

ANGLO-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1891-1913

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
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
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South Africa



Southern Part of Portuguese East Africa



----- Railroads

CHAPTER I.

Historical Background.

England and Portugal have been linked together for six centuries by treaties, political and commercial, not only in Europe but especially in South Africa. England's oldest ally has had, through her colonies, an influence on the development of the British colonial empire, particularly during the late 19th century after Germany came into the arena as a colonizer.

The Portuguese colonies in Africa proper are composed of Angola on the southwest coast and Mozambique on the southeast with British territory now separating the two. The area of the two regions is 800,000 square miles with a population of about 8,000,000. In the hands of Portugal much of this land is of no value, but in the hands of a more powerful nation it might be dangerous to British interests. In addition to these possessions, Portugal owns part of Guinea and several islands off the coast of West Africa; Madeira, Azores, Cape Verde, San Thomé and Principe. The whole area of Portuguese possessions, therefore, includes about 845,000 square miles.

In the early commercial development of England, Portugal was a natural port of call for British ships. Even during the Crusades England had had interests there. In 1386 the Treaty of Windsor was signed forming a perpetual league of the two countries against all outside enemies, and guaranteeing the

territorial integrity of Portugal and later also of her overseas possessions.¹ This, England's earliest foreign alliance lasted down to modern times, largely through the workings of the balance of power doctrine.

The explorations by Portugal in the 15th century began under Prince Henry the Navigator, the main motives being slaves and gold.² The work of Diaz and later of Vasco da Gama opened the route to India and certain ports along the west coast of Africa to the countries of Europe; and although Portugal never penetrated into the interior to any great extent, her early influence can still be seen in the names of towns along the coast. Up to 1580 Portugal took an active part in the rivalry for Africa, but after that time her power began to wane. The Cape of Good Hope was no longer considered her sphere, and by 1652 only Angola, Mozambique and (very vaguely) the interior below the Zambezi,³ Manicaland and Monomotopa, were left to her.

Further extensions of the Treaty of Windsor took place in 1642 and 1661 when two new agreements were signed. The gist of the two may be summed up in the following quotation from the Treaty of 1661.

"The King of Great Britain doth promise and

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1. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, (London, 1906), vol. 20, p. 124.
 2. G.M. Theal, The Portuguese in South Africa, (London, 1896), p.80.
 3. Mozambique in Peace Handbooks, (London, 1920), no. 121, pp.25-26.

oblige himself to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present".⁴ Thus a further safeguard was accorded Portugal's African possessions, and one which worked to the benefit of Great Britain as well.

But no amount of treaties could help her develop the regions she had obtained. By the 18th century, Portugal was a broken nation as far as control over her colonies was concerned. As an illustration we find that when in 1720 the Dutch came to Delagoa Bay in Mozambique, always acknowledged as belonging to Portugal, they were able to build a fort there without any serious interference from the Portuguese.⁵

In 1703 another Anglo-Portuguese treaty was concluded making Portugal economically and politically dependent on England.⁶ By the 19th century these treaties, far from making relations between the two countries amicable, seemed to supply causes for friction and formed the basis for English interference in Portuguese colonial affairs in South Africa.

Difficulties began in 1823 when an Englishman, Captain Owen, occupied for the British some territory on the Tembe river,

4. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. I, pp.497-501.

5. Mozambique in Peace Handbooks, no. 121, pp.26 and 28.

6. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. I, p. 501.

ostensibly belonging to Portugal.⁷ He reported that a frightful slave traffic existed in this region and drew up treaties with the chiefs giving it to England.⁸ Portugal was unable to do anything about it, and the treaties were forgotten for a time by the English. But in 1852 when the exploration and settlement of the interior north of Capetown had been begun by the British, they realized the importance of Delagoa Bay as an outlet for the region and remembered Captain Owen's work. The Portuguese flatly refused to recognize any claims the English made to the territory, and in 1872 after the question had been coming up at intervals they agreed to settle it by arbitration. The President of the French Republic was chosen as arbiter and gave his decision in 1875.⁹ The Portuguese claims were strong and well presented. The arbiter decreed that Portugal should retain Delagoa Bay and the territory as far south as 26° 30' south latitude. The boundary was definitely settled to Portugal's satisfaction, the only restriction being that she was to let no third power gain a foothold in her possessions.

From 1880 until 1891 there was almost continual dispute and dissension between England and Portugal over boundaries and claims. A good part of this arose out of the explorations of Livingston and the attempts by Englishmen to extend the power of

7. Mozambique in Peace Handbooks, no. 121, pp.29-30.

G.M.Theal. The Portuguese in South Africa, p. 277.

8. Theal, The Portuguese in South Africa, p. 277.

9. Ibid., p. 285.

Britain northward without regard for Portugal's aspirations for a coast to coast empire.

Trouble first arose in the eighties over the Congo. In 1882, the International Association of the Congo had been formed¹⁰ by Leopold of Belgium for the exploitation of the Congo region. France and Portugal immediately began to assert claims to the mouth of the Congo. For centuries Portugal had claimed the West coast up to 5° 12' south latitude and inland indefinitely, and while no one had disputed her claim south of 8° latitude, no one¹¹ had recognized it around the mouth of the river. England took alarm, not wanting to see France gain any control as she discriminated against foreigners, and remembered that Portugal was an old commercial ally. The result was that in February, 1884, Britain signed a treaty with Portugal in which she recognized the Portuguese claim to both banks of the river up to Noki, free navigation of the Congo to all, and duties not to exceed those in Mozambique in 1877.¹² France and Germany were very opposed to the treaty feeling that it would hurt their trade in the regions under their control, and approached one another on the idea of a general conference to settle the question.¹³ England agreed as Granville knew that without the consent of these two nations no treaty like the above could stand.

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10. H.L. Hoskins. European Imperialism in Africa, (New York, 1930), p. 39.
 11. Ibid., p. 40.
 12. Ibid., p. 40.
 13. Ibid., p. 41.

The Conference was called at Berlin in the fall of 1884 and lasted until the spring of 1885. The decisions regarding the Congo were as follows:¹⁴

1. There was to be free navigation on all rivers in Africa including the Congo;
2. The neutrality of the Congo Basin was recognized and eventually the Congo was to be made a free state;¹⁵
3. France was recognized as supreme on the north bank and Portuguese control of the south bank up to Noki was accorded;
4. Portugal was given the coastal province of Cabinda (Kabinda).

A great deal of pressure had to be brought to bear on Portugal before she signed this agreement and recognized another power in control of the north bank of the Congo.

This was the first time that Germany was taken into consideration in African questions, and it might be said to serve as a precedent for future attempts to satisfy her in regard to Anglo-Portuguese relations in South Africa. In 1886 Portugal and Germany came to an agreement over the northern boundary of Mozambique.¹⁶ It was to follow the Rovuma river to its confluence with the M'Sinje and thence to Lake Nyasa. At the same time Germany recognized the Portuguese claim to the

14. British and Foreign State Papers, 1884-85, vol. 76, pp.4-56.

15. Bismark saw in this a way of preventing an armed conflict over the Congo Basin, also the restriction of Portuguese advance and the preservation of free trade.

16. British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter cited P.P.), 1890, cd. 5904, p. 7.

region between Angola and the Mozambique (Northern Rhodesia) as her sphere of influence. France had signed a treaty with Portugal delimiting boundaries six months earlier.¹⁷ Germany had good reasons for her acquiescence to Portugal's claims. She gained commercial privileges in Mozambique and Angola; the exploitation of the resources, Portugal being in no position to do so herself. Also, Portuguese control in the territory north of Cape Colony was a decided stumbling block to British aspirations. Germany, like Britain, would prefer the control by a smaller power of regions to which she herself could advance no claim.

By 1888 the Portuguese claims in South Central Africa were causing a great deal of anxiety in England, no less than the French, and German recognition of them. Portugal based these claims on a treaty dating from the 15th century with a certain Emperor Monomatopa, and they included Barotseland, Nyasa and the whole course of the Zambezi.¹⁸ In addition she claimed by this treaty that the coastal territory from the mouth of the Zambezi to Delagoa Bay extended westward to include Gazaland, Manicaland, and Mashonaland. The Portuguese ambition for a coast to coast empire is clearly seen. These claims had been strengthened by Major Serpa Pinto's expedition in 1877-78, and a second one under two officers of the Portuguese navy in 1884-5.¹⁹

17. P.P., ed. 5904, p. 4.

18. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

19. Mozambique in Peace Handbooks, No. 121, p. 31.

Needless to say, the majority of the claims were ridiculous. Portugal had done nothing toward exploiting or colonizing the region. The natives knew little or nothing about the existence of the treaties. There were no Portuguese at all at that time on the highlands north of the Limpopo, nor had a single individual of that region, as far as it was known, even visited the tribes there within the preceding century. In fact, Portugal's position on this question was most unstable. All of this was in direct opposition to English plans for a South African colonial empire. As early as 1887 Salisbury had warned Portugal that:

"Her Majesty's government can not recognize Portuguese sovereignty in territories not occupied by her in sufficient strength to enable her to maintain order, protect foreigners and control the natives".²⁰

It might be well now to inquire into the British claims to this region. The dispute between the two countries seemed to center around Mashonaland. In 1836, the British had concluded a treaty with Umsilagaas, a supposed ruler of all of Mashonaland.²¹ In 1888, Chief Lo Bengula, ruler of Metabeleland and Mashonaland, concluded a further agreement, whereby he promised not to enter into any treaty, or cede any land to another power.²²

20. P.P., 1890, LI, cd. 5904, p. 8.

21. Ibid., p.32.

22. Ibid., p. 32.

It was of extreme importance for the future of British development in South Africa that no chance be left for an outside country to come in and make arrangements for the possession of the territory extending westwards between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers. The Portuguese and the South African Republic were not in any position to effectually take control in the above mentioned region. The question as to who was to establish control over this valuable region was answered by Cecil Rhodes. In 1889 due to his efforts, a royal charter was given to an organization from then on known as the British South Africa Chartered Company.²³ Its powers were great and hampered by few restrictions, political or economic. The territory in which it was to act was not very strictly defined. Mr. Rhodes was appointed managing director, and in reality had complete control of the whole enterprise.²⁴

In 1889, Portuguese mercenaries under Major Serpa Pinto invaded territories believed to be under British protection, and occupied Shiré, Katunga and other places.²⁵ The operations of the British African Lakes Company in the Zambezi and Shiré regions were hindered. Roving bands were sent in to terrorize the natives and establish kingdoms in the above mentioned districts. In the same year, Portugal organized a new district of Zumbo

23. G.M. Theal. Progress of South Africa in the Century. (London, 1900), p. 451.

24. Ibid., p. 451.

25. P.P., 1890, LI, c. 5904, pp.149,204-205.

(where there had been an ancient fort) extending into Mashonaland, claimed by Portugal under the old treaty. Britain immediately protested this action, and Portugal replied with the following arguments; the treaty with Lo Bengula was the only obstacle to the Portuguese claims, all the tribes in this region were not under him, some were under the control of Gunguhana, who had signed treaties with Portugal; in addition Portugal had built forts in this region at an early date. Salisbury had previously stated in a dispatch to his representative in Lisbon that:

"All of Portugal's claims to this region are based on historical incidents, and it is notorious that they have done nothing up to date to really take over the region. Furthermore, no Portuguese invasion will be tolerated in the future".²⁶

Senhor Gomes replied that no attack on Nyasa and Shire had been authorized by the home government. In addition he believed that it had never been a part of the Berlin Conference that a country must have effectual occupation in order to claim a piece of territory.²⁷

Salisbury's patience was exhausted, and, in January of 1890, more or less of an ultimatum was sent to Portugal commanding her to recognize the claims of England or she would take measures necessary for the adequate protection of her interests.²⁸

26. P.P., cd. 5904, p.43.

27. Ibid., p. 36.

28. Ibid., p. 207.

The Portuguese, as shown by the correspondence, seemed rather surprised at this turn of affairs; they apparently had not realized the seriousness of the issue. Senhor Gomes, on behalf of his government, began to back down and stated that Portugal would be willing to treat with Britain on the matter under Article 12 of the Act of Berlin.²⁹ Salisbury did not feel that this was necessary as long as Article 12 could not apply to this case because the territories in question had not been placed under a free trade system.³⁰ Furthermore, he was disinclined to allow some other country, possibly having interests elsewhere in South Africa, to become involved in this affair. There was the danger that in this time of stress Portugal might join hands with either France or Germany against her old ally.

Salisbury had his way and in 1890 a convention was drawn up delimiting the respective spheres of influence.³¹ Following a great deal of discussion in the Cortes, with Salisbury pressing the issue, the convention failed ratification and was done away with altogether.³² Shortly after this event there was a change of ministry in Portugal and a modus vivendi was

29. Article 12 of the Act of Berlin states, "in case of a serious disagreement, originating on the subject of or in the limits of the territories mentioned in Act I and placed under the free trade system, shall arise between the Signatory Powers of the Present Act, these powers bind themselves before having recourse to arms to appeal to the mediation of one or more of the friendly powers". P.P., cd. 5904, pp.209,230.

30. Ibid., p. 231.

31. Ibid., 1890-91, cd. 6212, pp. 4-12.

32. Ibid., p. 26.

signed on November 14, 1890, by Salisbury and de Soveral, (Portuguese minister to London). It was to be active for six months. At the end of that time it was extended for a period of one month until the treaty negotiations were completed. The terms were practically the same as those of the previous convention. In brief, the two countries agreed to:

"Accept the territorial limits in the Convention of 1890 in so far that for six months neither power will make treaties, accept protectorates, or exercise any act of sovereignty within the spheres of influence assigned to the other party by the convention".

Salisbury made his position perfectly clear when he stated:

"The Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires has been told by me more than once that, after what has taken place, I would not sign on behalf of Her Majesty's government, any treaty until it had been ascertained by note that the Cortes would accept it."

On June 11, 1891, a general treaty was signed settling all the matters of dispute. The chief points with which this article is concerned are as follows:

1. The two powers are to give each other preferential rights to any land covered in the treaty if either

33. P.P., 1890-91, LVII, cd. 6212, p. 29.

34. Ibid., p. 37.

35. Ibid., 1890-91, XCVI, cd. 6375, pp. 1-9.

- wishes to get rid of it;
2. Neither power will have any rights in the sphere of the other power;
 3. Trade between east Portuguese ports and British Central Africa for twenty-five years shall not have more duty than 3% on exports or imports;
 4. Free transportation on all rivers;
 5. The promise by Portugal to build a railroad from Beira to Umtali and Salisbury, a distance of 380 miles;
 6. The construction of railways, bridges, telegraph connections, etc., to be made by both countries on the banks of the Shire and the Zambezi;
 7. In general, the territory gained by Great Britain was Barotseland and part of Manicaland. Portugal received the rest of Manicaland, Maceguese and most of Gazaland;³⁶
 8. Portugal can extend her administration outside of the Barotse kingdom;
 9. Portugal agreed to grant absolute freedom of passage between the British sphere of influence and Pungwe Bay for all merchandise of every description;
 10. The limits of the Barotse Kingdom are to be settled by a joint Anglo-Portuguese Commission.

This convention was a necessity for the continuance of

36. P.P., 1890-91, XCVI, cd.6375, pp.1-9.

good relations between the two countries. Since 1890, Portugal had not been living up to the terms of the modus vivendi and had been holding up British ships and subjects on rivers supposed to be free.³⁷ The Chartered Company had of necessity established police in the disputed region to render ineffective the continued attempts of the Portuguese, despite the Convention, to take control of the region. A great deal of bitter feeling was engendered during the eight months preceding the signing of the treaty.

By the summer of 1891 even Portugal had appeared anxious for a final settlement. According to George Petrie in Lisbon, "the change has come over public opinion in regard to the settlement of the differences with England is very striking and remarkable. The fact is, the bitter experiences of the last eight months and the present deplorable financial and industrial condition of the country have opened the eyes of all classes to the fact that Portugal committed an enormous error in rejecting the treaty of 1890, and that an error of that nature can not be repeated with impunity".³⁸

Despite the fact that 500,000 square miles of the best watered and most promising portions of Central Africa were added to the British sphere of influence, Rhodes still protested against the niceness of the scruples of Salisbury in his treatment of

37. P.P., 1890-91, LVII, cd. 6495, p. 99.

38. British and Foreign State Papers, 1890-91, vol. 85, p. 889.

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 Portugal. There may have been some truth in his charge, as Salisbury could well have had a fear that in taking too drastic steps against Portugal he would be laying some foundation for a revolution, which might spread to the more or less unstable thrones of Spain and Italy.⁴⁰ This treaty destroyed forever the Portuguese dream of a coast to coast empire. On the surface, the ancient friendship and alliance was restored between the two countries. But it was a number of years before the Portuguese public forgot that they had been forced to give up land, long considered theirs, by a more powerful country, ally though she might be. The result of this bitterness toward England was apparent at the opening of the Boer War.

Between 1891 and 1899 there were various minor agreements on African questions successfully settled by the two countries. There remained the settlement of the boundaries of the spheres of influence north and west of the Zambezi as stated in the Treaty of 1891. An agreement was signed in 1893 by Roseberry and de Soveral concerning this region pending the actual delimitation of the boundaries by an Anglo-Portuguese Commission. This was to last until June 20, 1896. (It was extended at that time with the consent of Salisbury until January 1, 1898).⁴¹ The main terms of the document were:

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39. Sir Harry Johnston, Common Sense in Foreign Policy (London, 1913), p. 77. The Chartered Company continued its political control of the region gained until 1898, when its power was greatly modified. Theal, Progress of South Africa, p.458.
40. Ibid., p. 77.
41. British and Foreign State Papers, 1892-93, vol.85, pp.65-66.

1. As soon as a definite demarcation is established and land is said to belong to one power, all concessions and rights of the other power in that territory shall lapse;
2. All disputes until the demarcation is complete shall be settled as amicably as possible;
3. Neither in Nyasaland, Loangwa or Barotse territories shall the modus vivendi be held as prejudicing in any way the ultimate rights of Great Britain or Portugal;
4. The modus vivendi shall continue until July 1, 1896, when after a notice of three months, it may be denounced by either government the work of delimitation to be begun before the three months are up;
5. Pending the actual delimitation boundaries were laid down in detail.⁴²

In December of 1898, Great Britain and Portugal accepted the delimitation of the frontier between the British and Portuguese spheres of influence north and west of the Zambezi; the work of the Anglo-Portuguese Commission.⁴³ Beacons were placed to show the actual delimitation.

The last real boundary dispute came in 1897 over the Manica land frontier and was settled by arbitration, M. Vigliani of Italy making the award. In general it was decided that no

42. British and Foreign State Papers, 1892-93, vol. 85, p. 66.

43. Ibid., 1898-99, vol. 91, p. 112.

land west of $32^{\circ} 31'$ longitude should be Portuguese, and none east of it should be British (along this one territory).⁴⁴ From this award, out of a total of 1656 square miles of disputed territory, Great Britain got 1337 and Portugal 319 square miles.

The conclusions to be drawn from all of the arrangements between Portugal and Great Britain are obvious; England gained a great deal more in actual territory than she gave. But it is apparent throughout their relationship in the eighties and nineties that Salisbury was unwilling to deal too roughly with the weaker ally. It is undoubtedly true that he could have gained more land than he did by a stronger insistence upon the rights of Britain in South Africa. That was the opinion held by many Englishmen, notably Cecil Rhodes. But it is also true that he realized that by so doing he would be endangering the very delicate balance which Portuguese control of strategic parts of South Africa maintained for Great Britain. As for Portugal, her position just prior to the Boer war was fairly satisfactory. She had two large colonies, rich in possibilities, encompassing all the territory that she could well take care of, and a formal alliance with England that, until 1898, was satisfactory.

44. British Foreign State Papers, 1897-98, vol. 89, p. 714.

CHAPTER II.

Portugal in Anglo-German Diplomacy 1898-1899.

The discussion of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 concerning the eventual disposition of the Portuguese South African colonies is important in the development of later Anglo-Portuguese relations for three reasons. First, it throws further light on the value attached to the ownership of the Portuguese possessions by three great colonial powers - the value of which England at least was becoming more and more aware as her relations with the South African Republics were evidencing continued strain. Secondly, it serves as a very strong incentive if not as a primary cause for the Portuguese anxiety to conclude their treaty with England, which finally came about in 1899. Thirdly, it serves as an indication of the English realization that German support in South African affairs, if not in world affairs, was a necessity, due possibly to the continued hostility of France and Russia.

The treaty of 1898, according to Sir Edward Grey, was made reluctantly as far as Salisbury was concerned, and only in deference to Germany's insistence.¹ Yet during this very year, Chamberlain at the Colonial office was making repeated attempts to bring Germany into conversations relating to a future alliance.

1. Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years, (New York, 1925), vol. 1, p.44.

It is not at all difficult to believe that this Anglo-German Agreement pertaining to the Portuguese colonies which was proposed by Germany, might have been thought by Salisbury and Chamberlain to be a step in the direction of an even closer concord between England and Germany.

The events which led to the conclusion of this treaty may be stated rather briefly. The finances of Portugal were in a deplorable condition. The interest on British and German loans was in arrears. It was in the expectation that Portugal would approach one of them for a further loan that the agreement was finally made. In 1897 Salisbury through Chamberlain undertook to assist Portugal in her financial difficulties and at the same time to guard Great Britain against an alienation of the Portuguese colonies in South Africa to the Transvaal or to any other power. The English statesmen feared that Portugal, in her anxiety to get foreign loans might mortgage her colonial possessions to some strong power, thus putting England at a disadvantage.

The subject was first discussed by Mr. Chamberlain (Colonial Secretary) and Mr. de Soveral (Portuguese ambassador to England) in the summer of 1897. The negotiations fell through; but the fears of the Germans had been aroused as to

2. British Documents on the Origins of the War, ed. by G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, 1898-1914, vol. I, p. 45.

3. Every proposal of Mr. Chamberlain included the revenues of Lourenco-Marques as security and the relinquishment of the right to grant concessions to any other power. De Soveral thought his government would consent to such terms, but he was mistaken. However, in looking elsewhere for a loan, Portugal found the same conditions existed. She also began to see more reason to suspect the German intentions in regard to her colonies than the attitude of the British. Ibid., p. 46.

England's motives. She had long felt that in the Transvaal at least, England meant to check German penetration. The discussions were revived with Messrs. Rothschild and Portugal asked for a loan of £200,000 to enable her to fulfil her obligations to the Credit Lyonnais. This also fell through; but negotiations for another arrangement were under way when Germany decided to take an active interest in the affair. The German Minister had an audience with the king of Portugal to discuss the matter and stated, "Germany will not continue on amicable terms with Portugal if these negotiations are carried on without a due regard for the legitimate interests of Germany in her African colonies"⁴. During the early months of 1898 Hatzfeldt (German ambassador to London) had been calling on Salisbury urging an Anglo-German agreement in regard to a loan to Portugal, based on the revenue of her colonies as security.⁵ Mr. Balfour in a letter to Sir Frank Lascelles says:

"His Excellency [Hatzfeldt] commented very earnestly on some observations I had let drop on a previous occasion respecting the general attitude of Germany towards this country, and her apparent indisposition to work cordially with us even when our interests appeared to be identical, as in China. He assured me in the strongest language that I was mistaken, and that his government was not only

4. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p.329.

5. Mr. Bertie, (Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) had the idea that German participation in a loan would be undesirable. His idea was for England to carry the loan herself and then have a secret note with Germany that if there was a break-up of the Portuguese colonies, Germany would receive certain specified portions of the spoil.

animated by the friendliest feelings toward Great Britain, but was prepared to regard this agreement about South Africa as a new departure of the happiest augury for the future relations of the two empires".⁶

De Soveral became anxious about these reported conferences (he later told Sir Edward Grey quite frankly that he knew all about them and about the secret treaty that grew out of them)⁷ and said that he understood that Germany was to have nothing to do with the loan. Balfour, then Acting Foreign Minister, replied that as far as England was concerned there were only three ways open to Portugal: 1. A loan direct from England; 2. from England and Germany;⁸ 3. from another Power. He added that Great Britain might not find the latter alternative to her liking as it could bring on an international control of Portuguese possessions. It was finally made very clear to M. de Soveral that the British Foreign Office hoped to make the second possibility a success.

The pressure of the German government on the Foreign Office, added to the effect of the contemporary efforts of Chamberlain to complete a more general Anglo-German rapprochement, resulted in the signing of the Anglo-German agreement of August 30, 1898, concerning possible loans to Portugal, and the appendant secret clauses. The terms were as follows:

6. Grey, Twenty-five Years, vol. I, p. 68.

7. Ibid., p. 45.

8. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p. 66.

9. Ibid., pp. 71-72.

1. Loans to Portugal were to be made as favorable as possible, and issued by the two governments jointly;
2. They were to be issued on the security of the customs revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Timor;
3. The regions assigned to Great Britain were Mozambique south of the Zambezi and Mozambique on the left bank of the Zambezi above its confluence with the Shiré to the central part of Angola; Germany was to have the rest;¹⁰
"The portion of the Province of Angola, of which the customs revenues shall be assigned to the British loan, is comprised within the following limits: the northern frontier shall run from the coast along the 8th parallel of south latitude to the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, thence it shall descend that degree to the 9th parallel of latitude, and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as the frontier of the Congo Free State. The Southern frontier shall start from a point on the coast five English miles north of Egito, and shall run thence due east to the eastern frontier of the Province of Angola. The western frontier shall be the sea; the eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit of the Province of Angola".
4. In case of default, each power would obtain the customs houses and concessions in their sphere only.

10. In general the territories assigned each country were adjacent to land they already controlled, England getting Southern Mozambique and northern Angola; Germany getting northern Mozambique and southern Angola.

5. "All rights whether German or British, acquired in the provinces affected before the date of this Convention shall be fully safeguarded, provided they are of a purely private character, and convey neither political rights nor territorial nor purely administrative. It is also understood that no influence will be used in the future, either by the British or German governments, to obtain fresh concessions, except in those portions of the provinces of which the customs revenues are assigned to their respective loans".

This agreement of course was strictly hypothetical, as it came into force only under certain conditions; and under no circumstances was Portugal to be coerced into ceding or pledging her colonies. It was not a secret treaty and was designed simply to warn away other powers.

Following the signing of the above convention a secret note was agreed to between Balfour and Hatzfeldt which read as follows:¹¹ "Whereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding convention of this day's date, it might unfortunately not be found possible to maintain the integrity of the African possessions of Portuguese South Africa, as well as those in Timor, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective sovereigns, have further agreed that:

1. No third power is to be allowed to loan money to Portugal

11. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p. 73.

- or intervene in any way in the territories above mentioned;
2. Neither country will advance a claim of any kind over territory assigned to the other;
 3. If Portugal lose in any way those territories, German and English subjects in each other's territories will have equal rights;
 4. In regard to rights now of English and Germans being safeguarded in those lands, it is understood between these two countries that this applies to the so-called Katembe concession and that Great Britain will be friendly in respect to the confirmation of this concession by Portugal to German."

A further secret note made provisions for any contingency that might arise:

1. If before Portugal has to give up land, either country gains any rights or concessions in their territory, they will not take advantage of them until the other country has gained them too;
2. Or if they apply for special rights, the same thing holds;
3. If the territorial divisions are not carried out exactly, at least Ambriz will go to Germany;
4. Germany is to get a geographic degree of territory be-

12. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.I, pp.74-75.

tween the southern extremity of the Congo Free State in the region of the Lunde and the northern frontier of the part of Angola assigned to Great Britain.

According to Brandenburg, Germany had expected that England by refusing to allow Portugal to use European sources of revenue as security for the loan would bring about the collapse of Portugal, and so hasten the moment when these colonies would be actually partitioned.¹³ But he goes on to state that Salisbury made it clear that "the treaty only bound him to interfere if Portugal mortgaged the customs in Angola and Mozambique for a loan; and there he was undoubtedly right."¹⁴ Salisbury's stand on the matter might be made clearer by the following quotation from a statement he made to Hatzfeldt on this agreement:¹⁵

"Our motive for action was to maintain the status quo in respect to Portuguese possessions, and to prolong the life of Portugal the Cabinet were fully alive to the importance of the ancient treaties between Portugal and Great Britain [and that] we hold . . . that the treaties contain stipulations which, in substance, are still binding on England".

There can be no doubt but what he regarded the good will of Portugal as an essential feature to the development of British South African interests; hence his early reluctance in joining with Germany.

13. E. Brandenburg, From Bismark to the Great War (London, 1927), p. 156.

14. Ibid., p. 156.

15. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 1, p. 49.

Balfour wrote to de Soveral on August 31, 1898, that the negotiations with Germany were concluded and that the arrangements made would involve "neither loss or diminution of the sovereign rights of Portugal, still less any cession of territory";¹⁶ and that loans would be made as easy as possible for Portugal.

The expectation on which the treaty was based, namely, that Portugal would be compelled to raise a loan based on the security of her colonial revenues, was not realized and the treaty therefore remained inoperative. In the correspondence of Lord Salisbury, Lord Kimberley, and various officials at Lisbon, it seems there was a fear that as long as Portugal did not know the exact terms of the secret clause, she might try to negotiate a loan with France or some other nation, putting Germany and England in an equivocal position.¹⁷ But Germany did not want the treaties made public unless it was absolutely necessary.

These fears were almost realized in the months following the conclusion of the agreement when it became known that Portugal was negotiating in France for a loan, using the Azores as a security.¹⁸ Salisbury made it plain to the Portuguese government that England, under her treaty to protect Portugal from foreign aggression, could not stand for any such action as it might jeopardize British sea power if the islands should get under the control of some foreign power.¹⁹ The Portuguese

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16. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.1, p. 75.
 17. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
 18. Ibid., p. 79.
 19. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

government after some discussion struck that clause out of the agreement and the deal was never closed.

There was much anxiety and distrust in Lisbon concerning the whole affair. The stability of Anglo-Portuguese relations seemed to have suddenly found precarious footing. M. de Soveral, in speaking to Salisbury about the situation, stated that he thought there was no necessity for a loan; however, he feared that some country might force Portugal to such a loan and then seize the customs on non-payment.²⁰ Salisbury replied that he doubted if such an event would occur as it did not seem quite probable to him; but if it did happen, Portugal could rest assured that England would not stand idly by.²¹ De Soveral seemed to be simply seeking some hopeful confirmation of England's continued friendship, despite the new agreement.

As a result of Portuguese misgivings in regard to her political relationship with England, negotiations were begun in the early months of 1899 for a further convention between the two countries. In the summer of 1899, the Boer war was imminent and the Portuguese allowed the passage of arms through their territory to the Transvaal, due to a treaty they had concluded in 1875 with the Boers.²² England requested them to stop this practice, and de Soveral answered that it would be impossible to do so without giving the Transvaal government room for complaint.

20. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 1, p. 84.

21. Ibid., p. 84.

22. British and Foreign State Papers, 1874-75, vol. 66, pp. 1258.

"The king of Portugal ... binds himself to allow the free importation and transit of arms and military stores intended for the South African Republic, and applied for by the government of that Republic upon guaranties necessary to remove all doubt as to their destination being given".

He further pointed out that Great Britain had approved the Portuguese treaty with the Transvaal in 1882, even to the very clause under dispute. Great Britain replied that she had understood that clause was to apply only to the requirements of trade, not to the arming of a whole nation.²³ At this same time England was having difficulty with her own business firms, who, through Capetown, were engaged in a lively trade with the Transvaal in materials which could be used for war. As late as September 12, 1899, de Soveral was still protesting that an embargo on arms on the part of Portugal would be impossible until war actually broke out between England and the Transvaal.²⁴

During all the discussion over the Boer treaty, Portugal, through de Soveral, was obviously leading up to an agreement whereby her position would be secured. On September 13, 1899, de Soveral assured Salisbury that: "if war comes, Portugal fully realizes that she must declare herself on the side of England". He further stated that he was "authorized by my government to propose that the two governments sign an engagement binding each to close alliance in case of war with the Transvaal. This will enable England to attach the Transvaal by the Delagoa Bay railroad and make Lourenco-Marques a base of supplies".²⁵

23. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.1, p. 85.

24. Ibid., p. 86.

25. Ibid., p. 88.

A further illustration of Portuguese opinion in the fall of 1899 regarding a closer alliance can be found in this statement by Senhor Beirao, then Minister of Foreign Affairs for Portugal.

"The Portuguese government must make a supreme effort to maintain their neutrality or thrown in their lot with Great Britain; but on clearly specified terms which would remove all doubt as to the ultimate security of their possessions in Africa under absolute guarantee of Her Majesty's government".²⁶

Here again is an echo of the fear that was leading the Portuguese government on to this agreement and possibly more concessions to England, namely, that Germany might have persuaded England toward some type of action which would be inimical to Portuguese colonial interests.

Mr. MacDonell, British minister at Lisbon, confided to Mr. Bertie and Salisbury his views on the attitude of the Portuguese government. He felt that since 1898 Portugal had not entirely trusted England, hence Portuguese statesmen desired a convention which would secure their colonies from all danger, not only in regard to the Transvaal but also Germany. They were well aware, according to Mr. MacDonell, that in case of an attack on Lourenco-Marques, they would be unable to defend it and would have to appeal to England. In October, 1898, MacDonell had found

26. British Documents on the Origins of the World War, vol.1,p.89.

that Count Tattenbach "had been pressing the Portuguese minister, perhaps unduly, to accept the good offices of our respective governments for the purpose of raising a loan; he then unreservedly admitted to me that he understood his instructions to convey one of the objects of the Anglo-German agreement was to induce Portugal to contract a loan in order that, and when its proceeds had been extravagantly wasted, we should remain with a claim on the control of the Portuguese colonial customs.²⁷ It is possible that the peremptory language the Count held to the president of the Council before my return may at the time have led the Portuguese government to apprehend an ultimatum,²⁸ the more so as His Excellency subsequently announced the proposed visit of the German squadron. It is, therefore, [now] well understood by my French and German colleagues - as well as the Portuguese minister, that Her Majesty's government not only opposes a serious objection to a control, but also that your Lordship is not prepared to permit an attempt to enforce it".²⁹

When it came to actually drawing up the agreement, it was apparent that the Portuguese government was anxious to get all the assurances they could from England that she entertained no designs on their colonies, and she would not tolerate them in any other country. At the same time, Portugal was reluctant to

27. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, pp.86-87.

28. Refer to statement on page 29 regarding such a possibility.

29. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p.87.

commit herself as to her future action, (in case of war with the Transvaal) or to give enough assurances of her sincerity to satisfy England: In October, just before war was declared, de Soveral made the statement that Portugal did not want to be forced to make a formal declaration of war against the Boers as it would excite the other powers. However, he would quite approve of an undertaking on the part of his government that no supplies should pass from the seaboard of Portuguese territory to the Transvaal. He felt that that would satisfy all immediate objects. In addition to this he added, "Portugal will always be willing to consider any further exigencies which the progress of events might impose on her in pursuance of ancient treaties".³⁰

De Soveral then proposed the following note to be exchanged between Portugal and England:

"The government of his most faithful Majesty and the government of Her Majesty, the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and Empress of India, affirm the validity of the treaties between the two crowns, recognizing the duty that they have to maintain and defend reciprocally the integrity and the sovereignty of their respective territories, and in case of war between Great Britain and the Transvaal have understood to take the necessary measures to assure this end".³¹

Salisbury's answer was very much to the point and he did not mince words in informing de Soveral of what Great Britain ex-

30. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.1, p. 91.

31. Ibid., p. 92.

pected in the way of an agreement, more than that she intended to get.³² He indicated, first, that England was not out to establish her sovereignty over the Transvaal, therefore that would have to be changed. Secondly, England desired that if war came, Portugal would, at England's invitation declare war also. Thirdly, it was important that England stop the Transvaal supply of arms through Lourenco-Marques, therefore Portugal would have to free herself from the terms of the Treaty of 1875. If Portugal did not adopt this or some other way of putting a stop to the passage of arms, the situation would be grave and Great Britain would have no other way of attaining an end essential to her except by a blockade. Fourthly, he desired that Portugal should not proclaim her neutrality in case of war as England then would be unable to coal at Delagoa Bay. The above "suggestions" appeared to be more or less in the nature of an ultimatum, and it did not take the Portuguese long to make up their mind to accept them.

The secret treaty, the so-called "Windsor Pact", was finally signed on October 14, 1899. The first part confirmed Article one of the treaty of 1642:

"There shall be peace and friendship between the two governments. They shall have no treaty or counsel of war against the other".

The second part confirms the last article of the treaty of 1661:

32. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.1, pp.92-93.

"The King of England shall oblige himself to defend and protect all conquests or colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all its enemies, as well future as present".

The third section is strictly modern:

"The government of Portugal undertakes to prevent after war is declared between England and the Transvaal, or during the continuance of war, the import or passage of arms and munitions destined for war. They further will not proclaim their neutrality in the face of such a war".³³

Thus was guaranteed to Portugal all her existing possessions protected by the full strength of England;³⁴ and to England a satisfactory establishment of cooperation in case of war.

Although the terms of the treaty were secret, the fact that such a treaty had been made was public knowledge. It was very natural that Germany should be suspicious of this agreement. Eckardstein asked Landsdowne if this would affect their alliance and was answered that it left the secret agreement between Germany and Great Britain exactly where it was before.³⁵ As early as 1898, as has been stated, Salisbury had told Count Hatzfeldt that England was pledged not only to guarantee Portuguese possessions,

33. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 1, pp.94-95.

34. As things stood, England couldn't stop Portugal from disposing of any of her possessions; but if any country such as Germany tried to force her to do so, then England would be obliged to step in.

35. Ibid., pp.98-99.

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but she had an interest in keeping such a guarantee.

In discussing this topic, Brandenburg felt that the new alliance did not run counter in any way to the text of the Anglo-German convention; but he found it difficult to reconcile the spirit of the two agreements. In the Anglo-German agreement according to his views, it was implied, though not expressed, that Portugal, without any force being used, was to be compelled under pressure of financial necessity to evacuate her colonies to Germany and England.³⁷ He goes on to state that in his opinion the reasons³⁷ Portugal was able to get an agreement such as she did were:

1. She took advantage of the strained relations between England and Germany over Samoa;
2. Salisbury, thinking of old treaties, was afraid not to agree;
3. England had to avoid any difficulty in the use of the Delagoa Bay railroad in event of a war with the Transvaal.

The last point of view would be the most practical one to take, considering the difficulties of England in 1899, and the problems that were agitating the Foreign Office. A less fair view, from³⁹ a German angle, is given in the Memoirs of Prince von Bülow:

"This Treaty of Windsor was, of course, in flagrant conflict with the spirit of the Anglo-German agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies. It was not only a

36. Reference to page 29 this manuscript.

37. Brandenburg, From Bismark to the Great War, p. 156.

38. Ibid., p. 156.

39. Bernhard von Bülow, The Memoirs of Prince von Bülow, (Boston, 1931), p. 321.

guarantee for Portugal, but actually an encouragement to that country not to mortgage her colonies. It increased the old tendency of Portugal to give preference to Britain in all economic questions, to say nothing of the fact that the Treaty of Windsor further substantially increased the political dependency of Portugal on Britain".

But despite the agreement, things were not so friendly as it might seem on the surface. MacDonell, writing from Lisbon, pointed out that there had been a violent tone used in the Portuguese press in regard to the early campaign in South Africa. The government apparently was unable to check the excesses, or did not consider it politic to do so. He hastened to add that he did not associate the king and those interested in foreign affairs in this attack. It seemed evident that, although the events of 1891 left behind a sentiment of hostility, the educated and governing classes, while at heart they shared the antipathy of their fellow countrymen, were too well aware that politically, financially and commercially they were absolutely dependent on England's good will. As proof of his views he brought to the attention of Salisbury the following conclusions:

1. That irresolution and evasion were the marked characteristics of the foreign policy of Portugal;
2. That members of former cabinets, while in office supporting England, were now her most rabid opponents;

40. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.I, pp.96-97.

3. That the existing government could not too openly uphold a policy which they might be called on at any moment to condemn;
4. That having obtained an agreement which secured Portugal against all risk, they now imagined themselves to be in a position to put their own construction on it, and, by a careful observance of a strict neutrality, to put themselves in any event on the winning side.

Mr. MacDonell felt that all these attitudes perhaps accounted for the evasive stand of the government in the cases of the passage of arms, the landing of adventurers and the difficulties over the customs facilities which had come up since the signing of the treaty. Therefore, his conclusion was that if the British government were to call on Portugal from within the limits of the existing agreement to take a rather more active part in South African affairs, they would be virtually lost in public opinion, and would be forced to disclose the existence of such a treaty.

MacDonell was also concerned over the attitude toward England of the foreign representatives in Lisbon. The German ambassador was actively criticising and misrepresenting events in South Africa to the detriment of England. Portugal evidently understood by the early actions of Emperor Wilhelm that Germany

41. The London Times felt that the course of the Portuguese government was not an easy one. There seemed to be a general feeling abroad in Portugal that the alliance gave advantages only to England. The Times warned the Foreign Office that they should remember in dealing with Portugal the natural timidity of a small nation with regard to its colonial possession; and a fine national obstinacy in Portugal which could be led but not driven. London Times, October 18, 1899.
42. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p. 96.

might eventually support the Boers. The French minister apparently intended to press forward and consolidate French interests, emphasizing the fact that France would never admit any encroachments on the Portuguese possessions in Delagoa Bay because of Madagascar. He further stated that France would hold Great Britain responsible for the great amount of French capital invested in the Transvaal.⁴³

The result of all this foreign influence on Portuguese public opinion was that they considered it politic to court French and German good will in the event of Great Britain calling on them to join more effectively in the conflict. An article in the Correioda Noite, published under the auspices of the president of the council concludes,⁴⁴

"But the neutrality so jealously maintained by the Portuguese government has met with the approval of both the contending parties, and so important and effective is it, that were either to endeavor to profit thereby, the fact would offend the other powers, especially Germany, who only the other day declared that if the neutrality of Portugal were violated, it would put an end to German neutrality".

The same journal contained a German telegram to that effect. Thus

43. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p. 97.

44. Ibid., p. 97.

the superficial and dubious nature of Portuguese friendship was apparent to England in the early weeks of the war.

In going over the documents relating to the year 1899, it is not difficult to see the efforts that England, mainly through Chamberlain, was making toward a rapprochement with Germany, even at the expense of an older though weaker ally. Salisbury, who never admitted that England desired a formal alliance with Germany, appeared less eager to sacrifice Portuguese good will and possessions in order to insure German friendship. He was not desirous of completing the Anglo-German agreement, and it is apparent by his later actions that he did not intend to force Portugal into a precarious position in regard to her loans merely to afford a chance for the agreement to work. In 1899, German friendship was desirable, almost a necessity, but so was that of Portugal, and Salisbury in trying to steer an even course between the two was forced into a position in which the sincerity of his actions for all concerned might have been questioned.

CHAPTER III.

Anglo-Portuguese Relations During the Boer War.

The Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1899 deeply influenced relations during the Boer War. In the last two months of 1899, Portugal seemed to have forgotten, or else chose to overlook, her pledges in the treaty of October of the same year. The suspicions surrounding activities in Delagoa Bay were numerous. There were rumors of large shipments of guns through this port to the interior and other contraband of war including flour, declared a contraband¹ by the British. The head of the Portuguese customs department assured the British government that those rumors were false and that great precautions were being taken by the officials to guard against any unneutral action. So far, no contraband had been found. Nevertheless, Britain decided to send down inspectors as there seemed to be a great freedom of Boers coming and going through Delagoa Bay; and, as Britain said,² she felt Portuguese officials were possibly being hoodwinked. But Portugal could not interfere with people going through her port on legitimate business even though, according to one correspondent:

"Lourenco-Marques is developing into a regular Transvaal emporium and is becoming a headquarters for Transvaal agents who can now communicate with agents of other countries"³.

1. London Times, December 30, 1899.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., December 13, 1899.

In British eyes, the present status of Delagoa Bay was more useful⁴ to the Boers than if it had been in Transvaal territory.

In December, 1899, Great Britain began searching foreign vessels for contraband of war. Of course, the problem of right under international law was an important one. England could not adopt, arbitrarily, drastic measures against Portugal unless things were more definitely proved without raising serious international questions. The simplest thing to have done would have been to declare a blockade of Portuguese ports. On this point, Salisbury, in a letter to Mr. Goschen urging a more systematic search for contraband of war, remarked:

"It appears a blockade against Portugal without a declaration of war is impossible. Such a blockade as against neutrals is, I believe, without precedent. Neither France nor Germany would submit to have their vessels stopped by a blockade for which there was no warrant in international law. A war against Portugal must bring in these two powers at least. They would offer Portugal assistance and obtain in return valuable rights over Portuguese⁵ islands".

Nevertheless, during December, 1899, the British warships along the eastern coast of Africa, had stopped and searched some vessels that were under suspicion of carrying contraband, and

4. London Times, December 13, 1899.

5. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.I, p. 243.

also some vessels of neutrals landing in British ports. As to British rights on the high seas, by December they had not been exercised to any extent. This early search of vessels outside of Delagoa Bay caused unfavorable comment in other countries.⁶ Along with that, circulated rumors of agreements not made public; all of which reacted against England.

The first three months of 1900 showed a continuance of the agitation concerning contraband of war going through Delagoa Bay and bound for the Transvaal. Portugal, through official circles, continued to stress the fact that she was doing all she possibly could to put an end to it. The Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs said in the House of Peers "the course to be taken by Portugal is to see that neither belligerent finds help or support at Lourenco-Marques. I have received no information of the transit of men or war materials and any contravention of their orders by officials will be duly punished."⁷ He added that Portugal had no reason to doubt the loyalty and correct conduct of Great Britain.

The Portuguese attitude in general, as seen through the newspapers, shows them anxious not to have friction with England. They felt that it was an unjust accusation on the part of England that Portugal was not trying to maintain "strict neutrality". The Diario states:

6. London Times, December 28, 1899.

7. London Times, January 4, 1900.

"Stringent orders have been issued to Portuguese authorities at Mozambique and are being scrupulously complied with. England must see the falsity of the reports and take into consideration the negotiations between the two countries. Portugal can not afford a fresh rebuff from England".⁸

As further proof of their "strict neutrality" to England, the Portuguese government in recognizing the need for stricter control over the railway traffic between Lourenco-Marques and the Transvaal, revived an old law which compelled all persons leaving Portuguese territory to first obtain a passport signed by the governor-general in which they must give a guarantee through their consuls that they were not going into the Transvaal to fight.⁹

The British point of view during the same period is one of critical if not hostile suspicion of Portuguese actions and motives. There seemed no doubt that Portugal "meant well" on the surface; but the results from a British standpoint were not satisfactory. In the first place, the law described above as far as it worked out was defective. Certain foreign consuls appeared to have no difficulty in securing passports for their countrymen.¹⁰ The Boers openly admitted that many of the men

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8. London Times, January 6, 1900.
 9. London Times, January 12, 1900.
 10. London Times, February 5, 1900.

coming in were mercenaries recruited on the continent, and that they enjoyed the cooperation of some of the Portuguese officials. The authorities did stop many passports but "as a means of exercising control over the influx into the Transvaal, the present application of the Portuguese system is useless".¹¹

The situation regarding contraband of war had not improved in the eyes of Great Britain. The Boers boasted of the smuggling of machine guns and shells through the port right under the nose of the British and Portuguese officials. There was evidence that supplies of coffee, sugar and flour were getting into the Transvaal through a Delagoa Bay firm.¹² Some British business houses were profiting in the same way. It was difficult to trust the efficiency of Portugal's control over the goods, or to have much confidence in the easy-going policy of her officials.¹³

On December 29, 1899, there had occurred an incident which might have had more serious consequences. The German imperial mail steamer Bundesrath was seized on suspicion of carrying contraband of war and taken to the Prize Court at Durban.¹⁴ Great

11. London Times, January 29, 1900.

12. London Times, February 16, 1900.

13. One incident illustrates the point. British officials found arms in the trunks of some Germans, supposedly searched by Portuguese officials. When called to their attention, the Portuguese simply searched the articles specified by the British, and made no attempt to tighten up on their search by going through everything.

London Times, March 9, 1900.

14. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 94, 1901, p. 975.

Britain was severely criticised by all countries for the act as involving questions of international law in the seizing of neutral vessels. American public opinion was definitely hostile from the first to such action. The attitude of Portugal as shown through her newspapers was to regard this as the establishment of a blockade of Delagoa Bay, a neutral port. Even if the seizure of the vessel was made at a considerable distance from the port, still it was bound for Lourenco-Marques which would therefore constitute a violation of Portugal's rights as a "neutral".¹⁵

Naturally there was a shrill protest of this action from Germany. According to a speech by Von Bülow in the Reichstag the procedure in visiting a vessel consists of two or three acts, stopping a neutral ship on the high seas, searching her, or examining her papers. He said that the first two acts could be undertaken at any time, and if irregularities were observed, then the belligerent vessel could capture the neutral and have the case examined in a Prize Court; but if the seizure was not justified, the belligerent state was bound to order the immediate release of the ship and cargo and the payment of full compensation.¹⁶

Hatzfeldt gave Salisbury three reasons why the seizure was illegal.¹⁷ Firstly, there could have been no contraband of war, since, according to recognized principles of international

15. London Times, January 15, 1900.

16. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 94, 1901, p. 1006.

17. Ibid., p. 980.

law, there can not be contraband of war in trade between neutral ports. Secondly, a vessel's destination is to be considered neutral if both the port to which she is bound and every intermediate port is neutral. Thirdly, the destination of a vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the goods.

As far as the British side was concerned there can be some defense. It was positively known that large supplies of military material had made their way through Delagoa Bay. Even some British mail steamers were guilty of carrying contraband. The German East African line admitted that they had previously been carrying arms and munitions.

In considering the affair from the standpoint of international law, the following excerpts from a book by T.E.Holland, Letters on War and Neutrality, may serve to strengthen the case for Great Britain. As to the carrying of contraband of war, he states:

"Goods going to a neutral port cannot come under the description of contraband, all goods going there being equally lawful".

But since the Civil War, the following change has been adopted:

"Contraband goods, although bona fide on their way to a neutral port, might be condemned, if intended afterwards

18. Carriage of contraband is, according to Holland, no offense against either international law or the law of England. He states that the rule on the subject is that a belligerent is entitled to capture a neutral ship engaged in carrying contraband of war to his enemy, to confiscate the contraband cargo, and in some cases to confiscate the ship also, without thereby giving to the power to whose subjects the property in question belongs, any ground for complaint. A neutral state is not bound to prevent such assistance being rendered by its subjects to either belligerent as is involved in blockade running or carriage of contraband; but merely to acquiesce in the loss and inconvenience which may in consequence be inflicted by a belligerent upon persons so acting. T.E.Holland, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals, (London, 1909), pp. 96-97.

19. Holland, Letters on War and Neutrality, p. 117.

to reach the enemy by another ship or even by land carriage".

This is the principle of "continuous voyages" which might well refute von Bülow's view, which was an older one "that the destination of a vessel is conclusive as to the destination of the goods". Therefore, a consignment to Lourenco-Marques, connected as is the town by only forth miles of railroad to the Transvaal frontier, would seem to be well within this principle.²⁰

More support for the action of the British in seizing the Bundesrath can be found in this quotation from Holland:²¹

"The carriage by a neutral ship of enemy troops, or of even a few military officers, as also of enemy dispatches, is an enemy service of so important a kind as to involve the confiscation of the vessel concerned, a penalty which, under ordinary circumstances, is not imposed upon carriage of 'contraband' so called".

The Bundesrath was released on January 18, 1900, after a nine day's search in which no contraband was discovered.²² The failure to find any seemed, in German eyes, to deprive England of the right of search. The injured feelings of Germany were soothed, and a speech by von Bülow strengthened the feeling already prevalent, that England had been in the wrong and now was

20. Holland, Letters on War and Neutrality, pp. 117-118.

21. Ibid., p. 118.

22..British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 94,1901, p. 1002.

admitting it. According to him, England had backed down completely when she released the "Bundesrath" (and two others that had been stopped), gave evidence of readiness to pay compensation, promised to stop only mail steamers on suspicion, agreed to arbitrate the points in dispute if necessary, and expressed regret for what had happened.²³

The seizure of this vessel might have been taken as an announcement of a blockade of Delagoa Bay. The British did not have much choice. They might have obtained English supervision of shipments at Amsterdam and Hamburg; or they might have prevailed upon Portugal to allow the necessary facilities for the examination of all goods at Delagoa Bay. It was well-known that the customs house at Delagoa Bay was not reliable; in fact, it was notoriously pro-Boer.²⁴ Although the Portuguese Governor-general and his staff tried to act in accordance with international law, they were weak, and being so, were in the hands of their subordinates.

It was not until the spring of 1900 when Captain Fitz-Crowe (the British Consul-General) arrived that England obtained much satisfaction.²⁵ The British navy was put into action and terminated a great deal of the smuggling. There were many reports as to contraband being landed in regions adjacent to Delagoa Bay. These reports were now investigated and proven to be false. However,

23. British and Foreign State Papers, vol.94, pp.1006-1007.

24. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine [New York], November 1901, p.699.

25. Ibid., p. 704.

there were checks on the freedom of British action even after the more or less partial blockade of Delagoa Bay had been established. Ships could only be searched outside of territorial limits and in strict accordance with international law.²⁶ Where doubts existed, a watch was placed over the cargo as it was being unloaded. There was really no precedent for England to act upon. She had had no wars with countries lacking a seaport; yet at the same time for the successful progress of the war, she could not allow goods to go through Lourenco-Marques.

At first Britain stopped all vessels inside the line of shoals guarding the entrance to the Bay and searched them. Portugal vigorously protested and demanded jurisdiction over the whole Bay and up to the three mile limit outside the shoals.²⁷ Although the point was never definitely conceded, great caution was observed by all Captains of the fleet in order to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of the Portuguese officials. Finally only French and German mail steamers ran through to Lourenco-Marques. It was never proved that these vessels carried contraband, but they did bring hundreds of mercenaries who wore the Geneva Red Cross until the train crossed the frontier and then discarded it. These individuals were free from molestation as the Prize Law states:²⁸

26. Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, November 1901, p. 699.

27. Ibid., p. 701.

28. Ibid., p. 702.

"individuals travelling at their own expense and on neutral vessels although they may belong to enemy forces, can not be seized".

The actions of Great Britain in Delagoa Bay during the early months of 1900 appear to have excited the suspicion of Russia as to the ultimate purpose in regard to that region. There seemed to be news abroad of a proposed sale or cession of Delagoa Bay to England. One Russian Journal stated:²⁹

"It would be regarded as a breach of neutrality on the part of Portugal to which all other continental powers would be found to interfere".

Another paper went even further in censoring English action:³⁰

"There is need of an understanding between the powers with a view to placing Delagoa Bay under international guardianship to forestall England. If England should take it, Russia will retaliate by abrogating the Anglo-Russian convention regarding the delimitation of Pamir which was favorable to England anyway".

It is interesting to observe how closely England's actions in South Africa were being observed by European powers; a large part of their interests centering about the control of the strategic point of Delagoa Bay.

29. London Times, January 4, 1900.

30. London Times, January 13, 1900.

It was about this time that Russia tried to bring Germany and France into a union to interfere in the procedure of the Boer war.

The late spring of 1900 seemed to bring into action the Portuguese portion of the agreement of 1899. The facts above related all point in the direction of lack of cooperation on the part of Portugal under the terms of the treaty. The convention was secret and England could not come out openly and accuse her of not living up to her promises. At the same time she dared not take the measure of a declaration of war against Portugal. It is apparent from a study of the facts that Portuguese officials were trying to conciliate their public policy of "strict neutrality" (however they interpreted the term) with the spirit and content of the agreement. From 1900 on, as far as the facts show, there is real cooperation with British forces, almost to the point of active belligerency toward the Transvaal; and yet still under the cover of the term "strict neutrality". It made no difference to England what the Portuguese called it, just as long as she obtained the results desired. In truth, it was to the advantage of England that Portugal maintain a surface neutrality (despite the agreement) in order to forestall the possible criticism and active intervention of other countries, which had been hinted at.

In April, 1900, Portugal allowed British troops to pass
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through Beira bound for the interior. This resulted in a formal declaration on the part of the Transvaal and the Free State that the permission was regarded by them as tantamount to hostile action.

31. London Times, April 13, 1900.

Great Britain's attitude was that the Boers would be unlikely to back up that statement with force and if such a situation did arise, the British government would render Portugal all possible assistance. Portugal's answer to the Boers was that owing to ancient treaties with England, she could not see that the action should be regarded in the light of one designed to be hostile to the Boers. The Portuguese Minister stated that no power had raised objections except the South African Republics, and no ultimatum or further communication had been received by Portugal from the Transvaal, nor had any conflict occurred on the frontier. That the government was behind this evidence of cooperation with Great Britain may be seen from the fact that the Chamber of Deputies almost unanimously rejected the application of Senhor Costa to question the government on the passage of British troops through Beira.³³

There was a growing good will in Portugal toward Great Britain in the summer of 1900, fostered no doubt by the government through its newspapers. The Novidades in commenting on the situation in general, attempted to give some reasons for this change in public opinion.³⁴ It cited the very evident hatred of the Boers for England (Portugal's ally), and went on to say that England in defending her rule is also defending that of other nations that have possessions in South Africa (even those now

33. London Times, May 3, 1900.

34. London Times, June 2, 1900.

hostile to her). The paper brought out the fact that if the Afrikanders were to form themselves into a powerful nation, they would be a menace to all countries interested in keeping their possessions in South Africa. Portugal would undoubtedly bear the brunt of their attacks (because of Delagoa Bay), so for that reason if for no other, Portugal should wish to aid England in gaining her ends. Incidentally, British control over these two small republics would be preferable to that of any other colonial power, as she leaves the way open to others wherever she goes.

Despite the closer cooperation, there were suspicions, and confirmation of these suspicions, that the Transvaal was still drawing supplies through Delagoa Bay. A large quantity of explosives were found intended for the Transvaal and labelled "disinfectants". As a result of this discovery all customs house officials and railway employees at Lourenco-Marques were dismissed and their places taken by military officers.³⁵

In November, 1900, Portugal formally withdrew her recognition of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State as independent countries and called her consuls home.³⁶ The consuls of the two republics residing in Lourenco-Marques were asked to leave and no longer recognized as officials. This was due to the fact that on May 28 and October 25, 1900, Great Britain announced the annexation of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal respectively.

35. London Times, August 4, 1900.

36. London Times, November 16, 1900.

During 1900, the Portuguese rendered practical aid to Britain in carrying on the war. In September a great number of Boer refugees and a force of 3,000 men, who surrendered to the Portuguese troops at Ressano-Garcia, were sent to Delagoa Bay.³⁷ Some of these were placed on transports under guard; others were sent to Portugal to stay during the period of the war. No Boer who came into Portuguese territory now was allowed to return. During the summer and fall of 1900, Portuguese troops were sent down to Mozambique and placed along the frontier, especially at Koomati - Poort, the railway town, "to guard the frontier" the³⁸ dispatches ran. There is no evidence that they did any actual fighting. They were simply put there to take care of the refugees and to render it impossible for the Boer armies to get any supplies.

In December of 1900, an announcement was made to the Portuguese government through MacDonell to Senhor Arroyo (Minister of Foreign Affairs) of a visit of Admiral Ranson and the Channel Fleet. He was informed that the Portuguese king would give a state banquet and "would so word his speech as to remove all doubt or uncertainty concerning the nature of the present relations between the two countries".³⁹ He wanted in return an affirmation that this visit was to consolidate the old established alliance.

During a second banquet, the president of the Portuguese ministry referred to the alliance as "not only based on ancient

37. London Times, September 25, 1900.

38. London Times, September 10, 1900.

39. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.I, pp.97-98.

treaties, but [which] has been manifested by events of a very recent and special significance".⁴⁰

MacDonell's reply to this concluded with the statements:⁴¹

"The alliance not only took root in the past but is affirmed in the present. As I may say, war vessels of the present day are in their construction better adapted to the actual requirements than the caravels of the olden times, so has it been necessary to remodel and adopt to the present day the old instruments which were intended to unite us in the past.

"The old alliance by which we were formally bound only requires to be revived and confirmed and that confirmation is conveyed to Portugal in the presence of the Tagus of the channel squadron. Her Majesty's government therefore consider that the treaties which have so long existed between the two countries and which have so repeatedly been referred to as being still binding on us both, have been recently strengthened by late events. Consequently the earnest and loyal desire of the queen's government is that the firm and long standing alliance be resolutely maintained".

Apparently Landsdowne had authorized this statement,⁴² although the telegram is missing. According to the telegrams

40. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p. 98.

41. Ibid., p. 98.

42. Ibid.

in the British Documents and to the items in the London Times concerning this meeting, the king was very anxious to get public recognition of the closeness of their relationship. MacDonell wrote back to the Foreign Office that he felt that certain agencies had been at work to endeavor to persuade the Portuguese that President Kruger might finally succeed in enlisting, in some measure, the sympathy of European governments sufficient to satisfy the expectation of South African agitators and leave Portugal in an equivocal position.⁴³ However he added that his real opinion was that Portugal simply desired further assurances to safeguard her east African possessions, which would account, to some extent, for her very friendly attitude toward England despite hostile attacks on that country by the continental press.

This naval demonstration awakened a great deal of suspicion on the part of certain powers. Some imagined that Her Majesty's government had the intention of calling on Portugal to declare war; while others felt that Portugal was seeking aid against France. Eckardstein called on Landsdowne to ask if the manifestations at Lisbon in any way affected the secret agreement between England as to Portuguese possessions in South Africa.

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Landsdowne replied:

"The speech made at Lisbon merely reaffirmed the existence of the old alliance, of which everyone is aware, between Great Britain and Portugal, and leaves the secret agreement exactly where it was before the delivery of the speeches".

43. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol.I, p. 98.

44. Ibid.

Germany seems to have not given up the hope that Portugal would eventually have to come to them for aid.

On July 23, 1900, came to an end a dispute between Portugal on the one hand, and Great Britain and America on the other. This dispute was of ten years standing and was of importance as a further cause for friction between the two governments. It is necessary to go back a bit to get a background for the dispute. In 1875, Portugal and the Transvaal concluded a treaty whereby the Transvaal agreed to continue a railroad line which Portugal proposed to build to her frontier (the future Delagoa Bay railroad).⁴⁵ The Portuguese government got a concessionaire for their part of the railroad in the person of Colonel Edward McMurdo, an American, who agreed to built it without any government subvention if he should have the right to fix tariffs without state interference. The contract for the concession was drawn up and executed in Lisbon - in 1883.⁴⁶ The most important terms for this study were that within six months a Portuguese company was to be formed to be responsible for the fulfillment of the terms, one of which was that the line was to be completed in three years' time and if the company failed to live up to that or any part of the agreement, Portugal could re-occupy the time and put it up for auction for the benefit of the company.⁴⁷

45. Fortnightly Review, [London], September 1, 1900, p. 410.

British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 66, pp. 1258.

46. Ibid., p. 411.

47. Fortnightly Review. September 1, 1900, p. 411.

But the Portuguese Company was unable to raise the funds and in the end turned its concession over to a new concern, Delagoa Bay Company. The Portuguese Government refused to recognize the new company, and, demanded that despite heavy natural set-backs, the railroad had to be finished at the time set. It was impossible to do so and Portugal seized the railroad and began to operate it for her own benefit, instead of putting it up at auction for the benefit of the Company.⁴⁸ The American and British stockholders were backed by their respective governments who sued Portugal for this action.

The dispute was eventually referred to the Berne Tribunal for settlement, the point of debate being the amount of compensation due bond and shareholders of the railroad company for the wrongful seizure of their property and the cancellation of this concession by the Portuguese government in 1889. This railroad was a continuation of the Transvaal Netherland railway and one in which the Transvaal government was very interested. They had negotiated with Portugal for through carriage and special rates to Pretoria, especially in the interests of foreign steamship companies, notably the German ones. During the ten years of the dispute, the German and Transvaal governments were trying to obtain the control of the Delagoa Bay railroad.⁴⁹ Great Britain protested their right to do this until the award of the Berne

48. Saturday Review, April 1, 1900, p. 417.

Fortnightly Review, September 1, 1900, p. 416.

49. British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. I, p. 323.

Tribunal was known. The Portuguese Cabinet refused to commit itself to Germany, and there the matter rested until July, 1900, when Portugal was finally compelled to pay \$3,500,000 to British and American stockholders, the sum awarded them by the Berne

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Tribunal. Germany had apparently been suspicious of the motives of England. As early as 1894 Hatzfeldt informed Lord Kimberley that if the Portuguese colonies were broken up, Germany would not permit them to become German territory.
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During 1901 and 1902 the Portuguese troops in Mozambique continued their activities in standing back of the British. As in the previous year, the chief needs for these troops seemed to be to take charge of abandoned Boer ammunition and supplies near the Portuguese border; to be on hand to receive and provide for the Boer refugees that were coming across the border in increasingly large numbers; and to guard the frontier against a possible attack by the Boers, in their attempts to get supplies. There was close action between the two countries during this period and evidently the results were satisfactory as there were no disputes as had occurred in the first few months of the war.

During the period of the Boer war, Anglo-Portuguese relations were influenced by three situations. First Portugal, playing for protection, unwilling to give any more satisfaction

50. Fortnightly Review, September 1, 1900, p. 422.

London Times, July 23, 1900.

London Times, January 6, 1900. In this edition a notice copied from the Figaro of Paris appeared stating that a continental syndicate had been formed to furnish Portugal with an amount of money to discharge the claims of England in regard to the indemnity to be awarded by the Court of Arbitration, so that she would have no reason to seize Delagoa Bay. (It might be possible to attribute this to Germany in her attempt to forestall England).

than she had to, and at all times displaying the suspicion and insecurity of a smaller power trying to throw in her lot with the winning side. Then England, forcing Portugal to give in on many points which she felt were necessary to the progress of the war, laying herself open to criticism from the continent, and yet a bottom giving an impression of sincerity in regard to her fundamental motives as to Portugal. And lastly, Germany with her watchful eye on every move of either power in South Africa, jealous for her new colonial empire, and eternally suspicious of the motives of England, despite the satisfaction of her treaty.

CHAPTER IV.

Indentured Labor in the Portuguese Colonies.

The question of Portuguese use of native labor in the development of her colonies had come up in international circles before 1900. The traffic in negro slaves started with the Portuguese in the Middle Ages and was carried on chiefly from the western province of Angola. In the early part of the nineteenth century, all the European countries except Spain and Portugal had repudiated it. Even after 1850 there were many cargoes shipped to America, and when the Civil War stopped that, the traffic still lingered between Angola and Cuba and Brazil.¹ Britain at this time greatly increased the activity of her anti-slavery cruisers. The Portuguese seemed to be operating mainly along the coast while the Arabs carried it on in the interior.

In the eighties and nineties this bad situation was definitely stopped. Portugal signed the Berlin Act of 1885 and the Brussels Act of July, 1890,² binding the signatories to put an end to the slave trade and to punish those engaged in it. This did not, however, apply to contract labor or the moving of natives from one place to another to insure them work and to make them work. Other provisions of this act were for the opening up of

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1. Sir Harry Johnston, A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races, (Cambridge, 1899), p. 98.
 2. British And Foreign State Papers, vol. 82, pp.379-599; vol. 81, pp. 1011-1126.

road, rivers and railroads so that no secret slave trading could go on.

In the islands of San Thomé and Príncipe there had been a great development of cocoa growing. The natives of these regions had proven themselves utterly unsuited for this work, in fact for any work, and large numbers of "contract laborers" had been shipped from the mainland, principally the province of Angola, but a few from Mozambique also. ³ From 1888 to 1912 there is a record of 67,000 blacks being sent from the mainland to these islands. ⁴ Between the years of 1901-1905 the British government and certain powerful cocoa firms in England had misgivings as to the real state of affairs regarding contract labor. In 1905, the cocoa firms of Messrs. Cadbury, Fry, Roundtree and Stillwerck sent a representative down into Angola, a Mr. Joseph Burtt, who for two years studied the situation. During his absence, the agitation on this issue was continued in many quarters. The African Trade Section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce stated that "for four hundred years Portugal had worked her colonies on the basis of slave labor, regardless of the nominal

3. The supervision of recruitment of natives for the Transvaal had been carried on between the Transvaal government and the Governor-General of Mozambique. In 1901 a new modus vivendi was signed further regulating recruitment of natives. The terms included contracts for one year only, no coercive measures to be used, strict government supervision to be exercised on both sides and accurate records kept. Mozambique labor had been used in the Rand for a number of years and really with a minimum of abuses. The Portuguese government sent over a Curator to report to them on the conditions in the Rand mines. The report was very flattering to the Rand officials and substantiated the view already taken by certain British and Portuguese officials that the natives were well taken care of. Naturally it was to the interests of the British government, due to their control of the Transvaal, that the above report be as favorable as possible. British Foreign and State Papers, vol. 95, 1901, pp. 931-934. London Times, July 19, and August 29, 1904.
4. E.A. Ross, Report on Employment of Native Laborers in Portuguese Africa (New York, 1925), p. 61.

abolition in 1878".⁵ They urged a boycott of Portuguese cocoa, which in their opinion would work havoc with the plantation owners, and eventually bring them to a change in the conditions under discussion. However, they finally agreed to wait for the publication of Mr. Burt's report which was made in July of 1907.⁶

The report was concise and the suggestions very much to the point.⁷ The main items which he discussed were as follows:

1. Except for Angola, natives recruited were not compelled to contract themselves and those that were, were repatriated quickly on serving their contract.
2. Official bulletins showed that from 1901-1905, 18,000 natives had come from Angola.
3. The work was not difficult, but failure to carry out orders resulted in heavy fines and often severe corporal punishment, although that was expressly forbidden by law. There were many attempts at escape, due to the fact that there was no repatriation at all, although there were provisions existing for such.
4. There was much evidence of compulsion by various methods, and the sight of the servicals lying about on the wharfs convinced him that they had no desire to go.
5. He went to Lourenco-Marques and found a great contrast there. The natives were eager to volunteer and from the ones returning he heard favorable stories of a contented lot of natives.
6. Generally, Mr. Burt stated that he had no fault to find with the official system, but with the working out of its

5. London Times, October 4, 1907.

6. Mr. Cadbury, representing the cocoa firms, had an interview with the Portuguese colonial Minister at Lisbon. He was assured that the government would make a very thorough investigation, putting recruitment into the hands of a responsible government system, which would serve as a means of repatriation. London Times, December 16, 1907.

7. London Times, October 9, 1908.

provisions. The freedom of contract and the early repatriation necessary to its success were absolutely lacking in Angola. There was no evidence of a local committee of labor or a repatriation fund. In conclusion he said, "I am satisfied that, under the servical system as it now exists, thousands of black men and women are, against their will, and often under circumstances of great cruelty, taken away every year from their homes and transported across the sea to work on unhealthy islands from which they never return. If this is not slavery, I know of no word in the English language which correctly characterizes it".⁸

Naturally, this agitation was taken up and continued by the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society. At a meeting on December 4, 1908, they definitely condemned Portuguese indifference to conditions, and authorized a letter to the British Foreign Office urging it to use its utmost influence with the Portuguese government.⁹ From this date on, the Foreign Office is not given much rest by the above mentioned Society, even after conditions in San Thomé and Principe were markedly better.

The British government, through the Foreign Office, brought to the notice of Portugal the dissatisfaction with affairs in Angola. Grey said that the feeling in England was very strong, and was based on the certainty that the abuses in the interior, at least, had been very great. In 1908, the Portu-

8. London Times, October 9, 1908.

9. Ibid., December 5, 1908.

guese government sent out one Captain Paula Cid on a tour of investigation. He worked over a year gathering material, and his findings bore out Mr. Burt's report.¹⁰ The future action of Portugal was really rather difficult. The same law governing recruitment was working well in Mozambique, Cabinda and Cape Verde. According to him, there were several reasons for its lack of enforcement. It was often found necessary to induce the natives by pressure to volunteer for work in sufficient numbers, they being of a peculiarly low and indolent type. Then, too, it was difficult for Portuguese officials to control the recruiting agents over so large a territory as Angola.

The Portuguese government was accused by the Anti-Slavery Society of extreme slowness in acting on the above report, in fact, they were censured for waiting for the report at all. At this time there seemed to be disagreement in England between the various groups as to the seriousness of the situation. The Foreign Office and the Times did not accept verbatim everything that was related by returned observers on the problem of contract labor. Sir Edward Grey was subject to considerable veiled criticism on the part of the Societies and various groups interested in reform. In March of 1909, Mr. Cadbury again made it his business to investigate the integrity of the Portuguese government, so he spent five months in Angola checking up on how well the Portuguese government had carried out the rather vague reforms it had promised

10. London Times, April 3, 1909.

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after Mr. Burt's report. He found that they had done next to nothing. The result of all his observations was a solemn declaration on the part of his firm and several others to buy no more cocoa from these islands until the conditions were definitely remedied.

The reactions resulting from this action were varied. One London correspondent in Portugal summed it up as follows: "Public opinion here remains cool in the face of the boycott of the English cocoa manufacturers. In a certain section of the Press, attempts are being made to represent Mr. Cadbury, and his friends, as actuated by commercial jealousy; but well informed people, while regretting that their [British] reforming zeal should have found no scope nearer home, continue to believe in the excellence of their [British] motives; while the correct and friendly attitude of the British government is appreciated on all sides".¹²

Commercial opinion, while they realized that eventually such a boycott would effect a great deal of damage, (as British firms took more than a quarter of the cocoa produced) exhibited scepticism as to the reality of it. The cocoa could be sold under another name and through intermediary agents.

Another section of public opinion expressed the view that the boycott was only justified accidentally on philanthropic grounds and was in reality a trade boycott. Their reaction is

11. London Times, December 16, 1907.

12. Ibid., June 4, 1909.

interesting because they propose, as a more or less retaliatory measure, the recruiting of labor on a large scale from Mozambique for San Thomé and Príncipe, thus eventually depriving the Rand Mines of much needed laborers. This attitude was partly due to current rumors of irregularities in the methods employed by the Rand Native Labor Association in their recruitment in Mozambique. A new agreement had been concluded on April 1, 1909, between the Transvaal government and the Province of Mozambique concerning the recruitment of native labor and trade.¹³ This was to replace the one of 1901 and the additional convention of 1904. The above group expressed the fear that certain clauses of the treaty might prejudice the chances of the natives returning, thus depriving Portugal of valuable aid.¹⁴ Their fears were ungrounded as the Convention provided expressly that "the Transvaal government guarantees that the natives will be given their discharge at the end of the period of contract", in this new convention not to exceed two years.¹⁵

On July 17th of 1909, Portugal acted on the "suggestions" of Great Britain and of interested Societies in the form of a set of new Native Regulations for the Province of San Thomé and Príncipe. The objects for which the regulations have been made form the preamble, namely:¹⁶ (1) To delimit recruiting zones,

13. British And Foreign State Papers, 1909, vol.102, pp.110-115.

14. London Times, June 4, 1909.

15. British and Foreign State Papers, 1909, vol.102, pp.110-115.

16. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6522, pp.2-21.

(2) to fix the number of natives to be recruited in each zone each year, (3) to draw up itineraries which will allow the direct superintendence of natives on the journey, (4) to determine the zones and duration of licenses of recruiting agents, (5) to insure that the authorities shall not fail to look after the natives from the time they are recruited until they reach San Thomé and on the return journey until they reach their homes, (6) to reduce the length of contracts for the time being, (7) to secure repatriation for those who desire it, (8) to increase and systematize wages, (9) to publish all details with regard to the departure and return of the natives which may be of a statistical nature, and lastly, to facilitate the temporary suspension of emigration. These objects are really a summary of the law. It goes on to state that the "principles of the historic decree of the 29th of April, 1875, which definitely put a stop to slavery in Portuguese possessions, have been faithfully carried out, thus completing the civilizing and humanitarian labors which Portugal initiated in the eighteenth century and carried on in the nineteenth century"¹⁷. This document was further modified by a decree of December 9, 1909, the changes according to Villiers, (British minister at Lisbon)¹⁸ were all in the direction of protection for the natives.

Following the passage of the above regulation of July,

17. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6322, p. 2.

18. Ibid., pp. 27-30.

came a decree on July 31, 1909, issued by the King of Portugal suspending recruitment for three months. "Whereas it is necessary to make preparation for the change from the old to the new system of recruitment and engagement of native laborers in the province of Angola and Principe in such a manner that the civilizing object had in view may be entirely carried out, I hereby decree:-

1. The recruitment of native laborers in the province of Angola for the islands of San Thomé and Principe shall be suspended for three months from the date when the decree with the force of law as from the 17th instant is published in the official "Bulletin" of the Government of the Province of Angola.

2. During the above period of suspense only laborers may be engaged who have been recruited before the date of publication referred to in Act 1, and are on their way to the Coast, or who have arrived at any part in which a Curator or his delegate exists.

3. The Governor-General of the Province of Angola shall immediately adopt such measures as will insure strict compliance with the provisions of this decree.

4. Any legislation contrary hereto is hereby invoked".¹⁹

On first glance, the root of the evil seems to have been reached by the action taken by the Portuguese government; however, there still seem to be difficulties. Sir Edward Grey regretted that repatriation was not made compulsory, and that though the renewal of contracts was to be effected in public²⁰ the actual engagement of the natives was not. He was assured

19. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6322, pp.27-30.

20. Ibid., p. 25.

later on that point by Captain Paula Cid that any one interested in the recruitment was at liberty to attend. He was upheld in his criticism by H.A. Mackie, a British Consul at Loanda, who had made a thorough survey of the situation.

On November 17, 1909, the suspension of recruitment was lengthened to January 31, 1910. It had been found that the machinery required for carrying out the new regulations was far from perfected. Great Britain expressed doubt as to whether it would be in good working order even then and asked for still further suspension. This was refused by Senhor Beirao, Prime Minister. He said that recruitment would begin on February 1, but only in two areas in Angola where the new control could be most effectively exercised. He further stated that all officials were charged to follow out the instructions exactly under the superintendency of a man well versed in native experience from Johannesburg, Senhor José de Almeida.²¹

On the whole, the British Government seemed pretty well satisfied with the sincerity of Portugal in dealing with the problem. During all the correspondence and investigations and haranguings from the Anti-Slavery Society, the government had insisted on not forcing Portugal too far. They felt, and rightly so, that it was a problem, when once called to their attention, should be settled by them alone. Although Grey continued to be interested in the progress made, there is an impatience in his replies to

21. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd.6322, p. 33.

the energetic gentlemen of the Anti-Slavery Society, who apparently wanted England to go with an army and clear up the evils. One Lisbon correspondent calls Cadbury's visit and report "unreasonable interference". No doubt the fear that Portugal might shut down on the supply of labor from Mozambique for the Rand had a great deal to do with Grey's cautious policy.

During the years 1910 and 1911, Portugal's struggle with her major problem of repatriation was carried on, subject to the criticism and surveillance of the Anti-Slavery Society, the united cocoa firms and, to a less extent, Grey and the foreign office. There is no doubt but what the situation was a difficult one. According to figures, there was a small but steady stream of natives back to Angola, but the problem did not end there. Many natives were unwilling to go back to their original home. They were now too civilized and preferred to stay along the coast. There they spent their money on drink and in general were a nuisance and a disgrace. Undoubtedly the still apparent slackness of Portuguese officials was in part responsible for these conditions. Suggestions were brought forward for the forming of separate villages of these returned natives in unpopulated but fertile areas near the coast; starting them out with seed and a few farm implements the first year, and then a more or less strict supervision of their activities. This was taken under advisement. According to observations made by British Consuls, there were a great number being re-contracted in San Thomé and Principe which would seem to indicate some external pressure.

Consul Drummond-Hay visiting San Thomé and Principe in 1910 reported that the services there were in excellent condition, but the repatriation of those from Angola was going on very slowly. In some respects, he felt the native was better off where he was, as they were often captured by other natives on their way home and sold again among native tribes. But regardless of that fact, repatriation of all natives was the goal, and that was not being carried out. The report of a Portuguese, Major Vieira, on the matter brings it clearly before the public. He stated that although the natives were not badly treated, there were at least 50,000 of them that should have been repatriated immediately. He was convinced that the criticism of Portugal's "slavery" would never be stilled until obligatory repatriation was enforced. He was aware that it would cause a great loss to the owners, but it was his opinion that "the government cannot sacrifice the interests of humanity for ²³ mere private interests".

On February 4, 1911, a meeting had been held of the powerful plantation owners of San Thomé and Principe. The object of the meeting was to secure voluntary instead of compulsory repatriation. Their reasons were that as many natives had been residents for years, they had family ties and positions of trust. Secondly, compulsory repatriation would cause many hardships for the natives, and thirdly, there would be a great difficulty in filling their places. They formed themselves into a Commission

23. London Times, May 4, 1911.

and appealed directly to the Minister of Marines and Colonies for a suspension of the law. Adverse comment on this in the British press was apparent. It seemed that all the progress made might be wiped out. But the fears were groundless. The Minister decided definitely against the wishes of the plantation owners. He stated that fresh contract with those natives already there might be entered into, but only before one official and only after strict assurance had been given that the natives wished to remain. All natives recruited in the future, however, would be repatriated at the end of one year instead of three as formerly.²⁴

With the coming in of the provisional government in October, 1910, fear had been expressed that the change would affect the Treaty relations of the two powers. Grey denied that any change would be forthcoming and was further substantiated in his statement by one from Senhor Machado.²⁵

"We always welcome the interest shown in our most important affairs, but it is clearly we who must decide these questions unaided. Every nation has its own self government. The Portuguese government hope and desire that their decisions may always deserve the approbation of all friendly peoples, and, above all, that of their ally.

"but when we are not dealing with internal questions, but

24. London Times, February 4, 1911.

25. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6322, p. 43.

with reciprocal rights and interests, especially as regards the condition of African natives belonging to our country and living on the territory of another state, or conversely, subjects of another state living on Portuguese territory, we will endeavor to solve, in perfect harmony with the other nation concerned, questions which have acquired an international character. The foreign policy of the Republic, like its internal policy, will be dignified and independent, so that natural respect and solidarity in action may be preserved. The strengthening of this solidarity with the great and glorious English nation is a matter we have deeply at heart". In this statement is the echo of a very old Portuguese policy, the conciliation of England in any matter, while on the surface upholding Portuguese dignity and sovereignty. On May 15, 1911, came a further decree of the Portuguese government modifying the regulations concerning native labor. Every native had to procure by work the necessary means of subsistence, if he did not do so, the public authorities could force him to; contracts could be made for two years. Repatriation was not made compulsory at the end of that time, a negro could re-engage himself if he so desired. Very strict rules were laid down governing the methods of contracting and the penalties for any disregard of them. ²⁶ (The agreement is also mentioned as having occurred on the 27th).

26. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, ed. 6322, pp.61-73.

The success of the new regulations these first two years was hampered not by a lack of willingness on the part of the government to carry them out, but from the European and native vested interests in Angola, the difficulty of adjusting the natives and the weakness of the men sent to take care of it. At the end of 1911 there is a pertinent illustration of the active interests of European firms in the wealth of San Thomé and Príncipe. The plantation owners convened to consider an offer by a group of British capitalists to purchase the whole amount of cocoa produced annually. This would put an end to the so-called boycott of Portuguese cocoa by British firms which had existed for over a year now. The negotiations were progressing nicely when the suggestion was made to purchase some of the plantations in these islands for the purpose of floating an Anglo-Portuguese Company. The planters declined on the grounds that their government objected to such property passing into the hands of foreigners. But after a bill forbidding planters to sell their property to foreigners was withdrawn in the Chamber of Deputies, an Anglo-French Company was formed with a capital of £6,000,000.²⁷ All plantation owners wishing to dispose of their plantations could receive 60% in cash and 40% of the value in shares in the new company. These capitalists promised to show great improvements in the two islands. They felt sure that within two years, due to their advanced methods, the production of cocoa would be doubled.

27. London Times, March 26, 1912.

During 1912 and 1913 the agitation concerning the repatriation of the negroes continued. A further cause for the belief that Portugal was back-sliding in living up to her reforms was the knowledge that repatriation was suspended on March 27, 1912, until August of the same year. ²⁸ The reason for this action as given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Grey was that the machinery for taking care of them when they arrived had not been working successfully. He also felt that until the large and systematic recruitment of natives from Angola was begun again, the planters really needed the labor of those already there. Grey brought it to the attention of the Portuguese government that this was again going into the dangerous ground of forced labor.

The Anti-Slavery Society got busy and a Reverend John W. Harris went down to investigate the situation. He returned full of condemnation of the system and of the Portuguese government for lack of interest. He charged misappropriation of the Repatriation Funds; little repatriation in the last three years and no efforts made to take care of the natives when they did get back; finally that although the natives from Mozambique were true servicals, those from Angola were still slaves. He ended his article with the portentous suggestion, "Portugal must be asked to liberate and then repatriate the slaves. Great Britain

28. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6607, pp. 84-85.

can help her to do so. If, however, Portugal refuses friendly advice and disinterested offers of assistance, justice demands²⁹ that her African colonies be abandoned to an impending fate". The views held by the Anti-Slavery Society as a whole were similar, and were laid before Sir Edward Grey in a resolution, which ends, "the Society holds that should Portugal fail to abolish slavery in her dominions effectively and without delay, it will be compelled to call upon His Majesty's Government to terminate forthwith the alliance now existing with Portugal, since the British people will, we are confident, refuse to continue an alliance which involves the resources of Britain in the maintenance of slavery and the Slave Trade"³⁰.

Such was the attitude of a large part of public opinion in general. Sir Edward Grey was not hostile to the above mentioned groups, but there were points of view on which he differed with them. He never once admitted that "slavery" as such existed. He always referred to the labor as "contract labor". As far as investigations were concerned, he was not negligent there. Several consuls and vice-consuls on the spot were engaged in journeys and conversations with natives, the results of which were sent home to him. The consistence of opinion being that the Portuguese government was doing all in its power to regulate and remedy the abuses. According to Consular reports,

29. P.P., 1912-1913, LIX, cd. 6607, p. 7.

30. Ibid., p. 35.

the general condition of the natives in these islands was not bad, and in many instances repatriation was a poor policy. More than one consular report showed the feeling that the authoritativeness of Mr. Harris' report and of statements made by members of the Anti-Slavery society were to be questioned due to their sources of information.

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The stand taken by the representatives of the British government in Angola may be well summed up in the following extracts of a report to Grey: "The time has not yet come when it would be possible or desirable to relax the close attention with which the gradual introduction of the new regime is being scrutinized by our consular officers on the spot. But these gentlemen have reported in very favorable terms as to the conditions obtaining on the plantations they have visited, and their praises have been confirmed by Bishop J.C. Hartzell, of the M.E. Church; under these circumstances hasty condemnation would be not only unjust, but most impolitic; friendly appreciation of what has already been done might go far to encourage future efforts; and well informed criticism would be listened to with greater good will if the critics had shown in the past their appreciation of the difficulties of the strength of the resistance on the part of the vested interests, which had been successfully overcome by the Portuguese authorities both at home and in their colonies.

I would therefore urge that patience is still very necessary, and that we should continue to bring to the notice of the Portuguese government any concrete instances of abuses".³²

It is evident that Mr. Wingfield, the author of this report, was condemning the policy pursued by the members of the Anti-Slavery Society. As further proof of the stand taken by British officials, this extract from the consular report of Mr. Smallbones at Loanda³³ may be used:

"The central government in Lisbon and the present governor-general appear to be willing to make every effort to enforce the regulations of 1911 and to stop all abuses which have been practiced. Time only will show how far they are able to carry out their intentions and in particular how far they are able to force a sufficient number of natives, who are liable to work, to enter contracts. Only if they are able to create a sufficient supply of labor will they be able to do away with existing abuses.

"Should they fail in their attempts at reform, that failure would probably be due to the insufficiency of the control they are able to exercise in this colony and not to lack of good intentions on their part".

Portugal during 1912 and 1913 was not inactive. Following out a suggestion made earlier, she established by a decree on May 27, 1911, the creation of native agricultural settle-

32. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6607, pp. 28-30.

33. Ibid., p. 39.

ments for repatriated natives.³⁴ This was put into working order in 1912. On December 21, 1912, a further order was issued by the provincial government to make more successful the efforts being put forth to encourage the natives to seek work of their own free will. According to this decree, they will only seek work if they are paid in money.³⁵ The hoped for result was that the new in-

ducements offered would attract a large number of free laborers and recruitment of any kind could be done away with. These above innovations indicate the distance Portugal had travelled since 1908.³⁶ At the same time Portuguese officials in general were resentful of the criticism given them during the year 1912, when, as they thought, the sincerity and at least partial success of their efforts was obvious.³⁷

In summarizing the progress made by Portugal toward solving the labor problem in her colonies, it seems fairly obvious that again the two governments worked easily and in harmony as they had done often before. Portugal far from resenting the criticism welcomed it, if they felt it to be justified. As far as official criticism went, there was no difficulty. Great Britain made suggestions and Portugal tried to carry them out, with the

34. P.P., 1912-13, LIX, cd. 6322, pp. 61-73.

This was an attempt to create small native holdings, to educate and civilize the natives chiefly by means of agricultural work. A further section of the decree regulates the amount of work a native is forced to do during a year. Their military service is only for two months, and then in the capacity of a policeman.

35. Ibid., cd. 6607, pp. 72-75.

36. Ibid., pp. 58-59. A further illustration might be had in the forming of the Society of Emigration to San Thome and Principe on November 2, 1912, to force all plantation owners to recruit through one source which would be under government regulation both in Angola and in the islands.

37. London Times, July 2, 1912.

complete understanding of British officials of the difficulties under which she was working. By 1913, the most glaring abuses had been remedied and efforts were not being lessened to make the further adjustments necessary. There is no doubt that there were "further adjustments" to be made, as was brought out so often by the members of the Anti-Slavery Society; but credit must be given attempts made for the better. How long this "reform" attitude on the part of the Portuguese government would last was another question. Suffice to say that if any back-sliding was noticeable, there would be many sympathizers with the negroes to bring it to the attention of the authorities.

CHAPTER V.

Economic Development of Portuguese Colonies in Relation to
English Interests - 1902-1913.

Whenever the subject of Portuguese colonies came up in official circles, agreement was always reached as to the negligence of that government in developing its colonies, particularly Mozambique. The charge was quite true, with the exception of the Lourenco-Marques Railway to the Transvaal frontier, and one or two shorter lines, the government had ignored the possibilities of her territory.

In 1901, the British government negotiated a modus vivendi with Portugal in regard to the above mentioned railway and to labor for the Rand. There had been previous agreements existing between Portugal and the Transvaal on this subject, but now that that region was under British control, new negotiations were necessary. The Lourenco-Marques-Pretoria railroad, or as it is called, the Delagoa Bay railroad, is the most direct and shortest route from the Transvaal to the coast. There were several British owned railroads competing for the business of this region and terminating at Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. Naturally any preference given to the Portuguese railroad would be vigorously opposed by these firms. Disregarding that fact, it was to the advantage of British capital in the Transvaal to have as good a bargain struck as possible.

The negotiations were completed on December 18, 1901.¹ In general, the terms (regarding the railroad) provided for the establishment of the Delagoa Bay railroad on equal terms with the other lines as to rates, passenger and freight, and duties on goods entering Mozambique bound for the Transvaal.² This modus vivendi was not very popular with the other South African colonies that owned railroads. There had always been a great deal of rivalry for the Transvaal traffic and now that it was under the control of Britain they felt, no doubt, that preferences would be made for them. But Great Britain stood firm and refused to have the vivendi revoked or changed at the request of Capetown and Durban. Britain was afraid no doubt that Portugal might retaliate if it was changed and not allow any natives to go into the Transvaal, and it was absolutely necessary for her to have them in the Rand. Certain portions of the Portuguese were dissatisfied with the negotiations as not being favorable enough to Lourenco-Marques. They felt that the trade of that region would be destroyed now in competition with those other towns.

The situation got steadily worse from 1901 to 1905.

In 1904, an addition to the modus vivendi was made providing that

1. British and Foreign State Papers, vol.95, 1901, pp.931-934.
2. More specifically stated, the vivendi provided: 1. Rates on the Delagoa Bay line to be put on a pre-war basis; 2. If a modification of tariffs and rates on the British lines should occur, the above line will do the same; 3. Civil traffic from Lourenco-Marques to the Transvaal will be regulated on the same principles as that from the Cape or Natal; 4. Goods sent in transit from Lourenco-Marques on entering the Transvaal shall pay no higher duties than the same class of goods sent in transit from Durban, Port Elizabeth or Capetown. Ibid., pp.931-934.

"products of either colony or possession will only be admitted free of duty into the other colony or possession provided that the chief elements or chief constituent parts of such industry are the produce of the soil of such colony or possession".³ By 1905, there was a regular tariff war afoot. In June an attempt was made to negotiate a new modus vivendi reducing the rates on the other railroads. The proposed reduction would cheapen goods in the Transvaal and divide more evenly the over sea traffic between Lourenco-Marques and the other towns. Only 46% was going over the Cape lines, due to the equal rates and the longer distance down there from the Transvaal.⁴ Incidentally German and Austrian steamship lines were reaping the benefits of this as they began making Delagoa Bay their first stop. Continental articles were superseding those of England in the Transvaal.

Portugal at first utterly refused to consider a new modus vivendi, reducing the rates on the other lines below those of Lourenco-Marques. She seemed to be depending on the rivalry between the different lines and the dependence of the Transvaal on her for natives to carry her point through. They had decided backing in their stand by Transvaal public opinion, the government there even stated that they would be willing to carry all their trade through Lourenco-Marques.⁵

3. British and Foreign State Papers, 1904, vol. 97, p. 1085.

4. London Times, October 30, 1905.

5. Ibid., August 10, 1905.

Eventually there was a direct imperial negotiation between the two countries, instead of leaving it to the companies. The discussions dragged on until the fall of 1905. In November, at a conference in Lisbon the Portuguese authorities decided that the reduction of rates on other lines in South Africa would result in a more equitable division of trade and that the trade of Lourenco-Marques would not suffer too much by it.⁶ The controversy was temporarily settled in 1905 and preference rates were given to Natal and Cape Colony over Delagoa Bay, not without violent denunciation by the Portuguese press and authorities in Mozambique who cited it as a breach of the modus vivendi of 1901. They threatened to denounce the modus vivendi of 1901 concerning the natives if "justice" was not given the rights of Delagoa Bay.⁷

The result of the dispute was a new convention signed April 1, 1909, between the Mozambique government and that of the Transvaal and Native Labor and Trade. It was to last for ten years and to carry over if the Transvaal became a part of the Union of South Africa. The terms as far as the railroad rates were concerned,⁸ settled the matter again according to the wishes of Portugal. Part Two of the convention takes up the

6. London Times, November 28, 1905.

7. Ibid., January 11, 1907.

8. The Transvaal government gained advantages in the section of the Vivendi dealing with the regulations concerning the question of native labor, which was the security they desired. British and Foreign State Papers, 1909, vol.102, pp.110-115.

question of railroad rates and provides: ⁹ "1. The two governments will mutually and in consultation with each other devise and put into operation means and methods for facilitating and developing both the import and export trade; 2. The two governments with respect to all traffic of all descriptions for export overseas from the Transvaal through the port of Lourenco-Marques, will take such steps as may be considered expedient for facilitating and encouraging the same, and for this purpose they agree that throughout railway rates:

- a. From stations on the Central South African Railroad within the competitive area;
- b. From stations between Germiston (Pretoria) and Koomati Poort;
- c. From stations on branch lines connecting either directly with the competing area or with the through line from Pretoria to Lourenco-Marques

shall in no case be higher than those which are chargeable from such stations by any other route".

Part Three provides that no import or export duties shall be paid on the products of the soil or industry of either Mozambique into the Transvaal or vice versa, with liquor the only exception. It further provides that "with respect to goods imported into the Transvaal and exported there from through the port of Lourenco-Marques, no higher export duties shall be imposed, either in the Transvaal or in Lourenco-Marques than are levied on similar goods through the ports of the Cape Colony and

9. British and Foreign State Papers, 1909, vol.102, pp.115-118.

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Natal".

The other South African colonies denounced this Convention and the same disputes as to equality of trade arose again. But the union of South Africa which occurred in May 31, 1910, settled the question once and for all. It is interesting to note that throughout all the difficulty neither the home government or that of the Transvaal saw fit to force Portugal to a settlement of rates that would please the other colonies. The capitalistic interests in the Transvaal made it impossible to jeopardize the recruitment of labor in Mozambique by incurring Portuguese displeasure.

Portuguese railroad interests in Mozambique were not concerned alone with the Delagoa Bay railway to the frontier. In 1903 a decree was signed authorizing the construction of a railroad from Lourenco-Marques to the Swaziland frontier and included the improvement of the harbor at Lourenco-Marques. The Portuguese government stated that this construction would start as soon as it was certain that the line would be extended in British territory by the Transvaal government, preferably as far as Johannesburg. In order not to arouse suspicion on the part of the other colonies general Garjao declared, "the policy of the Portuguese government is to do nothing prejudicial to the Transvaal or to Swaziland, and to oppose in no manner the interests of the British colonies in South Africa".¹¹ In conclusion the

10. British and Foreign State Papers, 1909, vol.102, pp.118-120.
11. London Times, March 24, 1904.

Minister said he was certain that the future of the Transvaal was such that trade would flow into every port by which it was served.

In 1912, attempts were made for cooperation between a British Company and the Mozambique Company to build a railroad from the interior of Nyasaland and Shire' to the coast. British capital wished to have the consent of the Portuguese government to extend it through Portuguese territory terminating at Beira.¹² This would aid immensely in opening up that northern region, at the same time developing Beira into an important export and import center.

The development of Angola went ahead more slowly than that of Mozambique. Here is a territory more than fourteen times the size of Portugal, very rich and fertile, but never properly exploited. German and Belgian regions exist on either side of it with not half the resources but many times the development of those in Angola. The Portuguese tariffs were and are so high that they became a farce, since there were really no Portuguese products to protect. Mention has been made of the contract labor which was really its main interest, although they exported a little sugar cane and cotton.

After 1899, great concessions were given to British capital in Angola. German trade had been greatly hampered by restrictions, but they were beginning to press in and gain control

12. London Times, February 15, 1912.

of commercial enterprises. At this point it might be added that after her treaty with Germany in 1898, England gained great concessions not only in the spheres that had been assigned to her but the English firms had been getting a strong hold in German spheres. The difficulties in event of the break-up of Portugal's colonial empire are apparent.

There were three main railway lines under construction to the interior in the first decade of the twentieth century. The Loanda-Ambacca line, with a proposed extension of it to link Angola and Mozambique was being developed.¹³ The Benguella line, starting at Lobito Bay, is a British concession. It was started in 1902 by an English engineer who formed a company for the purpose of building a transcontinental line to join the line from Beira into Rhodesia, a projected length of 1,242 miles. By 1912, the railroad had reached Bihe, thousands of natives being regularly employed in its construction. A northeastern branch was planned to run from Bihe to the Katanga province of the Belgian Congo, opening up an enormously rich and still partially unexploited territory.¹⁴ Although this railroad was being financed and constructed by British capitalists and engineers, there was some official opposition to it in government circles on the ground it would deflect considerable trade from the Cape to subsidized German and Portuguese steamship lines.

In general, economic relations between Britain and

13. London Times, January 29, 1908.

14. London Times, September 10, 1907.

her colonies with the Portuguese colonies were decidedly improved in the period after the Boer War. The change of policy of Portugal toward her colonies, the betterment of the administration of Angola and Mozambique, the increased activity on the part of Portuguese merchants, the new railroad activity undertaken by the Portuguese government all tended to inspire British financial houses to acquire interests in the larger settlements, especially Lourenco-Marques. In 1905, an Anglo-Portuguese chamber of commerce was formed with the Marquis de Soveral at the head, a veteran at settling Anglo-Portuguese differences. It was felt that as England furnished a market for Portuguese produce, and Portugal and her colonies furnished a wide field for British enterprise under ameliorated conditions, a great deal of good would accrue to both countries. There was a good field for investment in Portuguese railways and mineral deposits. The increased financial stability of Portugal in the preceding four or five years made the enterprises more attractive. The agreement concludes that "to work in the interests of Anglo-Portuguese trade and commerce, and to consolidate the existing good relations between Great Britain and Portugal and her colonies will be the chief aim of the Anglo-Portuguese Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom".

15. London Times, December 8, 1905.

CHAPTER IV.

The Anglo-German Agreement of 1913.

This period does not bring about any radical change in the political relations between the two countries. It has been apparent throughout the previous discussion the eagerness with which Portugal has striven to maintain the amicable relations with Great Britain that had grown out of old treaties, and the general consideration shown the smaller country by the larger.

There are two or three incidents during the decade after the Boer war of the continuance of their common political interests. In 1903, they decided to submit to the arbitration of the king of Italy the Barotse boundary question. The treaty of 1891 had provided "the western line of division of the spheres of influence in Africa shall follow the center of the Zambezi from the Katima Rapids up to where the Zambezi reaches the Barotse kingdom. This is to remain British. Its limits to the west shall constitute the boundary between Great Britain and Portugal and shall be decided on by an umpire if a joint Anglo-Portuguese commission cannot reach a decision".¹ There were four conditions governing the arbitration:

1. What are the limits of the territory of Barotseland within the meaning of the above article?
2. This land means the land over which the King of Barotse was king in 1891;

1. British and Foreign State Papers, 1903, vol.97, pp.504-5.

3. The two parties shall furnish memorandum on the subject if they wish;
4. The cost of the investigation is to be divided equally.

On May 30, 1905, the King of Italy made known his decision. Briefly stated the boundary of the Barotse kingdom was:²

A straight line joining the rapids of Katinea on the Zambezi to the village of Andara on the Okovango up to the point where it encounters the river Kwando. The east edge of the bank of the Kwando up to 22° longitude; 22° longitude up to the intersection with 13° latitude; 13° latitude up to the intersection with 24° longitude; and 24° longitude to the frontier of the Congo.

There were two later settlements of boundary difficulties, one in 1907, the other in 1911. The former had to do with the boundary in East Africa, which was now accepted as being from the 18° 30' south latitude to the junction of the Sabi and Lundi rivers. The demarcation of that boundary by the British in accordance with the arbitral award of Signor Vigliani in 1897 was accepted by the Portuguese government.³

The demarcation settlement of November, 1911, accepts the boundary north and south of the Zambezi as it was laid down by an Anglo-Portuguese commission in November of 1904.⁴ In general, it was to be the center of the Shire⁵ and Ruo rivers.

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2. British and Foreign State Papers, 1905, vol.98, pp.382-385.
 3. Ibid., 1907, vol. 100, pp. 553-554.
 4. Ibid., 1911, vol. 104, pp. 185-193.
 5. Ibid., 1911, vol. 104, pp. 185-193.

In November of 1904 a treaty was signed between the two countries whereby they agreed that differences about treaties or legal matters not able to be settled by diplomacy, are to be referred to a Permanent Court of Arbitration; before referring it the two parties will meet to decide clearly the matter in dispute, the powers of the arbitrators, etc.⁶ This really was an extension of the Hague Conference of 1899 that they had both signed. It was to be in force for five years. In 1909 it was renewed for another period of five years.

This renewal coincided with the period of disturbance regarding contract labor. Rumors were abroad concerning a possible Portuguese loan gained on the security of Delagoa Bay. Sir Edward Guy denied it very decisively, and the following statement made by Senhor du Bocage, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sums up the situation:

"In South Africa, where British and Portuguese possessions adjoin one another, the best possible feeling exists between the administration of both countries. By the opening of new railroads and the extension and improvement of communication we are already in close touch with our British neighbors. In this respect all that is necessary for our mutual needs is being carried out, and, as I have said, the most excellent feeling exists on both sides of the Anglo-Portuguese frontiers. Stupid rumors are current from time to time about Portugal relinquishing portions of her territory, but these need not be taken into account, for

6. British and Foreign State Papers, 1903-4, vol.97, p. 68.

they are, on the face of it, ridiculous".⁷

In regard to the last point mentioned by Senhor Bocage in his statement, there was a great deal of speculation in the spring and early summer of 1912. Germany again enters in to form the triangle of relations in South Africa. In the early part of the century, there was a gradual change in Anglo-German relations. By 1907, England had reached agreements with France and Russia. Meanwhile, German trade in Portuguese colonies had increased enormously, doubling itself between 1900 and 1910, and by 1913 was threatening to displace that of Great Britain. There was also fear that Germany might get those many small islands belonging to Portugal as coaling stations or naval bases.

Accordingly, Haldane, Minister of War, was sent to Berlin in February of 1912 to negotiate for a naval holiday and better relations. As regards colonies, Haldane declared that England had no objection to Germany obtaining the larger part of Angola from Portugal and possibly a part of the Belgian Congo, the island of Timor would then fall to England.⁸ Immediately the Press took up rumors which leaked out from the sessions in Berlin. Both the British and Portuguese foreign offices during February and March were busy denying that any disposal of Portuguese colonies was to be made, or that Germany and England were negotiating an actual division of them.⁹ The Portuguese Minister in London, Senhor Teixeira, stated his opinion in a very emphatic

7. London Times, November 19, 1909.

8. Brandenburg, From Bismark to the World War (London, 1927), pp.403-407.

9. London Times, February 8, 1912, February 15, 1912, February 25, 1912.

manner:

"Great surprise has been caused in Portugal by the suggestion that Portugal is disposed to part with some of her colonies. All such suggestions I can assure you are absolutely baseless. Portugal was never less disposed to think of such a matter than she is today, and even to mention such a thing is hurtful to the patriotic feeling of every Portuguese. There have been no negotiations or advance on the part of any power with regard to such a matter".¹⁰

In March the Premier of Portugal published an extract of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1899, giving the main terms of it to the people.¹¹ He seemed to have as his purpose a stilling of the unrest in regard to the future of African colonies which was apparent in Portugal as well as in other countries. The questions came up in the House of Commons three or four times, as regards Germany's interest in the colonies and also England's apparent responsibility in regard to their future as was brought out by the extracts from the Treaty that were published.¹² In all cases evasive replies were given by the representatives of the Foreign Office.

From the evidence it does not seem that England was anxious to bring about any change in status of the Portuguese colonies; but there is no doubt but what she was using her previous relations with Germany over these colonies as one basis for restor-

10. London Times, February 15, 1912.

11. Ibid., March 18, 1912.

12. Ibid., May 14, 1912; Hansard, 5th Ser. XXXVIII, 765.

ing better feelings between Germany and England in the unsettled days of 1913.

In October of 1913 the efforts started by Haldane in regard to a revision of the terms of the Treaty of 1898 between England and Germany were completed. That treaty had held good for almost fifteen years, but the delimitation of the spheres of influence no longer satisfied either party. Germany was convinced that before long that treaty would have no practical value. She felt Portugal's financial weaknesses were over estimated; that she had other sources of revenue.¹³ The terms of the new treaty which was drafted and then "paraphed" (signing of initials only) were as follows:

1. The boundary of Angola was modified in favor of Germany, that of Mozambique in favor of England;¹⁴
2. England agreed to regard as a dead letter her defensive treaty of 1899 with Portugal if the colonies detached themselves from the mother country;
3. After some hesitation, Grey agreed, in a special supplementary treaty, not to come to the aid of Portugal if through mismanagement of her colonies, some other powers were compelled to interfere;
4. The two powers decided to oppose jointly any interference from a third power "whether this interference took the form of a loan to Portugal in return for a mortgage on the revenue of these provinces, or through the indirect acquisition of part of these territories, or by some other means".
5. Germany declared no interest in Timor and England none in San Thomé or Principe;
6. As soon as one part of the two great colonies came into the possession of England or Germany, the other party would have the right of occupying the share of the colony destined for it.

13. Brandenburg, Bismark to the World War, pp.465-66.

14. Ibid., pp. 465-67.

Grey urged the ratification of the treaty by parliament and the publication of it, along with the ones of 1898 and 1899. Germany objected so the treaty was only "paraphed" until a time limit for its application should be reached.¹⁵ In the spring of 1914 Germany again tried to carry it through without the terms being made public, Grey again refused as he had promised not to conclude any secret treaties. Until this new one was ratified by parliament, the earlier treaty would remain valid. Licknowsky, supported by Rosen, urged acceptance of the British conditions, for which he was criticised by Jägow.¹⁶ In July, 1914, the Emperor consented to its publication in the autumn. German hesitation for the publication of this treaty might have been due to a fear that her ever growing economic interests in the Portuguese colonies would have been made more difficult if the terms had been known.

The coming of the war made the treaty a dead letter. It is interesting to speculate as to whether an occasion might not have arisen through which the terms of the treaty would have operated. In the months just preceding the war the situation of Angola was desperate. The annual deficit was double the revenue. The Colonial Minister told the Portuguese government that something had to be done to demonstrate to the world that Portugal could handle her own colonies. No doubt the reported arrangements between Germany and England put a scare into Portuguese officials.

15. Brandenburg, Bismark to the World War, pp. 465-467.

16. Ibid., pp. 465-467.

His remedy was incorporated in a project providing for a huge loan to finish the railroads and roads and ports; a revision of laws concerning land concessions, native labor, commerce and industry and tariff; creation of new lines of navigation between Europe and the colony; the origin of a liberal credit and banking system in the colony; new laws for colonization to encourage small colonists; and a revision of the tariffs of the mother country in everything that concerned colonial products.

Fear was expressed in the Chamber of Deputies that the British government might call an international conference on the questions of the situation in the colonies, based on the known agreement between Germany and England, and on the rumors of further understandings being concluded.¹⁷ The Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs denied that any such possibility existed and his statement was further substantiated by one from¹⁸ Germany.

17. London Times, February 25, 1913.

18. Ibid.

APPROVED:

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