

Maximizing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Incarceration Boot Camps: A Response to Reduce Incarceration Costs and Recidivism

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**Maximizing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Incarceration Boot Camps: A Response to
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Abstract

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Statement of the Problem

When asked the question “What should happen to people who commit crimes?” most citizens respond without hesitation: “Send them to prison.” For some time now, this has been the solution to crime. This solution, however, does not come without a substantial cost. According to Battiato, Gray, Meuller & Witt (2007), the exact cost in 2006 was \$29,751 per prisoner annually in Wisconsin. In 2008, that was over 23,000 people. The total cost for WI DOC general funding continues to increase each year. The biennium budget for 2001-2013 submitted September 15, 2010, requests \$98.5 million, a 4.3% increase over base, just to support current operations and funding commitments. (WI Department Of Corrections [WI DOC], 2010)

Does sending them to prison work? There is substantial evidence that shows incarceration is not effective. Within three years of being released from prison, approximately 38.7 % of offenders are convicted of a new offense and returned to prison. (Battiato et. al., 2007) The reasons traditional incarceration fails to produce decreases in recidivism are simple to identify, but difficult to resolve. One reason prison fails is because it does not rehabilitate, it simply incapacitates the offender from committing more crimes while they are locked up. It is necessary to treat specific problems that lead individuals to commit crimes; to show them the incorrect behavior/coping mechanisms while teaching them a new, acceptable behavior. For example, 83%

of prisoners “have an identified substance abuse treatment need.” (Battiato et. Al., 2007) Yet, AODA treatment is not always ordered by the judge.

In our current financial crisis, it is necessary to look at alternatives that are less costly, do not sacrifice the safety of the general public, and reduce future criminal behavior. One possibility that would meet all these objectives is incarceration boot camps. They were introduced in the early 1980’s in Georgia and Oklahoma. Since then, states across the nation have experimented with this intermediate sanction. Many studies have criticized boot camps stating they do not reduce recidivism. Kurlychek (2010) states that correctional boot camps do not significantly impact recidivism rates. In 2003, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) published a comprehensive report that stated boot camps did little to dissuade participants from future criminal activity. Despite these negative perspectives, this paper provides evidence that, if properly implemented, they will provide the much-needed relief in cost and recidivism.

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I would like to thank God for giving me the courage, strength, and determination to meet the challenges put before me in this degree and in my personal life. He has shown me that our plans for ourselves are not always his plans and his time is not our time.

“Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.”

~ Mahatma Gandhi

Table of Contents

Approval Page.....	i
Title Page.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Abstract.....	v
Table of Contents.....	vi
I. Introduction.....	1
A. Incarceration Costs.....	1
B. Recidivism Rates.....	2
II. Review of Literature.....	3
A. History of Boot Camps.....	3
B. Examining Boot Camps.....	9
III. Theoretical Framework.....	16
A. Anomie/Strain Theory.....	16
B. Social Bond Theory.....	19
IV. Recommendations.....	24
A. Eligibility.....	24
B. Program Length.....	27
C. Rehabilitative and Educational Programs.....	27
D. Aftercare.....	28
V. Summary and Conclusions.....	30

VI. References.....32

I. Introduction

Corrections cost taxpayers a significant amount of money and accounts for a substantial portion of a state budget. Over the thirteen year span of 1990 to 2003, the Wisconsin prison population more than tripled. The 2011-2013 biennium budget submitted on September 10, 2011 notes a 4.3% increase over base and requests an increase in the average daily cost to house inmates (WI DOC, 2010). It is for these reasons that it is necessary to develop and utilize less expensive, yet efficient ways, to decrease costs. To meet both of these criteria, alternatives must decrease incarceration costs and prove successful in preventing return trips to prison for offenders. These two issues are explored in detail in this section to show the absolute necessity of alternative sanctions such as boot camps.

A. Incarceration Costs

The state of Wisconsin is spending an increasing amount of its budget on incarceration costs even facing a \$40 million shortfall in 2006. The same year, the total annual Wisconsin DOC budget was more than \$1 billion. This is a direct reflection of the steadily increasing prison population. As of 2005, Wisconsin incarcerated 258 out of 100,000 people - a rate higher than both the national and Midwest average (Battiatto et. al., 2007).

A common discussion topic amongst experts in the field revolves around ways to cut costs and save money. The expense connected with operating multiple prisons with thousands of inmates is a necessary, but costly, public service. The inevitable occurrence of crime within our society forces us to build, operate, and maintain numerous prisons with varying levels of custody. These costs, along with the prison population, are on the rise and, at present, there appears to be no relief in sight.

The average cost to house one inmate at a minimum security prison is just under \$30,000 per year in 2006 (Battiato et. al., 2007). With approximately 23,000 inmates in the custody of the Wisconsin Department Corrections during the same year, the cost for housing and care alone was approximately \$690,000,000 (WI DOC, 2006). This does not account for staff salary and operating expenses. Without question, the cost of funding prisons is a substantial burden to citizens and state budgets.

B. Recidivism Rates

One contributing factor to increasing incarceration costs is recidivism or return trips to prison for inmates. An estimated 38.2% of inmates released from prison return within three years. Additionally, 25% of offenders on active community supervision reenter prison with a new offense (Lind, 2009). That means the system is repeatedly paying thousands of dollars to house many of the same offenders over and over again. Incarceration alone has not proven to be an effective deterrent for crime. Factors that result in crime go much deeper than simply taking the offender off the street. Issues such as alcohol and drug addiction play a significant role in an offender's criminal behavior.

A program designed to address this issue, while punishing an offender for his crime is ideal. That is why for an alternative intermediate sanction such as boot camps to be successful, treatment for core issues must be incorporated into the program. In fact, MacKenzie and Souryal (1994) found that programs that had a strong focus on rehabilitation, participants diverted from prison, a longer program duration, and an intensive community supervision phase showed lower rates of recidivism. More recently, Lind (2007) reports that "properly executed rehabilitation and treatment programs targeted precisely at specific offender groups could reduce recidivism by 10

– 20%”. That is a very close description of the components and goals of incarceration boot camps and amounts to a substantial savings in incarceration costs.

II. Review of Literature

This section discusses the development of incarceration boot camps. A history of prisons and key incarceration phases that led to the creation and implementation of this type of intermediate sanction is reviewed. This is followed by a discussion of two boot camp program designs and operations.

A. History of Boot Camps

Civilization has always been faced with the problem of how to deal with law breakers. Early societies closely adhered to a *lex talionis* philosophy, essentially meaning “an eye for an eye”. Historically, punishments were cruel, unusual and literally torture. Many crimes were punishable by the death of the offender at most and extreme pain and mutilation at least. Branding, flogging and whipping were commonplace in the 1700’s. Specific and general deterrence were often accomplished through these types of penalties so people accepted them. Although appalling by today’s standards, it was not all that long ago that these practices were discontinued in our country. The last known whipping sentence was carried out on June 16, 1952 in Delaware when a burglar received 20 lashes. Prisons as punishment only developed in the last two centuries (Schmallegger, 2005). The American prison as we know it today was a progressive and ongoing development and to truly understand the current state of our incarceration system, it is necessary to review its various stages of development. Schmallegger (2003) provides an excellent chart depicting the “Stages of Development in the United States”. (Appendix A)

Imprisonment for criminals developed in Europe and made its way to the United States sometime in the eighteenth century. Pennsylvania Quakers converted the Walnut Street Jail into a prison in 1790 with a focus on rehabilitation. During the first stage of prisons, the Penitentiary

Era (1790 – 1825), penance was the focus. Offenders were encouraged to study the Bible and the prison was designed and built to minimize human contact, both between inmates and between staff and inmates. Even recreation and crafting was performed individually. Later, in 1823, Western Penitentiary was built with similar architecture and operated under similar thinking styles. This became known as the Pennsylvania system. (Schmallegger, 2003)

The Mass Prison Era followed the Penitentiary Era (1825 – 1876). As the numbers of criminals sentenced to prison began to increase, the idea of solitary confinement became unreasonable to maintain. The New York State Prison at Auburn was the first to abandon the separation of offenders, but the administration did enforce silence. This style became known as the Auburn system. Offenders were housed, fed and labored in groups. They even performed crafts in groups, but strict silence was maintained. In order to enforce this system, administrators utilized capital punishment and hard labor to punish violators. Although the Pennsylvania system had been previously deemed humane, the Auburn prison conducted an experiment that simulated the idleness and lack of human contact prisoners experienced in the Pennsylvania type system. Over a one to two year period, five of 83 men died, there was one suicide attempt, another went insane and the remainders were deemed “seriously demoralized”. After the experiment, prison reformers jumped on the Auburn style prison bandwagon. Auburn style prisons were also more cost efficient because of the simpler designs and the income created from offender made goods (Schmallegger, 2003).

Next came the brief Reformatory Era. Lasting only fourteen years (1876 – 1890), it is one of the shortest prison stages. After a visit to Great Britain to study prisons, the warden of Sing Sing Prison in New York decided to try a form of indeterminate sentencing combined with what we presently refer to as parole. With the backing of the New York Prison Association, the idea of

an earned release program with a period of community supervision was well received at the National Prison Association's first conference in 1870. With this in mind, the Elmira Reformatory opened in 1876. At the time, prison reformers strongly believed that young offenders had a higher likelihood of long-term rehabilitation so only offenders between the ages of 16 and 30 that were first-time offenders were accepted. The prison mandated that offenders attend school and learn a trade as well as meet goals of various requirements before they could be released. Although this era was brief and a relative failure due to reoffending, it is important to note the idea that young, first time offenders were more conducive to be rehabilitated (Schmallegger, 2003).

As the American population grew, so did the crime. Increasing costs of incarcerating a large population of offenders gave way to the Industrial Era (1890 – 1935). Putting prisoners to work inside and outside of the prison walls allowed costs of imprisonment to be reduced and actually even become profitable. Furthermore, with the abolition of slavery came a great necessity for cheap agricultural labor in the South. Cheap prison labor became a thriving enterprise and satisfied private manufacturers as well. However, workers competing for jobs, the lack of private sector jobs after the Great Depression, and the strengthening of workers' unions eventually became the demise of this era. Although it should be noted that prison industries do still exist today in some places, but are regulated by state and federal laws (Schmallegger, 2003).

Lasting only a decade next came the Punitive Era (1935 – 1945). This era notable mention except that it seemed to signify a shift from purposeful work and rehabilitation to simply locking up offenders. This seems to be a transition period between the collapse of the partial fiscal independence of prisons to the next era of rehabilitation (Schmallegger, 2003).

Post World War II brought feelings of success, unity, and improvement to Americans. Advances in mental illness and psychology, in general, opened the door to the Treatment Era (1945 – 1967). Society embraced the ideas that not only were offenders mentally immature and ill, but that they could be fixed with individual and group therapies. Ultimately, prisoners demanded a right to refuse treatment and scrutiny of the medical models being followed led to the abandonment of this era. Even though there are still some prisons that operate under this philosophy, it was dismissed by the majority as unacceptable by 1967 (Schmallegger, 2003).

Still seeking relief to rising costs and overcrowding, administrators were receptive to trying something new. Combining fresh ideas with the continued faith in the ability of offenders to change led to the Community-Based Era (1967 – 1980). The push during this era became known as “decarceration” and was marked by the belief that isolating law violators did not teach them how to conform to society’s norms or have a vested interest in the community’s well-being. Again, there are still traces of this era in existence, but it is no longer the predominant school of thought. This era was short in duration, but it is particularly noteworthy in the present topic because of its development and use of intermediate sanctions which plays a key role in incarceration boot camp philosophy (Schmallegger, 2003).

Repeat offenders and the increase in media portrayals of heinous crimes disheartened the public on rehabilitation and community-based integration efforts. The Warehousing Era (1980 – 1995) was born of this mentality. Emerging research results proclaimed that there was no treatment program that would effectively reduce recidivism. This led to the “nothing-works doctrine” which, in turn, paved the way to legislative and sentencing overhauls that included mandatory minimum sentences, truth-in-sentencing, and “three strikes and you’re out” (many of these aimed at drug offenders). During this time, there were also fewer releases of inmates and

increased pressure to sentence drug offenders to longer sentences. Naturally, these factors combined only compounded the problems of overcrowding and out of control costs. At the height of this era, several states were under court orders to reduce overcrowding because of the inability to comply with safety and other guidelines. Administrators desperately sought relief and solutions such as “tent cities”, early release of non-violent offenders, and routing prisoners to local jails were all options utilized. (Schmallegger, 2003) It was during this era that incarceration boot camps were first designed and implemented. From the review of prison history, it appears evident that this alternative to incarceration was necessary at this time to meet the high demand for punishment of offenders.

From about 1995 to the present brings a new era – the Just Deserts Era. In many ways it mirrors to the Punitive Era and it is difficult to distinguish it from the previous Warehousing Era. Currently, many state and federal prisons remain at or above maximum capacity. The only real difference is that the overcrowding and expenses are viewed as deserved and not simply a broken system unable to reform itself. The price of the “get tough” laws of the 1980’s and 1990’s is still being paid and will continue to be a fiscal burden in the future if something is not done to alleviate these issues. This is clear to administrators and justice reformers, but it doesn’t appear that the public is letting up on their “lock ‘em up” mentality. Prisons continue to be constructed at a huge financial burden to taxpayers even when the majority of offenders are convicted of property and drug offenses. Despite media portrayals to the contrary, violent crime is a small percent of the total crime picture. (Schmallegger, 2003)

As noted above, the War on Drugs in the 1980’s drastically increased the number of offenders sentenced to prison. Faced with overcrowded prisons and devastating costs, prison officials were faced with the daunting task of seeking alternatives which satisfied the public’s

demand for safety and punishment while balancing the administration's diminishing space capacity and sky-rocketing costs. Three combined factors led to the exploration of alternatives to incarceration: rehabilitation was no longer acceptable as a basis of sentencing offenders, a push to replace rehabilitation with a "just desserts" philosophy in sentencing criminals, and politicians declaring war on law violators and campaigning on the platform that they would seek harsher sentences (John Howard Society, 1998). Intermediate sanctions were explored and incarceration boot camps seemed to be an acceptable solution.

Incarceration boot camps as an alternative to prison emerged in the United States in the early 1980's in the south. In 1983, Oklahoma opened a boot camp program and another opened in Georgia about one month later. The idea piqued interest in the eyes of administrators and was socially acceptable as a form of punishment to the public. Only two programs were in operation in 1984, but by 1992 there were 41 programs operated by at least 25 states and the Federal government. Several more programs were set to launch (MacKenzie et. Al., 1994). Between 1993 and 1994, there was a 25% increase in total boot camp beds (John Howard Society of Alberta, 1998). Over a decade after the first programs began, in 1995, there were 75 state operated adult boot camps. Local and state authorities ran an additional 30 juvenile boot camps and there were 18 operated in larger county jails. (US DOJ, 2003)

Although the growth was impressive, the intended goals were not immediately measurable. It took time for participants of the infantile programs to complete the curriculum and be released. Additionally, it was difficult to evaluate programs because the design, implementation, and even eligibility criteria were varied for each program. Despite this obstacle, interested observers took up the task of reviewing the outcomes of boot camps and 152 independent studies were conducted to determine whether the incarceration boot camp

alternative was successful. The results were not what those who had invested in the programs had hoped for. One study of 44 boot camps “concluded that correctional boot camps do not provide either a significant increase or decrease in the odds of recidivism compared with other incarceration options” (Kurlychek, 2010). Over time and with careful evaluation, it seemed apparent that incarceration boot camps were not fulfilling their purpose for administrators or reducing overall recidivism rates. Recognizing this disappointment, several camps closed (roughly one third) and by 2000 only 51 camps remained. The average daily population in state operated camps had also dropped by more than 30% (Parent, 2003).

A. Examining Boot Camps

Now that incarceration boot camp history has been reviewed, the next step is to take a look at specific programs. Just as the current day prisons developed in stages, so did incarceration boot camps. Most scholars agree that there seems to have been three stages in boot camp development. The first generation of boot camps, stemming back to Georgia and Oklahoma in 1983, strictly adhered to the military style of discipline with daily exercise, discipline and hard work. Compliance was thought to be gained simply by enforcing rules and harsh discipline. Evaluations from this generation of boot camps showed that they were not very successful in achieving their intended goals. The second generation focused more on rehabilitation, integrating daily living skills and AODA classes with military drills and exercise. Many also included a community supervision phase. Studies of these programs were more positive than previous camps, but were still disappointing in that they did not show a significant recidivism reduction. For example, MacKenzie and Souryal (1994) studied eight such programs and found that some boot camps showed a slightly lower recidivism rate than traditional boot camps, but determined that it was due to the selection criteria rather than the experience itself.

They also added a new concern – technical violations for those under community supervision (Duwe & Kerschner, 2007). The third, and current generation, of incarceration boot camps encompass both of the first two components, but also incorporate an educational component and have typically been more successful (though results are not always significant for participant recidivism), especially when calculating decreases in cost (Parent, 2003).

In evaluating boot camp success, it is necessary to identify the goals of such a program. There are six generally identified goals of boot camps. The first goal is to create an alternative to prison that is less expensive. The second goal is to reduce criminal recidivism. The third goal is crime deterrence and the fourth goal is to improve management's ability to control offenders. The first four goals are at the forefront of most current boot camp designs. Less frequently, punishment and vocational education are listed as camp goals (John Howard Society, 1998).

Incarceration boot camps have had many varied designs and management styles. This makes it difficult to evaluate what was successful. This was noted in a detailed report published by the National Institute of Justice in February 1996 that compiled data from the late 1980's on. In the preface of the paper, Dr. Doris Layton MacKenzie and Eugene Hebert point out that programs were coined with a variety of names and subscribed to different models which was an obstacle when evaluating programs. Despite this difficulty, many evaluations were undertaken to determine whether this sanction was a valid, reliable, and cost-saving measure. However, evaluators have as many varied criteria for studying a program as there are management styles. When the first generations of boot camps were deemed unsuccessful, it was simple to say that boot camps as an intermediate sanction failed. However, there were traces of success in some evaluations. Dale G. Parent presented one such glimmer of hope in a National Institute of Justice report that stated, "Under a narrow set of conditions, boot camps can lead to small relative

reductions in prison populations and correctional costs.” Positive feedback like this created enough hope for some programs to continue and for a few new ones to be created. Current programs operate under more similar management and program styles than camps of the past and they are much closer to meeting the goal of success. Two programs currently in existence that operate under close to ideal program conditions are the Minnesota and Wisconsin Challenge Incarceration Programs (CIP). Both programs are worth reviewing and have several characteristics worth recommending for an ideal boot camp.

Complying with a legislative enactment, Minnesota’s Challenge Incarceration Program opened its doors in October 1992. Contrary to other states’ programs, however, Minnesota immediately required offenders to participate in treatment and education. They also have always required aftercare programming. The Minnesota Department of Corrections determines whether an offender meets the eligibility criteria for entry and the offender then has to agree to participate in the program. Originally, offenders were only excluded from the program if they: were sentenced to more than four years in prison, had a history of violent offenses, or if they were a supervised release violator. The list was later reviewed and expanded in April 2000 to prohibit offenders that had a lengthy history of behavioral or criminal issues. At this time, the program was also given authority to consider factors such as gang affiliation, ties to community and victim impact in whether to accept a particular offender (Duwe & Kerschner, 2007).

Once accepted to the program, the offender awaits transfer to the correctional facility which generally occurs only once per month. Minnesota has two separate facilities, one for males (Willow River) and one for females (Togo). Offenders arrive at their respective facility and begin Phase I of the program which is a six-month intensive residential program. Rigorous exercise, military drill and ceremony, and strict discipline are vital parts of the program.

Offenders generally operate under a daily 16-hour schedule with little free time. Participants do, however, participate in educational and treatment programming during this time as well (Duwe & Kerschner, 2007).

The offenders who successfully complete Phase I, move to the community and enter Phase II which is an Intensive Supervision phase. This phase also lasts six months and the offender must report daily to an agent and adhere to strict supervision rules such as a prescribed curfew, random drug/alcohol testing, maintaining full-time employment, and performing community service hours. They must also participate in aftercare programming as determined by the agent based on the needs of the specific offender (Duwe & Kerschner, 2007).

If successful in Phase II, participants move on to Phase III and remain in the community. Intense supervision rules and programming continue. Offenders participate in aftercare while maintaining the requirements of the previous phase. This phase is basically a benchmark for the offender because the expectations typically remain the same (Duwe & Kerschner, 2007).

Upon satisfactory completion of all three phases, the offender is considered a CIP graduate and then continues on regular community supervision until sentence completion. However, if an offender drops out of the program or is terminated in any of the three phases for behavioral or other reasons, he or she is returned to prison to serve the remainder of their sentence (in Minnesota it is two thirds of the sentence minus jail credit) plus time spent in CIP.

Minnesota's program is unique for several reasons. Unlike other state programs, Minnesota's CIP requires a six month residential phase which is slightly higher than the national average of 4.6 months. It requires two six-month community supervision phases. This makes the total program length 18 months which largely exceeds any other program reviewed by this

author. The longer length of time spent in aftercare is a vital component in reducing recidivism, which will be addressed in more detail in a later section (Duwe & Kerschner, 2007).

Just a neighboring state away is the Wisconsin Challenge Incarceration Program. The first program in Wisconsin opened in January 1991. The program opened in New Richmond, Wisconsin with only 20 male beds, but by November had expanded to 38 beds. Twenty-eight beds were added in 1995 to accommodate an alternative to revocation component and by 1996, the program had increased to 120 beds. This remains this site's current capacity. The program opened a 12 bed female building in February 2003 and further expanded to a separate site in Black River Falls, WI the following January that offered an additional 100 male beds. Wisconsin continues to run both the New Richmond and the Black River Falls programs and the female program is still operational as well (WI DOC, 2005).

Wisconsin's program runs a minimum of 180 days and is voluntary, but all program components are mandatory for program graduation. This program also combines military discipline and hard work with education and treatment components. Once the offender completes the program, he or she is released to intensive community supervision and is required to participate in aftercare programming to the extent available in the community (WI DOC, 2005).

The eligibility requirements of this program are worth noting. Some of the common eligibility requirements are that offenders cannot be convicted of any crimes against life or bodily security or of any physical or sexual assault of a child. They must also be deemed physically and psychologically capable of performing all program requirements. The program specifically prohibits participants who are currently taking any psychotropic medication. However, Wisconsin's program mandates that offenders must be under the age of 40 on the date

of admission and must have an identified substance abuse treatment need. Additionally, offenders who have demonstrated poor institutional adjustment or significant behavioral problems must correct their behavior and demonstrate compliance before acceptance to the program (WI DOC, 2005).

Wisconsin CIP is broken down into four residential phases: the first two weeks are orientation, weeks 3 through 10 are Phase I, weeks 11 to 20 are phase II; weeks 21 to 26 are Phase III and Phase IV consists of graduates awaiting release. Each phase has gradually increasing requirements and activities designed for the phase which must be completed before advancing to the next phase. Offenders who fail to complete the requirements of any phase are subject to removal from the program (WI DOC, 2005).

Release planning is initiated at the beginning of programming and the offender participates in the process. Once the residential phase is completed, the offender is released to the community and meets with a Probation and Parole agent for an orientation to the high-risk supervision phase. The intense community supervision phase lasts for a minimum of six months (WI DOC, 2005).

An impressive aspect of the Wisconsin program is that during the residential phase of the program, participants are evaluate daily by security and treatment staff to identify any behavioral issues and to document program progress. Collaborative staff meetings are also conducted weekly to discuss participant progress and individual interviews are held with the offenders to keep them informed on their evaluations and expectations (WI DOC, 2005).

Although other states operate incarceration boot camps as alternatives to prison, these two programs were chosen because they incorporate many components of what the author will

later recommend as requirements for successful boot camps. Additionally, there was sufficient information available about these programs to get a clear picture of program design.

III. Theoretical Framework

An analysis of the success and failure of incarceration boot camps must include an analysis of relevant theories to demonstrate the relationship between the cause for crime and why incarceration boot camps will serve as effective punishment, deterrent, and, ultimately, rehabilitation. This shows the relationship between the theory and why offenders offend which, in turn, leads us to conclusions on how best to deter their behavior. Here, Anomie/Strain theory and Social Bond theory are discussed and linked to the success of a boot camp program.

A. Anomie/Strain Theory

First published in 1938, Robert Merton presented an article on his theory of crime causation in an attempt to explain diversity in crime between cultures, groups, and individuals (Murphy & Robinson, 2008). Merton, despite many popular scholars of his era, disputed the fact that crime stems from strictly biological roots. Rather, he described a theory that is resultant from the conflict between the value society puts on specific goals as necessary indicators of success and the lack of value placed on how an individual attains those goals. This creates a disjuncture between goals and means (Murphy & Robinson, 2008). Further, Merton suggests that certain groups within a society are more likely to commit crime because legitimate means for attaining socially prescribed goals are not available to them (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Merton's presents two distinct, but related theories. First, he describes how anomie is created within a society. A society exists with prescribed goals of achievement and what achievements are necessary for success. Although what is viewed as success is different in each culture, each culture does, in fact, have common ideas of what goals are definitive of success. Some societies (such as the United States with its American Dream) may place a strong

emphasis on money and possessions. The more that you have, the more successful you are deemed to be. Although there are institutionally accepted norms for gaining this type of success, there is not always a high emphasis on these norms. Various avenues exist for becoming wealthy, not all of which are legal. Most individuals are limited in their selection of methods to attain success by the institutional norms that exist (i.e. getting an education and a good job). However, a shift occurs when there is not as high an emphasis on means as there is on the end result. In this case, some individuals, with the unspoken blessing of society, may deem unethical and/or criminal means as a more effective way to achieve success. Merton provides a metaphor for this situation in competitive sports. When winning is stressed and little focus is placed on playing the game and following rules, some players resort to cheating in order to win. This is also the result in some societies when money, for example, is so highly valued, but the institutional norms for obtaining money are not as emphasized. Some individuals will turn to criminal endeavors to fulfill their need to attain goals (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Merton offers five different ways individuals in society may conform or reject socially acceptable methods for attaining success. First, Merton describes the conformist. The majority of individuals in a society are members of this group. The conformist adheres to both cultural dictations of success and institutional norms for attaining it. Second is the innovationist. This individual values the goals of society, but rejects the ways to achieve them. This is a smaller group and is the category most criminals fall into. They value the same things as the majority, but don't value society's acceptable ways to achieve them. Third is the ritualist. These individuals are few as well. They are the direct opposite of the innovationist. They do not value the same end result as the majority, but do align their behavior within societal norms. Next is the retreatist, which contains the fewest members. These individuals have both goals and norms that

are different from the majority. They neither value the end result savored by society, nor the norms set forth to achieve them. Finally, is the rellion. This person, like the retreatist, rejects both the goals and norms of society, but also creates an entirely different subculture type of thinking with different goals and norms (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). All five of these personality types are considered individual adaptations to the society in which the person lives, but not selected intentionally. Rather they are imposed on the individual by the structure of society (i.e. neighborhood, wealth of family, ethnicity, etc.) (Schmalleger, 2005).

The second theory presented by Merton is what is referred to as strain. Strain occurs when there is goal blockage. Not all individuals are provided the same opportunities to achieve the socially defined goals of success. Some individuals have internalized both the means and the end as the majority of society, but they lack access to the tools necessary to attain the goals. This creates an internal strain and the individual feels pressure to resort to alternative (criminal) modes to achieve the valued goals. Poor people within a society are particularly prone to experiencing strain. They are pressured to achieve the same goals as others, but are limited in legitimate avenues to achieve them (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). This theory is particularly relevant to a discussion on crime causation because the majority of criminals (though not all) are from a poor familial background with limited resources, especially individuals who are convicted of property and drug crimes.

Merton's theories of crime causation center around the ideas that criminality arises not only from an overemphasis on socially determined goals, but also the disconnection between the weight allotted to those goals and the lack of weight given to the institutionally acceptable means to achieve those goals. Further, certain groups are more likely to experience frustration (strain) with this struggle because they do not have as many legitimate opportunities available to them

for various socio-economic reasons. These individuals feel pressure to resort to illegitimate opportunities in attempt to reach the socially shared goal. At its core, Merton's theory suggests crime is a result of a discrepancy between goals and means (Murphy & Robinson, 2008).

This theory was explored because it speaks to the causes of crime and describes the individuals more prone to commit crime. An explanation of crime causation paints a picture of criminals and their reasons for violating the law. A sanction is more likely to be successful if a population and its needs are identified. Traditional incarceration would not be successful in deterring crime if Merton's theory is correct. Imprisoning individuals who have devalued institutional means or are strained does not provide them an opportunity to develop tools that increase the value of appropriate means. Instead it puts them in contact with a large group of similarly minded people where there is a common acceptance of illegitimate means. In order to break the cycle, it is necessary to offer offenders discipline, education and life skills that assist them in internalizing means. Additionally, these two things would provide strained individuals with an expanded number of opportunities.

B. Social Bond Theory

Travis Hirschi, like Merton, took a slightly different approach than some colleagues when he first presented his control theory of delinquency in the late 1960's. He advanced a sociological as opposed to a psychological approach. Hirschi describes two main components of his theory. First, there is an inverse relationship between criminality and social bonds. This, according to Hirschi, means that as social bonds increase, an individual's tendency toward committing crime decreases. Second, there are four elements that make up the concept of social

bonds: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Each element plays an independent and combined role in promoting or discouraging deviant behavior (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Attachment is the emotional connection to others and appears in the form of relationships that are formed with friends, teachers, and adults, in general, in a youth's life. Of particular importance is the relationship with parents. When an emotional connection exists with others, the youth is more concerned with their opinions. Therefore, when there is an opportunity for deviant behavior the youth feels restrained for fear of disappointing those with whom he has formed an attachment. The youth does not want to cause a disruption in the relationship (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

The reason attachment to parents is so vital is because often during adolescence, the youth has many opportunities to interact with others and make decisions without parental supervision. There is no direct control over the youth's behavior. However, if there is strong attachment with the parents, there is indirect control over the youth because the youth considers his parents feelings before acting. A child who stops to think about his parents' reaction is less likely to follow through with deviant acts than a child who gives no thought to parental preferences (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Hirschi goes into great detail on attachment discussing that this component is the root cause of the psychopath. He states that a psychopath becomes alienated from interpersonal relationships and detaches himself. This, he says, could lead to the other symptoms of a psychopath such as aggression and manipulation. He further states that attachment to parents, peers and society allows for the internalization of societal norms. In turn, a lack of attachment leads to a rejection of the norms of society and allows the individual to minimize the feelings of

others who value those norms. Ultimately, it sets the individual free to deviate from society's norms and to commit crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Hirschi next discusses commitment as a component to his social bond theory. Frequently, fear plays a role in preventing people from committing crime. When the rewards of crime seem so great, it is fear that stops a person from acting on it. However, this fear is only present in people who have a commitment to the norms of society and who abide by the laws. The person has to be aware that their (criminal) behavior has consequences not only in punishment, but in losing stake in what he has legitimately accomplished and what he hopes to achieve in the future (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Commitment is developed when a youth is getting good grades in school and feels he has potential that would be at risk if he committed a deviant act. There is also a connection between conformity and the potential for future achievement. However, a youth that is failing school does not have much commitment to conformity because he does not have as much to lose. Commitment then also is a form of controlling deviant behavior because a fear exists should one deviate from social norms (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Next, Hirschi argues that involvement serves as prevention to crime. Often the opportunities to commit crime are presented due to the idle time on the hands of youth – unstructured time spent with peers. Therefore, keeping the child busy with various activities such as school, church, sports, and chores will limit the chances those opportunities will present themselves. The control in involvement, then, lies in participation in conventional, constructive activities. The same is true with adults. Work, deadlines, and appointments take up time and limit the time available for criminal activity to tempt them (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Hirschi's final component is belief. As a control theory, social bond assumes there is a common value system held and valued by all members of society. It is this value system that is violated when a crime is committed. However, everyone does not place the same importance on the value system as others. There are degrees of belief in the value system. Those individuals who do not place as much value in the norms and expectations of society have weakened belief in the system and are freer to commit deviant acts. Similarly, a youth who believes they should obey the law and refrain from committing crime, is more likely to do just that. It is important not to confuse this belief as positively valuing crime, but the lack of value placed on the prohibition of crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Social bond theory presents an important argument about crime causation. Certain norms exist within a society. The more an individual internalizes those norms and develops conventional bonds, the less likely he or she is to deviate from the norms. Hirschi describes four separate, but related bonds: attachment, commitment, involvement and belief. The weakening of any or all of these bonds increases the risk of criminal behavior to varying degrees. Each bond is important in itself, but also in combination with the other bonds. Should one bond (such as parental attachment) weaken there is a greater likelihood that the individual will commit deviant acts. This is not to say that one weak bond will absolutely lead to criminal acts, but it will increase the chances. Naturally, the weakening of more bonds will increase the risk.

In evaluating the ability of incarceration boot camps to effectively deter crime, crime causation is a factor. Hirschi's theory advances the argument that although everyone has deviant tendencies, strengthening social bonds decreases the likelihood that an individual will act on the deviant behavior. To be successful, a punishment must then strengthen those bonds to deter the criminal from future criminal activity. Incarceration boot camps provide discipline which can

lead to the strengthening of commitment and belief by creating a fear of punishment and allowing the individual to completely accept and internalize the value system. Education and life skills classes can lead to attachment and involvement by creating attachment to peers and other adults and by providing an opportunity to participate in constructive, conventional activities. Some programs even identify strengthening bonds as a program goal. MacKenzie and Hebert (1996) reported that New York's boot camp program has a specific therapeutic goal of strengthening participants' societal bonds. They also specifically mention both theories in their detailed review of several boot camps.

IV. Recommendations

Throughout this paper, it was apparent that evaluations of the effectiveness of boot camps were hindered due to the varying program designs. One vital recommendation would be to define program components that are the most successful and create a program model that encompasses those characteristics. Ideally, the program design would be implemented by every boot camp program. This would create a higher success rate in terms of reduced recidivism and incarceration costs as well as allow for consistent comparisons of program success. Four elements of successful programs were identified. Eligibility, program length, rehabilitative and educational programs, and aftercare are vital to the realization of identified program goals.

A. Eligibility

Recommendations for a successful incarceration program must begin with determining who is eligible or who the target population is. The key is to decide who would most benefit from this program while keeping the goals of reducing incarceration costs and prison populations in mind. Research indicates that voluntary participation, deciding authority, age, current offense/offense history, and sentence length are vital eligibility considerations.

Although who determines which offenders are eligible seems irrelevant, it is important to recognize that who decides has an effect on meeting the goals of the program. Most programs fall in one of two categories: judges choose individuals they think meet the criteria or department of corrections officials select appropriate candidates for participation. In their review of eight boot camp programs, MacKenzie and Souryal (1994) recognized the importance of this process by noting that reduced recidivism rates among participants in some programs was due in part to the selection process. They go on to report that restrictiveness of eligibility and suitability criteria

was directly related to the program's ability to reduce prison overcrowding. In some cases, offenders who are not sentenced to prison (i.e. probation violators or jail sentences) are given an opportunity to participate in boot camp programs. John Howard Society (1998) found that when judges selected program participants, many low risk offenders were being sent to the program. This ultimately created a net widening effect by increasing the number of participants even though only about half would have otherwise served a prison sentence. This undermines the goal of such programs.

Once a participant is deemed eligible, the next consideration is whether he should be required to participate or simply offered the opportunity to do so. Participation in incarceration boot camp is, and should be, considered a privilege because it offers the major advantage of a decreased prison stay. However, in order for participants to get the most positive experience possible, entry into such a program should be voluntary. If an offender is forced into a program, it is unlikely that the individual will view it in a positive light and reap the benefits. Internal motivation and rehabilitation are key factors in succeeding in these programs. Both factors are excluded with forced participation (John Howard Society, 1998). Some offenders may simply want to just go to prison and do their time despite the obvious advantage. It appears that the majority, though not all, state programs currently have voluntary entry programs as evidenced in a chart of 29 state programs compiled and published by MacKenzie and Hebert (1996).

As stated above, offense history is closely related to age. To truly reduce recidivism, it is necessary to reach out to youthful offenders who do not have an extensive criminal history in order to prevent them from moving deeper into the criminal justice system (MacKenzie & Hebert, 1996). That is why limitations of age and offense history are important. Over half of all programs (15) allow violent offenders (noting that some offenses are excluded, but not all) to

participate in boot camp programs. A small number (5) limit offense history to first-time felony offenders while others (8) allow only first-time offenders.

A larger limitation is found when looking at current incarceration. Most programs limit participation with a minimum (20) and maximum (23) number of years imposed on their current sentence, although the numbers vary extensively, particularly with the maximum sentence (MacKenzie & Hebert, 1996). John Howard Society (1998) points out that program length must be long enough to allow for rehabilitation programming, but in order to keep participants motivated it must be shorter than the stay they would have had if they served a traditional prison sentence. This is why most programs specify a minimum and maximum number of years on the offender's current sentence in order to participate. It ensures that offenders have time to participate in necessary programs and still allows them an advantage in less time spent in prison. This requirement also furthers the goal of decreasing incarceration costs.

It should be noted that a maximum age for participants was considered. However, data from existing boot camps supports the idea that if an offender is physically and mentally stable and meets the other program eligibility criteria (i.e. offense, sentence structure, etc.), he should be allowed to enter the program. This also increases program effectiveness by diverting more offenders out of the prison system and would likely not amount to a large number of offenders.

B. Program Length

The next important factor for a boot camp program to be successful is program length. As discussed previously, programs varied in several key areas including the length of program. Programs lasted between 90 and 180 days which Parent (2003) points out is too brief to generate the desired recidivism reduction. Additionally, many programs target offenders that have drug or alcohol treatment needs, but the limited time frame offered in most programs prevents sufficient programming in these areas and prohibits the availability of others (MacKenzie & Hebert, 1996). Begin (1996) emphasized the importance of longer programs when she pointed out that a multi-site evaluation showed a key component in the three more successful programs was increased program length – between 120 and 180 days. This also permits various phases within the program which allows participants to progress and creates incentive to continue.

C. Rehabilitative and Educational Programs

Adequate rehabilitative programming is directly related to program success (John Howard Society, 1998). As stated above, the necessity for increased program length is directly connected to the ability of the program to offer rehabilitative programming. Furthermore, addressing treatment needs will reduce recidivism rates by addressing root problems that result in criminal behavior. Rigorous physical training is not enough to reduce the likelihood that an offender will commit another crime. It is vital to address the issues that led to the offender's criminal activity. Low educational achievement, drug or alcohol addiction, and lack of job skills are all factors that need to be addressed in order to reduce recidivism.

Offenders that have drug or alcohol issues account for a substantial portion of the current prison population. Between the years of 1996 and 2006, drug offenders accounted for

approximately 20% of the growth in the prison population. Offenders incarcerated for operating under the influence accounted for more than 60% of the growth between 2001 and 2006. In the general population, approximately 83% of offenders have an identified substance abuse treatment need (Battiato et. al., 2007). These numbers are significant and indicate that drugs and alcohol are factors related to committing crime. In light of these facts, it is critical that any incarceration boot camp have an intensive alcohol and drug addiction treatment program to address this vital issue.

Although alcohol and drug addiction is the most common factor in the prison population, closely related are domestic violence and anger management issues. Many offenders lack appropriate communication and coping skills. This leads to poor relationships and bad decisions. Critical thinking and recognition of cognitive distortions is essential in providing offenders with the tools to develop and maintain relationships during and after incarceration. In order to accomplish this, both programs should be available to participants.

D. Aftercare

It is not enough to have an offender complete the residential boot camp portion of a program. For successful reintegration and reduced recidivism to occur, it is necessary for a program to include a substantial aftercare program. Supervision, accountability, and continued involvement in relevant programming are critical in reducing recidivism. John Howard Society (1998) reviewed several studies on various boot camp programs and determined that without proper follow-up care, any positive results from boot camp programs are short-lived. The same authors reference a study of the Harris County, Texas program that found not only that boot

camps had a positive influence on participants, but also that other studies produced negative results due to inadequate follow-up care.

Further evidence that aftercare length is directly related to participant success is found in the positive results yielded by both the New York and the Minnesota programs. New York has an extensive aftercare program that includes work programs, drug counseling and daily therapeutic community meetings. Minnesota has a two phase aftercare program that spans a total of 12 months which includes intensive supervision and continued participation in programming (John Howard Society, 1998).

The only questions then are what should aftercare include and how long should it last? Review of New York's and Minnesota's programs indicate that a sufficient length would be approximately 12 months and should be broken down into at least two phases to allow for gradually decreasing interaction with the offender. In the beginning it would be necessary to have regular, frequent contacts with an offender (preferably daily) in order to ensure successful transitioning into the community, allow for frequent drug testing and design an appropriate programming plan. As the offender successfully reintegrates and complies with program requirements, decreasing contact could be granted. A participant would be continually monitored until he completed all phases of a program, including aftercare.

Each of the four areas discussed provide a vital link to a successful boot camp program. Criteria must be specific and consistent in order to meet program purposes, but must not be so narrow as to limit participation to the point that it prevents the program from attaining the intended goals of reduced recidivism and incarceration costs.

V. Summary and Conclusions

Increasing prison populations have given way to an unsustainable corrections budget. Getting tough on crime has only served to stuff state prisons to capacity which, ultimately, is a price tag paid by taxpayers. The current system of “lock ‘em up” is not only costing hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, it is not deterring criminals from committing crime. Although the rates of violent crime have decreased, our lagging economy has opened the door to an enormous amount of property and drug crimes. In order to punish law breakers while decreasing a crippling state corrections budget, an alternative must be developed that addresses the social and financial needs of the public. Incarceration boot camps are an alternative, intermediate sanction that can meet these expectations if properly designed and implemented.

Incarceration boot camps divert offenders that would have faced a substantial prison sentence to a structured environment that combines military drill, rigorous exercise, and rehabilitation and treatment. Society’s demand that offenders be punished is met not only by incapacitation, but the required participation in daily physical activity. Further, the need for reduced incarceration costs is met by rewarding program participants with shortened sentences (fewer dollars spent based on length of stay) and providing necessary treatment and education for core issues to deter recidivism.

To capitalize on gains from this intermediate sanction, consistent program design and implementation must be combined with common evaluation factors. Consistent program designs allow accurate comparisons to be made between program sites. For example, if one site is experiencing a lower rate of participant graduation, a closer examination can look at factors

specific to that location and correct the problem. Similarly, common factors ensure that evaluations are utilizing the same criteria to determine program success.

In our current financial crisis, it is necessary to look at alternatives that are less costly, do not sacrifice the safety of the general public, and reduce future criminal behavior. Research indicates that incarceration boot camps are a realistic option to meet these goals.

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