THE POLITICS OF RACE IN CUBA, 1898-1913

BY

CATHY ELLEN DUKE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

HISTORY

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1975

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction

Studies in race relations are plentiful in the literature of Cuban history for they deal with a basic social fact, the multi-racial character of Cuban society. Yet writings on slavery and its abolition, which predominate in the literature on race relations, emphasize the roles of influential whites engaged in a morass of social, economic, and diplomatic considerations.[1] My initial desire in researching the subject was to go beyond 1886 and abolition to a period in which persons of color gained some initiative over their own lives as free individuals. Historians have virtually neglected the story of the colored from the declaration of emancipation until the 1930's. Centering upon one central aspect of race relations during these years, this study focuses on the development of the politics of race as manifested in urban centers from the years of the War for Independence (1895-98) through the 1912 crisis in black political development.

These self-imposed limits are not as arbitrary as they might appear. There is no denying that colored people in rural Cuba strongly influenced the race prejudices of white Cubans particularly through their religious practices, and a discussion of the interchanges between whites and blacks in a rural setting could shed much light upon the nature of race relations throughout the island. Unfortunately,

available sources on rural society are incomplete.[2] This paper will therefore be confined to a treatment of urban-based colored movements. While the term urban includes those persons living in towns larger than 2,000 persons, most of the key events discussed took place in Havana, with a third of the nation's population, in Santiago de Cuba, with over 45,000 persons, or in Camaguey, Matanzas, or Cienfuegos, each with over 25,000 inhabitants at the time of the 1907 census.[3]

Limiting the time span to 1898-1913 allows me to focus on the origins and steady escalation of political activity among non-whites. The development of colored participation in Cuban politics, which began substantially during the 1895 war, culminated in the creation of the Independent Party of Color (El Partido Independiente de Color). The party was, I believe, the first manifestation of a modern, nation-wide political mobilization of non-elite persons for the purpose of attaining some benefits of political power.[4] Since its inception as an informal association in 1903, the party's active members sought positions in the bureaucracy which they believed to be just compensation for their role in the Independence movement. The other two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, led almost exclusively by members of the white "revolutionary" Creole elite, opposed the Independents' competition in the area of political patronage.[5] More fundamentally, the parties resisted the

Independents' demands because the colored men's claims represented an explicit challenge to their total domination of the government. While the Independent Party primarily sought political power, its membership, composed almost exclusively of colored veterans of the War for Independence, explicitly championed racial equality in a society where the crucial decisions were made by whites and for whites. The Independents, as colored men, attacked the governing white elite's race prejudices and exclusionist policies. Although discrimination against colored persons was denounced in official rhetoric and was constitutionally illegal, unwritten social norms kept non-whites as a whole from obtaining equal rights and opportunities as citizens. The Independents believed that the predominant national political organizations represented the interests of the white elite and accordingly had done nothing to alleviate racial inequality and informal prejudice. In response to racial prejudice and the inefficacy of the other national parties, the Independents made themselves the spokesman for the rights of persons of color in Cuba. In turn the white elite, in government and out, tended to perceive the party as a threat to the long accepted dominance of whites in Cuban society.

In challenging the politically and racially exclusionist policies of the governing white elite, the Independents relied upon careful political strategies designed to extract maximum concessions from the government. Party leaders purposely used American influence, for example, as a

counterweight to the elitist Cuban regime. The Independents did not hesitate to play upon Creole fears of American intervention. At the same time, they correctly assessed that they themselves were subject to American actions or inaction which could affect substantially the outcome of their struggle with the government. The role of the United States in the island's politics of race is a field of investigation which I have unfortunately only been able to touch upon in this paper.

With a series of strategies planned by colored leaders and government responses, the confrontation between the white elite and the colored opposition escalated rapidly. This political process of polarization eventually forced the Independents to choose violence as a last tactical option, a decision which proved disastrous for the party and for the future development of political organization among colored Cubans.

II. Race and Class in the Nineteenth Century

The basic racist assumption that white persons should exercise political, social, and economic control over non-whites was a legacy of Cuba's colonial heritage. In its origins, Hispanic Cuba was a multi-racial society which recognized a hierarchical socio-racial structure of three racial categories: white, mulatto, and black. The white elite, which wielded authority almost exclusively,

expressed its dominance most fully through the institution of slavery.

Negro slavery had existed in Cuba since the sixteenth century. With the introduction of the labor-intensive sugar plantation to the island in the late eighteenth century, however, the institution came to occupy a central economic role. An estimated 950,000 Africans were imported as slaves in a ninety year period. The imports overwhelmed the approximately 90,000 non-whites and 180,000 whites living in Cuba in 1790, and drastically altered the numerical relationship of blacks to whites.[1] By introducing large numbers of non-whites to a position at the bottom of the socio-racial structure, it reinforced that structure. It also contributed toward a change in race relations which emphasized the increasingly "caste" nature of Cuban society.[2] The hardening of social lines of division was, in turn, reflected in the language. The white elite had developed a series of terms to describe the various nuances of shades of colored persons throughout the colonial period, but these designations had become more exact during the growth of the sugar plantation system. By the time the terminology appeared in print or in debate (1865-1910), the words mulatto and negro had been more carefully refined. Terms such as pardo and mulatto oscuro, which generally applied to persons of a dark, milky shade lighter than black, for example, provided for greater descriptive accuracy.

The most common designations were, however, negro (black or Negro) and the vague term de color (colored). These two terms did not correspond to a specific physical description, but, rather, to the basic racial categories into which the white elite divided the non-white population. With the huge influx of Africans after 1790, the great proportion of non-whites were labelled negro by virtue of their skin tones,and, more importantly, as an indication of their lower cultural, social, and economic status in Cuban society.

The other term de color also conveyed less about an individual's appearance than his social standing. In referring particularly to large aggregates, the designation could imply a relatively favorable social position. It could be used, for example, in describing all Cuban non-whites in contrast with foreign, uneducated, and potentially dangerous "blacks" in Haiti. The term also acquired a nuance of gentility, and as such was used in the polite language of public speeches and written texts. It could refer to groups of socially acceptable non-whites, such as the Independent Party of Color, regardless of whether all persons within the particular group fulfilled the physical description implied by the term.

Physical appearance was inevitably, however, the crucial factor in determining social status. Those non-whites who aspired to integrate into the top echelons of

the society corresponded in almost every case to a physical standard of preferred looks established unconsciously by the white elite. The whites clearly preferred individuals whose appearance most closely approximated their own including pure whites and also very light mulattos. This physical standard, which H. Hoetink has labelled the "somatic norm image," acted as a selection process which eliminated all but a few non-whites from possible membership in the elite.[3] Individuals such as the light mulatto José Morúa Delgado, whose senatorial position indicated his status as the cream of non-white society, without fail earned the label of de color.

Such physical standards were, of course, racist. In stressing the innate superiority of "whiteness," or shades closest to white, over "blackness," the white elite sought unconsciously to provide a rationale for white dominance on the basis of physical distinctions. The white elite brought this argument to bear as an integral part of the intricate, interlocking set of "proofs" used to justify their basic assumption that the colored man was an inferior being.

Other than physical appearance, which constituted the most obvious means of distinction used to rationalize white power, psychological arguments were powerful justifications for the socio-racial structure. Spokesmen for the elite assumed that colored men by nature had deficient

personalities which subjected them to extremes of child-like docility and savage violence. Under the tutelage of whites, the Negro seemed to them to be a submissive creature who behaved obediently just as a child might recognize the natural superiority of a parent.[4] Without white guidance, however, such as that provided by slavery, the whites believed that the Negro's latent savagery would resurface to the detriment of both white and non-white.[5]

As a bulwark to this theory of the defective Negro character, the white elite began to adopt the belief, which circulated particularly in Great Britain, that whites exclusively (produced and were charged to guard) civilization.[6] They accepted historical "facts" which argued that Africans had failed to develop any civilization of their own.[7] In dispensing the gift of civilization to blacks, the white elite asked in exchange only that the non-whites work as agriculturalists for the greater welfare of the total society.[8] The whites conceded that Negroes were "eminently fit for hard agricultural work of any kind, and especially for the cultivation of sugar."[9] In doing so, however, they assumed that non-whites were chronically indolent without white supervision.[10] Thus, both the theory of the defective Negro personality and the assumption of the superiority of white civilization supported the elite's belief in the need for social controls over colored persons, a notion which itself stemmed from a system of white domination.

The white elite, however, was by no means monolithic in its beliefs regarding the colored population. The greatest difference of opinion rested upon the very question of Negro rebelliousness and the need for social controls over non-whites. The controversy over this issue developed within a context of deepening division within the white elite itself.

In a sense, Cuba had two white elites. In the western provinces, influential whites had come to dominate the region through their control of sugar plantations. They had revolutionized the economic structure in alliance with peninsular merchants and Spanish bureaucrats who facilitated the marketing of their product abroad. With their heavy slave importations due to labor requisites, the planters also altered the social composition of the western provinces. The plantation economy accentuated socio-racial distinctions between a few rich whites and the mass of enslaved blacks.[11] In order to maintain slavery in the face of international attacks, and thus preserve their social and economic dominance, the planters relied again upon the support of Spanish authorities. As a result of these political and economic dependencies, the western sugar planters constituted a conservative elite which necessarily favored continuing ties with Spain.[12]

In contrast, the eastern sugar planters had fewer pragmatic reasons to support a continuing colonial status.

With their smaller operations, the eastern planter had far less impact on the economy and social structure of their region. Their management followed western patterns, but they had far fewer dealings with Spanish bureaucrats and merchants. Unlike the westerners who relied exclusively on slave labor and existed within a social setting without free blacks, and eastern planters recognized the agricultural pursuits of a free non-white rural population as well as the existence of a large free urban colored element.[13]

With less reliance on Spain for political and economic assistance, the eastern white elite was perhaps freer to absorb the nationalist ideology current throughout the Spanish-American world since 1810. Given the east-west division within the elite, it was not surprising that the easterners spearheaded Cuba's first attempt to secure political independence in the Ten Years' War (1868-78).

The Ten Years' War had its origins in the traditional political and economic conflict between the Cuban colony and its metropolis.[14] Questions of race, however, quickly intruded as factors in the uprising. The nationalist ideology espoused by the eastern white planters who organized the revolt attracted a heterogeneous groups of supporters from the eastern provinces, including persons of the middle strata of white Creoles, small slaveholders, and the free urban colored populations of Bayamo, Holguín,

Manzanillo, Las Tunas, and Santiago de Cuba.[15] The free coloreds' positive response to nationalist ideology apparently reflected their greater degree of political awareness due to urban living in general and their participation in politically active Masonic lodges.[16]

Even though non-whites participated in the planning stages of the revolt, the Oriente sugar planters who dominated the revolutionary leadership generally believed that the war would be fought principally by whites.[17] Manuel Céspedes, speaking for the majority of the revolutionary whites, resisted suggestions that the nationalists enlist the massive support of non-whites through a declaration of abolition. In part, they hoped to obtain backing from the conservative western planters who opposed abolition.[18] The revolutionary Creoles also feared, however, that mobilized, armed colored troops might turn their weapons against the whites in a social revolution. Their belief in the Negro's latent savagery and his desire for revenge against white domination pointed to the potential for serious racial disturbances.

Ultimately, Céspedes was forced to declare emancipation in order to counteract similar Spanish maneuvers to gain colored followers. These belated efforts to attract slaves and free persons of color to the rebel cause were, however, largely unsuccessful. Traditional estimates which

placed the numbers of non-white soldiers as high as half the total colored population have not been verified; rather, as the revolutionaries preferred, poor whites formed the principle body of Creole troops.[19]

The very absence of non-white participation, however, influenced the white elite's view of the colored population. When slaves and free coloreds outside the combat zone failed to join the insurrection despite the appeals of the elite, it relieved the white nationalists' fears of social upheaval and race war.[20]

The nationalists' growing tendency to disbelieve the myth of Negro rebelliousness was reinforced by their relationship with colored men who did fight in the war. The revolutionary elite maintained its position of authority through the structure of military command without any serious reported incidents of insubordination.[21]

Normal socio-racial distinctions became less important, however, as the experiences of battle encouraged the development of a sense of mutual trust between whites and non-whites which, in turn, was expressed in a new rhetoric of fraternity.[22] Although some of this rhetoric was purely a ploy to encourage colored men to join the rebel cause, it nevertheless reflected a new view of persons of color as soldiers or potential soldiers in a fight against the Spanish. The white revolutionary leadership responded to concrete evidence of military acumen among colored men, and

promoted them to positions of command as the fighting depleted the ranks of the officers. This emphasis on martial skills during the war, which took precedence over the normal hierarchical distinctions between classes and races, allowed persons of clearly negroid parentage to experience a rapid rise in their social status.[23] One such individual, Antonio Maceo, rose to the rank of brigadier-general in command of the second division of the first corps where he became a popular hero with influence over common soldiers. The white leadership relied not only on his military skills, but on his charisma which encouraged colored people to identify their interests with the independence struggle and probably increased their politicization.[24] In short, the experiences during the Ten Years' war not only removed some of the revolutionary Creole elite's fear regarding the consequences of the military mobilization of the colored population, but contributed toward their realization of the advantages of a multi-racial alliance against Spanish troops.

The abolition of slavery in 1886 did not reinforce the more positive aspects of developments in race relations during the Ten Years' War. It did, however, convince conservative white creole planters that effective social control over the colored population was not dependent upon the institution of slavery itself. The declaration of abolition had little effect on the socio-racial structure

of Cuban society. Some inconveniences and temporary losses were inevitable, occasioned, for example, by the increased geographical mobility of the ex-slaves. With limited economic opportunities available, however, the freed men generally worked either for their old master, or for another sugar planter as seasonal wage laborers.[25] Only a fraction of the ex-slaves managed to improve upon their economic status by becoming colonos, or tenant farmers.[26]

The basic complex of race prejudices was also unaffected by the formal announcement of emancipation. Just as Maceo had observed during the last years of the Ten Years' War, when white malcontents circulated rumors accusing him of planning to establish a Negro republic, ex-slaves learned that little had changed on the plantations in regard to elite assumptions.[27] In the towns, however, the colored population's increased mobility led to a greater emphasis on the belief in non-white criminal tendencies. Havana, in particular, suffered from the anti-social activities of the ñáñigos, members of secret societies with the attributes of a self-help and mutual defense league.[28] With a pseudo-scientific, racist commentary, white law enforcement officials stressed the "ethnic" and uncivilized nature of the ñáñigos rites, as well as the practices of witchcraft which flourished in rural areas.[29]

Despite these exceptions, however, the 1868 revolt and the end of abolition demonstrated to members of the

eastern nationalist elite, and, to a lesser degree, the western conservative elite that they could successfully maintain their position of dominance over the colored population under circumstances which did not permit physical coersion. Predictions of social upheaval during these crucial periods failed to materialize. Thus, when war with Spain erupted once again in 1895, the members of the nationalist elite, in particular, had revised their view of the dangers of Negro rebelliousness and saw positive advantages in encouraging the mobilization of colored men in the struggle for independence.

III. The Multi-Racial Coalition

The revolutionary Creole leaders of the Ten Years' War, defeated and living in exile in the United States, began to examine their military errors and to reassess their tactics in preparation for a new confrontation. The nationalists concluded that among their mistakes had been their initial failure to encourage the participation of colored men in the conflict. The decision had severely handicapped their cause. On racial criteria alone they had virtually excluded approximately one-third of the total male Creole population (approximately 237,000 persons) from their forces. Their calculated choice not to recruit colored men had an even more disastrous impact in the war zone of Oriente province where roughly 45 percent of the potential Creole manpower, or some 69,000 persons, were

non-white.[1] Although the revolutionary movement did attract Oriente's urban colored persons, the eastern Creoles' early recruiting ignored a roughly estimated 58,000 rural colored males in one province.[2] The revolutionary elite realized the need to end the isolation of these colored elements from the struggle for independence in view of the numbers of Spanish troops which opposed the Creoles. The white nationalist leaders thus embarked upon a propoganda campaign under the auspices of the newly organized Cuban Revolutionary Junta aimed at the non-elites and (La Junta Revolucionaria Cubana) particularly at the colored sector whose participation in the impending war was considered crucial.[3]

Jose Martí became the most eloquent and active spokesman in the Junta's deliberate attempt to enlist colored support for their cause. He believed that the discontent of colored men provided a potential pool for revolutionary activity. Although he championed the rights of the colored, however, Martí never challenged the Junta's assumption that the task of leadership and direction within the psoposed multi-racial coalition would fall to the white Creole elite.[4]

Before such a coalition could be formed, Martí first needed to convince the more conservative white elite outside the Junta and its new party, the Cuban Revolutionary Party

(El Partido Revolucionario Cubano), of the advisability of colored participation. These conservatives felt more inclined to support independence after 1886 when the issue of slavery no longer was a bone of contention between them and the nationalists. They still opposed, however, the notion of firearms in the hands of non-whites.[5] Martí did not try to deny their race prejudices which pictured the colored man alternatively as a docile creature unfit for combat and as a volatile savage who would turn his weapons against his white Creole superiors. Instead he chose to portray cultured colored Cubans as distinct from foreign blacks whose "primitive" nature corresponded with the elite stereotype.[6] Directly addressing himself to the conservatives' fears, Martí stressed the impossibility of racial conflict on the island. Any divisiveness which did surface he attributed to the ill-effects of Spanish propoganda.

Above all, the propogandist emphasized the nationalists' need for colored soldiers in the upcoming conflict with Spain. He maintained that colored Cubans had shown their dedication to the cause of independence in the Ten Years' War as they fought and died with whites "against a common tyranny." Given the proper stimulus and guidance, non-whites would make "willing and subordinate warriors" in the war ahead.[7] In short, he argued that the conservative Creoles would receive the essential benefits of increased

manpower without endangering their traditional patterns of dominance by including colored men in the armed coalition for independence.

If the colored were to fight, Martí needed not only to convince the conservative white elite of the advantages of their cooperation, but to gain the confidence and support of colored Cubans. In the effort to encourage non-white involvement, Martí and the Junta enjoyed the assistence of several Cuba-based colored organizations.

Following abolition, leading colored societies and brotherhoods had formed the Central Directory of the Colored Race (El Directorio Central de la Raza de Color) which proved instrumental in securing colored soldiers for the war. The organization's original intent had been to defend freedmen and orient them toward a life of self-sufficiency. With the approach of war, however, its President Juan Gualberto Gómez decided that colored Cubans, as Cubans, had an obligation to fight the Spanish. The Directory's leaders also felt that colored enlistments would legitimize the demands of non-whites for greater opportunities and rights in a free Cuba. Through the organizations' urgings, Guillermo Moncada, Quintín Banderas, Flor Crombet and others became important revolutionary leaders commanding colored troops.[8]

Another society, Friends of the Country (Amigos del Pais), which was originally an economic improvement organi-

zation, began to support the exiled revolutionaries and encourage colored participation. Several influential colored men in the society, including the same Juan Gualberto Gómez, recognized the impending multi-racial war coalition. They noted with some satisfaction that the nation at last accepted the help and appreciated the merits of colored men.[9]

Many other individual colored societies, including secret brotherhoods of slave origin (cabildos) and the societies of recreation (las sociedades de recreo), encouraged active support of the independence movement. They reinforced on a local level the propoganda campaign for massive colored participation requested by Martí under the banner of the new Cuban Revolutionary Party.[10]

Martí's rhetoric to colored Cubans, expressed in open letters and circulated by local colored Cuban organizations, conveyed an almost mystical notion of class harmony and brotherhood. His populist creed spoke directly to the interests of the colored man first as a respected member of the Cuban polity who loved liberty and who would fight "the ludricrous aristocratic caste which treats the majority with injustice or contempt."[11] Martí hoped to channel these egalitarian sentiments into a positive desire to enlist in a war which he claimed would bring justice, equality and liberty to all Cubans. To colored men, and particularly to recently freed slaves, however, he also

offered the respect and love of their fellow white countrymen.

Martí prayed that colored Cubans could "forget" slavery in an atmosphere in which white Cubans respected their "black brothers." The rancor created by slavery would disappear in the war as "Cubans pass from the differences of slavery to the brotherhood of sacrifice." In deemphasizing slavery and appealing to a sense of common brotherhood, Martí hoped colored Cubans would begin to feel that they belonged to the new Cuba. He realized that they would unite with their countrymen against Spain only if they saw themselves as an integral part of the struggle, as one of the "heterogeneous components of the Cuban nation."[12] For the first time, the colored man became, if only rhetorically, the compatriot of the white. Martí wrote:

> The harsh novelty and sharpness of social relations in consequence of the sudden change from being another's possession to being one's own man are less important than the sincere estimation of the white Cuban for the constant heart, the industrious nature, the evangelical love of liberty, the fervor of a free man, and the amiable character of his Negro compatriot...[13]

In a final plea for racial brotherhood in the cause of independence, Martí offered his friend Jose Antonio Maceo -- and, by implication, all non-whites -- his love. In an open letter he wrote:

> No one has sought or will seek to pass over you, or over your compañeros. You are necessary to Cuba . . .I say to you that I feel the deepest and most intimate love for you, as if I had been born in your own family. Don't you want me as a brother, Maceo? Didn't your mother cherish me like a son?[14]

Martí did have the assistance, although perhaps unknowingly, of his friend Maceo in his propoganda campaign. Maceo's clear status as a major war hero helped colored men identify with the independence movement. Regardless of whether the white creole leadership understood the psychological implications of including a dark hero in the pantheon of great men in the fight against Spain, Maceo's existence nevertheless strengthened the colored population's association with the "nation."[15]

Maceo and Martí together provided colored men with the ideological basis for action. Their fine words and deeds proved most effective, however, when the Junta explained to non-whites some practical advantages in supporting the war. Although Martí's promises for equal rights for all Cubans regardless of color may or may not have been believed by the colored man, the revolutionaries simply had more to offer on a relative scale. The Spanish regime with its system of privileges and limited freedom for the Negro held no attraction.[16] When the war appeared imminent, many colored men found Maceo's promise of a 30 pesos per month payment for military service a positive alternative to the

few employment opportunities available to them.[17] The white creole leadership also offered colored men the hope of advancement through the ranks while they reserved for themselves key positions of leadership. Although the actual opportunities for advancement probably remained relatively small, the promise of upward social mobility and increased status became a powerful inducement for military participation.

Through the efforts of Martí, the work of local Cuban societies, and the symbolic value of men such as Maceo, colored men did participate to a significant degree in the 1895 war although numerical estimates vary considerably. The source closest to the actual fighting asserted that 95 percent of all colored men fought in the war.[18] This participation had a significant impact on Creole troop strength. Colored men contributed from "possibly a majority" to 75 percent of the ordinary troops of the revolution.[19]

Without more documentation concerning patterns of recruitment it would seem precipitous to attribute this non-white participation solely to the direct efforts of Martí and the new tactics of the Junta. Some portion of the colored forces probably did enlist on a purely voluntary basis in response to the revolutionary propoganda. Non-whites drawn from Oriente's urban areas probably volunteered as did colored persons who saw an opportunity for social or economic advancement, or perhaps simply for an escape from

routine. Non-whites living in the war zone who joined the Creole army may have been subjected, however, to some degree of coersion. Some of these individuals were probably conscripted. In addition, a large number of non-whites under the authority of white Creole sugar plantation owners were simply expected to follow their former masters' leadership into war.

It is impossible with currently available sources to determine which factor or factors brought the greatest numbers of non-white soldiers into Creole ranks. Whatever the relative importance of these methods of recruitment, it may be said at least that the Junta's efforts to encourage colored involvement did not go unrewarded. The revolutionaries' intentional plan to create a multi-racial coalition met witheenough success to attract significant numbers of colored men to the War for Independence.

During the war, the myth of brotherhood created by Martí and spread through the Creole propoganda campaign perpetuated itself during the war by a spirit of "comrades-in-arms." The actual experience of side by side combat encouraged egalitarian sentiments among the troops and officers.[20] At the same time, however, the army's discipline and internal chain of command reinforced traditional vertical lines of authority. The white elite continued to provide the leadership in war although they made some accomodation for upwardly mobile non-whites.

The coexistence of two conflicting philosophies, the egalitarian and the hierarchical, did not create a crisis. One member of the Junta, Ignacio Agramonte, illustrated the ease of accepting both strains of thought when he acknowledged the sense of fraternity in wartime; pointing to his mulatto servant, he said, "This is my brother."[21]

The discrepancy between egalitarian promises and continuing patterns of hierarchy became ironic only in retrospect. In the pre-war years and the period of actual fighting, however, the immediate needs of attracting colored men into a multi-racial coalition against Spain superceded any concern for the future implications of raising the expectations of colored Cubans.

While the white nationalist leadership successfully created a forceful union against Spanish troops, neither rhetoric, nor the comradery of combat, nor even the great need for amicable race relations during the war eliminated ingrained white race prejudices against colored Cubans. Sentiments of Cuban brotherhood dominated public expressions on the subject of race in part because of the pragmatic necessity for an ideology which bound classes and colors together. As Esteban Montejo, a freedman and war volunteer noted, however, there were blatant contradictions between this rhetoric and social reality. Montejo recorded public slurs suffered by colored troops, which were demeaning to their loyalty, bravery, and manhood. Non-whites were helpless

when accused in one instance of murdering a white officer Cayito Alvarez. Colored officers also faced ridicule, including such proven war heroes as Quintín Banderas who had to confront slanders against his loyalty.[22] Despite the continuing presence of racist attitudes which might have led to serious dissension within the coalition, however, the multi-racial union remained intact.

In general, race relations during the immediately following the war contrasted favorably with the pre-war colonial period. After the war's end, the continuation of improved race relations gave colored nationals a new sense of optimism. Having participated in the elimination of the Spanish government, they had reason to believe that the racial barriers to upward mobility fostered under the colonial regime had been severely weakened if not destroyed.

One important factor which contributed to the impression of a decline in racist sentiment and in anti-Negro behavior was an increase in anti-Spanish feeling. During the war Cubans had attacked not only Spanish soldiers but local Spanish merchants as well. The merchants were unpopular as much because of their commercial position in local communities as because of their nationality. These outbursts represented legitimate expressions of conflict.

When the American military intervened in Cuba in 1898 and the war ended, the occupying forces attempted to enforce treaty provisions with Spain which stipulated protection

for Spanish lives and property on the island.[23] The Creole leadership bowed to the Americans and accepted the treaty terms. Both black and white soldiers reacted hostilely, however, when the Cuban General Maximo Gómez argued against anti-Spanish violence. Cuban veterans could not accept that the war "had neither victors nor vanquished."[24]

Despite the threat of imprisonment for abuse of Spanish nationals, anti-Spanish sentiment among Cubans continued to be expressed in open violence. The Cubans apparently saw their actions as legitimate even though illegal under the United States regime. They even adopted the American practice of lynching which they used to terrify Spanish residents. Diario de la Marina, a Spanish-owned newspaper, lamented the prevalence of "lynch law" directed against so-called guerrillas, Spaniards who failed to support independence or who actively sabotaged Creole efforts. In poorly patrolled rural areas Spaniards who operated small businesses were threatened with harm. Occasionally one died at the hands of angry anti-Spanish crowds.[25] Spanish residents demanded protection against these Cuban "jacobins," but American troops could not fulfill this impossible task. Despite the work of three thousand rural police, attacks on Spanish nationals continued for at least six years after the war lasting well into the first term of Tomás Estrada Palma, the Cuban republic's first President.[26]

Cubans also began to focus their attention on Spaniards whom the Americans permitted to hold positions in the Cuban bureaucracy. Loyalist Spaniards possessed necessary skills. Their presence became a source of discontent among Cuban nationalists, however, who thought that the Creole victory should have resulted in the exclusion of Spanish citizens from office-holding in Cuba.[27]

Anti-Spanish sentiments against these employees and against local merchants, which erupted into violence well after the end of the war, helped to unite the Cuban people. By absorbing the nation's attention as the principle object of hatred, prejudice, and open violence, the Spanish presence in Cuba ironically strengthened the tactical alliance between the white revolutionary elite and the colored population during a crucial transition period in which the island attained political independence.

In the post-war atmosphere of relatively amiable race relations, the recently victorious colored nationals began to demand the fulfillment of the revolutionary Junta's promise for equality or, more accurately, for greater life chances. The white leadership could not be held fully accountable, however, until it could assume control of the government and its resources. In the interim, non-whites were forced to deal with indifferent or hostile American intervention authorities for four years after the war (1898-1902). Colored Cubans nevertheless began to pressure the

one group of Creoles who retained some power under the Americans, the leaders of the Cuban Armed Forces. Colored men, as war veterans who had contributed to the Creole victory, began to demand their rights to full citizenship. They also sought concrete rewards for their military services in keeping with the army's wartime pledges. The Cuban army command felt compelled to heed the demands of both black and white veterans at least in part because of the potential military power they represented.

The chief initial compensation received by the ordinary soldier, regardless of color, was active duty pay of 75 pesos in return for the surrender of firearms.[28] The treatment of the Liberation Army (El Ejercito Libertador) was an important political issue which led General Maximo Gómez to arrange a $13 million peso loan from the United States to pay the troops, a move which led to his dismissal by the Insurgent Assembly (La Asamblea Insurgente) in 1899 as commander-in-chief.[29] By the time of the formation of the Estrada Palma government in 1901, black and white veterans had organized themselves into an effective political pressure group, the Veterans of the War for Independence (Los Veteranos de la Guerra de la Independencia), under the leadership of General Emilio Nuñez.

Colored veterans responded to the general heightened political awareness of ex-soldiers by forming a separate organization, the Veterans of Color, through which they

began to express their distinct interests as men of color. The organization did not demand exclusiveness in its membership, however, so that many non-white veterans belonged to both the Veterans of Color (Los Veteranos de Color), and the larger veterans society which had far greater political influence.

Veterans, as a group, easily constituted the most popular, vocal, and prestigious of the post-war interest groups. They exercised power informally, using the political parties as vehicles of their needs. The exact influence of the organization is difficult to assess, however, since persons elevated to high governmental positions with their help seldom owed their status strictly to military fame. The first President Estrada Palma, for example, who fought in 1868 and 1895 and belonged to the Junta, was also a wealthy eastern planter.[30]

By the time President Estrada Palma assumed office in 1902, the military compensation had not been settled. With veterans as a political force in the new republic, the army's payment became a central political question. The government had, however, few sources of income. Only the vocal complaints and implicit military threats of the veterans prompted it to attempt to fulfill its monetary obligations to the ex-soldiers. The compensation issue became more urgent as most members of the non-elites, including colored men, failed to obtain a civilian position

with equal or better status than their army posts. Many of these men had become the victims of a general post-war economic depression which fostered unemployment and widespread poverty.[31] The government tried to settle the question of compensation with Veterans President Nuñez without apparent success until the outbreak of armed disturbances in 1904 created a crisis.[32] Finally, in August of 1904, Estrada Palma bowed to threats of greater disorder by veterans, borrowing $35 million pesos to pay the Liberation Army.[33]

The distribution of these funds was uneven. Among the six corps of the army, the average pay received varied between 261 pesos and 530 pesos per person.[34] Six years after the end of the Spanish regime and seven months following the massive loan only 50 percent of the veterans had received partial or full compensation.[35]

While the rank and file of the Cuban army received few concrete benefits except pay following the victory, officers often did enjoy greater material rewards. The principle means of payment for special services open to the Estrada Palma government was patronage. The biggest plums were offered to members of the revolutionary Creole elite who had organized the campaign for independence and who had become army officers. But colored and white members of the non-elites had also attained leadership positions and received officers' commissions during the war on the basis of military expertise. Many of these officers who had been

discharged in 1899 were unemployed or could return only to a modest civilian job.

Colored officers experienced the worst dislocation because of governmental policies of discrimination. American military authorities prevented them from making use of their wartime skills in the newly organized Rural Guard (la Guardia Rural), for example, through exclusionist entrance requirements.[36] Colored officers who sought government jobs were thus forced to look for a civilian post. Desk jobs were not awarded on the basis of merit alone. Without the use of influence, even the highest-ranking colored officers failed to obtain positions, and instead returned to the countryside to work in canefields or on tobacco farms.[37]

Despite discrimination and educational handicaps, some colored officers did manage to obtain governmental posts. In contrast with the Spanish regime whose policy was to exclude non-whites from even the lowest bureaucratic positions, colored men received jobs because of their wartime achievements. Out of deference for the army's heroes, colored officers obtained employment in the public works department, in customs, in the magistrate's office, in the post office, and in the office of public instruction. The positions they received were not necessarily prestigious or lucrative. In customs, where posts were particularly desired because of graft, for example, the government

appointed only three colored inspectors; and not one colored officer became a regular day inspector out of fifty positions available. One informed observer noted that colored officers in the public works office obtained jobs as overseers rather than as project heads or administrators. He observed also that non-whites were limited to appointments as only second or third class school teachers in the office of public instruction. While white officers obtained the better paying, prestigious jobs, colored officers became night watchmen, porters, or postmen. The colored men who received these appointments were among the most illustrious of the Liberation Army.[38]

Like their white counterparts, colored officers recognized the system of personal influence which dominated the bureaucratic structure. Colored officers depended on two highly placed non-whites, José Morúa Delgado and Campos Marquetti, who used their personal influence to obtain jobs for the officers. Some higher posts were awarded to colored officers solely on the basis of their personal relationship with President Estrada Palma. Three distinguished men of color, Juan Bonilla, Jesus Gonzales, and Rafael Serra, freely admitted that they received their appointments because of their contacts with the President.[39]

A select few, perhaps six colored men, reached positions of power within the first decade of the republic. Like most highly placed whites, the two most influential colored

individuals made their reputation before the war. Neither were known as fighters, but rather gained their fame as men of letters. José Morúa Delgado was first involved in the independence struggle in 1868, and had been known as a moderate "evolutionist" prior to the 1895 war.[40] He became famous during the American occupation as an advocate of autonomy and a spokesman for a free Cuba. He was a delegate to the 1901 Constitutional Convention, and became a senator in 1902. At the height of his career, Morúa Delgado became president of the Senate from 1909 until his death three years later.[41]

Juan Gualberto Gómez also became a principle colored figure in the republic's early years. A long-time spokesman for the rights of colored Cubans as citizens, he had been the founder of one colored organization and an important member of the prestigious Amigos del Pais. After the war, he supported General Masó as president in 1901 as the Liberal Party candidate. When the Moderate Party candidate, Estrada Palma won, Gualberto Gómez failed to obtain office immediately.[42] He became a senator after the 1906 Liberal revolt, however, which he helped to instigate.[43]

Campos Marquetti enjoyed somewhat less influence than Morúa Delgado or Gualberto Gómez. Born of slave parents, he apparently obtained the aid of a patron who sponsored his education. He became known as a man of letters during the war. Following the occupation, he was elected senator,

a post he used to speak out against racial discrimination.[44] Three other colored senators, Lino D'ou, Sánchez Figueras, and Cuesta Rendón, advocated similar, though less militant positions. They occuped, however, far less influential positions in the government.[45]

It does not seem surprising that some colored officers enjoyed new benefits under the Republican regime and that a few men of color, six in a ten-year period, attained high senatorial office. In spite of American exclusionist policies and the natural tendency of the old Creole elite to secure for themselves the best positions, the revolutionary Creole leadership which inherited power recognized the importance of including this upwardly mobile element in the new government. Concessions toward colored officers, as well as non-elite white officers, became a political necessity. The government needed to respond to the rhetoric of racial democracy and egalitarianism which they had nurtured during the war by giving bureacratic jobs to the leaders of colored veterans, the colored officers. The officers' position in the government signified the regime's attempt to fulfill wartime promises to colored veterans.

The Creole leadership's policy also followed the sensible dictates of another rational political strategy, co-optation, which had been skillfully practiced during the Spanish colonial era. The Creole elite attempted to deprive the non-white population of their natural leaders by bringing

them into the system of government. In this way, the revolutionary elite could maintain the pose of egalitarianism while reinforcing the traditional hierarchical patterns of Cuban society. Colored officers who received government sinecures became part of the bureaucracy, and beneficiaries of the government. They felt less inclined to point out the discrepancies between wartime promises of egalitarian treatment and postwar realities.

The question remained, however, whether this traditional system of token co-optation would suffice for the mass of colored Cubans who had been somewhat politicized during the war and who, despite a small remittance for military services, had yet to receive concrete compensation for their role in the war. The post-war economic depression, in which the colored ex-soldiers suffered more than any other category of veterans, served to underline the broken promises made by the nationalist elite.

The group which benefitted most clearly from the elimination of Spanish power was the revolutionary Creole elite which had begun the independence movement and forged the multi-racial coalition that won the war. The American occupation deprived them, however, of the full enjoyment of their victory. Through American military authorities on the island, and later through treaties, the United States compelled Cubans to respect foreign citizens and their property, frustrating the confiscatory stage of the

independence movement.

The more conservative western members of the Creole elite, many of whom had joined the independence movement with reluctance, quickly showed their support for the American military regime.[46] The conservatives believed that the United States would guarantee a stable political environment for their older pre-war sugar and business interests.[47] This backing of subordinate native elements proved essential to American rule which was faced with opposition from the "separatists" who desired full independence.[48]

With military force and the support of influential Cubans, the American regime had the opportunity to promote United States business interests in the island. Despite the passage by the American Congress of the Foraker amendment in March, 1899 which prohibited the granting of franchises or concessions during the occupation, the military regime granted monopoly concessions in mining and railroads. The authorities also allowed the formation of huge trusts in sugar, among other business intrusions.[49] With American capital flowing in because of the military protection for investments, the Cuban conservatives responded by attempting to promote a stable and secure investment environment of stability and security which would benefit their own holdings as well.[50]

The nationalist Creole elite thus not only failed to dislodge and confiscate Spanish wealth, but they also had to contend with the increasing economic control of the United States, backed by military power. These "separatists" continued to fight as before for political independence. The crucial change came, however, when even the more conservative interests began to react hostilely to American economic penetration. Diario de la Marina, a conservative newspaper, opposed "the economic domination by the United States" as early as September, 1899. Gradually, the paper gained support in its criticisms against a "do-nothing" American regime which failed to take any steps to alleviate the devastated agricultural sector, but whose only accomplishment had been the alienation of national wealth.[51]

After less than two years of the American intervention, conservatives lamented that "the bulk of the more valuable properties, town and country, and a majority of the shares in paying railways and companies have passed into alien hands."[52]

When the Republican regime assumed control over Cuba, the Americans used two key agreements to stabilize economic relations between the two countries. The Platt Amendment insured against the danger of civil strife and property damage by providing for American military intervention in the event of danger to U.S. citizens or property on the island.[53]

Two years later the governments concluded an economic agreement, the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903, which complemented the political guarantees of the Platt Amendment by insuring a preferred market for American goods in Cuba.[54] With these guarantees, U.S. businessmen increased their holdings in Cuba until they hit the $100 million mark by 1903, with the heaviest investments in tobacco ($45 million) and sugar plantations and mills ($25 million).[55]

By 1912, American business trusts had increased their holdings substantially. The U.S. Deputy consul general R. Starret reported that sugar mill investments totalled $54 million with control over 36 of 173 plants. Oriente Province, with total American investments of $100 million, had a capitalization for sugar mills alone at $25.3 million. The American properties produced almost 35 percent of the total sugar crop and processed more than 70 percent of the crop in Oriente.[56]

This alienation of Cuban property was even more pronounced considering Spanish investments; Spaniards had extended their holdings considerably with ownership of 47 sugar mills and dominance in tobacco and cigar manufacturing, tobacco warehouses, cloth manufacture, hardware, and the processing of beef.[57]

Foreigners certainly did not own all businesses, but since sugar and tobacco dominated the Cuban economy, other commercial produces tended to follow the patterns of dependency established in those key sectors. With the economic dependence of Cuba on the United States begun during the

intervention and intensified by further investments, the revolutionary Creole elite which had won the war saw its options shrink in the private sector of the economy.[58]

Handicapped by severe economic and political constraints, the revolutionary elite saw government patronage as the only area over which they had control.[59] With a postwar depression in the sugar and tobacco industries, bureaucratic positions became increasingly sought-after by the white elite.[60] The non-elites also understood, however, that government jobs were to be given on the basis of service in the cause of independence. Veterans, including colored veterans, demanded jobs until the competition for bureaucratic positions became intense. Politically aware Cubans realized that these appointments, except in certain areas such as police work, were subject only to the ruling elite's decision. When the non-elites proved dissatisfied with the concessions offered, the bureaucracy became the focus of class and racial tension and conflict.

IV. The Deterioration of Race Relations

Politically aware colored Cubans looked forward to the Island's independence and to the assumption of control by the Estrada Palma government. The American intervention had delayed, they believed, the full enjoyment of their rights as citizens. They had waited for a republican regime which would fulfill partime promises to them of egalitarian treatment. Like the rhetoric of the war, however, the new

government was republican in form alone. Cuba acquired a constitution, parties, rules for elections and bureaucratic appointments, and other trappings of a democratic society, but these organizations, procedures and laws quickly became a vehicle for the ratification of elite desires, rather than the tools of a republican people.

The key weakness of Cuban republicanism lay in its party structure. Cubans would have relied on the revolutionary party, to implement the republican laws and procedures. The party had become disorganized toward the end of the war, however, when its principle spokesman José Martí was killed. When the Americans assumed power, there was no one national, unified party equipped to withstand the intrusion or to force the military regime to deal with the Cubans on an equal basis.[1]

The U.S. government charged itself with the task of preparing Cubans for self-government through its island representatives. Under the tutelage of the military governor General Wood, local politicans formed three parties, the National, Federal Republican, and Democratic-Union parties, which agreed on basic issues such as religious tolerance and racial "fraternity."[2] At the behest of the American regime, the parties met in a constitutional assembly in 1901 to write the basic law which would govern future political behavior. Predisposed to favor a republican form of government for reasons of political expediency,

the delegates enacted provisions not surprisingly close to the United States constitutional system.[3]

The assembly contributed the expectations of non-white Cubans who awaited a written indication of the promises of the revolutionary elite. Colored delegates lauded the articles againist personal privilege which signalled an end to discrimination exercised under Spanish law and spoke in favor of a constitution which embodied the concept of all men equal before the law.[4] Juan Gualberto Gómez and José Morúa Delgado pledged that the new republic would "recognize and safely protect the rights of all men."[5] Under the electoral law (article 39), the specifications for universal male suffrage and the opening of office holding to all literate males seemed to guarantee equal participation in the Republican government. So in spite of the Americans' failure to treat colored Cubans fairly, Gualberto Gómez could assure his constituency that colored men would regain their rights, exercise influence and participate in government according to their strength and numbers.[6]

The Assembly delegates also incorporated a more recent feature of American government, the professional bureacracy. They adopted a system of examinations for the civil service designed to admit applicants to government jobs on the basis of merit and skill. These qualifications had operated under the Intervention, particularly in the area of public education.[7] Under the 1901 Constitution, the examinations were extended to other government departments and became a prerequisite

for employment.[8] With a professional, efficient, and curruption-free bureaucratic structure, the American plan for good Cuban government was complete.

Despite the best intentions of American supervisors, however, the forms freely adopted by Cuban politicians did not coincide with the actual operation of the laws and administration. The forms suited the politicians' interest because they helped to satisfy both their American watchdogs and the popular demand for a republican regime. The revolutionary elite quickly began, however, to manipulate the formal structure to achieve goals contrary to constitutional tenets.

The colored veterans began to perceive the revolutionary elite's attempts at manipulations and to distrust their motives even at this early stage before its accession to power. White politicians who failed to recognize the urgency of colored veterans' demands for full civil rights, counselled patience until the Americans departed. Colored men were not satisfied,hhowever, with this advice. One distinguished colored journalist, Rafael Serra, responded that colored men had waited through slavery, the Spanish regime, the war, and the military occupation. He also had observed that colored Cubans received more abuse from their fellow white countrymen than from the Americans. Serra charged that the white revolutionary elite's discrimination had already violated the "unspoken pact" behind the multi-racial coalition which pledged equal rewards for equal patriotic service.[9] He attacked the Constitution's vague references

to democratic principles as a sham designed to conceal the ambitions of revolutionary politicians who sought to re-establish a system of privilege.[10]

Colored politicians like Captain Ramiro Cuesta preferred to blame the increasing discrimination not on the machinations of the white politicians, but on returning emigrants who had fled during the war. Cuesta noted that these unpatriotic individuals threatened to "establish racial differences" which had already led to violent disputes between them and the revolutionary clubs.[11] Whatever the origin of discrimination, leading colored persons tried to impress upon the whites that the needs of the minority could not be ignored.[12]

Colored spokesmen were aware of the discrepancies between the ideals of equality and fraternity which were embodied in the American-style governmental structure and actual political operations. The white politicians did not respond, however, to colored demands. One reason lay in the discrepancy between theoretical and actual standards of political behavior. The substantive behavior of the political parties differed most radically from the American system which was supposed to serve as a model. The parties, rather than becoming the vehicles for the expression of popular opinion, for issue formation, and for national political organization, became the personalist instruments of key politicians. The most blatant example of personalism was

practiced by Estrada Palma who formed the Moderate Party as his presidential vote-getting machine. General Masó, the defeated candidate, operated similarly by organizing the Liberal Party.[13] Estrada Palma proved more successful in his maniputations, attracting the support of the major victor of the prior congressional elections, the National Party, to his camp by freely dispensing promises of government jobs.[14] Once in power, Estrada Palma fulfilled his campaign debts to loyal party men by increasing the size of the already large bureaucracy.[15] Observers of the political scene noted this baldly cynical use of patronage powers. Diario de la Marina editorialized against

> the indifference and skepticism which has invaded Cuban politics, in a way such that the revolutionary ideal has been reduced to a mere pretext to cover personal ambitions; already no one concerns himself with anyone but himself, nor cares for anything but the more prestigious jobs and the more lucrative pensions."[16]

This state of affairs which contradicted the American-inspired civil service laws and the wartime promises of jobs for all veterans could have been opposed by the Congress if the constitutional system of balance of powers had been effective. The legislature was itself, however, a product of party disputes. In a Congress full of petty men interested "only in their own political careers," partisan interests prevailed. The Moderate-Nationalist coalition which controlled both houses, rather than opposing the President, actually contributed to a further perversion of the republican form

of government. They refused, for example, to enact laws which would have legalized a judiciary independent from the executive branch.[17]

The political environment was unstable with a partisan Congress and a system of political rewards which absolutely denied all Liberals access to the benefits of patronage. When the Moderates used electoral fraud to insure their job security through Estrada Palma's re-election in 1905, Liberals protested against the "politics of exclusion." Fearing that electoral fraud would be used again and again to deny them victory and bureaucratic jobs, the Liberals led a rebellion against the government. This armed conflict of the "ins" against the "outs" precipitated the second American intervention in 1906.[18]

Whatever the failures of such a political system, one obvious benefit fell to all politicians. Within the protective shield of constitutional republican forms, the revolutionary elite which inherited political rule managed successfully to maintain traditional hierarchical patterns of political behavior. If the "politics of exclusion" operated against the Liberal "outs," it operated much more effectively against the non-elites, and particularly against non-whites.

No where was the traditional vertical structure of Cuban society more in evidence than it was within the political parties themselves. Despite the fact that colored men

constituted a large nucleus of support for both the government and opposition coalitions, only three of the most important colored leaders received nominations for even the least important public posts during the Estrada Palma administration. Some of this discrimination against non-whites stemmed from the general exclusion of Liberals from office. Even in local areas such as Havana where Liberals had control, however, colored candidates did not appear nearly in proportion to their majority representation within the Liberal party. From 1901 to 1904, only one of 100 men in the Ayuntamiento of Havana was colored.[19] Despite their underrepresentation, non-white Liberals continued to support the existing party structure. They submitted to party discipline which demanded support for the official ticket.[20] Even when the Liberal Party captured national power, the colored Liberals agreed "to accept the government offices patriotically offered to them, according to their capacity."[21]

Some colored politicians publicly opposed these exclusionist policies. They organized the first protests against the discriminatory treatment of non-whites. Nine members of the Nationalist Party met to raise the issue of fair treatment in government appointments in November, 1901. They contended that the country needed the cooperation of white and black Cubans and peninsular Spaniards in order to consolidate the new political regime. To gain the support of colored leaders, however, the government could not ignore their talents. La Lucha, a Liberal daily, concurred:

> The men of color affiliated respectively with militant parties aspire to give themselves equitable participation in the functions of government, and above all, in the administrative functions. These men, without renouncing the beliefs of their respective parties, and continuing their membership in them, desire to improve themselves politically. ... We don't think that this claim is too exaggerated. It seems to us that men of color who have acquired certain notoriety for their culture and education ought to be employed."[22]

The white revolutionary elite which took control of the party structure intended to monopolize not only party leadership positions and elective offices, but bureaucratic jobs as well. The Estrada Palma government first attempted to exclude colored men from administrative posts on the basis of the informal, but socially rigid requirement that all patronage should benefit war veterans. The government encouraged rumors which baldly denied extensive colored participation in the independence struggle. The burden of proof for war service fell on colored veterans; and the government was able to exclude many non-whites in this manner without any fear of accusations of unjust treatment.[23]

Despite the Estrada Palma administration's attempt to legitimize discrimination in bureaucratic appointments, colored officers continued to seek sinecures because of few alternative employment opportunities. Like their white non-elite companions in arms, colored officers seldom had a steady job to which equaled their army status. While many colored veterans had been employed in agriculture before the

war, the post war depression which ruined that economic sector prevented agriculture from absorbing them even if they had been willing. Opportunities for non-whites closed even further as Spaniards who controlled commerce and many local manufacturing businesses refused to hire colored veterans, and as Americans excluded non-whites from technical business posts and banking services.[24]

With the colored officers, in particular, pressuring the Estrada Palma government for sinecures, the elite began to manipulate the formal rules for entrance into the bureaucracy established during the Intervention. The examination system which had been designed to insure uniformity of quality in the civil service became an instrument by which non-whites were denied jobs. Colored stenographers and typists, for example, who graduated from the Institute of Secondary Instruction (El Instituto de Segunda Enseñanza) failed to pass rigorous entrance tests, and were then unable to follow their career.[25] Colored secondary students were prohibited from entering the university through a system of exams which thus prevented them from pursuing the professions.[26]

If some non-whites managed to obtain positions in the bureaucracy, the system again operated against them by delaying deserved promotions or by prohibiting their appointment to higher, better paying positions. Under Estrada Palma, no colored person received a promotion to a day post

in Customs from less lucrative night jobs. In the Public Works Department, colored veterans could only advance to foreman of the third class. The administration also ignored the seniority rights of colored men.[27] Colored veterans who did receive positions most often obtained teaching jobs in the office of Public Instruction. Their posts paid less and were often located in small towns in the interior rather than in large urban centers.[28]

After Estrada Palma's second election in 1905 the yearly teacher examinations provoked a crisis. It became apparent that the government used the tests not only to prevent non-white hiring but to reduce the teaching rank of colored instructors.[29] Colored teachers who had achieved the rank of first grade suddenly, all over the island, were suddenly limited to the third grade. Non-white instructors were fired outright on charges of incompetence in many districts, and the government substituted white teachers as their replacements.[30]

The elimination of these colored bureaucratic employees from their posts represented the most dramatic case of the Estrada Palma government's attempt to actually remove colored men from their appointments, by the same trend occurred in other areas of the bureaucracy. In the post office department seven colored employees out of a total of fifty who had jobs were gradually replaced by whites until no colored people worked there.[31] Colored men were also eli-

minated from diplomatic service and the judiciary.[32]

The ability of the Estrada Palma administration to deny colored veterans a proportionate share of power in political parties, in the bureaucracy, and in the general functions of government stemmed partly from the tacit support of the United States. In two particularly sensitive areas, the composition of peace-keeping forces and immigration controls, the republican regime actually followed the example of the American intervention authorities by continuing exclusionist policies.

During the United States military rule in Cuba, Governor Wood ordered that colored men be restricted from entrance into the various arms-carrying agencies, including the police, the Artillery Corps, and the Rural Guard. Wood, and his successor General Ludlow, for example, instructed the police chief of Havana to eliminate all non-white applicants. The "new American mode" of segregation was quickly implanted so that by August, 1901 the Havana police force was "composed exclusively of white individuals."[33] The American authorities justified their exclusionist policy on the basis that they wanted to create a highly select force. They also wished to avoid clashes between the Havana police and southern U.S. troops stationed in Havana.[34]

When the Estrada Palma government assumed control, the exclusionist policy of the Havana police continued. Manipulating the results of civil service entrance examina-

tions, the police chief eliminated all colored candidate. This action was resisted by the Municipal Alcalde Dr. O'Farril, who believed that qualified colored men should be admitted by the intervention policy remained in force nevertheless.[35] While some non-whites did obtain positions in the police, by the end of the Palma Estrada administration, police superiors denied them promotions through unfavorable reports so that only three became officers. Two of these individuals, Francisco and Manuel Pacheco were removed on various pretexts by October of 1906.[36] Colored members of the police department of Santiago de Cuba also received similar discriminatory treatment, suffering "unjustified and violent retirement" because of their superiors' reports. In both departments, white officers replaced the dismissed colored policemen.[37]

The same injustices occurred in the Havana-based Artillery Corps, which had been founded by the American military regime on a segregationist basis. The republican government continued to exclude colored Cubans from the officer corps, although some non-whites were admitted as enlisted men.[38] This official maltreatment lasted throughout the Estrada Palma administration.[39]

While the police forces and the Artillery Corps practiced exclusionist policies, the most visible discrimination against colored Cubans occurred in the larger and more prestiguous Rural Guard. The Rural Guard had been organized

under American auspices in 1899 to replace the Liberation Army as the major national peace-keeping force. Ex-officers of the Cuban army contributed to the organization of the Rural Guard, and benefitted directly from its establishment by receiving commissions.[40] This employment opportunity proved a boon to many non-elite officers who could make use of their military skills, but who had had little formal education for non-military jobs.

The creation of Rural Guard did little to alleviate the particular problem of colored officers, however, because of American prohibitions against giving positions to non-whites. Acting directly against tradition Spanish policy in Cuba which had allowed colored men to enter the army, the Americans permitted few non-whites among the 3,000 enlisted men, and established an exclusively white officer corps.[41] Despite protests from colored generals and lesser chiefs of discrimination in the entrance procedures to the Rural Guard, the Estrada Palma government maintained the American exclusionist policy.[42] Even the conservative Diario de la Marina noted with some dismay in an editorial that the government's actions were illegal and unwise. The paper hoped that experienced colored officers would be used to eliminate rural banditry while their employment would dissipate their complaints of poor rewards for patriotic service in the war.[43] In response, seven colored officers did gain admittance to the Guard when it was reorganized in

August, 1903.

The colored men admitted to the Rural Guard, however, continued to be discriminated against by their superiors who disregarded seniority rights and delayed the promotions of colored personnel. Regardless of their achieved rank in the Liberation Army, the colored guardsmen were denied the right to ascend to the rank of captain.[45]

Like the discriminatory practices in regard to the peace-keeping forces, the new Cuban government's immigration policies also followed patterns established during the Intervention. The U.S. Congress had implemented restrictions on immigration in the 1890's in an attempt to exclude "alien races;" and American military authorities applied this principle of immigration barriers to Cuba in 1899.[46] The officials severely restricted the immigration of colored persons to the Island, and particularly sought to exclude Jamaican and Haitian Negroes.

The continuing opposition to Jamaican and Haitian immigration during the Estrada Palma regime cannot, however, be attributed solely to the American example. It seems likely that American racist sentiments encouraged the maintenance of restrictions against non-whites considering that virulent anti-black feeling was at its height in the United States during this period.[47] But Cubans had their own history of racism. Despite the obvious disadvantages of discouraging the immigration of cheap labor at a time when sugar

industry in particular constantly complained of a labor shortage, the Cuban elite continued to oppose Haitian and Jamaican large-scale immigration not only during the intervention but throughout both the Estrada Palma administration and the Liberal government which followed it. Racist sentiments among the revolutionary elite were not restricted by associations with the United States or by party affiliation.

The liberal daily La Independencia frequently spoke out against Haitian immigration during the period of American military rule. It deplored the effects of Haitians on the general population as "an element of disorder, lack of cultivation, and perversion" after observing the influx of immigrants in Santiago de Cuba.[48] Diario de la Marina, an organ of conservatism, also contained many letters speaking out against the "inconvenient and dangerous" immigration of Haitian laborers.[49] The paper railed violently against American companies, including railroad and sugar industries, which consciously imported foreign blacks as an action which "would introduce new elements of disturbance and would constitute a grave threat to the future of the Island." As an alternative, Cuban politicians advocated the positive encouragement of immigration from Spain or the Canary Islands as a source of laborers.[50] The policy of the Estrada Palma government was to implement restrictions against foreign colored persons and in favor of white Spaniards. The government actively promoted the advantages of Cuba in the Iberian capitals without much success.[51]

The Congress adopted an immigration law to bolster private efforts by allocating one million pesos to attract white immigrants which the law's sponsors defended as preferential, but not discriminatory.[52] During the Liberal regime of José Miguel Gómez, Congress appropriated another one million pesos to attract white immigrants.[53] Article 18 of this blatantly discriminatory law boldly stated that

> in no case should Cuban consuls expedite certificates of immigration in favor of individuals of the yellow or black race, or in favor of the sick, the infectious, beggars, or gypsies, nor of persons subject to the action of foreign tribunals for common crimes.[54] (S, June) 54

The Estrada Palma administration's policies in regard to immigration and the arms-carrying agencies revealed the influence of American ideas of social race which Cubans had observed during the Intervention years.[55] Contact with American racial views affected the new republican regime by reinforcing its desire to exclude colored Cubans from the economic and social benefits dispensed under its supervision.[56] The increasing discrimination directed against non-whites did not always stem, however, from conscious governmental policy. The particular impracticality and longevity of immigration restrictions illustrated that the white ruling elite had inherited an entirely Cuban set of race prejudices which were masked only in part by the war and its rhetoric of racial brotherhood.[57]

When postwar dislocations made it obvious that the economic system was unable to provide for the wants of every class of Cubans, the white elite began to employ racial arguments to maintain its dominant position at the expense of the colored population.[58] While the old conservative elite which controlled the private sector with the assistance of American capitalists, barred colored men from decent jobs in industry and commerce, the revolutionary elite which governed the country used race to justify exclusionism. They reinvigorated old racial theories of nineteenth century vintage with the spirit of scientific inquiry to serve as rationales in favor of exclusionism.

The white elite had always recognized the existence of at least two groups of non-whites, the urban-centered and politically aware colored who put their representatives in Congress, and the rural, "backward" colored.[59] The elite had attempted at times throughout the nineteenth century to eliminate by force so-called "African fetichist" practices, and particularly witchcraft, among the rural colored population. The white elite viewed these activities as a disruptive force which was essentially "incompatible with development and with the existence of a civilized society."[60] They felt that these practices not only hindered the general advancement of non-whites, but threatened white Cubans by the ritual violence associated with them including the murder of white children.[61]

During the early twentieth century, these "barbarous" crimes against civilization suddenly became the subject of scrutiny by the Cuban scientific community.[62] The Academy of Science (La Acadamia de Ciencias) objectively associated "religious atavism" in the island with "ethnic criminality," and even attempted to find a physiologic basis for such crime by measuring cranial capacity and brain weights.[63] With this pseudo-scientific dialogue to justify their actions, the police opened a series of campaigns against "criminal fetichism," arresting colored persons for murder, extortion, profaning graves, and other charges.[64]

The police did not content themselves, however, with eradicating the misdeeds associated with the African roots of colored Cubans. With government approval, they also attacked the urban colored population through raids on their cultural societies. The societies (centros) which engaged in community affairs served as self-help organizations and carried on religious activities. They suffered harrassment from both the Santiago de Cuba and Havana police forces who apparently considered the societies as great a threat to "morality" as witchcraft.[65]

The urban colored particularly resented these abuses because similar cultural centers run by Spaniards and white Cubans did not experience any such treatment. Members in colored societies in Santiago de Cuba complained to the provincial governor of Oriente Pérez Carbo of the "repeated,

cruel, and premeditated assaults by the authorities" on their social centers.[66]

The white elite accepted the justifications offered them by pseudo-scientific analyses of "religious atavism" and "ethnic criminality" which legitimized in their eyes the government-directed attacks on both the rural and urban colored population. The same rationales provided a "reasonable" basis for the discriminatory immigration policy, and for the exclusion of colored applicants from the bureaucracy, the police, and the Rural Guard.

Regardless of Cuban racial arguments and the impact of American racial views on the elite, however, the exclusionism practiced by the Estrada Palma government and its successor never reached the extremes observed in the United States during these years. The government never considered the severe measures of segregation codified in state Jim Crow laws; nor did they sanction lynching or the threat of lynching as necessary to counter to the "Negro threat," as American spokesmen did.[67] Unlike the average white American's awareness of the "black" and the "white" race which intensified racial differences, Cuban whites freely recognized the subtleties of shades produced through centuries of miscegenation.[68] Because of the advanced state of race mixture, the white elite instead defined their race prejudices with less apparent harshness through a system which recognized

a preference for men of their own color or shades of color closest to white.

The natural tendency of the Cuban white elite to prefer those persons somatically akin to them illustrated itself most clearly in government immigration restrictions which sought Spaniards and attempted to exclude "foreign Blacks." Cuban policy makers subscribed to the belief that white immigration would "lighten," and so improve the composition of the society. This philosophy of "whitening," popular in the nineteenth century, achieved new currency with scientific backing.[70] Even leading colored spokesmen accepted this reasoning. Juan Gualberto Gómez affirmed publicly that he did not oppose whitening which would "reduce the colored population first by increasing the number of racially mixed persons and then of whites."[71] Gómez or his colleague in the Senate under the Liberal regime, José Morúa Delgado, could perhaps abide this philosophy as two of the few colored men to reach positions of leadership in government. But their very existence pointed to the mechanism of selection which operated in Cuba which allowed only those colored of very light skin -- almost white -- to be eligible for advancement.[72]

The traditional concessions to light colored persons did not prove sufficiently satisfying, however, to the mass of urban colored men who found themselves subjected to Cuban white elite racial theories and "scientific" rationales.

The system of co-optation which operated so successfully under the Spanish failed for the first time to provide an adequate "escape valve" for non-elite pressures for advancement and social mobility. The general social mobilization which colored men experienced as a result of their massive participation in the war brought more non-whites into the participant sector of national politics. While more colored men achieved a greater awareness of the national polity through its influence on their lives as soldiers and veterans, the revolutionary white elite raised their expectations by promises of positive gains and the rhetoric of racial brotherhood during and just after the war. In doing so, the elite had been able to forge the multi-racial coalition. Their actions had unforseen consequences, however, in that they added an entirely new group of individuals who began to place much greater demands on the political system.

The attempts begun by colored men during the first Estrada Palma administration to influence the white political system were symbolized in many respects by the work of the 1902 Magna Assembly of the Colored Race (La Asamblea Magna de la Raza de Color). The Assembly represented an alternative to operating within the formal, white-controlled political parties. It was a meeting of smaller informal pressure groups who hoped to voice their demands jointly to the white governing elite.

Most of the constituent groups in the Assembly were local colored veterans' societies. Beginning in 1901, colored organizers had taken advantage of their natural organizational ties to form the Centers of Veterans of Color (Los Centros de Veteranos de Color). They sought to form it in hopes of establishing a society which could overcome the disadvantages of the larger Veterans of the War of Independence by speaking directly on issues of concern to non-whites. Working along informal lines of communication, the veterans quickly established centers in the larger urban areas in 1901. Within a year they had developed an internal organizational structure centered around an executive committee which sponsored the Magna Assembly, a national meeting of local representatives in June of 1902.[73]

The Magna Assembly of the Colored Race was to date the largest gathering of colored veterans for political purposes with 467 representatives and received extensive coverage in the white liberal press.[74] The principle spokesmen, Srs. Rendón, Captain Ramiro Cuesta, Ortiz Carrera, Colonel Lino D'ou, Sánchez Figueras, and Campos Marquetti, had promising political careers ahead of them because of the support of their respective colored constituencies.

Rendón established the purpose of the gathering as an attempt by colored men to secure their constitutional rights. The participants emphasized the spirit of wartime racial brotherhood and insisted that colored veterans had come to

fulfill the program of Martí. Rendón, recalling the struggle for independence, reminded the delegates that "blacks and whites united in sacrifice, so that the legitimate rights of one are the same legitimate rights as the other."[75] As veterans, colored men had earned the rights of full citizenship which were under attack.

Prior to the conference, the "attack" had usually taken the form of indifference. White politicians had chosen to ignore written forms of protest against the "sad condition of the colored class in Cuba."[76] The colored veterans knew, however, that the government could use legal procedures or the police to squash new colored organizations if chose to do so. The veterans realized that the government would receive the support of much of the white press for repressive measures. The white press remained adamently opposed to "disturbances" by colored men. Diario de la Marina and El Nuevo País had been particularly extreme in their hostility against the colored organizers.[77]

The conference leaders responded by making constitutionalism and republicanism their creed in opposing the ruling elite. The governing elite's actions clearly did not conform with the theoretical American-style standards of political behavior. The colored leaders charged that the "unresponsive" and "corrupt" government had made a mockery of the principles of justice and equality and had attempted to "despoil colored men of their natural rights."[78]

Invoking the protection of the Constitution, the leaders thus tried to manipulate the central symbol of egalitarianism in order to outflank the ruling elite's own attempts to use this key symbol of legitimacy.

Although the executive committee of the Assembly phrased its demands in terms of the need for legal equality according to the Constitution, it set itself to work toward the accomplishment of two practical goals which would benefit colored veterans. The committee's members sought the passage of laws favorable to non-whites and the elimination of discriminatory requirements in areas of public employment. The colored leaders realized the necessity of bringing pressures to bear upon the legislature to solicit favorable laws or to repeal laws harmful to the colored veterans. They pressured white intermediaries at times, such as the Alcalde Municipal O'Farrill of Havana who agreed to propose laws in the Congress which would "oppose obstacles to good will" and would assist in "the vindication of the colored race."[79] The committee's President Campos Marquetti also promised that colored veterans themselves would "work for the ideal they pursued" of legal equality by demanding cooperation from Congressmen until the close of the legislative session.[80] The Assembly demanded, for example, that Congress repeal the military laws of vigilence which oppressed black and white alike. The Assembly's radical faction of the Veterans of Color,

led by Sr. Sardinas, took more direct action in the campaign for rights under the banner of The Committee of Veterans and the Societies of the Colored Race (El Comité de Veteranos y las Sociedades de la Raza de Color) by organizing public meetings in the streets of Havana.[81] They also approached President Estrada Palma with a straightforward petition which called for the equality of all citizens not only in word but in deed.[82]

Both the executive committee and the dissidents primarily sought concrete results of equal treatment under the law. Believing that a man should not be deined a government job "on account of the color of his skin," the veterans' spokesmen demanded an end to the discriminatory entrance requirements for the police and Rural Guard. They insisted that non-whites had proven their loyalty to the nation in the war and their devotion to the principles of law and order in its aftermath. The spokesmen asserted the ex-soldiers thus deserved the right of equal access to the arms-carrying agencies.[83] Attacking exclusionism, the Assembly's President Campos Marquetti censured the police who had established discriminatory rules for colored men applying for jobs in the Rural Guard. He also charged that the favoritism of whites had led to secret agreements to "let in as few colored men as possible."[84] In other areas of civil service, Ramiro Cuesto protested that whites filled the second and first

ranks while non-whites were consigned to the third rank.[85] The petitioners to Estrada Palma's government also insisted that colored men who were employees be considered fairly in regards to seniority. They charged, for example, that colored policemen had been denied promotions to the rank of sargeant and above, and that access to the officer corps was limited to whites.[86]

The spokesmen of the colored veterans stressed that they did not ask for any privileges. Their demands were modest; they had never requested, for example, that a colored man receive an appointment as President of the Audiencia, since there was none qualified to fill this post.[87] They could not accept, however, government charges of widespread incompetence among colored applicants. Colonel Lino D'ou pointed to himself as a person of color who had shown capacity in public affairs as the secretary to the civil government of Santiago de Cuba, the more radical Sánchez Figueras deplored the attacks on the colored race's "ineptness." He noted with irony that these were the same colored men with more than sufficient aptitude and merit during the war.[88] The Veterans of Color insisted that they only wanted to protect their rights under the law. In a final ominous note to his fellow white politicians, however, Campos Marquetti warned that the colored race in Cuba had power if they wanted to use it. He assured the government that colored veterans had no desire to cause trouble, but

that they would not be content until they received justice and equality of treatment.[89]

The success of the Magna Assembly in publicizing the failure of the white revolutionary elite to fulfill its legal and patriotic obligations to colored veterans encouraged the formation of local colored organizations. Havana in particular became the center for protest because of the proximity of government officials.[90] It was not until 1906, however, that colored veterans realized that they would need more than informal pressure groups to bring about the changes they desired.

The turning point in the early history of colored political participation came with the August 1906 revolt of the Liberals against the Estrada Palma regime. The Moderates had attempted to insure the re-election of Estrada Palma and thus to guarantee their governmental monopoly on office-holding by manipulating the 1905 elections. In doing so, the party had broken its pledge to share the presidency with the Liberal Party on alternate occasions. In order to annul the elections, the Liberal opposition rebelled against the government. With an implicit appeal for American intervention, the Liberals violently protested against "continuism" (continuismo) as the beginning of dictatorship in Cuba.[91]

The armed revolt fit a pattern in which the threat or the use of force was employed to obtain political goals.

In the confrontation between government "ins" and opposition "outs," a resort to arms marked the most extreme form of protest against the violation of unspoken "rules" of elite political behavior. A call to arms was considered to be a legitimate use of an alternative political resource. During these confrontations, such as this succession dispute or the 1911 veterans' protest against the Civil Service law, little actual violence occurred.[92]

The August revolt, led by General José Miguel Gómez, had a special meaning for colored Liberals who had received particularly poor recompense for their war services.[93] Colored veterans, who composed more than a majority of the party's members, shared the expectations of their fellow white Liberals in their desire to gain power and access to government patronage jobs through their participation in the uprising.[94] The most famous colored men of the 1895 revolution joined the insurrection including Juan Gualberto Gómez and General Quintín Banderas, as well as lesser known figures such as General Evaristo Estenoz and the Pacheco brothers.[95]

When Estrada Palma resigned under the pressure of the rebel opposition and turned the island over to American intervention forces, both colored and white Liberals anticipated the satisfactory settlement of their claims to war compensation. Unfortunately, the "August Revolution" brought no modification in the division of spoils. While

leading white Liberals gained influence under American tutelage which they used to benefit white party members, the colored veterans received nothing.[96]

The resulting frustrations provided the impetus for the formation of colored parties. Taking advantage of the general political reorganization during the second American intervention (1906-09), leading colored individuals in several major cities began to organize in order to make more effective demands upon the government.[97]

On December 17, 1906, Dr. Serafin López and Apolonio Salazar called a meeting of colored persons in Santa Clara to propose the organization of a new party. Six distinguished local colored men formed a commission to study the proposal including Campos Marquetti. Like the informal societies which had existed before the Santa Clara Party concerned itself generally with "the situation in which the colored class in Cuba finds itself." Specifically, it addressed itself to the issue of the rights of public employees. The organizers hoped to end their dependence on whites for receiving and retaining their jobs.[98] The Santa Clara Party remained a provincial entity, but it maintained contact with other colored organizations which sought similar goals. In September 1907, for example, the party's President Colonel Octavio Ortiz sent a commission to the General Assembly of the Race of Color of Villaclara (La Asamblea General de la Raza de Color de Villaclara).[99]

Political activity among colored men became more frequent and general throughout the country in 1907 in anticipation of the 1908 Congressional elections. Incipient parties grew in San Juan de Yeras, Santa Clara and Villaclara as important persons of color met to unite for the upcoming primaries.[100] A political rally in San Juan y Martínez, Pínar del Río attracted the attention of El Mundo when colored orators spoke vehemently in the defense of their rights which they believed had been violated. The protesters, who particularly stressed the government's disregard of seniority among colored public employees, proposed a nation-wide organization of the colored race.[101]

The Camaguey Party, formed by leading colored citizens in August 1907, was the most ambitious effort for a united political front. The Party, which published a manifesto of their intentions to oppose the "oppression" of colored men, desired nothing less than to assume "the supreme direction of the interests of the colored race." Their manifesto boldly asserted that the Camaguey Party had come "to prevent the colored race in our country from continuing to serve as 'cannon fodder'."[102]

The white press could agree with the new party as long as the Camaguey citizens guarded against "excessive promises of equality in the enjoyment of public offices and in their influence on public life."[103] White conservative paper

Diario de la Marina generally reacted favorably to the party's purposes of "developing culture, morality, civil spirit and work" among the colored population for the ultimate goal of attaining "a noble ideal of perfection and progress." The editors of the paper believed that "any improvement in the colored race's culture which improved its dignity would become a positive benefit for Cuba."[104]

The theory of equal treatment did not upset the conservative paper; only the reality of colored demands on the system provoked their distrust.[105] The members of the Camaguey party protested:

> It has been nine years that we have been awaiting the arrival of our proper social level, and each time we see ourselves farther from it because those who impose justice are the first to make a hoax of it. Together, we have decided to establish a common convention that will permit us to mutually aid ourselves; we will work for the progress of our race in the political moral, and economic order. ....The colored race is an important part of the people who now are without aspirations because wherever they look, they only find thorns and deceptions. Why must we not work for our betterment if it is human, and national, and patriotic work?[106]

The party's political platform incorporated similar proposals to those that earlier informal pressure groups had advocated. The declaration demanded laws favorable to colored citizens and the elimination of obstacles to public employment. Article 3 of the published platform

stated that laws should be used to defend democratic principles; and that no law must deny a colored citizen's rights under any pretext. The colored Camagueyans insisted that other political parties recognize their aims as legitimate. Since the Camaguey Party allowed its members to belong to whatever other organization they desired, the platform demanded that the by-laws of the other political societies be examined to determine whether their laws showed respect for the rights of colored men.[107]

The Camagueyans' most militant demands concerned public employment. The party platform categorically stated that all colored men with sufficient education and culture should receive public appointments according to their proportion to the total number of Cuban citizens with equal qualifications. This article on proportionate representation provoked more controversy than any other proposal. Articles in the platform referring to discriminatory practices in the educational system or suggesting the formation of economic cooperatives among colored persons seemed mild in comparison. Newspapers including Diario de la Marina publicized the proportionate representation article, noting that it was approved along with the other provisions in the party platform by thirty of the most prestigious colored men of Camaguey.[108] While the response to the party's ideas was not always favorable, the widespread circulation of their militant program encouraged other colored persons to take political action.

V. The Independent Party of Color

Leading colored men of Oriente Province, stimulated by political activity among non-whites in other parts of the island, organized the Independent Party of Color in 1907. The party became the vehicle for the most articulate and nationally-based political response of colored Cubans to the prejudicial attitudes and actions of the white nationalist elite.

The founders of the party had received their early political education as members of the informal pressure group, the Independent Association of Color (La Asociación Independiente de Color). The Assocation was one of the many societies begun in response to the discriminatory practices of the Estrada Palma administration. Although the Santiago de Cuba-based organization attained some success in establishing centers in other urban areas of Oriente such as Holguín, the Independents attracted little attention from the white press or the government.[1]

The "August Revolution" marked a crucial date in the Independents' early history. As a result of the frustration among colored veterans which followed the Liberal revolt, the Independents began to attract more widespread support. The principle figure in catalyzing this new following was General Estenoz.

General Evaristo E. Estenoz y Corominus, a hero of the War for Independence, was only one of several leading colored

men whose disappointments under the Estrada Palma administration were further aggravated by the continuing exclusionism practiced by white Liberals during the second intervention. Despite Estenoz's attempts to cooperate fully with Governor Magoon's American regime, he never received a government job offer.[2]

The omission was not, however, a simple oversight. It pointed to a new attitude of the governing white elite, whether Moderate or Liberal, which violated the time-honored Spanish practice of co-optation. As a militarily expert leader with his own personal following among the colored population of Oriente, Estenoz should have been incorporated into the government bureaucracy under Estrada Palma if only to separate him from his supporters and to give him a stake in the status quo. As a "very light mulatto," even his physical appearance satisfied the white elite's unwritten racial criteria of those persons eligible for upward social mobility.[3] Nevertheless, the first republican Cuban government turned him away. Disgusted with his prospects, Estenoz participated in the 1906 Liberal revolt in the hope of improving his life chances. That effort did not bear fruit. By 1907 the general and his Liberal supporters in Oriente recognized that the 1906 revolt had failed to remedy any inequalities in the distribution of benefits. With American approval, white Liberals continued to exclude colored men from the rewards of patronage.

It was not surpsing then that General Estenoz turned to his colored followers to gain redress. Like the colored men of Santa Clara and Camaguey who organized political parties at this time in response to similar frustrations, Estenoz and his coterie of backers in Oriente decided that direct political protest would be necessary to prevent the white elite from forever monopolizing governmental power and bureaucratic sinecures. As a resident of Santiago de Cuba the general became involved with the Independent Association of Color in 1906 and quickly established himself as its leader. His reputation as a war hero and his skills as an orator enabled him to attract many confused colored Liberals into the Association and away from the white Liberal leaders, José Miguel Gómez and Alfredo Zayas, who had split the Liberal Party into factions. Estenoz completed the transition to his new political role when in 1907 he reorganized the Independents into a formally recognized political party, the Independent Party of Color.

The changes in organization were a reflection of a new alliance and a new program which drew the attention of the government and the conservative press. Estenoz's Liberal supporters had begun their public protests with the demand of securing a government sinecure for their leader. These activities were in keeping with the normal patterns of behavior for the followers of any revolutionary hero. In this case,

however, the militancy of the colored veterans' request provoked sharp opposition. The government accused Estenoz of engaging in criminal activity, a position which shocked the colored veterans. The government's attitude even surprised the editors of the white newspaper La Discusión who remarked at the oddity of the charge when the same job-seeking practices were "done daily by many whites."[4]

When the Independent Party was formed, it was based on a coalition of Estenoz's colored Liberals and the older Independents. Partially as a result of the older elements' influence, the veterans expanded their demands with a declaration to fight the discrimination of influential whites. The Independents met at Vuelta Abajo to protest the degrading situation of the colored Cuban who had to submit to "a regime of concealed, hypocritical inequality.[5] With the combined force of specific demands for bureaucratic posts and the general concern for colored rights the incipient coalition began to gain a greater following than any other new colored party. Even Diario de la Marina remarked that the Oriente party headed by Estenoz was "a movement worthy of notice."[6]

Despite the unsympathetic and spotty coverage of the Independents' meetings and statements in the white press, the white elite in government and out did became aware of the general aims and attitudes of the new organization. Although

the Independents' written platform appeared only in its official organ, La Previsión, their articles of faith could be gleaned from reading the Havana dailies.

The Independents first desired to distinguish themselves from the parties which dominated politics. They directed their primary attack against the existing national parties which had neglected the problems of colored Cubans. The Independents' spokesmen attributed the parties' negligence to the absence of any pressure from partisans of colored rights within the parties' decision-making circles. Despite the solid loyalty of colored veterans to the programs and candidates of the Moderates and Liberals, colored men had been excluded from all leadership positions. The white elite thus felt no compulsion to satisfy the special needs of colored citizens.[7]

The elite politicians' failure was symbolized by their empty rhetoric. The Independents noted with disdain that the Liberals spoke of equal rights for all Cubans while they took no action. The new party's spokesmen attacked the conservatives' slogan of "A Cuba of all and for all Cubans" with even greater vehemence. They particularly berated the conservative leader General Menocal for advocating "whitening" in Cuban immigration policies without regard for its harmful effects on colored Cubans.[8]

The Independents charged that the existing parties were

not only completely unresponsive to the demands of colored veterans but had decayed from within. They proclaimed that corruption had become endemic to the political scene so that personal gain appeared to be the driving force even in the Congress. The Independents also pointed to the dissolution of the Moderate Party and the factionalism which had split the Liberal Party as symptoms of the general failure of the political system.[9] In short the other parties had in their view not only failed to protect the rights of the colored minority but were incapable of any leadership.[10] The parties had become morally bankrupt.

With this grave situation, the Independents put forward their own party as the remedy for the "frank political decompositon" which had even touched the House of Representatives. They boldly stated:

> Only our own prudent and measured voice will rise above the unharmonious atmosphere as we forego all personal ambition in favor of the collective good and the greater grandeur of the nation.[11]

The Independents tended to exaggerate the difficulties which plagued the other parties while they tried to present themselves as the country's saviors in the hope of attracting adherents. Unlike the white politicians of either party who glossed over the issue of exclusionism, however, the Independents used their public forum to fight against racial

discrimination and to demand government redress of their grievances.

The cornerstone of the Independents' platform was a protest to obtain for colored Cubans their basic rights as citizens. Party speakers "asked peaceably for their rights which they had been denied with contempt for their dignity as free men."[12] They insisted that colored men should be able to enjoy "the rights obtained by all citizens."[13] Estenoz was the party's most effective orator as he traveled around the island and attracted public attention. His theme remained constant in each of his speeches. He reminded the government of the colored Cuban's claim to his citizenship, his participation in the war for independence. Since colored men had sacrificed to create the republic, they had earned the right to political justice.[14] Party members who witnessed one of his addresses described Estenoz's oratory. They said he

> raises his full voice in favor of the men of his race in a cry for help, which is also a protest against the injustice which weigh heavily on colored men in spite of Liberty.[15]

Although the Independents fought for the rights of colored veterans, they had found that rights in the abstract were difficult to protect. The guarantees in the Constitution did not mean anything without concrete steps to fulfill

their meaning. Hence the Independents established as the second part of their platform two specific demands of equal access to government jobs and of fair treatment for colored men within the bureaucracy as a measurable goal. The Independents implicitly challenged the white nationalist elite to fulfill their old wartime promises to colored men when they protested that

> colored men have been systematically passed over for promotion by the whites, excluded totally from all participation in the various branches of the administration when everyone knows that the colored race sacrificed itself with admirable valor in the war.[16]

The party did not consciously try to antagonize the government by setting unreasonable standards such as insisting that colored men receive certain key administrative posts or that the government employ equal numbers of whites and blacks in "a political mosaic." Nevertheless, the new and vocal demands upon the government aroused considerable opposition. The white Liberals in power particularly resisted the Independents' most militant demand for proportionate representation. Specifically, the Independents were proposing the equal admission to the bureaucracy of colored men who had the same education and qualifications as white applicants. Estenoz maintained that he only wanted "what is just: posts in proportion to their respective culture."[17] The white press reacted to this proposal with vehemence,

insisting that "while it is undoubtedly true that many capable persons of color do not live at public expense, there are many more white who find themselves in an identical situation."[18]

In this instance and others theyparties and white press felt it necessary to respond to the Independents' charges of discrimination with denials. In the Congress the colored Liberal José Morúa Delgado defended his party against the Independents' claims and assured the public that colored men never suffered discrimination by the government. He asserted that in fact that colored population had actually increased their representation as their cultural level improved.[19] Although there were some inequities, Morúa Delgado believed that the state would correct them in time through the educational system.[20]

Speaking for the conservatives, Diario de la Marina insisted that "of all the civilized countries where a large colored population exists, Cuba is the one which has conceded and is conceding the most rights to Negroes both legally and in practice."[21] The paper insisted that the parties never practiced exclusionism but had always considered the colored man "to be as much of a citizen as the white."[22] As proof it mentioned colored men who had been chosen as candidates for positions as counselors, mayors, provincial counselors, representatives, and senators by different parties.[23]

In just one instance two colored men, one a Liberal and one a Moderate, had been elected mayors in predominantly white towns.[24] The daily thus denied all wrongdoing by the governing white elite and stated categorically that "each person occupies a post according to his circumstances, his merits, or the conveniences of the group."[25]

The nationalist white elite did not content itself, however, with simply responding to the militant charges of the Independents. It counterattacked, accusing the party of encouraging racist sentiments. The papers Unión Española, El Comercio, and Diario de la Marina were in the forefront of the campaign against the Independents. They charged that the party's political agitation hid its true motive of promoting hatred for the white race among colored Cubans.[26] According to the papers, the Independents had created an organization which would sustain unharmonious relations between the races and foment "fatal germs of division."[27] Fortunately, Unión Española believed, colored people would refuse to follow the Independents and would instead pursue Martí's path of unity. The daily pointed to one public meeting in Havana in which the Independents' speakers had been "shouted down and censured" by a colored audience as proof.[28]

The Independents naturally attempted to answer the charge that they promoted racism among the Cuban people. In their

rebuttal they claimed that the white press, and particularly Diario de la Marina took a hostile attitude to their work because of the editors' anti-Negro sentiments. As Spaniards the journalists were "accustomed to seeing the Negro as an old slave, always on his knees," and they were afraid now that colored veterans demanded fair treatment.[29] The party's speakers further accused the press of attempting to prejudice the American intervention authorities against their cause by press reports that white children had been kidnapped and killed by "colored men who know how to read and write."[30]

While the Independents attacked the press, however, they understood the implications of the charges against them, charges which could discredit the party. The party was in a particularly vulnerable position. The Independents wanted to participate in the upcoming 1908 congressional elections but had to do it without offending the governing whites or their American overseers.

Party leaders therefore attempted to emphasize their national or universal concerns as much as possible in addressing the government or the white press. They spoke of "the general good of all those who make up the nation" and of "the respect and mutual consideration that must exist for all to enjoy the light of human civil and political law of the country."[31] Facing the charge of "racism" directly party journalists wrote in La Previsión:

> Our purposes do not include hatred nor any attempt to encourage antipathy against anyone; all Cubans have the right to be with us or against us, but we, inspired with a noble and generous goal, have the duty to maintain an equilibrium with all Cuban interests; and the black race has the right to intervene in the government of its country. Not for the end of governing anyone, but only with the purpose of seeing that we are governed well.[32]

Despite opposition from the whites in power, the Independents managed to obtain the approval of the American authorities who were to supervise the October congressional elections. The means by which Estenoz secured Governor Magoon's approval is not clear. Apparently the party met all legal requirements and had a record of cooperating with the American authorities.[33] Nevertheless, the American regime had a reputation for discriminating against colored men. They seem likely that they would have perceived the Independents as a threat in so much as the party represented colored Cubans. It would appear, however, that in this case Magoon felt that the obligation to establish a functioning, democratic party system overrode his apprehension concerning the colored party.[34] He probably could not disqualify the party without appearing to violate his own standards for correct political behavior. Whatever the manner of obtaining approval to participate in the elections, the party was permitted to place twenty names on the ballot in Havana and Las Villas provinces, including their President Estenoz, and proposed eighteen candidates for the Oriente elections.[35]

The Independents had a far more difficult task, however, as they faced widespread voter apathy among eligible colored men. The party leaders realized that they needed to convince colored men first to vote and then to vote for their candidates. To counteract the apathy, party spokesmen appealed to these colored men to fulfill their responsibilities as citizens in front of the American watchdogs:

> The elections are crucial to Cuba because they will demonstrate to our detractors that our sons have the ability to assume the responsibility of their government. They will also be important to the history of Antillian democracy, because in the midst of a cultured, progressive white society, Cubans of color are going to contribute by using their right of suffrage.[36]

The party's orators also called upon colored men to vote as a sign of their freedom as men who had known slavery. The speakers did not condone license, however, and emphasized the need for an orderly election. In a barb directed at the Liberals and the 1906 revolt Estenoz said:

> We will be the most ardent defenders of order, if anyone intends to perturb the calm, be they conservative or liberal. Men of color vote! Yes, vote and respect the authority of the President who directs the nation.[37]

Estenoz realized, however, that it would be far more difficult to mobilize voter support for the party among colored men who had never before participated in an election.

Rather than attempting to reach new voters and to rely upon them as the party's base of support, Estenoz chose what he believed to be a more rational strategy. Given the spontaneous support he received from colored Liberals, he decided to actively attempt to attract colored men away from the Liberal Party.[38] He also believed he could gain the backing of colored members of the newly organized Conservative Party which had been created by members of the defunct Moderate Party. To further his strategy Estenoz never insisted that Independents renounce their affiliations with other parties.[39]

The Independents' difficulties in deflating the white elite's opposition and in securing its own base of support were complicated by a third restraining factor. The party had just over one year's time in which to mount a campaign. Estenoz, in conjunction with other party strategists such as Gregorio Surín and Pedro Ivonnet, decided therefore to limit their efforts to the October congressional campaign and to forego a bid in the November presidential elections.

Despite the time limitations in preparing for the congressional campaign, Estenoz was optimistic as the election approached. He believed that colored men were deserting the other parties to join the Independents. His assessment proved false, however: with 57.6 percent of the eligible voters going to the pools, not one of the party's candidates was successful.[40]

The Independents' electoral defeat could probably have been attributed to their premature entrance into the political contest and the untested nature of their organization. With his broken hopes Estenoz bitterly blaimed the party's totalffailure on the lack of support among the colored population. Although he and the Independents understood the indifference of the majority of colored Cubans, they were disturbed that few leading non-whites outside the party offered to help the new organization. Estenoz reserved his most vehement attack for colored Liberals who worked furiously for the Liberal triumph. Party spokesmen attacked these "selfish" colored politicians as men who were working "for themselves and only for themselves." They became obsessed by these Negroes in the opposition, terming them "rabid dogs."[41]

Despite the party's sound defeat, however, its members continued to work with a renewed effort. The party's militancy had if anything increased as a result of their electoral loss. Estenoz boldly sounded the challenge to blacks and whites alike:

> Our labor cannot be compromised; either men of color achieve equality with the whites to participate equally in the republic; or else there is one of two alternatives; we will fall under the weight of our own work; or we will forever renounce our condition as Cubans, if here we must be saddled to a life with the quality of a slave.[42]

Less than a month after the election Estenoz formed an executive committee which included Gregorio Surín as secretary, and five other leaders who headed the organization at the provincial level.[43] By the time the successful Presidential candidate, José Miguel Gómez, assumed office in early 1909 the Independents had developed a stronger party with local roots in all but Camaguey province.[44]

The leadership at once decided to petition Gómez in reference to government jobs to ask for "the most equitable participation of all ethnic elements which populate the Republic."[45] More importantly, however, the Independents resolved to direct greater attention toward a new electoral strategy which depended upon colored urban workers. Party planners hoped that this pool of colored men would join the party when they realized their "inferior status." With these new recruits, the Independents intended to "shake the rest (of the colored population) who live in abject poverty."[46] In keeping with this approach the Independents' spokesmen far outdistanced any other politicians in their attacks on the Liberal government for its policies of discrimination against colored workers:

> All seems rosy: the country is celebrating fiestas, commerce and wealth are tripling, industry and yankee riches are being invested here, making it seem that those who mistrust the Americans are bad Cubans; but the poor families of Vuelto Abajo are hungry and anguish has come. . .above all to the Negro workers who are excluded from the workshops and are replaced by Spanish workers with the consent of the government.[47]

Party spokesmen also criticized the widespread corruption of the Gómez regime. They charged that the government's motto was "we sell everything;" and under this ethic, it allowed its diplomatic offices to be bought.[48] The Independents even charged President Gómez personally of corruption.[49]

Estenoz went too far, however, when he accused the Supreme Court of fostering racial hatred against colored men. In an article which appeared in La Previsión he referred to a case which the Court had refused to handle dealing with a disturbance between colored veterans and American servicemen in a Havana bar. In the incident the Americans had apparently made racial slurs against the colored Cubans. Estenoz believed that the Court should have defended the rights of the colored ex-soldiers against the provocations of the foreigners. In the editorial "To the Government and the Negroes of Cuba" he concluded:

> All men of color who would not instantly kill the cowardly aggressor who scoffs at them in a public establishment is a miserable being, unworthy of his manhood, who dishonors his country and his race.
>
> The Independent Party of Color will only cease its existence when a Negro can punish anyone severely, killing like a dog whosoever comes to Cuba to humiliate the brothers of Maceo; and the government would encourage and protect him. On that day, the Independent Party will have completed its evolutive mission.[50]

The appearance of the article solicited an immediate reaction from the authorities. President Gómez ordered

the arrest of Estenoz for an infraction of the printing law. On February 11, 1910, five days after his detainment, he was sentenced to prison for four months.[51]

The government did more, however, than send the Independents' leader to jail. The governing white elite chose to consider the La Previsión article's inflamatory tone as the standard by which the party should be judged. The leaders of the Liberal Party in particular used the occasion to seek to remove the Independents as a political competitor. In the Congress the colored Liberal José Morúa Delgado began a debate in which he proposed to put an end to the party's racist propoganda. The senator objected to any party or group which encouraged "the division of races."[52] He received the immediate support of one of the senate's leading conservatives, Gonzalo Pérez. Gonzalo Pérez expounded upon the theme that political groups composed "exclusively by men of one race or color . . .disturb the social order and the public peace" and eventually could provoke a state of "social war."[53] The two senators and their respective parties agreed that Congress had to act to end this potential threat to the "stability of the Republic."[54]

With Gonzalo Pérez's approval, Morua Delgado sponsored a revision of the Electoral Law. This law was based on article 11 of the Constitution which proscribed the recognition of privileges among Cuban citizens. On the floor of

the Senate the colored Liberal explained the reasoning behind his proposal. Referring to the Independents he said

> The Negro association is of itself without any importance...because it could never attain any national impact; but it could present the contrasting solution for whites to form an association: whites meeting to the exclusion of Negroes and Negroes meeting to the exclusion of whites; and here is the great conflict which my amendment seeks to avoid.[55]

On the 12th of February, he presented his amendment to the Senate. It read:

> Because the Constitution is established with a republican form of government and invests the status of "Cuban" upon those Africans who were slaves in Cuba, and does not recognize fueros nor personal privileges,
>
> Because the republican form established by the Constitution institutes the government of the people and by the people, without distinctions of race, birth, wealth, or professional title,
>
> Because the political parties have the undeniable tendency to form from their own ranks the government which develops in the country their political and administrative doctrines,
>
> The above senator considers the existence of parties or political associations composed exclusively for reasons of race, birth, wealth, or professional title as contrary to the Constitution and the practices of a republican regime and has the honor to propose to the Senate the following additional amendment to article 17 of the Electoral Law:
>
> (5) In no case will any association composed exclusively by individuals of one race or color, or by individuals of one class for reasons of birth, wealth, or professional title be recognized as a political party or independent association.[56]

The tenor of Morúa Delgado's comments and the wording of his amendment showed that he, as a colored senator, wished to disassociate himself from the Independents' activities. He fully accepted the white elite's view of the new party as a divisive and racist organization for two reasons. The senator had no sympathy for disappointed colored office-seekers who were willing to propose an alternate means to obtain a government job when he himself had benefitted by his cooperation with the white power structure. Second, as a Liberal he feared the Independents as a rival party which might draw colored supporters away from his party and erode his personal power base.[57]

Morúa Delgado's actions earned praise from the white press as well as his fellow senators. In writing in favor of the amendment both the conservative El Mundo and the liberal La Discusión explained that they had long opposed the "disruptive nature" of "ethnic passions."[58] Diario de la Marina favored the amendment in the belief that it would put an end to the "grave dangers to the republic." The paper charged that the "racist" Independents demanded actual "physical equality," or equal amounts of goods, and that they wanted to dominate public affairs. It also said that the party's members sought to subjugate the white population, and then to found a "Negro republic" similar to Haiti. Diario de la Marina even linked the party with sex crimes,

alluding to Estenoz's presumed carnal desire for white women.[59]

La Lucha, a liberal newspaper, was equally disturbed by the "racist" meetings of the party in La Casualidad, El Cobre, and other Oriente towns. The daily reported that in El Cobre party secretary Gregorio Surín advocated that Oriente be put under the direction of colored men in order to make it a colored province.[60] The paper's editors noted that the party's insults against the President and their defamation of whites had alarmed the people in the countryside. The editors demanded the government to take measures against "this fratricidal propoganda that is disturbing the public tranquility."[61]

Despite the overwhelming support for Mórúa Delgado's proposal in the Congress and among the white press, the amendment did create some opposition in both legislative houses. In the Senate, Cisnero Betancourt, a white Liberal, led the fight against the bill. He first tried to allay the fears of potential division along racial lines. Recalling the War for Independence in which more Negroes fought than whites, he noted that there was never a rebellion of blacks against whites."[62] He then specifically attacked the legality of the proposed legislation. The senator said that he found no constitutional provision which prohibited Negroes from forming a party. To the contrary, he asserted that the amendment threatened to violate articles 25, 28, and 36 of the Constitution which protected liberty of word

and thought, and the right of association and union.[63] Senator Laguardia supported Cisnero Betancourt's claims because he believed that "the association had never pursued illegal goals." Although Laguardia distrusted the Independents, he felt that Morúa Delgado's solution to eliminate the threat of the Independents was not in proportion to the "illness."[64]

Laguardia and Cisnero Betancourt also attacked Morúa Delgado's political motives. Laguardia charged that the Liberal senator feared his party could be defeated eventually by the Independents, and he so wished to eliminate this potential danger.[65] Cisnero Betancourt accused Morúa Delgado of attempting to protect his own colored following by raising the spectre of "racism" among the Independents.[66] In the House of Represntatives the single defender of the Independents during the debate, legislator Gonzales Lanuza, observed that the new party represented a danger only because the existing parties had failed to improve the social or political position of colored Cubans. Lanuza, a leader of the conservatives, insisted that Estenoz and his men had formed the Independent Party only after they had suffered from the deceptions of the Liberals and the Moderates.[67]

Both Representative Lanuza and Senator Cisnero Betancourt opposed the amendment for one final political reason. They feared that the party, if outlawed, would simply continue to operate outside the legal sphere.

In that event it would present an even greater danger to the authorities. Before the House Lanuza argued:

> How would this party continue after the passage of this law? It would be illicit, prohibited by law, and when parties cannot be formed, there are only three roads to take: they could convince themselves that it is not true that the existing Cuban parties cannot satisfy their legitimate aspirations; . . . But I do not believe they will be convinced; and then they will either resign their cause, or they will fight.[68]

Cisnero Betancourt also tried to convince the Senate that it was extremely unwise to attempt to eliminate legitimate protest.[69]

The arguments of Lanuza, Cisnero Betancourt, and Laguardia went unheeded, however. The amendment easily passed both houses, by 12 to 3 in the Senate and by a greater margin in the House.[70]

The Morúa amendment, as it became known to the public, was designed to bar the Independents from the political arena. The legislature knew that a prior electoral law, passed under the American authorities on March 21, 1908, permitted only three parties, the Liberal, the Conservative, and the Independent, to participate in the 1910 elections.[71] Since under this grandfather clause the Independent Party of Color could not change its formal name and continue to have access to the upcoming elections, the party could not respond to the Morúa Amendment simply by dropping the "of Color" from

its appelation.[72] With the Independents forced to maintain their racial designation and the Morúa amendment outlawing "racially exclusionist" associations, the party had no legal path open to it. The white governing elite believed it had successfully eliminated the Independents as political competitors in the 1910 elections.

The Independents' exclusion from the 1910 congressional elections did not silence them. It was true that the party had been stunned by Estenoz's arrest on February 6. Lacking their leader, the Independents were momentarily confused by the congressional action. Estenoz was released from prison, however, on February 23, 1910 as the result of a general amnesty law only one day before the final approval of the Morúa amendment. He assumed control immediately, responding to the Congress' action through a vigorous "exposition" addressed to President Gómez. The document stressed that the American authorities had recognized the Independent Party as a legal entity during the second intervention. It implied not only that the Congress had acted illegally but that the Independents might appeal to the Americans to gain redress. Estenoz's "exposition" also reversed the Congress' allegations. It accused Gómez and the Congress of promoting "disunion in the Cuban family" by the passage of the amendment which injured the rights of colored citizens.[73]

Party leaders, concerned with internal as party members

confronted divisions the new law, tried to promote a united front. Although the Morúa amendment was obviously designed to suppress their party, the Independents attempted to circumvent the law by insisting that it did not apply to them. Estenoz and Secretary Surín released a notice to their various party headquarters which instructed party chiefs to oppose the amendment. It read:

> Referring to the amendment of Senator José Martín Morúa Delgado of article 17 of the Electoral Law, which denies participation to political parties which are composed of individuals of only one race and which pursue racist tendencies, we must warn you that we do not fall under the conditions referred to in this law.
>
> In the first place, affiliated with our committees are individuals of all races which populate this island. . . . Ethnically we are the expression of pure criollism. Our tendencies are clearly specified in our program: we want an egalitarian republic without hateful ommissions by race.
>
> We want free immigration for all races. Our human, natural, and political proposals are manifest. This law which the Senate has approved will be directed against the Liberal and Conservative parties which have the racist tendency of proposing that the only immigration which may come to this island is white families.[74]

While the Independents denied that the amendment affected their political status, party spokesmen continued to attack the government and to bring their program before the public. In La Previsión Estenoz wrote that he and his fellow colored Cubans would not resign themselves to the "life of a slave" or condemn themselves "to a separate

existence."[75] The general proclaimed that the party had come into being to fight for equal justice for colored men and its members would certainly not submit when thousands of non-whites were still denied their "natural rights" by the Gómez regime.[76]

In addition to these criticisms of the government, party spokesmen tried to publicize the positive aspects of their work. La Previsión's editors published the party's 19-point platform which addressed itself to the specific problems of colored workers. The program was part of the continuing effort to attract colored workers into the party.

The Independents derived many of their platform's proposals from Cuban socialism. A Cuban socialist party had been formed in 1899 by recent immigrants. It directed its emphasis principally toward organizing unions in the transportation fields including unions for railroad and dock workers. The socialists never entered, however, into the formal political structure through the electoral process.[77] The Independents hoped therefore that they might benefit in the political arena with proposals never before placed before the general working public. By advocating measures which had proven popular among select portions of the working class, the party strategists intended to attract a broader base following.

Among the socialist-type measures which had been borrowed, the Independents proposed an eight hour day for all laborers.

They sought in addition to protect Cuban workers with their demand that the government guarantee preference for Cubans over foreign laborers. They also insisted upon government arbitration of labor disputes. More generally, the party platform proposed that the government overhaul its judicial and penal system and institute educational reforms. While these measures, if implemented, would have substantially improved the particular material situation of colored workers, they also would have benefitted all members of the non-elites.[78]

The most strident of the Independents' remarks concerned, as always, the area of public employment. Under the pressure of the amendment, party spokesmen increased their demands. Estenoz publicly protested once again that colored men had been passed over for promotions in the bureaucracy. This time his supporters insisted that governmental positions in the national government be divided equally between whites and blacks "so that the plate of one group is as full as that of the other."[79] They proposed the names of the Liberal Juan Gualberto Gómez for Secretary to the President, Estenoz for the Secretary of Public Works, and Morúa Delgado for Secretary of the Treasury. The Independents even dared to threaten the Gómez administration if it did not comply: they declared that "either half of the national wealth goes to Negroes, or no one will enjoy it in this land."[80]

Party demands also increased in regard to provincial governmental power. The party enjoyed its greatest strength

in Oriente where non-whites outnumbered whites in many towns including Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo with 56.7 percent and 60.6 percent colored populations respectively.[81] The leadership began to emphasize a new demand which took advantage of this numerical supremacy, andemand first developed by Gregorio Surín.[82] The party spokesmen insisted that elected officials and functionaries should be colored where a majority of the electorate was colored.[83] Surín even suggested that coloredmmen from other provinces could obtain positions in Oriente while whites would dominate elsewhere.[84]

Despite the Independents' protests, the government did not respond either by repealing the Morúa amendment or by removing the party from the list of illicit organizations. After one and one-half months of fruitless demonstrations all legal avenues to electoral participation in 1910 remained closed to them. Party leaders were divided as to the next step. Estenoz finally decided to resort to the most militant form of protest, an armed demonstration of force, in an attempt to pressure the Congress into repealing the Morúa amendment. On April 20, 1910 the Independents organized armed disturbances in the province of Las Villas.[85]

In response President Gómez acted swiftly. He announced that the government would employ "powerful means at its disposal to keep the public order." As a military precaution he sent the army to Las Villas as well as the other five provinces.[86]

The white parties reacted with alarm to the armed protest, accusing the Independents of "exciting the passions of Negroes against whites."[87] Although the party had always been accused of fomenting racial hatred, the Conservative Party met to condemn officially the "racist movement" of the Independents and their "savage insanity."[88] Leading Liberals also spoke against the rebellion as anti-patriotic and divisive.[89]

Diario de la Marina led the white newspapers in denouncing the events in Las Villas. The daily condemned the "dangerous and alarming agitation which can be attributed to the mad and criminal propoganda of the Independent Party."[90] The paper reported that certain elements of the colored race "demonstrated hostility to whites and to the government in those areas where they were strongest and most numerous."[91] La Discusión, a Liberal Havana daily, was shocked at the discovery of an intercepted Independent telegram from Guantánamo which allegedly revealed that the party "had plotted the extermination of the white race."[92] The telegram confirmed the fears of La Unión Español which had previously contended that the Independents not only espoused political goals, but had actually excited its adherents to commit criminal acts.[93] These announcements by the white press and the Conservative and Liberal parties of the Independents' atrocities actually led to panic among the whites in rural Oriente who fled out of fear to the nearest towns for protection.[94]

The white government and press refrained, however, from condemning the colored population as a whole. The Conservative Party insisted that "racism" did not dominate the hearts of Cubans and that the country was unified in its support of the government.[95] The Liberals assured their fellow Cubans that "we are not the enemies of the colored race." They affirmed that "all whites and almost all Negroes" opposed the Independents.[96]

The newspapers made similar distinctions. While La Lucha denounced the criminal and injurious activities of the party, it was careful to mention that these were "isolated acts done by specific persons." The editors said that the Independents' behavior could not serve to "establish responsibility against an entire collectivity."[97] The editors mentioned that many men of color were proven patriots who regretted the present unrest.[98]

La Lucha and Diario de la Marina cited sympathetic demonstrations of various colored individuals and colored societies as proof of their support for the regime.[99] In both large cities like Pínar del Río or Cárdenas, and small towns like Batabanó, Luis Lazo, Catalina de Güines, and San Nicolas, colored men met to protest against Estenoz's racist movement.[100] Even in Santiago de Cuba, the Independents' base, prominent persons of color visited the provincial Governor to denounce the Independents and offer their assistance to the administration.[101]

These public declarations of "adhesion" to the government by colored organizations continued throughout the duration of the disturbance. Through public meetings and open letters to government officials colored societies attempted to separate themselves from the actions of the Independent Party. The colored members either wished to express their sincere sentiments or hoped to escape government reprisals against their organizations. Most of these "adhesions" protested the Independents' "pernicious and fatal propoganda against the harmonious interests of the Cuban family."[102] The Societies of Color (Las Sociedades de Color), the prestigious central organization which coordinated the activities of local colored groups, acted in a typical manner. On May 3 the organization met to dispel the impression that the Independent Party represented their viewpoint. The membership declared:

> Our societies condemn all movements with racist tendencies because our members understand that all must succeed by love, fraternity, and agreement, and because we consider the fomenting of hatred to be criminal in the republic.
>
> We not only condemn the racist tendency of the group which is covered under the flag of the Independent Party of Color, that public opinion has condemned; but we note that they took violent action, putting our future in danger and breaking the solidarity that strongly exists in Cuba between whites and blacks.[103]

With whites and most colored men apparently in support of the Gómez government, the Liberal administration still

had two reasons to crush the movement with haste before it threatened to draw the support of more rebels. Many of the insurgents were Liberals. The government thus sought to minimize the number of desertions from its base of support, the Liberal Party. A sound defeat of the insurgents would have eliminated the Independents as political competitors.[104] More importantly, Gómez was concerned with the external repercussions of the revolt. The government feared that the Americans would intervene if it proved incapable of squashing the disturbance quickly.[105] The government was fortunate. Its troops closed in rapidly on the few rebels capturing them. The Rural Guard arrested Estenoz and another leader Ivonnet by order of the Secretary of Justice.[106] In Santiago de Cuba, local police detained Gregorio Surín, and confiscated copies of La Previsión.[107] The National Police arrested three other leaders, Ramón Miranda, Julian Valdés Sierra, and Francisco P. Luna.[108] The police also detained rank and file Independents in Regla, Guanabacoa, Santa Clara, and towns throughout Oriente province. Thirty-three men were arrested on April 23 and twenty-one more the following day.[109]

Despite "adhesions" to the government members of various colored societies also fell victim to the police. The heads of the Secret Police, the National Police, and the Special Police charged that the Independent Party was not the "sole initiator of the racist movement." They believed that

other associations of color also "tried to foment hatred against the white racial elements, as well as against the government."[110] The authorities detained members of the Aponte Institute and the societies The Gold Harp and Santa Barbara.[111]

With information gleaned from spies in the local colored organizations, La Previsión, and public speeches, the Justice Department announced its intention to prosecute all those involved in the "seditious movement calculated to develop open revolution against the government."[112] The Secretary of Justice formally accused the arrested men of "conspiracy to rebel" on April 26 and charged them with fomenting violence "in order that the colored race could assume power, and destroy the constitutional government."[113] The Independents were further charged with holding illegal meetings for the purpose of fomenting hatred against whites.[114] The government labelled the party an "illicit association" and ordered it dissolved.[115]

Although the government accused the Independents of organizing a vast conspiracy against constituted authority, imprisoned party members seemed confused by the regime's actions. While they confessed to being party members, they insisted that the Independents' doctrines had no racist overtones and denied participation in any meetings which encouraged the agitation of Negroes against whites.[116] Many Independents who remained free supported their fellow party members with public demonstrations of support. The

Santiago de Cuba group sent a delegation to the municipal convention, for example, to protest against the charges of the Independents' "racist tendencies and revolutionary propositions." The delegates stressed that the Independent Party aspired to develop inside the law and repudiated any violence. In Pínar del Río, party members organized a commission to see the mayor (alcalde) to assure him that the Independents respected public institutions, and they insisted that the colored members only desired to exercise their right to form a party under the Constitution.[118]

The imprisonment of party members was, however, the greatest jolt yet to party solidarity. The Independents had hoped that Congress would repeal the Morúa Amendment in response to their armed protest, but such a move in the House of Representatives led by Freyre de Andrade failed by a vote of 13 to 33. In jail and facing a tested law which banned their activities, some men led by party secretary Surín decided to accept the Morúa Amendment. This dissenting faction, which included the members of the Matanzas assembly, the president of Havana's organization, the committees of Yaraguamas and Consolación del Sur, and some persons from the Oriente and Santa Clara provincial assemblies, declared publicly on July 20, 1910 that they would cooperate with the government by disbanding.[120] In November Surín declared the formation of a new party, the Independent Republican Party (El Partido Republicano Independiente), which would support

Gómez.[121]

Despite his imprisonment, Estenoz responded rapidly to both the defections within his own party and the government's accusations. In an open letter addressed to the Surín faction on August 2, 1910, he declared that the party would not dissolve itself, would not change its ideals, and would not even change its name. He tried to reassure his fellow Independents that the party actually operated within the law. He emphasized that their imprisonment was only the result of the government's manipulations in the Electoral Law.[122]

A majority of the party members followed Estenoz, rather than the cooperative path of the Surín dissidents, when the Independents' President denied the regime's charges that he had spread racist propoganda and had conspired against the government. Estenoz insisted that his role in the party had always been to build its political strength.[123] He had succeeded so well in his task, he asserted, by gaining the support of 93,000 of the 103,000 colored men affiliated with the Liberal party, that the Conservatives and Liberals perceived the party as a threat.[124]

In spite of government subtrefuge Estenoz boldly declared in a letter from his jail cell that the party would continue to pursue its activities in the interests of the colored race. It would never "fall to its knees" before the challenge of the white parties and the government.[125]

In an interview in Diario de la Marina Estenoz recalled that the origins of the party lay in the post-1898 period when colored men began to demand more governmental participation. Estenoz said

> The radical change in institutions and sentiments could not be circumscribed by a total domination by the white element, under the cover of a half dozen Negro personalities, with the mass of disciplined colored men obedient to the voice of these half dozen saints.[126]

Drawing upon personal experience, Estenoz noted that colored Cubans began to ask for their share in a post-war system of government based on rewards for patriotic services. They were denied it. Colored applicants who aspired to bureaucratic positions were refused for lack of qualifications while illiterate or inept white candidates received appointments as mayors or as other officials.[127] Estenoz asserted that whereas the dominant aim of the other parties was to achieve personal ambitions, the Independent Party arose to remedy these inequalities which contradicted the principles of the revolution and the Constitution.[128]

Estenoz and 52 of his followers were released from jail on bail between May 5 and October 13, 1910. Nevertheless, the freed Independents and the 78 party members who remained in prison still faced a court trial. In the trial which lasted the month from November 14 to December 13, the government case charged the defendants with two types of violations.

The prosecutors accused the colored men of verbally attacking the government by threatening to overthrow the Gómez regime.[129] The Independents were also charged with committing crimes of a "racial" nature. Joaquín Hurtado of the Secret Police was one witness who denounced the men for plotting violence against whites in secret meetings. Other police agents cited incidents in which the Independents had condoned violent threats against white men.[130] The authorities also expressed fears that the Independents had sought to govern the island with the help of Haitians.[131]

Freyre de Andrade, a sympathetic white representative of Congress, defended the Independents against these lesser charges and the major accusation that the party had "incited men to revolution as a means to obtain success in their desires."[132] His defense proved sound. When the third criminal court of the Audiencia of Havana returned its verdict on December 24, the judges ordered the release of the prisoners on the grounds of lack of sufficient evidence.[133]

Although the governing white elite believed it had finally circumscribed the Independents' activities through these political and military maneuvers, the party was not defeated. The Independents began again to appeal directly to its colored constituency in order to overcome the obstacles placed in their path by the regime. As a major facet of their program, Party spokesmen began to publicize cases in which they actively attempted to fight racism. The Independents campaigned to gain the release, for example, of colored veterans charged with various crimes such as

carrying firearms. In another instance they tried to make the authorites reduce the sentence of a colored man accused of raping a white woman. Aside from their dealings with the judicial process, the Independents also exercised some informal pressure over non-governmental discrimination. They tried to arrange a boycott of a Havana hotel, for example, because it refused to serve non-whites. Through these positive steps to alleviate race prejudice, the party hoped to demonstrate the sincerity of their efforts to colored Cubans and thus to encourage them to join the Independents.[134]

The party never abandoned, however, its simultaneous attacks on the Gómez regime. The Independents hoped in particular to benefit by a governmental crisis which was at its height during the winter months of 1911-1912. The Gómez administration was at odds with the prestigious Veterans of the Wars of Independence organization which was demanding the repeal of the Civil Service law of 1908. The law, passed during the second American intervention, guaranteed the jobs of Spaniards in the bureaucracy to the dismay of the veterans who felt that "traitors" (guerrilleros) and Spanish sympathizers should be dismissed from administrative posts.[135] Although the government managed to end the serious agitation by April of 1912, this clash had weakened the regime.[136]

Pursuing their apparent advantage over the government during the winter months into early 1912, party spokesmen

denounced the Gómez regime for violations of their party's rights and for violations against colored citizens. The Independents attacked with the hope of pressuring the government to repeal the Morúa law and to grant them legal status as a party. During this crucial period the Independents pursued their strategy with the support of such papers as La Lucha which claimed that the party had been deprived of its constitutional guarantees.[137]

While the party's orators pictured the Independent Party as an aggrieved victim of the regime, they continued to protest against governmental discrimination directed against all colored man.[138] They again protested exclusionism in the arms-carrying agencies including the police,the Rural Guard, the artillery corps, and the army; exclusionism in private and public educational institutions; and exclusionism in workers' unions. In a new series of accusations, party spokesmen denounced discrimination within Cuban society not directly linked to governmental policies. They attacked discriminatory practices in the fields of art and science, in sports, in the Church, and in other areas.[139] Party speakers also criticized the white press and particularly Diario de la Marina, El Diario Español, La Discusión, El Triunfo, and La Unión Español for their prejudicial reporting.[140]

As a final element of his strategy, Estenoz decided to appeal to the American government. He saw this act as another

means of circumventing the power of the Cuban regime over his party, and particularly as a means to establish another basis to the party's claims for legal status. Although a plea to the United States authorities early in 1910 had little positive effect, Estenoz decided to send a delegation to Washington in January of 1912 which would present the party's grievances.[141] Principally, the Independents' representatives reminded the Americans that Govenor Magoon had recognized in a formal decree the legitimacy of their party prior to the fall elections of 1908 during the second American intervention. The representatives insisted that the Gómez administration had violated this decree in contravention of the proclamation which made all acts of the provisional American government binding. Furthermore, the delegates told Washington officials that they believed that the party would also be barred from naming candidates in the upcoming 1912 elections because of the illegal Morúa law.[142]

The American response to the Independents' complaints was extremely cautious. The reports of the American minister in Havana, A. M. Beaupré, preceded the delegation. These reports which labelled the Independents as a "source of agitation" prejudiced the United States officials against the party.[143] Without a positive indication from Washington, Estenoz was left to deal directly with an increasingly hostile Gómez regime.

VI. The 1912 Revolt

The Independents had hoped that their denouncements against governmental discrimination would gain popular support which, in turn, would encourage Congress to restore the organization to the status of a legal party. Once they were declared members of a licit association, the Independent Party's leaders planned to participate in the upcoming 1912 congressional elections. By March of 1912 the party's chiefs realized that their strategy would not succeed. Congress did not intend to repeal the Morúa amendment which outlawed the party. The Morúa amendment remained an apparently permanent obstacle to the Independents' electoral aspirations. Given these pressures, party leaders decided to begin a dynamic campaign to repeal the Morúa law and thus to gain the right to participate in the 1912 elections.

The leadership discussed various strategies throughout April but remained divided as to the correct course of action.[1] In mid-May the Independents' regional chiefs, including Pedro Ivonnet, Coronel Armenteros, Abelardo Pacheco, Julio Antomarchi and ten others, met with Estenoz in Santiago de Cuba to determine the party's immediate future. They had to act with haste for two reasons. As part of the government's plan to eliminate the Independents as a political force, the party's members were experiencing increasingly severe pressure from Secretary Geraldo Machado y Morales who sought to

enforce the ban on all of the Independents' public meetings.[2] The leadership was also concerned with electoral planning. The time was drawing short before it would be impossible for the party to launch any campaign even if it was legal.

On May 15 the leaders announced officially that unless the Morúa amendment were repealed by June 15 the Independent Party would prevent all elections.[3] At a second public meeting in Santiago de Cuba on May 17 Estenoz, accompanied by more than 40 Independents, did not hide the fact that the party was attempting to pressure Congress into repealing the Morúa amendment.[4]

To strengthen their campaign against the amendment the chiefs apparently decided to begin another "armed protest," a revolt designed to convince the Congress of the sincerity of their threats.[5] On the nights of May 18 and 19 key men in the various local branches of the party received invitations to "a family get-together in Belona," the code for a call to arms.[6]

The rebellion began on May 20, 1912 in Oriente and Las Villas provinces. Even as the conflict between the Independents and the government unfolded, the party's spokesmen were attempting to clarify the justifications for such action. Their tactics of insurgency would not, after all, have the desired effect -- the repeal of the amendment -- without sufficient publicty. In addition to the publicized statements from the May 15 and 17 meetings of the party, the Independents published an editorial in La Reinvindicación

entitled "To the Countryside" which explained the reasons behind the revolt.[7] The authorities were thus well aware that the purpose of the uprising was first to have Congress repeal the amendment and then to gain recognition of the Independent Party's legitimacy.[8]

While these immediate goals were paramount in the Independents' minds, they continued to advocate their more comprehensive ends of abolishing inequalities in Cuba between blacks and whites.[9] In an interview in Cuba Libre Estenoz proclaimed:

> the first cause of the uprising is to have the Morúa law repealed, and second it is to end the poor treatment suffered by the colored class...by the same government which denies (colored men) all political rights. . . .[10]

Among the Independents there was apparently a considerable concensus of agreement over the aims of the revolt as stated by their President Estenoz. The major chiefs of the party who each commanded small numbers of Independent Party troops, including Pacheco, Antomarchi, and Lacoste, supported publicly Estenoz's declarations.[11] During the fighting party soldiers also affirmed their President's interpretation of the uprising's purposes. As disappointment veterans of the War for Independents, the Independents' fighting men believed that the party could help them regain what the New York Times termed "their just political rewards." They nevertheless supported Estenoz's immediate goal to repeal the Morúa amendment as the necessary first step in

achieving an equitable settlement of their claims.[12] While these rank and file Independents demanded that "the revolution should be revindicated," they backed Estenoz with cries of "down with the Morúa law!" as they encountered government forces in battle.[13]

In setting their goal party leaders realized that they had a deadline. Unless the legislature acted before the congressional elections, the armed protest would not help the party. The leaders decided therefore to establish a series of ultimata. Even before the combat began Secretary Knox of the American State Department received a note from Estenoz which announced that the Independents would fight if the Gómez government would not meet their demands.[14] According to another source, an intercepted telegram, Estenoz established a timetable. In the telegram he announced to his followers that property was to be destroyed beginning on June 1 if the Morúa law had not been derogated. If the regime remained intransigent by June 15, party members would begin combat in earnest and inflict casualties on the government troops.[15]

The Independents tried to play a dangerous balancing game by these escalating tactics to scare the Congress into repealing the amendment. At the same time they intended to make their protest a symbolic act, much like the 1906 Liberal revolt, which did not involve a serious or bloody confrontation. In what Eugenio Lacoste, an Independent Party leader, described as "a movement which called itself 'armed' and

did not possess guns," the insurgent party members avoided clashes with government troops and stalled for time, hoping to convince the Congress to repeal the amandment.[16] Without a military objective, with few arms, and with a poor network of communication and organization, the Independents thus chose not to engage government forces directly.[17] Estenoz and his lieutenants instead relied upon their experiences in the 1895 war when they had learned to use Oriente's rough, mountainous terrain to evade Spanish troops and deliver blows to the enemy.[18]

Gómez denigrated the cowardly tactics of the Independents in a proclamation of June 7, claiming that the rebels "move among the thickets of the woods, attacking by surprise and avoiding combat."[19] General José E. Monteagudo, commander of the government troops in the war zone, also noted with disgust the futility of attempting to force the insurgents into combat.[20] The Independents' guerrilla tactics proved so effective that the government troops had to pursue the rebels in small groups on unfamiliar ground.[21]

Despite the shortage of war material the Independents carried out relativelyeextensive property destruction in Oriente and Las Villas in accord with the timetable established by Estenoz. Although the roving bands of party men occasionally sabotaged telephone lines, troop trains, or military outposts before May 31, they began in earnest on June 1 when the frequency of attacks on strategic targets increased.[22]

The advantage of mobility and surprise lay with the rebels. In small groups ranging from five to twenty they could cover the extensive area of the two provinces. The government forces had a more difficult task as they attempted to provide protection for military targets, towns, mining establishments, planted fields, isolated rural settlements, and stores.

Despite the efforts of the government forces, the Independents' troops looted small rural stores and cantinas with impunity in order to caputre supplies.[23] They also exacted arms and monetary payments from the owners of rural haciendas in Oriente and Las Villas, threatening to burn the owners' fields unless they complied.[24] In one instance Estenoz received $1,000 pesos from a sugar plantation owner through this method of extortion, while Ivonnet exacted $700 from a Spanish coffee hacendado.[25] In an interview, Estenoz admitted receiving 1,000 rifles and 750,000 rounds of ammunition from property owners and railroads.[26] Those owners who remained recalcitrant suffered the consequences, as more burned fields were burned.[27] The destruction of property was so widespread after June 1 that La Lucha stated that the slogan to repeal the Morúa amendment was merely a pretext for a war against property.[28]

The Independents' acts not only disturbed the Cuban government, but had international implications as well.

Much of the property under attack was owned by Spanish or American citizens. The demands of these foreigners for protection put an even greater strain on the available Cuban troops. The Rural Guard could not protect the Spanish canefields of Esperanza, Santa Rosa, and Cervantes from the rebels' incursions. These fields like that of the American-owned Marcos Sánchez plantation near Guantánamo were destroyed by fire.[29] American mining companies, including Juragua and El Caney also suffered grave losses.[30]

The most dramatic instance of the Independents' destruction took place in La Maya, an Oriente town of four thousand persons. The railroad which traversed the town made La Maya a logical target of a guerrilla raid. Estenoz and his lieutenant Ivonnet captured the town on June 1. Whether purposely or accidentally, a night fire which began on the second swept through La Maya and gutted all the houses. The town's destruction incensed the Cuban public as well as arousing the wrath of the United States government because of the loss of the American-owned La Maya Fidelity Company.[32]

The immediate impact of the La Maya burning was a dramatic increase in the panic of Oriente's countryside. White inhabitants near Cruces and Quemado de Güines, Oriente had left their homes during the first days of the rebellion, but the incident at La Maya turned this trickle of rural emigrants into a flood. Panic in the countryside became more generalized,

covering a wider area. By mid-June even townspeople in Sagua and El Cobre had fled to Santiago de Cuba.[33]

In Havana President Gómez had to confront the fact that the Independents' troops had proven to be at least temporarily superior to the government's. His first response was to attempt to gather the moral forces at his disposal to turn the nation against the Independents.[34] Attempting to unite the Cuban people behind the government, Gómez denounced the "fratricidal discord" promoted by the insurgents and called upon all patriots todefend the country.[35] The President recalled the spirit of unity with which black and white Cubans together had won independence. He publicly proclaimed that the nation would defeat its enemies and preserve harmony.[36] Gómez was able to support his claim that colored Cubans would oppose Estenoz after two weeks of fighting. He cited early intelligence data which showed that only 1500 to 2000 colored men supported the rebellion while 608,000 patriotically backed the government.[37] While later information sources counted 4,000 to 5,000 insurgents, Gómez's statements were still essentially accurate.[37] The New York Times and La Lucha reported similar data which seemed to demonstrate that general opinion censured the rebellion. Of all the papers Diario de la Marina's reports most closely paralleled the President's view when they insisted that "only a tiny minority" of men of color opposed the government.[39]

Municipal officials' assessments of local sentiments and popular demonstrations among colored citizens in support of the regime seemed to verify Gómez's assertions. The mayor of Santa Clara testified that his town's colored population had been "the first to lament the errors of the rebellion Matanzas' alcalde reported that non-whites had declared their loyalty to Gómez.[40] Similar reports of colored citizens' patriotic attitudes came from Havana, Santa Isabel, Colón, Yaguajay, Pedro Betancourt, Manguito, Bejucal, Unión de Reyes, Guanajay, Santa Domingo, Palos, and other towns throughout the island.[41]

Many colored societies also wishes to dissociate themselves from the insurgents and register their "adhesion" to the government. The prestigious society "La Luz" of Santiago de Cuba headed a long list of organizations who declared their support of Gómez. Holguín's "Alba", Quemado de Güines' "Progreso," Santiago de las Vegas' "La Gloria," Artemise's "La Antorche" Santa Cruz' "Fraternidad," Havana's "Morúa Delgado", "Martí", "Maceo," and "Progresista, and Santiago de Cuba's "Maceo de Gíbara" also announced their support of the regime.[42]

Government officials even heard that some members of the Independents had broken ranks to support the government. Carlos Poitlot, a section leader, convinced his men not to join Estenoz. In Cienfuegos, party members held a meeting to protest against the insurgents.[43]

Despite the officially optimistic opinion of widespread support for the government among colored citizens, however, the government and the press were far from consistent in their assertions. Although Gómez insisted that non-whites would not follow the "worst elements of the Negro race" into rebellion, he feared that Estenoz's fiery rhetoric would inflame the colored population.[44] Gómez was deeply disturbed by intelligence reports that colored plantation and mill workers had joined Estenoz after the insurgents had disrupted local operations.[45] Furthermore, although government spokesmen repeatedly denied that Cuba was in the midst of a race war, it was undeniable that the Independents' forces were composed almost exclusively of colored men. Whether consciously or not, the thought of colored men rising up against the governing white elite brought forth images of the Haitian rebellion which had been ingrained in the white psyche for more than a century. Both President and the press unleashed racist rhetoric of varying degrees of intensity.

Gómez began the verbal assault against what he termed the Independents' "movement against civilization."[46] In his statements he implied that the rebellion was not a simple contest for power between the government and contending political party, but an attack by non-whites on the governing white elite who were the guardians of the society, the President decried the "manifestations of ferocious savagery which has occurred ...especially in Oriente Province."[47] Gómez and

his minister Sanguily claimed that Estenoz's rebellion had erupted in an "explosion of barbarism" which had put Cuban civilization in danger.[48]

Diario de la Marina and other white newspapers accepted this interpretation of events, demanding quick action "in order to save the interests of civilization" from the furor of the Independents.[49] The press with its yellow journalism actually intensified the President's racist rhetoric through field reports and editorials, however, so that press releases themselves create panic and increase fear of a racial confrontation.

Yellow journalism in both liberal and conservative papers inflamed the public's fears. La Prensa, El Dia, El Triunfo, La Lucha, El Mundo, La Discusión, and El Diario de la Marina all printed stories which explained in graphic detail the horrors committed by the insurgents.[50] According to the papers, the Independents stood accused of murder, looting, arson, and other criminal activities.

The charge of rape aroused the most emotional impact among the public. These papers at various times accused the rebels of raping white women in La Maya, Guantánamo, and other areas.[51] Demanding harsh action against the offenders, El Mundo protested that women and the family was the ultimate repository of civilization, a sanctuary which had been violated by the "rebel hoards."[52] These charges in themselves

created "a state of apprehension closely bordering upon panic" according to the American consul to Havana.[53]

The public's fears were also increased by rumors circulated in the white press that Haitians and Jamaicans had assisted the Cuban rebels with contributions of men and arms. La Lucha reported that Jamaicans were among the fighting forces of the insurgents. The daily claimed the Jamaicans' participation represented a significant danger considering that perhaps 10,000 Jamaicans who had entered the country illegally.[54] Rumors that Haitians and Dominicans were to join the movement were sufficient to have government officials order a gunboat patrol off the Oriente coast to search for landing expeditions.[55] The Rural Guard and the Secret Police also responded by arresting foreign blacks as suspects including the Dominican General Victoriano López.[56]

The newspapers' white readers did not fear the foreign blacks' influence or the atrocities per se, but took these events and rumors of events as a sign that a race war had begun in Cuba. Congressmen such as Gonzales Lanuza, a conservative, denied the existence of a race war; President Gómez himself demanded the retraction of false or sensational news stories because of undesireable repercussions at home and abroad. Nevertheless, most dailies reported the news as if Cuba was in the midst of a race war.[57] Diario de la Marina and El Triunfo emphatically stated that the rebellion was racist.[58] La Luchas cited the party's propoganda, crimes,

and their desire to excite the passions of colored men as proof that the Independents had challenged white Cubans to a racial battle.[59] When government officials, including the Governor of Oriente, said that the Independents had risen "against men of the white race," both the party and the government found it difficult to rebut.[60]

Incensed by reports of real or imagined atrocities and emboldened by patriotic sentiments, the public responded wholeheartedly when Gómez asked for military assistance in defeating the Independents. Despite the 1906 confrontation which had resulted in an increase in troop strength as a result of the 1906 Liberal revolt, the government's regular forces remained inadequate to patrol the entire eastern region. The permanent army and rural guard together contained 12,000 men on paper but had only 3,000 regular troops. By May 30 Gómez had assembled 4,000 men in Oriente to fight 4,000 to 5,000 insurgents.[62]

When Gómez appealed to the public shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion, civilians and veterans organization came forward as volunteers.[63] Within two days the National Council of Veterans convened under President Emilio Nuñez and decided to oppose the Independents rather than remain neutral as they had done in 1906.[64] Led by Nuñez, who volunteered 1300 men to fight, local veterans organizations throughout the island offered their assistance to the government.[65] Some volunteers participated for political motives. Nuñez's first recruits, for example, were congression-

al candidates who hoped for favorable publicity. General Menocal, on the other hand, intended to embarrass the President with his offer of 3,000 men by implying that the government was weak. Most veterans, however, and particularly those who went to the war zone, were sincere in their patriotic efforts to defeat the insurgents.[66]

Equally important, citizens of towns in the beseiged area and men in mining developments and on plantations began to request arms from the government to protect their property.[67] With guns supplied by the American government and distributed by the Gómez regime, townspeople in the war zone organized defense leagues. Men in Cruces, Quemados de Güines, Santa Domingo, Palos, Cienfuegos, Bejucal, Santiago de Cuba, and even Havana established local militias to keep the peace and to respond in the event of a raid by insurgents.[68]

While both blacks and whites volunteered to fight the Independents, the government was reticent to allow colored men to carry arms against the rebels. Colored societies and veterans organizations offered their services either to local authorities for defensive purposes or to the national government as an active military force, but officials usually discouraged their participation by failing to provide them with guns and ammunition.[69] The mayor and council of Santiago de Cuba, for example, refused to arm colored men in their militia.[70]

The government also had more confidence in white regular troops. Before the outbreak of the rebellion, colored men found it difficult to obtain positions in the armed forces. If they received posts, they were generally were excluded from the ranks of officers. Although President Gómez proudly declared that whites and blacks marched "shoulder to shoulder like brothers" against the Independents, the immense majority of the government's troops were white.[71] Regardless of government rhetoric, the regime's discriminatory policies remained in effect throughout the uprising and continued to be enforced afterwards. The government's exclusionist policies were so blatant that leading members of the Senate denounced the injustice of rules proscribing the entrance of colored men into the army a full year after the revolt.[72]

While the public rallied to the support of Gómez, the Congress adopted a strangely passive role in the government's campaign against the Independents. Although it was public knowledge that the insurgents hoped by their actions to convince the Congress to repeal the Morúa Amendment, President of the House Orestes Ferrera urged congressmen not to interfere in the persecution of the rebels. He asserted that it was an executive, rather than a legislative matter.[73] Gonzales Lanuza, leader of the conservative opposition, agreed that the Congress should support the President's efforts. He intoned that it was "not the time for opposition but for patriotism."[74] Even some colored legislative representives

acquiesced to this position of unconditional approval of the President's actions.[75] Although the Congress's law had precipitated the revolt, only one senator even bothered to voice his continued support for the amendment in the midst of various speeches concerning patriotism, civilization, and the threat of disharmony to the nation.[76]

Although the great majority of the legislature declared their support for the President, a small but vocal minority surfaced which opposed the "do-nothing" attitude of the Congress. TThese dissidents, led by Campos Marquetti, feared that the executive's excessive freedom of action could eclipse individual liberty and congressional sovereignty. Although some of these congressmen were members of Gómez's own Liberal party, they attacked his approach to the rebellion.[77]

The dissenters first attempted to secure the passage of a bill repealing the Morúa amendment which they believed would put an immediate end to the fighting. The conservative leader Freyre de Andrade and Campos Marquetti introduced bills on June 4.[78] News of this step provoked strong opposition among citizens in the war zone, and particularly in Santiago de Cuba, where protests were staged against the congressmen's actions.[79] One conservative society, the "Union Club," wrote to inform the senators that the town's merchants, professional men, and the general public would suffer from the amendment's derogation.[80] The white press expressed shock that the legislature would even consider a step which would favor "the incendiary savages" who terrorized

the eastern territories.[81] La Lucha specifically denounced the effort to repeal the law as an implicit recognition of the Independent's right to rebel.[82]

The dissidents' bills never reached the floor for a vote on the issue of whether to consider the amendment's appeal. Campos Marquetti did not surrender, however, to the majority. He proposed the more moderate suggestion of mediation between the rebels and the government. The senator ignored requests by President Ferrara that he end his criticisms of the President's approach to the conflict, and he presented a motion to organize a congressional commission which would serve as a mediator. He received the backing of a leading conservative Fernández de Castro.[83] In support of his motion, Campos Marquetti declared that he and his fellow dissidents

> do not favor waiting for the results of the consequences which could be very grave for the country; but on the contrary, we support the position of preventing whatever evils we might face in the present situation, avoiding as much as possible those evils it would be convenient to avoid.[84]

In Campos Marquetti's view, an extended conflict would only exacerbate divisions in the country, allowing seeds of hate and racism to germinate.[85] The motion did not have enough votes to pass.[86]

The most prolonged effort made by the congressional dissidents was their attempt to secure amnesty for insurgents who wished to abandon the fight, but who feared reprisals

and jail terms if they surrendered to the authorities. After corresponding with both Liberals and Conservatives in Santa Clara and Santiago de Cuba who were more familiar with the war zone, Campos Marquetti assured his fellow congressmen that the government's position would not be compromised by encouraging the rebels "to return to legality."[87]

In considering an amnesty law, which had additional support from the colored senator Cuesta Rendón in the Senate, Campos Marquetti asked the legislators to recall the loyalty and bravery shown by colored men who participated during the War for Independence.[88] The colored congressman noted that despite the promises made in the war non-whites still suffered injustices which the Independents wished to remedy. He reminded his fellow legislators that most of the rebels were in fact veterans.[89] Although some colored men had strayed from legality, Campos Marquetti believed that in view of their past service to their country the Congress should write a law which would "put the mistaken or the repentent on the road to salvation."[90]

The colored congressman also reminded his peers of precedents for such a law in Spanish jurisprudence, Laws had provided for the king's right to declare amnesty for rebels who abandoned their armed opposition to the government. Campos Marquetti asserted that under Cuban law the right of pardon had fallen to the Congress. He demanded that the

legislature fulfill its responsibility to find a political rather than a military solution to the uprising by the passage of an amnesty law.[91] In a plea to his fellow congressman the representative said,

> it is suitable to dictate laws of amnesty which will leave in the revolutionary camp only those who want to be there voluntarily....; but we must leave the doors open to those who wish to return (to legality), to those who feel repentent....[92]

As expected, the amnesty resolution drew adverse commentary from the congressional majority. President Ferrara led the attack, accusing the colored legislator of cowardliness. He asserted that the amnesty law was "not a law of pardon, but a law of fear."[93] Ferrara denounced the proposal because it appeared to admit to the regime's weakness where none existed. He insisted that the Independents should be "totally defeated, demoralized, and in complete disorder" before a pardon could even be considered.[94] Freyre de Andrade supported Ferrara's assertion, opposing the suggestion of an amnesty law while the fighting continued.[95] Gonzales Lanuza, a conservative, also rejected the amnesty proposal in the belief that it would limit the effectiveness of the armed forces.[96] He attacked Campos Marquetti's actions as "obstructionist" and contrary to the wishes of the executive.[97]

To support his refusal to adopt an amnesty law, Ferrara

cited public opposition particularly in the war zone. He read the report of Garcia Kohly, the Secretary of Education, who had recently returned from the war zone; Kohly specifically mentioned the "unhappy effect which the notice of the project of an amnesty law presented in Congress has caused."[98] Diario de la Marina and the local New York Times correspondent also reported confusion among the population which could not understand why amnesty was considered prior to a suitable demonstration of force by the government.[99]

Although the dissidents saw their motion for amnesty tabled in the House of Representatives on May 24, they did not relinquish their position and continued to demand action on the question.[100] A congressional committee, including Ramiro, Cuesta, Guillén, Juan Gómez, Valdés, Garrero Audivert, Lino D'ou, Risquet, and Campos, visited Gómez to discuss amnesty in the hope that he would support the proposal.[101] They apparently received the President's approval of an amnesty law as a means to secure peace and order. When debate opened once again in the House, Campos urged passage of a law "which would facilitate the Executive in his application of a pardon or amnesty to those persons or in those areas where he deemed it fit..."[102] In a later session of the House on June 17 Campos argued further that such a law would merely legalize the de facto pardon for insurgents already announced on June 6 by the chief of the government's forces, General Monteagudo.[103] Cuesta Rendón and Cortina

Garcia voiced similar beliefs. These legislators were concerned that the power of law-making remain in the hands of the Congress.[104] In spite of the apparent logic in Campos' position, however, the House refused to consider the amnesty bill by a vote of 18 to 37.[105]

It seemed strange that the House of Representatives would fail to approve a provision for amnesty in view of the legal precedents for such action, and particularly after June 6 when a declaration by Monteagudo granted de facto amnesty to any insurgent who desired to surrender. Although the congressional refusal may be attributed to devious political motives, it seems that no explanation for the legislature's vehement opposition to an amnesty law may be based solely on a consideration of either national politics or a military victory over the Independents, of the purely national political arena. Rather, the Congress's inaction reflected its primary concern for the regime's international image.

Congressman Sánchez Figueras was the first to warn his fellow legislators against the danger of appearing unconfident in the eys of the United States.[106] He and his peers did not hesitate to advance arguments that the proposed amnesty law was a sign of weakness and was an inappropriate measure as long as the fighting continued. They understood that the law might be viewed by the American authorities as an indication of the regime's inability to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The legislators felt their

nation threatened far more by the possibility of another United States intervention in the name of order than by the rebel Independents themselves. Even Campos recognized the danger of foreign intervention. He believed, however, that a law of amnesty would help bring a quick conclusion to the fighting and thus end the threat of a third American occupation.[107]

On June 7 the House of Representatives acknowledged its preoccupation with the attitude of American officials toward the conflict by organizing a private congressional delegation to Washington headed by House President Ferrara. The Cuban delegation hoped to assuage the fears of the United States government and to convince Secretary of State Knox in particular that intervention was not necessary.[108] The Congress' fear of another American incursion not only turned the body against any suggestion for an amnesty law, but inclined it to dwell upon the need for a rapid victory over the Independents. Every passing day without a resolution to the conflict meant the possibility of intervention and an ultimate threat to Cuban national sovereignty. Under these external pressures Congress was willing to sanction any executive action which would accomplish the regime's goal of a swift end to the revolt. Hence when Gómez approached the legislature with a request for the suspension of constitutional guarantees, the Congress reacted favorably. As Diario de la Marina noted, the Congress had no wish to imitate the "barbarism" of the Independents. It seemed

expedient, however, to comply with the President's wishes in order to pursue the rebels and to avoid intervention.[109] On the same day of June 4, 1912 that the Congress was considering the amnesty proposal for the first time, Gómez presented his plan to suspend the Constitution. The President explained,

> until the present uprising has been fought without the need of any extraordinary measures, but it seems that these measures are now necessary in order to end the disturbance of order in a rapid manner and to avoid external complications which could produce grave consequences for the existence of the Republic.[110]

Specifically, the President proposed the suspension of articles 15,16,17,19,22,23,24, and 27 of the Constitution and the substitution of the Spanish Law of Public Order which had been promulgated on April 23, 1670.[111] During the debate congressmen placed limits on the extent and duration of the suspension, confining its application to Oriente Province alone for a period of 45 days. Furthermore, they refused to suspend as many civil rights as was permitted under the 1870 statute.[112]

Partisans of the proposal cited statements by General Monteagudo that the suspension of rights would enable the authorities to prevent the rebels' spies and agents in the towns from cooperating with those actually in arms.[113] Senator Gonzalo Pérez reinterated the government's need to appear strong and capable before foreign observers. He

assured his fellow congresmen that the constitutional suspension would greatly increase the impression of the regime's desire to end the revolt speedily.[114] Within two days of Gómez's request, both houses of Congress passed the law which temporarily suspended the Constitutional guarantees of Oriente's citizens.[115]

Gómez and the Congress acted under the assumption that the Independents actively sought to provoke intervention. Estenoz's own words seemed to confirm their fears. He had publicized several times his belief that the United States would restore the Independents' status as a legal party in the event of intervention.[116] Estenoz stressed that the party had enjoyed a special relationship with the American authorities during the second intervention who had extended legal recognition to the colored organization. Furthermore, Estenoz recalled that the American government had been willing to accede authority to the Liberal Party after its 1906 rebellion against the constituted government. The strength of this precedent was enhanced by the fact that not only the Independents but Gómez as well asserted that the uprising was of a political rather than a racial nature. The Independents made this claim as a counter to charges that they were a "racist" organization. Gómez also labelled the uprising as a "political" conflict, however, because he desired to assuage fears at home and abroad that the rebellion was not a "race war." If, however, the struggle was merely

a political dispute, it meant that the Americans were free to treat the colored party as they had the Liberals of the "August Revolution" with rewards and recognition.

Thus the Independents believed that the party could not lose and might possibly benefit by intervention, while the Gómez regime would certainly suffer. They did not seem to have to exert much effort to convince the Gómez administration of this interpretation. Hence party strategists used the possible threat of intervention as a means of political leverage in their effort to secure the quick repeal of the Morúa amendment and to gain recognition as a legal entity. While Estenoz in particular effectively pressured Cuban officials with the spectre of international complications, he stated in public with apparent sincerity that he and his party did not seek to provoke intervention. As the injured party in the conflict, he placed the entire responsibility for such a catastrophy on the government whose intransigence and manipulations had precipitated the revolt.[117]

The American government's actions may, in fact, have had a greater influence over the Congress' decision to approve the suspension of constitutional guarantees than the Independents' strategy or pronouncements. American officials in Cuban were keenly aware of the role given to the United States to play by both the Independents and the Cuban government. As early as May 24, four days after the

revolt began, they had informed their Washington superiors that "the movement was initiated for the express purpose of provoking an American intervention for the benefit of various interests which believed they would profit by a change in government."[118] Despite the Cuban administrators' viewpoint, American officials did not see at first any confirmation of their fears. It was not until after the capture on May 29 of an apparently authentic correspondence from Estenoz to his lieutenants that the Independents' plan became clear. The message read:

> If by June 1 the Morúa law is not repealed you will at once start to destroy all railroad bridges, telegraph and telephone lines, and other property of American ownership; and if this does not accomplish our purpose with the present government, within 15 days thereafter you will start killing men not of our own color irrespctive of nationality.[119]

The American minister to Havana A. M. Beaupré believed that the intercepted note provided "the most significant indication we (the American government) have had as to intentions of leaders and reasons for the lack of violence to date."[120] When the destruction of foreign property greatly increased beginning June 1, American authorities became convinced of the authenticity of the recovered document and the strategy it represented.[121]

Despite the United States government's knowledge of the Independents' plans and their intentions to use the

threat of intervention to pressure the Gómez regime, the American authorities had to concern themselves not with motives but with the physical danger to their nationals' property and lives.[122] United States private holdings in the war zone amounted to a considerable investment, including $25.3 million in sugar mills and plantations in Oriente alone. American businesses had also invested heavily in the mining and railroad industries.[123] Washington knew that American companies in the war zone had petitioned the Cuban government for troops to protect their properties. The La Maya land Co., the Guantánamo and Western railroad, the Santa Cecilia and Santa Lucia sugar companies, Atlantic Fruit Steamship Co., and the Juragua Mining Co. were just a few of the enterprises which made such requests.[124] Although the regime did provide some military protection for these companies. Cuban troops had been unable to put a halt to the insurgents' guerrilla raids on foreign properties. While the government's soldiers turned away rebels at Santa Cecilia and Guantánamo, the Juragua mining company and other American properties experienced considerable damage.[125]

Although officials in Washington perceived a real threat to American-owned property, Gómez tried to minimize the danger and conceal the extent of damage which had occurred. From the first days of the revolt Gómez expressed confidence that his government military forces would quickly crush the

colored movement with the forces at his command and with the overwhelming support of the Cuban people.[126] He repeatedly made statements that he expected "to have under control within a short time the revolt in Oriente and Las Villas provinces." Gómez declared, for example, on May 28 that the rebellion had been confined to Oriente without the use of extraordinary pressures and that the disturbances would be ended shortly.[127]

It was not long, however, before that American officials began to suspect that Gómez was seriously misrepresenting the true nature of the revolt in an effort to minimize the extent of property damage and conceal the regime's failure to defeat the rebels. New York Times reporters in the war zone sensed the discrepancies between the Cuban government's claim that only 150, not 2,000 men had rebelled with Gómez's call for volunteers. The reporters passed that information to Washington.[128] American State Department compared this assessment with its own sources that suggested that Gómez had also exaggerated the numbers of troops which the government had available to fight.[129] By June 4 reports from Santiago de Cuba, assessed the situation as extremely serious.[130] He assured his superiors in Washington that

> it may be said with certainty that the Cuban Government is systematically endeavoring to create an unduly optimistic view of the present situation. Whites throughout the country continue to grow more apprehensive. ...The contradiction

> between the Government's actions and its denials of apprehension have created a decided feeling of apprehension in the city (Havana)...[131]

Beaupré had also heard even more disturbing news. Rumors circulated in Havana that Gómez had been implicated as a party to the planning of the revolt, encouraging the uprising in "a dangerous political game."[132] Some newspapers noted that the President had first allowed the revolt to begin and then delayed a full prosecution of the rebels. They speculated that the war was a means to regain control over his Liberal party and particularly over colored party members, while the nation was preoccupied with the spectre of intervention.[133] Theseinnuendos were backed by substantive behavior. Washington received reports that able men requesting action in Oriente were steadily ignored, giving the impression that Gómez had not taken all possible steps to stifle the rebellion.[134]

Pressured by business interests in Oriente and suspecting possible collusion on the part of Gómez, the American government took several measures which greatly increased Cuban fears of an impending intervention. Two days after the revolt began the State Department ordered three ships to Cuba, the Prairie, and Paducah, and the Nashville. The Department sent the vessls and 600 marines to Guantanamo and Santiago de Cuba in the war zone where important American concerns had protested to Washington that the Independents threatened

their employees and were seizing their property.[135] By May 27 nine warships from the Atlantic fleet had been mobilized, including six vessels still harbored at Key West with a reserve force of 2,000 marines.[136]

The American military mobilization caused great consternation in Cuba. The American State Department felt obliged therefore to explain the action. Secretary of State Knox, through his minister in Havana, steadfastly assured the Cuban government that the American fleet and marines would be used only "in the event of the Cuban government's inability or failure to protect the lives or property of American citizens in Cuba.[137] He and Minister Beaupré stated categorically, however, that these defensive maneuvers "should not be considered intervention."[138]

The marines and warships were held in abeyance until June 1 when the rebels began to attack foreign properties with greater vigor. American troops landed at Daiquiri, Oriente on June 1 to protect their nationals' holdings from the Independents' incendiary campaign. The remainder of the marines disembarked on June 5 at Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba.[139] Their officers dispatched the troops to guard leading American mining concerns, foreign-owned plantations, and other foreign investments after Cuban authorities announced that they could not spare additional soldiers for this duty.[140] Four hundred fifteen men were sent, for example, to plantations surrounding Guantánamo on June 5. Marines

were also ordered to San Luis to protect a junction of the Cuban railroad and the American-owned Guantánamo and Western railroad on June 8.[141]

Gómez had no real choice but to accpet the Americans' actions. He even voiced his approval of the "preventive navy" dispatched by United States President William Howard Taft which would guard American property. He chose to interpret this move as a limited use of United States troops that would serve as "a means to avoid . . . the direct participation of American forces."[142] If Gómez could not control American involvement, he sought, at least, to use it to the best possible political advantage for his regime. Through his Secretary of State Manuel Sanguily, Gómez asked Washington to make it clear that the United States supported the Cuban regime.[143] Complying, American officials asserted that their government wished only to aid Cuban authorities in defeating the rebel Independents.[144] They stated that their government would continue to assist by protecting American properties, thus freeing the Cuban forces from police duty so that they could devote their full energies to the military campaign.[145] The officials also announced that marines dispatched in the war zone would not interfere in any way with internal Cuban affairs such as in the capture or surrender of prisoners.[146]

As a further declaration of support for Gómez's administration, President Taft reinforced Secretary Knox's assertion

that the American military maneuvers were purely defensive. In response to a letter from President Gómez, Taft insisted that the ships and troops were sent as a precautionary measure. It would enable the American government to act promptly in the event that United States property or lives were threatened. Taft stressed: "these ordinary measures of precaution were entirely disassociated from any question of intervention."[147]

Gómez had to take some form of patriotic stand, however, even against the "limited" American intrusion. Before the House of Representatives he argued that the Cubans public outpouring of both moral and military support for the regime made foreign troops unnecessary.[148] On this same point he also tried to appeal to American public opinion. In an article in the New York Times Gómez thanked the United States for its offer of assistance, but he argued "it is not right that it (help) be imposed unnecessarily when the good disposition of the Cubans is evident and they are strong enough by themselves."[149]

In his most dramatic move Gómez warned the American President Taft intervention. Such an act would place Cuba in "a humiliating, inferior position because of the disregard for her national rights."[150] Gómez wrote to Taft that he appreciated American precautions in protecting the lives and property of United States citizens. He implied, however,

that this assistance was predicated on the assumption that the United States gave its moral support to the Cuban government. He also suggested that the American government had accepted the condition that it would not land its forces in Cuba "unless both Governments agree upon such an extreme necessity."[151]

Taft would not, of course, allow such impertinence. The American President plainly said that Gómez had misinterpreted his statements. He reinterated his explanation that the United States distinguished between the acts of preparedness which had been carried out and "intervention." Taft bluntly asserted, however, that the American government "would not undertake to consult first with the Cuban government if a crisis arises requiring a temporary landing somewhere to protect life and property."[152] Taft did not hesitate to impress the Americans' obviously superior negotiating position upon Gómez either. Through Secretary Knox, Taft ordered Minister Beaupré to "impress vigorously" on the President of Cuba that a continued failure on the part of his government to protect life and property adequately will inevitably compel this (United States) government to intervene in Cuba under and in response to its treaty rights and obligations."[153]

These thinly veiled threats did little to assuage the fears of intervention among the Cuban government and people. As an almost predictably response, Cuban officials willingly distorted the truth in their talks with American

diplomats because they believed absolutely that intervention was imminent.[154] Gómez himself was prepared to exaggerate the regime's successes and to omit its failures in prosecuting the Independents. The President continued to announce that the uprising was "fast approaching collapse" even though his own officers contradicted him. On the same day Gómez made this statement, June 27, the leader of the Western Volunteers Colonel Piedra reported that 2,000 rebel guerrillas were still in arms. Other observers placed the figure as high as 4,000.[155]

The American government's actions and the exchange of views between Presidents Gómez and Taft during the period from May 24 to June 5 had another effect, however, on the government. It was the final and perhaps most influential factor in convincing the Congress that drastic steps had to be taken to end the Independents' uprising and thus eliminate the possibility of intervention. These events multiplied the government's concern about the Independents' strategy to pressure the regime with the threat of intervention. The correspondence and the American's act of sending troops and ships led Gómez to request and the Congress to approve the suspension of the Constitution in Oriente. With the Constitutional suspension conceding the executive extraordinary powers, Gómez ordered General Monteagudo to bring a swift end to the uprising and to "punish severely those responsible for criminal deeds."[156] Justifying harsh measures

by the assertion that "the political fate of Cuba as an independent republic is at stake," Gómez publicly admitted that "the orders are out to show the Negroes no mercy... and the revolution must be put down at any cost."[157]

With these guidelines Monteagudo's campaign against the Independents had disastrous effect on the personal freedom of not only the insurgents but all colored citizens in the war zone. The general's strategy was relatively simple. Under a policy of "reconcentration" (reconcentrado), Monteagudo denuded the countryside of the means of subsistence for the rebels. His greatest efforts, however, concerned the need to eliminate the insurgents' sources of military intelligence such as information on government troops movements, which filtered from the towns. He declared publicly that he would prevent the cooperation of colored conspirators in the towns with those actually in arms by dealing summarily with all persons suspected of giving aid in any form to the rebels. In short, Monteagudo explained that he would "take the severest measures in order to strike terror into the colored race."[158]

These draconian measures provoked protests from the Independents' spokesmen who insisted that innocent colored citizens suffered harsh treatment at the hands of Monteagudo's troops. Estenoz appealed to the United States government through the Santiago de Cuba consul J. Holliday, "protesting in the name of humanity against the conduct of government troops." Estenoz charged that the regime's forces had burned

the houses of 120 colored families and had killed a father and two young children in Ramón de las Yaguas who were totally unconnected with the uprising.[159] Another Independent, General Julio Antomarchi, also asserted that government troops in Las Villas were "mercilessly killing Negroes in no way identified with the insurrection and destroying their property.[160]

Although American officials refused to send a representative to inquire into these charges as Estenoz requested, a conservative newspaper Diario de la Marina later confirmed that colored persons had been victimized during the prosecution of the war.[161] Another independent source reported that hundreds of peaceful citizens who had nothing to do with the Independents had been subjected to threats on their lives because of their color. In just one incident two upstanding colored members of the Conservative Party had been killed by soldiers in Rodas.[162] It is impossible, however, to assess the number of civilian casualties among non-whites.

While colored non-combatants in the war zone found themselves the victims of Monteagudo's efforts to bring a rapid end to the conflict, the Independents in arms suffered at the hands of government troops. The insurgents who operated in poorly armed small units directed most of their violence against property. The regime's forces did their best, however, to inflict injury on the rebels' persons.[163] Reports from the field of battle confirmed that the Independents suffered far

more injuries and deaths in the uprising than the army or Rural Guard. The one-sidedness of the armed clashes was most blatant in a few cases, such as at the battle of Mícara which Monteagudo described as a "bloodbath."[164] Incidents were also reported of prisoner mistreatment, as at El Puente de Plantanillo and El Cristo where government troops alledgedly killed hundreds of captured Independents by machete.[165]

Because of poor communications and incomplete reporting, it is difficult to estimate the total number of casualties inflicted by the Cuban forces. Reasonably impartial secondary sources placed the casualty figure at a very rough 3,000 deaths for the colored insurgents.[166] Using newspapers, however, the number of reported deaths can be roughly estimated at 211, 196 of which occured in Oriente. Approximately 225 injuries not resulting in death were reported during the uprising as well. Thus the casualty rate based on a figure of approximately 4,000 to 6,000 insurgent Independents may be estimated as 7.3 percent to 10.9 percent of the combattants.[167]

The cruelty of the government troops in prosecuting the war was illustrated by one well-publicized incident involving a volunteer outfit which turned against four of its colored members.[168] Although the initial investigation showed that the four had been "assasinated accidentally" at Boquerón, further questioning revealed that at least three whites in the troop of Western Volunteers had conspired to commit their murders.[169] At the trial a defendant, Sargeant Duarted,

testified that the colored volunteers had been suspected of conspiring with the enemy, and they had been macheted despite their prayers and shouts protesting their innocence.[170] The bodies, which were submerged in water to hide the dead, were so badly damaged that a team from the Science Academy was required to affirm that the victims did "belong to the inferior race", and were probably "light mestizos" as the prosecution maintained.[171]

Although the civil liberties of colored citizens were not as restricted in the rest of the island as in Oriente, the colored population nevertheless lived under suspicion with some real limitations on their freedom. In Havana the municipal council passed an ordinance which ordered all Negroes to stay indoors after 7:00 P.M. In order to fulfill their grave "moral responsibility" to prevent injury to non-whites, the council also demanded that colored persons not congregate in public places.[172] Santiago de Cuba's officials also passed a law which prohibited the gatherings of more than three colored men.[173] Similar ordinances were passed even in cities where the Independent Party never existed.[174]

These actions by town councils only succeeded in aggravating an already tense situation. Townspeople, warned by Monteagudo of colored collaborators particularly in towns in the war zone, reacted with fear against a "fifth column." Clashes between whites and blacks increased. In their most extreme form, colored men were threatened with lynching.

At Regla, for example, a crowd of whites lynched a Negro who had had a dispute with a white man. Whites in Guanabacoa attempted to lynch a colored man accused of favoring the rebels.[175]

The government's law enforcement officials did not try to curb these excesses by white citizens. In fact, they actually contributed to the atmosphere of distrust by engaging in a series of arrests of suspected conspirators in towns far removed from the war zone. Totally abandoning their concern for due process, the police, Rural Guard, and Secret Police detained colored men in Sagua, Rodrigo, Quiebra Hacha, Lajas, Matanzas, Aguila, Guanajay, El Cobre, Pínar del Río, Consolación del Norte and Santiago de Cuba.[176] In Jesús del Monte, for example, colored individuals at a publicized meeting were accused of planning a racist conspiracy. Non-whites in Regla were also subject to arbitrary arrest.[177]

Rumors of a "fifth column" flourished in towns throughout the country, but the most dramatic case of a conspiracy scare occurred in the capital itself. Although there had been sporadic arrests in Havana before the authorities had any evidence of a secret conspiracy, the news that colored men had been stockpiling arms contributed to the insecurity which led to the formation of the Havana Local Guard.[178] The volunteers for the local guard contributed to the general apprehension by arresting and searching all colored persons

on the roads within a thirty mile radius of the city.[179]

It took only a small clash between three whites and a colored man to spark a panic on June 7.[180] That night thousands of white university students roamed the streets in gangs shouting "down with the Negroes!" and "lynch the Niggers!"[181] In one case, the students killed two unarmed colored men.[182] Perhaps unwittingly, the Havana police contributed to the fear and confusion by engaging in wholesale arrests of suspected colored conspirators.[183] They charged that colored persons meeting that night in the park actually were attempting to collect funds for the Independents' campaign.[184]

The reports of violence so disturbed the American minister Beaupré that he recommended that a warship be sent to the Havana harbor to serve as a quieting influence. Secretary Knox complied. Two vessels arrived on June 10 as a response to Beaupré's estimation that the outburst resembled a "race war."[185] President Gómez, fearful that this act signaled intervention and pressured by the colored Congressmen Campos Marquetti and Juan Gualberto Gómez to protect the colored population from violence by whites, issued a proclamation urging moderation. He also threatened all disturbers of the peace with jail sentences.[186] Fortunately for the government, the disturbances abated within a week with the authorities restoring order.[187]

While the suspension of guaranteed civil rights allowed the government to engage in excessive, and at times cruel

behavior toward the colored population, it did permit the authorities to prosecute the war with greater vigor. The government knew, however, that even with extraordinary powers it would be unable to bring a rapid end to the uprising unless Monteagudo found some way to undermine the loyalty of Estenoz's troops to their leader and cause.

Monteagudo developed a plan based on Spanish precedents. Disregarding the fact that the Congress refused to approve an amnesty law, he issued a public statement on June 6, one day after the constitutional suspension was approved, directed at Independents in the field which declared:

> Insurgents in arms who will appear and submit to the lawful authority before 12 P.M. on June 22 will be exempted from punishment and immediately liberated, except the originators or leaders of the rebellion and those guilty of a second offense. The originators and leaders will be exempted from the penalty to which they are liable if they surrender within the same time limit, and they will suffer the penalty immediately below, from the lowest to the medium degree. Those guilty of a second offense will be held under the surveillance of the authorities.[188]

The announcement provoked considerable public opposition, particularly in the war zone. Two leaders in Santiago de Cuba, for example, petitioned the government to repeal Monteagudo's promise of a pardon.[189] Several influential papers, including El Mundo, also expressed opposition to the amnesty.[190]

Despite this dissent the public offer of a pardon remained in effect because it appeared to prove successful in breaking the Independents' ranks. Prior to Monteagudo's announcement of June 6, La Lucha and Diario de la Marina reported only 15 Independents had surrendered. Only three days after the declaration on June 8, 400 rebels surrendered en bloc at El Cobre in response to Monteagudo's pardon.[191] The El Cobre surrenders were followed by reports that Independents had turned themselves in at Cabañas, Aguacate, Mayala, La Maya, Rodas, Güines, Cienfuegos, and Guara, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantánamo.[192] By June 24 over 600 Independents voluntarily left the field of battle.[193] The amnesty provision proved so effective that Monteagudo extended the grace period, allowing 205 more Independents to surrender at Guantánamo, Palma Soriano, Ramón de las Yaguas, San Luis. El Cobre, Alto Songo, and Santiago de Cuba.[194] One rebel leader who surrendered reported that over 300 insurgents still in the mountains wished to surrender as well.[195]

The de facto amnesty granted by Monteagudo undermined the Independents' chances for even a moderately secure bargaining position vis-a-vis the government. Hampered by the arrest of their town contacts and by the depletion of their ranks through surrenders, the Independents became more vulnerable to the regular government forces. After mid-June, the Rural Guard and army captured several important leaders

including Gregorio Surín, the party secretary, Lacoste, Antomarchi, the Pacheco brothers and the second-in-command Ivonnet.[196] The loss of these men and their followers only served to magnify the rebels' difficulties. By July 1 they had lost their key propogandists, some nine journalists, through arrest in a series of raids.[197] The authorities had also captured many insurgents in combat including 300 who languished in jail in Guantánamo, 197 in Cobre, and 823 in Santiago de Cuba.

The final blow to the movement came, however, with the death of Estenoz and Ivonnet. Ivonnet, who had been captured on July 17 outside of Ramón de las Yaguas, was killed "accidentally" by a startled guard, according to official reports.[199] Estenoz had met his death at Mícara in a bloody battle some weeks before, on June 28.[200] In true Iberian style the government publicly displayed their cadavers in the public square of Santiago de Cuba, symbolic of the Independents' defeat.[201]

When he received news of Estenoz's death, Secretary Ramírez stated confidently that the government was assured its victory. He predicted that the Independents would give up the fight since "the soul of the movement was dead."[202] Although the Secretary was unduly optimistic in his timetable, his prediction was essentially correct. By July 1 the rebels had only approximately 250 men left to

continue the fight.[203] The government clearly had established its superiority even in the Oriente region.[204] Before the end of July, the fighting had ceased, except for sporadic incidents; even Washington's officials had seen fit to withdraw the special American forces dispatched to Cuba.[205] The insurgent Independents, who had sought to secure their access to the political process by pressuring Congress to repeal the Morúa Amendment, had failed.[206]

XI. Conclusions

With the death of their principle leaders, the trials faced by members of the Independent Party seemed almost irrelevant. The trials, which began in August and continued through May of 1913, charged the Independents principally with inciting rebellion.[1] Despite the severity of the accusation, the rebels who were convicted received surprisingly light sentences, ranging from two months for publishing published inflamatory remarks to three and one-half years for minor chiefs in the revolt.[2]

The judicial processes moved slowly, however, for as late as May, 1913 hundreds of insurgents still languished in jail.[3] Public sentiment and the law both opposed these delays in justice. Congress responded by passing an amnesty law which conceded provisional freedom to persons charged with various crimes including the "crime of rebellion produced by political struggles."[4] By May 27, 1913 Secretary Cristóbal de la Guardia ordered the courts to release the accused in lieu of a bail fine in an attempt to put the entire episode beyond the nation.[5] Within a month most of the prisoners were released although a few noted leaders including Gregorio Surín and Julio Antomarchi were not released until October.[6]

With the destruction of the Independents' organization, presses, and leadership, the governing white elite could be

assured that its power would remain intact. The Independents' defeat marked the last sustained attempt by colored of the 1895 generation to secure the rewards they had expected to receive following the War for Independence.

The revolutionary white leadership during the war had perhaps inadvertently encouraged colored Cubans' expectations while they were attempting to create a multi-racial coalition against the Spanish. In a sense, the nationalist leaders had been trapped by their own military necessities into creating the myths of racial brotherhood and egalitarianism. Their success in spreading these myths and in gaining the support of colored men in the war effort helped to awaken politically an entire sector of the Cuban polity which heretofore had never placed significant demands upon the political system.

When the revolutionary leaders took over the republic's government, both white and colored Cubans began to demand bureaucratic jobs as a means of reward for military service. Competition became intense so that the nationalist white elite began to seek to monopolize government jobs. In order to exclude colored men from the benefits of patronage, the elite began to use racial arguments to justify its failure to live up to its wartime promises. This political retrenchment, which resulted in policies of racial exclusionism, aroused opposition from the somewhat politicized colored

veterans. A series of colored organizations including colored veterans societies and other informal associations attempted to resist the government's policies and to force the white ruling elite to concede the rights promised them in the war. After the Liberal revolt failed to remedy the inequities in the system, colored leaders began to organize political parties, as they did in Camaguey and Santa Clara, to secure equality particularly in government patronage.

The Independent Party of Color, stimulated as well by the 1906 revolt, was another of these colored parties. The Independents enjoyed, however, a more nationally-based following in their outspoken attacks on the government through their propoganda and their election campaign. The party's successes, though minor, were perceived by the Liberal government's leaders as a threat in the form of political competition. Equally important, the demands made by the party's colored membership tended to be interpreted as a potential threat to white dominance in the Cuban polity.

In response to real or perceived dangers, the Gómez government manipulated the political "rules of the game" to eliminate the colored party on grounds of its "racist" nature by means of the Morúa amendment. This hostile action precipitated the more violent phase of the political struggle between the Independents and the white governing elite in 1910 and, more seriously, in 1912. In the end the Independents'

attempts to force recognition of their party's legitimacy from the Congress through an armed protest failed as a political strategy. The confusion and ill-preparedness of their military campaign only contributed toward their demise as an organization. If blame may be laid for their defeat, it must lie with the Independents' leaders themselves. Estenoz in particular failed to put forward a program which would capture the imagination of the colored population, confining his attention to the much more narrow issue of the Morúa amendment's repeal.[7]

The revolt of 1912 itself revealed some crucial functional aspects of the Cuban political scene and the politics of race. The white governing elite, fearing that racial divisions might be interpreted as a fatal weakness by the United States, proclaimed the unity of black and white Cubans against the uprising. The Independents also stressed the political nature of their revolt by insisting that they had not begun a race war. Yet the regime's ambivalent actions, in regard to the participation of colored pro-government troops and the overwhelmingly colored composition of the insurgents seemed to believe these assertions. The interplay between government forces and rebels, as well as between whites and non-whites in the general populace, took place in an atmosphere of fear and prejudice fed by press reports of the Independents' atrocities. The fear of a race

war, so long in the memory of Cubans since the horrors of the Haitian rebellion, could not escape them. The revolt also represented a three-cornered political game. As the instigators, the Independents attempted to play off against each other the Cuban regime, and its fears of the American government, and the United States President Taft who was apparently obligated to intervene if the rebellion could not be subdued quickly. The Independents' resort to arms, in light of the diplomatic implications of violence in Cuba, must be considered as a serious political strategy, a strategy which came to be used with great frequency in the republic. The use of military force in politics either by the government or to oppose the government became an integral part of the Cuban political scene.

The importance of the American authorities in the 1912 revolt points to the overwhelming influence of the United States as an external factor in Cuban political affairs. Washington's role may at this period in the island's history be seen almost as that of a political actor, and one with the greatest political and military clout. Unfortunately, a thorough study of the subtle impact of American ideas of social race and of American economic and military power on the politics of race in Cuba must be reserved for a later date.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the appearance of the Independent Party of Color was not an aberration, but the result of a series of interactions between the governing white elite and the colored urban population. With the defeat of the Independents, the ruling white elite successfully retained a monopoly on political power. It was not until the 1930's with the revolution of Grau San Martín that the rights of colored men as Cuban citizens and the government's broken promises to them again became a national issue.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The best literature on slavery and abolition includes Franklin W. Knight's Slave Society in Cuba during the 19th Century (Madison, 1970), Arthur F. Corwin's Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886 (Austin, Texas, 1967), and Herbert S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba (Chicago, 1967), and of course, José A. Saco's Historia de la Esclavitud de la Raza Africana en el Nuevo Mundo, 4 vols. (Habana, 1938).

[2]The most prolific writer on Afro-Cuban affairs for the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is Fernando Ortíz Fernández whose interest in the colored Cuban was motivated in part by theories of ethnic criminality. He wrote Hampa Afro-Cubana: Los Negros Esclaves (Habana, 1916), Los Instrumentos de la Musica Afrocubana (Habana, 1954), Los Negros Brujos: Apuntes para un estudio etnológia criminal (Madrid, 1917). Other Cuban writers have also treated this subject including Rafael Roche y Monteagudo, an ex-policeman, who wrote La Policia y sus Misterios en Cuba (Habana, 1908, ed. unknown), Juan Luis Martinis Ecué, Changó, y Yemayá, Ensayos sobre la Subreligión de los Afro-cubanos (Habana, 1930), and Idelfonso Pereda Valdes's El Rancho y otres temas de etnografia y folklore (Montevideo, 1957).

The only author with a distinctively colored viewpoint, however, is Esteban Montejo's autobiography, edited by Miguel Barnet, The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave (New York, 1969).

[3]Cuba: Population, History, and Resources (1907) compiled by Victor H. Olmsted and Henry Gannett, (Washington, 1909), 136-7, 233-34.

[4]There had been, as early as 1899, socialist parties directed toward organizing the non-elites; but these organizations and their anarchist counterparts did not seek to include the entire class of workers, but organized certain "elite" workers, such as railroad workers, dock workers, and tobacco processing workers rather than the mass of workers. The organizing of sugar workers was left for a much later period, in the 1930's. Much work remains to be done concerning labor in Cuba.

[5]There were other parties during this period. The only major party, however, was the Moderate Party, organized by President Estrada Palma, and dissolved during the second American Intervention in 1906. Many ex-Moderates jointed the Conservative Party.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

[1]Report on the Census of Cuba 1899 (Washington, 1900), 69, 178.

[2]Franklin W. Knight, op. cit., 98, and H. Hoetink, Slavery and Race Relations in the Americas, (New York, 1973), 110.

[3]Hoetink, ibid., p. 25; and Fernando Ortíz Fernández, José Antonio Saco y Sus Ideas Cubanas, (Habana, 1929), 201.

[4]La cuestión Africana en la Isla de Cuba, considerado bajo su doble aspecto de la trata interior y exterior, (Madrid, 1863), 42; and A. Gallenga, The Pearl of the Antilles, (New York, 1970), 105.

[5]Gallenga, op. cit., 129-30.

[6]Curtin, Philip D., The Image of Africa: British Ideas in Action, 1790-1850, (Madison, 1964), 244.

[7]Curtin, ibid., pp. 250, 389; and George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind, (New York, 1971), 49.

[8]La Cuestion, op. cit., 3.

[9]Gallenga, op. cit., 77; and Ignacio Gonzales Olivares, Observaciones sobre la esclavitud en la Isla de Cuba, (Madrid, 1865), 11.

[10]Gonzales, ibid., p. 51; and La Cuestion, op. cit., 44.

[11]Knight, op. cit., 162; and Roland T. Ely "The Golden Age of the Hacendado: Society and Culture in the late colonial period," Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba, ed. Robert Freeman Smith. (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966,)167.

[12]See Corwin, op. cit. for a treatment of the international aspects of the slave trade and its internal impact on the Cuban sugar planter.

[13]Alexander Von Humbolt, Ensayos Políticos sobre la isla de Cuba, (Miami, 1969), 198 and 213; and Knight, op. cit., 160.

[14]Knight, op. cit., 154.

[15]Ibid., 160.

FOOTNOTES

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., 162, 167.

[18]There is disagreement between Knight, op. cit., 164 and Fernando Ortíz Fernández, Los Negros Esclavos, op. cit., 97.

[19]See Knight's footnote, 166; and 164; and Gallenga, op. cit., 159.

[20]Knight, ibid., 167.

[21]José Martí, Cuba: Política y Revolución (Obras Completas), (Habana, 1937), vol. 8, 168-69.

[22]Gallenga, op. cit., 172-73.

[23]Hoetink, op. cit., 108.

[24]Knight, op. cit., 166-67.

[25]Esteban Montejo, ed. by Miguel Barnet, op. cit., 60, 63-67.

[26]Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution, (Boston, 1968), 44.

[27]Knight, op. cit., 177; and Montejo, op. cit., 96.

[28]Rafael Roche, op. cit., 51, 119-20.

[29]Ibid., 59, 63, 169-70, 196; and Montejo, op. cit., 127.

Chapter III

[1]Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899, op. cit., 194-95. The figures cited includes the racial categories of "black" and "colored" as non-white. The figures for this 1899 census do not totally correspond to the population figures for 1895 given war casualties. The statistics are, however, the best available:

Total Cuban population:	1,572,797
Total Male population:	815,205
Excluding foreign white males, the male creole population:	699,465
Colored Males:	237,398

FOOTNOTES

[2]Ibid., 111, 144-5. This figure is extrapolated using the percentage of persons living in rural Oriente, and the percentage of the entire Oriente population which is male and non-white.

[3]Martí, op. cit., vol. 8, 163.

[4]Ibid., vol. 8, 168.

[5]Knight, op. cit., vol. 8, 167.

[6]Martí, op. cit., vol. 6, 162-63.

[7]Martí, vol. 6, 159, 161-164, 168.

[8]Montejo, op. cit., 182; and Serafin Portuondo Linares, Los Independientes de Color, Historia del Partido Independiente de Color, (La Habana, 1950), 11.

[9]Alberto Arredondo, El Negro en Cuba, (Havana, 1930), 33. He cites de Patria, June 11, 1892.

[10]Ibid., pp. 34-5.

[11]Martí, op. cit., vol 6, 161.

[12]Ibid., vol. 8, 165-66.

[13]Ibid., vol. 8, 168.

[14]Arredondo, op. cit., 33. Quoted from De Patria, April 20, 1894.

[15]Montejo, op. cit., 170; and Hoetink, op. cit., 159-65.

[16]Montejo, op. cit., 171; and Martí, op. cit., vol. 8, 128.

[17]Montejo, op. cit., 170.

[18]Ibid., 211;

[19]Arredondo, op. cit., 36; and Commission on Cuban Affairs, Problems of the New Cuba, R. L. Buell, et. al., (New York, 1935), 31.

[20]Montejo, op. cit., 180.

[21]Commission on Cuban Affairs, op. cit., 31.

[22]Montejo, op. cit., 182, 204.

FOOTNOTES

[23]Rafael Martínez Ortíz, Cuba: Los Primeros Años de Independencia, (Paris, no date publication), 73. The provision was in the Treaty of Paris, article XIII, signed December 10, 1898.

[24]Montejo, op. cit., 210.

[25]Diario de la Marina, September 8, 1899.

[26]David A. Lockmiller, Magooniin Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention, 1906-1909, (Chapel Hill, 1939), 35; and Diario de la Marina reports attacks through 1904.

[27]Diario de la Marina, September 6, 1902.

[28]Martínez, op. cit., 17-18.

[29]Lockmiller, op. cit., 5-6.

[30]Ibid., 16-18.

[31]Diario de la Marina, September 10, 1903.

[32]Ibid., June 15, 1904 and August 26, 1904.

[33]Ibid., August 26, 1904.

[34]Ibid., November 3, 1904.

[35]Ibid., March 24, 1905.

[36]Lockmiller, op. cit., 35; and Martinez, op. cit, 79.

[37]Montejo, op. cit., 217; and Rafael Serra, Para Blancos y Negros: Ensayos Políticos, Sociales, y Económicos, (Habana, 1907). This book is a collection of essays and published articles.

[38]Serra, op. cit., 76-77.

[39]Ibid.; and Montejo, p. 217.

[40]La Lucha, April 15, 1901.

[41]Diario de la Marina, July 3, 1912; and Montejo, 208.

[42]Ibid., November 16, 1901.

[43]Ibid., July 3, 1912.

[44]Libros de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes, June 5, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[45]La Lucha, June 30, 1902.

[46]Diario de la Marina, March 30, 1900.

[47]Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, op. cit., 29.

[48]Diario de la Marina, November 25, 1899.

[49]Ibid., February 23, 1900.

[50]Ibid., February 23 and March 29, 1900; and Ruiz, op. cit., 29.

[51]Diario de la Marina, July 14, 1900.

[52]Ibid., July 20, 1900.

[53]For analysis and text see R. L. Buell, "Cuba and the Platt Amendment," Foreign Policy Association Information Service, vol, 5, no. 3, 37-62.

[54]Lockmiller, op. cit., p. 21; and Ruiz, op. cit., 48; and

[55]Diario de la Marina, December 11, 1903.

[56]New York Times, June 16, 1912.

[57]Diario de la Marina, November 15, 1910.

[58]C.A.M. Hennessy, "The Roots of CubanNNationalism," in Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba, (New York, 1966), 23.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Diario de la Marina, November 25, 1899.

Chapter IV

[1]Cosme de la Torriente y Pezaza, Cuarenta Años de Mi Vida 1898-1938, (Havana, 1939), 1; and see José Martí's writings cited in bibliography.

[2]Martínez, op. cit., 174, 341; and Diario de la Marina, March 30, 1900.

[3]Martínez, op. cit., 193.

[4]Torriente, op. cit., 33.

FOOTNOTES

[5]Serafin Portuondo Linares, op. cit., 13.

[6]Diario de la Marina, April 12, 1901.

[7]Ibid., July 4, 1901.

[8]Ibid., April 4, 5, 1907.

[9]Serra, op. cit., pp. 91-93.

[10]Ibid., 19.

[11]La Lucha, June 30, 1902.

[12]Diario de la Marina, August 1, 1900.

[13]Lockmiller, op. cit., 28.

[14]Ibid., 28.

[15]Enrique Lumen, La Revolution Cubana, 1902-1934, (Mexico City, 1934), 33.

[16]Diario de la Marina, October 9, 1901.

[17]Ibid., August 31, 1902; and Lockmiller, op. cit., 28.

[18]Diario de la Marina, October 12, 1906, December 6, 1906, June 9, 1907; and Hennessey, op. cit., 23.

[19]Serra, op. cit., 74.

[20]Portuondo, op. cit., 26-27.

[21]La Lucha, March 15, 1909.

[22]Ibid., November 9, 1901.

[23]Portuondo, op. cit., 13; Montejo, op. cit., 210.

[24]Portuondo, op. cit., 14-15.

[25]Serra, op. cit., 83.

[26]Alberto Arredondo, op. cit., 49.

[27]La Lucha, June 9, 1902.

[28]Arredondo, op. cit., 49; and Serra, op. cit., 83-84.

FOOTNOTES

[29]Lockmiller, op. cit., 134-35.

[30]Serra, op. cit., 205.

[31]Ibid., 76.

[32]Portuondo, op. cit., 15.

[33]Diario de la Marina, August, 1901; Montejo, op. cit., 216.

[34]Portuondo, op. cit., 15. He cites Ludlow's statement of June 29, 1902.

[35]La Lucha, June 9, June 21, 1902.

[36]Serra, op. cit., 83. Francisco and Manuel Pacheco became leaders in the Partido Independiente de Color. They were a lieutenant and captain of police.

[37]Ibid., 204-05.

[38]Ibid., 44.

[39]Ibid., 83.

[40]Martínez, op. cit., 79.

[41]Lockmiller, op. cit., 35.

[42]La Lucha, June 11, 1902.

[43]Diario de la Marina, June 1, 1902.

[44]Ibid., August 1, 1903.

[45]Serra, op. cit., 83.

[46]Frederickson, op. cit., 270.

[47]Ibid., 267-275.

[48]Diario de la Marina, February 21, 1900.

[49]Ibid., February 23, 1900.

[50]Ibid., July 24, 1901.

[51]Ibid., April 3, 1905; October 29, 1904.

[52]Ibid., May 2, 1906; May 23, 1906; June 3, 1906; June 4, 1906; June 22, 1906; June 30, 1906.

FOOTNOTES

[53]Ibid., August 11, 1909.

[54]Libros de Sesiones del Senado, June 26, 1910.

[55]H. Hoetink, op. cit., 111.

[56]Portuondo, op. cit., 12-13.

[57]Ibid., 12.

[58]Commission on Cuban Affairs, op. cit., 122.

[59]Diario de la Marina, May 17, 1909.

[60]Ibid., March 2, 1905; La Lucha, January 30, 1905.

[61]Roche, op. cit., pp. 196, 218; La Lucha, November 28, 1904; also six other dates in November - December, 1904.

[62]La Lucha, November 28, 1904.

[63]Ortiz, Los Negros Brujos, op. cit., pp. 27, 31; Diario de la Marina, May 25, 1906; May 26, 1906; May 27, 1906; May 30, 1906; July 9, 1906, and Frederickson, op. cit.

[64]Ortiz, Los Negros Brujos, op. cit., 360-365; La Lucha, November 26, 1906; Diario de la Marina, March 23, 1909, and March 24, 1909.

[65]Roche, op. cit., 209; and Serra, op. cit., 204.

[66]La Lucha, April 26, 1906; April 13, 1907.

[67]Frederickson, op. cit., see Chapter on Negrophobia.

[68]Diario de la Marina, August, 1901.

[69]Hoetink, op, cit., 111.

[70]Diario de la Marina, July 14, 1901. See Saco, op. cit., on "whitening" philosophy in the nineteenth century.

[71]Ibid., July 3, 1912.

[72]Ibid., April 15, 1901; and Hoetink, op. cit., 199.

[73]Ibid., June 2, 1902.

[74]La Lucha, June 23, 1902.

[75]Ibid.

FOOTNOTES

[76]Serra, op. cit., 89.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Ibid.

[79]La Lucha, June 21, 1902.

[80]Ibid., October 9, 1902.

[81]Ibid., November 1, 1902.

[82]Ibid., June 11, 1902.

[83]Ibid., June 21, 1902.

[84]Ibid., June 30, 1902.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid., June 11, 1902; June 23, 1902.

[87]Ibid., June 11, 1902.

[88]Ibid., June 30, 1902.

[89]Ibid.

[90]Ibid., July 30, 1902.

[91]Diario de la Marina, September 20 - 30, 1906; Lockmiller, op. cit., 31, 38; Hennessey, op. cit., 23.

[92]Diario de la Marina,November 9, 1911; December 13, 1911; Lockmiller, op. cit., 38; Torriente, op. cit., 44. Torriente was Secretary of the National Council of the Association of the Veterans of Independence.

[93]Montejo, op. cit., 182.

[94]Portuondo, op. cit., 26-27.

[95]Ibid., 24.

[96]Ibid., 25.

[97]Lockmiller, op. cit., 177.

[98]Serra, op. cit., 207-08.

FOOTNOTES

[99]*La Lucha*, September 8, 1907.

[100]*Ibid.*, September 8, 1907; November 5, 1907.

[101]Serra, *op. cit.*, 208-09; "Resumen" August, 1907. Cited from *El Mundo*, July 28, 1907.

[102]*Ibid.*, 212. Cited from *Diario de la Marina.*

[103]*Diario de la Marina*, September 8, 1907.

[104]*Ibid.*

[105]*Ibid.*

[106]Serra, *op. cit.*, 211-12. *Diario de la Marina* (no date).

[107]Serra, *op. cit.*, 212-13.

[108]*Ibid.*

Chapter V

[1]*Diario de la Marina*, May 7, 1904.

[2]*Ibid.*, November 18, 1908.

[3]*Ibid.*, June 8, 1912.

[4]Serra, *op. cit.*, 210.

[5]*Ibid.*

[6]*Diario de la Marina*, January 9, 1907.

[7]Portuondo, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27; Serra, *op. cit.*, 89.

[8]Portuondo, *op. cit.*, 77-78.

[9]*Ibid.*, 35.

[10]*Ibid.*, 22.

[11]*Ibid.*, 34. Cited from *La Previsión*, no date given.

[12]*Diario de la Marina*, August 6, 1907. Cited referring to a meeting of 600 at San Juan y Martínez, Pínar del Río.

FOOTNOTES

[13]Lockmiller, op. cit., 121.

[14]Diario de la Marina, February 17, 1908.

[15]Ibid., October 8, 1908.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., February 17, 1907.

[18]Ibid., August 6, 1907.

[19]Ibid., May 3, 1910.

[20]Ibid., August 6, 1907.

[21]Ibid., August 6, 1907.

[22]Ibid., September 3, 1907.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., July 5, 1907.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., August 6, 1907; Portuondo, op. cit., 27.

[27]Diario de la Marina, October 8, 1908.

[28]Portuondo, op. cit., 31. He cites Union Espanola, September 20, 1908.

[29]Portuondo, op. cit., 27. I believe he cites La Previsión, no date given.

[30]Ibid., 29-30. From La Previsión, no date given.

[31]Ibid., 20. Unknown citation; probably La Previsión, no date.

[32]Ibid. La Previsión, no date given.

[33]Diario de la Marina, November 18, 1908.

[34]Lockmiller, op. cit. The book on Magoon's tenure as governor is not specific on these events.

[35]Portuondo, op. cit., 37.

[36]Ibid., 38. Quoted from La Previsión, no date given.

FOOTNOTES

[37]Ibid., 39. Quoted from La Previsión, no date given.

[38]The split in the Liberal Party after the 1906 revolt was a three-way division; Estenoz led one faction. See Diario de la Marina.

[39]This stand was incorporated into the 19-point platform of the party, published in La Previsión. See José Rivero Muñiz, El Primer Partido Socialista Cubano, (Universidad Central de las Villas, 1942).

[40]Portuondo, op. cit., 35. Lockmiller, op. cit., 179-180. Lockmiller notes that 466,745 persons were eligible to vote from a total population of 2,048,980; of those eligible, 269,132 voted. In percentages, 22.7 percent of the population could vote; 57.6 percent of these voted, or 13.1 percent of the total population. However, the voting figures of eligible voters seem high.

[41]Ibid., 40-41. Probably cited from La Previsión, no date given.

[42]Ibid., 43. Probably cited from La Previsión, no date given.

[43]Ibid. 45.

[44]Ibid., 51.

[45]Ibid., 51.

[46]Ibid., 43.

[47]Ibid., 54. Quoted from La Previsión, no date given.

[48]Ibid., 59. Quoted from La Previsión, no date given.

[49]Ibid.; and La Lucha, April 15, 1910.

[50]Portuondo, op. cit., 56. Quoted from La Previsión, February 5, 1910.

[51]Ibid., 59.

[52]La Lucha, February 13, 1910; and Sesiones del Senado, op. cit., February 12, 1910.

[53]Portuondo, op. cit., 93-94; Sesiones del Senado, February 11, 1910.

[54]Sesiones del Senado, February 11, 1910.

FOOTNOTES

[55]Ibid.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid.; and Portuondo, op. cit., 93.

[58]Diario de la Marina, March 10, 1910.

[59]Ibid.; and Portuondo, op. cit., 74-76.

[60]La Lucha, April 12, 1910.

[61]Ibid., April 15, 1910 and April 21, 1910.

[62]Sesiones del Senado, February 14, 1910.

[63]Ibid., February 11, 1910 and Portuondo, op. cit., 90. Cited from articles published in Guanabacoa newspapers by Cisnero Betancourt, no date given.

[64]Sesiones del Senado, February 11, 1910.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes, May 2, 1910.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Sesiones del Senado, February 14, 1910.

[70]Ibid.,; and Sesiones de la Camara, May 2, 1910.

[71]Diario de la Marina, March 21, 1908; and Portuondo, op. cit., 47. The Moderate Party had been dissolved.

[72]Portuondo, op. cit., 121.

[73]Ibid., 60-61; and La Lucha, April 12, 1910.

[74]Portuondo, op. cit., 106-107. Cited from La Previsión, no date given.

[75]Ibid., 65. Cited from La Previsión, no date given.

[76]Ibid.

[77]See José Rivero Muñiz, El Primer Partido Socialista Cubano, op. cit.

[78]Portuondo, op. cit., 68. Cited from La Previsión, no date given.

FOOTNOTES

[79]Ibid., 105. Cited from La Previsión, no date given.

[80]Ibid., 106. Cited from La Previsión, no date given.

[81]Cuba: Population, History and Resources, p. 194.

[82]La Lucha, April 12, 1910.

[83]Ibid., April 7, 1910.

[84]Ibid., April 12, 1910.

[85]Ibid., April, 21, 1910.

[86]Diario de la Marina, April 21, 1910.

[87]Ibid., April 20, 1910.

[88]Ibid.

[89]Ibid., April 21, 1910.

[90]Ibid., April 20, 1910.

[91]Ibid., April 21, 1910.

[92]Ibid., April 30, 1910. Reported in a news summary of other newspapers.

[93]Ibid., April 27, 1910. Reported in a news summary of other newspapers.

[94]Ibid., April 23, 1910.

[95]Ibid., April 21, 1910.

[96]Ibid.

[97]La Lucha, April 25, 1910.

[98]Ibid., April 26, 1910.

[99]Diario de la Marina, April 21, 1910. La Lucha report in a news summary of other newspapers.

[100]Ibid., April 28, 1910; La Lucha, April 28, 1910; May 4, 1910; May 5, 1910; May 6, 1910.

[101]La Lucha, April 27, 1910.

[102]Ibid., May 1, 1910.

FOOTNOTES

[103]Ibid., May 3, 1910.

[104]Diario de la Marina, April 24, 1910.

[105]La Lucha, April 26, 1910.

[106]Diario de la Marina, April 23, 1910; April 24, 1910.

[107]La Lucha, April 26, 1910.

[108]Ibid., April 23, 1910.

[109]Ibid., April 24, 1910; and Diario de la Marina, April 24, 1910. The former source says over twenty persons were arrested; the latter mentions seven arrested in Bejucal, eleven in Guanabaco and Regla, one in Havana, and two others unspecified.

[110]La Lucha, April 23, 1910.

[111]Ibid.,; and April 26, 1910; April 28, 1910.

[112]Ibid., April 23, 1910; and New York Times, April 24, 1910.

[113]La Lucha, April 26, 1910; April 29, 1910; and New York Times, April 24, 1910.

[114]New York Times, April 24, 1910; La Lucha, April 24, 1910; April 26, 1910; and Diario de la Marina, April 24, 1910.

[115]Diario de la Marina, April 24, 1910.

[116]La Lucha, April 24, 1910; April 25, 1910.

[117]Ibid., April 23, 1910.

[118]Diario de la Marina, April 23, 1910.

[119]Sesiones de la Camara, April 22, 1910.

[120]Portuondo, op. cit., 131, 134.

[121]Ibid., 13.

[122]Ibid., 132-33. Cited from La Prevision, no date given.

[123]Diario de la Marina, April 24, 1910.

[124]Ibid.; and La Lucha, April 23, 1910.

FOOTNOTES

[125]Portuondo, op. cit., 128. Cited from an open letter dated October 8, 1910.

[126]Diario de la Marina, April 23, 1910.

[127]Ibid., April 24, 1910.

[128]Ibid.

[129]Ibid., November 15, 1910; and Portuondo, op. cit., 140.

[130]Diario de la Marina, November 15, 1910, and Portuondo, op. cit., 137-140. He cites the transcribed sessions on the case.

[131]Portuondo, op. cit., 139.

[132]Diario de la Marina, November 15, 1910.

[133]Portuondo, op. cit., 149. He cites the transcribed sessions on the case.

[134]Ibid., 163-169.

[135]One example from Diario de la Marina, April 2, 1912.

[136]Foreign Relationsoof the United States, (Washington; 1919). Correspondence from American Minister A. M. Beapré to Secretary of State Knox, February 27, 1912.

[137]La Lucha, March 26, 1912.

[138]Ibid.

[139]Portuondo, op. cit., 155-59.

[140]Ibid., 157.

[141]New York Times, April 24, 1910; Foreign Relations, op. cit., Correspondence from Minister Beaupré to Secretary Knox, January226, 1912.

[142]Foreign Relations, op. cit., Correspondence from Minister Beaupre to Secretary Knox, January 26, 1912.

[143]Ibid., Correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, March 23, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

1912 Revolt

[1]La Lucha, April 16, 1912.

[2]Portuondo, op. cit., 197.

[3]La Lucha, May 20, 1912.

[4]Portuondo, op. cit., 202.

[5]Ibid., p. 50.

[6]La Lucha, May 27, 1912.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., May 19, 1912; New York Times, June 19, 1912.

[9]La Lucha, May 28, 1912.

[10]Diario de la Marina, May 29, 1912.

[11]Ibid., June 21, 1912; La Lucha, May 25, 1912; New York Times, June 20, 1912.

[12]New York Times, May 21, 1912.

[13]La Lucha, May 20, 1912; May 21, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912; May 24, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., p. 245.

[14]La Lucha, May 24, 1912.

[15]Foreign Relations, op. cit., Correspondence from Minister Beaupré to U. S. Secretary Knox, May 29, 1912.

[16]New York Times, May 23, 1912; June 1, 1912; and Diario de la Marina, June 11, 1912.

[17]La Lucha, November 26, 1906.

[18]New York Times, May 28, 1912.

[19]Diario de la Marina, June 7, 1912.

[20]New York Times, June 3, 1912; June 8, 1912.

[21]Ibid., May 28, 1912; May 29, 1912; June 7, 1912.

[22]Ibid., June 7, 1912; and Diario de la Marina, May 21, 1912; May 22, 1912; May 25, 1912; May 25, 1912; May 26, 1912; May 30, 1912; May 31, 1912; June 5, 1912; June 6, 1912; La Lucha, May 21, 1912; May 22, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[23]La Lucha, May 26, 1912; May 27, 1912; May 28, 1912; May 29, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 28, 1912; July 6, 1912.

[24]New York Times, June 3, 1912.

[25]Ibid., May 26, 1912; May 27, 1912.

[26]Diario de la Marina, May 29, 1912.

[27]Ibid., June 10, 1912; June 11, 1912; June 13, 1912.

[28]La Lucha, May 30, 1912.

[29]New York Times, May 24, 1912; May 28, 1912.

[30]Ibid., May 25, 1912; La Lucha, May 22, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 23, 1912.

[31]Portuondo, op. cit., 244-45; Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1912; Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 3, 1912.

[32]New York Times, June 5, 1912.

[33]Ibid., May 23, 1912; June 17, 1912; La Lucha, May 21, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912; May 24, 1912; June 8, 1912; June 14, 1912.

[34]Diario de la Marina, May 30, 1912.

[35]Ibid., June 7, 1912.

[36]Ibid., May 30, 1912; La Lucha, May 21, 1912; May 22, 1912.

[37]Diario de la Marina, July 4, 1912.

[38]La Lucha, May 24, 1912.

[39]Ibid., May 22, 1912; Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1912; New York Times, May 23, 1912.

[40]La Lucha, June 12, 1912; Diario de la Marina, June 7, 1912.

[41]La Lucha, May 21, 1912; May 22, 1912; May 26, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912; May 24, 1912; May 27, 1912; June 6, 1912; June 7, 1912; June 8, 1912; June 29, 1912.

[42]Diario de la Marina, May 29, 1912; May 30, 1912; May 31, 1912; June 2, 1912; June 10, 1912; June 13, 1912.

[43]La Lucha, May 22, 1912.

[44]Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[45]New York Times, May 31, 1912.

[46]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence Beaupré to Knox, June 6, 1912.

[47]Diario de la Marina, June 7, 1912.

[48]Ibid., June 8, 1912; Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence Cuban Foreign Minister Sanguily to U. S. Secretary Knox, June 8, 1912.

[49]Diario de la Marina, June 6, 1912; June 9, 1912. The newspaper cites El Mundo on June 9.

[50]Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1912; June 6, 1912; June 7, 1912; June 8, 1912; June 11, 1912; and Portuondo, op. cit., 253.

[51]Diario de la Marina, June 6, 1912. The newspapers cites El Dia and El Triunfo.

[52]Ibid., June 7, 1912. The newspaper cites El Mundo.

[53]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 11, 1912.

[54]La Lucha, May 25, 1912; May 31, 1912.

[55]New York Times, May 24, 1912; May 26, 1912.

[56]Ibid., June 4, 1912; La Lucha, May 25, 1912; May 26, 1912; Diario de la Marina, June 8, 1912.

[57]La Lucha, May 21, 1912; May 23, 1912; June 8, 1912; June 10, 1910.

[58]Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1912; June 21, 1912.

[59]La Lucha, May 24, 1912.

[60]Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912.

[61]Ibid., June 21, 1906; and Lockmiller, op. cit., 35.

[62]New York Times, May 24, 1912; May 27, 1912; May 29, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 9, 1912.

[63]New York Times, May 28, 1912; May 31, 1912. The May 31 issue cites a letter from Ignacio Ramírez to the President Gomez.

[64]La Lucha, May 22, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., 236.

FOOTNOTES

[65]La Lucha, May 21, 1912; New York Times, May 23, 1912.

[66]New York Times, May 26, 1912; June 9, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., pp. 252-53.

[67]New York Times, June 6, 1912; June 11, 1912.

[68]Ibid., June 4, 1912; June 7, 1912; Diario de la Marina, May 26, 1912; June 5, 1912; June 6, 1912; June 8, 1912; La Lucha, May 21, 1912; May 22, 1912.

[69]Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912; May 24, 1912; May 29, 1912.

[70]New York Times, July 13, 1912.

[71]Ibid., May 23, 1912; May 30. 1912.

[72]Diario de la Marina, May 8, 1913.

[73]Sesiones de la Cámara, May 22, 1912.

[74]Ibid.; and New York Times, May 23, 1912.

[75]Sesiones de la Cámara, May 22, 1912.

[76]Sesiones del Senado, May 22, 1912; La Lucha, May 22, 1912.

[77]La Lucha, May 24, 1912; Diario de la Marina, June 8, 1912.

[78]New York Times, July 4, 1912.

[79]Diario de la Marina, June 6, 1912.

[80]La Lucha, May 28, 1912.

[81]Diario de la Marina, June 6, 1912. The newspaper cites El Dia.

[82]La Lucha, May 30, 1912.

[83]Sesiones de la Cámara, May 24, 1912.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Ibid.

[86]La Lucha, May 26, 1912.

[87]Sesiones de la Cámara, May 24, 1912.

[88]Diario de la Marina, May 29, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[89]Ibid., June 17, 1912.

[90]Sesiones de la Cámara, May 24, 1912.

[91]Ibid., June 5, 1912.

[92]Ibid., May 24, 1912.

[93]Ibid.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Ibid., June 17, 1912.

[96]Ibid., June 5, 1912.

[97]Portuondo, op. cit., 222.

[98]Diario de la Marina, June 22, 1912.

[99]Ibid., July 5, 1912; New York Times, June 17, 1912.

[100]La Lucha, May 30, 1912; Sesiones de la Cámara, May 24,

[101]La Lucha, May 30, 1912.

[102]Sesiones de la Cámara, June 3, 1912, June 5, 1912.

[103]Ibid., June 17, 1912.

[104]Ibid.

[105]Ibid.

[106]La Lucha, May 22, 1912.

[107]Sesiones de la Cámara, May 24, 1912.

[108]Ibid., June 7, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., p. 227; Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence Beaupré to Knox, June 7, 1912.

[109]Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1912.

[110]Ibid., June 4, 1912; and Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence Beaupré to Knox, June 3, 1912.

[111]Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912.

[112]Ibid.; and Sesiones del Senado, June 5, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[113]Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1912; New York Times, June 4, 1912.

[114]Sesiones del Senado, June 5, 1912.

[115]Ibid.,; Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912.

[116]New York Times, June 19, 1912; La Lucha, May 29, 1912.

[117]La Lucha, May 29, 1912.

[118]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, May 24, 1912.

[119]Ibid., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, May 29, 1912.

[120]Ibid.

[121]Ibid., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 8, 1912.

[122]Ibid., correspondence Cuban Secretary Sanguily to American Secretary Knox, June 8, 1912; New York Times, June 16, 1912.

[123]New York Times, June 16, 1912.

[124]Ibid., May 26, 1912; May 27, 1912; May 31, 1912.

[125]Ibid.

[126]La Lucha, May 21, 1912; Foreign Relations, op. cit.,

[127]New York Times, May 28, 1912.

[128]Ibid., May 22, 1912; May 28, 1912.

[129]Ibid., May 30, 1912.

[130]Correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 6, 1912.

[131]Ibid., correspondence, Beaupre to Knox, June 4, 1912.

[132]New York Times, May 28, 1912.

[133]Portuondo, op. cit., 203-04. The author cites El Dia which reportedly was sued for libel by Gómez.

[134]New York Times, June 8, 1912.

[135]Ibid., May 24, 1912; Foreign Relations, op.,cit., correspondence, Knox to Beaupré, May 23, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[136]La Lucha, May 26; New York Times, May 27, 1912.

[137]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Knox to Beaupré, May 25, 1912.

[138]Ibid., correspondence Cuban Secretary Sanguily to American minister Beaupré, May 25, 1910; Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912.

[139]Diario de la Marina, June 1, 1912; June 5, 1912.

[140]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Sanguily to Knox, June 8, 1912.

[141]New York Times, June 8, 1912; Diario de la Marina, June 5, 1912.

[142]Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912.

[143]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 5, 1912.

[144]Ibid., correspondence, Knox to Beaupré, May 23, 1912.

[145]Ibid., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 6, 1912; New York Times, June 7, 1912.

[146]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Orestes Ferrara to Knox, June 13, 1912.

[147]Ibid., correspondence, Taft to Gómez, May 27, 1912; Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912; Sesiones del Senado, May 31, 1912.

[148]Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912.

[149]New York Times, May 28, 1912.

[150]Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912.

[151]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Gómez to Taft, May 27, 1912.

[152]Ibid., correspondence, Taft to Gómez, May 29, 1912.

[153]Ibid., correspondence, Knox to Beaupré, June 5, 1912.

[154]Ibid., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 10, 1912.

[155]New York Times, June 27, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[156]La Lucha, May 21, 1912.

[157]New York Times, May 29, 1912.

[158]Ibid., June 4, 1912.

[159]Ibid., June 19, 1912.

[160]Ibid., June 16, 1912.

[161]Diario de la Marina, July 5, 1912.

[162]Portuondo, op. cit., 252.

[163]La Lucha, May 26, 1912.

[164]Portuondo, op. cit., p. 251.

[165]Ibid., pp. 60, 255.

[166]Lumen, op. cit., 34; and Commission on Cuban Affairs, op. cit., 33.

[167]Total cases reported in Diario de la Marina and La Lucha dealing with the Independents were 340. To reach the figures stated as 211 deaths and 225 injuries, the median of the categories was used. For example, in the category "6 to 10 deaths," if 3 cases were reported in this category, the median 8 was used to multiply by 3 to estimate very roughly that there were 24 deaths for this single category.

[168]La Lucha, July 2, 1912.

[169]Ibid., July 14, 1912; Diario de la Marina, July 5, 1912.

[170]La Lucha, July 14, 1912.

[171]Ibid., July 15, 1912; Diario de la Marina, July 9, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., 259.

[172]Sesiones de la Cámara, June 5, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., p. 221.

[173]Diario de la Marina, June 7, 1912.

[174]Portuondo, op. cit., 221.

[175]Diario de la Marina, June 8, 1912; June 9, 1912.

[176]Ibid., July 11, 1912; July 14,1912; La Lucha, May 19, 1912; May 20,1912; May 21, 1912; May 22, 1912; May 23, 1912; May 29, 1912; July 2, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[177]Diario de la Marina, June 8, 1912; June 9, 1912; June 10, 1912; June 11, 1912.

[178]Ibid., May 25, 1912; May 26, 1912; June 6, 1912; La Lucha, May 25, 1912; May 26, 1912; May 28, 1912; New York Times, June 1, 1912; June 4, 1912; Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 1, 1912; June 2, 1912.

[179]New York Times, June 4; Diario de la Marina, July 5, 1912.

[180]Diario de la Marina, June 7, 1912.

[181]New York Times, June 9, 1912; La Prensa, June 8, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., 266.

[182]New York Times, June 9, 1912; Portuondo, op. cit., p. 267.

[183]New York Times, June 9, 1912; Diario de la Marina, June 7, 1912; June 8, 1912; June 11, 1912.

[184]Diario de la Marina, June 9, 1912.

[185]Ibid., June 7, 1912; June 10, 1912; Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupre to Knox, June 9, 1912.

[186]New York Times, June 9, 1912.

[187]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 13, 1912.

[188]Ibid., correspondence, Beaupré to Knox, June 12, 1912; also Diario de la Marina, June 15, 1912.

[189]Diario de la Marina, June 17, 1912.

[190]Ibid., June 9, 1912.

[191]Ibid., May 29, 1912; June 2, 1912; June 3, 1912; June 4, 1912; June 8, 1912; La Lucha, May 22, 1912.

[192]Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1912; May 23, 1912; May 24, 1912; June 10, 1912; June 21, 1912.

[193]New York Times, June 24, 1912.

[194]Diario de la Marina, May 28, 1910; May 30, 1912; June 16, 1912; June 17, 1912; June 18, 1912; June 19, 1912; June 23, 1912; June 24, 1912; June 25, 1912; June 26, 1912; June 28, 1912.

[195]Ibid., July 15, 1912.

[196]Ibid., June 13, 1912; June 16, 1912; June 17, 1912; New York Times, June 20, 1912.

FOOTNOTES

[197]Diario de la Marina, June 1, 1912; June 2, 1912; June 7, 1912; June 8, 1912; June 10, 1912; June 21, 1912.

[198]Ibid., July 2, 1912; La Lucha, July 13, 1912.

[199]Diario de la Marina, July 19, 1912.

[200]Ibid., June 28, 1912.

[201]La Lucha, July 19, 1912.

[202]New York Times, June 28, 1912.

[203]Diario de la Marina, June 29, 1912.

[204]Foreign Relations, op. cit., correspondence, Beaupre to Knox, July 2, 1912.

[205]Diario de la Marina, July 20, 1912; July 22, 1912; July 24, 1912; La Lucha, July 2, 1912.

[206]Diario de la Marina, July 31, 1912.

Conclusions

[1]Diario de la Marina, September 25, 1912; February 6, 1913.

[2]Ibid., October 1, 1912; February 6, 1913.

[3]Ibid., May 27, 1913.

[4]Ibid., May 3, 1913.

[5]Ibid., May 27, 1913.

[6]Ibid., June 20, 1913; October 3, 1913.

[7]Portuondo, op. cit., 279.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arredondo, Alberto. El Negro en Cuba. Havana, 1930.

Buell, R. L.. "Cuba and the Platt Amendment," Foreign Policy Association Information Service. Vol. 5, No. 3, 37-62.

Commission on Cuban Affairs. Problems of the New Cuba. R. L. Buell, et. al.. New York, 1935.

Corwin, Arthur F. Spain and the Abolition of Slavery in Cuba, 1817-1886. Austin, 1967.

Cuba: Population, History, and Resources, 1907. Compiled by Victor H. Almsted and Henry Gannett. Washington, 1909.

Curtin, Philip D. The Image of Africa: British Ideas in Action 1790-1850. Madison, 1964.

Diario de la Marina. Havana.

Ely, Roland T. "The Golden Age of the Hacendado: Society and Culture in the Late Colonial Period," Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba. Ed. Robert Freeman Smith. New York, 1966.

Fredrickson, George M. The Black Image in the White Mind. New York, 1971.

Gallenga, A. The Pearl of the Antilles. New York, 1970.

Gonzales Olivares, Ignacio. Observaciones sobre la esclavitud en la Isla de Cuba. Madrid, 1865.

Hennessy, C.A.M. "The Roots of Cuban Nationalism," Background to Revolution: The Development of Modern Cuba. New York, 1966.

Hoetink, H. Slavery and Race Relations in the Americas. New York, 1973.

Humbolt, Alexander von. Ensayos Politicos sobre la isla de Cuba. Miami, 1969.

Klein, Herbert S. Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba. Chicago, 1967.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Knight, Franklin W. Slave Society in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century. Madison, 1970.

La Lucha. Havana.

La Prensa. Havana.

Libros de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes. Cuba.

Libros de Sesiones del Senado. Cuba.

Lockmiller, David A. Magoon in Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention, 1906-1909. Chapel Hill, 1939.

Lumen, Enrique. La Revolución Cubana, 1902-1934. Mexico, 1934.

Martí, Jose. Cuba: Política y Revolución (Obras Completas). 8 Vol. Havana, 1937.

Martín, Juan Luis. Ecué, Changó, y Yemayá, Ensayos sobre la Sub-religion de los Afro-Cubanos. Havana, 1930.

Martínez Ortiz, Rafael. Cuba: Los Primeros Años de Independencia. Paris, no date publication.

Montejo, Esteban. The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave. Ed. Miguel Barnet. New York, 1969.

New York Times.

Ortiz Fernandez, Fernando. Hampa Afro-Cubana: Las Negros Esclavos. Havana, 1916.

____ Los Instrumentos de la Musica Afrocubana. Havana, 1954.

____ Los Negros Brujos, Apuntes para un estudio etnologia criminal. Madrid, 1917.

____ José Antonio Saco y Sus Ideas Cubanas. Havana, 1929.

Pereda Valdes, Idelfonso. El Rancho y otros temas de etnolografia y folklore. Montevideo, 1957.

Portuondo Linares, Serafin. Los Independientes de Color Historia del Partido Independiente de Color. Havana, 1950.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899. Washington, 1900.

Roche y Monteagudo, Rafael. La Policia y sus Misterios en Cuba. Havana, 1908.

Ruiz, Ramón Eduardo. Cuba: The Making of a Revolution. Boston, 1968.

Saco, José A. Historia de la Esclavitud de la Raza Africana en el Nuero Mundo. 4 vols. Havana, 1938.

Serra, Rafael. Para Blancos y Negros: Ensayos Políticos, Sociales, y Económicos. Havana, 1907.

De la Torriente y Pezaza, Cosme. Cuarenta Años de Mi Vida, 1898-1938. Havana, 1939.

APPROVED Peter Smith
MAJOR PROFESSOR

DATE November 15, 1974