

The Implications of Ineffective Courthouse Security Procedures in American Courthouses:
Revising Courtroom Security

Approved: Dr. Sabina Burton, PhD, Date: 08-09-14

The Implications of Ineffective Courthouse Security Procedures in American Courthouses:
Revising Courtroom Security

A Seminar Paper

Presented to

The Graduate Faculty

University of Wisconsin-Platteville

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science in Criminal Justice

David Stephen Clark

August, 2014

Acknowledgements

My educational journey would not have been possible without my four-year old daughter Sarah. Her birth in 2010 compelled me to examine my life and strive to improve my education. Until Sarah's birth I was content and successful in my career as a Deputy Sheriff with an Associate's Degree in Criminal Justice. Once Sarah was born I realized that for Sarah's benefit, I needed something more out of my career and my education to ensure I could provide for her as she grew. All of the studying, the personal sacrifices, and the sleepless nights preparing assignments have been for her and will dramatically improve my ability to provide for her as she starts her journey through life and education. I would gladly make the same sacrifices all over again for Sarah. I hope that I have made her proud, have set a positive example for her, and am a good father. I would also like to thank my father Stephen, my mother Barbara, and my brother Brad. Without their support and encouragement I could not have completed this journey.

I would also like to extend my personal thanks to each course instructor I have had the privilege to learn from during my time at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville. Because of their experience, dedication, patience, and passion for teaching, reaching graduation has been an unparalleled learning experience.

I want to extend special thanks to Dr. Cheryl Banachowski-Fuller for everything she has done for me and for this school. Finally, I would like to extend special thanks to Dr. Sabina Burton for all of the time and effort she has given on my behalf as I completed this seminar research project. Her contributions to my education will not be forgotten.

Abstract

The Implications of Ineffective Courthouse Security Procedures in American Courthouses:

Revising Courtroom Security

David Stephen Clark

Under the Supervision of Dr. Sabina Burton

Statement of the Problem

Securing the American courthouse is arguably an often overlooked and underappreciated aspect of the American criminal justice system. Most courthouses in the country possess some degree of formal security, however, the effectiveness of those security endeavors have proven to be lackluster in many cases. Outbursts of violence in the courtroom including fatal shootings date back to the early 1900s and continue today. Although statistically rare, the byproduct of these shootings is instant and often harsh criticisms from members of the public, the media, and even from law enforcement officials and administrators. The fact that violence is still occurring within American courthouses supports assertions that security efforts need considerable improvements and supports arguments that the criticisms may be well-deserved. Until efforts are improved, the criminal justice system's courtroom security practices will dwell in the realm of relative ineffectiveness and the actual efforts law enforcement is properly executing will remain unrecognized.

Present-day courthouse security programs generally utilize a hybrid structure combining staff with highly evolved technology to safeguard individuals within the courthouse. These efforts consistently focus on securing three primary physical locations; the exterior of the

courthouse including the grounds, the common areas within the courthouse including all areas with public access, and more restricted areas including the courtroom, prisoner holding areas, and judge's chambers. Security lapses in just one of these primary areas can create the potential for a lethal incident. Assumptions about courthouse security tend to lead to the conclusion that the highly evolved state of technology used in courtrooms makes them invincible. These assumptions are misplaced and the continuing trend of violence proves that assertion. Human error and several other factors often contribute to lapses in security. Lack of training, insufficient staffing levels, and budgetary concerns make up just a portion of the factors that play major roles in the effectiveness of court security efforts.

There are a number of conspicuous weaknesses that exist within current security procedures in American courthouses. These deficiencies have been revealed through research, direct information from law enforcement officials and administrators, and through reviews of previous violent incidents. Notwithstanding the useful information obtained from these sources, the learning curve is somewhat lethargic in relation to the escalations in violence. Although it would be arrogant to assume that the criminal justice system can prevent all forms of violence within courtrooms, it is a reasonable expectation to assume the learning curve can be compressed and law enforcement can take positive steps toward more advantageous security practices and therefore, reduce the occurrences of violence.

Method of Approach

The method of approach used for the current study of courthouse security is through analysis of secondary data. This data originates from several sources. First, scholarly journals and other peer-reviewed materials provide a solid basis for understanding the problems

associated with courthouse security practices. Next, governmental websites provide reliable empirical data regarding courthouse security, offer direct information obtained from law enforcement officials, and provide realistic solutions to security problems based on existing best practices. Finally, supplemental information comes from criminal justice system degree course book materials. These course books offer additional insight from leading scholars relating to the courthouse security topic. This is direct subject information that is commonly accepted and taught at collegiate levels.

Results of the Research

The results of the study incontestably illustrate some relevant trends that prove advantageous for court security officials seeking to improve security practices. First, the study clearly reveals that glaring weaknesses exist within American court security practices. These shortcomings provide opportunities for criminal elements to exploit security efforts and commit violent crimes within the courthouses of the United States or on the grounds of those facilities. The study also offers useful insight in regard to the major contributing factors for these vulnerabilities. These factors involve human error, technological problems, funding issues, and a host of other contributors. Finally, the study shows that through a collaborative effort using best practices, security efforts can be greatly enhanced. Although these efforts cannot realistically prevent all violence in the courtroom, the results show that by using best practices solutions, the chances of a violent event in the courtroom can be significantly diminished.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE	i
TITLE PAGE	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABSTRACT	iv-vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii-viii
SECTION:	
I. INTRODUCTION	1-2
A. Statement of the Problem	2-4
B. Purpose and Significance of the Study	4-5
C. Study Limitations	5-6
II. LITERATURE REVIEW	7-8
A. Examination of Empirical Data on Courthouse Shootings and Violence	8-19
B. Identifiable Weaknesses in Security Procedures	19-27
C. Successful Security Procedures	28-35
D. Comparison Analysis	35-36
i. Comparison of Security Procedures from Two Major Courthouses	36-42
E. Barriers to Success for Security Procedures	42-47
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	48
A. Routine Activities Theory	48-50
B. General Strain Theory	50-52
C. Social Disorganization Theory	52-53

D. Rational Choice Theory	53-55
IV. MODEL PROPOSAL FOR COURTHOUSE SECURITY	56
A. Blueprint for Model Courthouse Security	56-66
B. Security Model	67-70
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	71-74
VI. REFERENCES	75-81

Section I. Introduction

One of the earliest recorded courthouse shootings occurred on March 14, 1912 in Carroll County Virginia. Following the imposition of a one-year sentence for interfering with the official performance of deputies in the course of duty, Floyd Allen pulled a firearm from underneath his clothing and gunfire rang out in the courtroom. When the shooting stopped, one judge, the county sheriff, an attorney, one juror, and one witness lay dead and dying. Several other individuals suffered gunshot wounds (Hall, 2004). When considered as a whole in relation to the number of courthouses in the United States, this type of violence is arguably atypical. However, violent events on the grounds of or within the confines of American courthouses occur. When these events happen, the resulting media frenzy and public uproar results in demands for improvements in courthouse security procedures. Although fixing security issues is an obvious choice, implementing these security improvements has proven to be a significant challenge for law enforcement, courthouses, and governmental officials.

According to Gould (2007), the nature of court security changed dramatically following the 1990s bombing incident at the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centers in 2001. Birkland and Schneider (2007) note that although the Oklahoma City bombing that claimed 168 victims did not directly involve a courthouse, related agencies were headquartered inside the Murrah Building so the incident caused an increase in appreciation of the needs for courthouse security and the threat of domestic terrorism as well. According to Gould (2007), incidents like the Oklahoma City bombing forced courts to examine the potential for external threats as well as internal ones when considering security measures.

The types of threats courthouses face vary significantly and essentially, run the gamut of possibilities. However, in addition to shooting incidents, some other specific threats that attract higher concern include the possibility of bombings and the introduction of various biohazards into the court facility. For example, in 2001 a powdery substance was released into an Arizona court. This caused the court to close for three days. Another courthouse was also closed after a powdery substance was introduced into the courthouse via a screening station (Campbell & Reinkensmeyer, 2007). Each of these threats presents a unique and demanding security challenge for those assigned the task of protecting America's court system.

The brief examples described above demonstrate the diversity and potential deadly nature of the threats faced by courthouses and their officials in the United States. The diversity of the threats and incidents also creates a myriad of questions revolving around the proper way to achieve a secure courthouse. In addition to the actual task of physically securing a courthouse, the responsible parties face numerous other challenges that inhibit efforts to implement successful security procedures. Examples of these barriers might include lack of staff members, inadequate training, and insufficient budgets. The problems associated with the barriers above are compounded even more after an incident occurs because of media scrutiny, public outcry, and outrage from victims or their survivors. Effective courthouse security is essential and threatens the sanctity of the justice system so overcoming ineffective security procedures is critical (Zaruba, 2007).

Statement of the Problem

Violent incidents in courthouses clearly establish the need for effective courthouse security. Because violence is still occurring, the resulting conclusion must be that courthouse

security efforts are insufficient. According to the Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (CSCAO) (2008), most law enforcement efforts are reactive in nature. This means that courthouses throughout the United States are susceptible to violent incidents because of subpar and reactive security practices. Although not every courthouse has terrible security practices, many have little or no security at all. This presents a significant problem for anyone working for the courts, attending proceedings as spectators, witnesses, or jurors, and ample opportunities for criminals to introduce violence into the courtroom environment. The CSCAO says that to be successful, courts security practices must be proactive in nature and that by making the change from a reactive system, an increase in effectiveness and levels of security in courthouses can be expected.

In addition to being proactive, proper court security must be a synthesis of security procedures, technology, and individual effort all of which are designed to prevent criminal acts from occurring within the courthouse (National Sheriff's Association, 2014). Because of the existing court security practices in many courthouses, vulnerabilities that can be exploited by criminals arise. According to Fautsko, Berson, and Swenson (2013a), fatal and non-fatal shootings, bombings and bomb threats, arson, knifings, and other forms of assaults are among the types of incidents law enforcement must deal with in American courthouses. Fautsko et al., (2013a) note that courthouses are commonly visited by large numbers of people. This creates additional problems for the individuals tasked with creating a safe and secure environment within the courthouse. Campbell and Reinkensmeyer (2007) add that the courthouse and everyone within it are potential targets for violent criminals. According to Zaruba (2007), problems in courthouse security exist and incidents like the Oklahoma City bombing and the courthouse incidents in Fulton County Georgia and Chicago Illinois support that assertion.

According to Fautsko, Berson, and Swenson (2013c), in a study of courthouses, more than 41% of courts rated their own security as either only fair or poor. This single statistic clearly reveals that American courthouses have some security issues.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

The current study has several purposes. First, the study seeks to identify and prioritize the existing weaknesses within existing court security procedures. This is critical because improving procedures requires a solid understanding of the problem. Barriers to success are closely related to the existing weaknesses and therefore, barriers will be identified and examined in the study as well. However, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2011) notes that even though weaknesses and barriers are identified in courthouses, many of those are never changed. In addition to identifying the weaknesses and examining barriers to success, the study intends to examine the types of security procedures that are working well within the courts. Reviewing and analyzing existing court security procedures that work well provides a baseline for developing a working model of a successful court security program that is based on best-practices. The study will also examine existing empirical data regarding violence in the American courthouse and will offer insight that will assist in refining the final proposed model security policy. In addition to looking at data, it is important to understand the applicable criminological theories behind courthouse violence. Understanding the motivations of criminals that commit violent acts in courthouses provides insight into methods for preventing these tragedies. In addition, because of the preventative nature of courthouse security, a solid understanding of theory assists in formulating viable model policies for security practices. The research will also examine methods for overcoming various barriers that prevent law enforcement and other court security

professionals from completing the tasks at hand. Each of the aforementioned research goals will be utilized to synthesize a working model policy for successful courthouse security procedures.

The significance of the study is multi-faceted as well. First, some experts assert that limited scholarly material on the courthouse security subject exists. Improving courthouse security requires a thorough examination of past security breaches and through the current research, the potential to reignite scholarly interest in the court security topic. Next, scholarly and governmental studies tend to be limited to federal, state, or county courtroom violence. For example, the GAO (2011) conducted a study of federal courthouses and although useful, the study had no relevance to county or local courthouses. Rather than focus on a specific aspect or niche within the courtroom security umbrella, this study will attempt to examine security procedures as a whole by incorporating data and other relevant information from courthouses across the board. Conducting the current research project in this manner will hopefully reveal useable information related to security trends as a whole versus focusing on a small niche of a much larger system. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the study will hopefully provide a functional blueprint for courthouses with subpar security procedures to use for improvements.

Limitations of the Study

The primary limitation associated with the current research project revolves around the existing scholarly research. There appears to be more governmental studies than scholarly research studies and in addition, some of the scholarly material that exists is somewhat dated. Because the study utilizes existing scholarly research and depends on a secondary analysis of that research, limitations develop when research is dated or when there is a shortage of scholarly materials to reference. Specific limitations that arise because of this issue might include accuracy

issues based on the age of the material, scope of the material, and the lack of new empirical data for consideration. Even though some information is dated, utilizing a combination of scholarly material and reliable governmental websites creates the ability to generate reliable research for the current project. The synthesis of this material appears to be more than capable in assisting with the development of a new model security policy for courthouses.

Section II. Literature Review

Reviews of existing literature on the subject of courthouse security provide several opportunities for researchers to gain access to valuable information. The empirical data presented within this paper serves as the cornerstone for the research project and reveals some concerning and even shocking trends. Analysis of the empirical data provides clues for improving security procedures, information about the barriers faced by court officials, and information about procedures that are not working. In addition, the empirical data provides valuable information about the successful procedures courts are using to secure their facilities. That information serves as a basis for the forthcoming model proposal.

The Basics

There are 3,084 sheriff's offices in the United States. Most states rely on the sheriff's office of a given county to provide security for the courthouse in that particular jurisdiction. This would include providing security for the exterior of the courthouse, the inner common areas, the courtrooms, the judge's chambers, and members of the staff and general public. In addition, the sheriff's offices generally provide staff to handle security for and movement of detainees to and from court appearances (Etter & Swymeler, 2009). At the federal level, the United States Marshal's Service (USMS) is in charge of protecting federal courthouses. The USMS protects 94 federal courthouses and a total of 440 court locations. Approximately 5,000 security officers are involved in the process of protecting these locations. In addition, the USMS also protects approximately 2,200 federal judges and another 10,000 miscellaneous court personnel (USMS, 2014). The figures provided by the USMS do not take into consideration the thousands of

civilians in attendance at federal courthouses on a daily basis. Adding the civilian population to the USMS' responsibilities only increases the strain on security resources.

Empirical Data on Courthouse Shootings and Violence

Between 1907 and 2007, a total of 114 shootings occurred in American courthouses. California topped the list with a total of 14 during this period followed by Texas with 13 shootings. California and Texas had far more courthouse shootings than any other states. Several states tied for the third highest number of shootings. Those states included Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Ohio with four courthouse shootings each. Rounding out the state totals, several states including Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania reported only one shooting during this 100-year period. Of the 114 shootings, more than 60% (69) occurred between 1987 and 2007. In other words, 60% of the courthouse shootings happened in a brief and recent 20-year period. Shootings occurring after 2007 are not included in these figures and because incidents are still occurring, the concern levels of court administrators and law enforcement officials should be high. Yet, as forthcoming information will reveal, many courthouses still have little or no security at all and are not making efforts to improve the procedures in place (Etter et al., 2009).

According to Fautsko et al. (2013c), a study of courthouse incidents was conducted that included not only shootings, but bombings and arsons as well. The study differs from the information provided by Etter et al. because it includes incidents from multiple criminal categories rather than just shooting incidents. The study concluded that 199 total incidents occurred between 1970 and 2009. Breaking the incidents down by decades reveals a trend that consistently shows an increase in violence with the passage of time. Between 1970 and 1979,

there were 20 documented incidents. Violence increased every decade thereafter and between 2000 and 2009, peaked with 78 total incidents occurring. Preliminary figures for 2010 and 2011 indicate that if the pace continues, the next decade will likely break the 100-incident mark.

Another study called the CJES documented 209 court-related violent incidents between 2005 and 2011. The study included minor violent crimes thereby accounting for the higher incident numbers during a shorter time period (Fautsko et al., 2013c). Dow (2007) offers yet another figure and says that since 1990, there have been no less than 26 courthouse shootings in the United States. The author further explains that of the 26 shootings approximately 50% occurred in larger cities with the rest in smaller jurisdictions and that only four involved escape attempts.

Specific Notable Recent Incidents

In March of 1995, a male party entered the King County (WA) courthouse to attend closing arguments in his divorce trial. The suspect pulled a pistol from his briefcase and shot his soon-to-be ex-wife and her two female friends. The fatal shots were all fired at close range and all three victims died (Dow, 2007). A limited analysis of this shooting based on the incident description reveals that the suspect was able to get inside the courthouse with a firearm. However, information does not clearly state how the firearm got inside so the possibility that the suspect forcibly removed the weapon from court security personnel exists. In either case, several potential weaknesses in security could be present. Finding a specific weakness would require additional incident information.

In March of 2005, a male was being tried for a rape charge in Fulton County Georgia. During the trial, the defendant overpowered a deputy and took her firearm. The defendant then used that firearm to kill four individuals including a Superior Court judge and a court reporter.

This particular incident offers support for policies that restrict everyone (even officers) from having firearms inside courtrooms (Baehler & Somerlot, 2005). In addition, the method used by the assailant to obtain the weapon indicates a possible issue with self-defense training or perhaps, a problem with the level of alertness of the officer. Again, determining the exact issue would require additional incident details.

In June of 2005, a divorced male disgruntled over a child support issue showed up at a Seattle (WA) courthouse brandishing a hand grenade. The individual's goal was to personally deliver some papers to a judge and a short standoff ensued. The suspect was eventually shot by two police officers. Following investigation, it was discovered that the hand grenade was a diffused World War II relic and was completely non-functional (Dow, 2007). The circumstances of the incident indicate the need for improved security procedures outside the courthouse.

In June of 2006, a male suspect shot through a window of the Washoe (NV) county courthouse injuring the judge that presided over his child support and alimony case. The suspect was dissatisfied with the recent decisions of the judge he shot. Similar to the hand grenade incident in the previous case, the precipitating event revolved around child support and alimony issues. Because of violence directed at judges, many of them now carry concealed weapons (Miller and Flores, 2007). An analysis of the incident clearly indicates a need for improved security outside the courthouse. Placement of a camera system outside the courthouse may have alerted authorities and prevented this shooting.

In September of 2011 a male who was upset with the judge handling his child visitation case entered the Crawford County (AR) courthouse carrying a fully automatic firearm. The suspect shot and wounded the judge's case coordinator and then intentionally tracked down the

judge presiding over his case. The suspect attempted to discharge his firearm several more times but a mechanical error prevented it from firing. Law enforcement officers shot and killed the suspect (Fautsko et al., 2013b). A thorough analysis of this incident would require more information. For example, knowing when the weapon was initially displayed would provide useful information for analyzing a potential weakness in security procedures. If the suspect displayed the weapon outside the courthouse and shot his way in, this indicates a weakness with perimeter security. Conversely, a potential problem with screening processes surfaces if the suspect passed through the court entryway and did not display the firearm until after entering. Additionally, knowing if perimeter cameras were present would be helpful. A camera system that provides exterior views of the courthouse can identify behavioral clues that alert officers within the facility. For example, a person wearing a long coat on a warm day would be out of the ordinary.

During December of 2011, Minnesota joined the ranks of states with recent nationally-recognized violent courtroom events. In Grand Marais County (MN), a male was convicted of sexual assault. The same day, the convicted man shot and wounded the county attorney responsible for his prosecution and shot the father of one of the victims of the sexual assault. Law enforcement officers subdued the suspect and placed him into custody (Fautsko et al., 2013b). A review of this shooting indicates a screening procedure weakness but more information would be required for a thorough analysis.

In March of 2012, another example of violence outside of the courthouse occurred. At a courthouse in Tulsa Oklahoma a suspect started firing a weapon outside the facility. One police officer and a random civilian were shot during the incident. Police wounded the suspect and took him into custody. The suspect's brother was shot and killed by police officers exactly one year

earlier and officials believe this was the precipitating factor for the shooting (Fautsko et al., 2013b). Although enhanced perimeter security would not guarantee the safety of individuals, using camera systems that focused on the exterior of the courthouse or implementing foot patrols outside the facility would improve the chances of preventing an incident from occurring.

Also in March of 2012, a stabbing occurred in Grays Harbor County (WA). A male entered the courthouse and stabbed a judge and a deputy sheriff. The suspect's intent was to steal a court file containing information about his conviction for domestic abuse. Following the stabbing, the suspect fled the scene but was taken into custody the following day. Although nobody was killed and the incident did not involve a firearm, its serious nature warrants a notation here and serves as another example of an individual gaining entry into a courthouse with a deadly weapon (Fautsko et al., 2013b). Incident details show that the suspect was able to enter the courthouse with the knife which most likely is the result of a weakness in screening procedures.

In February of 2013 a male went on a shooting spree in the New Castle County (DE) courthouse. The suspect was the father of a litigant in a child support case and entered the lobby of the courthouse. While in the front lobby, he shot and killed his former daughter-in-law and a friend of hers. Two law enforcement officers were also shot and wounded. The male fled the scene and later committed suicide (Fautsko et al., 2013b). A brief analysis of this incident indicates some form of weakness in entryway screening procedures that allowed the suspect to get inside the courthouse with a firearm.

Also in February 2013, a shooting occurred in Chesterfield County (SC). A male involved in a child support case waited outside the courthouse with a firearm. As the mother of

his child left the courthouse, the suspect shot her and the child's grandfather. Both parties survived. After leading law enforcement on a high-speed motor vehicle pursuit, the suspect was apprehended (Fautsko et al., 2013b). The shooting incident is yet another example that demonstrates the need for improved security measures outside of the courthouse. Camera systems outside of the facility and foot patrols by security personnel may have detected the presence of the suspect and prevented the shooting.

The incidents briefly detailed above reveal the seriousness of courthouse security problems and represent a small percentage of the shootings that have occurred in courts throughout the United States. In each case, a suspect was able to bring a deadly weapon onto the courthouse property, bring it into the courtroom without resistance in many cases, or even remove a weapon from the possession of an officer. The analyses of the incidents detailed above rely on limited information but indicate the need for improved courthouse security measures. Three relatively simple security measures that potentially would have changed the outcome of the incidents are foot patrols around the building perimeters, camera systems outside the courthouse, and effective entryway screening. At the very least, these measures may have provided officers with behavioral clues that prompted an investigation of the suspicious nature of these individuals.

As a final addition, another courthouse shooting recently occurred on June 6, 2014. According to Chuck (2014) of NBC News, a male tried to enter the Forsyth County Georgia courthouse. The suspect was wearing a mask and a bullet-resistant vest. In the course of trying to enter the courthouse, the suspect shot a sheriff's deputy. The deputy shot and killed the gunman. In addition to the firearm, the suspect was carrying smoke grenades, explosives, and spike strips that could be used to slow police response. Large amounts of ammunition were also discovered

on the suspect and he had zip-ties and water with him. The incident caused the courthouse to close so authorities could search the building for explosives as a precautionary measure. Because the incident is so recent, a specific motive is unknown at this time but the suspect was scheduled for a plea hearing the day of the shooting.

Motives, Victim Information and Weapon Data

Because many of the suspects in courtroom shootings are deceased by the end of the event, some motives are never verified with certainty. However, some baseline information on motives does exist. Information from Etter et al. (2009) details 114 courthouse shootings and within the data, statistics about motives are present. The leading motive was assassination of an official covering just over 35% of the 114 shootings. Following that, domestic violence or other domestically-related problems accounted for approximately 33% of the shootings. Several of the previously detailed shootings documented some form of domestically-related issue. Specifically, several of them cited child support and child custody issues as the precipitating event. Dow (2007) adds that shootings that occur at courthouses are very personal and notes that approximately 50% of them involved some type of family-law dispute. The author also notes that many of the suspects had a prior conviction for some form of spousal abuse or at least a previous accusation. Escape also plays a role in courthouse violence. In approximately 25% of the shootings, Etter et al. (2009) indicates that escape was the root motive for the event and that attempted unlawful access to courthouse facilities accounted for approximately 7% of the shootings. Additional motives for the shootings may exist.

Learning how a firearm was introduced into the courtroom environment can offer valuable clues in relation to the potential weaknesses within security processes. In addition,

viable options for correcting weaknesses may surface. Etter et al. (2009) explain that just over 77% of the firearms used in 114 documented shootings were brought to the scene by the suspect. In other words, regardless of whether the incident occurs outside the courthouse or inside, the vast majority of the weapons are coming to the scene from outside. The previous statistic shows that preventing the firearm from coming onto the property or into the building could have potentially eliminated approximately three-fourths of the shootings. Slightly less than 20% of the firearms used in the shootings were obtained by forcibly taking the firearm away from an armed law enforcement officer. Potential weaknesses here include the amount of self-defense training for officers and the security level of holsters. Stemming from the statistic, support also surfaces for policies disallowing firearms in the courtroom because 20% of the shootings would not have been possible if the officers were unarmed. Finally, approximately 3.5% of the firearms were smuggled into the courtroom and given to a defendant or prisoner. Here, potential issues for security procedures at the front door surface because these firearms should never make it into the courtroom. Experience and training levels may also play a role in allowing firearms through the doors of the courthouses.

Empirical data on the victims in courthouse shootings also exists. The top groups of victims accounted for over 59% of the total number of victims. Plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, civilians, and attorneys fall into this group and accounted for 53 fatalities, 50 wounded persons, and four missed targets. Approximately 32.5% of the victims were law enforcement officers including 30 fatalities, 26 wounded officers, and three missed targets. Judges accounted for just over 8% of the victims and included six fatalities, six wounded judges, and three missed targets. Information shows that approximately 39% of the shooters were subsequently shot by law enforcement or security and another 13 committed suicide after the event (Etter et al., 2009).

Data clearly indicates that the overwhelming percentage of victims were non-law enforcement. The civilian victim statistic is alarming and relates to a fundamental premise of the nation's courts. According to Zaruba (2007), every civilian that enters a courthouse is entitled to protection to help ensure that justice is served in the courthouse. The number of civilian victims shows that the job is not getting done. The author also notes that without a sound and secure justice system, the potential for society to self-destruct exists. Ultimately, the responsibility for security falls to members of American sheriff's offices and the USMS. Miller et al. (2007) add that many people believe that because the government requires civilians to attend court for jury duty and to serve as witnesses, the government then shoulders the responsibilities for protecting those individuals during their service to the justice system.

Empirical Data on Threats

In addition to occurrences of violence in American courthouses, the staff charged with the protection of the court system has to investigate many threats as well. Statistical information regarding threats clearly reveals the serious nature of court security. A study conducted in 2004 by the U.S. Department of Justice shows an increase in the number of threats received by the federal judiciary between 1998 and 2003 with a dramatic increase after 2003 (Perkins, 2006). The author also explains that the study showed 565 threats in 2002 with an increase to 674 threats by 2004. In 2005, that number jumped dramatically to more than 900 threats. For 2006, 822 threats were documented by July. According to Fautsko et al. (2013c), the USMS Center for Judiciary Security says the number of threat investigations increased from 592 in 2003 to 1,258 case by the end of the 2011 fiscal year. Breaking this down, the average number of threats at the federal level is approximately 3.5 every day. The USMS (2014) adds that 1,155 judiciary threats were assessed and investigated during the 2013 fiscal year and that violent courthouse incidents

have risen every decade since 1970. The Government Accountability Office (2011) also offers a contribution to the discussion noting that threats against federal courthouses rose from around 600 during 2004 to in excess of 1,400 during the 2010 fiscal year. Although differences in exact statistics exist because of varying sources, it is clear that threats are on the rise.

Threats occur at county levels as well. According to Dow (2007), the King County (WA) security staff documented more than 2,000 total incidents just in 1993. These incidents included fights, assaults, and threats of violence. Increases in threats appear to coincide with the rising number of violent incidents noted above. The increase in both areas reveals that courthouse security measures are not as effective as they should be.

The aforementioned CTAV study cited by Fautsko et al. (2013b) also reveals some specific information regarding the sources of threats to courthouses. Approximately 87% of the threats came from a total of six different sources. The top three threat sources include domestic assailants, unknown assailants, and dangerous individuals (no more information provided). On-bond defendants, criminal assailants, and prisoners complete the list of the top six threat sources. The remaining 13% of the threats comes from domestic terrorist incidents, various accomplices, case litigant assailants, and miscellaneous sources. Although stopping incidents altogether is arguably impossible, the above information provides valuable clues in regards to where court security measures should focus attention.

Miscellaneous Empirical Data

Approximately 57% of 500 courthouses involved in a survey advised that at least one of their higher-profile trials had a criminal gang member or extremist group member on trial. In addition, more than 90% of the courthouses had access in some form to metal detectors but only

used them sparingly including spotty use during major trials. The other 10% of courthouse did not have access in any form to metal detectors. Because so many courthouses have access to metal detectors and fail to use them, questions surface about the decision-making processes of court security officials (Etter et al., 2009).

Perkins (2006) says that in the previous 35-year period, 16 judicial employees and 42 court clients were killed. In addition, another 40 judicial officials and 53 court clients were assaulted. The locations of incidents varied from the exterior of the courthouse (and the grounds) to locations inside the courthouse. Data from the CTAV study showed that 43% of the courthouse incidents occurred around the perimeter of the courthouse. Perimeter locations include the parking lot, outer steps, courthouse plaza, and the sidewalks surrounding the facility. Subsequently, perimeter areas become important to consider when conceiving security procedures. Another 30% of incidents occurred inside the courthouse facility. Interior areas include corridors, stairwells, office spaces, elevators, and lobby areas. The courtroom was also a major location for problems with 16% of the incidents in the CTAV study occurring there. Approximately 8% of the incidents occurred off-site at judicial residences with an additional .5% occurring at other off-site non-court locations. Finally, 2% of the incidents occurred inside the judge's chambers (Fautsko et al., 2013b). As with previous empirical data, the information provided above offers significant clues in relation to security procedures and reveals where efforts should be focusing.

In the CTAV study, the exterior of the courthouse was clearly the location with the highest number of incidents. Consalvo (1998) offers some data relating to the security outside the courthouse and although outdated, it warrants mention. The author says that a battered woman's chances of being killed by the batterer increase by 75% once she as leaves the

courthouse. A powerful statistic like this provides additional support for arguments to improve courthouse perimeter security. The argument for improvement is based on incident location and strongly ties in with the previously disclosed trend of domestically-related shootings.

During the first five months of 1994, 46 handguns were seized off of King County courthouse patrons. In 1995, King County (WA) experienced a courthouse shooting. Almost immediately afterwards, money was allocated to improve security by installing screening equipment. Unfortunately it took a major incident to prompt improvements in screening but the endeavor proved successful. During the first full year following the installation of the screening equipment, approximately 1,200 weapons were confiscated at screening stations. Of that total, 715 of the items confiscated were firearms. The extensive collection of weapons removed from courthouse patrons resulted in King County adding legal knives, scissors, screwdrivers, and other sharps such as letter openers to a list of items banned from the interior of the courthouse (Dow, 2007). However, effective entry screening procedures have no effect on what takes place outside the courthouse. Of the 26 shootings mentioned Dow (2007), 11 of them occurred outside the courthouse so entry screening efforts would have been inapplicable in assessing security procedures during those incidents.

Identifiable Weaknesses in Security Procedures

Devising a comprehensive and effective court security plan requires a thorough understanding of more than just the physical locations requiring attention. One key to implementing effective security comes from understanding where the existing weaknesses are in a given security plan or procedure. Weaknesses vary depending on the courthouse and a number of other variables. However, reviewing existing scholarly literature provides a solid basis for

understanding some of the most common weaknesses that affect the efficiency of security procedures inside and outside of courthouses.

Architecture

The NSA (2014) says that one major problem with the design of courthouses is the lack of input from security professionals during the construction phase. The NSA adds that this oversight often results in costly post-construction upgrades. According to Campbell et al. (2007), many older courthouses do not have a designated large public entrance that allows for the implementation of appropriate numbers of screening lanes and equipment. Instead, these older courthouses often have many entrances that cause safety concerns and monopolize the time of a limited amount of staff members. Cooper (2007) adds that older courthouses often lack secure corridors or entry points for prisoners. This creates additional security concerns because of architectural design problems. Campbell et al. (2007) also note that older courthouses often lack other essential security features such as bullet-resistant glass, electronic access to court chambers, secure ventilation, and secure parking for judicial officials. In addition, older buildings generally do not have a designated space to serve as a central camera monitoring station. The absence of these essentials forces courts to use valuable budget funds to make renovations to improve security. New facility construction efforts need to pay particular attention to the security issue during the designing stages of the facility to prevent these costly oversights from occurring.

Another major issue arising from the architectural design of courthouses is the multifunction nature of many of the facilities (Cooper, 2007). In other words, in addition to serving as a courthouse, a given structure may also house other governmental entities within the

same building. Some jurisdictions have government centers that house services ranging from driver's license renewals up to and including serving as a law enforcement center, courthouse, and jail. Although arguably practical from a financial viewpoint, this practice can cause security-related issues such as controlling access points. Implementing and maintaining effective security in courthouses is an expensive undertaking and often causes safety features to be overlooked. Feiner (2007) notes that between 1997 and 2007, the average cost of security features during building construction increased from \$8.50 per square foot to in excess of \$25.00 per square foot. This is almost a 300% increase in a ten-year period and offers a potential explanation for the lack of attention to security details. The aforementioned concerns represent only a fraction of the security considerations that must be addressed when building or renovating a courthouse facility.

Courthouse Perimeter

A study revealed that 92% of courthouses surveyed had perimeter video surveillance that was less than acceptable or had none whatsoever. Adding to this problem, most courthouses did not have regular foot patrols outside the facility. The combination of these two factors significantly limits security efforts outside of the courthouse. In addition, 36% of the courthouses surveyed did not have bollards (a short vertical post permanently installed to block access to an area) outside the building. Courthouses use bollards to prevent vehicles from driving up to or into the courthouse. As mentioned in the architecture section above, secure parking is an issue for many courthouses and the survey revealed that 89% did not have a safe location for staff members to store their vehicles during work. The lack of secure parking means that vehicles belonging to court officials are virtually wide-open targets (Fautsko et al., 2013c).

Courthouse Interior

A survey of courts revealed that approximately 26% of them did not have any form of entryway screening or security at the access points of the facility. The remaining 74% had some form of screening procedure but many needed significant equipment upgrades to be considered effective. For courthouses with security screening, 84% of them only screened members of the public. Additionally, a specific study of security procedures recommended significant improvements for an overwhelming 97% of the screening stations with at least 26% requiring the presence of additional staff to be considered effective. Another alarming statistic revealed that 55% of the surveyed courts did not use any type of security officer (licensed law enforcement or private) inside the courtrooms during trials and that approximately 38% of the judge's chambers in these facilities did not have any form of duress alarm (Fautsko et al., 2013c). Miller et al. (2007) argue that glaring safety concerns like this lead to stress among judges. A survey of 1,112 state judges in Pennsylvania revealed that 52% of them had experienced one or more incidents that involved either a threat or a physical assault of some type. In addition, 70% of the judges surveyed said that the threat or assault occurred within the courthouse. Essentially, individuals that should not be gaining access to the interior of the courthouse are being allowed to pass through security. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that security efforts at these facilities are not effective.

Supervision

One of the base-level weaknesses in court security supervision is the lack of a consensus regarding who is in charge. According to Howard (2006), traditionally, the local sheriff's office has been tasked with protecting the county court buildings but in reality, there is an overlap in

security responsibility making it a combined effort from the sheriff's office and the judges. In a perfect world, a court security committee would designate these responsibilities but Fautsko et al. (2013c) say that 86% of surveyed courts had no type of formal court security committee. Adding to the confusion, Miller et al. (2007), note that 97% of judges within the system believe the courts have a responsibility to take steps to provide a secure environment and mitigate various stressors that jurors and other visitors to the courthouse experience. These shortcomings provide indications that serious lapses within court security management processes may exist. In addition, 84% of courts surveyed did not have any type of formal incident reporting system or at best, had an ineffective one. The absence of a formal incident reporting system means that many courts cannot track problems that do occur. Lack of reporting also means that no formal way to assess problems exists and therefore, there is no way to correct them beyond guessing. Gould (2007) asserts that some court leaders fail to regularly monitor security efforts and this creates a sense of insecurity among visitors as well as other staff. Ortwein (2007) adds that courts often assign the court administrator as the supervisory security official even though that person has no background for the position. Lack of expertise creates a weakness because of limited position knowledge. The problem is compounded because the court administrator also has duties in that role and therefore, assumes responsibilities for multiple positions or roles within the system.

Staffing and Training

A court survey revealed that 21% of them were not providing any formal court security training for their officers. Of the 79% providing training, it failed to include court-specific courses. This means that although many court security officers receive training, it is not specific to their job description and therefore, essentially useless for court security procedures. Another survey shows that more than 50% of the respondents said that no court security training was

provided at their courthouse and that approximately 11% more did not know the answer to that question. In addition, more than 50% of respondents said that no emergency preparedness training was being provided and another 16.8% had no idea how to answer that question (Fautsko et al., 2013c).

Fautsko et al. (2013c) also report that approximately 30% of respondents believe their law enforcement agency staff rates poor or fair in relation to court security because of the quality of officers staffing facility posts. Interestingly, this statistic is essentially self-incriminating for the agencies expressing little or no confidence in their officers. Individual agencies are responsible for hiring qualified officers and providing regular and relevant training for them. The lack of confidence in those officers therefore implicates that agency and its own shortcomings in hiring and training practices.

Collectively, prior statistics indicate that many courthouses are virtually unprepared for an incident such as a shooting. The courthouse facilities are also unprepared for other types of emergencies such as a tornado because of the lack of emergency preparedness training. The National Sheriff's Association (NSA) (2014) adds that staffing shortages are also a significant problem at courthouse entryways where metal detectors are used and in addition, many video surveillance systems remain unmanned. The NSA also notes that training plays a major role in officer responses because many active alarms were treated with complacency and staff just assumed them to be false alarms. Because nobody responded to these alarms when they went off, it is not only ineffective security, it is unacceptable.

Equipment

The NSA (2014) discloses that equipment problems are a major concern for court security. The equipment can be ineffective or outdated, may be used inappropriately because of lack of training, or can be maintained inappropriately leading to malfunctions. One of the most telling statistics regarding equipment comes from Fautsko et al. (2013c) and discusses a security team that conducted formal security assessments at 40 court locations. The assessment resulted in the identification of approximately \$1.5 million dollars in equipment upgrades for court security. The figure is staggering not only based on the upgrade costs, but because it only refers to the needs of 40 courthouses. As stated earlier in this study, there are 3084 county courthouses in the United States. If only a total of 1% of these courthouses had similar equipment needs, this translates to a cost estimate of \$11,550,000. Based on aforementioned statistics and other empirical data, it is reasonable to speculate that more than 1% of courthouses nationwide will need upgraded security equipment.

An additional example of an equipment issue involves the issuance of Tasers. Tasers are an important tool for resolving incidents with lower levels of force. Etter et al. (2009) note that a survey of courthouses revealed that only about 53% of officers assigned to court security were issued Tasers. According to Taser International (2014), an X-26 Taser costs approximately \$855 each for law enforcement agencies. Taser International also says the agency must purchase dart cartridges (\$26), holsters (\$34), batteries (\$35), and training cartridges averaging \$21 each. Adding these figures together and estimating the number of officers that would potentially need this equipment quickly multiplies into a significant financial undertaking for an agency needing just 20 Tasers for their court staff. Many agencies are much larger than this and would need well in excess of 20 Tasers. In addition, any such estimate would only cover the equipment itself and

not associated certification training or recertification training. This is just one simple piece of equipment so it is easy to see that equipment costs can quickly become overwhelming for an agency.

Miscellaneous Weaknesses

One weakness that is often overlooked is the decision-making processes of court officials. Miller et al. (2007) say that many judges do not react to safety threats. Approximately 70% of judges admit to experiencing incidents that involved threats or other inappropriate actions, yet 42% of them did nothing to change their behavior. The authors also explain that 25% of judges admitting to being physically assaulted in the past did not change their behavior in any fashion. One speculation is that the judges may believe that changing their behavior to react to a threat implies a personal weakness. The key is the decision-making of these court officials. Despite direct security threats, and in some cases even assault, many judges make a conscious choice not to alter behavior. Failing to modify behavior or take some form of precautionary measures does nothing to mitigate the threat, makes no common sense at all, and arguably worsens an existing problem because of the lack of action.

Additional miscellaneous weaknesses noted in courthouse security procedures reveal some other potential avenues for improvements. Fautsko et al. (2013c) reveal that only 39% of courts conduct some form of screening on incoming mail plus 88% of the respondents do not screen postal carriers or other individuals delivering packages. Failure to screen incoming mail, packages, and the individuals responsible for the delivery process leaves courthouses wide open to some form of attack through the mail. As previous information revealed, bombs and biological agents have become valid concerns for courthouses and both could be delivered in daily mail or

packages. The same survey indicated that 70% of courtrooms do not have any form of closed-circuit video surveillance. Therefore, if an officer is not physically present in the courtroom, nearly three fourths of courtrooms have no security inside. A survey of 60 courts in Washington revealed that 24 of them had no security at all. Another 16 had what was referred to as limited security, and just 20 of these facilities conducted full entryway screening (Dow, 2007).

Campbell et al. (2007) argue that courthouses with security bypass cards create hazards. Because certain personnel are allowed to bypass screening, this creates lapses in security procedures and therefore, unnecessary risks arise. Attorneys have been common recipients of bypass cards. The authors also say that bypass privileges for attorneys in some courthouses resulted in rumors of the attorneys carrying firearms into the facility inside of personal briefcases. The root issue of issuing a bypass card creates a secondary weakness.

Any person other than a licensed law enforcement officer or authorized security person possessing a firearm inside the court facility is an unwarranted risk. Officers carrying firearms inside a courthouse has become a hotly debated issue in recent years. If a licensed and trained officer carrying a firearm inside a courtroom causes a heated debate, there should be little argument that a civilian attorney with unknown firearm skills carrying a concealed firearm inside the facility may create a problem. In addition to attorneys, other common recipients of bypass cards include judges (who traditionally refuse to submit to screening), paralegals, investigators, outside contractors, and other miscellaneous court employees. Any of these individuals could potentially introduce a concealed weapon into the courtroom for any purpose and therefore, create an unnecessary security risk (Campbell et al., 2007).

Successful Security Procedures

Although many weaknesses exist around and within American courthouses, not every facility is a security disaster. In fact, many courthouses are demonstrating positive and effective security procedures. The success stories from around the country serve as a solid baseline for courthouse security procedures. Some examples of security measures that promote success in the courthouse setting are detailed below. Additional details will be provided in the forthcoming proposal for model court security procedures.

Architecture

Successful security plans begin with the architecture and design of courthouses. Perkins (2006) says that the architectural structure of a courthouse must be addressed to promote safe environments for court employees and civilian attendees. Security experts must be involved in the planning stages and echoing the successful designs of other courthouses is not a crime. Carchman (2007) says that a solid security plan is not static. In other words, the plan is consistently evaluated and it evolves as security needs change. Carchman also notes that a good plan should be reevaluated on a yearly basis at minimum and successful courthouses conduct these regular reviews. The obvious choice is to have the luxury of planning and building a new secure courthouse facility that already includes the latest technological and architectural advancements. However, as previously noted, many courthouses are older buildings. Working with an old courthouse means that remodeling and upgrading become the most viable choice. Using an evolving process to upgrade courthouse buildings and equipment can assist in achieving successful security (Baehler et al., 2005). Adding bullet-resistant materials to many locations in the courthouse is a common example of an upgrade that has proven successful. The

judge's bench area and specified windows within the courthouse are common examples of areas that might benefit from this type of upgrade.

Successful courthouses use designs that allow ample waiting space for members of the public and provide secure corridors (access points) for judicial officials. The increased public space helps security officers separate members of the public that are from opposing parties. Keeping these people apart reduces the chances for any type of outbursts, assaults, or worse. Providing secure access for judges allows these officials to come and go without having any direct contact with members of the public, other civilians with an interest in the proceedings, and perhaps most importantly, prisoners (Perkins, 2006).

Courthouse Perimeter

Security threats can occur anywhere and the NSA (2014) recognizes four primary areas involving the courts; the courtroom, nonpublic areas inside the facility and near the courtrooms, public areas inside the facility, and the exterior of the courthouse. Because the exterior of the courthouse is completely public, effective courthouse security begins outside the facility. One successful and essential perimeter feature for courthouses is video surveillance. Perimeter cameras provide security personnel with the ability to monitor activity outside the courthouse and the ability to detect potential problem behavior before it gets inside the facility (Baehler et al., 2005). The success of perimeter video surveillance is not limited to facilities within the United States. Lippert and Walby (2012) say that Canadian cities use a video system called MCS to monitor outdoor activities in their municipalities, and for monitoring the exterior of some governmental buildings within cities.

Some examples of problem behavior outside the courthouse that may potentially move inside include disorderly conduct, assaults, and demonstrations. Having the ability to detect these problem behaviors and react to them before they move inside the courthouse is important.

Problem behavior outside the courthouse may also lead to concerns revolving around the safety and security of court personnel parking areas (NSA, 2014). To address this issue Baehler et al. (2005) note that a fenced parking garage with key card access is effective. Perkins (2006) supports the recommendations for secured parking and notes the feature as a successful procedure.

Courthouse Interior

One of the most important requirements for improving courthouse security is disallowing all weapons inside the facility (Baehler et al., 2005). Fulfilling the requirement means that even courthouse security officers would not carry firearms or other weapons inside the building. The zero-tolerance practice is controversial and many courthouses still mandate that officers carry firearms when inside the facility. Campbell et al. (2007) note that many chiefs and sheriffs prefer that officers carry firearms inside the courthouse because of their belief that it was not safe inside the facility. In other words, so little confidence in security procedures existed that even the top law enforcement officials believed firearms were needed inside their own courthouses for safety. Despite the two-sided argument, Perkins (2006) supports the recommendations by Baehler et al. (2005) and argues that no weapons should be permitted inside courthouses. The author notes that if this recommendation is ignored and firearms are permitted inside the courthouse for security purposes, under no circumstances should any weapons be allowed into secure areas of the building. A common example of a secure area would include the prisoner holding area and the judge's chambers.

Perkins (2006) also argues that everyone entering the courtroom (with the exception of court security personnel) should be screened for weapons. The recommendation includes screening judges, attorneys, and other court personnel and would eliminate the bypass privileges previously discussed. Although this recommendation is not generally popular with courthouse officials, it is a sensible one and offers a much better chance to ensure that no weapons are getting inside the courthouse. Fautsko et al. (2013b) support Perkins' assertions and say that successful courthouse security plans have excellent screening policies. The authors also explain that screening should be among the foremost concerns of security personnel and add that many of the courthouse shootings occurred at facilities without this essential component.

In addition, Perkins (2006) makes some general recommendations for activities inside the courthouse that have proven successful in the past. First, security officers should always have a visible presence inside the facility and must be present inside the courtrooms when court is in session. Next, officers responsible for security should never get involved with prisoner escorts because it detracts from their primary assignment. Instead, separate officers should be assigned to those duties and there should be a minimum of two staff for prisoners under escort. To supplement security officers inside the courthouse, Walker (2006) recommends an intelligent video system (IVS). An IVS has the capability to detect people that enter or attempt to access unauthorized areas of the courthouse, can monitor secure doors that are not staffed, and can pan or zoom in as needed to detect minor details applicable to security. In support of that argument, Jameson and Strudwick (2009) note that it is essential to have video surveillance in public areas of the courthouse facility and that doing so has proven successful in the past.

Supervision

The Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (CSCAO) (2008) says that deterrence, detection, and prevention needs for court security are best met when key personnel are directly involved in the planning process. This means that supervisory level personnel need to take ownership of the responsibilities associated with planning and implementing security procedures. To accomplish this goal, a court security committee is essential and effective. It is recommended that at least one judge, the county sheriff, the head county commissioner, and the court administrator are involved with the security committee. Including these key individuals satisfies the baseline requirements for supervisory personnel overseeing the security processes and offers a solid experiential base to build a plan from. Perkins (2006) says that these key officials must recognize the needs for effective court security and take an active role in implementing effective plans and training for security. Birkland and Schneider (2007) add that excellent supervisors lead by example and have a direct bearing on how an organization responds during a crisis. Because resources are often limited, organizations with successful security procedures have leaders that are aggressive, decisive, demonstrate the ability to prioritize needs, and work within constraints.

Staffing and Training

Training is considered one of the most important factors contributing to successful security procedures. Baehler et al. (2005) argue that effective crisis management starts with planning, solid training, and regular practice of emergency plans. The CSCAO recommends routine security-related training for all personnel regardless of duty assignment. Zaruba (2007) says that successful courthouse security ultimately depends on humans even when courthouses have advanced technology because it is the people that assess and intervene. The same core

groups of people also mitigate threats and live incidents in progress. The author recommends hiring only the best but also ensuring that those individuals receive a consistent and vigorous training regimen. Practice and training are essentially synonymous because scenario-based training incorporates live role-playing and practice runs for emergencies. Training directly relates to equipment use and arguably, no matter how updated and reliable the equipment, it is only as effective as the staff members using it. Therefore, training plays a significant role in achieving effective security and when staff lacks the expertise to use equipment properly, it can essentially be removed from the solution because nobody knows how to use it properly.

Training also directly ties into prevention. The NSA (2014) says that a highly-trained staff with the ability to detect potential issues and rapidly respond to them is one of the most effective deterrents a court can possess and is a proactive, preventative asset that no facility should do without. Because of this, court officers that regularly receive updated security training are the most effective officers. Training should include techniques and scenarios that focus on preventative measures and mitigation techniques for incidents such as escape, disorderly conduct, firearms incidents, physical assaults, bomb threats, bomb explosions, demonstrations, hostage situations, suicides (or attempts), thefts, fires, and arsons. One concern not noted in the author's list is the threat (or deployment) of biological agents and it only makes sense that this type of incident should be incorporated into training as well.

Equipment

Functional and updated equipment is essential to successful court security. The previous Taser discussion warrants another brief mention here. Although the average cost of a Taser without accessories is \$855 (Taser International, 2014), the tool represents an important non-

lethal addition to a courthouse security plan and becomes even more relevant for a facility that does not allow officers to bring firearms into the building. It is imperative that officers have the proper tools for providing security within the facility. In addition to Tasers, other examples of these tools might include firearms, handcuffs, aerosol chemical restraints, and batons. However, this equipment must be kept in exceptional condition and officers need to understand how and when to use it.

Equipment also covers technological items and other physical items previously discussed. Internal video surveillance, bullet-resistant glass, computers, electronic access cards, and screening equipment all fall under this broad umbrella. In addition, items outside the courthouse also qualify as equipment and again, have already been discussed in previous sections. Examples of this type of equipment might include bollards, fencing for secure parking areas, and perimeter video surveillance. Using these items requires human involvement so staffing, training, and equipment are not only related, they are co-dependent on each other. If a weakness surfaces in one area, the others suffer (Fautsko et al., 2013c).

Miscellaneous Successes

Courthouses that promote safe and secure environments call upon everyone in the court's employ to act as extra sets of eyes and ears. With additional people staying alert and making objective observations, security is greatly enhanced. Activities that are common indicators of potential issues include loitering without apparent purpose, inappropriate clothing inside the courthouse (for example, heavy coats), people that stare down others or are unusually withdrawn, individuals that avoid face to face interactions or eye contact, and people waiting in the common areas that do not have some form of vested interest or involvement in the court proceedings.

Although none of these cues are guaranteed indicators of a potential problem, investigating them has proven successful in the past (Fautsko et al., 2013b).

In addition to having additional sets of eyes and ears, Walker (2006) notes that courthouse facilities with effective security use advanced technology. Computers, electronic access cards, and advanced video surveillance are examples of technology fitting into this category. Such technologies represent the pinnacle of current advancements and greatly enhance the effectiveness levels of security within courthouses. Another technological advancement that assists successful security programs is communication methods. The National Center for State Courts, Court Consulting Services (2007) says that use of current communication methods including digital radios, emails, and other forms of instant messaging dramatically improve security efforts. In the absence of these technologies, communications can be fragmented, and therefore, be less effective during times of crisis.

Another successful practice involves record keeping. Court security staff should document all types of courthouse incidents and maintain some form of searchable database for them. In addition to providing documentation for tracking purposes, a searchable database offers additional benefits. A database of information could potentially reveal patterns or weaknesses and potentially offers a powerful form of supporting argument when going to the budget table to request additional security funding (Perkins, 2006).

Comparison Analysis of Security Procedures from Two Major Courthouses

Conducting a comparison analysis on the security procedures of two relatively similar courthouses offers a unique opportunity to review some of the specifics of a security plan. In addition, a comparison analysis provides a viable method for identifying weaknesses in security

procedures and determining what is proving successful. Through the analysis, the identification of weaknesses and strengths provide a basis for reasoning out viable solutions to address identified problems. Finally, the information contained within the comparison analysis has applications in creating the forthcoming model security policy.

The comparison analysis presented here essentially mirrors a court security comparison from Gould in 2007. By paraphrasing information contained in Gould's comparison, effective security methods and other information that have direct applications to the forthcoming model security proposal surface. Gould's comparison focused on the security procedures of two metropolitan courthouses. The author notes that both courts are considered leading examples of security procedures and although generally effective, the comparison identifies some common areas that cause concern among security experts. Based on a review of Gould's comparison, it is clear that although relatively successful, both of these courts could be doing more in regards to security procedures (Gould, 2007).

The Two Courts

Gould referred to the courts in the comparison analysis as Southville and Northville. For purposes here, the courts will be referred to as "Alpha" and "Bravo". Basic information about both courts reveals that they are among some of the busiest courts in their respective states although court Alpha is larger than court Bravo. Court Alpha is responsible for approximately 1.5 million residents in comparison to around one million for court Bravo. Court Alpha hears approximately 300,000 cases per year and employs approximately 90 judges. In contrast, court Bravo hears approximately 35,000 cases per year and employs approximately 20 judges (Gould, 2007). Breaking these numbers down to a per-judge caseload, a judge from court Alpha would

hear approximately 3,333 cases per year in comparison to 1,750 cases per year for court Bravo. Breaking the statistics down one step further, if court were held 365 days per year, a judge in court Alpha would hear 9.13 cases per day as opposed to a judge from court Bravo hearing 4.79 cases per day. Although the per-judge caseload differs, it is quite clear officials from both courts are consistently busy.

Security in Court Alpha

Security for court Alpha first became a concern in the 1980s when a judge resigned and assumed the head position on a newly formed court security committee. At that time the sheriff's office shouldered the responsibility for providing security in court Alpha and that trend continues today. Magnetometers were installed in the court in late 1980s and security became a larger priority after an individual introduced a firearm into the facility in the early 1990s. Court Alpha currently has magnetometers, x-ray machines, and equipment capable of detecting organic material at the facility entrances. Court Alpha also obtained funding for improved perimeter security but some of those funds were used to purchase equipment for scanning mail. The court's mail scanners can detect explosives but not organic material. The equipment is not capable of scanning parcels (Gould, 2007).

Based on complaints from court Alpha staff, they are currently allowed to bypass entryway screening procedures by entering through secure doors using a key card. The bypass privileges have created a problem because staff members frequently hold doors open for individuals that have not been issued a key card. Attorneys entering the courthouse are also given priority entrance privileges but still are required to go through the screening procedures. Closed-circuit television cameras are present at court Alpha however most of them lack the ability to

pan. In addition, the cameras do not have audio capabilities, are limited to focusing on outside entry points, and generally do not have staff monitoring them because of personnel shortages. A reduction in the security budget has forced the sheriff's office to shuffle security deputies. Deputies are moved from one location to another within the courthouse based on need and sometimes on the type of trial in progress. The staff shortage causes lapses in security because certain posts are left unattended when deputies are shuffled from one location to another. If the court is hearing a major trial additional deputies are placed on staff. Despite the general staff shortage, court Alpha manages to keep at least one deputy assigned to each judge's courtroom but many of these deputies are new and inexperienced. Security positions are considered an entry-level slot for deputies so new hires start there and work upward from that point. A new deputy has to earn his or her rotation out of the courthouse to a street-level position. Fortunately some senior deputies request court security assignments and rotate back into positions within the facility. These requests benefit the court because senior deputies bring a substantial amount of experience to the security staff. However, some senior deputies are just seeking a less-demanding assignment to finish their careers and really do not take court security assignment seriously (Gould, 2007).

Judges for court Alpha enjoy some specific security measures designed to protect their safety. Judges sit behind bullet-resistant benches and are in close proximity to a panic alarm button that can summon deputies. However, the comfort that comes from these security essentials is lost once the judge leaves the courthouse because they are forced to park their vehicles in unsecured parking lots. Unsecured parking lots leave staff vehicles wide open to tampering or other forms of human interaction. In addition, the lack of security would easily

allow an individual to lay in wait by a judge's vehicle and confront or assault the official when he or she left the courthouse (Gould, 2007).

Court Alpha's security committee maintains a list of priorities for consideration. Secured parking for court staff is one of the top priorities because of the aforementioned lack of precautions in parking areas. Additionally, court Alpha wants to implement upgrades to video surveillance system capabilities at the courthouse. Beyond these priorities, court Alpha plans to install more bollards outside the courthouse and is considering formally allowing judges to carry concealed firearms into the facility. Apparently, some judges are already armed. This practice has been deemed as unofficial, is informal, and is essentially ignored by court security officials (Gould, 2007).

Security in Court Bravo

Court Bravo is located in a building that shares space with a lower court, the clerk's office, the district attorney's office, and several state offices. Because of the multifunction nature of court Bravo, security is run by committee with judges, sheriff's office personnel, and other stakeholders in control and sometimes at odds over security procedures. Arguments over security procedures generally defer to the county sheriff's office for a final decision but certain public complaints have been known to provoke judges to intervene in security procedures.

Magnetometers were introduced into the courthouse during the 1970s and x-ray machines followed shortly thereafter. Currently, court Bravo does not have a method for detecting explosives or organic materials. A short trial period that forced employees to go through screening generated so many staff complaints that court Bravo removed the requirement.

Currently, staff members are allowed to bypass screening procedures, can walk directly through

magnetometers, and are not even required to stop if they set off the alarms. The informal nature of the court's screening means that even if a staff member set off an alarm because he or she was carrying a weapon, nobody would require that person to return to the facility entrance for a more detailed security check. Magnetometers are staffed by a combination of sheriff's deputies and civilian screeners (Gould, 2007).

Deputies are assigned to key locations in the courthouse such as the courtrooms, a central control area, and prisoner holding cells. Deputies also control all defendant escorts within the courthouse. In addition, deputies occasionally conduct foot patrols around the perimeter of the courthouse. Like court Alpha, deputies working for court Bravo rotate through the court security position with an average tour only lasting about one year. Civilian bailiffs supplement licensed officer's security efforts. The lower courts within the multifunction facility are generally staffed by civilian bailiffs whereas the county court generally uses the licensed deputies (Gould, 2007).

Court Bravo has a video surveillance system with a motion-activated digital video recorder system but the system does not currently record. In essence, the system is simply a live-action viewing system versus a recorder. In addition, there is no staff presence in the control room to monitor the video system. The county does have an explosive-sniffing canine officer at its disposal but the dog is only used during times of increased security or during major trials. During major trials, the county also assigns extra deputies specifically to the courtroom for crowd control and enhanced security. Additionally, during the high-profile cases deputies use metal-detecting wands to help screen individuals entering the court facility. All mail entering court Bravo is scanned for metal but not for explosives or biohazards. Court Bravo uses access cards for employees that restrict access to areas in which the employee is expected to be working. Employees can access the area(s) in which he or she is supposed to be working but

cannot access other sections of the courthouse. Court Bravo has a problem with employee turnover so the experience level of personnel creates potential issues. Judges have panic alarms and are allowed to park in an underground parking lot however, that it offers only a limited amount of security. Court Bravo admittedly has an issue with lack of resources but recent trends indicate that the financial situation in relation to court security is improving (Gould, 2007).

Concerning Issues

Although generally effective, the court security procedures for court Alpha and court Bravo present some concerns. First, both courts currently allow staff to enter the courthouse with virtually no security screening. This provides the opportunity for anyone on the staff to bring weapons into the courthouse. One court even refuses to stop an employee if that person sets off the alarms. Because of the shortcomings associated with screening procedures, an employee could easily introduce any type of weapon into either facility undetected. The current procedures in both courts create an unnecessary security risk. Attorneys are also given special privileges in regard to screening procedures (Gould, 2007).

The lack of consistency in policies causes security concerns. Everyone entering the facility should be required to go through screening procedures regardless of position. The security policies for court Alpha and court Bravo show that each court is essentially reactive in nature with regard to security when they both should be proactive. Gould's review of the courts reveals that both courts have staffing and funding problems. In addition, one court is forced to mix authority and policy with multiple agencies thereby complicating security efforts. The review also shows that equipment issues exist and in cases where the appropriate equipment is in

place, it appears to be outdated. Camera stations at both courthouses remain unmanned or at the very least, understaffed (Gould, 2007).

Several other key areas in both facilities also appear to be understaffed or unmanned in some cases. Both facilities rotate inexperienced deputies through the courts and one court limits the tour of duty for security officers. The practice arguably prevents assigned deputies from gaining an effective level of competence before rotating out to another assignment. The other court allows senior deputies looking for an easy assignment to rotate back into court security positions to finish out careers. Only one court can detect organic materials and that ability is limited at best. In addition, only one court has access to an explosive-detecting canine. The valuable resource is underused and appears limited to major trials where security is actually considered a major concern. Although both courts are well-respected, details reveal that both court systems treat security with complacency in key areas thereby creating some serious concerns. Arguably, the complacent and reactive nature of both court systems indicates that more serious problems could have occurred within the courthouses or on the grounds of the facilities (Gould, 2007).

Barriers to Success for Security Procedures

Numerous security breaches existing at American courthouses indicate the need for revised security procedures. Despite the proactive security approaches of many American courthouses, ineffective procedures still exist because of various barriers to success. These barriers to success hinder the efforts of well-intentioned courts and the result is ineffective security procedures. Some of these common barriers are briefly outlined below.

Funding

Although a number of barriers prevent courthouses from implementing successful courthouse security programs, empirical data suggests there is little doubt that funding is by far the most significant issue. Nearly every courthouse facility identifies funding as one of its primary issues and admits to having difficulty in obtaining money for security purposes (Fautsko et al., 2013b). Because of the problem, stakeholders need to be aggressive in seeking out funding. Fautsko et al. (2013c) add that funding is often particularly difficult for courthouses in smaller jurisdictions. They also note that courts need to remain persistent in requesting funds rather than waiting for a major incident to occur before asking. The authors go on to say it is not a matter of if a major incident happens, but rather, when.

Raftery (2007) argues that leaders must place public safety above all else. The author says that many leaders view the costs of safety as too high politically and economically so security measures are often overlooked. Sarre and Prenzler (2012) weigh in on this argument and note that for those ignoring safety issues, potential civil liability awaits. They argue that inaction creates a dangerous environment for anyone within the court facility and that this represents a breach of duty. As an example of liability, Dow (2007) notes that King County Washington spends approximately six million dollars annually just on entrance screening and settled a lawsuit related to ineffective courthouse security. King County paid \$1.6 million dollars to the plaintiffs in the action. Although the aforementioned case settled in 1996, this is an example of how proper funding may have enabled this agency to provide a higher level of security in their courthouse and therefore, avoid any liabilities.

Other scholars also recognize funding as the most significant barrier for courts aiming for effective security. Gould (2007) says that despite the incidents that have occurred, many justice system leaders are still fighting a battle to convince legislators and even court officials that security improvements are needed and are practical. Miller et al. (2007) recognize that funding is a typical issue for courthouses. They argue that governmental officials need to find creative ways to provide more funding for court security efforts. Such funds would be allocated to hiring more staff, training, purchasing equipment, implementing intervention programs, and conducting research. Among the shortcomings that affect our courts, Zaruba (2007) also views funding as the major problem and notes the importance of writing aggressive security budgets.

Part of the reason that court security funding is such an issue is because it has to compete with budget requests for other critical resources within the court system. Court managers understand this so security funding becomes a balancing act and forces compromises to be made. Unfortunately, these compromises (in some cases) have proven to have deadly results (Campbell et al., 2007). Dow (2007) adds that although equipment costs can be significant, the real costs associated with court security arise from hiring staff, training them, and paying out salaries associated with the security personnel. Costs associated with staffing are considered part of the security budget. Fautsko et al. (2013b) add that frustrations resulting from funding issues tend to cause complacency among security officials but they warn court leaders to remain vigilant and proactive when requesting money. Courts should not settle for anything less than a continuously evolving series of security improvements within the system.

Before moving on to other forms of barriers, it is relevant to briefly mention where funding for courthouse security comes from. City, county, and state governments are the primary sources of funding for most courthouses. However, the percentages those sources provide differ

and additional sources are also available. A survey showed that 51.3% of courthouse security funding comes from county governments with another 30.9% coming from the states. City governments also contribute to security efforts with approximately 7% of the funding. Rounding out government sources, the federal government provides a measly 2.9% of the funding. Another 7.8% of funding comes from miscellaneous contributors with an additional .1% coming from private sources. Finally, 12.2% of the courts surveyed indicated that a portion of filing fees provide a source of security funding for their facilities. In other words, more than 87% of courts could generate additional funding by simply introducing a program that allocates a portion of filing fees toward security initiatives. A well-planned program like this could provide a significant portion of funds necessary to upgrade security procedures and equipment (Fautsko et al., 2013c).

Additional Barriers

Although funding is certainly the most prevalent barrier, courts face other issues that hinder security efforts. Under the architecture umbrella several barriers surface that adversely affect security. First, the geographic location of a courthouse can impact security. According to the GAO (2011), location matters. The GAO says that courthouses located in border-states often deal with different issues than facilities in other locations. For example, a border-state courthouse may see a higher number of drug-related cases and therefore, the high-profile nature of some of these cases place additional demands on security efforts; for example, additional staffing for the trials. Geographic location can also cater to or hinder courthouse designs. For example, the location of a courthouse may limit the availability of secure parking, can affect the number of access points, may dictate where entryways are located, and can limit the size of the facility. Each of these factors can potentially have an adverse effect on security procedures.

Another barrier under the architecture umbrella is the design specifications. Courthouses in some jurisdictions must follow design guidelines for certain characteristics such as barrier-free access, aesthetics requirements from the city, and fire safety guidelines. These requirements can affect how the building is designed and built and therefore, has an impact on security considerations. Gould (2007) says that aesthetic requirements sometimes force courthouses to remove safety barriers (bollards) outside the building in exchange for more appealing forms of barriers. These barriers are often less effective than a true bollard. An additional architectural barrier arises when a courthouse is designated as a historic building. When a courthouse is considered historic, upgrades and other modifications may either be denied or at the very least, must be compromised because of the designation. Denials for modifications or mandates for a compromise cause lapses in security. In addition, in the absence of denied requests or mandated compromises, some historic courthouses may not be able to physically support security modifications because of their age and design. Courthouse age and design therefore force compromises and subsequently cause lapses in security (GAO, 2011). The varying number of designs should not be allowed to affect security efforts because courthouses of any size, shape, or form face the same types of threats. Because the threats remain the same, security precautions should be consistent across the board regardless of design (Gould, 2007).

Courthouses that serve multifunction purposes also act as a barrier. The GAO (2011) says that out of the 424 federal courthouses in the nation, 201 of them share their building with other federal agencies. When the building is shared, security efforts must be coordinated with the other agencies that occupy the building and this can cause a number of issues. Examples might include disputes over who is in charge, disagreements on security measures that are in force or have been proposed, and managing multiple policies under one roof.

Fautsko et al. (2013c) venture in a different direction in regard to barriers to success and note that the size of the courthouse often matters. What they argue is that smaller courthouses often have more difficulty implementing fully effective security procedures because of issues such as funding and physical size of the facility. Funding has already been discussed but physical size can impose limitations on courthouse facilities as well. Examples might include dictating the number and location of entrances, limiting the placement (and therefore the effectiveness) of screening equipment, and constricting the flow of traffic in and out of the facility. These types of barriers theoretically expose smaller courthouses to serious risks that large courthouses may not have to address because the size of the larger facility eliminates the restrictions.

Another barrier is the firearms debate. Although the basics of this issue have already been addressed, its importance warrants a second look. Campbell et al. (2007) say that the firearms debate is still hotly contested in some jurisdictions. Law enforcement officers are among the most frequent attendees in courthouses so whether they enter armed or unarmed has attracted considerable attention from scholars and critics. In the absence of some form of rule or law, courthouses currently make their own decisions and policies on the firearms issue. It has already been established that some law enforcement administrators do not feel comfortable inside courthouses if the security officers are not armed. However, it has also been established through empirical data that some of the courthouse shootings are the direct result of an officer inside the facility losing possession of his or her firearm to a suspect. Facts like this are at the root of the firearms debate and will most likely continue to cause concern from advocates and opponents.

Section III. Theoretical Framework

The value of criminological theories cannot be understated. Tillyer and Eck (2011) say that criminological theories play an important role in explaining the reasons for occurrences of crime. The authors also say that criminological theories reveal variations in crime trends over time and can assist in explaining variations in the crime rates of different cities. In addition, the authors note that criminological theories assist in assessing difference in the risks of becoming a crime victim. Applying several criminological theories to the problem of courtroom violence offers some possible explanations for why the crimes occur. Reviewing some of the applicable criminological theories also offers some information that could be useful in preventing courthouse violence.

Routine Activities Theory

The Routine Activities Theory (RAT) has applications for explaining a wide range of crimes and more specifically, applies to reasons for violence. Besides the obvious application to courthouse violence, crime prevention experts have also used RAT as a framework for developing crime prevention strategies (Tillyer et al., 2011). RAT is a criminological theory first proposed by Cohen and Felson. The theory essentially proposes that the bulk of criminal activity occurs during the routine daily activities of individuals and that is when criminals seize the opportunity to commit a crime (Tibbetts & Hemmens, 2010). Hollis, Felson, and Welsh (2013) clarify that routine activities include the daily activities of people and that for RAT to apply, the convergence of three primary factors must occur. RAT requires a motivated offender, a suitable victim, and the lack of capable guardianship and these factors must converge in space and time. When the elements converge, crime occurs. Tibbetts et al. (2010) says that disrupting the

convergence of any of the three elements can prevent crime from happening. Courthouse security becomes important because effective procedures have the potential to disrupt the cycle. The guardianship role is an important element of RAT for law enforcement to consider. Guardianship is a human presence that through an intentional or unintentional action does something that prevents a crime from occurring (Hollis et al., 2013).

The aforementioned empirical data and detailed descriptions of violent courthouse events clearly establish the first of the three elements in RAT, a motivated offender. The supplemental information provided regarding the number of threats received by courthouses and their officials every year supports the presence of motivated offenders. The second element of RAT is the presence of suitable victims. The daily presence of court officials, judges, other court employees, and thousands of civilian visitors clearly reveal that there is not a shortage of victims for a motivated offender. Finally, the last element of RAT is the lack of capable guardianship. The weaknesses in court security that have been described throughout this paper definitively show that courthouses with ineffective security exist and therefore, establish that a lack of capable guardianship exists within these facilities (Tibbetts et al., 2010).

Tibbetts et al., (2010) note that law enforcement officers and other security professionals are frequently considered the capable guardians in relation to RAT. Therefore, the performance of these professionals can either complete or disrupt the three-element cycle in RAT. If the cycle is completed because of the lack of capable guardianship (ineffective court security), crime occurs. The completion of the RAT cycle then becomes a viable explanation for why violent courthouse incidents occur. If the cycle is broken (effective security), violent incidents in courthouses are prevented. When this happens, breaking the RAT cycle applies and serves as an explanation for why crime did not occur in the courthouse. Tibbetts et al. (2010) also note that

technology, alarm systems, dogs, and other tangible items can fall under the capable guardianship role. This means that security procedures and the equipment used to execute those procedures become a part of the completion or disruption of the three-element RAT cycle. Forecasting which individuals are or will become motivated offenders with certainty is not realistic. In addition, civilian attendees and court staff will always be present in the courtroom to a certain degree so some level of suitable victim will most likely exist. Because of these two factors, the amount of control that law enforcement can impose on these two elements of RAT is debatable. As noted above, the key to prevention is breaking the RAT cycle so law enforcement needs to focus efforts in each of the three RAT areas in an effort to disrupt the cycle. For example, focusing on behavioral clues may help recognize individuals that may be motivated offenders. However, Hollis et al. (2013) say that recognizing motivated offenders in public space is a difficult challenge in comparison to a privatized space. Law enforcement can also impose some form of control in the suitable victim category. For example, reducing the exposure of the courthouse staff to members of the public may reduce the number of suitable victims for a motivated offender. In the long run, because courthouses are public, law enforcement will always face an uphill battle when it comes to securing the courthouse and for that reason, every effort to make security procedures as effective as possible needs to be taken.

General Strain Theory

Strain (stressors) in an individual's life causes emotions and forces a person to cope. When legitimate forms of coping strategies fail to work or are unavailable, illegitimate behavior results (Broidy, 2001). Huck, Lee, Bowen, Spraitz, and Bowers Jr. (2012), explain that Agnew's General Strain Theory (GST) says deviant behavior and crime are directly connected to the types of strain and forms of stress that a person experiences in his or her life. Therefore, criminal

activity is the way that individuals deal with accumulated stressors. GST recognizes three types of strain; failing to achieve valued goals, loss or removal of positive stimuli, and the presence of negative stimuli (Broidy, 2001). Zavala and Spohn (2013) add that the presence of these three factors promotes anxiety, anger, and even depression and that each increases the chances for criminal behavior. However, strain does not automatically result in criminal behavior because some individuals possess the ability to cope with negatives and mitigate them. Various forms of anger contribute to criminal behavior when a person cannot cope and the likelihood of criminal behavior becomes more prevalent (Broidy, 2001).

Differences in strain across gender also exist and potentially relate to violent acts committed within American courthouses. Previous empirical data reveals that males are frequently responsible for courthouse shootings and therefore, understanding how strain affects males becomes important. According to Broidy (2001), males tend to be more concerned with material forms of success and this leads to criminal activity including violent crime. In addition, males generally engage in more frequent conflicts versus females and therefore, are also more likely to be victims. Males also are more likely to respond to stressors with anger versus females that have tendencies to become depressed. Finally, when strain (stressors) accumulates and males are unable to cope, the lack of reaching a goal(s) can often result in violent crime.

The male response to stress makes GST potentially important for explaining the occurrence of violent incidents in courthouses. As an example, detailed descriptions of shooting incidents provided earlier reveal that many of the male suspects had some form of documented family dispute happening that arguably contributed to the incident. Family disputes such as divorce, child custody issues, parenting time arguments, child support claims, and alimony arguments cause strain on the male. Although females involved in these arguments also

experience strain, information just documented reveals that females would generally respond to these stressors with non-violent responses such as depression. Conversely, males tend to respond to the example stressors with anger followed by violence (Broidy, 2001). An example of a violent response could be a shooting incident at the courthouse. As statistics show, targets for the violence range from a spouse or significant other to law enforcement, judges, and even civilians. The outbursts of anger are the result of the male's inability to cope with the stressor and therefore, GST becomes an applicable theory for explaining the crime.

Social Disorganization Theory

Leading theorists for the Social Disorganization Theory (SDT) are Shaw and McKay. The basic premises of SDT are that the failures of social institutions within the community cause a breakdown in social control. The loss of social control (the breakdown of the community) subsequently is the cause of crime. In simpler terms, when a community becomes disorganized because of loss of control the disorganization causes crime to occur. Examples of social institutions that promote control include the church, schools, family, governmental entities, and community groups (Tibbetts et al., 2010). Alanezi (2010) adds that the breakdown (or changes within the community) are rapid and dramatically affect the ability to exercise formal and informal control. The author also explains that a more recent definition of social disorganization is the absence of common values and effective social control within a community or neighborhood. Barnett (2002) adds that income variances also affect the disorganization levels of a given community or section of it. If income is low in a community or area, that particular location is generally more disorganized and therefore, more prone to criminal activity. The author also notes that one of the key social institutions within the realm of control is the family.

When that breaks down, criminal activity can even surface in generally organized communities or neighborhoods.

SDT has applications for explaining violence in the court systems. Alanezi (2010) says that crime as well as delinquency increase when law enforcement systems serving as social controls are weak and ineffective. Therefore, if court security is ineffective, the probability for crime to increase within the judicial system increases. The author also explains that the absence of social control promotes crime. As previously demonstrated by empirical data, many courthouses do not have any security at all and therefore, an absence of social control within the facility exists. SDT also applies to court violence through a connection to funding and basic resources. Smaller communities often lack the funding and resources necessary to impose social control and therefore, are more susceptible to criminal activity. Previous information revealed that courts in smaller jurisdictions often have significant problems with funding and other resources and therefore, SDT may offer a viable explanation for the incidents in these facilities (Barnett, 2002).

Rational Choice Theory

Two notable theorists connected with the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) are Cornish and Clarke and the theory basically involves a reward versus punishment process. RCT says that offenders make a conscious decision to commit a crime and it involves the same cognitive processes as other behavioral choices that are not criminal in nature (Tibbetts et al., 2010). Within the cognitive process are two decision-making systems. The first part of the cognitive process involves decisions that are made based on intuition, do not involve much reasoning, and are greatly influenced by emotions. The second level of the cognitive process involves high

levels of reasoning, requires a great deal of effort, and is slow and deliberate. RCT suggests that this process is used when making decisions about legal or illegal behaviors and that the entire process is essentially a cost versus benefit analysis that occurs before making a choice. When a person is considering criminal activity he or she works through the cognitive process. If the individual believes that the potential benefits of the action outweigh the costs, the decision to act is likely forthcoming (Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009).

The connection between RCT and courthouse violence can be demonstrated through a theoretical example. Assume that a potential offender wants to eliminate an individual in the courthouse. Prior to committing the violent act, the individual works through the cognitive process described above. Depending on the result of that process, the violent act will either occur or the would-be offender will find enough reasons not to commit the act. If the would-be offender believes the benefit of the act (eliminating a target in the courthouse) outweighs the cost of the act (getting caught, killed, or committing suicide), he or she will act. A reasonable person would most likely argue that none of the cost options outweigh the potential benefit but according to Paternoster et al. (2009), not everyone reasons in the same manner and therefore, variations in the end decision occur. In other words, varying perceptions about the pain and punishment that result from the crime contribute to the decision. This explains why some individuals might come to the conclusion that the benefit outweighs the cost. In addition, Dugan, LaFree, and Piquero (2005) note that when individuals use the cognitive process to weigh the costs of getting caught, that thought process focuses not only on apprehension, but also on the severity of the punishment. What this means is that some individuals may decide that apprehension, conviction, and incarceration is an acceptable result provided that the severity of the incarceration is not excessive.

The theories detailed above do not represent the only applicable theories in relation to courthouse violence. As demonstrated, several theories apply so depending on viewpoint, a particular theory may apply at any given time. In addition, it is commonly accepted that a single criminological theory is not capable of explaining all forms of crime. It is partly for this reason that many theories exist.

Section IV. Model Proposal for Courthouse Security

Effective court security involves protecting the physical safety of courthouse staff and visitors. Successful security requires effective procedures, staffing, physical environments, and the resources needed to accomplish those goals (Cooper, 2007). Research shows that for staff and visitors to be safe, effective courthouse security is essential. Empirical data also reveals that significant weaknesses are present within many of the country's courthouse facilities and adversely affects security efforts. Empirical data about existing weaknesses and successful practices can be utilized to create the basis for a blueprint of effective courthouse security.

Blueprint for Model Courthouse Procedure

An effective security plan has to be comprehensive, detailed, and must attempt to plan for any type of incident that could occur within the courthouse or on the grounds of the facility. Depending on the source, essential requirements for an effective security plan will differ. Previous information provides an extensive list of essential features and practices that courthouse facilities need to implement for effective security. The forthcoming information discusses some practices, options, equipment, and other essentials for a courthouse security plan. Following the discussion are the basic requirements for a model security program.

Courthouse Design, Location, and Exterior Features

Ideally, security considerations should be incorporated into new facility construction when possible. The design of a new courthouse facility must include plans for three individual zones; public, private for judges and staff, and secure for prisoner areas (Board for Judicial Administration Court Security Committee, 2009) (BJACSC). A number of essential architectural

features allow new facilities to provide the best chance for a safe facility. Examples of key architectural features include a single public access point, a separate judicial entrance, secure parking facilities for staff, and amply-sized lobby spaces that cater to the requirements of screening procedures and equipment. In addition, new facilities should provide public waiting spaces large enough to accommodate individuals from opposing parties and secure locations for holding detainees. Finally, the construction of new facilities has to account for locations where people could hide or areas that might be blind spots and eliminate them (Hardenbergh, 2004, CSCAO, 2008, Fautsko et al., 2013b).

Zaruba (2007) includes eight zones of security for consideration when constructing, renovating, or assessing a courthouse facility. The zones start with the exterior of the facility and work inward. The author's security zones are site and parking, building perimeter, public areas, staff locations, courtrooms, judicial chambers, prisoner holding zones, and facility support areas. Each area is equally important and security considerations within those areas should remain at the forefront of any plans. The author adds that many states have online court security guidelines and standards to follow as a reference when constructing or renovating a facility.

The BJACSC (2009) recommends that every courthouse has physical barriers outside the facility that limit approach and access of vehicles. Fautsko et al. (2013c) recommend the installation of cement bollards for these physical barriers. Bollards should be able to withstand impact from a 4,000 pound vehicle traveling 30 miles per hour. Other options for barriers include drop-arms, impact-resistant beams, and reinforced cement walls. All barriers should be designed to create a 100-foot setback from the courthouse (CSCAO, 2008). Secure parking was mentioned as an essential element of security (Fautsko et al., 2013c) and the BJACSC (2009) adds the recommendation that parking areas should be fenced, well-lit, and have controlled gate access

using key cards. When impractical, the alternative is to designate reserved parking spaces and provide foot patrols to monitor the spaces. The patrols should be conducted by licensed law enforcement officers.

Additional scholars make some more miscellaneous recommendations for consideration. The NSA (2014) recommends using the location of a facility and natural barriers as an advantage when practical. For example, rivers, cliffs, ravines, and other topographical conditions can add to the effectiveness of security. The NSA admits that natural barriers may only slow down intruders and recommends using other types of barriers in conjunction. For example, using a natural barrier such as a steep hill in conjunction with a lighted fenced area at the top would be better than just the hill. Another example of a combination of barriers would be a courthouse with a river on one side that is monitored by a closed-circuit television system.

Some courthouses may have loading docks or receiving entrances for deliveries. For those that do, it is recommended that these locations have the equipment and personnel to conduct full screening on any incoming packages or personnel entering the facility. This includes metal detectors, explosives detection equipment, and x-ray capabilities. Finally, multi-function facilities should be avoided if possible because they create specific problems for security. As previously mentioned, problems might include multiple agency heads trying to implement security procedures, disagreements over responsibilities, and arguments over access (BJACSC, 2009). Finally, the CSCAO (2008) recommends an aggressive approach to security outside the facility. Effective perimeter security includes at minimum a state-of-the-art video surveillance system and staff working inside the courthouse to monitor it. In addition, perimeter security can be enhanced by incorporating roving foot patrols.

Courthouse Interior Features

A major decision that needs to be made and adhered to regarding the courthouse interior is whether or not firearms will be allowed inside (Zaruba, 2007). Several scholars and organizations (Hardenbergh, 2004, Baehler et al., 2005, Perkins, 2006, BJACSC, 2009, Fautsko et al., 2013b) recommend a strict policy that clearly prohibits firearms inside the courthouse. The policy includes law enforcement officers and other security staff. Once the policy is implemented it must be strictly enforced. Courts must also make decisions about other forms of weapons inside the facility including Tasers, tactical batons, knives, and aerosol chemical restraints. Each of these weapons is a common tool carried by law enforcement and security officers. Although policies must be made in regard to less lethal weapons, firearms are clearly the most relevant to the shooting incidents.

Limiting the public access points to one has already been discussed in the architecture section but several key interior features are directly linked to this critical feature. Fautsko (2008) says that a single public access point is critical because it funnels the public through one screening area. Screening stations are essential (Fautsko et al., 2013b) and must have magnetometers, x-ray machines, handheld screening wands, duress alarms, and a closed-circuit television camera system as tools (BJACSC, 2009). In addition, key registration is an important aspect of a secure courthouse. Courthouse staff should maintain accurate lists of individuals that have standard keys to the facility. In the event a person is terminated, quits, or retires, the individual should be responsible for returning the key. Every effort should be made to retrieve the key. If the courthouse cannot get a key back from a former employee or if a key comes up missing, the courthouse should change locks (CSCAO, 2008).

Several other interior features are important for effective courthouse security. Every courtroom should have bench seating that is mounted to the floor. Fixed bench seating prohibits someone from using a chair as a weapon (CSCAO, 2008). Fautsko (2008) recommends that staff members enter the facility through a secure access point requiring key cards. The author also adds that staff needs to be screened just like the members of the public and recommends against bypass privileges. Fautsko et al., (2013b) reiterate the necessity for all staff to be searched. Finally, officers coming to the court to testify will be armed. To accommodate the zero-firearms policy Hardenbergh (2004) says that every courthouse should provide a secure gun lockers for officers. When an officer comes to court, he or she needs to place the firearm in a secure locker for the duration of the visit.

The BJACSC (2009) makes some additional recommendations for the interior security of courthouses. In conjunction with the screening process, courts should post advisories that advise individuals of what can and cannot enter the facility. To further strengthen security, courthouses need to account for more thorough searches of people suspected of trying to bring in weapons and should have a secondary process for locating contraband. Therefore, every courthouse needs to have access to a private area where same gender personnel can conduct thorough searches of suspected individuals. Finally, an area to securely store confiscated items must be present in every courthouse. Confiscated items should be handled in the same fashion as any other form of evidence to ensure chain of custody is kept. The CSCAO (2008) says that any person refusing to be searched or screened should be denied access to the courthouse and escorted off the facility grounds.

Technology

Much of the technology needed for effective security has already been discussed and does not need to be touched on again. Examples of such technologies include closed-circuit television surveillance, magnetometers, x-ray machines, handheld metal detectors, and explosive-detecting equipment. In addition to these essentials, some other forms of technologically advanced tools are available to enhance security efforts even more.

A common example of a simple technology used to identify employees is a badging system. The badging system provides a simple but uniform method for identifying employees. Employees are issued identification badges with pictures on them. Anyone desiring to verify the status of a person inside the courthouse can look for the badge. If a person is displaying the badge, their identity can be verified by comparing the person to the photograph on the card. Badges can also be more technologically advanced and can have bar codes attached to the cards. The bar codes can be scanned to verify identity and the cards can double as a cardkey for electronic access to points within the courthouse. In conjunction with the keycards, an electronic reader must be present in the courthouse. The keycard reader allows an employee to swipe the card and gain access to a location. Notwithstanding the advantages of a badging system, it is common sense for employees to display some form of visible identification at all times. Numeric PIN (personal identification number) pads are also an option for courthouses. A PIN pad allows an employee to enter a specific set of numbers to gain access to a courthouse location. One problem associated with the PIN system is its susceptibility to compromise (CSCAO, 2008).

Another technology that is quickly becoming popular is biometrics. The use of biometric technology involves using unique physical characteristics for identification purposes. Readers

can be installed throughout the courthouse and can identify a person through a number of options including fingerprints, retina scans, and facial recognition. Fluoroscopes are also gaining popularity and can greatly enhance screening abilities inside a courthouse. A fluoroscope is a device that can provide an x-ray image or view of weapons, explosives, and other forms of contraband that a person might be carrying (CSCAO, 2008). Finally, portable explosives detectors are now available because of advances in technology. The detectors are roughly the size of a small suitcase so they are very portable. Based on preprogramming, vapors emitted by trace explosives can be detected and will set off alerts. Early in the development of this tool there were problems with false positives but those issues have been eliminated as technology has progressed (NSA, 2014).

Supervision, Authority, and Policy Considerations

The first consideration for administrators is to make a decision about who is in charge of courthouse security. Fautsko et al. (2013b) say that the clear choice among scholars is that law enforcement is in charge. Federally, the USMS would be in charge and for most county courthouses the sheriff's office handles security. Once a decision has been made about who is in charge, the next step is to establish a security committee and appoint a coordinator (BJACSC, 2009). Ortwein (2007) refers to this position as the Director of Emergency Management (DEM). As previously noted, a security committee involves key members from multiple areas including the sheriff's office, the courts, and the county commission. Without a security committee, assessing the needs of the courthouse is virtually impossible (Fautsko et al., 2013b). Court security committees meet on a regular basis, discuss the needs of the courthouse, and make recommendations on courses of action (Zaruba, 2007).

In conjunction with the court security committee, the Sheriff needs to write and implement policy. Standard operating procedures (or policy) are one of the key points in a ten-point blueprint the National Center for State Courts developed in relation to court safety and security (Reichert, 2005). In other words, thorough policy is essential for effective court security. Campbell et al. (2007) note that the involvement of a security committee is critical to policy. Key elements need to be addressed in the security plan via policy. According to the BJACSC (2009) some of these key elements include screening procedures, weapons storage and policy, high-risk trial policies, court security officer duties, and detainee movements. The BJACSC also recommends policies on incident reporting, emergency evacuation, and minimum staffing requirements. It is common for policy to be very detailed and include specific language for many procedures. Fautsko et al. (2013d) recommend forming a task force dedicated to policy. The authors say that the task force must draft policies for law enforcement and security, facilities management, response to emergency situations, screening protocols, overall security operations, definitions of contraband, and contingency plans for active-shooters.

In conjunction with policy, court security staff needs to consider public relations, community education, and community partnerships. Effective policy should address methods for approaching each of these sensitive areas. Public cooperation depends on opinion and opinion is affected by the level and effectiveness of community education and partnerships. In other words, a court that educates civilians and forms partnerships with community members helps itself. If policy addresses how to involve and educate the community about security needs, the court has a better chance of getting what it needs (Campbell et al., 2007).

Staffing

At the most basic level, Fautsko (2008) recommends that at least one security officer is present inside the courthouse at all times. In addition the author advises that another officer should remain at the entrance during operation hours and no less than one roving officer should be conducting random walk-throughs of the courthouse facility. The 2014 NSA report states that adequate staffing is the key to the physical security of the courthouse and the safety of its occupants and that human presence is the core of effective security procedures. The NSA stresses that officers on staff must be physically capable of performing the essential functions of the job. The NSA says that many courthouses fail in this area because they allow aging officers that are not physically or mentally capable of handling the job work in the facility. What it boils down to is that courthouses need to have an adequate number of staff on hand at all times and they need to be physically capable of doing the job. It is possible to supplement the staff with the addition of canines. As previously noted in the courthouse security comparison, both of those facilities fell short in this areas and only used canines sparingly. The NSA (2014) recommends that courthouses use canines as a regular part of the staff. If a sheriff's office does not have a canine, it should get one and a regular part of duty should include courthouse security.

Training

Training must be relevant, consistent, aggressive, and of high quality for security to be effective. Security staff must train for every possible scenario that can be dreamed up. Many problems discovered during security assessments relate back to inadequate or non-existent training. In other words, courthouses are not training enough. To remedy this problem, courts should include the sheriff's office, security personnel, court staff, judges, and other stakeholders

in any training that relates to the safety and security of the facility. In addition to training from a scenario-based mindset, the courts also need to train on specific related topics (NCSCCS, 2007). Ideally, training for employees must begin as soon as practicable but the BJACSC (2009) recommends that the process start immediately after hiring and continue annually.

As it relates to shootings, training is extremely important and Fautsko et al. (2013b) note that active-shooter training is essential for every courthouse. Included in the training should be role playing and scenarios that incorporate as realistic of a situation as possible. Active-shooter training should also include any agencies or entities that might be called upon for mutual aid during a real-life event. A portion of the training should also be dedicated to familiarizing everyone involved with the layout of the courthouse. The authors also say that all court staff can be trained to recognize suspicious behavior and to pick up on indicators that potential problem-people exhibit. As a supplement to regular training the authors recommend regular drills that also practice responses to violent events. All court personnel should participate in these drills. According to Fautsko et al., (2013b) regular training should be conducted in relation to communications. It is possible to incorporate communications into other relevant training but the key is to make sure that everyone understands how to communicate effectively during normal operations or when a major incident is occurring. Finally, a part of the training regimen should include a regular debrief regarding incidents that have occurred in the courthouse. The debriefing includes incidents ranging from minor to major and needs to be conducted every three or four months and aids courthouse and security staff in devising strategies for improving procedures (Fautsko et al., 2013d).

Equipment

Equipment is essentially an extension of some of the features of the courthouse as well as the technology used within it. Several examples of previously unmentioned features and specific pieces of equipment warrant mention. Ballistic glazing is a feature that can be added to a number of items in the courthouse and can strengthen security efforts. Ballistic glazing is essentially a shell that can stop ballistic rounds from penetrating an object. Common objects that are coated with ballistic glazing include judge's benches, witness stands, jury boxes, walls, doors, and countertops. Glass can also be ballistic-rated and can be tinted or coated with a one-way mirror to help enhance security (CSCAO, 2008). The NSA (2014) also promotes the installation of bullet-resistant plastic shields inside of courtrooms. Shields can be placed to separate the spectators from the court staff, can be placed directly onto the judge's benches, and can be placed in any other location that security personnel deem necessary.

Although CCTV cameras have already been mentioned, certain pieces of equipment can improve the effectiveness levels. For example, equipping the CCTV with panning, fixed, variable, light enhancing, or black and white lenses can improve the quality of the picture. Door viewers (peepholes) is another simple piece of equipment that can be added to courthouse doors and will significantly improve a person's ability to see what is going on inside a courtroom without disrupting the proceedings. In addition to equipment in the courthouse, it is important for security officers to have what they need on their person. Most of these items have already been mentioned and include (in some cases) a firearm, Tasers, tactical batons, aerosol chemical restraints, handcuffs, knives, and two-way radios (CSCAO, 2008).

Security Model

The proposal below outlines the essential requirements necessary for effective courthouse security and is based on the previous work of Fautsko et al. (2013d). The authors based their work on a best-practices assessment of courthouses throughout the United States conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC). The NCSC assessment relied on internal expertise for their reviews but also utilized information from reputable organizations including the USMS, the NSA, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Transportation Safety Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Association for Court Management.

The Foundation

Every court needs to start by meeting three fundamental requirements necessary for effective security. The first requirement is to establish a command center in the courthouse for monitoring all facility activities. A command center concentrates the brains of the facility in one location and allows for ease in control and for effective monitoring. The next requirement is to conceive, write, and implement an extensive policy and procedure manual that outlines the entire security agenda. It is imperative that all policies and procedures within this manual are adhered to. The final initial requirement is to form a security committee. The importance of a security committee has already been discussed. The committee must meet on a regular basis to assess any security issues the courthouse faces and to devise solutions for those problems. Once these fundamental requirements are in place the remainder of the security plans can be built from that point on (Fautsko et al., 2013d).

Requirements in Detail

For new facilities, security considerations must be at the forefront of all design plans. The location of the facility, how the building will be protected on the outside, and what will be implemented for internal security all are very important. Once a location has been chosen, several initial considerations are surface. First, previous information shows that a new courthouse facility should not be used as a multifunction building. In other words, the only thing the building should be used for is the courthouse. Plans for the facility need to accommodate for separate and secure parking for court staff. The parking should include measures such as a security gate, a fence, and keycard access. Ideally, a security officer should also be in place during hours of operation. The need for a security guard can be eliminated if the secure parking is underground and is protected by a keycard-coded door. The outside of the courthouse should include protective cement bollards and have a minimum setback distance of 100 feet. A designated public parking lot is preferable but municipal spots may be available to accommodate the public. Ideally, the perimeter of the building needs to be protected by a high-quality CCTV system that is supplemented by roving foot patrols. The building should be designed to minimize or completely eliminate potential blind spots on the outside of the facility. Aesthetic features such as shrubbery should be positioned in such a way that it does not create a potential hiding or blind spot. Windows on the lower level of the building need to be high enough to prohibit anyone from gaining a clear view of person(s) inside the facility. Windows for the courtrooms and judge's chambers should be bullet-resistant and have one-way mirrored views so nobody can see inside the building from the outside. Ideally, the facility will have a separate entrance for courthouse employees. The staff will still be required to be screened by a security officer posted at that entrance during hours of operation. If the facility has a delivery area, that door should also

be secured and manned by an officer when deliveries are coming in. Any delivery person entering the facility will be screened as well as the packages they bring in (Fautsko et al., 2013d).

Moving to the inside of the facility, the first area that anyone entering the building should encounter is the screening area. Everyone entering the facility needs to be screened (Florida Sheriff's Association, 2014). The screening station(s) must be of appropriate size for the facility and should be able to accommodate the anticipated number of visitors without long delays. All screening stations need to be permanently staffed during hours of operation by a law enforcement officer specifically assigned to courthouse security. The screening stations should include magnetometers, x-ray machines, explosive detection capability, portable scanning wands, and have to be continuously monitored via CCTV. Stations should have storage areas for officer's weapons and for any confiscated contraband. Courthouses must have a secondary location to accommodate for more thorough searches of people suspected of trying to bring in weapons or contraband. The area should be private and ideally, any searches made will be conducted by a security officer of the same sex as the potential suspect. Anyone refusing to be screened or searched upon request will be escorted off the grounds of the courthouse (Fautsko et al., 2013d).

CCTV camera systems are imperative and will be present throughout the entire facility. The building should be equipped with duress or panic alarms in the judge's chambers and in each courtroom. Access to key areas inside the facility should be controlled by secure doors that require either a key card, PIN number, or some other form of security measure to gain access. Employees will be required to wear an employee identification card in a visible area at all times. In addition, employees must verify their identity upon request and will submit to a search upon request. The courthouse should have a designated prisoner holding area that is secure and staffed

by officers. During prisoner movements, officers will always be present. Each courtroom should have a minimum of one uniformed officer present during hours of operation with the sole responsibility of court security. During high-risk trials staffing levels will be increased. Canine officers should be available upon request and ideally, will make random but frequent appearances at the courthouse for security patrol purposes (Fautsko et al., 2013d).

Courtrooms need to have permanently mounted bench-style seating. Courtrooms should be of appropriate size to allow for a setback space between the judge's area, the jury's area, the witness stand, and the public area. Doors to the courtroom should be equipped with electronic locks and have peepholes for spot checks by security officers. In addition, the courtroom will be monitored by CCTV cameras at all times (Fautsko et al., 2013d). Security staff will make a daily check of the entire courthouse (including the building perimeter and courtroom inspections) and will test panic and duress alarms each day. In addition, security officers will regularly test security doors, lights, and telephone systems within the courthouse (CSCAO, 2008, Florida Sheriff's Association, 2014). The BJACSC (2009) says that critical equipment such as x-ray machines and magnetometers should have regular maintenance checks conducted by qualified technicians to ensure proper function. The organization adds that the courthouse needs to have a designated safe room for employees to go during an incident. After-hours access to the courthouse needs to be strictly monitored. Officers should conduct a sweep of the courthouse at closing time to make sure everybody is out of the facility and to ensure that no suspicious items or packages have been left behind. It is imperative that cleaning and maintenance personnel pass background checks prior to employment. The procedure helps eliminate the possibility of an after-hours employee introducing contraband into the facility. Background checks need to be updated at least annually (Fautsko et al., 2013d).

Section V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Unfortunately, violent incidents in American courthouses are not uncommon with some being fatal. There are in excess of 3,000 county courthouses in the country and about another 90 federal facilities. In a one-hundred year period ending in 2007, a total of 114 documented shootings occurred in courthouse within the United States. In addition to the severity of the shooting incidents, courthouses face other forms of violence all too often. Statistics show that assaults and threats are commonplace in courthouse settings and despite the efforts of law enforcement these incidents appear to be on the rise. In each decade since the 1970s, violence in court buildings has increased. Expert analyses of courthouse incidents, studies, and other empirical data clearly reveal that weaknesses in security procedures exist.

Assassinating a courthouse official is one of the leading motives for courthouse shootings and more than 75% of the firearms used in these incidents were brought into the facility from the outside. Statistics are also indicative of problems in security procedures. Theoretically, if security procedures had been able to prevent the weapons used in these incidents from getting into the courthouses, far less shootings would have occurred. In support of this assertion, during the first full year following the installation of metal detectors and improved security procedures, the courthouse in King County Washington confiscated 715 firearms.

Weaknesses in courthouse security run the gamut. Architecture and courthouse design play a role. For example, many older courthouses lack the advanced technology of new facilities and this shortcoming causes serious security problems. Perimeter security also surfaces as a major weakness. In a survey of courthouses, 92% of them had either no perimeter video surveillance or had systems that were of unacceptable quality. In addition, most courthouses

failed to incorporate regular security foot patrols outside of the building. Inside the courthouse, more than 70% of the facilities had lackluster screening procedures. From a supervisory standpoint, the sheriff's office is generally considered as the authority for courthouse security but arguments over who is in charge are frequent. More than 85% of courts do not have any type of formal security committee which causes additional concerns for the safety of staff and the general public. Most of the training for facility staff is not courthouse-specific and in general, there is a lack of equipment needed for effective security. Staffing shortages also plague many courthouses compounding security issues.

Successful courthouse security procedures incorporate a collective effort that starts at the perimeter of the building. The effort continues throughout each individual aspect of the security procedure. Courthouse design, use of technology, adequate staffing, effective screening procedures, and collaborative efforts all contribute to the success of security efforts. In addition, strict policy adherence, quality video surveillance, and aggressive staff training play key roles in creating a secure environment within the courthouse.

Many barriers to success also exist. The most significant challenge that courthouses face is obtaining the funding necessary to implement effective security. Many scholars agree on this point and recommend creative and aggressive strategies for obtaining funding. Additional barriers to success exist. For example, the location of the facility, its age, and the multifunction nature of many facilities each contribute to weaknesses in security. The debate over firearms policies also surfaces as a barrier to success. Most scholars appear to be advocates of disallowing all firearms inside courthouses but some officials (including chiefs and sheriffs) disagree with this assertion and continue to allow officers to carry guns into the facility.

Several criminological theories are applicable for explaining the violent events occurring in the nation's courthouse facilities. RAT has been widely used in explaining criminal activity but has specific applications for courthouse violence. The existence of willing offenders, the presence of suitable victims, and the lack of capable guardianship make up the RAT cycle. Each of these three elements is present within the court system and disrupting the RAT cycle is the only way to prevent violence from happening. In addition to RAT, GST applies to courthouse violence. GST says that strain forces individuals to use coping methods and legitimate efforts fail, violence is often the result. SDT can also be used to explain the occurrences of violence in courthouses. SDT posits that disorganized neighborhoods lack social control. The disorganization of communities and loss of control causes crime. Finally, RCT says that an individual uses the same cognitive process to make a decision about committing a criminal act as he or she would to engage in legitimate behavior. If the cognitive thought process leads the individual to believe the potential benefits of committing the crime outweighs the costs, the person will likely act criminally.

Providing effective security for a courthouse requires a collective effort from law enforcement and court employees. Paying particular attention to every conceivable detail is imperative because any weakness will be exposed and exploited by offenders. Key elements for effective security include solid facility design, quality perimeter security, and outstanding screening procedures. In addition to these essentials, courthouses must have well-trained and motivated staff that are properly equipped for the job. A big part of successful efforts depends on the acquisition of funding. Without funding, staffing levels drop, training decreases, equipment becomes outdated (or is not purchased at all), and security suffers. Although courthouse officials and law enforcement continue to make valiant efforts, statistics show that they are losing the

battle. Without significant revision of the security procedures in American courthouses it is likely that violence will not only continue but it will increase.

References

- Alanezi, F. (2010). Juvenile delinquency in Kuwait: Applying social disorganization theory. *Domes*, 19(1), 68-81. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/905719893?accountid=35812>
- Baehler, A., & Somerlot, D.K. (2005, June). Developing and evaluating courthouse security and disaster preparedness. *The Justice Management Institute*.
- Barnett, C., & F, C. M. (2002). Social disorganization theory and the contextual nature of crime in nonmetropolitan counties. *Rural Sociology*, 67(3), 372-393. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/199336598?accountid=35812>
- Birkland, T. A., & Schneider, C. A. (2007). Emergency management in the courts: trends after September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. *Justice System Journal*, 28(1), 20-35.
- Board for Judicial Administration Court Security Committee. (2009). *Washington state courthouse public safety standards 2009*. Retrieved from <http://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/securitystandards.pdf>
- Broidy, L. M. (2001). A test of general strain theory. *Criminology*, 39(1), 9-35. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/220695164?accountid=35812>
- Campbell, C. F., & Reinkensmeyer, M. W. (2007). The court security challenge: A judicial leadership perspective. *Justice System Journal*, 28(1), 49-VIII. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/194781084?accountid=35812>

Carchman, P.S. (2007). *Safety in the municipal courts, responding to a Supreme Court directive.*

New Jersey State League of Municipalities. Retrieved from

http://www.njslom.org/magart0507_p58.html

Chuck, E. (2014). *Bomb squad sweeping Georgia courthouse after shooting.* Retrieved from

[http://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/bomb-squad-sweeping-georgia-courthouse-](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/bomb-squad-sweeping-georgia-courthouse-after-shooting-n124591)

[after-shooting-n124591](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/bomb-squad-sweeping-georgia-courthouse-after-shooting-n124591)

Colorado State Court Administrator's Office. (2008). *Colorado courthouse security resource*

guide. Retrieved from

http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Financial_Services/Court_Sec

[urity_Resource_Guide.pdf](http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Financial_Services/Court_Sec)

Consalvo, M. (1998). "3 shot dead in courthouse": Examining news coverage of domestic

violence and mail-order brides. *Women's Studies in Communication*, 21(2), 188-211.

Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/198271258?accountid=35812>

Cooper, C. S. (2007). The evolving concept of "court security". *Justice System Journal*, 28(1),

40-VI. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/194782520?accountid=35812>

Dow, C. (2007). Citizens have a right to safety in the courthouse. *Justice System Journal*, 28(1),

36-V. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/194780987?accountid=35812>

Dugan, L., LaFree, G., & Piquero, A. R. (2005). Testing a rational choice model of airline

hijackings. *Criminology*, 43(4), 1031-1065. Retrieved from

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/220696558?accountid=35812>

Etter, G.W., & Swymeler, W.G. (2009). *Research note: courthouse shootings 1907-2007*. Retrieved from <http://hsx.sagepub.com/content/14/1/90>

Fautsko, T.F., Berson, S.V., Swenson, S. K., (2013a). *Courthouse security incidents trending upward: the challenges facing state courts today*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/163/filename/164.pdf>

Fautsko, T.F., Berson, S. V., (2013b). *Courthouse violence in 2010-2012*. Retrieved from <http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/182/filename/183.pdf>

Fautsko, T.F. (2008). *Entry screening: the court's first line of defense*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/facilities/id/117>

Fautsko, T.F., Berson, S.V., Swenson, S. K., (2013c). *Status of court security in state courts*. Retrieved from <http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/184/filename/185.pdf>

Fautsko, T.F., Berson, S.V., O'Neil, J.F., Sheehan, K.W., (2013d). *Steps to best practices for court building security*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/170/filename/171.pdf>

Feiner, E.A. (2007). *Securing our future*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/94/filename/95.pdf>

- Florida Sheriff's Association. (2014). *Model policy for: court security and bailiff duties*. Retrieved from <https://www.flsheriffs.org/uploads/Court%20Security%20Model%20Policy.pdf>
- Gould, J. B. (2007). Security at what cost? A comparative evaluation of increased court security. *Justice System Journal*, 28(1), 62-VII. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/194777925?accountid=35812>
- Government Accountability Office. (2011). *Federal courthouses, improved collaboration needed to meet demands of a complex security environment*. Retrieved from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11857.pdf>
- Hall, R. L. (2004). A courtroom massacre: Politics and public sentiment in progressive-era Virginia. *The Journal of Southern History*, 70(2), 249-292. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/215787743?accountid=35812>
- Hardenbergh, D. (2004). *The future of court security*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utis/getfile/collection/facilities/id/125/filename/126.pdf>
- Hollis, M. E., Felson, M., & Welsh, B. C. (2013). The capable guardian in routine activities theory: A theoretical and conceptual reappraisal. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, 15(1), 65-79. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cpcs.2012.14>

Howard, R. M. (2006). Balancing courtroom safety and free expression: Huminski v. Corsones.

Justice System Journal, 27(1), 107-V. Retrieved from

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/194777500?accountid=35812>

Huck, J. L., Lee, D. R., Bowen, K. N., Spraitz, J. D., & Bowers, James H., Jr. (2012). Specifying the dynamic relationships of general strain, coping, and young adult crime. *Western*

Criminology Review, 13(2), 25-45. Retrieved from

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/1037380127?accountid=35812>

Jameson, J., & Strudwick, K. (2009). Tensions in security partnerships: Observations of a city CCTV system and its partners on the ground. *Crime Prevention and Community Safety*,

11(2), 90-103. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cpcs.2009.1>

Lippert, R., & Walby, K. (2012). Municipal corporate security and the intensification of urban surveillance. *Surveillance & Society*, 9(3), 310-320. Retrieved from

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/1314692310?accountid=35812>

Miller, M. K., & Flores, D. M. (2007). Addressing the problem of courtroom stress. *Judicature*, 91(2), 60-69. Retrieved from

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/274692207?accountid=35812>

National Center for State Courts; Court Consulting Services. (2007). *A comprehensive emergency management program: a model for state and territorial courts*

2007. Retrieved from

<http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utls/getfile/collection/facilities/id/92/filename/93.pdf>

f

- National Sheriff's Association. (2014). *Court security resource guide*. Retrieved from https://www.flsheriffs.org/uploads/NSA_CourtSecResourceGuide.pdf
- Ortwein, C.E. (2007). *Director of emergency management: a case for a new court position*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/118/filename/119.pdf>
- Paternoster, R., & Pogarsky, G. (2009). Rational choice, agency and thoughtfully reflective decision making: The short and long-term consequences of making good choices. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 25(2), 103-127. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10940-009-9065-y>
- Perkins, G. (2006). *Protecting court staff: recognizing judicial security needs*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/facilities/id/120/filename/121.pdf>
- Raftery, W. E. (2007). Mini-symposium on court security: Editor's introduction. *Justice System Journal*, 28(1), 16-VIII. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/194776841?accountid=35812>
- Richert, D. (2005). Improving courthouse security. *Judicature*, 88(5), 233. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/274736494?accountid=35812>
- Sarre, R., & Prenzler, T. (2012). Issues in courtroom security: A key role for the private sector in Australia and New Zealand. *Security Journal*, 25(1), 25-37. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/sj.2011.3>

Taser International. (2014). *Taser products*. Retrieved from <http://www.taser.com/>

Tibbetts, S.G., & Hemmens, C. (2010). *Criminological Theory A Text / Reader*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.

Tillyer, M. S., & Eck, J. E. (2011). Getting a handle on crime: A further extension of routine activities theory. *Security Journal*, 24(2), 179-193. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/sj.2010.2>

United States Marshals Service. (2014). *Judicial security 2014*. Retrieved from http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/judicial_sec-2014.pdf

Walker, D.J. (2006). *Intelligent video technologies enhance court operations and security*. Retrieved from <http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/utills/getfile/collection/tech/id/580/filename/581.pdf>

Zaruba, J. E. (2007). Courthouse security-A direction or a destination? *Justice System Journal*, 28(1), 46-IX. Retrieved from <http://search.proquest.com/docview/194791875?accountid=35812>

Zavala, E., & Spohn, R. E. (2013). The role of vicarious and anticipated strain on the overlap of violent perpetration and victimization: A test of general strain theory. *American Journal of Criminal Justice: AJCJ*, 38(1), 119-140. doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12103-012-9163-5>