.09 (0.42)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.80* (0.35)	-0.03 (0.39)	0.88 (0.46)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.23 (0.41)	0.25 (0.32)
Constant	-4.64* (1.14)	-5.81* (0.26)	-7.52* (0.82)	-7.90* (0.84)	-10.07* (1.25)	-8.83* (0.26)	-9.33* (0.88)	-9.36* (0.73)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.51	-3,283.73	-336.89	-370.75	-140.34	-2,642.58	-252.49	-375.28
Akaike Inf. Crit.	389.01	6,605.47	711.77	779.50	318.68	5,323.16	542.97	788.57

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. * p < 0.05.

Demographic characteristics—including age, gender, income, education, and nativity status—do not exhibit statistically significant associations with Republican presidential vote choice in the Asian American sample during either the 2016 or 2020 election cycles. Similarly, political interest and political knowledge do not show meaningful relationships with vote choice in these years. These findings suggest a limited role of individual-level demographic or cognitive characteristics in forming electoral preferences within this group. This contrasts with other racial populations, where demographic variables such as education, gender, or income occasionally demonstrate statistically significant associations with presidential vote choice. The absence of such associations in the Asian American case highlights the need to consider alternative explanatory factors—particularly those tied to group-based identity or racialized political contexts—when examining electoral behavior.

6.2.2. Moderating Effect of Education on Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The influence of education on the relationship between racial resentment and Republican vote choice among Asian Americans remains inconsistent. In both the 2016 and 2020 elections, the interaction between education and racial resentment is statistically insignificant, suggesting that education does not systematically weaken or strengthen the effect of racial resentment on Republican support. This contrasts with other racial groups where education plays a clearer role in shaping political attitudes.

For White Americans, education significantly moderates this relationship, particularly in 2016 (3.33, $p < 0.05$), suggesting that higher education reinforced the link between racial

Table 6-8. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Education	-1.87 (1.16)	-1.65* (0.25)	-0.01 (0.67)	-0.76 (0.73)	-2.72 (1.77)	-0.43 (0.34)	0.19 (0.87)	0.93 (0.92)
Racial Resentment	0.54 (2.56)	1.43* (0.37)	2.12 (1.43)	3.78* (1.31)	2.54 (2.78)	3.13* (0.36)	3.20* (1.37)	4.48* (1.21)
Education × Racial Resentment	4.48 (3.24)	3.33* (0.64)	1.54 (2.24)	0.86 (2.07)	6.78 (3.99)	0.34 (0.59)	1.12 (2.19)	-1.08 (1.79)
Constant	-3.82* (1.26)	-5.19* (0.27)	-7.28* (0.83)	-7.45* (0.88)	-8.41* (1.55)	-8.91* (0.30)	-9.35* (0.93)	-9.72* (0.87)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-174.57	-3,270.17	-336.65	-370.66	-139.00	-2,642.41	-252.35	-375.10
Akaike Inf. Crit.	389.14	6,580.35	713.30	781.33	318.00	5,324.83	544.71	790.20

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

resentment and Republican support. By 2020, this effect diminishes, indicating a weakening role of education in shaping this relationship. In contrast, among Black Americans, education does not meaningfully alter the effect of racial resentment on Republican vote choice, as interaction terms remain weak and insignificant across both elections. Hispanic Americans show a different trend—while education had little moderating effect in 2016, by 2020, the interaction turns negative (-1.08), suggesting that higher education may weaken the link between racial resentment and Republican support over time.

Overall, racial resentment influences Republican vote choice across all groups, but education’s moderating role varies. Among Whites, education initially amplifies this relationship, while for Hispanics, its effect shifts toward reducing it. Black voters show minimal interaction between education and racial resentment, similar to Asian Americans, for whom

education does not significantly alter this dynamic. These trends illustrate how racial identity, rather than education alone, shapes the political impact of racial resentment.

6.2.3. Moderating Effect of Education on Relationship Between Party Identification and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

As presented in Table 6-9, the interaction term between education and party identification does not reach statistical significance for Asian American respondents in either 2016 or 2020. These results indicate limited evidence that education is consistently related to changes in how party identification corresponds with Republican vote choice for this group across the two election cycles. This outcome is consistent with results observed for Black and Hispanic respondents, implying a weaker association between partisanship and vote choice at higher levels of education—the estimates lack statistical precision. In contrast, White respondents display a statistically significant interaction in both years, accompanied by narrower standard errors. In these models, higher levels of education are more clearly associated with a reduced probability of Republican vote choice conditional on party identification.

In summary, the interaction effects for Asian Americans, Black respondents, and Hispanic respondents remain comparable in magnitude and statistical uncertainty. The clearest evidence for an education-related difference in the relationship between partisanship and vote choice appears only in the estimates for White respondents.

Table 6-9. The Effect of Education and Party Identification on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Education	-0.29 (1.09)	0.44* (0.21)	0.72 (0.59)	-0.31 (0.63)	0.49 (1.34)	1.38** (0.27)	1.78* (0.82)	0.80 (0.69)
Party Identification	3.77** (1.46)	5.60** (0.24)	4.26** (0.82)	3.93** (0.72)	4.57** (1.65)	5.77** (0.26)	6.60** (0.91)	4.91** (0.78)
Education × Party Identification	-0.52 (1.88)	-2.25** (0.37)	-1.31 (1.33)	-0.47 (1.13)	-0.83 (2.13)	-2.90** (0.42)	-2.73 (1.42)	-0.81 (1.20)
Constant	-4.90** (1.27)	-6.30** (0.26)	-7.76** (0.86)	-7.69** (0.84)	-10.54** (1.47)	-9.90** (0.29)	-10.23** (0.93)	-9.61** (0.76)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.47	-3,265.44	-336.40	-370.66	-140.26	-2,618.29	-250.58	-375.05
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.93	6,570.87	712.80	781.32	320.52	5,276.59	541.17	790.11

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

6.2.4. Moderating Effect of Education on Relationship Between Self-Reported Ideology and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The analysis of the interaction between education and self-reported ideology reveals varying voting for Donald Trump among Asian Americans, White Americans, Black Americans, and Hispanic Americans in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections.

The analysis reveals a noteworthy similarity between Asian Americans and Black Americans: both groups exhibit consistently null interaction effects between education and self-reported ideology across the 2016 and 2020 elections. For Asian Americans, the lack of significant interaction suggests that neither higher education nor conservative ideology

Table 6-10. The Effect of Education and Self-reported Ideology on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Education	-1.76 (1.62)	-0.22 (0.34)	-0.25 (1.07)	-2.38* (1.02)	-1.81 (1.64)	0.85* (0.38)	-0.13 (1.23)	-0.65 (0.94)
Self-reported Ideology	-1.65 (2.24)	1.82* (0.36)	0.86 (1.05)	-0.18 (1.04)	-3.09 (2.04)	2.14* (0.38)	1.69 (1.17)	-0.17 (1.01)
Education × Self-reported Ideology	2.35 (2.86)	-0.65 (0.60)	1.07 (1.78)	3.55* (1.78)	3.44 (2.80)	-1.97* (0.63)	1.16 (1.92)	2.04 (1.59)
Constant	-3.87* (1.49)	-5.95* (0.30)	-7.15* (0.93)	-6.66* (0.92)	-9.06* (1.50)	-9.59* (0.31)	-9.17* (1.04)	-8.85* (0.82)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.17	-3,283.15	-336.71	-368.76	-139.60	-2,637.68	-252.30	-374.46
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.35	6,606.31	713.41	777.51	319.20	5,315.36	544.61	788.92

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

substantially altered their resistance to Trump, likely reflecting the community's broader concerns with his rhetoric on immigration and race. Similarly, for Black Americans, the null interaction effects reinforce their strong Democratic alignment and widespread disapproval of Trump's presidency, where education and ideology had minimal impact on their voting behavior. This shared trend underscores the importance of race and community-specific dynamics in shaping political behavior, particularly for groups historically marginalized in American politics.

The results for other groups showcase distinct observations compared to Asian Americans. White Americans exhibit a significant interaction term in 2020, indicating decreased support for Trump among educated conservatives. This outcome likely reflects shifting opinions about his presidency, particularly regarding his response to the pandemic and racial conflicts. In 2016, the interaction term is not significant, suggesting that Trump's widespread populist appeal

may have bridged educational differences among conservatives. Hispanic Americans display a significant interaction in 2016, where higher education strengthened the influence of conservative ideology, increasing support for Trump. By 2020, the interaction loses significance, hinting at declining support from educated conservatives, likely in reaction to Trump's divisive immigration policies and rhetoric.

The findings demonstrate distinct observations across racial groups. For Asian Americans and Black Americans, education and ideology operate independently of one another, with broader sociopolitical factors driving voting behavior. In contrast, White Americans and Hispanic Americans show more dynamic interactions, influenced by shifts in Trump's policies and rhetoric between the two election cycles. These results emphasize the context-specific nature of voter behavior and the unique dynamics within each racial group.

6.2.5. Moderating Effect of Education on Relationship Between Operational Ideology and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The interaction term between education and operational ideology reveals important differences in how these factors jointly influence Republican vote choice across racial groups in the 2016 and 2020 elections, with notable contrasts and similarities to Asian Americans. For Asian Americans, education does not significantly moderate the relationship between self-reported ideology and Republican vote choice, reflecting a unique dynamic where partisan alignment is influenced more by other factors, such as racial identity and socio-political experiences. This empirical result contrasts sharply with White Americans, where a significant negative interaction

Table 6-11. The Effect of Education and Operational Ideology on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Education	0.39 (2.36)	-2.20* (0.42)	-0.44 (1.56)	-0.43 (1.44)	-1.83 (2.06)	-0.64 (0.42)	-1.57 (1.49)	0.63 (1.20)
Operational Ideology	8.02* (4.08)	6.34* (0.54)	6.22* (2.06)	7.80* (1.99)	3.62 (3.30)	9.26* (0.56)	2.91 (1.97)	7.32* (1.72)
Education × Operational Ideology	-2.05 (5.00)	3.75* (0.92)	1.70 (3.32)	-0.16 (3.07)	4.05 (4.22)	0.86 (0.88)	4.70 (3.09)	-0.44 (2.47)
Constant	-5.40* (2.00)	-4.88* (0.32)	-7.03* (1.13)	-7.64* (1.14)	-8.91* (1.77)	-8.79* (0.34)	-8.31* (1.14)	-9.54* (1.00)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.42	-3,275.19	-336.75	-370.75	-139.90	-2,642.11	-251.31	-375.27
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.84	6,590.38	713.51	781.49	319.80	5,324.21	542.61	790.54

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

in 2020 ($-1.97, p < 0.05$) indicates that higher education mitigates the partisan effects of conservative self-identification. The stronger moderating role of education among Whites underscores their more ideologically polarized electorate compared to the relatively stable ideological alignment of Asian Americans.

Black Americans share similarities with Asian Americans, as education shows no significant moderating effect in either 2016 (1.07) or 2020 (1.16). This absence of interaction suggests that for both groups, other influences, such as historical or racialized experiences, dominate their partisan preferences, limiting the role of education in shaping ideological alignment. In contrast, Hispanic Americans exhibit a significant positive interaction in 2016 ($3.55, p < 0.05$), where education amplifies the partisan effects of self-reported ideology, though this effect diminishes by 2020 (2.04). This variability underscores how education interacts with

ideology in more context-dependent ways for Hispanics, reflecting their diverse socio-political experiences, which differ from the consistent insignificance observed among Asian Americans.

When comparing the moderating effects of education on self-reported and operational ideology, the findings for Asian Americans remain consistent: education does not significantly alter the influence of either measure of ideology on Republican vote choice. In contrast, White Americans exhibit stronger moderating effects for both operational and self-reported ideology, reinforcing their entrenched ideological polarization. Black and Hispanic Americans show mixed outcomes, with some significant interactions for self-reported ideology but minimal effects for operational ideology, illustrating distinct political dynamics influenced by education. These contrasts underscore the unique political behavior of Asian Americans, shaped by different socio-political contexts and priorities compared to other racial groups.

6.2.6. Moderating Effect of Education on Relationship Between Economic Evaluations and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The interaction between education and economic evaluations—both national and personal—revealed a consistent result of null effects across all racial groups in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. For Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic Americans alike, the interaction terms were statistically insignificant, indicating that educational attainment did not meaningfully moderate the influence of economic perceptions on Republican vote choice. While log odds ratios fluctuated slightly, such as -1.58 for Asian Americans in 2020 or -0.77 for White Americans in the same year, none of these shifts achieved significance. This uniform lack of

Table 6-12. The Effect of Education and Economic Evaluations on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Education	-1.05 (1.49)	-0.88* (0.29)	1.03 (0.90)	-0.13 (0.84)	0.58 (1.03)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.36 (0.77)	0.67 (0.59)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-3.53 (2.15)	-3.15* (0.32)	-1.45 (0.99)	-1.14 (0.94)	2.75 (1.63)	2.39* (0.27)	0.57 (0.88)	1.71* (0.82)
Education × National Economic Evaluation	1.03 (2.69)	0.64 (0.53)	-1.43 (1.59)	-0.75 (1.46)	-1.58 (2.21)	-0.77 (0.45)	2.25 (1.42)	-0.71 (1.23)
Personal Economic Evaluation	2.33 (1.88)	-0.11 (0.29)	1.25 (1.01)	0.61 (0.91)	1.82 (2.11)	0.08 (0.35)	0.05 (1.25)	0.73 (1.04)
Education × Personal Economic Evaluation	-3.90 (2.47)	-0.30 (0.47)	-1.53 (1.58)	-1.92 (1.44)	-1.97 (2.85)	-0.47 (0.57)	0.51 (2.05)	-0.86 (1.60)
Constant	-4.38* (1.42)	-5.61* (0.28)	-7.81* (0.90)	-7.81* (0.91)	-10.62* (1.35)	-9.12* (0.26)	-9.11* (0.88)	-9.58* (0.76)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.43	-3,282.99	-336.48	-370.62	-140.08	-2,641.11	-251.21	-375.12
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.86	6,605.99	712.96	781.24	320.16	5,322.23	542.41	790.24

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

significant interaction effects underscores the limited role of economic evaluations, in conjunction with education, in shaping Republican support. Across these diverse groups, other factors—such as partisan loyalty, cultural concerns, or policy-specific dynamics—likely played a more decisive role in driving electoral behavior. These findings reveal notable racial and ethnic similarity in how education interacts with economic evaluations to shape Republican vote choice.

6.2.7. Moderating Effect of Education on Relationship Between Presidential Job Approval and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The analysis emphasizes the divergent outcomes of education's interaction with presidential job approval in shaping Republican vote choice across racial and ethnic groups. The interaction between education and presidential job approval in influencing Republican vote choice reveals subtle dynamics across racial and ethnic groups in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. The log odds ratios for these interactions, derived from logistic regression models, shed light on the differential roles education and perceptions of Donald Trump's presidency played in shaping voter preferences.

Among Asian Americans, Black Americans, and Hispanic Americans, the interaction between education and presidential job approval consistently demonstrates weak and statistically insignificant effects across both the 2016 and 2020 elections. For Asian Americans, the log odds ratios (1.22 in 2016 and 0.11 in 2020) suggest that educational attainment did not meaningfully influence how views of Trump's performance shaped voting behavior. Similarly, Black Americans show minimal interaction effects (log odds ratios = 0.002 in 2016 and 0.25 in 2020), reflecting that education had little impact on the relationship between presidential approval and Republican vote choice. Hispanic Americans also display insignificant interaction terms (log odds ratios = 0.75 in 2016 and -0.01 in 2020), indicating that education and job approval did not jointly shape Trump support. These findings draw attention to a common pathway among these groups, where factors such as racial identity, systemic inequalities, and community-specific concerns appear to overshadow the moderating role of education on presidential evaluations.

In contrast, White Americans show distinct empirical evidence, with significant interaction effects in both election cycles. In 2016, the positive log odds ratio (0.92) indicates that higher education amplified the influence of favorable presidential evaluations on Trump support, consistent with optimism and partisan alignment. However, by 2020, this interaction shifts to a significant negative effect (log odds ratio = -2.00), suggesting that education

Table 6-13. The Effect of Education and Presidential Job Approval on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Education	-1.17 (1.52)	-0.94* (0.23)	0.33 (0.75)	-0.86 (0.77)	-0.01 (1.38)	0.66* (0.28)	0.43 (0.95)	0.44 (0.83)
Presidential Job Approval	-1.08 (2.14)	-0.53 (0.27)	-0.94 (0.94)	-0.48 (0.86)	0.27 (1.80)	1.70* (0.30)	0.06 (1.01)	1.31 (0.95)
Education × Presidential Job Approval	1.22 (2.65)	0.92* (0.46)	0.002 (1.53)	0.75 (1.37)	0.11 (2.46)	-2.00* (0.54)	0.25 (1.64)	-0.01 (1.51)
Constant	-4.24* (1.52)	-5.57* (0.26)	-7.45* (0.84)	-7.40* (0.88)	-10.19* (1.44)	-9.43* (0.28)	-9.49* (0.93)	-9.42* (0.82)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.40	-3,281.74	-336.89	-370.60	-140.34	-2,635.74	-252.47	-375.28
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.80	6,603.49	713.77	781.20	320.68	5,311.49	544.95	790.57

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * p < 0.05.

dampened the impact of positive job approval on voting behavior. This shift reflects increasing polarization and discontent among more educated White voters, particularly in suburban and urban areas, in response to Trump’s leadership style and policy priorities.

6.2.8. Subchapter Summary

This subchapter revisits key findings on presidential vote choice in relation to the earlier analysis of party identification. Three variables—party identification, operational ideology, and racial resentment—consistently correspond to Republican vote choice among Asian Americans. By contrast, self-reported ideology does not yield comparable results, unlike what is observed in

other racial groups. These associations persist throughout election years, emphasizing their central role in explaining electoral behavior.

In addition, this study evaluates whether education alters the relationship between these attitudinal variables and vote choice. While prior results on party identification identified conditional effects in the 2020 context, particularly under heightened racial salience, no comparable interactions appear in the presidential vote choice models—even during that same year. These findings emerge through the extended CES dataset, which includes both midterm and presidential elections from 2014 to 2022. This coverage enables a dual-level analysis that earlier studies based on CMPS, NAAS, or AAPI data did not pursue. As a result, this chapter identifies stable attitudinal anchors and highlights limits in the moderating influence of integration, especially when comparing party identification and electoral choice among Asian Americans.

7. Cohesiveness: Minimal Subgroup Divergence in Asian American

Chapter 7 investigates both the internal heterogeneity and potential cohesiveness of Asian American political orientations through the lens of the integration–marginalization framework. It analyzes how national origin and immigration status shape partisan identification and presidential vote choice, recognizing these factors as central to the uneven pathways of political incorporation. Asian Americans are disaggregated into three regional subgroups, East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese), South Asian (e.g., Indian, Pakistani), and Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Filipino), to examine whether shared political tendencies emerge despite substantial variation in migration histories, cultural backgrounds, and structural access. Immigration status, particularly the distinction between foreign-born naturalized citizens and U.S.-born individuals across the 1.5 and second generations, further conditions how individuals interpret their civic belonging, navigate political institutions, and respond to racialized experiences. These subgroup characteristics inform both the extent of integration and the salience of marginalization, shaping the formation of political identity across generational and origin-based lines.

The chapter also examines the moderating role of education as a vital marker of structural incorporation. It evaluates whether educational attainment conditions the relationship between racial resentment and political outcomes, shedding light on whether political resources tend to reinforce existing racialized orientations or function to recalibrate them. This analysis addresses both the points of divergence and areas of convergence across Asian American subgroups, assessing whether a cohesive political identity is taking shape or whether internal variation remains a defining feature of their political development amid uneven incorporation and contested belonging.

7.1. National Origin

7.1.1. Basic Model of Party Identification

Figure 7-1 displays the mean values of party identification across three Asian American subgroups, East, South, and Southeast Asians, on a standardized scale from 0 to 1. A score of 0 corresponds to strong Democratic identification, while 1 indicates strong Republican identification. The y-axis reflects the average partisan position for each subgroup. Each point marks the group mean, and the vertical bars indicate standard errors, calculated from the standard deviation and sample size. Narrow bars reflect greater precision; wider intervals suggest limited subgroup size or more variability.

Southeast Asians show the highest average score (0.38), followed by East Asians (0.36), with South Asians reporting the lowest (0.29). However, all subgroup means fall below the midpoint of the scale, indicating consistent distance from Republican identification. These values suggest no substantial differences in partisan orientation across national origin groups. Despite variation in background or community context, Asian Americans display a largely Democratic tendency that holds across subgroup categories. This trend, sustained in further statistical evaluation, points to a cohesive partisan position across the Asian American population.

Table 7-1 presents subgroup-specific regression models estimating the associations between main variables and party identification among East, South, and Southeast Asian Americans. The dependent variable ranges from 0 (strong Democratic identification) to 1 (strong Republican identification). The models include measures of ideological orientation, racial




Figure 7-1. Mean Party Identification by Asian American National Origin Subgroup

attitudes, political resources, and demographic and economic characteristics. By disaggregating the analysis by national origin, this analysis examines whether consistent or subgroup-specific relationships emerge within the Asian American population and provides empirical context for the theoretical argument that political identity is shaped through stratified experiences of incorporation and marginalization.

As presented in the earlier chapter, the analysis of party identification within Asian American subgroups—East, South, and Southeast Asian—confirms that three variables consistently correspond to partisan orientation: self-identified ideology, policy preferences, and racial resentment. These associations appear regardless of national origin, based on pooled CES samples from 2016 to 2022. While the subgroup sample sizes are limited for year-specific regression models, the use of combined data provides more stable comparisons. This approach

addresses a limitation in existing research, as widely used datasets such as CMPS, NAAS, and AAPI surveys often exclude respondents from midterm election cycles. The extended coverage in the CES, which includes 2014, 2018, and 2022, makes it possible to identify whether national origin influences core attitudinal associations in Asian American political identification with greater consistency over time.

A number of variables, age, religiosity, education, nativity status (foreign-born vs. U.S.-born), political interest, and personal economic evaluation, are not statistically associated with party identification in any of the three subgroups. While these variables have been relevant in other studies of political behavior, the consistently null associations here suggest that, in these models, they do not correspond meaningfully with partisan identity across East, South, or Southeast Asian Americans. The lack of association for nativity status, for instance, indicates that immigrant background when considered alongside other characteristics, does not differentiate partisan self-placement in a systematic way. Similarly, education and political interest, often viewed as indicators of political incorporation, are not directly associated with party identification in these subgroup-specific models. These findings raise the possibility that such resources may operate in more contingent ways, formed by subgroup histories or the salience of racialized belonging.

By contrast, both self-reported ideology and operational ideology display statistically significant and directionally consistent relationships with Republican identification across all three subgroups. Respondents who place themselves further to the ideological right or who express more conservative policy preferences, tend to report stronger identification with the Republican Party. While the association is consistent, its magnitude varies across groups. Southeast Asians show a stronger relationship with self-reported conservatism, whereas East

Table 7-1. Determinants of Party Identification among Asian Americans Across National-Origin

	Party Identification		
	East	South	Southeast
Foreign-born	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
Age	-0.001 (0.0003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Male	0.04* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income	0.07* (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Education	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)
Religiosity	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.001 (0.03)
Self-reported Ideology	0.49* (0.03)	0.41* (0.05)	0.57* (0.05)
Operational Ideology	0.49* (0.04)	0.44* (0.09)	0.37* (0.07)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.001 (0.04)
National Economic Evaluation	0.01 (0.02)	0.10* (0.05)	0.04 (0.03)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)
Racial Resentment	0.12* (0.03)	0.20* (0.07)	0.18* (0.05)
Political Interest	0.01 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Political Knowledge	-0.004 (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05* (0.01)
Midwest	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)
South	0.03* (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
West	-0.01 (0.01)	0.06* (0.03)	0.004 (0.03)
Year: 2018	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Year: 2020	-0.001 (0.02)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)
Year: 2022	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
Constant	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.07 (0.06)
Observations	1,875	497	696
R ²	0.55	0.38	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.54	0.36	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. * p < 0.05.

Asians display a comparatively stronger relationship with operational (policy-based) ideology. These distinctions may reflect subgroup differences in how political attitudes are expressed or internalized, possibly linked to modes of migration, community context, or exposure to political messaging.

Other variables display relationships that differ across subgroups. For example, gender is statistically associated with party identification only among East Asians, where men are more likely than women to report Republican identification. This gender-based relationship does not appear in the South or Southeast Asian models. Similarly, household income is positively associated with Republican identification only among East Asians, suggesting that socioeconomic position may have a stronger correspondence with partisan orientation in that subgroup. These patterns may reflect variations in the perceived alignment between class-based interests and party platforms, or differences in how economic incorporation is politicized. Presidential job approval is negatively associated with Republican identification in the East and South Asian models. Respondents who approve of the president (likely a Democrat during the survey years) are less likely to report Republican identification. This association does not appear in the Southeast Asian model, possibly indicating subgroup differences in presidential salience or variation in partisan sorting based on national political figures. Similarly, national economic evaluation is only associated with party identification among South Asians, where more positive assessments correspond with stronger Republican identification. Personal economic evaluation, by contrast, does not show a significant relationship in any subgroup, suggesting that individual-level economic assessments are not closely tied to partisan self-placement within this sample.

A particularly consistent variable across all three subgroups is racial resentment. Respondents who show higher levels of racial resentment—measured through agreement with

items that downplay structural racism, tend to report stronger Republican identification. The association is statistically significant for all groups and appears strongest in the South Asian model. This pattern indicates that racial attitudes, even when not explicitly group-targeted, are centrally positioned in the configuration of partisan identity for Asian Americans. Racial resentment may reflect orientation toward dominant racial hierarchies or the degree to which individuals identify with race-conscious or race-neutral narratives.

Finally, political knowledge is positively associated with Republican identification for South and Southeast Asians but not for East Asians. Among the former, higher political knowledge corresponds with stronger Republican identification—a pattern that departs from expectations that political knowledge typically enhances alignment with liberal or system-challenging orientations, especially in marginalized populations. This result may reflect subgroup-specific processes in which political knowledge enables clearer alignment with issue-based conservatism or exposure to political frames that reinforce status-quo preferences. The lack of association for East Asians suggests that the role of political knowledge may be less central—or differently structured—within that subgroup’s political reasoning.

Overall, these results underscore both convergence and differentiation in the relationships between key variables and party identification across Asian American subgroups. While ideological orientation and racial resentment appear consistently associated with Republican identification, other variables, particularly economic position, presidential approval, and political knowledge, show more conditional relationships. These findings support the argument that political identity among Asian Americans is not uniformly shaped by integration or marginalization alone, but by the interaction of both processes as they vary across subgroup contexts.

7.1.2. Basic Model of Presidential Vote Choice

Figure 7-2 displays the average proportion of respondents in each Asian American subgroup—East, South, and Southeast Asians—who reported voting for the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump. The y-axis spans from 0 to 1, with each point denoting the group mean. Vertical bars represent standard errors, where narrower bars indicate greater estimate precision.

Southeast Asians report the highest Republican vote share at 0.29, followed by East Asians at 0.26. South Asians report the lowest at 0.18. Although these figures suggest modest variation, all three means fall well below the midpoint. This consistency across subgroups signals a comprehensive tendency to avoid Republican presidential candidates. Despite differences in migration background or community formation, each subgroup tilts toward Democratic preferences. The data does not support a narrative of deep internal division. Instead, these results suggest a shared orientation in presidential vote choice across national-origin lines.

Table 7-2 presents logistic regression models estimating the associations between attitudinal, demographic, and contextual variables and reported vote choice for the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, in the 2016 and 2020 elections. The models are disaggregated by national origin—East, South, and Southeast Asians—allowing for a comparative assessment of subgroup-specific relationships. These models incorporate predictors reflecting ideological orientation, racial attitudes, political identity, economic perceptions, and political resources, offering a comprehensive view of how patterns of incorporation and marginalization correspond with candidate support across distinct segments of the Asian American population.




Figure 7-2. Proportion Voting Republican by National Origin

As indicated in the chapter 6, party identification, operational ideology, and racial resentment consistently correspond to presidential vote choice among Asian Americans, regardless of national origin. In contrast, ideological self-placement does not show a consistent association with Republican vote choice. This summary draws from pooled CES data in 2016 and 2020, as subgroup sample sizes by year do not support separate regression models. While prior studies tend to isolate individual presidential cycles and emphasize variation by subgroup, this approach underscores a shared structure across East, South, and Southeast Asian voters. The CES provides a broader temporal scope than other datasets—such as CMPS, NAAS, or AAPI

surveys—enabling analysis of continuity in political behavior despite subgroup differences in migration histories or incorporation.

Across all three subgroups, several variables do not show statistically significant relationships with Republican vote choice. These include foreign-born status, age, gender, income, self-reported ideology, national economic evaluation, political interest, political knowledge, and regional controls. The absence of significant associations for nativity status suggests that immigrant background alone does not differentiate vote choice in a consistent manner once attitudinal and contextual factors are included. Likewise, the lack of associations for age and gender indicates that generational position and gender cleavages do not correspond consistently with partisan vote choice. Although variables like income, symbolic ideology, and political interest have theoretical relevance in broader voting behavior research, their limited correspondence here may reflect subgroup-specific political learning processes, or the mediating influence of more proximate cues such as party identification.

Three variables show statistically significant and directionally consistent associations with Republican vote choice across all Asian American subgroups. First, party identification is strongly associated with support for Trump. This relationship underscores its role as a central heuristic in electoral decision-making and supports the view that party identification serves as a critical integrative mechanism, particularly in contexts where institutional signals or partisan indicate more structured and policy-relevant orientations that align with candidate choice. Third, racial resentment is positively associated with Republican vote choice across all three subgroups. Individuals who express higher levels of resentment, typically characterized by rejecting structural explanations for racial inequality, are more likely to support the Republican candidate.

Table 7-2. Determinants of Republican Vote Choice Across National Origin among Asian Americans

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate		
	East	South	Southeast
Foreign-born	-0.50 (0.35)	0.22 (0.73)	-0.04 (0.63)
Age	0.0000 (0.01)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Male	-0.23 (0.35)	-0.96 (0.79)	-0.65 (0.58)
Income	0.24 (0.84)	1.13 (1.86)	3.01 (1.66)
Education	-0.97 (0.72)	6.44* (2.56)	0.15 (1.22)
religiosity	1.28* (0.46)	1.01 (1.27)	2.27* (1.00)
Party Identification	4.41* (0.69)	2.71* (1.25)	4.60* (1.11)
Self-reported Ideology	0.35 (1.09)	1.26 (1.59)	0.10 (1.49)
Operational Ideology	7.98* (1.43)	7.41* (2.92)	11.40* (2.61)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.66 (0.75)	-1.27 (1.48)	2.88* (1.42)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.90 (0.78)	-1.10 (1.41)	1.25 (1.10)
Personal Economic Evaluation	1.77* (0.89)	-3.33* (1.54)	-2.43 (1.55)
Racial Resentment	5.70* (1.13)	6.77* (2.03)	3.15* (1.59)
Political Interest	-0.09 (0.20)	0.09 (0.47)	-0.08 (0.38)
Political Knowledge	0.24 (0.21)	1.02 (0.56)	0.38 (0.37)
Midwest	-0.86 (0.67)	-0.26 (0.89)	-2.16 (1.57)
South	-0.10 (0.59)	-0.18 (0.90)	-0.88 (1.27)
West	0.12 (0.48)	1.26 (0.94)	-1.07 (1.18)
Year: 2020	-0.95* (0.43)	-1.68 (0.86)	0.27 (0.64)
Constant	-8.08* (1.33)	-10.87* (3.36)	-10.27* (2.65)
Observations	787	195	274
Log Likelihood	-129.55	-40.77	-48.51
Akaike Inf. Crit.	299.11	121.55	137.02

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. * $p < 0.05$.

This finding underlines the relevance of racialized frameworks for political preferences within the Asian American electorate, regardless of differences in national origin.

Only a limited number of variables show statistically significant associations with Republican vote choice in one or two subgroup models, reflecting internal variation within the Asian American electorate. Among South Asians, higher education is associated with greater support for the Republican candidate. Religiosity shows a similar association for East and Southeast Asians and appears to correspond with distinct bases of ideological alignment across communities. Presidential job approval reaches significance only for Southeast Asians and may reflect subgroup-specific evaluations of political leadership. Personal economic evaluation is positively associated with Republican support among East Asians but negatively associated among South Asians, pointing to contrasting interpretations of economic satisfaction and its partisan relevance. The 2020 election year is associated with reduced Republican support among East Asians, likely due to the heightened salience of racial tensions during that period. These subgroup-specific associations underscore the importance of analyzing Asian American political behavior through the lens of uneven incorporation and varied racialized experiences.

These findings reveal both shared and subgroup-specific associations between political attitudes, demographic characteristics, and vote choice. While party identification, operational ideology, and racial resentment appear to function as common correlates of Republican support, other variables reflect the contingent nature of political meaning across national-origin lines. These results reinforce the need to interpret Asian American political behavior not as uniformly structured, but as shaped through layered and context-specific combinations of structural incorporation and racial positioning.

7.1.3. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Party Identification and Presidential Vote Choice Across National Origin

In both the party identification (Table 7-3) and vote choice models (Table 7-4), the interaction between education and racial resentment does not reach statistical significance for any of the three national-origin subgroups. The interaction coefficients remain modest, with large standard errors across all models, pointing to considerable uncertainty in the estimated relationships. For party identification, none of the interactions approach conventional thresholds for statistical significance. These results imply that the association between racial resentment and political orientation does not consistently vary by level of educational attainment within East, South, or Southeast Asian American populations.

This absence of statistically meaningful moderation challenges the expectation that education, understood here as a primary indicator of structural integration, alters the relationship between racial resentment and political orientation. Although education is often associated with greater access to civic resources and exposure to dominant political norms, the current results do not suggest that it differentiates the connection between racialized attitudes and partisan preferences within the Asian American population. One possible explanation is that the influence of education is shaped by subgroup-specific experiences with political incorporation, institutional barriers, or racial positioning, which may limit its capacity to reshape responses to marginalization. It is also possible that the relationship between racial resentment—an indication of how individuals position themselves in relation to structural racism and racial group claims—and political orientation remains largely consistent across educational levels.

Alternatively, variation may exist but remain difficult to detect given sample limitations.

Table 7-3. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Asian Americans by National Origin

	Party Identification		
	East	South	Southeast
Education	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)
Racial Resentment	0.21** (0.06)	0.32 (0.17)	0.27** (0.10)
Education × Racial Resentment	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.13)
Constant	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.20* (0.09)	-0.13 (0.07)
Observations	1,995	621	741
R ²	0.55	0.36	0.52
Adjusted R ²	0.54	0.33	0.51

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 7-4. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Asian American National Origin Groups in Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate		
	East	South	Southeast
Education	-2.48 (1.57)	2.80 (4.57)	-0.75 (2.20)
Racial Resentment	2.47 (3.14)	-0.04 (8.08)	1.33 (3.91)
Education × Racial Resentment	4.38 (4.04)	7.90 (9.18)	2.66 (5.32)
Constant	-7.00** (1.63)	-7.83 (4.50)	-9.52** (3.01)
Observations	787	195	274
Log Likelihood	-128.98	-40.39	-48.39
Akaike Inf. Crit.	299.95	122.78	138.78

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * p < 0.05.

In any case, the results point to a relatively uniform relationship between marginalization and political orientation across levels of structural integration, highlighting the importance of examining additional dimensions of group experience that may better explain variation in political expression among Asian Americans.

7.2. Immigration Status

This subsection investigates how immigration status—distinguishing between native-born and foreign-born Asian Americans—is associated with political orientation, focusing on both party identification and presidential vote choice. Nativity reflects divergent pathways into the political system, with native-born individuals typically exposed to early-life socialization within U.S. institutions, while foreign-born individuals engage the political environment through later-life incorporation. To evaluate whether these distinct experiences correspond with differences in partisan alignment, separate models are estimated for each group. Additionally, this section examines whether the relationship between racial resentment, understood as an expression of group-based marginalization, and political behavior varies by level of education, a core indicator of structural integration. This analysis considers whether the interaction between incorporation and marginalization differs across nativity groups, contributing to a better understanding of how political identity is constructed within stratified contexts of belonging.

7.2.1. Basic Model of Party Identification

Figure 7-2 shows the mean values of party identification among Asian Americans, divided by immigration status. The y-axis represents the average partisan position on a 0–1 scale, where 0 indicates strong Democratic identification and 1 denotes strong Republican identification. Each point reflects the group mean, and vertical bars indicate standard errors based on subgroup variability and sample size. Narrow intervals suggest greater precision.

Foreign-born Asian Americans report a mean score of 0.38, while native-born Asian Americans register slightly lower at 0.35. Although a numerical difference appears, both means fall well below the midpoint of the scale. This consistent proximity to the Democratic end suggests limited variation in partisan position based on immigration status. Despite distinct nativity backgrounds, both groups distance themselves from Republican identification. The absence of a substantive divide reinforces the broader finding that Asian Americans, regardless of immigration history, tend to adopt similar partisan orientations.

Table 7-2 presents regression models estimating the associations between key predictors and party identification, separately for native-born and foreign-born Asian Americans. These models examine how structural indicators, attitudinal predispositions, and demographic characteristics correspond with partisan orientation, allowing for a comparison of political identity formation across distinct incorporation pathways. Within the framework of integration and marginalization, nativity implies differing points of entry into the American political system, early socialization through institutions for the native-born, and later-life adaptation for the foreign-born. These models help examine whether these divergent trajectories correspond with different configurations of party identification.




Figure 7-3. Mean Party Identification by Immigration Status

The analysis of party identification by immigration status confirms a consistent association with ideological orientation and racial resentment across both native- and foreign-born Asian Americans. These relationships hold in pooled CES samples from 2016 through 2022. While the sample size for each group in individual years limits disaggregated regression models, the extended time span of the CES facilitates a clearer picture of long-term consistency. In contrast to datasets like CMPS, NAAS, or AAPI surveys—which center on presidential cycles—the CES includes midterm respondents, expanding the empirical scope and enabling a more complete comparison over time. This comprehensive coverage helps clarify that shared attitudinal indicators, rather than nativity-based distinctions, structure party identification within the Asian American electorate.

Table 7-5. Determinants of Party Identification by Immigration Background Among Asian Americans

	Party Identification	
	Native-born	Foreign-born
South	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.02)
Southeast	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age	-0.001* (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.001)
Male	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Income	0.07* (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Education	-0.002 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Religiosity	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Self-reported Ideology	0.49* (0.03)	0.51* (0.03)
Operational Ideology	0.45* (0.04)	0.44* (0.05)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.07* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
National Economic Evaluation	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Racial Resentment	0.13* (0.03)	0.18* (0.04)
Political Interest	0.004 (0.01)	-0.0001 (0.01)
Political Knowledge	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Midwest	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
South	0.06* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
West	0.03 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Year: 2018	0.001 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Year: 2020	0.003 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Year: 2022	-0.01 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
Constant	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.14** (0.05)
Observations	1,751	1,317
R ²	0.52	0.50
Adjusted R ²	0.51	0.50

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. * p < 0.05.

Several variables show no statistically significant associations with party identification in either model. These include Southeast Asian origin, education, religiosity, national and personal economic evaluations, and political interest. The consistent absence of statistical relationships across nativity groups suggests that these indicators do not differentiate partisan identity in a meaningful or stable way once other factors are included. For instance, educational attainment, often treated as a critical dimension of structural integration, does not correspond with party identification in either model, pointing to the possibility that its political relevance is contingent, indirect, or filtered through subgroup-specific experiences. Similarly, the null results for religiosity and economic evaluations suggest that neither belief systems nor material considerations systematically correspond with partisan identification within the Asian American electorate, regardless of immigrant background.

By contrast, three variables are positively and significantly associated with Republican identification in both the native-born and foreign-born models. Self-reported ideology and operational ideology are strongly related to Republican identification in both groups, reinforcing the role of ideological orientation as a consistent anchor in partisan identity. The nearly identical strength of these associations across nativity groups suggests that both symbolic and issue-based ideological identification remain stable correlates of party identification, regardless of differences in political socialization or institutional exposure. Racial resentment, interpreted here as a marker of political marginalization, capturing the degree to which individuals reject race-conscious claims or minimize structural inequality, is also positively associated with Republican identification in both models. This result points to the broad reach of racialized political meaning across immigrant and U.S.-born Asian Americans, even in the absence of uniform structural positioning.

Several variables show statistically significant associations with party identification in only one of the two nativity models, underscoring internal differentiation within the Asian American electorate. Among native-born individuals, younger respondents, men, and those with higher income are more likely to identify as Republican, suggesting that generational position, gender, and economic status may carry more partisan relevance for those more fully embedded in U.S. institutions. Presidential job approval and residence in the South are also associated with lower and higher Republican identification, respectively, aligning with broader patterns in partisan geography and executive evaluation. In contrast, the foreign-born model shows fewer significant associations. South Asian origin is linked to lower Republican identification relative to East Asians, and political knowledge is positively associated with Republican alignment, possibly indicating a closer correspondence between ideological information and partisan choice in this group. These distinctions highlight how political identity is formed through uneven pathways of incorporation and group-specific experiences with racial and institutional structures.

These models underline both shared and distinct pathways of partisan alignment across immigration status. While ideological orientation and racial resentment consistently correspond with Republican identification in both groups, other factors such as age, income, and political knowledge, show it nativity-specific associations. These findings strengthen the need to interpret Asian American political identity as a product of stratified incorporation, where structural integration and racialized positioning interact in contingent and group-specific ways.

7.2.2. Basic Model of Presidential Vote Choice

Figure 7-4 shows the average proportion of Asian American respondents who reported voting for the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, separated by immigration status. The y-axis ranges from 0 to 1, with each point indicating the group's mean vote share and vertical bars representing standard errors. These intervals indicate the level of estimate precision based on response variation and sample size.

In examining presidential vote choice by immigration status, the findings indicate that party identification, operational ideology, and racial resentment consistently associate with support for the Republican presidential candidate, regardless of whether respondents were native- or foreign-born. In contrast, self-reported ideology does not show a consistent association. These conclusions are based on pooled CES data from 2016 and 2020, as individual-year subgroup samples do not support reliable regression estimates. Previous studies have often focused on single-election cycles or emphasized differences by nativity. In contrast, this analysis underlines the stability of core attitudinal indicators across immigration status. The inclusion of midterm and presidential election cycles within the CES makes possible an expanded investigation into electoral behavior that past datasets could not capture. This scope allows for a more complete understanding of political cohesiveness across Asian Americans with different immigration backgrounds.

The foreign-born group records a Republican vote share of 0.32, while the native-born group registers a lower proportion at 0.24. Although the averages differ slightly, both groups report values well below the midpoint, pointing to low overall support for the Republican candidate. This consistency reinforces the broader tendency within the Asian American




Figure 7-4. Proportion Voting Republican by Asian American Immigration Status

population to support Democratic presidential candidates. Regardless of nativity, respondents express limited identification with Republican electoral options, suggesting that differences in migration experience do not produce distinct partisan divides in presidential vote choice.

Table 7-6 presents the logistic regression results estimating Republican presidential vote choice separately for native-born and foreign-born Asian American respondents. The dependent variable is coded as a binary outcome indicating support for the Republican candidate. Each model includes main political attitudes, racial resentment, and standard demographic characteristics. Log-odds coefficients are reported alongside standard errors in parentheses. The table identifies statistically significant associations using conventional thresholds. The model

structure facilitates comparison across nativity groups to evaluate whether pathways of structural incorporation and racialized experience correspond with distinct electoral tendencies.

Most variables in the model show no statistically significant association with Republican vote choice across either native-born or foreign-born Asian Americans. These include national origin, age, gender, income, education, self-reported ideology, presidential job approval, national and personal economic evaluations, political interest, and political knowledge. The absence of statistically meaningful associations for these variables indicates that, once core political predispositions and racial attitudes are considered, demographic and contextual characteristics do not consistently differentiate vote choice. Notably, education, income, and economic evaluations—often associated with electoral behavior, do not show independent associations here, suggesting that partisanship and issue-based orientation may occupy a more immediate position in vote choice formation than class-linked factors within this electorate.

In contrast, three variables demonstrate statistically significant and consistent associations with Republican vote choice across both groups. Party identification maintains a strong positive relationship with candidate support, reinforcing its central role in shaping electoral alignment. This result holds across nativity groups, indicating that party identification provides a stable reference point regardless of immigration status. Operational ideology also displays a significant association with Republican support, indicating that policy preferences align with vote choice across native-born and foreign-born Asian Americans.

Racial resentment remains a significant predictor in both models, with higher levels associated with greater support for the Republican candidate. This association points to the relevance of racialized worldviews in organizing political orientation across both native-born and foreign-born Asian Americans. The consistency of this relationship supports that attitudes related

Table 7-6. Determinants of Republican Vote Choice by Immigration Background among Asian Americans

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate	
	Native-born	Foreign-born
South	0.003 (0.67)	-0.07 (0.48)
Southeast	-0.39 (0.52)	0.26 (0.43)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Male	-0.61 (0.40)	-0.20 (0.36)
Income	0.30 (0.91)	0.79 (0.94)
Education	-0.81 (0.78)	0.38 (0.80)
Religiosity	1.54** (0.52)	1.12* (0.56)
Party Identification	4.47** (0.79)	3.55** (0.62)
Self-reported Ideology	0.46 (1.21)	0.89 (0.91)
Operational Ideology	8.98** (1.55)	7.36** (1.46)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.08 (0.79)	0.08 (0.76)
National Economic Evaluation	0.37 (0.84)	-0.64 (0.71)
Personal Economic Evaluation	1.11 (0.88)	-0.33 (0.89)
Racial Resentment	5.17** (1.11)	3.99** (1.05)
Political Interest	0.26 (0.23)	-0.31 (0.22)
Political Knowledge	0.13 (0.23)	0.41 (0.24)
Midwest	-1.30 (0.80)	-0.20 (0.60)
South	-1.07 (0.70)	0.52 (0.52)
West	-0.26 (0.55)	0.52 (0.50)
Year: 2020	-0.65 (0.45)	-0.40 (0.41)
Constant	-9.20** (1.59)	-7.47** (1.35)
Observations	715	541
Log Likelihood	-108.87	-125.75
Akaike Inf. Crit.	259.75	293.50

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. * $p < 0.05$.

to racial hierarchy function as a persistent basis of political differentiation within the Asian American electorate.

Religiosity reaches statistical significance in both models, with a slightly stronger association observed among native-born individuals. This result shows that religious attachment may hold different political relevance depending on generational context. In particular, it may operate as a source of social belonging that aligns with conservative electoral preferences. The presence of this association across nativity groups underlines the broader relevance of religious identity in shaping political behavior within the Asian American electorate.

7.2.3. Moderating Effect of Education on the Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Party Identification and Presidential Vote Choice Across Immigration Status

In the party identification model (Table 7-7), the interaction between education and racial resentment produces divergent results by immigration background. Among native-born Asian Americans, the interaction term is negative but not statistically significant. This outcome indicates that educational attainment does not substantially change the association between racial resentment and partisan identity in this group. Among foreign-born individuals, however, the interaction is both negative and statistically significant. This result suggests that the positive association between racial resentment and Republican identification weakens as education increases. One interpretation is that higher education among the foreign-born may correspond with greater exposure to civic norms or institutional values that orient individuals away from exclusionary attitudes.

Table 7-7. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Asian Americans by Immigration Status

	Party Identification	
	Native-born	Foreign-born
Education	0.03 (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)
Racial Resentment	0.20** (0.07)	0.36** (0.09)
Education × Racial Resentment	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.23* (0.11)
Constant	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.20** (0.06)
Observations	1,751	1,317
R ²	0.52	0.51
Adjusted R ²	0.52	0.50

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table 7-8. The Effect of Education and Racial Resentment on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates by Immigration Status among Asian Americans in Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate	
	Native-born	Foreign-born
Education	-1.54 (1.42)	-1.70 (1.69)
Racial Resentment	3.50 (2.88)	-0.14 (3.07)
Education × Racial Resentment	2.35 (3.79)	5.41 (3.91)
Constant	-8.67** (1.78)	-5.89** (1.73)
Observations	715	541
Log Likelihood	-108.68	-124.87
Akaike Inf. Crit.	261.37	293.74

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * p < 0.05.

In the presidential vote choice model (Table 7-8), the interaction term does not reach statistical significance for either native-born or foreign-born respondents. Although the coefficients are sizable, the large standard errors point to considerable uncertainty in the estimates. These results indicate that education does not consistently alter the association between racial resentment and vote choice in this context. Campaign-specific considerations, candidate perceptions, and contemporaneous racialized events may introduce variability that weakens the observable link between long-term predispositions and vote choice. While education moderates the relationship between racial resentment and party identification among the foreign-born, the same pattern is not observed in vote choice outcomes.

7.3. Chapter Summary

This chapter examined whether political divisions exist within the Asian American population based on national origin and immigration status. Descriptive figures and regression models both indicate a consistent orientation: Asian Americans across East, South, and Southeast Asian subgroups, as well as across native- and foreign-born status, display Democratic-leaning party identification and low support for Republican presidential candidates. While subgroup averages show modest variation, no substantial divergence appears across these classifications. The analyses challenge expectations of fragmentation by demonstrating that these demographic distinctions do not produce meaningful departures in partisan behavior.

The regression models further reinforce this interpretation. Regardless of national origin or nativity, self-reported ideology, operational ideology, and racial resentment show consistent associations with party identification. Similarly, operational ideology, racial resentment, and

party identification correspond with presidential vote choice, whereas self-reported ideology does not. While prior studies often assert that national origin or immigration status functions as a primary factor in shaping political orientations, these findings present a counterpoint: the determinants of partisan outcomes remain structurally consistent across the Asian American population.

Lastly, moderation analyses reveal minimal evidence that education alters the relationship between racial resentment and political outcomes. Except for a modest interaction effect in the foreign-born sample for party identification, education does not consistently differentiate the relationship between core attitudinal variables and either party identification or presidential vote choice. Although the use of pooled data prevents isolating election-specific contexts such as 2020, future research may extend this inquiry with cycle-specific samples to further examine potential variation by immigration status.

8. Conclusion

This dissertation proposes a framework to explain how Asian Americans develop political attitudes and behaviors by focusing on the tension between two forces: their growing socioeconomic integration into American society and their continued racial exclusion. This dual process of incorporation and marginalization operates through distinct pathways. On one side, integration is supported by factors such as educational and occupational achievement, residential mobility, and participation in mainstream social networks. On the other side, marginalization persists through the racialization of group identity, experiences with discrimination, exclusion from dominant narratives, and interactions with broader racial minority communities whether through solidarity, comparison, or participation in social movements. This simultaneous positioning within and outside of dominant political life contributes to a political outlook that is fluid, marked by ambiguity, and shaped by the specific context in which attitudes are formed and expressed.

To evaluate this framework, this dissertation hypothesizes that education treated as a proxy for integration, moderates the relationship between core attitudinal factors and both party identification and presidential vote choice. In most electoral contexts, it is hypothesized that education will have limited influence in altering partisan outcomes, as racialized group identity and exclusionary experiences often take precedence. However, this moderating effect is not expected to be consistent. During moments of heightened racial salience such as the 2020 election, education is expected to play a more active role. Specifically, education may operate as filters that shape how individuals process ideological and racial cues, potentially weakening the link between conservative predispositions and Republican identification. Under such conditions,

education is hypothesized to disrupt straightforward attitudinal sorting and generate more context-sensitive partisan responses.

Through this analytical structure, the dissertation examined how Asian Americans respond to, negotiate with, or distance themselves from partisan cues. Their political outlook takes form through a layered process filtered through experiences of belonging and exclusion, rather than a simple conversion of attitudes into behavior.

Findings from the empirical analyses offer confirmation—and complication—of the proposed mechanisms operate under varying electoral conditions. Across both party identification and presidential vote choice models, the findings point to a meaningful divide between symbolic ideology and operational policy attitudes. While self-identified conservatism corresponds with Republican identification, it lacks explanatory power in models of presidential vote choice. In contrast, conservative policy preferences consistently correspond with Republican partisanship and electoral support. Racial resentment also demonstrates consistent associations across both outcomes. Notably, compared to other racial groups, only these specific variables—operational ideology and racial resentment—consistently associate with both partisan identity and vote choice for Asian Americans, while self-reported ideology does not associate with vote choice across election cycles. These findings hold across both presidential and midterm election contexts, demonstrating the persistence of these relationships regardless of temporal or institutional variation. These trends reinforce the claim that political attitudes for Asian Americans operate through multiple dimensions—ideological labeling, policy orientation, and racial positioning—that do not converge in uniform ways. Importantly, this consistency appears across subgroup boundaries, as the same relationships are observed regardless of national origin or immigration status.

A key implication of these findings lies in the inconsistent role of education in forming party identification among Asian Americans. While education is traditionally assumed to consolidate ideological clarity and partisan behavior, their effects among Asian Americans remain conditional and uneven. Across most election cycles, education do not substantially modify the relationship between ideological or racial attitudes and Republican identification. Their limited interaction effects mirror patterns observed in racially marginalized groups in which identity-based considerations often take precedence over resource-driven variation.

However, deviations emerge in specific electoral contexts. In 2020, conditions marked by intensified racialization created an environment in which political resources assumed a more visible role. During this period, education began to differentiate patterns of party identification. In contrast to earlier cycles that observed limited differentiation based on political resources, higher levels of education and cognitive engagement were associated with weaker associations between conservative attitudes and Republican identification. These results point to a departure from earlier parallels with other racially marginalized groups and instead resemble trends more commonly observed among White respondents for whom political sophistication often filters and reframes partisan cues. This shift underscores how the content and function of political resources are shaped not only by individual capacity but also in relation to external political conditions, particularly under racially charged discourse. Asian Americans with greater political sophistication may not simply internalize partisan messages; instead, they assess the racial implications embedded in elite rhetoric, especially when such rhetoric targets their own community. In these cycles, political resources operated less as tools of partisan reinforcement and more as mechanisms of critical distance, bringing their role into closer correspondence with

tendencies observed among higher-resource White voters. In presidential vote choice models, however, the moderating effects of education appear limited, including during the 2020 cycle.

As indicated in the results, the moderating role of education within Asian American population often indicates configurations commonly found in Black and Hispanic communities in which identity-based considerations outweigh distinctions tied to education. Yet in specific contexts, these dynamics shift. Political sophistication begins to function as a filter in the development of party identification—paralleling patterns more frequently observed among White respondents. These changes reinforce the central theoretical claim that Asian American political attitudes and behaviors develop not through a single ideological or identity-based axis, but through the interaction of institutional incorporation and racialized exclusion. This dual process produces outcomes that are contingent and variable, formed simultaneously by access to political resources and the persistent negotiation of group boundaries in American political life.

But, to interpret these results with appropriate caution, it is necessary to acknowledge the study's limitations. First, the use of survey data—primarily from the Cooperative Election Study (CES)—imposes constraints on the scope and depth of measurement. Main concepts such as racialization, perceived exclusion, and the ambiguity of political identity are indirectly inferred through available proxies rather than measured directly. The CES also lacks sufficient disaggregation of Asian American subgroups, limiting the ability to explore intra-group variation formed by localized context, and the contextual experience of racialization.

Second, they remain based on observational data, and although the analyses illuminate the conditional role of political resources, they do not permit definitive causal claims. As such, the study cannot make definitive causal claims regarding the relationships between ideology, racial attitudes, and partisan outcomes. Although the use of interaction terms and multi-cycle

models enhances internal validity, unobserved confounders and selection dynamics remain a concern. These methodological constraints do not undermine the core findings but point to the need for future research using mixed methods, longitudinal panel data, and more tailored survey instruments to deepen understanding of political identity formation under racialized conditions. Addressing these gaps would further clarify how institutional incorporation and marginalization jointly inform the partisan outlook of Asian Americans.

Despite these limitations, this dissertation offers several contributions to the study of political behavior and racial politics. Theoretically, it advances a more contingent account of assimilation by integrating mechanisms of conditional political expression, demonstrating how Asian American political orientations emerge not from linear incorporation but through an ongoing negotiation between institutional access and racialized exclusion. This framework moves beyond traditional models of group-based sorting by foregrounding the role of context, identity ambiguity, and racial positioning in shaping both party identification and vote choice.

Methodologically, this project uses multi-cycle national survey data to examine temporal shifts in political behavior among Asian Americans, a population frequently treated as uniform in prior political science research. By drawing from several election years, the analysis captures fluctuations in partisan orientation and variation in the influence of political resources under distinct political and social conditions. Unlike prior research based on datasets limited to presidential contests, this study incorporates the CES, which includes both midterm and presidential elections. The inclusion of multiple electoral environments strengthens the evaluation of year-specific trends in political behavior. Moreover, the CES provides subgroup identifiers such as national origin and immigration status, which make it possible to examine

distinctions within the Asian American population and evaluate the degree of political cohesiveness across subgroups.

Empirically, the findings complicate prevailing assumptions about ideological consistency and immigrant political loyalty. This study challenges narratives of fixed partisan affiliation such as the “immigrant Democrat” trope (Chan et al., 2024; Kim, 2024), by demonstrating that political attitude and behavior within Asian American communities is fluid, context-sensitive, and frequently ambivalent, structured through both strategic evaluation and racialized positioning.

Collectively, these contributions prompt reconsideration of how race, cognition, and structural signals interact. The analysis underlines the need to move beyond static models of political attitude and behavior and attend deeply with the layered relationship between racial identity, informational capacity, and electoral context, particularly in a political moment shaped by instability, perceived group threat, and contested belonging. Grasping these processes is critical for capturing the complexity of Asian American political life, and for contributing to a more inclusive and responsive account of democratic representation in an era of deepening inequality.

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Appendix A. Summary Statistics

Table A1. Summary Statistics (Continuous Variables)

	Variables	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
All Respondents	Party Identification	0.4	0.4	0	1
	Age	50.2	17.1	18	98
	Income	0.4	0.2	0	1
	Education	0.5	0.3	0	1
	Religiosity	0.6	0.4	0	1
	Self-reported Ideology	0.5	0.3	0	1
	Operational Ideology	0.5	0.3	0	1
	Racial Resentment	0.4	0.3	0	1
	Political Interest	0.8	0.3	0	1
	Political Knowledge	0.7	0.4	0	1
	Presidential Job Approval	0.3	0.2	0	1
	National Economic Evaluation	0.4	0.3	0	1
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.5	0.3	0	1	
Asian American	Party Identification	0.4	0.3	0	1
	Age	38.3	15	18	94
	Income	0.4	0.2	0	1
	Education	0.7	0.3	0	1
	Religiosity	0.5	0.4	0	1
	Self-reported Ideology	0.4	0.2	0	1
	Operational Ideology	0.4	0.2	0	1
	Racial Resentment	0.4	0.3	0	1
	Political Interest	0.6	0.3	0	1
	Political Knowledge	0.6	0.4	0	1
	Presidential Job Approval	0.3	0.2	0	1
	National Economic Evaluation	0.4	0.3	0	1
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.5	0.2	0	1	

Table A2. Summary Statistics (Categorical Variables)

	Variables	Value	Freq.	Percent	Value	Freq.	Percent
All Respondents	Republican Voting	<i>Selected</i>	53751	45.2%	<i>Non-selected</i>	65081	54.8%
	Gender	<i>Male</i>	172681	53.9%	<i>Female</i>	147652	46.1%
	Race	<i>Asian</i>	8884	2.7%	<i>Black</i>	37164	11.3%
		<i>White</i>	241431	73.6%	<i>Hispanic</i>	25502	7.8%
		<i>Others</i>	15184	4.6%			
	Foreign-born Status	<i>Foreign</i>	22884	7.0%	<i>Native</i>	304441	93.0%
	Region	<i>Northeast</i>	56579	18.9%	<i>South</i>	108284	36.2%
<i>Midwest</i>		67271	22.5%	<i>West</i>	66821	22.4%	
Asian American	Republican Voting	<i>Selected</i>	718	27.3%	<i>Non-selected</i>	1911	72.7%
	Gender	<i>Male</i>	4552	52.3%	<i>Female</i>	4144	47.7%
	Foreign-born Status	<i>Foreign</i>	4339	49.0%	<i>Native</i>	4520	51.0%
	Region	<i>Northeast</i>	1507	19.1%	<i>South</i>	1801	22.8%
		<i>Midwest</i>	1040	13.1%	<i>West</i>	3562	45.0%

Question Wordings for Measurement

1) Party Identification

- Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?
- Strong Democrat (=0); Not very strong Democrat; Lean Democrat; Independent; Lean Republican; Not very strong Republican; Strong Republican (=1)

2) Republican Voting

- For which candidate for President of the United States did you vote?
- Donald Trump (=1) Otherwise (=0)

3) Race

- What racial or ethnic group best describes you?
- Respondents could choose among the following: White; Black; Hispanic; Asian; Others (Native American; Middle Eastern; Two or more races; Other)

4) Gender (Male)

- What is your gender?
- Female (=0); Male (=1)

5) Income

- Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?
- Less than \$10,000 (=0); \$10,000 - \$19,999; \$20,000 - \$29,999; \$30,000 - \$39,999; \$40,000 - \$49,999; \$50,000 - \$59,999; \$60,000 - \$69,999; \$70,000 - \$79,999; \$80,000 - \$99,999; \$100,000 - \$119,999; \$120,000 - \$149,999; \$150,000 - \$199,999; \$200,000 - \$249,999; \$250,000 - \$349,999; \$350,000 - \$499,999; \$500,000 or more (=1)

6) Education

- What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- No HS (=0); High school graduate; Some college 2-year; 4-year; Post-grad (=1)

7) Foreign-born Status

- *Native-born* (=0), I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant; My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant; My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA
- Foreign-born (=1), I am an immigrant to the USA but not a citizen; I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen

8) Religiosity

- Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?
- Never (=0); Seldom; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; Once a week; More than once a week (=1)

9) Self-reported Ideology

- In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?
- Very liberal (=0); Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very Conservative (=1)

10) Operational Ideology

- Averages together respondents' self-placement on SUPPORT/OPPOSE questions on the following issues: *Immigration; Abortion; Gun Control; Environmental Protection; and Crime (Policing)*
- *Immigration: What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following?*
- *On the issue of abortion (gun regulation, environmental protection, and policing) do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Support or Oppose*

11) Political Interest

- Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs ...
- Hardly at all (=0); Only now and then; Some of the time; Most of the time (=1)

12) Political Knowledge

- In the CES survey, I code as 1 a respondent's answer to each of the questions regarding the party affiliation of their elected officials if it matches the validated variables; if it does not match, I code each one as 0. I include the "Don't Know" and "Never heard of" in the analysis and code them as 0, which means that the respondents do not provide any information.
- CC22_310a CC22_310b; CC20_310a CC20_310b; CC18_309a CC18_309b; CC16_321a CC16_321b (questions CC16_340g- CC16_340h)

13) Presidential Job Approval

- Do you approve of the way each is doing their job? *President*
- Strongly disapprove (=0); Somewhat disapprove; Somewhat approve; Strongly approve (=1)

14) National Economic Evaluation

- Would you say that OVER THE PAST YEAR the nation's economy has ...
- Gotten much worse (=0); Gotten somewhat worse; Stayed about the same; Gotten somewhat better; Gotten much better (=1)

15) Personal Economic Evaluation

- OVER THE PAST YEAR, has your household's annual income...?
- Decreased a lot (=0); Decreased somewhat; Stayed about the same; Increased somewhat; Increased a lot (=1)

16) Racial Resentment

- Averages together respondents' self-placement on AGREE/DISAGREE questions on the racial resentment:
- How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 1) *Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same.* 2) *Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.* 3) *I resent when Whites deny the existence of racial discrimination.* 4) *Whites get away with offenses that African Americans would never get away with.* 5) *Whites do not go to great lengths to understand the problems African Americans face.*

17) Region

- In which census region do you live?
- Northeast; Midwest; South; West

18) Asian National Origin

- From which country or region do you trace your heritage or ancestry? (Check all that apply)
- China; Japan; Korea; Taiwan; India; Pakistan; Vietnam; Philippines; Hmong

Appendix B. Moderating Effect of Political Interest/Knowledge on Party Identification

B.1. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on the Relationship Between Self-Reported Ideology and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

The tables examine how political interest moderates the relationship between self-reported ideology and party identification, focusing on Asian Americans while comparing their trends with Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. Additionally, it draws connections to the moderating effects of education, indicating similarities and contrasts across groups.

For Asian Americans, self-reported ideology is a consistent predictor of party identification, but political interest as a moderator becomes significant only during the Trump administration in 2020 ($-0.20, p < 0.05$). Politically engaged Asian conservatives were less likely to align with the Republican Party during this period, likely reflecting resistance to Trump-era rhetoric and policies. In other years, the interaction remains insignificant, paralleling the limited moderating role of education on ideological alignment for Asian Americans, where broader social and political factors outweigh these influences. Both education and political interest show conditional effects that only emerge under specific political contexts.

Compared to Whites, whose political interest consistently moderates ideological alignment across all administrations, Asian Americans exhibit more sporadic effects. For Whites, political interest mitigates partisan polarization even under polarizing leaders like Trump, while education shows similarly persistent effects, especially in later years when it weakens conservative-Republican alignment. Black Americans demonstrate significant moderation by political interest

only under Obama, with the effect disappearing under Trump and Biden, similar to the minimal role of education observed for this group. For Hispanics, both political interest and education show inconsistent moderating effects, with significant impacts primarily under Obama and occasional reversals under Trump, reflecting their group's diverse and evolving political alignment.

The moderating effects of political interest and education on ideological alignment are more conditional and context-dependent for Asian Americans, with significant impacts emerging primarily during the Trump administration. This contrasts with Whites, where both political interest and education consistently influence partisan alignment, and Blacks and Hispanics, who display sporadic or minimal effects. These findings emphasize the importance of racialized experiences and specific political contexts in shaping how ideology interacts with political engagement and education to influence party identification.

Figure B-1 visualizes the predicted probability of Republican identification among Asian Americans based on ideological self-placement, while considering differences in political interest. The x-axis measures ideological orientation, ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative positions, and the y-axis represents the predicted probability of identifying as Republican. Two distinct trend lines capture the effect of low vs. high political interest, accompanied by 95% confidence intervals. The predictions are derived from regression results presented in Table B-1-1, with all models adjusting for a consistent set of controls.

Table B-1-1. The Effect of Political Interest and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.05 (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Self-reported Ideology	0.56* (0.11)	0.49* (0.09)	0.55* (0.08)	0.62* (0.08)	0.42* (0.07)
Political Interest × Self-reported Ideology	-0.02 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.20* (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)
Constant	-0.16* (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	-0.17* (0.05)	-0.15* (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.53	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-1-2. The Effect of Political Interest and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.003 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)
Self-reported Ideology	0.62* (0.02)	0.58* (0.02)	0.53* (0.02)	0.55* (0.02)	0.60* (0.02)
Political Interest × Self-reported Ideology	0.03 (0.02)	-0.10* (0.02)	-0.08* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.02)	-0.14* (0.02)
Constant	0.04* (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-1-3. The Effect of Political Interest and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.11*	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Self-reported Ideology	0.13*	0.11*	0.12*	0.26*	0.23*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Political Interest × Self-reported Ideology	0.22*	0.10*	0.19*	-0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.24*	0.19*	0.004	0.03	0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-1-4. The Effect of Political Interest and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04	0.04	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Self-reported Ideology	0.39*	0.37*	0.29*	0.47*	0.39*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Political Interest × Self-reported Ideology	0.16*	0.03	0.11	-0.05	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	0.09	0.05	-0.17*	-0.14*	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

The Effect of Ideology on Asian American Party Identification (2014-2022)
Moderated by Political Interest




Figure B-1. The Effect of Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification for Asian Americans with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Levels of Political Interest. The x-axis represents ideological self-placement, ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of identifying with the Republican Party. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of political interest, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of political interest. Each panel represents a different election year from 2014 to 2022.

While all years show a positive association between conservatism and Republican identification, the 2020 panel stands out. The gap between politically interested and uninterested individuals is more noticeable across ideological positions, especially at the conservative end of the spectrum. Unlike previous years where political interest exerted minimal differentiation, 2020 shows a distinct divergence, suggesting that political engagement meaningfully shaped the translation of ideological beliefs into party identification during this period.

In 2020, Asian Americans with strong conservative leanings and low political interest had a 67.2% predicted probability of identifying as Republican, compared to 54.3% for those with high interest—a striking reversal of expectations. Among strong liberals, those with low interest were predicted at just 5.2%, while high-interest liberals were modestly higher at 12.7%. This counterintuitive shift—where low-interest conservatives display greater partisan alignment than their more politically engaged counterparts—signals a rare departure from typical patterns in political behavior, where interest often amplifies ideological consistency.

This unexpected finding resonates with your broader framework that emphasizes the interplay of assimilation and marginalization in shaping Asian American political identity. Political interest, usually associated with ideological clarity, here appears to complicate the ideological-partisan connection. One possible explanation is that during 2020—a year marked by COVID-19, surging anti-Asian hate incidents, and highly polarized national rhetoric—politically engaged Asian Americans confronted cross-cutting pressures. Heightened awareness of racialization and social positioning may have led politically interested conservatives to question Republican alignment, softening their partisan attachments. Conversely, those with lower political interest may have relied more on simplified ideological cues, reinforcing the conventional association between conservatism and Republican identification. This divergence

underscores how contextual forces and lived racialized experiences shape how ideology is converted into partisan identity, particularly among minority communities navigating both integration and exclusion.

B.2. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on the Relationship Between Operational Ideology and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section investigates how political interest moderates the relationship between operational ideology and party identification, focusing on Asian Americans and drawing comparisons with Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. The analysis demonstrates similarities and contrasts in the moderating effects of political interest across these groups, particularly in the context of racialized experiences and partisan dynamics.

Operational ideology is a consistent predictor of party identification for Asian Americans, with significant positive effects across most years (e.g., 0.26 in 2016 to 0.59 in 2022, $p < 0.05$). However, the interaction between political interest and operational ideology remains insignificant (e.g., -0.19 in 2018, -0.06 in 2020). This suggests that political engagement does not meaningfully alter the relationship between conservative policy stances and Republican alignment. Similarly, the moderating effect of education on operational ideology for Asian Americans was also insignificant, reinforcing the idea that pragmatic policy preferences rather than heightened engagement or educational attainment drive their partisan alignment. Unlike with self-reported ideology, where political interest significantly weakened the Republican alignment of engaged conservatives during the Trump administration, operational ideology demonstrates greater stability, reflecting a focus on issue-based pragmatism.

Table B-2-1. The Effect of Political Interest and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.03 (0.11)	0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Operational Ideology	0.14 (0.11)	0.59* (0.14)	0.48* (0.12)	0.26* (0.11)	0.48* (0.10)
Political Interest × Operational Ideology	0.10 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.003 (0.11)
Constant	-0.11 (0.10)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.17* (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-2-2. The Effect of Political Interest and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Operational Ideology	0.12* (0.02)	0.58* (0.03)	0.48* (0.02)	0.56* (0.02)	0.66* (0.02)
Political Interest × Operational Ideology	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.15* (0.03)	-0.12* (0.02)	-0.11* (0.02)	-0.19* (0.02)
Constant	0.01 (0.02)	0.08* (0.02)	-0.07* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.08* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-2-3. The Effect of Political Interest and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Operational Ideology	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.08)	0.24* (0.07)	0.22* (0.07)	0.29* (0.07)
Political Interest × Operational Ideology	0.09 (0.06)	0.32* (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Constant	0.20* (0.04)	0.24* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.15* (0.03)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-2-4. The Effect of Political Interest and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.15* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.002 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)
Operational Ideology	-0.11 (0.06)	0.42* (0.09)	0.47* (0.08)	0.51* (0.08)	0.56* (0.07)
Political Interest × Operational Ideology	0.28* (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)
Constant	0.16* (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.21* (0.04)	-0.15* (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.38	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

White Americans exhibit consistent and significant moderation of operational ideology by political interest, especially during the Trump administration (e.g., -0.12 in 2018, -0.19 in 2022, $p < 0.05$). This contrasts with Asian Americans' stable relationship between operational ideology and party identification, as political engagement among Whites diminishes their ideological alignment with the Republican Party. Similarly, the moderating effects of education were more clear for Whites, amplifying or tempering ideological alignment depending on the political context, whereas Asian Americans displayed limited variability across these factors. For Black Americans, operational ideology is a weaker predictor of party identification, and the moderating effects of political interest are sporadic, with significant effects observed only in select years, such as 2016 (0.32, $p < 0.05$). This contrasts with Asian Americans' consistent alignment between operational ideology and partisanship, illustrating the stronger role of racialized experiences in stabilizing Black Democratic loyalty. Similar pathways emerge in the moderating effects of education and self-reported ideology for Black Americans, emphasizing the minimal influence of these factors relative to entrenched partisan preferences.

Hispanic Americans display significant alignment between operational ideology and Republican identification, with moderation by political interest showing mixed results (e.g., 0.28 in 2014, -0.13 in 2020). This resembles Asian Americans in the variability of moderation effects, although Hispanics demonstrate greater sensitivity to political and policy contexts, particularly during the Trump administration. Both groups show limited moderating effects of education, reflecting a shared focus on contextual and issue-specific dynamics rather than broad ideological shifts.

The moderating effects of political interest reveal both commonalities and distinctions across racial groups. Asian Americans demonstrate stability in the relationship between

operational ideology and party identification, with limited influence of political interest or education. This contrasts with Whites, where political engagement and education significantly moderate ideological alignment, reflecting dynamic partisan polarization. Black Americans exhibit weak moderation, reinforcing the stability of Democratic loyalty, while Hispanics display context-dependent moderation, aligning them more closely with Asian Americans in their pragmatic responses to political and policy shifts. These findings underscore the complex interplay of ideology, political engagement, and racialized experiences in shaping partisan dynamics.

B.3. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on the Relationship Between Economic Evaluations and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section examines the moderating role of political interest on the relationship between economic evaluations—both national and personal—and party identification across racial groups, with a focus on Asian Americans. The analysis highlights significant differences and similarities between Asian Americans and White, Black, and Hispanic Americans, emphasizing the interaction effects under varying political contexts across the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. While Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans show limited responsiveness to personal economic evaluations, their reactions to national economic conditions diverge, particularly under Democratic leadership. In contrast, White Americans demonstrate the strongest and most consistent effects of political interest on economic evaluations, reflecting a heightened sensitivity to economic conditions. Black Americans remain the most stable in their Democratic alignment, largely unaffected by economic perceptions or political engagement.

Table B-3-1. The Effect of Political Interest and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.21*	-0.004	-0.04	-0.001	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)
National Economic Evaluation	0.12	-0.17	0.10	0.13	-0.23*
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Political Interest × National Economic Evaluation	-0.31*	-0.04	0.05	-0.06	0.21*
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.12	0.01	-0.06	-0.04	0.02
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Political Interest × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.18	-0.09	0.07	-0.0005	-0.004
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Constant	-0.25*	0.10	-0.10	-0.09*	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.34	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-2-2. The Effect of Political Interest and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.04*	-0.04*	0.02	0.002	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.16*	-0.25*	0.27*	0.18*	-0.27*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Political Interest × National Economic Evaluation	-0.05*	0.04	-0.14*	-0.10*	0.13*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.04*	-0.03	0.07*	0.04	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Political Interest × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.06*	0.0001	-0.12*	-0.06*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.01	0.15*	-0.09*	0.03*	0.17*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-2-3. The Effect of Political Interest and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.10*	0.11*	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.01	-0.003	0.14*	0.09*	-0.07*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Political Interest × National Economic Evaluation	-0.14*	-0.17*	0.001	0.0003	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.06	0.01	-0.08	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Political Interest × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.10	-0.08	0.04	-0.0004	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.11*	0.09*	-0.06*	0.04	0.11*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-2-4. The Effect of Political Interest and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.12*	-0.01	0.01	0.05*	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.10	-0.30*	0.14*	0.25*	-0.21*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Political Interest × National Economic Evaluation	-0.20*	-0.02	-0.003	-0.14*	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.01	0.05	-0.09	0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Political Interest × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.08	-0.06	0.05	-0.04	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Constant	-0.03	0.03	-0.22*	-0.15*	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

When comparing the moderating effects of political interest and education, parallels emerge in the stability of Asian Americans' partisan alignment. Both analyses suggest that neither political interest nor education substantially alters the relationship between economic evaluations and party identification for Asian Americans, emphasizing a consistent focus on collective concerns over individual economic circumstances. In contrast, White Americans show consistent moderating effects of both education and political interest, amplifying or mitigating the relationship between economic evaluations and partisan alignment. For Black and Hispanic Americans, the effects of political interest and education are context-dependent, revealing situational variations driven by political environments and policy salience. These findings underscore the complex interplay between political engagement, socioeconomic evaluations, and racialized experiences in shaping partisan alignment.

B.4. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on the Relationship Between Presidential Job Approval and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section examines how political interest moderates the relationship between presidential job approval and party identification across Asian Americans, White Americans, Black Americans, and Hispanic Americans, highlighting variations across the Obama (2014, 2016), Trump (2018, 2020), and Biden (2022) administrations. The analysis emphasizes how political engagement shapes partisan alignment differently across racial groups and political contexts.

Among Asian Americans, political interest most strongly moderates this relationship during the Trump administration (2020), where a significant negative interaction effect (-0.29, $p < 0.05$) indicates that politically engaged individuals were less likely to translate positive

Table B-4-1. The Effect of Political Interest and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)	-0.002 (0.04)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.06 (0.07)	0.25* (0.08)	-0.18* (0.07)
Political Interest × Presidential Job Approval	0.11 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.29* (0.09)	0.09 (0.10)
Constant	-0.13 (0.08)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.17* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.53	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-4-2. The Effect of Political Interest and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.06* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.15* (0.02)	-0.07* (0.02)	0.17* (0.02)	0.22* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Political Interest × Presidential Job Approval	0.24* (0.02)	0.09* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.17* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	0.08* (0.01)	0.16* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.14* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.57	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.57	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-4-3. The Effect of Political Interest and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.11* (0.03)
Political Interest × Presidential Job Approval	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.09* (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Constant	0.16* (0.03)	0.13* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.11* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.30
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-4-4. The Effect of Political Interest and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.13* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	-0.14* (0.05)
Political Interest × Presidential Job Approval	-0.03 (0.08)	0.003 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Constant	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.22* (0.03)	-0.15* (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

evaluations of Trump into Republican alignment. This reflects resistance to Trump's rhetoric and policies among politically aware Asian Americans. By 2022, under Biden, the interaction effect becomes insignificant, suggesting a stabilization in partisan dynamics. Compared to the moderating effect of education, political interest appears more dynamic, particularly in shaping resistance to Republican alignment during polarizing periods like the Trump presidency.

White Americans demonstrate a contrasting result, with political interest consistently amplifying partisan polarization across all administrations, including Obama (0.24, $p < 0.05$ in 2014).

Politically engaged Whites are more likely to align their party identification with their disapproval of the sitting president, differing from Asian Americans, where political interest occasionally mitigates partisan alignment. While education among Whites moderates partisan alignment by softening ideological divides, Asian Americans show a more situational and dynamic influence of political engagement.

Black Americans exhibit minimal and inconsistent effects of political interest, such as during the Obama administration in 2014 (-0.01 , $p < 0.05$), reflecting their strong Democratic alignment, which remains stable regardless of political engagement or presidential evaluations. Similarly, Hispanic Americans display stable tendency, with largely insignificant interaction effects, especially under Trump, contrasting with the fluid and context-dependent responses observed among Asian Americans.

The moderating effect of political interest on presidential job approval reveals the unique responsiveness of Asian Americans to political engagement compared to other groups. While White Americans consistently exhibit amplified polarization, and Black and Hispanic Americans show weaker or stable interaction effects, Asian Americans demonstrate variability that reflects their distinct socio-political positioning. This underscores the importance of examining the

intersection of political engagement, presidential evaluations, and race to understand the evolving partisan dynamics of Asian Americans.

B.5. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

The role of political interest in moderating the relationship between racial resentment and party identification among Asian Americans is inconsistent, showing significance in only one election year (2016, $-0.36, p < 0.05$). This suggests that for politically engaged Asian Americans, racial resentment had a weaker effect on Republican alignment during that period. However, the absence of similar effects in other years indicates that political interest does not consistently shape how racial resentment influences partisan affiliation. This contrasts with other racial groups where political engagement appears to interact more predictably with racial resentment in shaping party identification.

Among White Americans, political engagement regularly softens the relationship between racial resentment and Republican identification, with significant dampening effects appearing consistently over time (e.g., 2016 and 2022). This stands in contrast to the more variable trend among Asian Americans, where political interest does not consistently alter the influence of racial resentment on partisanship.

For Black Americans, political interest has a limited and inconsistent impact, resembling the fluctuating effects observed among Asian Americans. Only in 2014 does it significantly enhance the connection between racial resentment and party identification, but this does not persist in later years. Hispanic Americans, however, show a clearer trend, particularly in 2020,

Table B-5-1. The Effect of Political Interest and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.05 (0.09)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Racial Resentment	0.09 (0.11)	0.40* (0.11)	0.19* (0.09)	0.36* (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)
Political Interest × Racial Resentment	0.16 (0.14)	-0.36* (0.14)	-0.002 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)
Constant	-0.09 (0.09)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-5-2. The Effect of Political Interest and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
Racial Resentment	0.12* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	0.17* (0.02)	0.16* (0.01)
Political Interest × Racial Resentment	0.03 (0.02)	-0.11* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.02)	-0.14* (0.02)
Constant	0.04* (0.02)	0.10* (0.01)	-0.05* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.09* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-5-3. The Effect of Political Interest and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Racial Resentment	0.02 (0.04)	0.28* (0.06)	0.11* (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)
Political Interest × Racial Resentment	0.12* (0.06)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
Constant	0.20* (0.03)	0.14* (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.02)	0.13* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-5-4. The Effect of Political Interest and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Interest	-0.08 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Racial Resentment	0.04 (0.06)	0.26* (0.08)	0.11* (0.06)	0.28* (0.06)	0.21* (0.05)
Political Interest × Racial Resentment	0.16* (0.07)	-0.14 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.15* (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Constant	0.10* (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.19* (0.03)	-0.16* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.48	0.51	0.52	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

when political engagement notably reduced the influence of racial resentment on Republican affiliation. This suggests that for Hispanic Americans, political interest plays a more striking role, whereas for Asian and Black Americans, its influence remains weaker and less predictable.

Overall, political interest moderates racial resentment's effect on party identification differently across racial groups. White Americans exhibit a consistent trend of mitigation, while Hispanic Americans show sporadic but significant moderation. Asian and Black Americans, on the other hand, demonstrate weaker and less stable effects, suggesting that other factors—such as immigration experiences, generational shifts, or group-based racialization—play a greater role in shaping their political affiliations than political engagement alone.

B.6. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Self-Reported Ideology and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

The moderating effect of political knowledge on the relationship between ideological positions and party identification reveals both similarities and contrasts across racial groups, with Asian Americans showing distinctive trends. Among Asian Americans, political knowledge exhibits context-dependent effects, with notable fluctuations tied to presidential administrations. For instance, during the Trump administration in 2018 (0.20), knowledge strengthened ideological alignment with the Republican Party, reflecting heightened polarization. However, by 2022 under Biden, the negative interaction term (-0.20) suggests that political knowledge weakened ideological alignment, indicating a mixed response to political dynamics and policies. This variability contrasts with the more consistent outcomes observed among White Americans.

Table B-6-1. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.005 (0.04)
Self-reported Ideology	0.42* (0.08)	0.42* (0.06)	0.29* (0.07)	0.47* (0.06)	0.55* (0.06)
Political Knowledge × Self-reported Ideology	0.23* (0.11)	0.04 (0.08)	0.20* (0.08)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.20* (0.07)
Constant	-0.08 (0.08)	0.12* (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.53

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-6-2. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.005 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Self-reported Ideology	0.61* (0.01)	0.51* (0.01)	0.49* (0.01)	0.52* (0.01)	0.53* (0.01)
Political Knowledge × Self-reported Ideology	0.05* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.07* (0.01)	-0.07* (0.01)
Constant	0.05* (0.01)	0.13* (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.13* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-6-3. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.07*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Self-reported Ideology	0.14*	0.07*	0.10*	0.17*	0.31*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Knowledge × Self-reported Ideology	0.28*	0.20*	0.23*	0.11*	-0.11*
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.24*	0.22*	0.02	0.08*	0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.23	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-6-4. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.09*	-0.05	-0.01	0.03	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Self-reported Ideology	0.34*	0.29*	0.28*	0.46*	0.43*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Political Knowledge × Self-reported Ideology	0.29*	0.18*	0.14*	-0.05	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.13*	0.10*	-0.16*	-0.14*	0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.39	0.48	0.51	0.52	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

White Americans consistently show negative and significant interaction terms (e.g., -0.07 in 2020 and 2022), indicating that political knowledge tempers ideological alignment, reinforcing polarization but moderating strict party-line adherence. Compared to Asian Americans, this group exhibits less fluctuation, reflecting entrenched partisan divisions. Black Americans, in contrast, display stronger positive moderating effects, particularly during the Obama and Trump administrations (e.g., 0.28 in 2014 and 0.23 in 2018), where knowledge amplifies alignment with the Democratic Party. However, the trend mirrors Asian Americans in 2022, as knowledge weakens ideological alignment (-0.11), illustrating shared responses to evolving political dynamics.

Hispanic Americans show observations similar to Asian Americans, with fluctuating knowledge effects. Political knowledge amplified the ideological alignment during Obama's presidency (e.g., 0.29 in 2014), but this effect gradually weakened over time, culminating in negative interaction terms by 2022. Unlike Asian Americans, this decline appears more gradual, reflecting distinct demographic and political experiences. Compared to education's moderating effects, which are often stable and reflect long-term partisan trends, political knowledge among Asian Americans shows more situational variability, underscoring the group's dynamic and evolving political identity.

These findings reveal the unique, context-driven interplay between political knowledge, ideology, and party identification among Asian Americans. While similarities exist with Hispanic Americans in fluctuating trajectories, contrasts emerge with the stable effects observed for Whites and the generally amplifying role of knowledge for Black Americans. These dynamics underscore the importance of considering sociopolitical contexts when analyzing the diverse and shifting political behaviors of racial groups.

Figure B-1 displays the estimated probabilities of identifying as Republican among Asian Americans across five election years (2014–2022), based on ideological self-placement (x-axis) and levels of political knowledge (distinguished by solid and dashed lines). The y-axis indicates the probability of Republican identification. Political knowledge serves as a moderator, with shaded confidence intervals representing uncertainty around the estimates. The results are drawn from Table B-6-1, and each year’s panel reflects estimates from fully controlled regression models.

The influence of political knowledge on partisan alignment varies by year, but 2014, 2018, and 2022 exhibit distinctive divergence—especially at the ideological extremes. In each of these midterm elections, ideological conservatives with high political knowledge showed either a surge or sharp decline in Republican affiliation relative to their low-knowledge counterparts. Meanwhile, among strong liberals, differences based on political knowledge remained marginal. These years stand out because political knowledge not only amplified partisan attachment among conservatives early on (2014, 2018) but, by 2022, reversed that pattern entirely.

The 2014 election revealed that strong conservatives with limited political knowledge had a predicted probability of Republican identification at 56.3%, while this likelihood increased to 71.8% among those with greater political awareness. Among strong liberals, however, knowledge worked in the opposite direction—those with higher political knowledge were even less likely to identify as Republican (7.5%) than their low-knowledge counterparts (14.6%), suggesting that political awareness reinforced resistance to Republican affiliation.

During the 2018 cycle, this divide sharpened further. For strong conservatives, Republican identification jumped from 43.1% (low knowledge) to 67.7% (high knowledge), demonstrating a stronger reinforcement of partisan alignment. Meanwhile, strong liberals

The Effect of Ideology on Asian American Party Identification (2014-2022)
Moderated by Political Knowledge




Figure B-1. The Effect of Self-reported Ideology on Party Identification for Asian Americans with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Levels of Political Knowledge. The x-axis represents ideological self-placement, ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of identifying with the Republican Party. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of political knowledge, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of political knowledge. Each panel represents a different election year from 2014 to 2022.

exhibited only a modest increase in Republican identification with knowledge—from 13.7% to 18.3%—implying that knowledge may have added nuance or cognitive dissonance without fundamentally shifting partisan identity.

A dramatic shift unfolded in 2022. While strong conservatives with limited knowledge recorded the highest probability of Republican identification at 69.9%, those with greater knowledge were significantly less likely to identify as Republican (49.0%). This reversal suggests a disruption in the previously observed strengthening effect of political knowledge, hinting at disaffection or reevaluation among politically informed conservatives. On the liberal end, partisanship remained steady—strong liberals consistently hovered around 14% Republican identification regardless of their political knowledge.

The diverging effects of political knowledge underscore how Asian American political identity is not simply a function of ideological consistency but is shaped through a more dynamic interaction with cognitive and contextual factors. Political knowledge, often gained through higher education and civic exposure, contributes to more deliberate partisan evaluations. Among conservatives, it initially bolstered Republican attachment, but the drop in 2022 suggests that informed individuals may have begun questioning the alignment between their ideology and the party's direction—possibly in response to racialized rhetoric or dissatisfaction with partisan messaging.

For liberals, increased knowledge consistently reinforced distance from the Republican Party, signaling that political awareness amplified their commitment to values tied to inclusion, equity, and social justice. These patterns reflect how the forces of integration—such as education and informational access—interact with racialized experiences to produce a fluid and sometimes ambivalent political orientation. The 2022 reversal among knowledgeable conservatives suggests

that even ideological clarity can be moderated by a broader awareness of systemic marginalization, especially as Asian Americans encounter exclusion despite high levels of socioeconomic integration.

B.7. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Operational Ideology and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section examines the moderating effect of political knowledge on the relationship between operational ideology and party identification among racial groups from 2014 to 2022, with a focus on Asian Americans. Comparisons are drawn with White, Black, and Hispanic Americans, demonstrating the unique dynamics within and across groups. Political knowledge captures individuals' understanding of political issues, while operational ideology reflects their alignment with policy preferences. The analysis also incorporates comparisons with the moderating effects of education, political interest, and self-reported ideology, offering a broader perspective on partisan alignment.

For Asian Americans, political knowledge demonstrates fluctuating effects across presidential administrations. During the Obama years (2014–2016), interaction terms were weak and insignificant, suggesting minimal moderation of operational ideology on party identification. This stability aligns with the group's strong Democratic support during that period. Under Trump (2018–2020), political knowledge significantly amplified the alignment between operational ideology and Democratic identification, particularly in 2018 (interaction term: 0.40). However, by 2022 under Biden, the interaction reversed (-0.25), weakening the influence of operational

Table B-7-1. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.04 (0.08)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.04)
Operational Ideology	0.22* (0.08)	0.40* (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)	0.27* (0.09)	0.65* (0.08)
Political Knowledge × Operational Ideology	-0.01 (0.11)	0.04 (0.12)	0.40* (0.12)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.25* (0.09)
Constant	-0.16* (0.08)	0.12* (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.53

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-7-2. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.04* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Operational Ideology	0.10* (0.01)	0.52* (0.02)	0.46* (0.02)	0.59* (0.02)	0.58* (0.01)
Political Knowledge × Operational Ideology	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.09* (0.02)	-0.09* (0.02)	-0.14* (0.02)	-0.11* (0.01)
Constant	0.02 (0.01)	0.10* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-7-3. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Operational Ideology	-0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	0.11 (0.06)	0.20* (0.05)	0.56* (0.05)
Political Knowledge × Operational Ideology	0.15* (0.04)	0.31* (0.07)	0.23* (0.06)	0.21* (0.06)	-0.28* (0.06)
Constant	0.22* (0.03)	0.24* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.31

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * $p < 0.05$.

Table B-7-4. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Operational Ideology on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Operational Ideology	-0.03 (0.04)	0.35* (0.07)	0.33* (0.07)	0.54* (0.06)	0.60* (0.05)
Political Knowledge × Operational Ideology	0.22* (0.06)	0.12 (0.08)	0.19* (0.07)	-0.16* (0.06)	-0.16* (0.06)
Constant	0.12* (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.15* (0.03)	-0.16* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.48	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.38	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * $p < 0.05$.

ideology, reflecting potential ambivalence about policy outcomes or evolving political narratives. This variability contrasts with the stable effects of education, which consistently reinforce ideological alignment for Asian Americans across years.

White Americans show a consistent moderating effect of political knowledge on the relationship between operational ideology and party identification, with negative interaction terms across all years (e.g., -0.09 in 2016, -0.14 in 2020). This stable moderation reflects entrenched polarization, where knowledge tempers strict ideological alignment, contrasting with Asian Americans' fluctuating outcome. While political knowledge among Whites mirrors education's moderating role in weakening ideological divides, Asian Americans show greater contextual variability driven by policy narratives and shifting political dynamics.

Black Americans demonstrate knowledge-driven amplification of operational ideology, particularly during the Trump administration (e.g., 0.23 in 2018). However, this effect weakened by 2022 (-0.28), paralleling Asian Americans' transitions under changing political contexts. Unlike knowledge, education has limited influence among Black Americans, reinforcing their strong baseline Democratic loyalty. This contrasts with Asian Americans, for whom education and knowledge alike reveal dynamic shifts across administrations.

Hispanic Americans share some similarities with Asian Americans in the fluctuating effects of political knowledge. During the Obama years, knowledge amplified partisan alignment (e.g., 0.22 in 2014), but this effect diminished under Trump and Biden, with interaction terms turning negative by 2022 (-0.16). The gradual decline among Hispanics reflects distinct demographic and political experiences, with education providing stabilizing effects similar to those observed in Asian Americans. However, Asian Americans display sharper contextual shifts, reflecting their unique socio-political positioning.

The moderating effect of political knowledge on operational ideology reveals distinct and context-dependent patterns across racial groups. Asian Americans exhibit unique variability over time, contrasting with the consistent tempering effects observed among Whites and the amplifying effects among Blacks. Similarities with Hispanics emerge in the fluctuating influence of knowledge, though Hispanic empirical patterns are less abrupt. When compared to education, which consistently moderates ideological alignment, political knowledge among Asian Americans plays a more dynamic and situational role. These findings underscore the importance of contextual political dynamics in shaping partisan behavior across diverse racial groups.

Figure B-2 illustrates the relationship between operational ideology and the predicted probability of Republican identification among Asian Americans, broken down by political knowledge levels (low vs. high) across years from 2014 to 2022. The x-axis represents respondents' positions on the operational ideology scale (liberal to conservative), while the y-axis shows the predicted likelihood of identifying as Republican. Solid lines represent those with low political knowledge, and dashed lines indicate those with high political knowledge. The interaction effect—whether political knowledge moderates the ideological influence—was statistically significant in 2018 and 2022, the two most recent midterm elections.

While the overall trend shows that conservatives are more likely to identify as Republican than liberals, the influence of political knowledge evolves strikingly between 2018 and 2022. In 2018, political knowledge moderated ideological influence but only to a moderate extent: high-knowledge conservatives were somewhat less likely than their low-knowledge counterparts to identify as Republican (39.4% vs. 55.8%). By 2022, this gap expanded substantially—Republican identification among low-knowledge conservatives rose sharply to 79.7%, while high-knowledge conservatives dropped to 54.7%. This widening divergence

The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Party Identification (2014-2022)
 Moderated by Political Knowledge




Figure B-2. The Effect of Operational Ideology on Party Identification for Asian Americans with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Levels of Political Knowledge. The x-axis represents operational ideology, ranging from liberalism to conservatism. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of identifying with the Republican Party. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of political knowledge, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of political knowledge. Each panel represents a different election year from 2014 to 2022.

suggests a heightened sorting effect, where political knowledge began functioning less as a reinforcement of partisanship and more as a buffer against conservative ideological pull—a contrast to earlier years.

Midterm election cycles appear to sharpen these contrasts. In 2018, the Trump administration’s economic policies and deregulation agenda likely kept conservative Asian Americans aligned with the Republican Party, even among those with higher political knowledge. However, the 2022 midterms occurred in a markedly different political climate. The legacy of COVID-19, ongoing anti-Asian sentiment, and escalating partisan polarization may have contributed to the waning Republican identification among informed conservatives. Political knowledge appears to have fueled skepticism, introducing a level of critical evaluation that distanced them from partisan loyalty. Meanwhile, liberals exhibited consistent low levels of Republican identification regardless of knowledge level—26.9% vs. 25.3% in 2018, and 15.2% vs. 14.8% in 2022—highlighting that knowledge exerted a stronger moderating role among conservatives than liberals.

Rather than reinforcing fixed partisan loyalties, political knowledge interacts with ideology in ways that reflect deeper processes of social integration and identity negotiation. Among conservatives, particularly those with greater cognitive resources, higher political knowledge seems to disrupt a linear path between ideological conservatism and Republican affiliation. This could be a response to racialized narratives and exclusionary policies that became more pronounced during and after the Trump presidency. The interplay of operational conservatism with high political awareness likely introduced internal tensions, as informed individuals reconciled their economic or cultural leanings with broader concerns about racial inclusion and immigrant identity.

For liberals, stability across years and knowledge levels reflects a more cohesive political identity, one that is perhaps more grounded in both ideological conviction and collective experiences of marginalization. Altogether, the 2018–2022 contrast reveals that political knowledge operates not just as a capacity to process political information, but as a mediator of racialized experiences, complicating and reshaping how ideology informs partisan identity within the Asian American electorate.

B.8. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Economic Evaluations and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section examines how political knowledge moderates the relationship between economic evaluations—both national and personal—and party identification, with a primary focus on Asian Americans and comparisons to White, Black, and Hispanic Americans. The analysis spans 2014 to 2022, encompassing the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, and reveals the distinctiveness of Asian American political behavior within broader racial and ethnic dynamics. Political knowledge moderates national economic evaluations dynamically and contextually for Asian Americans. During the Obama administration, politically knowledgeable individuals mitigated the partisan impact of negative national economic evaluations (-0.26, 2014), aligning with Democratic recovery narratives. Under Trump, the moderating effect of knowledge diminished, reflecting competing economic and social narratives. By 2022, under Biden, political knowledge again moderated negative national evaluations (-0.13), though less strongly than

Table B-8-1. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.17*	0.04	0.11*	0.03	-0.05*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
National Economic Evaluation	0.05	-0.20*	0.10	0.09	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Political Knowledge × National Economic Evaluation	-0.26*	0.02	0.05	0.002	-0.13*
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.04	-0.10	-0.09	-0.06	0.11
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Political Knowledge × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.07	0.09	0.11	0.03	-0.14
	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	-0.21*	0.12*	-0.10	-0.08*	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.34	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-8-2. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.04*	-0.03*	0.08*	0.003	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.005)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.20*	-0.31*	0.24*	0.17*	-0.14*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Political Knowledge × National Economic Evaluation	-0.004	0.13*	-0.09*	-0.10*	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.01	-0.09*	-0.03	0.03*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Political Knowledge × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.02	0.10*	0.005	-0.06*	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.02	0.16*	-0.07*	0.04*	0.14*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.58	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.58	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-8-3. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification – Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.11*	0.08*	0.02	0.04*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.07*	-0.10*	0.06*	0.12*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Political Knowledge × National Economic Evaluation	-0.09*	-0.05	0.10*	-0.04	-0.10*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.001	-0.06*	-0.10*	-0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Knowledge × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.02	0.02	0.08*	0.05	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.14*	0.14*	-0.03	0.03	0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.30

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-8-4. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Economic Evaluations on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.15*	-0.05	0.02	0.04*	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.13*	-0.41*	0.08*	0.21*	-0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Knowledge × National Economic Evaluation	-0.20*	0.17*	0.07	-0.11*	-0.16*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.01	-0.08*	-0.10*	0.01	0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Political Knowledge × Personal Economic Evaluation	-0.09	0.16*	0.08	-0.05	-0.10*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.01	0.07	-0.18*	-0.14*	0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.48	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.38	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

during Obama's presidency. Personal economic evaluations, however, had limited impact, reflecting a collective focus on national concerns over individual circumstances.

Black and Hispanic Americans show some parallels to Asian Americans in their responses to economic evaluations moderated by political knowledge. During Democratic presidencies, politically knowledgeable Black Americans (-0.09, 2014) and Hispanic Americans (-0.20, 2014) also mitigated the partisan impact of negative national evaluations, mirroring Asian Americans' collective orientation and alignment with Democratic messaging. By 2022, both Black (-0.10) and Hispanic Americans (-0.16) displayed reduced partisan impacts of national evaluations, resembling the trend among Asian Americans during Biden's presidency.

Hispanic Americans also share similarities with Asian Americans in the fluctuating effects of political knowledge across administrations. During Trump's presidency, knowledge amplified partisan alignment for positive national evaluations among Hispanics, reflecting a responsiveness to economic growth narratives. While Asian Americans showed a more muted response during the same period, both groups exhibited contextual variability in how knowledge shaped the partisan impact of economic evaluations.

White Americans exhibit a stark contrast to Asian Americans. Political knowledge consistently reinforces ideological rigidity among Whites, amplifying partisan alignment during the Obama years (0.13, 2014) and dampening the effects of positive evaluations under Trump. Unlike Asian Americans, where knowledge introduces fluidity, Whites display entrenched polarization, with knowledge consistently shaping partisanship through an ideological lens. This rigidity also aligns with the moderating effect of education for Whites, which similarly reinforces ideological divides.

Black Americans differ from Asian Americans in their consistently strong Democratic alignment, with minimal influence of political knowledge during Republican administrations. For example, during Trump's presidency, Black Americans' interaction terms remained insignificant, contrasting with the heightened sensitivity observed among Asian Americans. Education among Black Americans similarly has limited moderating effects, reflecting strong partisan loyalty.

Hispanic Americans contrast with Asian Americans in their stronger sensitivity to personal economic evaluations. By 2022, politically knowledgeable Hispanics demonstrated significant moderating effects on personal evaluations (-0.10), indicating an individualized orientation that diverges from Asian Americans' collective focus on national concerns. Political knowledge moderates economic evaluations differently across racial groups. Asian Americans display a context-dependent and fluid relationship, with knowledge stabilizing partisan responses during Democratic administrations and introducing variability during Republican presidencies. Black and Hispanic Americans share similarities with Asian Americans in mitigating the partisan impact of negative national evaluations during Democratic administrations, but Blacks show greater stability and Hispanics more sensitivity to personal economic concerns. Whites stand apart with entrenched ideological rigidity, where political knowledge and education consistently amplify or moderate partisan alignment. These findings underscore the unique role of political knowledge in shaping Asian Americans' partisan behavior and its contrasts with other racial groups.

B.9. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Presidential Job Approval and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

This section analyzes the moderating role of political knowledge in shaping the relationship between presidential job approval and party identification, focusing on Asian Americans and comparing their analytical results to White, Black, and Hispanic Americans from 2014 to 2022. Political knowledge emerges as a key factor influencing how evaluations of presidential performance translate into partisan alignment, with unique and dynamic effects for Asian Americans that vary across political administrations.

Asian Americans exhibit a dynamic and context-dependent relationship between political knowledge, presidential job approval, and party identification. This fluctuating trends contrasts with the stability observed among White Americans, where political knowledge consistently reinforces partisan alignment. For Whites, political knowledge amplifies ideological divides, as shown during both Democratic (e.g., Obama in 2014) and Republican (e.g., Trump in 2018) administrations, reflecting entrenched polarization. In contrast, for Asian Americans, political knowledge sometimes mitigates the relationship, particularly under Biden, where broader socio-political factors and racialized experiences play a greater role.

Black and Hispanic Americans share some similarities with Asian Americans in how political knowledge shapes partisan alignment, but their outcomes are less variable. Like Asian Americans, politically knowledgeable individuals within these groups often align with their policy preferences, as seen during the Obama and Trump administrations. However, the magnitude of shifts among Black Americans is smaller, reflecting their stable Democratic loyalty. Hispanic Americans display more striking shifts, particularly under Biden, where negative

Table B-9-1. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification – Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.26* (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)
Political Knowledge × Presidential Job Approval	0.14 (0.10)	0.21* (0.07)	0.21* (0.08)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)
Constant	-0.12 (0.07)	0.17* (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-9-2. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.01)	-0.05* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.08* (0.01)	-0.14* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.18* (0.01)	0.06* (0.01)
Political Knowledge × Presidential Job Approval	0.19* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.16* (0.02)	-0.13* (0.01)	-0.21* (0.02)
Constant	0.06* (0.01)	0.19* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.57	0.58	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.57	0.58	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-9-3. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.15* (0.03)	-0.14* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Political Knowledge × Presidential Job Approval	0.07* (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	0.15* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.21* (0.03)
Constant	0.18* (0.03)	0.16* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.08* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.31

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-9-4. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Presidential Job Approval on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.13* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.13* (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Political Knowledge × Presidential Job Approval	0.05 (0.06)	0.16* (0.05)	0.21* (0.04)	-0.14* (0.05)	-0.31* (0.05)
Constant	0.04 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.15* (0.03)	-0.16* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.48	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.37	0.47	0.51	0.52	0.55

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

interaction effects suggest dissatisfaction with Democratic leadership. This mirrors Asian Americans' responsiveness to specific political contexts, but Hispanic Americans exhibit a slightly stronger and more consistent reaction to economic and policy-related concerns. Education introduces an additional layer of comparison. For Asian Americans, education plays a limited and inconsistent role in moderating the relationship between presidential approval and party identification, similar to Black Americans. However, for Whites, education reinforces polarization, much like political knowledge. Hispanic Americans experience variability in both education and knowledge effects, but their education-based moderation tends to stabilize partisan alignment, contrasting with the fluctuating role of political knowledge for both groups.

The moderating effect of political knowledge on presidential job approval reveals that Asian Americans' partisan alignment is shaped by fluid and situational dynamics, in contrast to the entrenched and consistent outcomes of Whites. Black and Hispanic Americans share some contextual similarities with Asian Americans, particularly in their responsiveness to specific administrations, but their overall patterns are less variable. These findings underscore the unique role of political knowledge for Asian Americans, reflecting their intricate engagement with presidential evaluations, racialized experiences, and evolving partisan landscapes.

B.10. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Party Identification Across Racial Groups

Among Asian Americans, political knowledge does not exhibit a strong or consistent moderating effect on the relationship between racial resentment and partisan alignment. While racial resentment is sometimes linked to increased Republican identification, political knowledge does

Table B-10-1. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Racial Resentment on Party Identification – Asian Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.12* (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03)
Racial Resentment	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.07)	0.15 (0.09)	0.32* (0.08)	0.16* (0.06)
Political Knowledge × Racial Resentment	0.17 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)
Constant	-0.08 (0.08)	0.13* (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Observations	663	979	1,053	1,160	1,050
R ²	0.35	0.44	0.48	0.52	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.43	0.47	0.52	0.52

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-10-2. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Whites

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	0.02* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.08* (0.01)	0.04* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Racial Resentment	0.14* (0.01)	0.09* (0.02)	0.17* (0.02)	0.18* (0.01)	0.11* (0.01)
Political Knowledge × Racial Resentment	0.02 (0.01)	-0.06* (0.02)	-0.10* (0.02)	-0.13* (0.01)	-0.08* (0.01)
Constant	0.03* (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)	-0.07* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.12* (0.01)
Observations	25,694	27,059	31,339	30,976	30,880
R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67
Adjusted R ²	0.56	0.57	0.67	0.67	0.67

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-10-3. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Black Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Racial Resentment	0.01 (0.03)	0.13* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.30* (0.03)
Political Knowledge × Racial Resentment	0.16* (0.04)	0.17* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	-0.21* (0.05)
Constant	0.20* (0.03)	0.17* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)	0.09* (0.02)
Observations	2,963	3,205	3,296	3,696	3,936
R ²	0.22	0.25	0.28	0.29	0.31
Adjusted R ²	0.22	0.24	0.27	0.28	0.31

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

Table B-10-4. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Racial Resentment on Party Identification - Hispanic Americans

	Party Identification				
	2014	2016	2018	2020	2022
Political Knowledge	-0.08* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Racial Resentment	0.03 (0.04)	0.14* (0.05)	0.19* (0.05)	0.27* (0.04)	0.25* (0.04)
Political Knowledge × Racial Resentment	0.22* (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.17* (0.04)	-0.09 (0.05)
Constant	0.12* (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.23* (0.03)	-0.17* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
Observations	1,945	2,365	2,898	2,967	2,788
R ²	0.38	0.47	0.51	0.53	0.55
Adjusted R ²	0.38	0.47	0.50	0.52	0.54

Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 for interpretability. Each model includes a consistent set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, personal economic evaluation, and region (dummy-coded for Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). * p < 0.05.

not systematically amplify or weaken this association across election cycles. The only exception appears in 2022, where the interaction term trends negatively, suggesting that political awareness may dampen the effect of racial resentment, though the result remains statistically insignificant.

In contrast, White Americans display a distinct and consistent trend where political knowledge weakens the influence of racial resentment on Republican identification. The negative interaction terms in multiple years highlight how political awareness tempers ideological polarization in this group. This trend diverges from Asian Americans, where the moderating role of political knowledge is weaker and far less predictable. The stable effect observed among Whites suggests a stronger connection between education, political knowledge, and partisan attitudes, reinforcing existing research on ideological socialization.

Black Americans and Hispanic Americans exhibit varying trends, but with notable contrasts to Asian Americans. Among Black respondents, political knowledge sometimes strengthens the association between racial resentment and Republican identification, as seen in 2016 and 2018, while in 2022, it significantly weakens this relationship. This variability suggests that the influence of political awareness is shaped by broader political and racial contexts rather than a singular directional trend. Hispanic Americans display a different trajectory, with political knowledge initially amplifying the relationship between racial resentment and Republican identification, particularly in earlier years, but shifting by 2020, when it begins to reduce this effect. Compared to Asian Americans, who do not exhibit a clear moderating trend, Hispanic Americans demonstrate a more apparent shift, reflecting the evolving nature of their political engagement and identity formation.

Appendix C. Moderating Effect of Political Interest/Knowledge on Vote Choice

C.1. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Party Identification and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

Table C-1 provides estimates for interaction terms between political interest and party identification in relation to Republican vote choice across racial and ethnic groups in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The interaction term is of particular interest here, as it provides information on whether the association between partisan identification and Republican vote choice varies across levels of political interest.

In the case of Asian American respondents, the interaction term does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in either 2016 or 2020. The direction of the estimates remains consistent throughout both years. These results provide limited empirical basis to determine whether higher or lower political interest corresponds with a stronger or weaker relationship between party identification and Republican vote choice in this group.

This general pattern of statistical uncertainty is not limited to Asian American respondents. Similar results are observed in the Black subgroup, where the interaction terms are also not statistically distinguishable, and standard errors remain wide. In contrast, White and Hispanic respondents display statistically significant interaction terms in both years with more precise estimates. These results are more consistent with the interpretation that the connection between party identification and vote choice is less evident at higher levels of political interest within this subgroup.

Table C-1. The Effect of Political Interest and Party Identification on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Interest	0.30 (1.02)	0.52* (0.22)	0.75 (0.56)	1.98** (0.67)	0.16 (1.24)	0.47 (0.27)	-0.67 (0.71)	1.27 (0.67)
Party Identification	4.15** (1.29)	5.08** (0.32)	4.94** (1.04)	5.26** (0.89)	4.88** (1.64)	5.79** (0.36)	5.08** (1.06)	6.82** (1.03)
Political Interest × Party Identification	-1.09 (1.71)	-0.91* (0.40)	-1.89 (1.30)	-2.24* (1.14)	-1.28 (2.13)	-1.94** (0.44)	0.02 (1.32)	-3.09* (1.22)
Constant	-5.05** (1.21)	-6.10** (0.28)	-7.99** (0.88)	-8.39** (0.92)	-10.67** (1.43)	-9.84** (0.32)	-9.55** (0.92)	-10.53** (0.85)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.30	-3,281.03	-335.78	-368.75	-140.16	-2,632.67	-252.49	-371.86
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.60	6,602.06	711.56	777.50	320.31	5,305.33	544.97	783.73

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

In the aggregate, the results for Asian, Black, and Hispanic respondents point to limited or inconsistent variation in the relationship between party identification and Republican vote choice across different levels of political interest. In contrast, results for White respondents indicate more stable evidence of variation based on political interest. In the context of Asian Americans specifically, the lack of statistically significant interaction effects across both elections suggests that the partisan-vote relationship remains relatively stable across levels of political interest, within the limits of statistical confidence provided by these models.

C.2. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Self-Reported Ideology and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The interaction between political interest and self-reported ideology reveals consistently insignificant effects on Republican vote choice across racial groups during the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, particularly for Asian Americans. Log odds ratios of -2.25 in 2016 and -3.21 in 2020 for Asian Americans show no significant interaction, reflecting their fluid and context-dependent political behavior. This suggests that ideological alignment, even when paired with political engagement, did not strongly influence Republican support, likely due to diverse policy concerns and cultural variability within the community.

White Americans also show insignificant interaction effects, with log odds ratios of 0.35 in 2016 and -1.16 in 2020, indicating that while perceptions of Trump's presidency may have shifted, political interest and ideological alignment did not significantly influence Republican support. Black and Hispanic Americans exhibit a similar analytical result of insignificant interactions across both elections. For Black voters, entrenched Democratic loyalty and structural factors, such as systemic racism and historical party alignments, overshadowed individual-level effects of political interest and ideology. For Hispanic voters, the heterogeneity of their electorate, shaped by varied priorities like immigration policy and economic concerns, diluted the impact of these variables on Republican support. These findings reveal a shared observation across racial groups, where the interplay between political interest and self-reported ideology does not significantly influence voting behavior, underscoring the importance of structural, contextual, and group-specific dynamics in shaping electoral decisions.

Table C-2. The Effect of Political Interest and Self-reported Ideology on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Interest	0.90 (1.45)	-0.07 (0.34)	-0.14 (0.98)	-0.21 (1.02)	1.26 (1.74)	0.11 (0.40)	-0.63 (1.13)	-0.37 (0.89)
Self-reported Ideology	1.56 (1.93)	1.23* (0.48)	0.95 (1.31)	0.25 (1.30)	1.61 (2.45)	2.05* (0.54)	2.36 (1.46)	0.68 (1.20)
Political Interest × Self-reported Ideology	-2.25 (2.63)	0.35 (0.60)	0.63 (1.63)	2.06 (1.75)	-3.21 (2.99)	-1.16 (0.66)	-0.05 (1.82)	0.40 (1.48)
Constant	-5.51* (1.44)	-5.63* (0.35)	-7.19* (1.03)	-6.78* (1.05)	-11.51* (1.75)	-9.52* (0.39)	-9.57* (1.16)	-9.26* (0.91)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.13	-3,283.56	-336.81	-370.05	-139.75	-2,641.03	-252.49	-375.25
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.26	6,607.12	713.62	780.11	319.50	5,322.06	544.97	790.50

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

C.3. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Operational Ideology and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The interaction between political interest and operational ideology reveals varying influences on Republican vote choice across racial and ethnic groups in the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. Asian Americans and Black Americans display a more similar result compared to other racial groups in terms of the interaction between political interest and operational ideology influencing Republican vote choice. In both groups, the interaction was insignificant in 2016 but became significant in 2020, reflecting an increase in Republican support among politically engaged conservatives during Trump’s reelection campaign. This evidence suggests a shift in political dynamics within these groups, possibly driven by targeted outreach efforts or responses

Table C-3. The Effect of Political Interest and Operational Ideology on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Interest	1.54 (2.04)	-1.89* (0.42)	-1.76 (1.34)	0.17 (1.39)	-5.25* (1.82)	-2.49* (0.41)	-5.18* (1.25)	-0.73 (1.12)
Self-reported Ideology	9.48* (3.64)	4.80* (0.74)	3.84 (2.35)	6.46* (2.39)	-1.48 (3.02)	6.33* (0.72)	-1.60 (2.04)	6.04* (1.98)
Political Interest × Self-reported Ideology	-4.13 (4.53)	4.58* (0.91)	4.48 (2.95)	1.68 (3.03)	11.18* (4.06)	4.43* (0.89)	10.28* (2.73)	1.30 (2.41)
Constant	-6.09* (1.89)	-4.23* (0.39)	-5.97* (1.22)	-7.02* (1.31)	-6.90* (1.58)	-7.48* (0.39)	-6.20* (1.12)	-8.97* (1.07)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.07	-3,271.54	-335.75	-370.60	-136.75	-2,630.68	-245.68	-375.14
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.15	6,583.08	711.49	781.19	313.51	5,301.36	531.36	790.28

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

to salient issues during the Trump presidency.

In contrast, White Americans show consistently significant interactions across both elections, demonstrating a stable and strong alignment between operational ideology and political interest in shaping Republican support. Hispanic Americans, on the other hand, exhibit no significant interaction effects in either election, emphasizing the complexity and diversity of their voting behavior. Thus, the fluctuating significance seen in Asian Americans and Black Americans sets them apart from the stable trends observed in White and Hispanic voters.

The analysis reveals that Asian Americans share a similar observation with Black Americans in terms of the growing significance of the interaction between political interest and operational ideology from 2016 to 2020, suggesting a shift toward higher Republican support among politically engaged conservatives during Trump’s presidency. However, the contrast

The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Republican Voting
 Moderated by Political Interest




Figure C-1. The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Voting for Republican Candidate (Donald Trump) in Presidential Elections with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Levels of Political Interest. The x-axis represents operational ideology, ranging from liberalism to conservatism. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of voting for Donald Trump. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence interval. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of political interest, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of political interest. The upper panel presents results from the 2016 election, while the lower panel displays results from the 2020 election.

lies in the broader context of their political behavior: while Asian Americans demonstrate a more fluid and context-dependent alignment influenced by specific issues or policies, Black Americans' alignment reflects a smaller, ideologically conservative subgroup within an otherwise strongly Democratic demographic. These findings revealing the evolving dynamics within the Asian American electorate, which remain distinct from the more stable partisan alignments seen in White and Hispanic voters, emphasizing the need for issue-specific and culturally informed approaches to understanding their political behavior.

Figure C-1 examines the interaction between operational ideology and political interest in shaping Asian American vote choice in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, specifically the predicted probability of voting for Donald Trump. The x-axis displays the spectrum from operational liberalism to conservatism, while the y-axis captures the likelihood of Trump support. Solid lines represent respondents with low political interest, and dashed lines represent those with high interest. The figure visualizes how political engagement conditions the ideological basis of vote choice during two of the most polarizing elections in recent U.S. history.

The contrast between 2016 and 2020 reveals a shifting role for political interest. In 2016, ideological orientation appeared to drive vote choice with limited influence from engagement: conservatives across interest levels overwhelmingly backed Trump, while liberals, regardless of engagement, remained staunchly opposed. Political interest was largely inert—it neither intensified nor diluted the ideological alignment with Trump. In the 2016 election, ideological conservatism was a powerful predictor of Trump support—so powerful, in fact, that political interest had minimal effect. Even among disengaged conservatives, the likelihood of voting for Trump was near-universal (97.7%), while high-interest conservatives still showed strong support

(79%). Among liberals, support for Trump was already low, with minimal difference between interest levels (0.5% vs. 2.3%).

However, the landscape changed in 2020. Among conservatives, the probability of voting for Trump dropped sharply for those with low political interest—down to just 3.3%—while it remained robust (88.2%) among those who were highly engaged. Among liberals, political interest further entrenched opposition: the predicted probability of voting for Trump fell to nearly zero among high-interest liberals, reflecting an even stronger rejection than in 2016. What was once a relatively static dynamic had become deeply polarized, with political interest emerging as a powerful moderator of ideological effects.

Among low-interest conservatives, Trump support collapsed to just 3%, a stunning reversal from four years prior. In contrast, high-interest conservatives retained strong alignment (88.2%), suggesting that political interest had become essential for maintaining conservative loyalty. Meanwhile, highly engaged liberals became even more resistant to Trump than they had been in 2016, with their predicted support falling below 1%. These shifts point to a deeper entrenchment of political interest as a sorting mechanism, shaping who stays aligned—and who drifts away—based on ideological signals.

This transformation in voting behavior reflects how political engagement conditions the translation of ideological beliefs into electoral choices. In 2016, ideological conservatism alone appeared sufficient to predict support for Trump, especially among Asian Americans with low political interest. By 2020, however, engagement became more than a background factor—it emerged as a key driver of ideological consistency and partisan commitment. Conservatives with low political interest were far less likely to support Trump, while those who were politically

engaged remained loyal, highlighting the filtering role of political engagement in processing ideological cues during a period of deepening polarization.

These dynamics underscore the tension between assimilation and marginalization that shapes Asian American political behavior. For highly engaged conservatives, continued support for Trump may signal a commitment to political integration through ideological affiliation. Yet among disengaged conservatives, the stark decline in support suggests that the racialized environment—marked by anti-Asian rhetoric and exclusionary policies—may have prompted disengagement or disidentification with the Republican label. Their voting behavior illustrates how experiences of racialization can disrupt ideological alignment, particularly in moments of heightened political hostility.

Among liberals, political engagement appears to reinforce resistance, especially in the face of perceived threats to minority communities. Rather than simply amplifying ideological leanings, political interest seems to activate a sense of group consciousness and critical awareness of how race intersects with electoral politics. This perspective is consistent with the broader argument that Asian American political identities are not passively shaped by ideology alone, but emerge through ongoing negotiations between social inclusion, cultural preservation, and responses to systemic exclusion. Engagement serves not only as a marker of political awareness but as a means of navigating and redefining political identity in an increasingly racialized and divided political climate.

C.4. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Economic Evaluations and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

Analyzing the interaction between political interest and economic evaluations—both national and personal—provides a deeper understanding of how these factors shaped support for Republican candidates across racial and ethnic groups during the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. The interaction between political interest and economic evaluations for Asian Americans reveals an intricate trend, aligning more closely with Black and Hispanic voters in 2016 but resembling White voters in 2020. The shift from an insignificant negative effect in 2016 to a significantly positive one in 2020 emphasizes how politically engaged Asian Americans increasingly prioritized national economic narratives, reflecting broader economic concerns similar to those observed among politically engaged White voters. However, the persistent insignificance of personal economic evaluations underscores a shared observation with Black and Hispanic voters, where other factors, such as racial identity and cultural dynamics, were more central to shaping electoral behavior. This analysis underscores the fluid and context-dependent nature of Asian American political behavior, shaped by evolving sociopolitical and economic conditions.

Table C-4. The Effect of Political Interest and Economic Evaluations on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Interest	1.04 (1.26)	1.10* (0.28)	0.69 (0.82)	1.55 (0.81)	-1.98* (0.88)	-0.84* (0.19)	-0.30 (0.66)	-0.07 (0.52)
National Economic Evaluation	-0.98 (1.73)	-1.25* (0.43)	-1.47 (1.21)	-0.64 (1.13)	-1.89 (1.57)	1.24* (0.37)	2.50* (1.10)	1.49 (0.97)
Political Interest × National Economic Evaluation	-2.58 (2.29)	-2.08* (0.54)	-1.02 (1.50)	-1.28 (1.45)	5.16* (2.13)	1.02* (0.46)	-0.97 (1.33)	-0.28 (1.20)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.30 (1.56)	0.80* (0.38)	-0.71 (1.11)	-0.31 (1.16)	-1.03 (2.00)	-0.83 (0.44)	1.03 (1.41)	-0.73 (1.16)
Political Interest × Personal Economic Evaluation	-1.10 (2.13)	-1.44* (0.47)	1.51 (1.38)	-0.17 (1.47)	2.09 (2.53)	0.93 (0.56)	-0.96 (1.73)	1.33 (1.45)
Constant	-5.60* (1.35)	-6.48* (0.31)	-7.77* (0.93)	-8.03* (0.95)	-9.26* (1.26)	-8.80* (0.27)	-9.86* (0.96)	-9.49* (0.78)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-174.88	-3,276.32	-336.65	-370.36	-137.35	-2,640.13	-252.22	-375.26
Akaike Inf. Crit.	389.77	6,592.64	713.31	780.73	314.70	5,320.26	544.44	790.51

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

C.5. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Presidential Job

Approval and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The interaction between political interest and presidential job approval reveals a consistent outcome of insignificance across Asian, White, Black, and Hispanic voters in both 2016 and 2020. For all groups, presidential job approval did not interact meaningfully with political interest to influence Republican vote choice, indicating that political engagement did not amplify or diminish the effect of evaluations of Trump’s presidency. Among Asian Americans, as with

Table C-5. The Effect of Political Interest and Presidential Job Approval on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Interest	-0.71 (1.06)	0.09 (0.23)	0.41 (0.67)	1.36 (0.75)	-0.70 (1.30)	-0.27 (0.26)	0.07 (0.76)	0.68 (0.74)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.75 (1.44)	-0.10 (0.37)	-0.57 (1.07)	0.59 (1.03)	0.0002 (1.88)	1.20* (0.40)	1.42 (1.16)	2.58* (1.09)
Political Interest × Presidential Job Approval	0.92 (1.93)	0.05 (0.47)	-0.51 (1.35)	-0.92 (1.33)	0.47 (2.40)	-0.62 (0.51)	-1.71 (1.46)	-1.76 (1.38)
Constant	-4.41* (1.28)	-5.76* (0.28)	-7.57* (0.86)	-7.93* (0.94)	-10.09* (1.40)	-9.20* (0.30)	-10.09* (0.98)	-10.04* (0.87)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.39	-3,283.73	-336.82	-370.51	-140.32	-2,641.83	-251.79	-374.45
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.78	6,607.46	713.63	781.01	320.64	5,323.66	543.58	788.91

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

other groups, the neutrality of the interaction suggests that vote choice was likely shaped more by other factors, such as identity, policy concerns, or broader partisan dynamics. This uniform lack of interaction indicates the limited role of political interest in moderating the impact of presidential approval on electoral decisions across racial and ethnic groups, underscoring the importance of context-specific and identity-driven influences in shaping voter behavior.

C.6. Moderating Effect of Political Interest on Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

For Asian Americans, racial resentment significantly influences Republican vote choice in both 2016 and 2020, particularly in 2016 (5.35, $p < 0.05$). However, political interest does not

meaningfully change this effect, indicating that racial attitudes shape voting behavior regardless of engagement in political discourse. The absence of a significant interaction suggests that among Asian Americans, political knowledge or awareness does not necessarily heighten or diminish the role of racial resentment in shaping party preference.

In contrast, among White Americans, political interest amplifies the effect of racial resentment, as seen in 2016 (1.44, $p < 0.05$), reinforcing partisan alignment. This suggests that politically engaged Whites are more likely to align their resentment-based attitudes with Republican support. However, Black Americans, like Asian Americans, show no significant interaction effects, meaning political engagement does not substantially alter how racial resentment influences vote choice. Hispanic Americans show a mixed result—while racial resentment is a consistent predictor of Republican support, political interest does not significantly moderate this relationship.

These results showcase key differences in how political engagement interacts with racial resentment. Among Whites, political interest reinforces ideological divides, while for Asian and Black Americans, engagement does not meaningfully alter the effect of racial resentment. Hispanic Americans show some variation, but the results remain inconsistent across elections. These distinctions underscore the different ways racial attitudes influence political behavior across racial and ethnic groups.

Table C-6. The Effect of Political Interest and Racial Resentment on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Interest	0.33 (1.04)	-0.37 (0.25)	0.41 (0.60)	0.79 (0.72)	-1.63 (1.75)	-1.09* (0.35)	-1.35 (0.80)	-0.53 (0.81)
Racial Resentment	5.35* (2.25)	2.03* (0.52)	3.65* (1.51)	3.97* (1.58)	5.17 (2.91)	2.57* (0.47)	2.28 (1.62)	3.25* (1.22)
Political Interest × Racial Resentment	-1.94 (2.91)	1.44* (0.65)	-0.91 (1.93)	0.41 (2.05)	2.73 (3.85)	1.00 (0.59)	2.07 (2.02)	0.80 (1.55)
Constant	-5.16* (1.29)	-5.40* (0.29)	-7.61* (0.87)	-7.50* (0.93)	-9.39* (1.67)	-8.58* (0.35)	-9.03* (0.97)	-9.14* (0.87)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.28	-3,281.28	-336.78	-370.73	-140.09	-2,641.15	-251.97	-375.15
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.57	6,602.56	713.56	781.46	320.19	5,322.30	543.94	790.30

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

C.7. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Party

Identification and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

Table 7-13 presents log odds ratios for the interaction between political knowledge and party identification across racial and ethnic groups in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The primary interest lies in whether the strength of association between party identification and Republican vote choice varies across levels of political knowledge.

In the case of Asian American respondents, the interaction terms are not statistically significant in either year, with relatively wide standard errors. These estimates do not offer a clear indication that political knowledge consistently corresponds with variation in how party

Table C-7. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Party Identification on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Knowledge	0.09 (0.63)	-0.81** (0.14)	-0.09 (0.37)	-0.91* (0.39)	0.77 (0.90)	-0.12 (0.19)	0.63 (0.59)	-0.94* (0.46)
Party Identification	2.77** (0.78)	4.07** (0.18)	4.08** (0.57)	3.23** (0.46)	4.52** (1.10)	4.41** (0.22)	5.66** (0.75)	3.88** (0.54)
Political Knowledge × Party Identification	1.10 (1.09)	0.59* (0.25)	-1.00 (0.81)	0.89 (0.69)	-0.88 (1.44)	-0.13 (0.30)	-0.97 (1.05)	1.00 (0.78)
Constant	-4.36** (1.15)	-5.57** (0.26)	-7.82** (0.85)	-7.30** (0.83)	-10.60** (1.37)	-9.06** (0.27)	-9.89** (0.93)	-9.08** (0.74)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.00	-3,281.06	-336.13	-369.92	-140.15	-2,642.49	-252.06	-374.48
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.01	6,602.13	712.25	779.84	320.30	5,324.98	544.12	788.95

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

identification relates to Republican vote choice within this group. Also, estimates for Black and Hispanic respondents do not show statistical significance in either year, although the direction of the log odds ratios varies.

In contrast, White respondents show statistically significant interaction terms in only 2016, suggesting that, within this group, higher political knowledge is more regularly associated with a reduced relationship between party identification and vote choice. The estimates are more precise, and the direction remains consistent across time.

Considering the full set of comparisons, the interaction estimates for Asian Americans, Black respondents, and Hispanic respondents remain statistically inconclusive, with no consistent directional trend. White respondents are the only group in which the interaction between political knowledge and party identification reaches significance in the 2016 election. This distinction points to differences in how political knowledge is related to the partisan-vote

relationship across racial and ethnic lines, though further evidence would be needed to draw broader generalizations beyond the years observed.

C.8. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Self-Reported Ideology and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

For Asian, Black, and Hispanic voters, the interaction effects remained statistically insignificant across both election years, suggesting that ideological alignment paired with political knowledge did not meaningfully influence Republican vote choice. This outcome demonstrates the centrality of broader factors—such as racial identity, cultural dynamics, and specific policy concerns—in shaping the voting behavior of these groups, rather than the interplay of knowledge and ideology. In contrast, White voters exhibited a significant interaction in 2016, reflecting the role of political knowledge in reinforcing ideological clarity.

Republican support during Trump’s initial campaign. However, this interaction diminished by 2020, aligning more closely with the insignificant effects observed in other groups. These results emphasize the distinct yet converging dynamics of political knowledge and ideological alignment across racial groups, with Asian Americans sharing a more consistent trend of non-significance with Black and Hispanic voters, contrasting with the initial influence seen among White voters.

Table C-8. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Self-reported Ideology on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Knowledge	-0.69 (0.95)	-1.02* (0.22)	0.27 (0.65)	-1.40* (0.68)	1.48 (1.16)	-0.44 (0.27)	-0.93 (0.88)	-1.28* (0.65)
Self-reported Ideology	-1.28 (1.21)	1.06* (0.27)	2.02* (0.72)	1.03 (0.68)	0.38 (1.43)	0.92* (0.33)	1.25 (0.95)	0.20 (0.73)
Political Knowledge × Self-reported Ideology	2.54 (1.73)	0.88* (0.40)	-1.19 (1.05)	1.60 (1.15)	-2.20 (1.97)	0.45 (0.45)	1.94 (1.41)	1.52 (1.11)
Constant	-3.84* (1.24)	-5.51* (0.27)	-7.90* (0.90)	-7.17* (0.86)	-11.10* (1.47)	-8.85* (0.30)	-8.88* (0.97)	-8.91* (0.78)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-174.42	-3,281.26	-336.23	-369.77	-139.71	-2,642.07	-251.54	-374.35
Akaike Inf. Crit.	388.85	6,602.53	712.46	779.55	319.43	5,324.15	543.08	788.70

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

C.9. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Operational Ideology and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

Asian Americans exhibited a distinct shift in how political knowledge interacted with operational ideology compared to self-reported ideology, illustrating the detailed ways these factors influenced Republican vote choice in the 2016 and 2020 elections. In 2016, the interaction term (2.54) was positive but statistically insignificant, reflecting a limited role of ideological clarity and political knowledge in driving Republican vote choice, akin to the outcomes observed among Black and Hispanic voters. By 2020, however, the interaction term (6.11) became

Table C-9. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Operational Ideology on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Knowledge	-0.53 (1.41)	-1.85* (0.28)	-0.96 (0.96)	-1.86* (0.87)	-2.36 (1.35)	-2.40* (0.29)	-2.90* (0.99)	-1.72* (0.78)
Operational Ideology	4.82* (2.30)	6.43* (0.47)	6.41* (1.56)	6.02* (1.31)	2.11 (2.44)	6.27* (0.49)	1.20 (1.59)	5.10* (1.33)
Political Knowledge × Operational Ideology	2.54 (3.07)	2.97* (0.61)	1.25 (2.06)	3.05 (1.91)	6.11* (2.99)	5.02* (0.61)	6.98* (2.14)	2.79 (1.63)
Constant	-4.01* (1.37)	-4.93* (0.30)	-7.09* (0.98)	-6.82* (0.93)	-8.10* (1.51)	-7.41* (0.30)	-7.59* (0.98)	-8.58* (0.84)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.17	-3,272.20	-336.70	-369.46	-138.38	-2,610.82	-247.12	-373.87
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.34	6,584.40	713.41	778.92	316.75	5,261.65	534.24	787.74

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

statistically significant, suggesting that politically knowledgeable Asian Americans with conservative operational ideologies were substantially more likely to support Trump.

This marked shift may reflect targeted policy appeals by the Trump administration, particularly in areas such as economic recovery or foreign policy, which resonated with ideologically conservative Asian voters. Unlike Hispanic voters, where the interaction remained insignificant in both years, Asian Americans demonstrated a growing alignment in 2020 that paralleled trends among White and Black voters, revealing the evolving influence of ideological clarity and political knowledge within this group. These findings underscore the fluid and context-dependent nature of Asian American political behavior, influenced by both specific policy appeals and broader sociopolitical dynamics.

The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Republican Voting
Moderated by Political Knowledge




Figure C-2. The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Voting for Republican Candidate (Donald Trump) in Presidential Elections with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Levels of Political Knowledge. The x-axis represents operational ideology, ranging from liberalism to conservatism. The y-axis shows the predicted probability of voting for Donald Trump. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of political knowledge, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of political knowledge. The upper panel presents results from the 2016 election, while the lower panel displays results from the 2020 election.

Figure C-2, based on regression estimates from Table C-9, presents the predicted probabilities of voting Republican (i.e., for Donald Trump) among Asian Americans in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The x-axis represents operational ideology, ranging from liberalism to conservatism, while the y-axis displays the probability of voting Republican. The figure compares individuals with high versus low levels of political knowledge, shown by different line styles (solid for low knowledge, dashed for high). This visualization allows for a clear examination of how political knowledge moderates the effect of ideology on vote choice across two polarizing presidential cycles.

The differences across the two election years are especially noticeable among conservatives. In 2016, politically knowledgeable operational conservatives had a strikingly high predicted probability of supporting Trump—93.4%—while those with lower knowledge still showed substantial support at 68.0%. Among liberals, the probabilities were extremely low regardless of knowledge, though slightly lower for those with more political knowledge (2.1% for low-knowledge liberals, 1.3% for high-knowledge). This suggests that political knowledge sharpened ideological alignment, reinforcing both support and opposition to Trump depending on ideological orientation.

A notable shift emerged in 2020 among conservatives with limited political knowledge. Their predicted probability of voting Republican plummeted to 13.5%, representing a 54.5-point drop compared to 2016. In contrast, politically knowledgeable conservatives still showed a strong alignment with Trump, with a predicted probability of 83.1%. This divergence suggests that political knowledge had become a more polarizing force among conservatives. Among liberals, the 2020 pattern remained consistent: high-knowledge liberals were almost entirely

opposed to Trump (0.2%), while low-knowledge liberals showed slightly more support at 2.0%, mirroring earlier trends.

What emerges here is a portrait of political behavior shaped not just by ideology, but by how individuals learn, internalize, and respond to systems of exclusion and acceptance. In 2016, high political knowledge served to consolidate ideological identities, reinforcing a sense of belonging within partisan communities. However, by 2020, this function had changed. For conservatives, knowledge began to operate as a gatekeeper—sustaining partisan loyalty only for those deeply engaged with politics, while disengaged conservatives became more ambivalent, perhaps reacting to exclusionary rhetoric or perceived racial targeting. These shifts reveal how political knowledge does not act in a vacuum—it interacts with racialized experiences and broader sociopolitical contexts, creating space for divergence even within ideologically similar groups. This suggests that Asian Americans, far from passively absorbing ideological signals, navigate their political identity through a process of negotiation that incorporates awareness, lived experiences, and community-level concerns, particularly in an era defined by racial polarization and shifting definitions of belonging.

C.10. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Economic Evaluations and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

Table 7-16 shows how the interaction between political knowledge and economic evaluations (both national and personal) influences Republican vote choice across racial and ethnic groups during the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, demonstrating significant contrasts in how these factors operate among Asian Americans, and other racial groups. For Asian Americans, the

Table C-10. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Economic Evaluations on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Knowledge	1.66 (0.88)	0.33 (0.18)	0.36 (0.56)	0.27 (0.50)	-0.06 (0.61)	-0.49* (0.13)	-0.30 (0.52)	-0.73 (0.39)
National Economic Evaluation	-1.70 (1.08)	-1.79* (0.25)	-1.45* (0.69)	-0.71 (0.66)	1.01 (1.09)	1.32* (0.25)	0.95 (0.80)	0.85 (0.60)
Political Knowledge × National Economic Evaluation	-2.15 (1.61)	-1.89* (0.35)	-1.55 (0.98)	-1.64 (0.90)	1.12 (1.46)	1.07* (0.32)	1.28 (1.05)	0.74 (0.80)
Personal Economic Evaluation	0.38 (1.10)	0.41 (0.23)	0.53 (0.71)	-0.22 (0.64)	0.87 (1.40)	-0.71* (0.30)	-0.32 (1.06)	-0.51 (0.73)
Political Knowledge × Personal Economic Evaluation	-1.39 (1.44)	-1.18* (0.31)	-0.24 (0.95)	-0.43 (0.88)	-0.60 (1.76)	0.91* (0.39)	1.05 (1.46)	1.32 (1.01)
Constant	-5.13* (1.14)	-6.17* (0.25)	-7.77* (0.82)	-7.87* (0.82)	-10.04* (1.23)	-8.83* (0.26)	-9.25* (0.87)	-9.25* (0.72)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-174.60	3,268.82	-335.64	-369.09	-140.05	2,637.03	-251.75	-374.86
Akaike Inf. Crit.	389.20	6,577.65	711.28	778.18	320.09	5,314.06	543.49	789.73

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

interaction effects were not statistically significant in either election year. In 2016, national economic evaluation and personal economic evaluation showed no meaningful influence when conditioned by political knowledge. Similarly, in 2020, the interaction terms for national evaluations and for personal evaluations remained insignificant, indicating that politically knowledgeable Asian voters did not weigh economic evaluations heavily in their decision-making. These results align closely with trends observed among Black and Hispanic voters, where the interaction effects also failed to reach significance in both election years, underscoring the peripheral role of economic evaluations for these groups. Instead, factors such as racial

identity, immigration policies, or cultural concerns likely shaped their electoral decisions more prominently.

In contrast, White voters exhibited consistent and statistically significant interaction effects, underscoring their distinct reliance on economic evaluations as a decision-making tool. In 2016, the interaction between political knowledge and national economic evaluation was negative and significant (-1.89, $p < 0.01$), suggesting that knowledgeable White voters were less inclined to credit national economic conditions to Republican candidates. By 2020, both national (1.07, $p < 0.01$) and personal (0.91, $p < 0.05$) economic evaluations demonstrated significant interactions, reflecting the increased salience of economic considerations for politically knowledgeable White voters. These findings highlight a divergence between White voters, who systematically integrated economic conditions into their vote choice, and Asian, Black, and Hispanic voters, who exhibited a more fragmented or inconsistent trend. For Asian Americans, this contrast underscores their complex and context-dependent political behavior, shaped less by traditional economic frameworks and more by unique group-specific concerns and dynamics.

C.11. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Presidential Job Approval and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

The interaction between political knowledge and presidential job approval reveals a consistent lack of significant effects across racial and ethnic groups in both the 2016 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections. For Asian Americans, the interaction terms were negative and insignificant in both years, indicating that political knowledge did not meaningfully moderate the

Table C-11. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Presidential Job Approval on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Knowledge	0.61 (0.77)	-0.45* (0.16)	-0.88 (0.46)	-0.50 (0.48)	1.00 (1.00)	0.07 (0.20)	0.39 (0.65)	-0.69 (0.54)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.12 (1.06)	0.08 (0.22)	-1.62* (0.67)	-0.04 (0.60)	1.22 (1.33)	1.09* (0.27)	0.45 (0.85)	1.06 (0.69)
Political Knowledge × Presidential Job Approval	-0.03 (1.39)	-0.26 (0.31)	1.24 (0.95)	-0.06 (0.87)	-1.42 (1.80)	-0.56 (0.37)	-0.44 (1.17)	0.47 (1.01)
Constant	-4.73* (1.14)	-5.82* (0.25)	-7.22* (0.81)	-7.61* (0.82)	-10.64* (1.33)	-9.16* (0.27)	-9.67* (0.91)	-9.30* (0.74)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.51	-3,283.39	-336.03	-370.75	-140.02	-2,641.46	-252.42	-375.17
Akaike Inf. Crit.	391.01	6,606.77	712.07	781.49	320.05	5,322.93	544.83	790.35

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

influence of presidential job approval on Republican vote choice. This suggests that other factors, such as cultural concerns, identity-based considerations, or policy-specific appeals, played a more central role in shaping voting behavior within this group.

Similarly, White, Black, and Hispanic voters exhibited insignificant interaction effects in both election years. Among White voters, the interaction terms were also negative but lacked statistical significance, reflecting a muted moderating role of political knowledge in the relationship between presidential job approval and Republican support. For Black and Hispanic voters, the interaction terms showed varying directions across years but remained consistently insignificant, underscoring that political knowledge did not substantially alter the salience of job approval in shaping their vote choice. These patterns align with broader trends where other factors, such as entrenched partisan alignments, racial identity, and immigration concerns, likely played a more dominant role for these groups.

The consistent insignificance of the interaction terms across all groups suggests that political knowledge, while important in shaping overall political behavior, does not strongly moderate the influence of presidential job approval on Republican vote choice. This finding underscores the multifaceted nature of electoral decisions, where contextual and identity-based factors often outweigh the direct interplay of knowledge and performance evaluations. For Asian Americans, the similarity in observations with other racial groups showcases a broader trend of limited interaction effects, reinforcing the importance of exploring alternative explanations for variations in voting behavior.

C.12. Moderating Effect of Political Knowledge on Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Vote Choice Across Racial Groups

Among Asian Americans, the interaction between political knowledge and racial resentment does not reach statistical significance in 2016, indicating that political awareness did not meaningfully alter the relationship between racial attitudes and Republican vote choice.

However, in 2020, the interaction between political knowledge and racial resentment among Asian Americans (5.83, $p < 0.05$) indicates that higher levels of political knowledge significantly strengthened the relationship between racial resentment and voting for the Republican candidate. This suggests that politically knowledgeable Asian Americans who harbored higher racial resentment were more likely to support Trump, with the odds of doing so increasing by nearly

Table C-12. The Effect of Political Knowledge and Racial Resentment on Vote Choice for Republican Candidates Across Racial/Ethnic Groups in the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections

	Vote Choice for Republican Candidate							
	2016				2020			
	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian	White	Black	Hispanic
Political Knowledge	1.00 (0.66)	-1.10* (0.16)	-0.63 (0.41)	-0.78 (0.45)	-2.16 (1.12)	-0.85* (0.24)	-1.03 (0.60)	-1.65* (0.56)
Racial Resentment	4.78* (1.37)	2.15* (0.31)	2.43* (0.95)	3.86* (0.82)	3.67* (1.80)	2.51* (0.32)	1.44 (1.17)	2.31* (0.78)
Political Knowledge × Racial Resentment	-1.32 (1.78)	1.64* (0.42)	1.05 (1.36)	0.86 (1.29)	5.83* (2.50)	1.22* (0.41)	3.68* (1.54)	2.62* (1.09)
Constant	-5.00* (1.17)	-5.44* (0.26)	-7.36* (0.80)	-7.44* (0.84)	-8.66* (1.33)	-8.55* (0.29)	-8.69* (0.90)	-8.65* (0.75)
Observations	687	22,434	2,741	1,848	921	27,814	3,285	2,554
Log Likelihood	-175.23	-3,276.05	-336.59	-370.53	-137.59	-2,638.24	-249.62	-372.43
Akaike Inf. Crit.	390.45	6,592.11	713.18	781.05	315.19	5,316.49	539.25	784.86

Note: Entries in the table are log odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1 to aid interpretation. Each model includes a comprehensive set of control variables: age, gender, household income, educational attainment, foreign-born status, religiosity, operational ideology, self-reported ideological placement, racial resentment, political interest, political knowledge, presidential job approval, national economic evaluation, and personal economic evaluation. Regional fixed effects are also included, represented as dummy variables for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. * $p < 0.05$.

six times compared to those with lower racial resentment. Unlike in 2016, this result points to a shift in how political awareness influenced the role of racial attitudes in shaping Republican vote choice among Asian Americans. This outcome diverges from White voters, where the interaction remained consistently positive and significant in both elections, and from Black and Hispanic voters, who also exhibited a strengthening effect in 2020, though with lower log odds ratios (3.68 and 2.62, respectively).

White Americans display a contrasting result, with a consistently significant and positive interaction term in both 2016 (1.64, $p < 0.05$) and 2020 (1.22, $p < 0.05$), indicating that greater political knowledge amplifies the link between racial resentment and Republican vote choice. Unlike Asian Americans, where this effect emerges later, White voters exhibit a stable relationship over time.

The Effect of Racial Resentment on Asian American Republican Voting
Moderated by Political Knowledge




Figure C-3. The Effect of Operational Ideology on Asian American Voting for Republican Candidate (Donald Trump) in Presidential Elections with Low (solid lines) and High (dashed lines) Levels of Political Knowledge. The x-axis represents racial resentment, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest). The y-axis shows the predicted probability of voting for Donald Trump. Shaded areas around the lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The solid line corresponds to individuals with lower levels of political knowledge, and the dashed line represents those with higher levels of political knowledge. The upper panel presents results from the 2016 election, while the lower panel displays results from the 2020 election.

For Black Americans, political knowledge interacts with racial resentment in 2020 (3.68, $p < 0.05$), suggesting that knowledgeable individuals with higher racial resentment were more likely to support the Republican candidate. This trend mirrors Asian Americans' 2020 shift, though it is more noticeable among Black voters. Hispanic Americans follow a similar trajectory, with a positive and significant interaction in 2020 (2.62, $p < 0.05$), aligning them more closely with the outcome seen among Asian Americans than White voters, where this effect remains stable across both election cycles.

Figure C-3—constructed using logit regression results from Table C-12—illustrates the interactive effect of racial resentment and political knowledge on the predicted probability of voting Republican among Asian Americans in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. The x-axis captures levels of racial resentment (low vs. high), while the y-axis displays the likelihood of voting for the Republican candidate. Political knowledge is represented by two lines: solid for lower political knowledge and dashed for higher political knowledge, with shaded areas indicating 95% confidence intervals. Each panel corresponds to one of the two election years, allowing for a direct temporal comparison.

The contrast between 2016 and 2020 reveals a major transformation in how political knowledge conditions the relationship between racial resentment and Republican vote choice among Asian Americans. In 2016, individuals with high levels of racial resentment were consistently likely to vote Republican regardless of political knowledge. Those with low knowledge showed a predicted probability of 74.4%, while those with high knowledge had a similarly elevated probability of 70.1%, indicating that political awareness did little to disrupt the alignment between racial resentment and conservative vote choice.

At the low end of the resentment scale, political knowledge played only a limited role. Low-resentment individuals with low knowledge had a 3.5% chance of voting Republican, compared to 8.9% for their more knowledgeable counterparts. These numbers show that while political knowledge slightly increased Republican support among this group, the overall effect remained marginal.

The 2020 data indicate a collapse in Republican support among low-resentment Asian Americans, with vote probabilities dipping to 1.2% among those with limited knowledge and to a mere 0.1% among those with greater political awareness. Notably, the confidence intervals were much narrower, especially among the highly knowledgeable, pointing to greater internal consistency and clarity in political orientation within this group.

Among those with high racial resentment, however, political knowledge created a sharp divide. Individuals with low knowledge had a much lower probability of voting Republican in 2020—33.2%, down from 74.4% in 2016. But those with high political knowledge showed an intense consolidation of support for the Republican candidate, with a predicted probability of 95.1%, reflecting a striking polarization not observed in the earlier election cycle.

These changes over time highlight how the interaction between racial attitudes and political knowledge has grown more intricate in shaping the electoral behavior of Asian Americans. Rather than consistently dampening the effect of racial resentment, political knowledge appears to have become a selective amplifier—minimizing partisan drift among low-resentment individuals while reinforcing Republican alignment among high-resentment respondents. This diverging tendency points to a more complex relationship between cognitive engagement and ideological development, one that does not fit cleanly into traditional models of knowledge as a moderating force.

What emerges is a deeper fragmentation within the Asian American electorate, rooted in how individuals process political information through the lens of racial identity. The heightened polarization in 2020—amid intensified racial rhetoric and rising anti-Asian sentiment—likely contributed to this sorting process. Politically aware individuals with low resentment were further pushed away from the Republican platform, while those with high resentment and greater knowledge grew more committed to it. This development reflects a broader negotiation of political identity in a racially charged environment, where knowledge does not simply inform but also polarizes—deepening the rift between segments of the community based on how they interpret and internalize racial cues in national politics.