Research Paper

A STUDY OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS
AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INQUIRY
IN EASTERN CENTRAL DISTRICT

F.S. Zufferey



LAND
TENURE
CENTER

An Institute for Research and Education
on Social Structure, Rural Institutions,
Resource Use and Development

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDO	Assistant Community Development Officer
AD	Agricultural Demonstrator
ALDEP	Arable Land Development Program
AMA	Agricultural Management Association
AO(LR)	Agricultural Officer Land Resources
APO	Animal Production Officer
BAC	Botswana Agricultural College
BCW	Botswana Council of Women
BMC	Botswana Meat Commission
CCDO	Chief Community Development Officer
CSM	Corn Soya Milk Mixture
DAO	District Agricultural Officer
DDC	District Development Committee
DO	District Officer
DO(L)	District Officer Lands
EO	Education Officer
FC	Farmers Committee
FG	Fencing Group
FWE	Family Welfare Educator
HT	Head Teacher
LB	Land Board
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MRTC	Mahalapye Rural Training Center
NLB	Ngwato Land Board
PTA	Parent Teachers Association
RDU	Rural Development Unit
RECC	Rural Extension Coordinating Committee
RIO	Rural Industrial Officer
SLB	Subordinate Land Board
S&CD	Social and Community Development (Division)
SWC	Social Welfare Committee
TGLP	Tribal Grazing Land Policy
UCCSA	United Congregational Church of Southern Africa
VA	Veterinary Assistant
VDC	Village Development Committee
VET	Village Extension Team
VHT	Village Health Committee

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Summary of Recommendations

I. Creation of Local Institutions

Where no VDC has been introduced, it is **recommended** that:

1. Extension workers, more specifically ACDOs, first identify and promote through careful needs assessments, with the **active** participation of the residents, one or two groups/institutions best tailored to community needs, and then devote as much effort on extending group and management skills (as defined in **3.12.2**), using **A Handbook for Facilitators** (Stanley, Rick, Zufferey 1983), or other appropriate material for providing technical input.

2. When such groups/institutions have proved viable, the ACDO in collaboration with other extension agents cautiously introduce in the community the concept of VDC by launching widespread information campaigns to explain the roles and objectives of a VDC to the community at large.

3. Such training be performed with appropriate nonformal adult education techniques and appropriate media, e.g., popular theater, community rallies, posters and other visual aids, study groups, role-playing, etc., instead of lectures by the ACDO.

4. VDC elections be held only when the residents have acquired sufficient understanding of roles, objectives, and operations of their VDC, so as to elect appropriate members.

Where VDCs and FCs already have been introduced:

5. Peripheral, dysfunctional, and nonoperational institutions be left alone and extension efforts concentrate only on those few institutions identified by careful community needs assessment that are:

   - highly valued and meet real needs of the residents, and
   - offer the best potential for simultaneous development of group skills and group management.

6. The ACDOs, in collaboration with other extension workers, give priority to creating general community awareness of roles and objectives of VDCs, as recommended in **1** and **2** above, and ensure that chiefs are included in that training.

7. Once community-wide knowledge has been established, new VDCs be elected with full participation of community residents.

8. The ACDO concentrate on extending group and management skills (as defined in **3.12.2**) and design ongoing training programs for improving VDC operations as appropriate.

9. Ongoing training emphasize to VDC members the representative nature of their position and the fact that they are ultimately accountable to the community at large.

10. The ACDO, in collaboration with other extension workers, organize similar information and consultation sessions for migrants as appropriate and encourage the VDC to include representatives of that segment of the community.

II. Extension at the Center

11. The Rural Extension Coordination Committee (RECC) facilitate and take active measures to ensure coordination of extension efforts among various departments and ministries involved (3.10.2.2) by:

    - including VET duties in the job description of extension cadres;
    - requiring regular reports of cooperative projects from each extension cadre;
    - requiring regular VET meetings;
    - requiring district/national supervisors to visit the VETs as a team at least once a year.

12. RECC become the recognized forum for joint extension planning by:

    - requesting the departments/ministries involved to circulate their annual plans to each other and to RECC;
    - drawing a single integrated plan from various department plans and ensuring its implementation and supervision.

13. RECC investigate, design, and promote the necessary mechanisms to also make extension staff accountable to the local VDCs for their work and performance.

14. An internal evaluation of the S&CD Division be conducted and the division's specific role in extension be redefined in line with the recommendations presented in several "Institutions Research" reports.

15. That both S&CD and the Department of Field Services (MoA) in collaboration with districts and regions study the possibility of reducing the size of extension areas and have those of the different cadres coincide as much as possible.

III. Extension Training

16. Extension training for both ACDOs and ADs emphasize working with rural people along the line of their interests and needs, particularly those related to improving livelihood, physical level of living, and community welfare.

17. Extension training curriculum be seriously revised and some of the following elements possibly be included:

    - group planning, consultation, meetings, workshops, and participatory techniques;
    - effective use of subject and result demonstrations;
    - effective use of adult education complementary supporting activities such as: relevant technical support, formulation of work plans, preparation of calendar of events, planning for committees in-service training, evaluation processes of group/project activities, etc.;
    - familiarization with informal training techniques, e.g., popular theater, exhibits, tours, use of media.

18. For appropriate subjects, extension workers be trained **together** at BAC and the importance of teamwork in extension be emphasized.

IV. Land Legislation

19. That the Presidential Commission on Land Tenure consider investigating the legal constraints reported in **6.1.5.1-3**, and recommend effective mechanisms to remedy the law.

20. That the same commission also consider facilitating the design of effective legal mechanisms for assisting the Land Boards in their difficult task of land resources administration, as reported in **6.1.4.**

21. That the same commission assess the performance of the Land Division (MLGL) and draft effective Terms of Reference for future operations of the division.

22. That the Minister of Local Government and Lands, by virtue of the powers granted to him under the TLA (par 37b and c) consider prescribing the inclusion of SLB plans and policies into Tribal Land Board main policies and the other enforcement mechanisms outlined in **6.3.2.3, Step 1b.**

V. Resource Management Strategy

23. That a Resource Management Pilot Project be initiated in the Mahalapye Subordinate Land Board area.

24. Resource Management Committee membership--it is recommended that:

    (a) a Resource Management Committee be established, comprised of:

        - all SLB members;

- two additional members (to be appointed);

- one DO(L) (possibly the new one to be recruited for the subdistrict);

(b) the DO and Tribal Authority (Mahalapye) serve as advisory members to the committee in customary matters.

25. Plan of Operations--in order to achieve this objective, the three following steps are **recommended**:

Step 1: Decentralization of Controls

That the necessary measures be taken by the Minister of Local Government and Lands, the Main Land Board Council, and district authorities for facilitating the decentralization of the controls listed in **6.2.2** to the communities of Mahalapye SLB constituency.

26. Enforcement Mechanisms. Community decisions to be effective must derive from the power actually to enforce these decisions. Thus, the following mechanisms appear necessary and are therefore **recommended** for empowering the VDCs to enforce community decisions:

(1) That community plans drawn in collaboration with the SLB, as outlined in **Step 2(g)** and further revised in **Step 3(b)**, be ratified by the Tribal Land Board and made official community management policies.

(2) That any further modification of the community plan be made with the consent of both the community at large and the SLB, and be reported to the Tribal Land Board.

(3) That the VDC become the official responsible body accountable to the Land Boards and District Council for ensuring the implementation of the community plan by all village residents.

(4) That both Tribal and Subordinate Land Boards discharge their duties and obligations granted to them under the Act and Regulations, subject to approved community plans.

27. **Step 2: Rural Communities as Resource Management Base**

That rural communities (as defined in **2.2**), with their respective village lands and grazing locations, become the primary base for resource management.

In this second step, it is **recommended** that the Resource Management Committee:

(a) Organize a first round of consultations with each village government body (i.e., VDC/chief plus extension workers) in order to inform them of the Resource Management Program, and establish a schedule for future consultations with community-wide membership.

(b) Organize, at the set time and dates, a second round of consultations in order to explain and discuss the program with the communities at large.

(c) Conduct additional information sessions as necessary, until the residents fully understand the aim and objectives of the program and its implications.

(d) Also adequately inform the communities about the roles, purpose, and functions of Land Boards and other institutions involved in the management of local resources.

(e) Brief the communities on objectives and content of current district and national land policies.

(f) Emphasize at all stages of the information/consultation process that resource management is the joint responsibility of both residents and Land Boards, and continually demonstrate to the residents that this is so (see **6.2.1**).

(g) Encourage the communities to produce a simple "mental" resource management plan for each community area, based on the community's perception of spatial distribution of local resources and on general consensus, which could, at a later stage, be sketched by the committee. (The list provided in **6.2.3** could serve as a guide.)

(h) Compile, in the meantime, any other pertinent information available on the constituency, as outlined in **6.2.3**.

(i) Summarize and make a sketch map of all community plans; note all requirements and constraints mentioned and locate them geographically on a constituency map (e.g., water sources, arable requirements, grazing constraints, land shortages, possible new settlements, etc.).

(j) Compile and analyze all the findings as outlined in **Step 3**.

28. **Step 3: Drafting Resource Management Proposals**

That in accordance with the findings and analysis, the Resource Management Committee attempt to draft resource management proposals for the constituency.

It is therefore **recommended** that, before drafting proposals, the Resource Management Committee:

(a) present the results of the analysis to each community in the constituency;

(b) present and discuss incompatible community plans with the communities concerned and clearly explain the reasons why and how their plans ought to be modified;

(c) also consult with the appropriate officers and staff (and other resource persons) directly implicated in all proposals to be drafted;

(d) when community plans are compatible and in agreement with constituency planning, resources be allocated in accordance with respective community plans, unless counter to government or Land Board regulations.

VI. Implementation Requirements

29. Political Support. In this perspective it is therefore recommended that the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, the Tribal Land Board, Council and district authorities give full support to the decentralization of controls (listed in **6.2.3**) to the communities of Mahalapye SLB constituency, so as both to strengthen the leadership and decision-making power of village institutions in those communities and to raise their incentive to plan and manage community resources in collaboration with the Land Boards (see **2.6.4** and **6.2.3**).

30. Staffing and Transport. For implementing this project it is recommended that:

(a) two additional members be appointed on the Mahalapye SLB for at least the period of the fieldwork;

(b) a DO(L) be recruited to provide guidance and technical support to the SLB team;

(c) the DO(L) and at least two SLB members (interchangeable) constitute the fieldwork team;

(d) the team be provided with a 4X4 vehicle for its fieldwork.

31. Training Requirements and Material.

(a) The Resource Management Committee, under the guidance of the DO(L) and in consultation with the Main Land Board, Tribal Authority, and other appropriate resource persons, first make a clear and simple summary of:

- current land policies;
- specific roles and functions of the Land Board;
- roles and functions of: conservation committees and range ecology and land resources officers;

And make sure that there is consensus among themselves on all these points.

(b) Consultation/information sessions on land utilization, resource conservation, and related topics be planned and designed in collaboration with Nonformal Education staff or other competent resource persons and on the basis of appropriate extension material, e.g., **A Handbook for Facilitators** (Stanley, Rick, and Zufferey 1983).

(c) Information sessions aim primarily at stimulating the general participation in land-use discussions with the villagers, and avoid confronting the communities with preconceived plans.

(d) Appropriate visual aids be utilized (e.g., posters, flip charts, slides) to illustrate various types of land use, instead of maps which virtually no resident understands.

32. Subordinate Land Board Boundaries. In relation to this problem it is **recommended** that the SLB constituency boundaries (to be soon revised and mapped) be drawn in accordance with resource management findings around manageable numbers of well-demarcated communities with related resources clearly defined, farming preferably homogeneous units or homogeneous resource management units rather than areas based on tribal ties.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

This report on local institutions and resource management is a companion study to that conducted during the 1980-81 agricultural season (Zufferey 1982), which established baseline data for a fencing impact study in the same four communities, i.e., Sajwe Fencing Group, Kgagodi, Moshopa, and Maape villages (see fig. 1).

1.1.1 Fencing Study Outline. Given the extensive adoption of fencing practices in communal areas of Central District in August 1980, Central Agricultural Region initiated a fencing impact study in collaboration with the Rural Sociology Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture in order to analyze the effects of group/communal fencing on crop production, household income, access to water and land, livestock movements, quality of grazing, and management practices.

To that end, three fencing groups (Sajwe, Kgagodi, and Moshopa) at early fencing stage and representing a cross-section of the three most common types of fence were selected, as well as one control site (Maape) which was considered unlikely to initiate a fencing project.

The study was planned to be conducted in two distinct phases:

- **Phase 1:** pre-fencing data gathering (completed);
- **Phase 2:** post-fencing analysis (to be conducted after completion of the fences).


1.1.2 Institutions and Resource Management Research. Central District identified its first CFDA on 26 March 1982 (see Zufferey 1983). The CFDA program staff perceived the fencing study to offer an appropriate setting for initiating research on local institutions in Central District. Thus, with the assistance of two additional university students, research on local institutions was conducted simultaneously with the fencing study post-harvest data gathering in September-October 1981.

The resource management component, initially to be included in the analysis of local institutions, was ultimately conducted separately. Because of the time constraint and the complex nature of land-use and resource management in communal areas, three weeks of further fieldwork was conducted in December 1981 with five university students in order to concentrate only on resource management issues.

1.2 Origin of the Data

Since both the fencing study and this inquiry on institutions and resource management were simultaneously conducted in the same communities, the fencing study (Zufferey 1982) should be consulted for additional data.

Figure 1. Map of Research Sites



1.3 The Report

This report is composed of two distinct parts:

Part 1 deals specifically with local institutions.

- It presents the ethnic and historical background of the communities studied, gives a detailed analysis of the traditional structure, and analyzes the major problems identified.

- Second, it gives a detailed inventory and analysis of modern institutions and extension, summarizes the problems, and gives recommendations.

Part 2 deals with resource management characteristics and problems.

- It presents an inventory of the resources identified, illustrated with maps and indices, and presents the population, land, water, and livestock resource base.

- Second, it gives an overview of traditional and current management practices.

- Finally, it summarizes the constraints identified, highlights potential elements for resource management, and suggests a land use and resource management pilot approach for the communal areas of Central District.

1.4 Notes on Research Methodology

The research combined group and key informant interviews, informal conversations, and participant observation, such as taking part in fencing activities (e.g., cutting, transporting poles, clearing, etc.), systematically attending all **kgotla** and local institution meetings, and joining other community informal events (e.g., beer parties, school concerts, dances, beauty contests, etc.).

Student researchers were provided with research guidelines (see Appendix 1) which were drafted by the research coordinator in collaboration with the District Officer/Development (DO/D) and the District Officer/Lands (DO/L) in Serowe, and the research program staff. These guidelines were thoroughly studied and discussed with the students before going to the field and in the field itself.

A sample survey was conducted in Kgagodi and Moshopa villages in order to cross-check the information on Village Development Committees (VDCs) with the communities at large. A second survey was prepared for a similar purpose with regard to Subordinate Land Board (SLB) operations. This had to be replaced by informal discussions with the residents as questions pertaining to village settlement, land allocation, and Land Boards caused considerable uneasiness and suspicion among the farming community.


2. Traditional Structure

2.1 Kgagodi Ward Structure

Kgagodi village presents features of a tightly knit community in which virtually all nine wards are closely interrelated and clustered around the chief's ward. The ward structure can be summarized as in figure 2.

FIGURE 2

Kgagodi Ward Structure



——————— subordinate relationship

- - - - - - related by marriage

. . . . . assimilated

The majority of the residents are Talaote people from the modern Ngwato tribe distributed into four subwards clustered around kgosing (chief's ward). Modibana and Moetlapele already were subordinate wards of Kgagodi in Shoshong before 1889 and Mosokwane joined Kgagodi in 1902. While Lekama ward was assimilated during the tribal move to Palapye (1889), Magwaneng, Mhaladi, and Mokatane are related to kgosing by the intermarriage of the wardheads into the chief's family.

2.2 Kgagodi Ward History

The Botalaote originated from Shoshong, first capital of the Bangwato, moved with the tribe to Palapye (second capital), and were then dispersed or allocated new territories east of Palapye by Khama the Great, partly because of water shortages in Palapye and partly because of Khama's plan to consolidate his kingdom against the Boers threatening to move north.

2.2.1 Kgagodi Ward. The main ward was established as Kgagodi ward of Batalaote in Shoshong and Palapye. Because of leadership conflicts arising between Phalalo, the head of the ward, and his younger brothers, Khama moved the ward to Maokaatuwe (current Kgagodi). This move was made to preserve Phalalo's authority, but also was part of Khama's strategic plan.

2.2.2 Modibana and Moetlapele Wards. These were subwards of Kgagodi in Shoshong and Palapye, and followed their main ward to Maokaatuwe.

2.2.3 Mosokwane Ward. Mosokwane also was composed of Batalaote people in Shoshong and settled later in Palapye. Mosokwane ward became a subward of Kgagodi in Palapye. When the capital moved to Serowe (1902), some Mosokwane people went to Sefhope, some to Malaka, and others to Diloro (close to current Kgagodi). This ward still is closely related to the current chief. (Mosokwane headman is the chief's nephew.)

2.2.4 Khapane Ward. This ward originated from Mosweu ward in Palapye. In 1902, Mosweu people went to settle in Sefhope. Khapane (Mosweu's brother) separated from his ward and joined Batalaote to Maokaatuwe. Since Mosweu already was a subward of Mosokwane in Palapye, they remained with their main ward in Kgagodi. However, this subward included only one family: Khapane, his wife, and four boys, and still now they are referred to as the "Khapane family" rather than ward. Currently, only two families are still alive in the village. Since their headman lives at Palapye, they are administered by Mosokwane ward.

2.2.5 Mhaladi Ward. This ward originated from Palapye Mhaladi ward. Mhaladi people, like most other people in Palapye, suffered from water and land shortages and were in quest of a better settlement. When Kgagodi moved, they joined him to Maokaatuwe. This ward is related to Kgagodi ward by intermarriage only. The current headman is the chief's first cousin.

2.2.6 Mokatane Ward. This ward originated from Mokatane royal ward in South Africa. Their chief Moganane and families (father and five uncles of current headman) came north after the Ngwato move of 1902 and settled in Maokaatuwe. They were initially attached to Mhaladi ward, but maintained an autonomous **kgotla.** When they grew in number, they formed their own ward, Mokatane. This ward is now related to the main ward since Chief Malokoane from Kgagodi (previous chief) married an aunt of the current headman.

2.2.7 Lekama Ward. The Lekama people originated from Kaa people in South Africa. The Kaa people are said to be offshoots of the Rolong who dispersed at the death of their chief Tau in 1760. Ancestors of Lekama people had settled in Shoshong as royal ward of Bakaa. During the tribal move to Palapye (1889), they were assimilated by Batalaote and moved to Maokaatuwe

with Kgagodi. It is said that because of conflicts arising between Chief Kgagodi's sons and Lekama people, Kgagodi moved the ward close to his, at the western side of the village where they still are today. This ward is also said to have introduced in Kgagodi the first Christian church, London Missionary Society, of which the headman's mother was a minister.


2.2.8 Magwaneng Ward. Magwaneng ward originates from Magwaneng **kgotla** in Mauntlala. After the death of her husband, one of the current Magwaneng people's ancestors (Magoleng) left Mauntlala for Shoshong, the Ngwato capital. Magoleng remarried in Shoshong among Kgagodi people and her sister (Sempone) joined her later in Shoshong, where Magwaneng people appear to have first been incorporated in the Ntabana and later in the Kgagodi wards. When they grew in sufficient numbers, they formed their own **kgotla** Magwaneng, named after their grandfather. When the capital moved to Palapye, Magwaneng was told by Khama the Great to follow Kgagodi to Maokaatuwe, current Kgagodi.

2.3 Moshopa Traditional Structure

2.3.1 Ethnic Composition and Ward Structure. Moshopa community is composed of three predominant ethnic groups: Bakhurutshe, Bobirwa, and Boseleka, and the ward structure is summarized as follows:

FIGURE 3

Moshopa Ward Structure



* Those two wards often are referred to as one: the "Bobirwa Ward."

2.3.2 Historical Background.

2.3.2.1 Bahurutshe. The Bahurutshe with Bakwena and Bakgatla were the last (third) and greatest wave of Sotho people who entered South Africa around the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They ultimately settled in what is now Western Transvaal and, according to tradition, were originally united under Mohurutshe, their leader. Yet, because of disputes among his descendants, they rapidly broke up into different segments each of which became afterwards separated in many different tribes. Thus by the end of the eighteenth century, the Bakwena who seceded from Mohurutshe had divided into: BaMogôpa-Kwena, Bakwena (of Bechuanaland), BaNgwaketse, Bangwato, and Batawana (Schapera 1952:6).

The Bahurutshe meanwhile had also broken apart. Mohurutshe's son and successor Motebele ill treated his younger brother Motebejane who moved away and established his own village. He was joined later by other members of the tribe who disliked Motebele's rule. Motebele tried to bring them back by force, but was defeated and fled to Ootse. There he quarreled with another brother, named Lesele, of whose marriage he disapproved. Lesele withdrew from the village accompanied by most of the people and ultimately settled in what is now known as Northeast District. There they came in contact with Bakalaka who corrupted their tribal name into its current form of "Bakhurutshe" (Schapera 1952:9).

Among the Bakhurutshe, further disputes about succession to the chieftainship led to the secession of a large group which fled under Moatshe and Tsapo along the Boteti River where they lived as an independent tribe until subjugated by the Bangwato (c. 1845). Other disputes between Chief Moloise and other members of the royal family remaining behind in Tati district caused several of the chief's uncles to flee to the Bangwato and Moloise himself after quarreling with Molebatsi, his successor, also fled to the Bangwato (Schapera 1952:13).

Eight community elders interviewed concurred that the Bakhurutshe, initially established in Serowe, moved four generations ago to the current Moshopa area under the leadership of their chief Molokomme and were the first ethnic group to settle in Moshopa. It appears that a second group of Bakhurutshe, currently known as "Batshweneng" (Khurutshe totem) arrived in the area and initially settled in Psweroge south of the current Moshopa. Those Batshweneng have been apparently assimilated by Chief Molokomme and one of their leaders married in Malokomme's family. From that marriage one son (Moshopa) was born, whose son Morulanyi was the great-grandfather of current Chief Morulanyi.

2.3.2.2 Babirwa. Babirwa, Bapedi, and several other groups who became subject communities in the eastern part of the Ngwato territory are said to be allied to the Sotho peoples of the northwestern Transvaal (Eastern Sotho). Social, political organization, and mode of life of all of these groups seem to have much in common with the Tswana people, despite many obvious differences in detail. However, we still know very little about them (Schapera 1952:4)

From Birwa accounts in Moshopa, the Babirwa apparently occupied the Bobonong area and, after having subjugated Chief Molokomme, a group of them occupied Moshopa. Those Babirwa later fled to Bobididi (South Africa) chased by

Matabele incursions. On their return to Bobonong, Toteng, Shabang's brother, left Bobonong to settle in the Mokobeng and Chadibe area. Later Shabang himself, the leader of the tribe, joined his younger brother but formed a separate ward. One son of the chief in Chadibe married Sekgantshwane, Shabang's daughter. At the death of her husband, she returned to her father's with three sons (Morulanyi, Rabatsheka, and Raboneti) and one daughter (Matino). Since Shabang's only son (Raisaka) had stayed in South Africa, Shabang nominated Morulanyi (his grandson and grandfather of the current chief) as his successor.

2.3.2.3 Baseleka. The Seleka people in eastern Botswana are generally also classed as Transvaal Sotho since they have assimilated the language and culture. But in origin, they are really Transvaal Ndebele from Nguna stock.

The Baseleka from Mmadinare have a close relationship with Bamalete whom they regard as their parent tribe. Separation apparently took place in the vicinity of Ngwapa Hill on the Crocodile River due to a dispute in the course of which the Malete chief looted the cattle of his younger brother who thereupon seceded and became the founder of the Seleka tribe.

The Voortrekkers' treatment of the local population led in 1852/53 to the flight of several tribes into Ngwaketse and Kwena territories. The Seleka people crossed further north into the territory of the Bangwato (Schapera 1952: 4,5,11).

From community accounts, Baseleka moved north from Seleka in South Africa to the current Seleka in Tswapong (northeast of Moshopa) under the leadership of Mateolo. Some of them settled in Moshopa after establishing supremacy over Mmotlana ward residents who had come from Gosetshe ward in Serowe (also called Mmotlana) with their chief, Kgagabi Lesarwa. These people currently form a cluster of three wards: Moroka, being the main ward, with Mmotlana (subward by assimilation), and Thipana (decentralization of Moroka).

2.4 Maape Traditional Structure

2.4.1 Ethnic and Historical Context. Community residents say that Maape community originally was composed of four predominant ethnic groups: the Mathibatsela, Mabuo, Mosarwa, and Sesetlha people.

2.4.1.1 Mathibatsela and Mabuo. In the 1850s, Chief Moremi from Tswapong undertook to allocate new areas to his brothers in order to consolidate his kingdom against frequent incursions of white settlers in quest of lands. One of them, Mathibatsela, occupied the Malaka area and had four sons: Mogome, Tlhobukwe, Letate, and Nyabane. At the Ngwato tribal move from Shoshong to Palapye (1898), Mathibatsela and his people were assimilated by the Bangwato and remained loyal to Paramount Chief Khama.

Letate, succeeding his brother Mogome, discovered the Maape River (Semakwakwe) on a hunt. That area was then occupied by Mabuo people from Gotau. Mabuo people, however, found the settlement inadequate and left for Bobodidi (Transvaal). Letate then asked Chief Khama's permission to settle in the area. Permission was granted on the condition that his royal messengers and soldiers still could keep their base in Maape. Letate, Nyabane, Papadi, and families

(±10 people) settled in Maape and ever since have justified their name of "Mathibatsela."*

On their return from Bobididi, Mabuo people under leadership of Nkgakge went straight to Maape, their former settlement. Conflict erupted over land-ownership and Mabuo people accused Mathibatsela to have usurped their territory. Paramount Chief Khama sent his councillor Mokubung to settle the dispute and demanded coexistence of both groups. Since the Mathibatsela people were already well established and organized in Maape and since a settlement could not possibly have two heads, the "newcomers" became somewhat subordinate to Mathibatsela. Each group formed separate **kgotla** which are sometimes referred to collectively as the "Mogome ward." At Letate's death, Morupisi, one of his four sons, took chieftainship.

2.4.1.2 Sesetlha and Mosarwa. Under the reign of Mathibatsela in Malaka a certain Ditshwang in quest of better settlement came from Serowe from Sesetlha **kgotla**, subward of Basenya at Metsemasweu. Ditshwang married Nyabane's daughter and had a son, Moepi, who established the Sesetlha ward in Maape.

In the same manner Sebihelo from the Mosarwa ward in Shoshong moved to Maape with his brother Papadi. When he was on his way from Serowe to rejoin his brothers reported to be in Tutswe, Sebihelo's wife died in Malaka. Sebihelo then settled in Malaka, married one of Nyabane's sisters, and gradually established the Mosarwa ward in Maape.

These two wards were foreign to the Batswapong. Even though Chief Morupisi delegated the headmanship to Moepi (Sesetlha) and Sebihelo (Mosarwa), with **kgotla** autonomy, they did not seem to have had much influence in local politics and remained subordinate to Mathibatsela and Mabuo chiefs.

Although the origin and history of such wards has been confirmed by older people, current royal family members still deny the existence of Sesetlha and Mosarwa as official **kgotla**. The current chieftainship crisis in Maape appears to originate from those early tribal conflicts and supremacy of the "Mogome ward" (Mabuo and Mathibatsela) over the others.

2.5 Sajwe Lands Area

Sajwe is not a village community, but a lands area 42 km northeast of Serowe where a group of Serowe farmers plow together.

2.5.1 Historical Background. The Sajwe farmers are composed of 37 original families from Goseetsho ward in Serowe, initially occupying the eastern side of Serowe Hill. As part of decentralization of the Serowe wards in the 1940s due to increasing conjestion at the center, Goseetsho ward was relocated opposite Batalaote ward in 1947 in order to make more room for Maaloso royal ward. Gasebalwe Seretse, advisor and relative of Tshekedi Khama, was

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* From **"Motse o thibile tsela,"** lit., "village that blocked the road" (to soldiers).

mandated to relocate the ward and the same year (1947) the Seetsho people moved to their current location under the headmanship of Kgosietsho Ramojababo.

2.5.2 Ward Linkages. The Goseetsho wardheadman reported that traditional general consultation among Serowe wardheads on major community issues and **kgotla** cases is fast disappearing. The presence in Serowe of both the District Senior Tribal Authority and the District Council Administration appear to be two significant factors directly affecting quality and relevance of the traditional ward structure in the community.

Goseetsho ward, as most other wards in Serowe, was said to collaborate with adjacent wards only on issues of immediate concern common to all of them, e.g., water reticulation, infrastructure, etc. Similarly, wardheads consult each other only on issues pertaining to **kgotla** membership and unresolved matters are directly forwarded to Serowe main **kgotla** by the headmen concerned.

2.6 Headmen/Chiefs

Community leadership in all communities studied is essentially exercised by the headmen and chiefs at their respective levels.

2.6.1 Chieftainship. It must be noted that two distinct levels of chieftainship have to be distinguished between "traditional chiefs" and "nominated chiefs," referred to hereafter as Tribal Authority chiefs. Traditional chiefs are the leaders who **inherited** the chieftainship. Tribal Authority chiefs are those who were **nominated** and **elected** and currently perform the role of paid civil servants in constituencies covering several villages.

Confusion often arises from the fact that Tribal Authority chiefs are commonly referred to as chiefs, while traditional chiefs have become known as headmen. Yet, in the eyes of the population, both are equally **kgosi** (chiefs), except that traditional chiefs appear to command more loyalty among village residents than Tribal Authority chiefs who often are perceived as outside government officials. (See below, **2.6.3.**)

Thus, in those communities, leadership can be said to be exercised through three successive levels: the headmen (ward level), traditional chiefs (his ward, **kgosing**, or village level), Tribal Authority chiefs (Tribal Authority constituency levels).

2.6.2 Headmen's and Traditional Chiefs' Duties and Jurisdiction. While each headman (and traditional chief) performs duties and jurisdiction at his own ward level, the traditional chiefs, in addition, attend in main **kgotla** meetings to matters unresolved at the ward level. Unsolved matters at the main **kgotla** level are in turn referred to Tribal Authority chiefs.

2.6.2.1 Basically, the headmen's duties are twofold:

- they perform the role of leaders and referees for their ward; and
- they liaise between their ward and **kgosing** (chief's ward) by transmitting resolutions from the chief's ward to their people and referring ward unsolved matters to the main **kgotla**.

2.6.2.2 In both Moshopa and Kgagodi a strict sense of hierarchy was observed in this interrelationship. For example, a wardhead does not interfere in the domestic matters of his subward unless such matters are referred to him by his subwardhead. Similarly a subwardhead will not report to **kgosing** (main **kgotla**) prior to consulting with his main wardhead. In the same way, headmen do not report to Tribal Authority chiefs without first informing **kgosing** (main **kgotla**/traditional chief), and the traditional chief will not intervene in any ward matters unless requested to do so.

2.6.2.3 The jurisdiction of headmen is currently limited to the following:

- settling ward disputes;
- seduction, rape, and divorce cases;
- crop damage cases;
- fights involving no physical injury;
- selection of sites for newcomers in the ward in consultation with traditional chiefs.

In relation to those cases, headmen and traditional chiefs can apply the following sanctions and penalties:

- fines of four head of cattle in cases of illegitimate pregnancies;
- one ox in cases of crop damage by cattle;
- one goat in cases of crop damage by smallstock;
- up to four lashes in other cases.

Cases beyond the jurisdiction of headmen and traditional chiefs include:

- murder;
- fights involving physical injuries;
- thefts;
- fines payable in cash.

All of these latter have to be referred to Tribal Authority chiefs because they normally require official records, police statements, or receipts.

2.6.3 Tribal Authority Chiefs. Tribal Authority chiefs have now become the official authority in customary matters. Unlike traditional chiefs, they are not attached to wards but adjudicate cases and customary matters referred to their court by the traditional chiefs in their constituency. The same **kgotla** procedures are followed in Tribal Authority courts as in any other **kgotla** hearing, except for the use of official forms and documents, written records taken by a court clerk, and sanctions enforced by Tribal Authority policemen.

The new Tribal Administration, just as the traditional chieftainship, has been stripped of many of the pre-independence prerogatives attached to chiefs,

e.g., land allocation, control of stray cattle (**matimela**). The Tribal Administration's main functions are limited to:

(a) administering justice through customary courts;

(b) settling land disputes;

(c) carrying out certain traditional and ceremonial duties;
(d) providing general leadership and advice in everyday matters (Reilly 1981:15).

Further, Senior Tribal Authority chiefs fall under direct control of the government. While still appointed according to custom, their official recognition must be ratified by the government and the government may refuse to recognize an appointment. In such cases, the chief concerned forfeits both his salary and his membership in the House of Chiefs. In turn, Senior Tribal Authority chiefs appoint subchiefs who also have to be officially recognized before they are eligible for a salary or can exercise formal authority at their respective courts.

As a result, most Tribal Authority chiefs are more loyal to the District administration--their formal employer--than to the communities they actually administer.

2.6.4 Problems of Traditional Leadership. The current authority exercised by the various levels of chieftainship appears to be considerably weakened by two basic factors: loss of their own control and decision-making power, and skewed attendance in the **kgotla**. Despite the well-established ward structure and strict hierarchy still observed between wardheads in some communities, all headmen and traditional chiefs deplore the low attendance at **kgotla** meetings. Out of 20 wardheads interviewed, 8 attributed this phenomenon to people's "irresponsibility" or "indifference." The majority (12) felt that they are gradually "losing authority" because, in their own terms, "the government is now minimizing the importance of attending meetings." Further interviews revealed three major reasons that appear to be weakening traditional leadership:

2.6.4.1 Control over Resources. Allocation of land and, to some extent, management planning of community resources (i.e., water, grazing, and arable land)--both prerogatives of traditional chiefs--are currently controlled by Land Boards (LB) and Subordinate Land Boards (SLB) which in all communities studied are institutions located outside the community (**5.3.3**). Even though chiefs are requested to sign SLB applications, their control over community resources remains "symbolic" since, in cases of conflict, LBs take the final decision (see below, **Moshopa 5.3.4.3**). As a result (though not common) some residents tend to bypass the regular channels by applying for land/water directly to SLBs. In this process, not only allocation but also management planning of community resources itself become ultimately dependent on outside institutions, thus reducing considerably traditional authority in the communities. (See case studies below, **5.3.4.3**).

2.6.4.2 Decision-Making Power. If control over resources rests outside the communities, decision-making power, by the same token, loses much of its relevance and effectiveness. What headmen and traditional chiefs regard as

"loss of authority" and "poor emphasis from the government on meeting attendance" appear to relate directly to the quality of decision-making currently taking place in rural communities. Local residents realize that, unless they have effective control over community resources, their inputs in **kgotla** meetings or other consultation/planning exercises--however democratic they may be--lose much of their relevance. Thus, many residents have become disinterested (if not cynical) about attending **kgotla** meetings, and those who do attend appear to participate more out of curiosity than community concern.

2.6.4.3 Representativeness of the Kgotla: In addition to the problems of control and decision-making power, the current **kgotla** has its own inherent limitations.

Traditionally, the village **kgotla** was the only representative institution at village level ruled by the unquestioned final decision of the chief. Currently the **kgotla** still is recognized as the official focus of rural communities. The **kgotla** still is the main village body dealing with customary law and general community issues. It is the acknowledged public place where information is disseminated and violators disciplined. It is also the place where any adult can stand and voice his/her own views. For these reasons, the **kgotla** still gives official character to community decisions and maintains very high legitimacy compared to other village institutions (see, for example, RSU 1981:Part 1). Because of the legitimacy chiefs and **kgotla** still enjoy, it is commonly assumed that **kgotla** decisions/resolutions "represent" the community.

Yet, in a sample of 372 households in the 4 communities, 27 percent had family members working elsewhere. Those migrants comprised 5.2 percent of all family members in the sample, ranging from 2.8 percent to 11 percent of village populations.* These people were primarily young men and women, often with higher formal education, who were forced to seek employment in South Africa or towns and major villages in Botswana. This means that a good proportion of the most able-bodied segment of the population lives outside the villages and at any time is not represented at the village **kgotla**.

Those migrants, however, still belong to their village. Since only few find long-term employment in towns, the majority has to be content with short-term or unskilled work and periodic return to their extended family. A crucial factor is that those people return home with an important asset: cash. From the same sample, 62 percent of the migrant labor force were found to contribute to their household, i.e., 47.8 percent in cash, 8.5 percent in kind, and 5.7 percent both in cash and in kind. Thus, the majority of them (53.5 percent) not only bring cash to their community, but also have control over this capital. Part of this income is usually spent on domestic consumption (food, livestock, etc.); a good part of it is spent on beer. This cash influx encourages the dependence of older residents on outside resources and, because the migrants spend a large proportion of their time at beer parties, the village **kgotla** has become the preserve of older residents. (See also Gulbrandsen 1980:82-85; and Noppen 1982:130-34.) No means has yet been found for incorporating the migrant labor force into the community consultation and decision processes.

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* See Zufferey (1982) for more details.

2.7 Summary

2.7.1 This inquiry into the traditional structure indicates that all village communities studied are composed of different ethnic groups and that the traditional ward structure varies from one community to the next. While in Kgagodi and Moshopa all wards are clustered around **kgosing** (chief's ward) and observe a strict hierarchy, both with **kgosing** and among themselves, Maape presents a profile of a community divided into two distinct factions competing for control and leadership. Sajwe, in contrast, illustrates a phenomenon common to most major villages, where traditional ward linkages are fast disappearing. Because of the presence of the Senior Tribal Authority and Council agencies in major centers, traditional wards tend to relate individually to Senior Tribal and Council authorities instead of following the traditional channels.

2.7.2 Despite these differences, the traditional ward structure with its chiefs and headmen still remains the recognized forum for community consultation and the central motor of community mobilization and organization from which even modern institutions derive their authority (see below, **VDC 3.4.2**).

2.7.3 Yet, the influence of traditional authority is considerably reduced because:

- jurisdiction and authority in customary matters now rest with Tribal Authority chiefs to whom traditional chiefs must report;
- ultimate control over community resources lies in new institutions (LBs and SLBs), generally located outside village communities;
- since control of resources lies elsewhere, traditional decision-making power has lost much of its relevance and effectiveness, resulting in general disinterest in traditional consultation/planning processes;
- finally, the migrant labor returning periodically with cash to their villages give rise to a new community organized around beer parties and divorced from traditional **kgotla** gatherings, discouraging **kgotla** meeting attendance, and increasing the dependence of older residents on outside resources.

3. Modern Institutions

3.1 Introduction and Definitions

Modern village institutions can be classified into three distinct groups:

(1) institutions directly **related to agricultural activities**; those include: Fencing Groups (FC), Tick Control Groups, Borehole Syndicates, Cooperatives, Smallstock Groups, and sometimes 4B Clubs;

(2) other **voluntary village institutions**, such as Botswana Council of Women (BCW), Village Health Committees (VHC), Parent Teachers Association (PTA), Social Welfare Committees (SWC), Organizations for Destitutes, etc.;

(3) **coordinating committees.**

In theory, agricultural groups in Central District are coordinated by a Farmers Committee (FC). No official standard definition of an FC has yet been adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture and agricultural regions have differed in their approach. Central region and district staff developed a first set of guidelines in 1977, and, after one year of practical experience with FCs, a revised version was adopted in Central Region and followed by some other regions (e.g., Gaborone).

The purpose of an FC as defined in those terms of reference is:

(a) to support the Agricultural Demonstrator (AD) in planning, organizing, and implementing extension activities within an extension area;

(b) to represent the farming community in making the community's problems, needs, opinions, and proposals known to the Ministry of Agriculture or other outside organization;

(c) to plan, implement, and manage agricultural development projects affecting or involving the extension area as a whole (Central Region 1978:1).

The important distinction between FCs and other agricultural groups is that FCs are supposed to represent the community as a whole.

All other local institutions, including the FC itself, fall under the leadership of the Village Development Committee (VDC), which is the official planning and coordinating body in the community.

VDCs and FCs can therefore be said in Central District to be the two key committees responsible for coordinating all modern village institutions.

3.2 Kgagodi Agricultural Groups

In Kgagodi, five agricultural groups were identified as follows: Fencing Group; Smallstock Group; Tick Control Group; Cooperative; 4B Club.

3.2.1 Fencing Group (FG). Origin. The idea of fencing a community's arable lands originated in 1978 from Mokoane cattlepost residents who had long fenced their private "gardens"* and from three farmers who had past working experience at the Mmankgodi fence in the Mahalapye area. The purpose of erecting a communal fence is to reduce crop damage by livestock. In 1980, crop damage cases reported to wardheads ranged between three and eight per **kgotla**. Many others went unreported.

Status. In 1979, an executive committee of five was elected in the **kgotla** for one year, but no election has been held since. The general membership includes all 141 households plowing in the fenced enclosure, or 63.5 percent

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* Cultivated lands at cattleposts are usually referred to as "gardens." Arable land is not legally allocated in grazing areas, but small garden plots are allowed. The size of the gardens, however, tends to reach gigantic proportions. One measured was 800m X 750m. The majority of cattlepost residents have "gardens."

of the total households plowing in the community. Other residents are encouraged to contribute and participate.

In early 1980, fencing contributions were set at P40.00 for male adults and P20.00 for females. Because of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, these fees were later reduced to P20.00 and P15.00, respectively. In April 1981, it was decided to reduce them once more to P10.00/household (P5.00 each). Controversies over contributions prevented completion of group bylaws and collection of joining fees. So far only two rolls of wire have been donated by two farmers as total group contributions.

In March 1981, the FG submitted its project to the Subordinate Land Board (SLB) in Maunatlala, but as of February 1983 has not yet received firm approval. In June 1981, SLB officers pegged the three major corners of the fence without surveying the whole project systematically. SLB officers expect the fence line to be first cleared so they can drive along it, measure it, and then decide whether or not to approve it (see below, **Problem 5**).

Training is limited to three members who attended a one-week course on fencing at Mahalapye Rural Training Center (MRTC) in 1980. In addition, seven members have past experience in fencing from Serowe, Bobonong, Ramotlabama, and South Africa.

Progress. The fencing project was surveyed in December 1981 (see **fig. 4**). The fence encloses 25.8 km immediately south of Kgagodi village composed of two sections (each and west) separated by the road running south to Maunatlala. Of the total length, 10.4 km have been cleared, 15.4 km are still to be cleared, and 12 gates have been proposed.

A noticeable difference in performance can be observed between the two sections or subgroups. While in the 10 km covered by the eastern section 7.4 km had been cleared, the western section, covering 15.8 km, had cleared only 3 km.

Problems.


(1) Lack of group management skills appears to be a fundamental problem affecting Kgagodi FG. The group has not yet reached consensus on joining fees, which prevents both completion of group bylaws and financial group contributions.

(2) The committee itself lacks basic administrative skills. Past records were kept on loose sheets of paper, most of which are lost, and no funds have yet been raised to purchase proper record books.

(3) There have been no financial contributions to date partly because of foot-and-mouth disease which considerably reduces income from cattle sales.

(4) General participation in the project is low and uneven primarily because of water shortages for livestock in Kgagodi. Currently most farmers either must trek their cattle approximately 10 km to the closest livestock borehole between Kgagodi and Tamasane or must draw water from neighboring wells which requires heavy labor.

Figure 4. Map of Kgagodi Communal Fence: Current Status (Dec 1980)



(5) Finally, the fact that the project itself has not yet received formal approval by SLB also appears to result in the low participation in group fencing. Some farmers feel that, if the project is ultimately not approved or must be altered, their effort of clearing 26 km of bush will have been wasted.

3.2.2 Smallstock Group (SSG). Origin and Membership. Because the numbers of smallstock were rapidly declining, an SSG was formed in 1979 on the initiative of the local AD. The group is composed of twenty-three members including an executive committee of five.

Status. Group bylaws were completed in early 1980 and amended in April 1981 with a fee increase.

Initial fees were set at 38t per month regardless of the number of stock. In April 1981, an additional 10t/animal was added to the monthly contribution in order to meet dosing expenses.

In May 1981, the group had P19.00 in cash; P17.00 was spent in July on medicine, and the total balance at that time amounted to P2.00.

In 1980, two demonstrations were conducted by the Smallstock Officer in April and July. Another was conducted in May 1981.

The group doses three times a year in March, May, and August with an automatic gun borrowed from the Gaborone or Mahalapye Smallstock Office and uses a private crush owned by a group member.

Total cash sales for 1980 amounted to P627.00 for 22 goats sold to Müller's Butchery in Selebi-Phikwe at prices ranging between P23.00 and P36.00 per animal.

Problems. This group was mostly concerned with how to increase its membership. The group feels that a larger membership would not only help increase group contributions but would prevent smallstock reinfection by untreated animals. Thus the group wishes that the Animal Production Officer (APO) and the AD would organize campaigns and broadcasting programs in order to encourage other residents to join.

3.2.3 Tick Control Group (Diloro). **Origin and Membership.** An initial group of seven members started in 1977 as a smallstock dosing group and then changed their priority to tick control. In April 1979, this group bought a knapsack pump (P75.00) by increasing fees from P5.00 to P8.00. This pump was used by individual members at their own convenience. In April 1979 the total membership increased to 13 members managed by an executive committee of five members and has remained unchanged since.

Status. Group bylaws were completed in early 1979.

In August 1980, the group had a cash balance of P50.00. Income is raised partly from joining fees (P8.00) and from fees of 5t per beast per month for members and 20t for nonmembers.

The herds dipped range from 15 to 98 animals. It takes 10 to 12 days to dip the members' cattle. The estimated number of cattle dipped ranges between 600 and 630 cattle. Dipping was reported to take place on an average of once a month. During the rains, the group dips twice or more according to the funds available.

Projects. Since 1980, the group has planned to purchase a spray race and to apply for SLOCA subsidies but, because of foot-and-mouth disease, the farmers' income from cattle sales is considerably reduced and was said to prevent the group from raising enough contributions in order to purchase such facilities.

Problems. Since 1979 there has been no increase in membership. This was primarily attributed to the foot-and-mouth outbreak. As with the SSG, this group expects assistance from the AD and other support staff in encouraging other members to join.

3.2.4 Cooperative. On 9 July 1981, a few farmers encouraged by radio broadcasts decided to form a committee and promote a marketing cooperative in Kgagodi. This committee liaises directly with its Farmers Committee.

Among the expected benefits of this cooperative are:

- selling cattle to the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) at better prices;
- having a community-based agency for the distribution of drought-relief food;
- provision of cheaper veterinary facilities;
- distribution of yearly dividends or interests.

Only two members have had previous experience with such institutions, but expect future training.

3.2.5 4B Club. Origin. Kgagodi 4B Club was initiated in 1974 by the head teacher and the club intended to start a school garden. A schoolteacher temporarily lent a small garden plot to the club to help it start operating. In 1979, the school fenced its own garden on the school ground.

In January 1982, four teachers, including the head teacher, were leading a club of 50 schoolchildren.

Status. The club is basically involved in three kinds of activities: knitting and sewing, gardening, and carpentry work. In addition, it also offers training sessions in knitting to village residents. So far three are attending those courses.

To date, the club has raised P60.00 from sales and concerts. Vegetable sales amounted to P10.00 in 1978, P25.00 in 1979, and P30.00 in 1980. The 1981 estimate is in the neighborhood of P45.00.

The club directly liaises to its FC through a resident 4B leader, who also is an FC member.

Problems.

(1) Despite its direct link to FC, the Kgagodi 4B Club remains very school-centered. This situation was reported to arise from the head teacher's possessive attitude. Residents say he "runs the club the way he wants" and considers it to be "his own thing." As a result, both 4B leaders and teachers become frustrated and the FC does not seem to be able to remedy this situation.

(2) The club also faces crucial problems of water shortage and lack of implements for the garden. Schoolchildren currently walk 3.5 km to the nearest borehole to water their garden with buckets.

The head teacher's intention is to raise additional funds from beauty contests and concerts in order to purchase more garden tools from Mahalapye.

3.3 Kgagodi Voluntary Institutions

Voluntary village institutions in Kgagodi include: Parent Teachers Association; Botswana Council of Women; Village Health Committee; Social Welfare Committee.

3.3.1 Parent Teachers Association (PTA). Origin and Duties. A PTA was initiated in 1974 under the influence of the head teacher with the objective of increasing the participation of parents in the education of their children and in school activities. An executive committee of four members was elected in **kgotla** for two years in 1980.

PTA committee members are chosen from both teachers and parents. The community first selects a group of candidates among the teachers who then join parent candidates for final elections.

The PTA's primary function is to coordinate all school activities and attend to any problems that may arise. More specifically, PTA is responsible for ensuring adequate accommodation and good maintenance of school facilities.

Status. The PTA has undertaken two projects since its existence: the provision of school latrines and rethatching one classroom. In both cases the PTA ran into conflicts with the Village Development Committee which considered it to be part of its duties to implement these projects. Another thatching project is planned for this year.

The PTA raises funds from school fees at 60t/child/year and from school concerts. Its cash balance to date amounts to P100.00. Recurrent expenses amount to P24.00/month for two cooks. Training activities so far include one seminar open to the community at-large designed to promote better understanding of the role and functions of PTA in the community.

Problems.

(1) Lack of funds appears to be a serious problem. The cooks' salaries at P24.00 are rather high recurrent expenses for this institution if one considers that the PTA is also expected to cover transport expenses to sports competitions and school rallies.

(2) The general water shortage in the village prevents the implementation of horticultural projects.

(3) The conflict over roles and objectives between PTA and VDC has led to many controversies and competition between the two.

3.3.2 Botswana Council of Women (BCW). Origin and Objectives. A BCW started in 1968 under the influence of a radio program and the perseverance of a dedicated woman from Mmadinare who was running a shop in Kgagodi at that time. The BCW was composed of five women who also constituted an official committee approved by a **kgotla** meeting in 1968.

The objectives of this BCW were: to ensure adequate nutrition and sanitation standards in the community concerned with poor health services in Kgagodi. The BCW persuaded the Selebi Phikwe doctor to visit the community twice a week. In 1970, the BCW purchased a roundavel for medical examinations. In the same year, however, a Council clinic was built in Maunatlala (25 km south) and, in 1974, a healthpost was constructed between Mogapinyana and Kgagodi, on the outskirts of the village. Since then, health needs have been adequately met and the BCW activity dropped.

Status. Inactive. The BCW never had any bylaws. The chairlady lives in Maun. There were no funds. No elections have been held since 1968.

Problems.

(1) Kgagodi BCW's collapse appears to relate to the construction of the Council clinic in Maunatlala. BCW expected a clinic to be erected in Kgagodi, but it was built in Maunatlala instead. The BCW then hoped to have a healthpost built in the village, but it was eventually built between Kgagodi and Mogapinyana, so as to cater for both communities. This succession of events deeply frustrated BCW.

(2) Internal jealousy in the membership also contributed to the downfall of the institution. Because the Family Welfare Educator (FWE) also was teaching mothers how to knit, the BCW's president was said to have reported her to Selebi Phikwe for seeking to take over BCW's leadership. This controversy spread within the membership and paralyzed further progress.

(3) The lack of clear understanding of BCW's purpose and objectives together with poor group and management skills appear to have been the most fundamental problems.

3.3.3 Social Welfare Committee (SWC). Origin and Objectives. This committee was initiated in 1979 at the suggestion of the Selebi Phikwe physician with the intention of assisting the poor by organizing distributions of mealie meal from the closest shops. Twice a year the SWC also was to organize clothing and additional food supplies from welfare assistance. A committee of five members was elected on the spot in **kgotla** for a two-year term of office.

Status. Mealie meal distributions are currently organized every Wednesday from Seumola store in Mogapinyana out of welfare assistance funds. In addition, SWC raised P20.00 from sales of empty bags.

Problems.

(1) Duplication of roles between the BCW, the Village Health Committee, and the SWC considerably impairs the effectiveness of this committee.

(2) The SWC was elected hastily without much knowledge of purpose, role, and management of such an institution.

(3) Executives themselves were neither fully aware of expected roles and duties nor equipped to assume those tasks.

(4) Absence of two key members (vice-secretary elected to the VDC and treasurer married in Serowe) without replacement considerably reduced the SWC's effectiveness.

(5) Chronic lack of support. SWC members complained of the regular absence of the Assistant Community Development Officer (ACDO) during rationing days and of her lack of interest in their activities.

3.3.4 Village Health Committee (VHC). Origin and Objectives. This committee was started on 29 July 1981 on the initiative of the FWE and the Selebi Phikwe health staff. The local chief was notified by mail and a **kgotla** meeting was held to elect a committee of five executives.

This committee was initiated essentially to assist FWE in tracing TB defaulters and encouraging them to take their drugs regularly. Other tasks of VHC are to: identify malnourished children and unattended sick residents, and report any other public health or sanitation hazards in the community.

Plan of Operation. To that end, the VHC intends to recruit additional members and divide into three subgroups of ten in order to cover the whole village area. The VHC also intends to attend regular training sessions given by the FWE and to raise funds from concerts and beer parties. The envisaged plan of operation consists of reporting identified needs to the chief, who will then call a VDC meeting at which VHC will inform VDC of its findings and intentions. The VHC currently feels that the chief ought to be **ex officio** member of their committee because his active participation would give more weight to its decisions and operations.

3.4 Kgagodi Coordinating Committees

As previously mentioned (**3.1**), in Central District FCs and VDCs are the two most important local institutions responsible for coordinating all other groups and institutions in rural villages. While FCs' primary role is to plan, implement, and manage agricultural projects with the help of the AD, VDCs have the overall task of planning and coordinating rural development at community level.

Thus, special attention was given to those committees and a special meeting arranged so as to enable many committee members to participate in our interviews.

3.4.1 Farmers Committee. Origin. An FC was first promoted in 1967 by the AD who emphasized the benefits of using treated seeds and plowing subsidies

as means of raising interest in the farming community. Free distribution of seeds after the 1966 drought convinced a few farmers to form an FC and a first committee of five members was elected in **kgotla**.

For eleven years this committee remained idle (see **Problems** below). Because of the emphasis given to FCs by Central Region (**3.1**), a new one was elected in 1979 composed of five executives and six additional members. Five of those additional members also belong to agricultural subgroups and ensure liaison between these groups and the FC.

Status. Despite a relatively well-established structure, Kgagodi FC met four times in 1980 and held no meetings in 1981. It has no bylaws yet.

The current FC inherited P10.00 from the previous committee, of which P3.50 was spent in 1980 on transport to Palapye to buy seeds. The balance is P6.50. No other funds have been raised except P1.00/member donated in 1981 to meet the transportation cost of visiting the Maunatlala Agricultural Show.

No project has been undertaken since 1979. The reasons advanced were: lack of community participation and record books.

The FC, however, planned to build a dam in Namwena Valley in collaboration with Diloro and Mogapinyana farmers, starting December 1981. This project is still at the planning stage.

Training support included: 1979, two members attending a one-week workshop on FC management at MRTC; 1980, two members taking a one-week course on fencing and plowing; 1981, four members attending a one-week FC management course.

Outside Assistance included the delivery in 1980 of 50 bags of seeds from the Palapye District Agricultural Office and, on 23 November 1980, seven ALDEP row planters were forwarded (four not operating). The FC also expects receiving AE10 funds for communal fencing. (See above **3.2.1.**)

Problems.

(1) The lack of knowledge of the FC's role and functions combined with lack of management skills and training support likely are fundamental problems. The executives themselves did not seem aware of the potential benefits their institution could provide to the community and they showed little knowledge of improved farming practices.

(2) The FC also has to operate under difficult conditions of widespread crop damage and severe water shortages which considerably hinder the implementation of most agricultural projects.

(3) Finally, the FC lacks consistent training support. Members reported that the AD, despite his good technical knowledge, did not show much interest in and support for FC activities.

3.4.2 Village Development Committee. Origin and Membership. Kgagodi has had four consecutive VDCs, elected in 1967, 1969, 1975, and 1979, respectively. The current VDC, composed of 17 members, includes an executive committee of five, an advisory body of four additional members, three **ex officio** members (ACDO, Councillor, traditional chief), and five co-opted members (FWE, AD, Veterinary Assistant, Postmaster, Revenue Officer).

Self-Help. Self-help was generally correctly defined by the executives and considered to be a useful development strategy because government agencies, they say, "cannot provide everybody with everything" and because "small improvements can be implemented without spending much money."

The organization of self-help activities in the community follows four consecutive steps: (1) project identification by VDC; (2) consultation with ACDO; (3) project submission to chief; (4) **kgotla** meeting called by chief.

VDC Status. Ideally the VDC is to meet twice monthly. In reality it meets irregularly and no meeting was called during the 1980-81 plowing/harvesting season. According to records, the average attendance is six members.

VDC identified eight basic needs in the community. In order of priority, these include:

(1) provision of water in the village;

(2) building a community hall;

(3) upgrading the postal agency into a post office;

(4) building additional classrooms;

(5) upgrading the healthpost into clinic;

(6) promoting meat market facilities;

(7) telephone;

(8) inviting various government agencies to inform the population on development policies, grants, and subsidies in order to raise motivation among the residents.

Completed VDC projects include: 3 roundavels (2 rooms and kitchen); 1 cement house with kitchen; 2 one-room roundavels; **kgotla** latrines; school latrine with Council assistance; postal agency (1978) closed in January 1981 for misuse of funds by the postal agent.

Currently no project is being implemented. Those mentioned above are planned projects only, i.e., intended to be forwarded to Council.

In December 1981, the VDC had P101.87 in cash raised from slaughtering fees (50t/cattle and 20t/goat) and VDC housing rents (five roundavels at P1.00 each month and one cement house at P6.00/month).

In August 1980, skills and local production surveys were conducted by the Rural Industrial Officer (RIO) Central in the Kgagodi area. Only 13 people for the whole area including Mogapinyana and Diloro were identified practicing

the following productive activities: sorghum mill, 1 (Kgagodi); building pole collector, 1 (Kgagodi); knitting, 2 (in Kgagodi); builders, 2; thatchers, 4; woodwork, 1; leatherwork, 2.

According to its bylaws the VDC is to report twice a month to the village **kgotla**. In reality, VDC was found to report once a month on average.

Support. Council built the school, toilets, and one storeroom with VDC participation. VDC further filed an application on 5 July 1981 for a village borehole, clinic, community hall, and six additional classrooms. None of these was being implemented in January 1982.

Linkages. Kgagodi local institutions should relate to each other in the manner pictured in **figure 5.**

Each agricultural subgroup has one member on the FC who is expected to act as group representative and ensure liaison between his/her group and the FC. Similarly, the FC includes two VDC members who are expected to report to and represent the farming community in the VDC.

A striking feature of the Kgagodi modern structure is the presence of a so-called "Central VDC" above the local VDC. This Central VDC was formed in April 1981 by the local Councillor with the intention of coordinating projects with neighboring communities, i.e., Diloro and Mogapinyana. VDC members of the three communities are expected to liaise with Central VDC. This link between the Kgagodi VDC and Diloro does not function (see **Problems** below).

Voluntary institutions do not include VDC members in their membership, but liaise indirectly to the VDC through the traditional chief who is an **ex officio** member.

Finally, the Subordinate Land Board for the area is located 27 km south in Maunatlala and interacts with the community only on request.

VDC Performance. Despite linkages that appear to be in place, this structure operates only in theory. VDC performance was checked at three different levels: VDC executives themselves, other community leaders, and the community at large.

1. Problems Perceived by Executives. VDC executives do not perceive any problem of coordination or community organization in the village. Their only problem relates to the actual implementation of their proposed projects and their ability to persuade the Council to take action.


2. VDC Performance Perceived by Community Leaders. Out of seven community leaders interviewed, four found their VDC quite unsatisfactory. The three others who found it "acceptable" relate its performance to the personal qualities of the VDC chairman.

Community leaders reported the following problems:

(1) Five mentioned poor attendance and participation of VDC members in their own meetings.

FIGURE 5

Kgagodi Modern Structure



(2) VDC members were said rarely to attend meetings with other organizations and, after calling meetings with groups of village communities, often fail to attend themselves.

(3) It was felt that the VDC had developed a self-centered attitude and looked down on other organizations because of its increasing awareness of being the umbrella committee in the community and the official channel between village and government agencies.

(4) Because of this attitude of superiority, residents resent VDC coordination.

(5) Extension staff complain of being regularly bypassed by the Central VDC's initiatives and of never being consulted or notified of

meetings despite regular visits of the Councillor in the village. The election itself of this committee was said to have been held without the knowledge of the ACDO or the AD.

3. VDC Performance Perceived by the Community. If VDCs are established to "serve the community" and meet the "real needs" of the community, the community itself should be in the position to tell most objectively how the VDC operations actually reflect the residents' aspirations. Thus, a random sample of 80 families (nine per ward) was interviewed on importance, consultation, and role of their VDC, on self-help, and on possible improvements.

The survey revealed the following: out of 80 families, 6 percent had realistic expectations of the VDC; 5 percent know its role; 51% were not informed in any way of its activities; 55 percent feel VDC projects do not help them meet their needs; 61 percent suggest improvements.

On the other hand, the concept of self-help (**ipelegeng**) is well understood by 76 percent and considered important. If one adds the number of residents ready to join in self-help activities (37 percent) to those who already work at the fencing project, the self-help potential reaches 81 percent.

3.5 Moshopa Agricultural Group

Moshopa Fencing Group was the only agricultural group identified.

3.5.1 Fencing Group (FG). Origin. The idea of communal fencing initially spread to rural areas from the TGLP radio campaigns of the 1970s. Later that idea was reinforced by two visits made to other fencing projects (Lerala 1978; and Sefhare 1979). Two resident farmers considerably influenced the farming community by their determination and their previous fencing experience in Matlhakoleng (1960s). They finally convinced a nucleus of farmers to constitute an FG in Moshopa by presenting the first cash contributions themselves.

A group of ten farmers finally organized themselves in 1978 with a great deal of suspicion from the farming community. Only two additional farmers brought their contributions that year. In 1979, because of much heavier crop damage by domestic animals, 51 farmers joined, thus bringing the group's cash balance to P184.00. The following year the idea of fencing won the whole community and appeared to be the solution to solve common problems.

Reasons for Fencing. Three major reasons appear to have pushed the Moshopa farmers to initiate a fencing project:

(1) The obvious one is the extensive crop damage caused by domestic animals. Out of 120 farmers surveyed, 58 percent reported crop damage. In 1981, reported cases ranged between five and sixteen per **kgotla** and an increasing number of farmers harvested in mid-July in order to avoid losing too many crops.

(2) Lack of manpower appears to be another major reason. Since most children attend school or seek employment in towns, herdboys (**badisa**) are becoming scarce. Thus, fencing becomes a convenient alternative.

(3) Finally, fencing enables basic rotational grazing. Protecting arable lands during the growing season preserves fodder for the post-harvest period.

Group Status. On 13 May 1979, an executive committee of five farmers was officially elected under supervision of both the local chief and the Tribal Authority chief from Sefhare and the general membership was officially extended to all villages and adjacent cattlepost residents.

In 1980, the FG applied to the Mahalapye SLB and the project was formally approved the winter of the same year. A sketch map was produced in 1978 by the AO(LR)/Serowe and subsequent changes remapped in 1979 (see **fig 6** below). Group bylaws were officially approved in **kgotla** on 29 February 1980.

Every male adult* is expected to contribute once P5.00 and female adult, P2.00. Those contributions are raised by ward and cattlepost area, respectively. Funds are kept at the home of the group secretary who also acts as treasurer. As of 1 July 1981, the FG cash balance amounted to P556.50 and one roll of wire (one mile) was donated by Mokoane cattlepost.

In February 1982 the FG received 44 rolls of HS wire from AE10 subsidies.

A five-day workshop in fencing techniques was attended by five members in May 1977 and June 1980 at MRTC. Despite relatively little training, some farmers learned how to fence from neighboring groups (e.g., Sefhare); others have skills from past experience in South Africa or Matlhakoleng.

Fencing Project. 1. Description. In 1979, the FC started clearing a "drift fence" separating the community's arable lands from the adjacent grazing areas (see **fig 6**). The initial line was to run from the Makote Hills in the east to Mabeleapudi Hill in the west. A year later the western section was modified in order to include additional fields of the Dingope area. The line was then to join Didole Hill and run further north to the Mmamalwadi Hills. The final project eventually compromised between the two initial ones. The line was finally cleared halfway between the initial proposals because it was felt that more grazing ought to be kept in the western section. Yet, that western section still remains very controversial and, despite formal approval of SLB, further conflicts relating to water access and grazing tenure have risen (see case study below, **5.3.4.3**).


In the eastern part of the project it was decided to have the fence join the existing Sefhare fence instead of fencing all the way to the Makote Hills.

2. Progress. The project was surveyed on 12 July 1981 after clearing was completed. The total length of the cleared line of 21.3 km is divided into 6 subsections with 12 proposed gates (**fig 6**). The actual fence differs considerably from the 1979 proposal map.

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* Common criteria used to determine adulthood are: landownership and having worked/working in South Africa, for men; and a minimum of two children, for women.

Figure 6. Map of Moshopa Drift Fence: Organizational Chart of Fencing Sub-Groups



3. Group Organization. Fencing is organized by subsections according to lands areas and adjacent cattleposts. Since the fence crosses six consecutive cultivated lands areas (see **figs 6** and **11**), the FG divided into six subsections. Lands areas in the interior work with adjacent areas that are on the fencing line, e.g., all areas north of the Pilikiwe Road joined the Dingope section, Ithakanye joined Diphudi, and Sekgwaneng works with Tlhakadiawa.

Some of those lands areas vary considerably in size (compare Kolomajwe with Moralana or Diphudi on **fig 11**). The smaller sections, therefore, undertook to fence part of the larger ones in order to share the work more equitably amongst them (compare **fig 6** and **fig 11**). Kolomajwe and Dingopoe still cover comparatively larger distances than the others, but they also include a larger number of farms. Thus, despite those slight differences, the work appears equitably distributed among the subgroups.

4. Group Management. A significant observation about Moshopa FG is that both organization and project management primarily rest on the self-determination of the villagers and the traditional ward structure. Coordination by FC or VDC is virtually nonexistent since both coordinating committees are only symbolic. The input of extension staff is minimal since neither an AD nor an ACDO is based in the community. Yet, with full support of the local chief and faced with a clear felt need (protecting crops), the community organized itself in an attempt to find a solution to a common problem.

In addition to contributions collected by each ward (**3.5.1**), each section operates independently under the leadership of a wardheadman who plows in the area and each section establishes its own work schedule (see **table 1**). All problems of attendance, punctuality, or conflict are dealt with by subgroup leaders (headmen) in their respective sections, and the FG committee is responsible for the overall supervision of the project.

Advice on fencing techniques is provided by one or two skilled members in each section.

Linkages. Despite the symbolic role of coordinating committees, the FG still refers decisions and problems to its FC which, in turn, transmits them to the VDC. These channels seem to be observed not so much to seek formal approval, help, or solutions but, rather, out of a strict sense of hierarchy similar to that in the traditional structures.

Reports to and ratification by coordinating committees further appear to ensure power of enforcement to the FC, just as **kgotla** resolutions give official character to community decisions. This power, however, does not stem from authority based on performance or democratic elections, but from the fact that both FC and VDC are primarily composed of chief's relatives. Thus the nature of those linkages ensures FG committee authority which might otherwise be challenged by group members.

Problems.

(1) As a result of fragmented management by section, physical differences can be observed in the work. Poles vary from section to

section in size, height, depth, and spacing. Subgroups also diverge on the number of strands and gates.

(2) The overall coordination by the FG committee is not effective because committee members were elected more on the basis of their social status than their technical knowledge. This often results in lengthy discussions between skilled members and executives.

(3) As a result of lack of uniform implementation, some sections will likely deteriorate faster than others; it still remains to be seen who will maintain the fence and how.

(4) Long-term land-use planning factors may have been overlooked. In places (Mokoane, Kolomajwe) the fence is being built fairly close to the fields. Thus, the fenced area may not, in a long term, be adequate to satisfy the increasing demand for arable land.

(5) Finally the dispute over the fence realignment in the Dingope section (western section) likely is the most fundamental problem the project is facing. This problem is treated at length in a subsequent case study (see below, **5.3.4.3**).

3.6 Moshopa Voluntary Institutions

Voluntary institutions identified in Moshopa include: Parent Teachers Association, Botswana Council of Women, Social Welfare Committees, 4B Club.

3.6.1 Parent Teachers Association (PTA). Origin and Objectives. This association was formed in January 1979 by the head teacher after facing considerable problems in feeding schoolchildren and raising funds for school activities and transport. A committee of five members was elected in **kgotla** with the immediate objective of providing pots and cooking utensils and raising additional funds for maintenance of teachers' quarters.

Status. The Moshopa PTA apparently had a good start and managed to provide the cooking utensils needed and to raise an additional P10.00. Currently the PTA seems to have lost a great deal of its dynamism and efficiency.

Plans. The PTA's future plans are to build a new school kitchen and an additional one for the teachers. The PTA also intends to participate in the building of **kgotla** and VDC offices if those projects are undertaken.

Problems.

(1) The PTA appears to suffer from considerable internal problems. The association seems to be centered around the head teacher who feels he can request parents' assistance for any activity at any time. In addition, he is very conscious of the advisory role he has to play on how PTA funds ought to be used, and how committee recommendations should be implemented.

(2) Divergence of opinion among teachers as to how the PTA should operate and what its role ought to be resulted in the withdrawal of some teachers from the association.

TABLE 1

Moshopa Drift Fence Survey Data (12/7/81)

SECTION SUBGROUP	LEADERS (Headmen)	LENGTH (m)	NO. OF GATES[a]	ACTIVE MEMBERS	WORKDAYS	NO. OF POLES	LABOR MAN-DAYS
Dingope	Balemetse	4,700	1	16	Fri-Sat	512	48
Ramotlhokakobo	Gaokgabelwe	3,000	1	12	Mon-Wed	110[b]	36
Moralana	Keipurile	3,150	2	10	Mon-Wed	103[b]	20
Tlhakadiawa and Sekgwaneng	Kgosietsile	3,150	2	9	Mon-Wed	150	81
Kolomajwe	Gaogakwe	4,800	3	15	Mon-Wed	180	150
Dipudi and Ithakanye	E. Lechaina	2,500	3	30	Fri-Sat	642	525
	TOTAL	21,300	12	92	- -	1,697	860

[a] Only planned number of gates.

[b] Indicates additional poles that could not be counted because dispersed in many various areas.

(3) PTA also has a poor relationship with the community at large, primarily because of the attitude of the head teacher. The PTA, BCW members, and three other teachers believe that the significant problems of their respective institutions relate to the poor collaboration they have with their head teacher. One stated that the head teacher is a "stumbling block in the interrelationship of most village institutions."

(4) Another factor that paralyzes the PTA was said to be the poor quality of education given at school. Parents said this could be seen in their children's behavior and bad manners.

(5) The head teacher was further said to "never give any advice or help" and rarely to attend community meetings or respond to any other village committee request.

(6) From field observations, it appeared that Moshopa teachers, being isolated with no public transport, developed their own teaching routine without much supervision. Several of them were regularly found drinking beer before morning schooltime (8:00 a.m.). Standard 7 classes never seemed to be given afternoon tuition unless a school inspector was expected. In meetings, the head teacher gave clear signs of nervousness and boredom.

(7) As a result of these problems, parents resent contributing funds to the association. The PTA's only income is the 60t/child/year which is insufficient to cover school activities, maintenance, and transport expenses.

(8) Finally, PTA lacks adequate skills to run the organization effectively and does not have the support of the chief.

3.6.2 Botswana Council of Women (BCW). Origin and Membership. Moshopa BCW started in 1972 after the local Councillor and CCDO introduced the idea in the community and explained the benefits of such organizations. Eleven members registered but five withdrew when 50t registration fees were imposed. Thus, only six members currently remain in the Council. A new committee was to be elected in 1981, but elections failed for lack of consultation.

Status. BCW's current main activity is to organize the distribution of Corn Soya Milk (CSM) relief food to under-five children, pregnant mothers, and TB patients. In order to be eligible to CSM rations, BCW set two conditions: (1) mothers must bring their babies for weighing; (2) they also were requested to contribute a bundle of thatching grass. Cash from grass sales will be used to buy a door for the new storeroom.

BCW projects include building of one roundavel to store CSM food donated by Food Aid (USA). This storeroom, however, was built too close to the teachers' quarters' latrines and is currently not used. Thus, BCW intends to build a new storeroom in a more suitable location.

In addition, BCW does crocheting and knitting and intends to buy wool and material as a group and build up a common fund from knitting sales.

BCW's funds are primarily raised from beauty contests, cooking competitions held during public holidays, and sometimes concerts when allowed to use a classroom by the head teacher.

BCW also takes advantage of CSM distributions at the healthpost to sell their knitting and cooking, and empty bags and oil containers at 5t each.

The Council's cash balance to date amounts to P70.52 kept at the treasurer's house.

Problems. Moshopa BCW basically ignores its fundamental objectives, i.e., "to help the poor and the needy in Botswana." This institution revolves very much around its own interests and developed as "a good club" benefiting primarily its own members. Questioned on those very objectives, the members said they felt that "there is not enough time to take that kind of commitment."

3.6.3 Social Welfare Committee (SWC). Origin and History. In 1978, an SWC was initiated on the suggestion of the ACDO, operating from Sefhare (23 km east). The function of this committee was to distribute drought relief food to the needy in the community. A committee of five executives was immediately elected in **kgotla** which in turn co-opted five additional members. The ACDO was to come and train this new committee in their work. But she came only once in 1980 to inform the community that food was on the way.

Later in the same year 72 bags of maize seeds were delivered to the community. Since the AD is based in Chadibe (30 km east) the seeds were put at the healthpost by the VDC secretary and later distributed to the farmers by VDC in presence of the SWC's vice-secretary. The SWC's chairman later reported his deep dissatisfaction at having been bypassed and accused the VDC of taking over the SWC's duties and responsibilities. Since then the SWC became disinterested and collapsed.

Problems.

(1) Evidently this institution collapsed because of duplication of roles between VDC and SWC and because of the intervention by the VDC without consulting the officers elected in **kgotla**.

(2) More significant has been the lack of training and extension support which resulted in many misunderstandings over the roles and duties of the organization and the various executives. The chairman, for example, expected the secretary to keep both money and records.

(3) SWC members also complained that they had been elected in haste and forced by the **kgotla** decision to take office without their knowing exactly what duties and functions the committee was to perform.

3.6.4 "Mabeleapudi" 4B Club. Origin and History. The 4B Club was introduced in 1971 on the recommendation of the 4B Officer during one of his visits to the Tswapong area. Initially people were rather skeptical and Chief Lechaina rather suspicious, feeling that his authority might by undermined by all the new organizations emerging in his village. Yet, the chief gave the

green light to the 4B leaders, although he did not attend their meetings. The same year a committee of four executives was elected and started with a group of 25 schoolchildren producing woodwork and knitting items.

When Mr. Moloi, founder and key leader of the club, was transferred to Bobonong, the 4B Club considerably declined, until 1979 when he was reappointed to Moshopa. He then revived it with increased experience gained from courses he had attended at MRTC and Selebi Phikwe.

Status. The current status of Mabeleapudi 4B Club looks promising. The club produced a number of crochet, knitting, and sewing articles that won prizes at the Sefhare Show in 1980. The boys make furniture, tools, and wood carvings sold locally. From sales and concerts the club raised P22.35.

4B training reaches beyond school boundaries. Leaders are sent regularly to MRTC to attend 4B management courses and, in the mind of the leaders, "4B must become a broader village institution supported by all parents." To that end, 4B leaders organize information campaigns on 4B in the community and encourage parents to attend courses and 4B activities. The club intends to organize a 4B show for Moshopa residents only. This appears to be the most effective way to inform the community about the roles and benefits of 4B. The club also plans to mold bricks for the new school kitchen and find a suitable site for horticulture. Finally, the club intends to increase and diversify club activities, e.g., send a few candidates to courses in photography and have them teach other members how to operate a camera.

Problems.

(1) Lack of water on the school compound and lack of funds to buy a fence have consistently prevented the club from starting their vegetable-gardening project.

(2) Lack of support from the head teacher is another chronic problem. The head teacher was said never to attend 4B meetings and to show very little interest in the performance and progress of the 4B Club. Use of classrooms for club activities was said to be often refused for arbitrary reasons, such as "children make too much noise." (See also PTA problems, **3.6.1**; BCW, **3.6.2**; and VDC, **3.7.2.4.**)

(3) Finally, the club receives little support from the chief and other institutions because none of them clearly understand the role and objectives of 4B Clubs, or perceive the club to be a threatening competitor (BCW).

3.7 Moshopa Coordinating Committees

3.7.1 Farmers Committee (FC). Origin. The AD first attempted to establish an FC in Moshopa in 1972. A committee of five members was elected but during seven years little progress was made because of the general suspicion of the farming community about adopting innovations such as using planters, dehorning, castrating, etc. When the AD was transferred in 1979, the FCE remained idle.

Status. This committee is currently symbolic. No elections have been held since 1972. It never meets, no project has yet been initiated, and it has no bylaws. Cash available to date amounts to 75t. The AD had suggested raising funds in order to buy record books. However, nothing was recorded on those books and no additional funds collected.

Problems.

(1) The lack of clear understanding of rule, objectives, and operations of an FC and the premature departure of the AD left the FC at a standstill.

(2) The FC did not develop the necessary management skills.

(3) Lack of expertise from FC members and general suspicion of the farming community prevented progress.

3.7.2 Moshopa Village Development Committee. Origin and History. Moshopa has had three consecutive VDCs, as follows.

(1) First VDC (1966-1974). Even though VDCs were officially introduced by the government in 1968, Moshopa had a very similar institution in 1966. Concerned with the increasing number of schoolchildren, Chief Lechaina and Moshopa residents felt the need to have their own school in the village, instead of sending their children to Sefhare, 21 km away. The Education Officer suggested they form a committee and articulate their need to the Council. The application was filed in 1968 and roofing material and builders were sent to build the new school. The community molded the bricks and paid half of the builder's salary. In 1972, the treasurer's house burned down with all books, records, and funds.

(2) Second VDC (1974-1979). On 28 July 1974, a new committee of five members was elected. This VDC managed to raise enough funds to build the AD's quarters (two roundavels). However, it was soon discovered that community funds were misused, and the VDC lost the trust and cooperation of the residents. Under heavy pressure, the committee finally brought all books and funds (P188.00) to the village **kgotla** and resigned. Before leaving, the VDC felt it legitimate to take out an additional P127.00 to cover their traveling expenses to the installation of Chief Ian Khama in Serowe. Since there was another P50.00 still to be paid on the AD's quarters, the incoming committee was left with P11.00 in cash.

(3) Third Committee (1979+). The current VDC was elected on 6 June 1979 and is composed of five executive members, five additional members, four **ex-officio** members (ACDO, chief, and two Councillors), and one co-opted member (FWE, the only extension worker based in the community). No teacher was co-opted for the reasons already described above (see PTA, **Problems, 3.6.1**).

A striking feature of this VDC is that the three major executives are close relatives of the chief. VDC executives chosen among chief's relatives were found to command greater authority and respect in the community and to be in a better position to recover the funds apparently misused by the previous VDC.

Self-Help. As in other communities, the concept of self-help (**ipelegeng**) is generally well understood and as many put it: "It is the only way to survive." Yet, when self-help is associated with VDC or other government programs, confusion results.

Such confusion appears to arise from the fact that many programs such as AE10, LG17, SLOCA, Drought-Relief, and Labor-Intensive programs are commonly referred to as "self-help." Yet, they require only a small self-help component in order to establish eligibility for subsidies. Thus, in the mind of many rural dwellers, self-help has now become associated with subsidies and when a pure self-help project (**ipelegeng**) is attempted, the participants expect to be paid.

VDC Status. The current Moshopa VDC is inactive. Since January 1981, the committee met twice, once to enter funds in their books, and a second time to discuss the possibility of building **kgotla** offices. According to the records, the total attendance never exceeded five members.

No project has been implemented under the current VDC. Planned projects include building **kgotla** offices. Offices are felt to be a more appropriate place to keep funds and records, and with new offices the VDC believes they could have their own tribal policeman and handle their own court cases instead of referring them to the Tribal Authority Chief in Sefhare. A second potential project is building public latrines at the **kgotla**, when funds are available.

VDC's cash balance amounts to P216.00. VDC's income is raised from party fees. Anyone organizing a beer party is requested to pay the VDC P1.00 (60t contributed by the host, and 40t by the music men). In 1980, 60 parties were registered, and 70 between January and July 1981. In addition, VDC envisages organizing concerts during the summer months, when the number of beer parties generally decreases because grain reserves are very low or exhausted.

On several occasions, VDC requested the chief to call a **kgotla** meeting in order to report on VDC activities. The chief, however, never complied with the request and avoids VDC meetings. It was reported that the chief and other headmen were implicated in the missing-funds affair, and, since 11 October 1979, the chief has completely withdrawn from VDC activities.

VDC Performance. The same interviews and survey were conducted in Moshopa as in Kgagodi (see above **3.4.2.6** and **3.4.2.6**) which revealed the following problems:

1. **Problems Perceived by Executives.** The legacy left by the second VDC puts the current committee in a difficult position until trust and credibility can be regained in the community.

   The executive acknowledged not understanding the role, functions, and operations of the VDC and complained about having no one to train and guide them. For the first time, in July 1981, they actually saw the **"VDC Handbook."** The ACDO was said to have visited the community four times in 1980.

The chief was reported to be a major problem in the community because of his basic lack of knowledge about the role and objectives of modern institutions, his failure to hold meetings as promised, and his lack of determination in defending community interests. He was said to often leave meetings in session and hide in a **"shebeen"*** without explanation and, in a meeting called for VDC in 1978, to have heard court cases instead.

2. **Problems Perceived by Community Leaders.** The seven institutions' leaders interviewed are unanimous in saying that Moshopa VDC is only symbolic. Among common criticisms mentioned were:

   - poor understanding of role and VDC operations;
   - poor meeting attendance among VDC members themselves;
   - no concrete projects implemented with community funds;
   - lack of self-involvement in the community;
   - reluctance to seek advice from other community leaders.

   Two solutions for improvement were suggested: (a) VDC should tackle its own committee problems first, in order to help others; (b) VDC should discuss relevant problems with the intention of achieving results.

3. **Performance Perceived by the Community.** A random interview of ten families per **kgotla** (ward) revealed that out of fifty-five families:

   - 62 percent were not consulted in any way on VDC planning;
   - 40 percent did not know the role of a VDC;
   - 79 percent have realistic expectations of their VDC;
   - 76 percent consider self-help (**ipelegeng**) activities important (but not because of VDC);
   - 89 percent are ready to participate in self-help (**ipelegeng**) activities;
   - 44 percent suggest improvements;
   - 53 percent do not know how to improve it.

3.8 Sajwe Fencing Group (FG)

3.8.1 Background. Sajwe farmers include 37 original families from Goseetsho Ward in Serowe (see above, **2.5**) who plow together in Sajwe lands north of Morupule Colliery, 42 km northeast of Serowe (**fig 1**). Traditionally, it was customary to plow together in the same area as a **kgotla** (ward). Seetsho people initially plowed around Swaneng Hill (Serowe). Because the soil was poor in Swaneng, they requested permission from Chief Tshekedi Khama in

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* Local unregistered "bar," usually in a private house.

1947 to plow in Sajwe. Ever since Seetsho people have been plowing in Sajwe lands.

3.8.2 Origin and Membership. Because of increasing crop damage, Sajwe farmers thought of fencing their lands as early as 1975, before fencing groups were officially promoted. On the advice of the AD, who arrived in 1976, the first consultations were initiated with Sajwe farmers. TGLP radio programs and additional visits to Mmapashalala fence convinced the Sajwe community to form a fencing group.

A first committee was elected in 1976 composed of 14 executive members. Currently the FG includes a total of 72 family units.

3.8.3 Group Status. Bylaws were completed in 1978. Membership fees were set at P100.000 or 1 head of cattle per male adult (18 years and over) and P20.00 in cash or the equivalent in kind for female members. To date the group has raised P1,616.15 in cash from fees and beer parties, and received 8 gates and 16 rolls of wire (P965.85) from AE10 subsidies. In early 1979, the group applied to SLB and the project was surveyed and approved in June 1979.

3.8.4 Project Description and Progress. **Figure 7** compares the initial project with recent fencing modifications. **Figure 8** summarizes current fencing progress.

The Sajwe fence is no longer a small enclosure, as initially planned, but will join the proposed Hulwane fences (currently waiting for SLB approval) west from Sajwe lands. In addition, the north and southeast corners have been extended so as to include two additional fields.

Figure 8 shows that the total fence measures 15.75 km, of which 4 km have been completed with five strands of steel wire and five gates. Four kilometers have been cleared and another 7.5 km still are to be cleared.

Group Organization and Management. Sajwe farmers form a small homogeneous group bound by traditional **kgotla** ties, which operates very much as a large family. While the executive committee is reelected every year, the general membership is considered to be the advisory body and every member has regular input in group meetings held twice monthly or when needs arise.

The FG does not relate to any coordinating committee (FC or VDC) but manages itself, with the advice and support of the AD. The chair and secretary, both female members, are the "cornerstones" who maintain cohesion, impetus, and leadership in the group. Successful group management appears to stem primarily from the leadership qualities of these two members.

The chair who is 57 years old and completed Standard 2 in 1942, was said to be much respected partly because of her high rank (second-top) in the United Congregational Church of South Africa (UCCSA), partly because of her patience, respect of every member's work and ideas, her initiative and tenacity. Others attributed her authority to the fact that one of her sons is DAO in Serowe or to her wealth. The secretary, who is 30 years old and completed Standard 7, is also known for her conscientiousness and tenacity.

Figure 7. Map of Sajwe Group Fence: Proposed Fence and Current Development





Figure 8. Map of Sajwe Group Fence: Current Status (Dec 1981)



The group itself does not divide into subsections but distributes the work according to every member's ability. Thus, the older members will be given holes to dig, the fitter ones cut poles, while women clear branches or help with the wiring. Project implementation is supervised by two skilled members.

Beside their physical participation in the project, women's most significant contribution relates to fund-raising. Beer parties are organized once a month by every family in turn, raffles are organized for both children and adults with sugar and tea prizes, and Mophane worms and thatching grass are collected for sale. All of these activities are organized by women and the profit goes to the FG's treasury. In December 1981, the average profit for raffles amounted to P10 (children) and P24.00 (adults) per raffle and the total profit raised with those methods amounted to P649.50.

The FG also devised means to enforce its bylaws. If younger members, for example, do not participate in the project as expected, they can be punished with two lashes and older members can be fined P40.00. If a member plowing in the protected area never participates, upon completion of the fence he will be fined two cattle or his harvest confiscated until a set value is regained. Corporal punishment has been administered during group meetings in the presence of Chief Ramojababo and at least two P40.00 fines had been paid for that year.

Problems.

(1) A number of group members are reluctant to pay their membership fees, either because those fees are believed to be too high (P100.00) or because they still doubt the ultimate benefit of the project.

(2) Without consulting the FG, Palapye SLB reallocated one plot in the protected area to a group member. The new owner and the group as a whole expect further problems with the original owner.

(3) The FG also faces the problem of integrating farmers into the fencing projects (both Sajwe and adjacent ones) who privately applied for land in those areas to be fenced and who were not necessarily aware of nor prepared to join in group ventures.

(4) The FG also faced boundary disputes in the eastern section between Sajwe and Dikabeya FG (now settled).

3.9 Maape Community

Maape is the only community under study in which no local institution has yet developed.

Maape is a widely scattered community where 34 percent of the residents live permanently at the lands, and there is virtually no remote cattlepost. The essential reason for dispersion appears to be the long history of internal leadership competition (2.4) which still persists, and the failure of maintaining the village borehole in operating condition. Some of those issues and other complex land use problems relating more directly to district institutions are presented in subsequent case studies (see below 5.3.4).

In addition, Maape is fairly isolated between Pilikwe and Ramokgonami with no public transport, and the extension staff covering the area operate out of Ramokgonami, 15 km to the east.

3.10 Extension

3.10.1 Staff Inventory. The following field staff work in the study villages:

Kgagodi: 1 ACDO, 1 AD, 1 FWE, 1 VA;

Moshopa: 1 FWE (ACDO and AD operating, respectively, from Sefhare (21 km) and Chadibe (30 km);

Maape: 0 (attended by Ramokgonami staff, 16 km);

Sajwe: 0 (AD operates from Serowe, 42 km).

3.10.2 Village Extension Team (VET). Only Kgagodi is in a position to organize a VET. This was attempted in 1980 in order to promote better cooperation between local village institutions and provide advice on village development to the VDC.

This VET, however, never operated and met only once in 1980 to discuss the idea of forming a team. Despite repeated attempts from the AD and ACDO to call subsequent meetings, the VET never managed to meet again.

Problems.

(1) One major problem of this VET appears to be the basic lack of understanding of a team approach to extension work.

(2) This problem seems to arise from the fact that each extension worker is directly accountable to different ministries, each with its own programs and priorities that are not coordinated nor integrated at any level (center, district, or village).

(3) As a result, the field staff's first duty tends to be satisfying his/her own department, with common community work as a very secondary priority.

(4) This problem is further reinforced by the fact that extension workers are not accountable to any village-based institution. This situation not only undermines the field staff's motivation to meet local needs, but also encourages lack of coordinated extension at the village level and reinforces direct accountability to respective departments which ultimately control both salaries and promotions.

As a result, the VET concept still remains a rather theoretical approach in many communities which receive little commitment from field workers.*

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* A detailed analysis and discussion of some of those extension problems have been presented in other reports. Consult L. Fortmann, "Improving Village-Based Extension Services in Botswana" ([Gaborone] : October 1982).

3.10.3 Extension Staff. Although no formal measure of effectiveness was used to evaluate extension staff, interviews and observations revealed considerable differences in their performances.

Observations. The first general observation was the degree of remoteness of most extension workers from rural dwellers. Their basic attitude is to wait for residents to knock on their door rather than to go to the people. The Moshopa VDC, for example, reported to have been visited four times by their ACDO in 1980, and no visit at all was recalled in Maapa. (See also **3.3.3** and **3.4.1.**)

Extension staff do not seem to possess the rudimentary skills of community development and communication nor the group processes and basic adult education techniques necessary to perform community work. In addition, some look down upon, adversely label, or considerably underestimate the ability of rural people.

Problems. In addition to the fundamental problems mentioned under VET **(3.10.2)**, extension staff face a number of logistical and administrative problems in their own extension areas.

(1) The size of extension areas (ACDO in particular) is unmanageable. Most ACDOs are expected to cover two to four agricultural extension areas without means of transportation.

(2) Because the various extension areas do not coincide, the overall coordination of extension remains difficult.

(3) Because of vacancies, some ADs have to cover up to three extension areas (Moshopa).

(4) In-service training is minimal. AD monthly meetings, for example, are usually spent on general information update and progress reports on logistical problems in district or region. Actual extension training workshops for either ACDOs or ADs rarely amount to two per year.

(5) Guidance and supervision are inadequate.

3.11 Problems of Modern Institutions--A Summary

The performance of modern institutions in these communities reveals numerous and quite diverse problems. Some relate to environmental conditions in the area, others to lack of support and group skills, others to institutions based outside those communities. While some of the problems can be generalized to all modern institutions, others are more specifically related to coordinating committees or government institutions.

3.11.1 General Problems. Water and Disease. Lack of both domestic and livestock water in Kgagodi reduces the performance of virtually all groups/institutions in the community (see above, FG, PTA, 4B). Farmers spend much time trekking their cattle to a neighboring borehole (15 km) or drawing water from wells; domestic water is currently drawn from a borehole, 4 km north of

the village (see case study, **5.3.4**). Foot-and-mouth disease, in addition, was reported to add a further constraint directly affecting group financial contributions. Thus, the heavy work involved in securing domestic and livestock water, combined with foot-and-mouth disease, leaves the majority of Kgagodi residents with little time or money for group or other productive activities. Foot-and-mouth disease also was reported to be an additional constraint affecting financial group contributions (Kgagodi: tick control group, small-stock group).

Group Skills and Group Management Problems. The majority of modern institutions, including coordinating committees, lack the basic skills to operate and function as a group.

- A number of them were formed on the spot without adequate information on objectives and purpose of their institution (Moshopa: SWC, 4B, Kgagodi, SWC).
- As a result many of them duplicate roles and compete with each other for projects and fund-raising (PTAs/VDCs; SWCs/BCWs; 4Bs/BCWs).
- Most executive committees show little ability to work as a group and lack basic administrative skills, i.e., records/bookkeeping; lack of understanding of specific roles and duties of respective officers; information, consultation, planning, decision-making, and evaluation processes; group management and supervision (BCWs, SWCs, PTAs, and Kgagodi FG Committee).

Training and Support. Three out of four communities under study lack adequate extension staff (**3.10.1**). No extension worker is yet based in Maape. Only one FWE operated in Moshopa from 1979 to 1982, and staff support provided from neighboring villages was found quite insufficient (see Moshopa: SWC, FC, Maape).

In Kgagodi, a well-staffed community (five extension agents including the HT), no ongoing training for any group/institution is planned except by the FWE.

Finally, all 4B clubs under study and some PTAs receive little support and encouragement from their head teachers (see: 4B, Kgagodi and Moshopa; and PTA, Moshopa) and also little response from traditional chiefs because of their basic lack of understanding of objectives, role, and operations of those institutions.

3.11.2 Specific Problems. Coordinating committees (FCs and VDCs), in addition to the constraints listed above, also face problems related to their specific role and purpose.

(1) **Coordination and Management.** These committees are not performing their coordinating role. No village plans are being designed and no local institutions coordinated. The surveys conducted in Kgagodi and Moshopa (**3.4.2** and **3.7.2**) clearly show that: very few residents have realistic expectations of their VDC; the majority of them are not informed of its activities and find VDC projects do not meet their needs; and a large majority suggest improvements.

(2) **Lack of Community Representation.** The current Moshopa VDC was elected on the basis of traditional influences and status (3.7.2) and expects to "rule" other institutions without involving themselves in project implementation (3.7.2).

Kgagodi projects are identified by VDC behind closed doors and then brought to the chief and community for approval. Kgagodi VDC was further said to select projects that improve its own "self-image" rather than the living standards of the community (3.4.2).

Finally, some VDCs tend to be used as political fora by local Councillors (see Kgagodi, Central VDC, 3.4.2) in which participation of extension staff and the community at large are deliberately excluded (3.4.2).

3.11.3 **Problems Related to Government Institutions.** Government institutions include both outside bodies such as Subordinate Land Boards and extension staff based in the communities. Further problems relating to other Council agencies and decision-makers are discussed more extensively in the **Resource Management** section of the report.

Extension Staff. Extension staff face a number of problems of their own which bear directly on the performance of local institutions.

(1) Lack of coordination of extension efforts at the center discourages the formation of effective VETs and reinforces direct accountability of field workers to departments and ministries that themselves are not coordinated (3.11.2).

(2) The lack of accountability to any village-based institutions (VDCs/FDs) undermines field staff motivation and discourages coordinated extension at the local level.

(3) Extension workers tend to be divorced from rural communities and are not equipped to perform community work (3.10.3)

(4) Vacancies and considerable variation in size of extension areas make coordination of extension difficult or unmanageable (e.g., ACDOs).

(5) In-service training and supervision are inadequate.

Subordinate Land Boards (SLB). All three fencing groups studied encountered problems with their SLB. Allocation procedures in Kgagodi inhibit general participation in fencing. Sajwe FG faces problems of land reallocation in the fenced area, and both Moshopa and Sajwe FGs have or had boundary problems with their projects (see also below, 5.3.4 and 6.6).

3.12 Analysis and Recommendations

This inquiry has described a variety of local groups/institutions, most of which are dysfunctional because objectives are poorly understood and basic skills to perform group activities have not been developed.

Coordinating committees, whose primary responsibility is to plan and coordinate local development, ignore their specific role, tend to operate in isolation, and compete with traditional authority for control and leadership.

Finally, the mining labor force, an important segment of those communities, is almost invariably left out of community consultation and planning.

Several factors appear to influence the low performance of local institutions.

3.12.1 Creation of Local Institutions. A number of voluntary institutions emerge under the influence of dedicated members from neighboring village institutions; a good number of others are introduced as part of government policy and development strategy (VDCs, FC, VHCs, agricultural groups) by various government officers, each of whom presents the advantages and benefits of his/her organization/project to the community.*

In addition to the fact that each preaches for his/her own program in isolation from his/her colleagues, the typical extension-talk approach of government officers conveys some sense of obligation on the part of the villagers to initiate committees because of the official character of the message. As a result, a flurry of groups, committees, and institutions emerge in rural communities. Only a few of them are actually established out of a genuine assessment of community needs performed with and by communities.

3.12.2 Group and Management Skills. In order to become functional and viable, groups must first meet real, felt needs in the community. Second, a number of group and management skills are necessary to enable the group to perform group activities and operate as a group. These include:

- group consultation techniques: i.e., how to organize and run meetings; how to consult among group members, between the group and the **kgotla**, between the group and the community at large.

- group decision-making techniques: i.e., how to take group decisions; how to formulate those decisions and resolutions;

- organizational skills: i.e., how to make agendas, calendars of events; how to keep and use records, minutes, and financial books;

- planning and management techniques: i.e., how to plan group activities; how to set group objectives; how to divide, implement, and supervise group activities; how to evaluate performance; how to deal with dissident members; and how to enforce group decisions.

None of these skills is automatically given by simply appointing committees or electing them in a **kgotla** meeting. Management skills develop from

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* A number of district and Council officers currently are of the opinion that it is their duty to "appoint VDCs" (CFDA meeting, 16 February 1983).

practical experience and long-standing training support. For this reason the formation of a few functional groups has the special advantage of being an informal **ad hoc** form of organization, allowing time for trial and error during which the group can rise and grow before solidifying into formal organization. When a formal organization does emerge, it is more likely to be appropriate to its tasks than if a formal organization were set up in the beginning (e.g., current VDCs, FGs). This sequence allows the forms of community organization to grow out of their functions.

Thus, coordinating committees (VDCs or FCs) which are expected to perform a rather complex level of management, are more likely to become functional if they emerge from simple groups and voluntary institutions that are themselves functional and operating effectively at their own levels. From successful groups a number of members with management experience and new skills emerges and can then undertake more complex management tasks (e.g., VDC or FC) while group management can then be delegated to other members. This process, however, requires cumulative training as both the management complexity and the number of managers increase.

3.12.3 Training Support and Follow-Up. Absence of ongoing training and follow-up is one of the most crucial problems directly affecting low performance of local institutions. The only input received by a number of local committees is the brief general introduction given at the village **kgotla** at the time of elections. Elections then commonly take place without general preparation, consultation, or active participation of the community, except for a meeting notice. Then, if anything happens at all, it is usually a sporadic and **ad hoc** kind of assistance, most often provided in times of crisis.

This state of affairs raises serious questions about both the kind of extension approach taught to extension cadres and the general appropriateness of their training.

3.12.4 Recommendations. In the light of the above problems and analysis of local institutions, it is recommended that:

Creation of Local Institutions.

Where no VDC has been introduced.

(1) Extension workers, more specifically ACDOs, first identify and promote, through careful needs assessment with the active participation of the residents, one or two groups/institutions best tailored to community needs, and then devote as much effort on extending group and management skills (as defined in **3.12.2**) as on providing technical input, using <u>A Handbook for Facilitators</u> (J. Stanley, K. Rick, and F. Zufferey, 1983) or other appropriate material.

(2) When such groups/institutions have proved viable, the ACDO in collaboration with other extension agents cautiously introduces in the community the concept of VDC by launching widespread information campaigns to explain the roles and objectives of a VDC to the community at large.

(3) Such training be performed with appropriate nonformal adult education techniques and appropriate media, e.g., popular theater, community rallies, posters and other visual aids, study groups, role playing, etc., instead of lectures by the ACDO.

(4) VDC elections be held only when the residents have acquired sufficient understanding of roles, objectives, and operations of their VDC, so as to elect appropriate members.

Where VDCs and FCs have already been introduced:

(5) Peripheral, dysfunctional, and nonoperational institutions be left alone and extension efforts concentrate only on those few institutions identified by careful community needs assessment that are highly valued and meet real needs of the residents and offer the best potential for simultaneous development of group skills and group management.

(6) The ACDOs, in collaboration with other extension workers, give priority to creating general community awareness of the roles and objectives of the VDC, as recommended in (1) and (2) above, and ensure that chiefs are included in that training.

(7) Once community-wide knowledge has been established, new VDCs be elected with full participation of community residents.

(8) The ACDO concentrate on extending group and management skills (as defined in **3.12.2**) and design ongoing training programs for improving VDC operations as appropriate.

(9) Ongoing training emphasize to VDC members the representative nature of their position and the fact that they are ultimately accountable to the community at large.

(10) The ACDO, in collaboration with other extension workers, organizes similar information and consultation sessions for migrants as appropriate and encourages the VDC to include representatives of that segment of the community.

Extension at the Center.

(11) The Rural Extension Coordinating Committee (RECC) facilitates and takes active measures to ensure coordination of extension efforts among various departments and ministries involved (**3.10.2**) by:

- including VET duties in the job description of extension cadres;
- requiring regular reports of cooperative projects from each extension cadre;
- requiring regular VET meetings;
- requiring district/national supervisors to visit the VETs as a team at least once a year.

(12) RECC become the recognized forum for joint extension planning by:

- requesting the departments/ministries involved to circulate their annual plans to each other and to RECC;
- drawing a single integrated plan from various department plans and ensuring its implementation and supervision.

(13) RECC investigate, design, and promote the necessary mechanisms also to make extension staff accountable to local VDCs for their work and performance.

(14) An internal evaluation of the S&CD Division be conducted and the division's specific role in extension be redefined in function of the recommendations presented in several Institutions Research reports.

(15) That both S&CD and the Department of Field Services (MoA) in collaboration with districts and regions study the possibility of reducing the size of extension areas and have those of the different cadres coincide as much as possible.

Extension Training.

(16) Extension training for both ACDOs and ADs emphasize working with rural people along the line of their interests and needs, particularly those related to improving livelihood, physical level of living, and community welfare.

(17) Extension training curriculum be seriously revised and some of the following elements possibly included:

- group planning, consultation, meetings, workshops, and participatory techniques;
- effective use of subject and result demonstrations;
- effective use of adult education complementary supporting activities such as: relevant technical support, formulation of work plans, preparation of calendar of events, planning for committees' in-service training, evaluation processes of group/project activities.
- familiarization with informal training techniques, e.g., popular theater, exhibits, tours, use of media.

(18) For appropriate subjects, extension workers be trained together at BAC and the importance of teamwork in extension be emphasized.

Part II

Resource Management: Inventory, Characteristics, and Problems

4. The Resource Base

4.1 Introduction

The predominant resources available in these communities are land, water, and livestock. This section first gives a brief population profile of the communities and describes the resources identified.

4.2 Community Characteristics and Definition

Most communities of eastern Botswana normally include a village residential area, an adjacent arable lands area, and a number of cattleposts, either adjacent to villages or arable lands or in more remote areas. Except for Sajwe, which is not a village community as such, but a group plowing in Serowe lands, the term "community" refers hereafter to all three locations. Agricultural data, on the other hand, were collected only for lands areas being fenced, excluding cattlepost "gardens" (see above, 3.2.1, fn).

4.3 Population Profile

From August to October 1980, a community census was conducted in each community including lands and cattlepost areas in order to establish landownership and population living permanently in the communities. Dependent schoolchildren studying outside the communities were also included in the figures. Table 2 (following page) summarizes these findings and compares them with the 1981 Population Census figures for villages and their associated areas combined.

4.4 Land and Water Sources Inventory

Arable lands with related fencing projects are shown in relation to grazing areas and water sources for each community, respectively, in figures 9-12. In addition, an index following each figure presents characteristics, ownership, and usage of each water source identified.

4.5 Arable Land Characteristics

The figures show that arable lands appear as fairly homogeneous islands of land in the middle of grazing areas and, in most cases, are located close to the village residential area. This appears to be the result of the traditional land allocation pattern, when land was allocated by local chiefs and plowed by wards (see 3.8.7 and 5.2).

The maps also illustrate the current Central District trend toward communally fenced arable lands. Since arable areas still are fairly well demarcated (at least traditionally), communities find it easier to fence the whole village lands area at once rather than to fence individually.

TABLE 2

Permanent Population Profile

	TOTAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS OCTOBER 1980 (community census)	VILLAGE AND ASSOCIATED AREAS[a] TOTAL (1981 Census figures)
Sajwe fencing group	543	-
Kgagodi	1,447	1,656
Moshopa	1,556	1,619
Maape	1,173	1,078

[a] Differences appear to result from the fact that "associated areas" seem to have been associated by the Census on a geographical basis for census purposes and, therefore, include enumerated people who do not necessarily belong to those communities (e.g., Mokgoana, E.A. 20 included in Moshopa or Serule borehole; E.A. 90 included in Kgagodi).

For the 1980/81 agricultural season, the area plowed inside the fences was 158 ha for Sajwe, 446 ha for Kgagodi, and 639 ha for Moshopa, representing a respective average of 2.5, 3.3, and 3.5 ha per farm, with respective total yield averages of 0.19, 0.12, and 0.14 tons of total crops per hectare. For the same season, crop damage was reported in 55 percent of the farms in Sajwe, 40 percent in Kgagodi, and 58 percent in Moshopa (cf Zufferey 1982, for greater detail).

4.6 Grazing Land Characteristics

The pastures, in contrast, surround the arable lands and are used on a commonage basis predominantly with either the neighboring villagers, adjacent cattlepost dwellers, or both. However, farmers from other areas also can, in agreement with the local residents, share those grazing resources. In the four communities studied, the following grazing practices were observed.

In **Sajwe** (fig 9), within a radius of approximately 45 km, pastures situated north of the fence are predominantly shared with Phikwe and Letshana communities; in the east by Palapye and Dikabeya; in the south by Palapye and Bikwe; and in the western section by Hulwane and Botepetepe lands areas.

In **Moshopa** (fig 11), a similar practice is followed with the difference that pastures immediately adjacent to arable lands areas are predominantly used by the farmers plowing those lands and other farmers from adjacent communities. Thus, for example, farmers plowing in Dipudi lands predominantly pasture their herds immediately across the fence section protecting Dipudi lands and share southeastern grazing areas (e.g., Motshwerekgomo, Mokoane, Morukutshwane, Mapye) with both their neighboring section (Kolomajwe) and Maifhala

Figure 9. Map of Sajwe Fence and Water Sources




Figure 10. Kgagodi Proposed Fence: Lands Area + Water Sources




Figure 11. Map of Moshopa Drift Fence, Land and Water Sources




Figure 12. Map of Maape Village (Control): Lands Areas and Water Sources




Table 3

SAJWE WATER SOURCES INDEX

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
1	Bojalekudu	d	"pr"*	b	all year	1979	dam-group
2	G. Mosiakgomo's	w	pr	b	all year	1940	s
3	Musi's	w	pr	b	all year	1935	s
4	Sianang's	w	pr	N/A	N/A	1948	s (not maintained)
5	Daju	bh	co	b	all year	1948	C
6	L. Mosiakgomo's	w	pr	b	Dec	1852	s

* Restricted to group members only.

Table 4

KGAGODI WATER SOURCES INDEX

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
-	Kgagodi B/H	bh	co	d	all year	1970	C
1	Molaudi	p	co	b	Nov-Apr/Jul	-	-
2	Mmachete	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
3	Bula's	d	pr	d	Nov-Apr	1973	s
4	Sepoke	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
5	Mabolane	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
6	Morotologa	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
7	Mmanotunkelo	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
8	Ntapa	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
9	Moralana	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
10	Mohibidu	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
11	Mmadikeledi	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
12	Mmampswe	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
13	Rasegojwa	p	co	l	Nov-Apr/Jul	-	-
14	Mmaesepele	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
15	Jeoffrey's	w	pr	(? lives in Maunatlala)			
16	Mosu	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
17	Dokgoropana	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
18	Mpane	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
19	Dikgoropa (1)	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
20	Sekgoropana	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
21	Manwana	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
22	Dikgoropa (2)	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
23	Monpati	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
24	Mokoba	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
25	Keikanne	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-

[continued]

[Table 4, Kgagodi Water Sources Index, cont.]

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
26	Makoobiditse	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
27	Nobe's	w	pr	l	all year	±1920	s
28	Mosukuki's	d	pr	b	Nov-Jul	1968	s
29	Kakana's	d	pr	b	Nov-Apr	1973	s
30	Otsile's	d	pr	b	Nov-Apr	1974	s
31	Kgomotso's	d	pr	b	Nov-Apr	1972	s
32	Motshere's	d	pr	b	Nov-Apr	1972	s
33	Mhata	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
34	Mmota	p	co	l	Nov-Apr	-	-
35	Noge's	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
36	Rakelapile	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
37	Mmabotswana	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-
38	Mokweba	p	co	b	Nov-Apr	-	-

39 includes a series of 18 private chain wells on both sides of the road going to Mogapinyana north of the village past the healthpost on the western side of the river (Tshokana). These wells belong, respectively, to: B. Sephako, Moseki, Senata Mogapi, K. Monakane, S. Pharabatho, G. Kolonyane, E. Monthe, M. Palalo, K. Lesolame, K. Dichaba, O. Mmopi, L. Magwaneng, T. Mapulane, O. Mosweu, K. Morupise, K. Tebogo, K. Mokalake, Malokoane.

40 includes 6 private chain wells on the eastern side of the Tshokana River (Mogapinyana): Kekgethile, Sekomile, Masheleng, Motsamai, Makolo, Billie.

Note: Those wells are domestic wells and were dug around 1945 and are used throughout the year. Some, however, are also used for livestock. Prices vary from well to well according to the number of stock and range from 1 beast/year to 1 goat for 8 cattle.

Except for Malokoane's well (Kgosing well), most others are salty and few people actually buy water for livestock. Further details, uncertain.

Table 5

MOSHOPA WATER SOURCES INDEX

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
1	Nokaennye	w	co	b	all year	±1920	village
2	Nokaetona	w	co	b	all year	±1920	village
3	Village	bh	co	d	all year	1965	C
4	Village	w	co	b	all year	1968	village
5	Makhiba	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
6	Ramagorwe	p	co	l	Dec	-	-
7	Mapye	p	co	l	Dec-Feb	-	-
8	Morukutshwane	p	co	l	Dec-Feb	-	-
9	Mamalotwana (l)	p	co	l	Dec-Jan	-	-
10	Obonetse's	d	pr	d	Dec-Apr	1974	s
11	Gakemoitse's	d	pr	d	Dec-Apr	1973	s
12	Seboko's	d	pr	d	Dec-Apr	1972	s
13	Kolomajwe	p	co	b	Oct-Jul	-	-
14	Digkama's	p	co	l	Dec	-	-
15	Gatalaphiri	p	co	l	Dec-Feb	-	-

[continued]

[Table 5, Moshopa Water Sources Index, cont.]

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
16	Radinonyane	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
17	Lekgarapana	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
18	Malekgala	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
19	Dinoipana	p	co	b	Dec-Mar	-	-
20	Modise	p	co	b	Dec-Jan	-	-
21	Moralana	p	co	b	Dec-Mar	-	-
22	Ramotlhokakobo	p	co	b	Dec-Mar	-	-
23	Mamalotwana (2)	p	co	b	Dec-Mar	-	-
24	Dingope	w	co	b	Dec-Apr	1962	Dingope farmers
25	Mosola's	d	pr	d	Oct-Jul	1974	s
26	Motate	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
27	Mpyane	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
28	Dingope	d	(applied for by Dingope group, not built yet)				
29	Sileji	p	co	d	Dec-Feb	-	-
30	Sesakajwe	p	co	d	Dec-Feb	-	-
31	Moloi	p	co	b	Dec-Mar	-	-

Table 6

MAAPE WATER SOURCES INDEX

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
1	Makekelete	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
2	Ditlhojane	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
3	Malegapa	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
4	Gasonoki	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
5	Dinku	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
6	Digana	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
7	Moswe	p	co	l	Dec	-	-
8	Makobana	p	co	l	1 week	-	-
9	Ramonabe	p	co	b	Dec-Jan	-	-
10	Khudaga	p	co	b	Dec-Jan	-	-
11	Sesa	p	co	b	Dec-Jan	-	-
12	Tadi	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
13	Mosu	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
14	Masukusu	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
15	Lenganang	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
16	Phibedu	p	co	l	Dec-Jan	-	-
17	Molato (1)	p	co	l	Dec-Jan	-	-
18	Molato (2)	p	co	l	Dec	-	-
19	Diphologulo	p	co	l	Dec	-	-
20	Moruwele	p	co	l	Dec	-	-
21	Maiputshwane	p	co	l	1 week	-	-
22	Metsimohibidu	p	co	l	1 week	-	-
23	Mogoloki	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
24	Sekgarapana	p	co	b	2 weeks	-	-
25	Dithagane	p	co	b	Dec	-	-

[continued]

[Table 6, Maape Water Sources Index, cont.]

No.	Name	Type pan (p) dam (d) well (w) B/H (bh)	Ownership communal (co) private (pr)	Usage domestic (d) livestock (l) both (b)	Time Used (months)	Date Built	By Whom council (C) self (s)
26	Mmadinonyane	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
27	Dipitse*	w	pr	b	all year	±1920	families
28	Majwaneng	d	co	b	all year	1960	Majwaneng residents
29	Malotwana	p	co	b	Dec-Jan	-	-
30	Rantsiapana	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
31	Motopi	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
32	Pekwaena	p	co	b	2 weeks	-	-
33	Maletona	p	co	b	Dec-Jan	-	-
34	Mathatswane	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
35	Moralaneng	p	co	b	Dec-May	-	-
36	Semodi	p	co	b	Dec-Feb	-	-
37	Moamokeme	p	co	b	Dec	-	-
38	Mophene	p	co	b	1 week	-	-
39	Kopun	w	co	b	all year	1980	Kopun residents
40	Old Maape	w	co	b	all year	±1920	village
41	Old Maape	d	co	b	all year	1968	village
-	Maape B/H	bh	co	d	all year	1953	Tshekedi Khama
-	Taun B/H	bh	co	l	all year	1957 1970	Mr. Rich C

* As the name indicates, Dipitse refers to a series of dug (chain) wells. These "dipitse," all close to the dam, include 8 wells belonging, respectively, to: Morupisi, Poso, Nkgakge, Matlhoane, Modise, Mmasentshwela, Mofiki, and Matiose. Two, however (Modise and Matiose), have not been maintained and are no longer in use.

residents from Sefhare. It must be reemphasized, however, that this practice only is a general trend and that cattle movements in grazing areas are governed neither by official boundaries nor by any other legal provision.

Kgagodi (fig 10) follows much the same general practice as Moshopa along the communal fence. But, in addition to sharing these adjacent grazing areas, Kgagodi also has at least 25 remote cattleposts spread around the village area within a radius of approximately 50 km. These remote cattleposts were said to have belonged to Kgagodi since 1902 when the village was founded during the tribal move to Serowe.

Maape (fig 12), in contrast, presents a situation where grazing is very much interlocked with arable lands. Pastures shown in figure 12 are shared by Ramokgonami community in the east; Mahalapitsa, in the northwest; and Moshopa, further south. In addition, Maape has no distant cattlepost and virtually all the village herd (1,355 head in 1981) is pastured on grazing areas shown on the map. Maape residents expressed their desire to protect and possibly extend grazing within their community areas, particularly in what is left in the eastern section.

4.7 Water Sources Characteristics

The water sources indices following each map show a relatively large number of sources in each community area. Yet the majority of these are natural pans which depend on the amount and nature of the rains. Their capacity and usage also depend on the size of both the natural depressions and the water catchments. Thus, in what is considered to be "good rainy seasons," as was the case in 1980/81, most of those natural pans contained water for only two to three months after the rains, i.e., from December to April. Only a few contained enough water to last nearly to the next plowing season. Those included Molaudi and Rasegojwa pans in Kgagodi, Kolomajwe pans in Moshopa, and Moralaneng in Maape.

A number of other water sources are small private dams. These dams usually are very simple mud bunds built across small catchments or slopes by individual farmers in their own field and function in much the same way as natural pans, subject to the same constraints.

The most reliable sources clearly are boreholes and chain wells which rely on technology such as drilling or blasting in order to reach the water table, and some communal dams generally built with mechanical assistance on much wider water catchments. Among reliable sources in the communities are the following:

- 4 in Sajwe : index numbers : 1, 2, 3, and 5;
- 3 in Kgagodi : index numbers : 27, 39 (Malokoane), and Kgagodi Bh;
- 4 in Moshopa : index numbers : 1, 2, 3, and 4;
- 7 in Maape : index numbers : 27, 28, 39, 40, 41, Maape Bh, and Taun Bh.

From this inventory one observes that reliable water sources are generally located close to the village residential area and that lands areas are virtually void of reliable sources. When the rains are satisfactory, both domestic

and livestock water at the lands is sufficient for only a few months after the rains stop, and in a good number of sources water lasts less than a month. When natural sources dry up, waster must be brought to the lands from reliable sources either by sledge or by donkey cart.

4.8 Livestock Resources

During the 1980/81 agricultural season an average of 65.4 percent of the farms in the four communities combined were found to own cattle. The average numbers of head per owner were: 18 for Maape; 28 for Moshopa; 32 for Kgagodi; and 43 for Sajwe. The remaining average of 34.6 percent had no cattle, and 58.4 percent were found to either borrow, hire, or use **mafisa** animals.

Despite the large size of the herd in those communities, these figures show that cattle ownership, and by the same token access to draft power, is unevenly distributed, and as many as three-fifths of the farms resort to hiring, borrowing, or using **mafisa** animals for plowing.

Smallstock husbandry was found to be much less substantial. An average of only 44.5 percent of the total households owned goats and 9.5 percent owned sheep, with an average herd size of 10 head per owner for both sheep and goats. Smallstock is reared primarily for domestic consumption. Of the 44.5 percent, 10 percent of goat owners and 5 percent of sheep owners had sold an average of 2.5 and 1.1 animals, respectively, in a year (**cf** Zufferey 1982, for more details).

5. Local Institutions and Resource Management

5.1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to summarize the major traditional resource management trends followed in those communities and highlights, in a second section, current practices and problems. The management of communal perennial water sources appears to be particularly difficult, and therefore three brief historical accounts of communal boreholes are presented in order to better illustrate the management complexity of such resources.

5.2 Traditional Management Practices

All respondents concurred that chiefs traditionally played a key role in land allocation and management of communal resources.

Settlement in and management of natural resources in some areas studied have been delegated to royal wardheads by paramount chiefs (Kgagodi, 1902). In other instances, local chiefs (Batswapong) were assimilated into the Ngwato tribe but kept their chiefly functions at their own level (Maape). In others still, some groups established supremacy over others prior to being themselves assimilated into the main tribe (Moshopa). Yet in all cases one major responsibility of traditional chiefs, in addition to keeping law and order, was to allocate land and to some extent manage communal resources with their people.

5.2.1 Land Allocation. At the time of the early settlement, land was considered to be plentiful and the common patrimony of the **morafe** (nation). Local chiefs designated and allocated areas of land to community wards (**2.4.1.1** and **3.8.1**) and ward members plowed in their respective ward lands. As communities developed, however, local residents were forced to adjust traditional tenure to needs and constraints arising in their communities.

5.2.2 Traditional Land Use Practices. Historical accounts of the lands areas studied (consult **fig 10-12**) revealed the following practices:

(1) As the original wards grew in **size and population**, new lands had to be cleared and wards were given additional land. Thus, for example, Moralana lands in Moshopa (**fig 11**) became an extension of the Sekgwaneng area. Majwaneng and Kgomodiatshaba lands in Maape (**fig 12**) are respective decentralizations of Semodi and Moshakgalo lands. Rasegojwa, Molaudi, and Moralana lands in Kgagodi (**fig 10**) are decentralizations of Ramoatswi lands.

(2) **Conflicts** with neighboring settlements over landownership pushed farmers to plow in different areas. Thus, in Kgagodi, conflicts arising between Diloro and Mmadinkhu farmers in the 1940s resulted in the latter moving to Mmumohibidu area (**fig 10**).

(3) The opening of new lands also was part of some **chiefs' strategy to consolidate their community territory** by preventing neighboring settlements from taking too much land. Thus, Ithakanye lands in Moshopa (**fig 11**) were opened in order to prevent Sefhare farmers from encroaching in Moshopa territory.

(4) **Poor soil** also was a reason for finding better lands. For example, Moshopa farmers plowing in Malotong (**fig 11**) moved to Dingope. Others in Kgagodi (**fig 10**) moved from Moralana to Kobalemakabi and from Madintha to Ramoatswi for the same reason.

(5) **Regular floods** along rivers and depressions encouraged other farmers to find more suitable lands. This problem pushed Chief Morupisi in Maape to redesignate permanent lands areas for each of the four wards as follows: Semodi lands, to Mathibatshela ward; Moshakgalo lands, to Mabuo ward; Malegapa lands, to Sesetlha ward; Taun lands, to Mosarwa ward.

(6) **Dense vegetation** along some river valleys raised the expectations of other farmers to find new water sources and plow in those areas. For example, the Marumo family from Kgagodi moved from Mmabotswana lands in the 1940s to Mmampswe Valley.

(7) More **successful farming** by neighboring farmers attracted others to come and plow in the same area (e.g., Mr. Ramoswai from Ratholo plowing in Semodi).

(8) In other instances, chiefs requested farmers to plow elsewhere in order to **protect grazing.** Thus, because of high overgrazing in Ramoatswi and Rasegojwa caused by large numbers of stock watering in

Rasegojwa and Mokweba pans, Chief Kgagodi, in concert with Chief Monyepetsi from Mogapinyana moved Mosokwane ward to Moralana while Mogapinyana farmers were moved northeast of Mogapinyana.

Early land use practices therefore appear to have been largely influenced by: demographic expansion of rural settlements; the need to consolidate settlements' territory; local ecological conditions (water, soil, vegetation, etc.); the concern to strike a healthy balance between arable and grazing resources.

5.2.3 Traditional Grazing Practices. Traditional grazing patterns, still currently characterized by distribution and sharing of grazing resources with adjacent communities and cattleposts' residents according to respective lands areas, appear to illustrate what traditionally was common grazing practice based on ward relationship and family ties.

This phenomenon can also be observed in communities that have distant cattleposts such as Kgagodi. Each cattlepost identified (**table 7**) still has a **modisa-naga** (grazing controller) whose primary duty is to control who is actually grazing in the cattlepost area.

These **badisa-dinaga** were/are selected according to the degree of seniority in the cattlepost area and traditionally liaised directly with the village chief. Decisions to allow or prohibit outsiders to graze their livestock in these areas were ultimately taken in concert with the chief and unauthorized farmers were reported to the village **kgotla**.

A striking characteristic of that practice is that the stocking rate and grazing capacity of the land were/are rather marginal considerations in managing grazing resources. Permission for or prohibition of outsiders in those grazing areas was rather based on the degree of relationship they had with village wards or community residents.

5.2.4 Observations. Early practices seem to indicate that land management essentially was a community affair strongly based on the traditional chief-ward relationship in which the chief was expected to be the "provider" or "manager" (**modisa**) of the common patrimony, subject, however, to common decisions taken with his people through the **kgotla** system. This system was, of course, subject to factors such as the authoritarian or tyrannical attitudes of some chiefs.

Factors such as the land use practices described above illustrate that the use of community land was in no way uniformly systematized, but rather left to the discretionary management of the residents within the territory allotted to them.

In their respective community areas, residents gradually learned both the potential and the constraints of their environment and appear to have adapted to problems arising primarily by expanding or moving to new lands. Yet, none of these moves or decisions were simply left to private initiative, but either came as straight directives from the chiefs or were ratified by **kgotla** meetings.

TABLE 7

Kgagodi Remote Cattleposts

NAME OF AREA	SHARED WITH (COMMUNITIES)	BADISA-DINAGA OR GRAZING "CONTROLLERS" (NAME)
Dibokolodi	Mogapinyana	Tselapedi
Digkoropa	Lesenepole, Diloro, Tamasane	S. KenosiDikwalo
Dikwalo	Tamasane, Mogapinyana, Diloro	K. Kepaletswe
Doododmatshele	Moremi, Tamasane	T. Mokutedi
Kgopathate	Mogapi, Mogapinyana, Lesenepole, Maunatlala	M. Masale
Kobalemakabi	Tamasane, Lesenepole, Maunatlala, Diloro	S. Mokaatobolo (south) O. Mmopi (southwest) Marume (west)
Madibabontsho	Mogapinyana, Maunatlala, Lesenepole	K. Tebogo
Mafsefse	Serowe	*
Mailadimmala	Mogapinyana	K. Kepaletswe
Maretele	Mogapinyana, Diloro	*
Masweswe	Mogapi, Mogapinyana	R. Kolonyane
Mmabanyana	Kgagodi only	K. Kepaletswe
Mmabalelwa	Mogapinyana, Diloro	K. Kepaletswe
Mmadikhudu	Diloro	*
Mokgatshadinama	Mogapi, Mogapinyana, Lesenepole, Maunatlala	K. Reasentshe
Monabeng	Mogapinyana, Mogapi	Kebadfile
Mototswane	Maunatlala, Mogapi, Lesenepole, Mogapinyana	M. Rabadubi
Mpane	Tamasane, Moremi, Maunatlala, Lesenepole	E. Mokwai
Sasajwe	Mogapinyana	Sepako
Segogwane	Kgagodi only	*
Semelore (hill)	Diloro	Kedikilwe
Sepenane	Mogapinyana, Maunatlala	*
Setote	Mogapi, Lesenepole, Maunatlala, Moremi	O. Kebonang
Tlhagasanung	Mogapinyana	G. Kolonyane
Tshokaneng	Lesenepole, Mogapinyana, Maunatlala	*

* Indicates vacancies or names uncertain.

5.3 Current Management Practices

5.3.1 Introduction of Modern Institutions. In the 1960s, new institutions were introduced as part of government development strategy both in districts and in villages. While LBs and SLBs were given the control and custody of the country's natural resources, a number of council agencies became the official channels providing government resources to rural communities, and Tribal Authority chiefs became the official authority in customary matters (see **2.6.3**). In the villages, the VDC became the official local institution responsible for coordinating village development and the official channel liaising with council agencies.

5.3.2 General Implications. In the process of modernization, the traditional resource management pattern, very much "chief-community" centered, lost a great deal of its autonomy. Local chiefs, virtually stripped of their traditional jurisdiction, now have to come to terms with modern institutions, which although foreign to most rural dwellers, ultimately control their community resources. As a result, traditional chiefs face considerable leadership problems and the traditional community decision-making process has lost much of its effectiveness (see **2.6.4**).

5.3.3 Role of Land Boards. The Land Boards were first set up in 1970, and according to the Tribal Land Act of 1968, Land Boards now have the following powers:

> all powers vested in a chief under customary law in relation to land, including:
>
> (1) the granting of rights to use any land;
>
> (2) the cancellation of the use of any rights to use any land;
>
> (3) hearing of appeals from, conferring or setting aside any decision of any subordinate land authority;
>
> (4) the imposition of Restrictions on the use of Tribal Land (par 13).

The Tribal Land (Subordinate Land Boards) Regulations of 1973 also state that "a Subordinate Land Board may regulate its own procedures" subject to "direction made by the Tribal Land Board" (par 7).

5.3.4 Rotational Grazing. The most obvious form of resource management currently taking place in these communities is group/communal drift fencing. These fences, separating grazing areas from arable lands, enable the farming community to practice basic rotational grazing. Protecting lands areas during the growing season preserves fodder for the post-harvest period. After harvest, with general community consensus, the opening date of the gates is officially announced in **kgotla** by the chief and cattle are then moved from the grazing side into the lands areas. Communal fences in addition were also found to be the ideal solution to the general lack of **badisa** (herdboys) and to reduce the problem of crop damage, particularly in those lands close to water sources.

5.3.4.2 Grazing Management. Little more is undertaken currently to manage grazing resources than was done in traditional times (3.2.3).

Traditionally, local chiefs found solutions to overgrazing problems by requesting farmers to move to different areas (see 3.2.2). Chiefs still try to discourage applications for land in overgrazed areas, but no longer have the authority to compel farmers to plow or graze in different areas. Similarly, "grazing controllers" in distant cattleposts no longer tend to take the decision with the chief to accept or refuse grazing areas to outsiders, but consider that responsibility to be theirs with other residents in the grazing area.

5.3.4.3 Water Management. For the purpose of this analysis, water sources have been classified into four main categories: (1) surface water sources subject to general management by the community at large; (2) private seasonal sources generally including small dams and seep wells at the lands; (3) private perennial sources such as chain wells, boreholes, and some group dams; and (4) communal perennial sources referring to communal chain wells or boreholes. (See also Fortmann and Roe 1981; Bailey 198-)

(1) Surface Water Management. In general, water management consists of making maximum use of surface water and, as those sources run dry, moving gradually to perennial sources as need arises. Surface water in pans and small dams reaches full capacity during the growing season (January-February) at the time the herd is grazed outside the fences. Thus, the livestock is first watered from surface water found in grazing areas.

After the harvest, cattle move into the arable area and use water both at the lands and in grazing areas, if still available. Water sources at the lands are used by any resident farmer with no order of succession from one lands area to the next, and no stock limitation is imposed at any of these sources.

When water becomes scarce at the lands, cattle are then trekked to the closest reliable sources (either major pans, chain wells, or livestock boreholes), starting with the farmers who do not own private sources. Thus, in the dry season Kgagodi farmers water their stock at a borehole approximately 10 km west of the village on the Bobonong-Palapye road; Moshopa farmers water in Kolomajwe pans and village wells (index numbers 13, 1, and 4), and Maape uses Gotau wells, north of Martin's Drift road (±15 km).

(2) Private Seasonal Sources. In addition to surface water, small private dams or seep wells are also used at the lands for both domestic and livestock supply. Although private, such sources normally are shared with neighboring farmers at the lands with no fee or restriction imposed. Use of private sources does require the owner's permission. Neighbors are expected to use domestic water only, even if the owner is using water for both domestic and livestock purposes.

The maintenance of private seasonal sources is the owner's entire responsibility. Yet, in case of major repairs, the farmers using that source will normally come together and do the necessary work. Other owners resort to "letsema"* as a means of maintaining their water facilities.

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* Practice consisting of paying voluntary labor with beer.

Most people drawing water from private small sources appeared to possess a strong sense of common responsibility for keeping the facilities in best possible condition. When drawing water, everyone seemed careful to either reshape the banks, scoop mud, or skim grass as necessary, without waiting for the owner's request to do so.

(3) Private Perennial Sources. This category refers to privately owned chain wells or boreholes that yield water most of the year and to one group dam. Chain wells refer hereafter to shafts dug deeper than they are wide, the top portion of which is lined with logs to prevent cave-ins and equipped with a roller, chain, and bucket (Fortmann and Roe 1981a:155). Both the perennial nature and the restricted ownership of group dams are quite debatable since many of them run dry and their ownership is sometimes extended to the community at large. However, the only group dam identified during the study satisfies both criteria and was, therefore, classified in this category.

Wells and Boreholes. As water in these sources is more reliable, both access and management increase in complexity. Unlike in temporary sources, well and borehole owners set fees and conditions for drawing water from those sources which vary a great deal from one owner to the next. Some of them allow water to be drawn only for domestic use; others also sell water for livestock. Fees vary substantially and were found to range between one beast per year for an unlimited number of stock to one goat/sheep per eight head of cattle. (See Kgagodi Index numbers 39, 40).

Other private perennial wells were inherited and are managed as common property by family members. Noge's well in Kgagodi (Index no. 27) provides such an example. The six legal heirs of the family well (five brothers and one sister) delegated the management responsibility of their well to the eldest brother who also happens to be a ward headman. At that well, livestock fees are imposed in the amount of one beast per year for 40 and more head of cattle. Below 40 head water fees are paid in cash (between P10.00 and P50.00) according to the number of stock watered.

Funds plus livestock and their offspring obtained from water fees also are managed by the eldest brother and shared by the co-owners of the well. The fees collected were said to be barely sufficient to cover maintenance costs. Yet, in case of water shortage, the well owners, rather than reducing access, prefer to water elsewhere themselves.

On the other hand, because fees are paid, the well can be closed only after consulting with the fee payers. Noge's well had to be temporarily closed in January 1982 because of the increasing pressure placed on it resulting from its close location in the village area and general water shortages in other sources.

Sajwe Group Dam. Sajwe dam is a perennial **haffir**-dam located approximately 2.5 km north of the fence (**fig 9**) and was completed in 1980 in collaboration with the Dam Building Unit (MoA), by the same group of farmers that initiated almost simultaneously the fencing project (see **2.5** and **3.8**). A **haffir**-dam is a dam in which the water is held back by a mud wall, but less than half of the water at full storage lies above the ground level that existed

before the **haffir**-dam was built (Fortmann and Roe 1981a:154). This source is considered to be "private" in the sense that water access strictly is restricted to group members (72 families) and no water is sold to any outsider.

The group bylaws, completed in 1981, state the following:

- In addition to an excecutive committee of five members, the group elects every year a management committee of three farmers each, in charge for one week in turn of controlling the number of cattle watered at the dam. The maximum accepted is 50 beasts per owner. Excess cattle are expected to be watered at other wells. To that end, every group member watering at the dam reports in advance to the management committee the exact number of stock he intends to water, and the committee keeps records of both names of farmers and respective numbers of stock. Access to the dam is refused to both nonmembers and unrecorded livestock.

- Group members who have not worked physically at the project are requested to pay P5.00 compensation. No other fee is imposed.

- A group member who damages the fence is charged P100.00. In the case of damage by an outsider, he is requested to pay 2 head of cattle and is liable to customary court.

- The dam is maintained by hired labor paid out of group funds raised from group parties (see **3.8.5.5**).

(4) Communal Perennial Sources. In this category, a distinction must be made between communal wells, which are/were all built by the residents (consult Water Indices with **figs 9 to 12**), and communal boreholes, which are installed for the communities by the Council Works Department.

While communal wells are by and large managed by the villagers on a self-help basis or in the same way as private temporary sources at the lands (**3.3.4.3**), management of communal boreholes faces abysmal problems. Some constraints relate to the nature and quality of relations between government agencies, politicians, and local levels. In other cases, the presence of communal boreholes reinforces internal factionalism in communities. In others still, communal boreholes interfere with management of grazing and arable resources. In order to highlight some constraints, three brief historical accounts of communal boreholes are presented here.

Case Studies: (a) Kgagodi Borehole. Water shortage in Kgagodi has been a persistent problem. Around 1966, the general concern over lack of domestic water reached its climax and pushed the community to discuss possible solutions. After consulting Mogapinyana and Diloro residents, Chief Monnaatlala from Kgagodi held a general meeting and consensus was reached to have a borehole drilled in the village. That decision was transmitted to the local Councillor who was pressed to present the community's request to Council.

A first water survey was conducted by the Department of Water Affairs from Palapye in 1967 and two holes were drilled: one at Leupane, northeast of the

village; the other along the Ramoatswi River, southeast. The first drilling at Leupane raised strong opposition from Malokoane people who feared that their private well would be completely drained by the new borehole. The drillers then went to the second location, but did not strike water. It was then concluded that there was no water and the search was abandoned.

A year later (1968), further complaints were channeled to Council by the newly appointed Councillor and a new survey followed in 1969. Surveyors were reported to have "dropped" in the village without informing, consulting, or involving anyone in the community and to have declared (after one day) that the only water available was too salty. The same survey, however, identified an important source 4 km north of the village on the Tshokana River and decided to drill the borehole in that location. The work was started by Council in 1970 and completed in 1971.

The community still expressed its dissatisfaction because of the distant location of the borehole (4 km) and the poor quality of consultation, particularly since their local traditional doctors all confirmed abundant water in the village.

Those concerns were once more forwarded to Council, which suggested having water reticulated from the borehole to each of the three communities instead of drilling new holes. This suggestion, however, was massively rejected by the community for fear of not having enough water to supply the three villages and running the borehole dry. Eventually, Council promised to have a third survey conducted in 1978, but nothing happened since.

Meanwhile, Kgagodi residents had to rely on donkey carts and two local tractors to transport domestic water from the new borehole to the village. Currently, they buy their domestic water at P1.00 per drum (includes transport and fees).

In 1980, new delegates were again sent to Council to inquire about the delay of the third survey. The answer was that their project had to be postponed until Christmas 1981. No action has been taken to date (February 1983).

Thus, eleven years after the construction of the new borehole, the most affluent residents still buy their domestic water and water for livestock is not provided. As a result, other perennial sources (Noge's and Malokoane's wells) face increasing pressure and the owners currently lock their wells.

(b) Maape and Taun Boreholes. The management constraints of those two boreholes are closely related, as we shall see, to the creation of a permanent settlement for Maape residents. Both these boreholes are only 3.5 km from each other (fig 12) and technically belong to the Maape area, Taun being traditionally a lands area of Maape. Both locations have had their respective boreholes for a number of years.

Maape Village Borehole (Mophene). Maape borehole was drilled in 1953 by Chief Tshekedi Khama. It was apparently part of Khama's strategy to drill boreholes throughout Ngwato Tribal Lands in order to win the loyalty of local tribes and prevent the Boers from moving north to settle in tribal lands. It appears that drilling a borehole in Maape also was part of Khama's effort to

win the local population's loyalty of that area of Tswapong* against Seretse. At that time, Tshekedi and part of the tribe were opposing Seretse because of his intention to marry a white woman. After drilling the borehole, Tshekedi asked Maape people to equip it, but the Maape residents, remaining loyal to Seretse, refused.

Taun Borehole. A trader from Zeerust (South Africa) trading in Mahalapye and owning shops in Ramogkonami and Maape, used to buy cattle frequently in the Tswapong area. In 1957, the trader in question applied to Tshekedi Khama for a piece of land in order to build a borehole in Taun for watering his cattle in transit to BMC.

The presence of new water in the area considerably modified the social organization of the community. Before the opening of the borehole, water shortage in Taun had already pushed Ramodise and Lemogang (successors and sons of headman Modise, Mosarwa leader in Taun) to settle in Semodi lands. Attracted by the vacancy in Taun, Johanne (son of Sesetlha headman of Malegapa) established himself as "chief" of Taun against Chief Poso's agreement and started allocating land in both Taun and Malegapa areas. The opening of this new borehole in Taun crystallized these divisions and further encouraged Taun and Malegapa residents to settle permanently in their area, instead of returning periodically to the village.

The borehole owner employed an increasing number of local residents to cater for his cattle and trained one resident to be his full-time pumper. However, the borehole, which was intended to be the exclusive property of the owner, gradually was used to supply domestic water to local residents with the complicity of the pumper, and later on also to supply water for livestock without the owner's knowledge, until the pumper, in 1967 (10 years later), was caught red-handed and fired on the spot.

The same month, the pumper took the case to Mahalapye Magistrate's Court and to the MP and charged his employer with having fired him without notice, having been granted no leave for ten years, and for refusing water access to local residents. While the borehole owner was found guilty by the court on the first two charges and had to compensate his pumper, the MP took the third one to Parliament and the trader was requested to leave Maape within the year, after compensation of P800.00 had been paid (half by the whole Maape community, half by the government).

Settlement and Water Management. The ethnic and historical context of Maape (2.4.1) already has described a long history of tribal conflicts between Mabuo ward, on the one hand, and Sesetlha and Mosarwa wards, or the "foreigners" (Bahaladi), on the other. Sesetlha and Mosarwa wards, which initially were allocated, respectively, Malegapa and Taun lands areas (fig 12) by Chief Morupisi, currently want to have the new village established in Taun, while Mabuo ward wants it in Mophene (New Maape). Each faction's determination

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* Maape is only 18 km from Pilikwe, which was founded in 1953 by Tshekedi Khama on his arrival in the area and is still considered to be Tshekedi Khama's village.

to have the new village built on its side is further reinforced by the presence of perennial water in both locations.

In 1968, the Council Secretary and the local MP encouraged Chief Rantsiapana to gather his people and settle in Sekgweng (northeast) because Maape was too inaccessible and the population too scattered to provide adequate services. Chief Rantsiapana suggested that he would rather move to Mophene (New Maape), since water already was available in that location and Sekgweng was not his area. He also suggested to keep Taun as a grazing area and use the Taun borehole for livestock only.

The Taun faction strongly opposed these suggestions and argued that, while still in the old village, the decision had been taken to build the new village in Taun. After lengthy debates, Taun swung Council's decision in their favor and the Taun borehole was reequipped by Council in 1974. In the same year, however, the Council Secretary met again with the Maape community in order to finalize the settlement issue. A general meeting was held and a majority of the residents were in favor of moving to Mophene, but Taun found the proposition unacceptable, arguing that Taun residents are in the minority. The Council Secretary then ordered the removal of all installations from the Taun borehole to be used to equip the Maape borehole which had remained unequipped since 1953. The Taun faction then appealed to the DO Mahalapye who supported the Council Secretary. Appealing further, Taun finally found support in the MP against the Council Secretary who was said to be accused by the MP of "making trouble in villages."

With the support of the MP (who paid half the cost) and with self-help funds, Taun residents reequipped their borehole. In 1975, a total of P869.89 was raised from local contributions set at P20.00 per household and mine worker and 50t per female resident for cleaning the reservoir. A borehole committee was formed of three members and initial water fees set at P1.00/farmer/month for cattle owners and 50t for nonowners.

This form of management, however, faced considerable problems. The pumper's salary set at P8.00/month proved to be too high for local contributions and people's general expectation of being paid for working at the borehole nearly led to complete paralysis of borehole operations until a second pumper, also trained by the original borehole owner from Zeerust, offered to operate the borehole free-of-charge.

In 1976-77, when a Council school and healthpost were built in Taun,* fees were insufficient to cover the additional water expenses incurred in the construction of these buildings. Council then decided to provide free fuel

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* Similar antagonism between both factions also occurred over the location of the new school and healthpost and also involved Councillor and MP, each supporting one faction against the other. A new Council Secretary elected at that time, after referring the issue to the Senior Tribal Authority because of the tribal nature of the conflict, finally decided to build the school in Taun since the borehole was already equipped. Once the school was established, the healthpost was obviously going to be built close to the school and water.

for the borehole engine as a contribution, which further discouraged the residents from paying their water fees. Ultimately, for the second time, Council had to take over the management of the borehole. The same pumper was kept on with an increased salary of P140.00/month and was given an extra compensation of P600.00 for previous work. The borehole is currently used for domestic supply and for livestock during the dry season only at 20t/beast/month.

In the meantime, Maape residents bitterly complained to Council for allowing Taun to equip privately a borehole which was to be used by the whole Maape community, but no action was taken by Council. In addition, the Maape borehole had its own problems.

After 21 years, the Maape borehole was finally redrilled and equipped in 1974 with the installations brought from Taun under Council Secretary's orders. Yet, water proved insufficient to supply the Maape community. The residents thus requested Council to redrill it once more. Three years later (1977) Council responded and drilled a new hole very close to the first one (5m east), but no water was struck. The drillers then concluded that water was insufficient in that location for borehole requirements. The borehole equipment was once more transferred to Lecheng village which desperately needed both pump and engine.

In 1981, Acting Chief K. Poso, still convinced that water was plentiful in Mophene, hired a borehole mechanic from Machaneng and asked him to reinvestigate the water potential in Maape. When inspecting the initial Council drilling (21 lengths), the mechanic realized that it had gone beyond the water table. After reducing the shaft by one length, he found that water was plentiful. Since February 1982, Council has reequipped the Maape borehole for a second time. The entire process of making the Maape borehole operational has taken 29 years.

(c) Resource Management in Moshopa. This account illustrates the difficulty of dissociating management of a community's arable and grazing resources from water management. The previous sections described general characteristics of arable and grazing resources (**4.5, 4.6,** and **5.2.2, 5.2.3**) and showed that basic rotational grazing by means of fencing (**5.3.4.1**) is the major form of managing community resources adopted by Moshopa residents. A drift-fence project was initiated in 1978 by Moshopa community in order to separate arable from grazing areas (**3.5.1**).

The implementation of that community project, however, came to a standstill in January 1982 because of the consequences of the apparent misappropriation of a communal borehole situated approximately 12 km northwest of Moshopa village.

Historical Background. Prior to the move of Tshekedi Khama to Pilikwe (1953), the grazing area west of the Dingope fence subsection (see **figs 6** and **11**), also known as Koromong, already was, according to the residents, a grazing district (<u>naga</u>) belonging to Mshopa. A communal borehole (Malatso borehole) was sunk by Council in 1952 in order to provide the livestock water to Moshopa farmers who grazed their animals in great numbers in that area at that time.

Tshekedi Khama, who grazed his cattle in both the Pilikwe area (his village) and Koromong, made an agreement with Chief Lekgetho of Moshopa (c 1956) to share that borehole with Moshopa residents, because he found the Pilikwe borehole to be too far from Koromong (± 20 km). Malatso borehole, however, was shared only temporarily with Tshekedi Khama, since a year later he moved his cattle to Nata.

Around 1968, a close female relative of Tshekedi Khama moved her cattle from Chadibe to Koromong and was said to have renewed Tshekedi's agreement with Chief Lechaina of Moshopa, but during the same year she equipped the communal borehole with a private engine, pump, and pipes. Thereafter, water access to Moshopa residents was refused on the grounds that the borehole facilities were private and costly to maintain. Thus, Malatso borehole became the **de facto** private property of that person and now is "owned" by her son, hereafter called the complainant.

In 1969, the Malatso borehole was "registered" at the district office as Borehole ECB 66 (Central District Classification records). These records indicate that ECB 66 was drilled in 1954 and is under the ownership of "Malatso Estate." However, Malatso borehole was never registered at the Water Apportionment Board (water affairs). The Department of Geological Surveys (Lobatse) confirmed that Malatso borehole, officially no. 421, was drilled in August 1952 for the government. The geological survey still considers borehole 421 to be a government borehole, i.e., communal (Record G.S. no. 66, Lobatse).

Implications for Grazing Resources. The appropriation of the borehole by the complainant and family not only secures them the private usage of that communal water source, but also confers on them a relative monopoly on grazing resources in the area. Since Moshopa farmers no longer have access to the borehole, they are almost compelled to graze their cattle elsewhere.

Implications for Arable and Grazing Resources. Beginning in 1978, the Moshopa Farming Group consulted for two and a half years with all village residents and neighboring communities (i.e., Sefhare and adjacent cattleposts), including Koromong. The complainant, however, was said to have himself never attended any community meeting despite repeated verbal and written invitations by the community. In winter 1980, after the drift-fence project had finally been approved by the Mahalapye SLB and the 21.3 km of fence line completely cleared, this person complained directly to the Ngwato Land Board (NGL) that the fence was being built too close to "his" borehole and was going to interfere with the movement of his cattle.

According to written records,* the succession of events between Moshopa residents and the NLB occurred as follows.

- After the complaint reached the NLB, a first meeting was held in Moshopa between Land Board members and the community. The NLB maintains that at that meeting "an amicable decision [was] reached" and "an agreement was

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* The documents referred to in the following pages can be found in **Appendix 3.**

made that the line should be re-aligned northeast from the gate" (see Ngwato Land Board, "Report," p. 2).

- The community said there was no agreement, because the meeting had been called on an **ad hoc** basis without any prior notification and was attended by only 10 to 15 uninformed people (see Community Letter, 26 Sept. 1981, p. 2). Further, the meeting took place only because the NLB compelled the chief to leave a village funeral while it was still in progress to attend to their needs (see **Kgotla** Meeting Minutes, 27 Oct. 1981, p. 2).

- The NLB conducted an investigation on 9 September 1981 and discovered that poles had been erected for approximately 300m along the disputed section of the original cleared line. This was interpreted as a direct violation of the Land Board's authority which resulted in the production of a strong report accusing the community of deliberately neglecting the board's ruling and aggressively violating amicable decisions. The investigatory report concluded that fencing could continue only according to the "accepted" diversion, and, if this were unacceptable, fencing had to stop until a new meeting had been called by the board (Ngwato Land Board, "Report").

- The community decided to reply to the NLB's report. A special community meeting was called on 24 September 1981 to discuss the report and the fence realignment issue. Two hundred eighty-six people attended the meeting (in contrast to the normal **kgotla** attendance of 10) and all found the realignment unacceptable. It was then decided to draft a community letter to NLB in order to explain that community agreement was still far from being reached and to raise fundamental questions that, it was believed, if answered, would improve community/Land Board relations. These included: specific reasons for the complainant's complaints; reasons for overruling the SLB's approval; settlement of the borehole issue (Community Letter, 26 Sept. 1981).

- After receiving this letter, the NLB convened a meeting in Moshopa village **kgotla** on 27 October 1981. According to the **Kgotla** Meeting Minutes, 27 October 1981, 350 residents attended this meeting and a great deal of time was spent debating the initial "agreement" which the residents forcefully denied was a general community agreement. When the AD tried to orient the debate toward the fundamental questions raised in the community letter, the board members positively refused to address them on the grounds that these problems were not the object of the meeting. Further, the AD was reprimanded for raising such questions. The meeting ended in complete discontent and disagreement.

- Profoundly disappointed in the outcome of the meeting, the community then decided to appeal directly to the Minister of Local Government and Lands. In January 1982, the Fencing Group secretary drafted a letter in Setswana to the minister in the name of the chief and the community in which he described the problem and the entire process with copies of previous documents. To date (Feb. 1983), 13 months later, the community still has received no reply.

In the meantime, agricultural extension supports the fencing group. An AE10 Project Memorandum in the amount of P4,173.80 was approved by the DDC in November 1981. By December 1981, poles were erected along 10 km, and 40 rolls of steel wire were delivered in January 1982. In February 1983, two-thirds of the fence was completed with five-strand wire and all poles fixed except in the disputed section. Moshopa farmers are anxious to complete their fence because the open area is one where many cattle congregate and enter the lands area and cause crop damage. On the other hand, NLB has ordered them to stop unless they follow the new realignment. Until a decision on this case is made by the ministry, arable agriculture in the area will continue to suffer the effects of crop damage.

6. Analysis and Recommendations

This study shows that the major forms of local resource management in the communities studied are primarily confined to basic rotational grazing implemented by erecting drift fences and maintenance of communal water sources.

6.1 Factors Affecting Community Resource Management

The limited scope of local resource management undertaken by village institutions appears to be influenced by a number of factors: some derive from traditional attitudes and practices; others, from the communities' lack of awareness of and exposure to resource management innovations; others, from constraints more specifically related to Land Boards; and still others, from the shift of traditional power and control over community resources to modern institutions.

6.1.1 Traditional Elements. The first part of this report shows that, despite the creation of modern institutions at both village and district levels, the traditional forms of village organization and resource management still prevail. Virtually all village consultations and community decisions rely on the ward structure; and the organization of community work, collection of contributions, and management of community resources, e.g., fencing, maintenance of communal wells, etc., also are strongly based on the traditional **kgotla** system. Thus, resource management appears to be inhibited, first, by the lack of integration between traditional and modern forms of social organization; and further, by the two following elements.

6.1.1.1 Attitude to Land. Land, in the eyes of a majority of the residents of all four communities, was found still to be essentially considered the common patrimony of the **morafe** (nation) or the ward's/tribe's common property. Therefore, community resources belong just as much to one ward member, **de facto** and **de jure**, as to any other community member. The question is only to determine with the chief where and what portion of **his** land a given member is going to work on. "Owning" land thus appears to confer to the local residents a sense of identity and membership in a specific social group in comparison with the **bahaladi** (foreigners), who are, in contrast, expected to apply for land.

In such a context, modern notions such as land-use planning, land allocation, and resource management are generally poorly understood because land

appears to be more an attribute of family/ward status than a commodity that ought to be better utilized or managed. Similarly, self-allocation of land by community members is quite acceptable as long as the chief has given his consent and the self-allocator has sufficient draft power. Self-allocation is bad practice only because SLBs say it is, and, since Land Boards now have the final control over land, the residents have to comply with Land Board regulations.

Such an attitude to land was particularly strong in Maape where our discussions of resource management appeared rather strange and foreign. Self-allocation also is extensive, particularly in Majwaneng lands (fig 12), where a majority of farmers had both self- and SLB-allocated fields.

6.1.2 Inheritance of Land. In addition to new lands currently allocated by SLBs, traditional family* lands to a large extent are still passed on to new generations according to a fairly well established pattern. In all communities visited, the family patrimony tends to remain with the youngest born sons. If there is enough family land, all members plow in their land, normally each in his own plot. If the family land is too small, as many elder sons of the household head as necessary are expected to apply to the chief for new lands, until the remaining members are able to live off the family land. The remaining group thus includes the youngest sons, with whom the family land will ultimately remain, and unmarried sisters. Daughters do not inherit land because they are expected, sooner or later, to be plowing in their husband's fields. If only unmarried daughters remain, their closest male relative (first cousin) inherits the land, and, if more land is needed, the elder sister(s) will have to apply for new lands.

This inheritance pattern suggests that family resources are highly treasured and tend to be kept as long as possible within the household. Overlooking these practices can generate many problems in the allocation of new lands, particularly if they have remained temporarily fallow and are reallocated by SLBs (e.g., Sajwe, 3.8.6).

6.1.3 Scope within Environment Perception. In addition to the traditional elements mentioned above, subsistence agriculture is the central preoccupation to which the farming community devotes its efforts for eight months of the year (Oct. to May). Thus, improving the quality or management of community resources is not perceived to be as important by most farmers as is securing sufficient land enabling them to plow as much as the rains allow and as the organizing of adequate draft power at the best plowing time, also dictated by the rainfall, permits. This likely is one reason why fencing groups are

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* Family here is to be understood as lelwapa (extended family), in which the household head is referred to as Mong. Thus, in many family lands, a number of other relatives also can plow and often individual plots are lent to other relatives or neighbors. The land, however, belongs to the household head, who ultimately decides who, where, and how much land is distributed among family members.

popular and generally more successful* since they appear to respond more directly to one of the farming community's major preoccupations.

6.1.4 Lack of Exposure to Innovations. In addition, the average farmer has received little exposure (if any) to techniques available for improving range productivity, soil moisture, and water conservation. If he/she has this exposure (such as in the case of woodlot projects, rain tanks, and firebreaks), these innovations generally are introduced as prerogatives of **ad hoc** groups and not as the result of overall community area management. A considerable danger in this practice is that innovations tend to be introduced and groups formed for their own sake instead of providing solutions to specific management constraints in the overall community areas.

6.1.5 Constraints Experienced by Land Boards. The Land Boards, which by virtue of the Land Act passed in 1968 were given the responsibility for the administration and custody of the land (see **5.3.3**), have the ultimate responsibility for planning and managing local resources. In the attempt to perform this task, the Land Boards and Subordinate Land Boards face a number of constraints at their own levels which affect local resource management and planning. The following are the major constraints identified.

6.1.5.1 Lack of Administrative Mechanisms. The virtual absence of clearly defined administrative mechanisms necessary to administer land resources effectively considerably inhibits the effectiveness of the Land Boards. Sandford (1980:51) noted this discrepancy in the 1975 *W*hite Paper in relation to water management. The *W*hite Paper advocates public control over privately owned water supplies, restriction of private sources for livestock supply, and phasing out of private sources watering above allowed quota (par 30 and 40). No clear mechanisms, however, have yet been spelled out in order to enable the Land Boards to enforce these restrictions.

6.1.5.2 Lack of Administrative Guidance. This constraint is closely related to the previous one and affects the SLBs more specifically. SLBs, like Main Land Boards, are governed by the Land Act, and, according to SLB Regulations (1970), they can regulate their own procedures (see **5.3.3**) under the guidance of their Main Land Board. For most SLBs, however, the Land Act appears to be a legal document very difficult to understand or interpret correctly and no specific directives and guidance have yet been provided by the Ngwato Land Board for effective SLB operations.

6.1.5.3 Absence of Records for Land Administration. Both the Main Land Board and the SLBs commonly complain that land is "not well defined"; that they do not know how much land is currently allocated, being used, or left for future allocation; and that landownership is not well established since no land registry exists.

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* This is not to say that other groups such as tick control groups, dosing groups, dip tank groups, etc., are less successful or less important. But, because those groups are primarily oriented toward very specific and **ad hoc** types of activities, they do not as such deal with management of communal resources.

6.1.5.4 Circumscribed Land-Use Planning. The Land Boards also face boundary changes and a number of illegal allocations, self-allocations, allocations performed by Tribal Authority chiefs. They do not feel empowered to take final decisions over these, essentially because no land-use plan according to which resources should be allocated has yet been designed. By the same token, the legal and administrative mechanisms to support it have not been identified (see also RDU 1982:67).

6.1.5.5 Ad Hoc Allocation Criteria. As a result of the constraints mentioned above, the SLBs tend to develop their own allocation criteria either according to specific problems identified in their constituencies or for the sake of convenience. Thus, in Maape, it is said that a quota of ten applications must be reached before officers will come and consider applications. In Kgagodi, the SLB systematically refuses to allocate residential water points within an 8-km radius of the village for fear of draining existing sources. In order to allocate the fencing project, the SLB also requested the community first to clear the line so the SLB could drive on it and measure it, after which it would be approved or disapproved. This meant considerable effort on the part of the community solely for SLB's convenience (see **3.2.1**). Finally, in Moshopa, the approval of the fencing project by the SLB was formally overruled by the Main Land Board (see **3.5.1** and **5.3.4.3**).

6.1.5.6 Spatial Context of Land Allocations. The current land allocation process appears to confine itself to single community areas. The decisions on allocations are taken on the basis of mutual consent between the local chief, the applicant, and his neighbors in the community context without considering broader implications. Thus, allocations performed with mutual consent in a given community normally are beneficial to that community, but may be simultaneously detrimental to the next. Maape is a clear example of such a situation. Maape community, considerably short of grazing land, wishes to preserve the little grazing left on the eastern side of the village (see fig 12). Ramokgonami village, adjacent on the east, wants to extend arable lands into the same grazing area. Fields are currently encroaching in that grazing section because arable lands were granted from the Ramokgonami side with full consent of the chief and the applicants, overlooking, in the process, the concerns of Maape residents. This shows that community management planning must be formulated in the context of a broader ecological area.

6.1.6 Lack of Community Power and Control. The most crucial problem resource management faces is the rural communities' lack of control over their own resources.

Legal control over land resources is currently governed by The Tribal Land Act (TLA) of 1968 which vested in the Land Boards all the right and title to land in each tribal area: "for the benefit and advantage of the tribesmen of that area and for the purpose of promoting the economic and social development of all the people in Botswana" (par 10). The legal provisions of the TLA reflect the Government of Botswana's intention to integrate local participation (traditional community consensus) into the land planning/administration exercise by installing both Tribal and Subordinate Land Boards as the official representative bodies at the local level over land matters. Yet, despite this intention, the power and controls established in the TLA have remained considerably centralized and local input into the formulation of land policies, land

rights, and local control is minimal. This is substantiated by considering the following provisions of the TLA.

6.1.6.1 Lack of Local-Level Inputs. The Tribal Land Act (TLA), The Tribal Land Regulations (Reg) of 1970, and The Tribal Land (Subordinate Land) Boards Regulations (SLB Reg) of 1973 all indicate the lack of local-level input in the following areas.

(a) **Policy Formulation.** The Tribal Land Regulations state that: "When a Land Board proposes to formulate or adopt a policy related to its functions, it shall outline the proposed policy with the view of the District Council submitted in writing by the Secretary of the District Council" (Reg:par 5)).

The TLA states that: "a Land Board shall consult with the District Council in the formulation of policy relating to the exercise of its functions" (TLA:par 11), and that the "President may give to any Land Board directions of a general or specific character" (TLA:par 11).

(b) **Customary Land Rights in Grazing Areas.** "The Land Board, in consultation with the District Council, shall determine and furnish the Minister with the description of the grazing areas within the Tribal area" (TLA:par 17).

(c) **Customary Land Rights in Commonage.** "A Land Board may after consultation with the District Council by resolution set aside any land outside a grazing area as commonage" (TLA:par 18).

(d) **Cancellation of Customary Rights.** "An SLB shall in no case cancel the grant of any customary right to use land but may recommend cancellation of such rights to the Tribal Land Board" (SLB Reg:par 18).

(e) **Appointment of SLB Clerk.** "The Tribal Land Board shall appoint a Clerk for each Subordinate Land Board in its area of jurisdiction" (SLB Reg:par g).

(f) **Treasurer of Land Board.** "A Land Board may with the consent of the District Council engage as its Treasurer the Treasurer of the District Council . . . subject to the approval of the Minister" (Reg:par 32).

Thus in regard to this legislation which concerns policy formulation, customary rights over grazing, commonage, and cancellation of these rights, as well as the appointment of Land/Subordinate Land Board staff, the only "input" SLBs have is one of **advisory body** to the Main Land Board on cancellation of customary rights. All other decisions remain legal prerogatives of District Council and Land Board authorities, subject to ministerial or presidential approval or directives.

6.1.6.2 Centralized Power and Controls. A number of other provisions of the TLA and subordinate legislation also reduces local control and administration of land resources to a minimum. Among these figure the following.

(a) **Co-Options of Land Board Members.** "A Land Board may, **with the approval of the Minister,** co-opt not more than two persons . . . to assist the board in the discharge of its functions" (TLA:par 5); and "A Subordinate Land Board may, **with the approval of the Tribal Land Board,** co-opt not more than two persons" (SLB:Reg 5).

(b) **Procedure of Land Boards.** "A Land Board may regulate its own procedure" (TLA:par 7), but "The Minister may by notice in the Gazette . . . prescribe the procedure of a Land Board or a Subordinate Land Board" (TLA:par 37b); and "Subject to the provisions of the Tribal Land Act . . . or to any regulations made by the Tribal Land Board, a Subordinate Land Board may regulate its own procedure" (SLB Reg:par 7, and TLA:par 19); and "The Tribal Land Board may issue special or general direction to Subordinate Land Boards regarding their procedure or administration" (SLB Reg:par 7).

(c) **Customary Land Rights Appeals.** Appeals against both application and cancellation of these rights must be lodged "verbally or in writing **with the District Commissioner** for submission to the Minister" (Reg: par 13 and par 17); and, similarly, "Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Subordinate Land Board may appeal to the Tribal Land Board by lodging a notice of appeal . . . **with the Clerk of the Subordinate Land Board** or the **Secretary of the Tribal Land Board**" (SLB Reg:par 17).

All of these provisions reinforce and reflect a centralization of power. Co-option of members must be ratified either by the minister or by the Tribal Land Board at their respective levels. Rights of appeal must also be lodged with verbal or written consent of the District Commissioner in cases of appeal against Tribal Land Board and the recommendation of the SLB Clerk in cases of appeals against Subordinate Land Board accusations. Finally, autonomous procedures are given to Tribal/Subordinate Land Boards, on the one hand, but are taken away, on the other, by the fact that the minister and Tribal Land Boards can prescribe any special or general direction or procedures to their Subordinate Land Boards.

6.1.6.3 The Extensive Role of the Minister. In addition to the involvement of the minister in the legal provisions listed above, the extensive number of prerogatives directly attributed to the minister under the TLA further highlights the lack of decentralization. Among the most salient are the following.

(a) **Customary Land Rights.**

(1) **Certifications of Grant.** "A Certificate of Grant of any customary right . . . issued by a Land Board shall specify whatever conditions the Land Board with the approval of the Minister imposes" (Reg:par 12).

(2) See also above: **6.1.6.1,** (b) and (f); **6.1.6.2,** (a), (b), (c).

(b) **Common Law Land Rights.**

(1) **Grant of Land Rights.** "A Land Board may not grant land under this section without the consent in writing of the Minister" (TLA: par 24 and par 23).

(2) **Transfer of Rights.** "Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Land Board not to grant its consent to a transaction . . . may appeal to the Minister . . . and the Minister may make such order in the matter as he may think fit" (TLA:par 26).

(3) **Change of User.** "If disposed to allow the application, the Land Board shall submit to the Minister for its consideration" (Reg par 26); and "The Land Board may . . . refuse or allow the application provided that there shall be an appeal to the Minister against any refusal (TLA:par 27).

(4) **Prohibitions on Grant of Land.** "No land may be leased or granted to any person . . . for agricultural or horticultural purposes, save to a tribesman or to the Government of Botswana except with the prior consent of the Minister" (TLA:par 31).

(5) **Appeals Against Refusal of Transaction.** "[A]ny person aggrieved thereby shall appeal to the Minister by serving on him notice of appeal" (Reg:par 24).

All of these provisions force the centralization of control to the ministerial level. Grants of common law land rights and the conditions attaching to the grant of customary land rights require either the approval or the written consent of the minister. Transfer, change of user, prohibitions on grant of land, and appeals against transactions of common law land rights also are immediately subject to consideration or consent of the minister. The general analysis of common law land rights, as established in the TLA, indicates that, despite the official installation of Tribal/Subordinate Land Boards, a significant proportion of the minister's most valuable time must be spent on dealing with common law leases.

6.1.6.4 Recommendations. Assuming the above provisions are still in effect, it is <u>recommended</u>:

(1) That the Presidential Commission on Land Tenure consider investigating the legal constraints reported in **6.1.6.1** and recommend effective mechanisms to remedy the law.

(2) That the same Commission also consider facilitating the design of effective legal mechanisms for assisting the Land Boards in their difficult task of land resources administration, as reported in **6.1.4**.

(3) That the same Commission assess the performance of the Land Division (MLGL) and draft effective terms of reference for future operations of the division.

(4) That the minister, by virtue of the powers granted to him under the TLA (par 37b and 37c) consider prescribing the inclusion of SLB plans

and policies into Tribal Land Board main policies and the other enforcement mechanisms outlined in **6.3.2.3 (Step 1)**.

6.2 Potential Elements for Resource Management

6.2.1 Introduction. The previous section has presented a variety of constraints that affect resource management in rural communities. One fundamental constraint appears to arise from the fact that, in the process of modernizing land administration, not only the rural communities lost formal control over their resources, but many detailed controls traditionally exercised jointly by the chief and his village **kgotla** (community) can no longer operate. Thus, despite the argument that communities still are "consulted" since chiefs are requested to countersign land applications and that communities still "plan" their resources since they also propose, for example, where fences ought to run, some residents bypass the chief's authority in matters of land application (**2.6.4.1**) and community projects are paralyzed because the control over community resources does not ultimately rest within the community (see **5.3.4.3**).

Resources traditionally managed by all community members now are administered by a few SLB officers who cannot be expected to possess the same extensive knowledge of land resources and constraints as did traditional communities given their limited manpower and the large size of SLB constituencies. Furthermore, the SLBs still depend on the chiefs and headmen for consulting communities, determining the location of resources to be allocated, and settling land disputes.

Thus, modern land administration suffers from both the loss of formal control by the communities and the reduced knowledge of land resources and constraints although, in practice, a great deal of local control still is informally exercised and information provided through the traditional channels of authority and community structure. The close dependence of the modern land administration on traditional forms of management indicates that it is premature simply to discard the "old system" and that a synthesis of traditional and modern elements is likely to be more successful. From this analysis the following elements appear to offer some potential for improving management of local resources.

6.2.2 Traditional and Modern Management. The considerable extent of traditional forms of community organization (**6.1.1**) as well as traditional attitudes to resources and landownership (**6.1.1.1, 6.1.1.2**), as they still are found in those communities, should not purely and simply be written off on the grounds that they are old-fashioned. Nor should it be assumed that new institutions necessarily are more effective. The traditional system would not have survived if it did not have some value, and the case studies (**5.3.4.3**) indicate that modern institutions have not brought management of local resources any closer to the government's objectives of resource conservation and social justice.

These considerations suggest that resource management could possibly be improved by:

(a) building on existing forms of social organization and developing a more thorough understanding of the nature and potential of traditional practices for resource management;

(b) adopting a resource management strategy which blends traditional elements with modern forms of management;

(c) making the maximum use of all information and available knowledge in rural communities and integrating it into the management/planning process;

(d) promoting a true spirit of collaboration between communities and SLBs, so that local resource management becomes their joint responsibility and not the sole prerogative of the Land Boards.

6.2.3 Decentralization of Controls. Section **2.6.4** already established that the absence of effective control over community resources considerably undermines the leadership and decision-making power of rural communities. Absence of control further inhibits the communities' incentives to undertake land-use and resource-management planning in their area.

A community can be said to be in control if it can take effective decisions on the following points:

(a) general land-use zoning, i.e., where grazing and arable lands should be, where drift fences should run, whether and where land/grazing resources should be kept, forage plantation(s) attempted.

(b) whether and where grazing areas should be preserved or closed for resting;

(c) where water points should be located;

(d) what should be the maximum size for individual arable lands allocations;

(e) what should be the maximum limit of an individual's holding of livestock;

(f) what activities and resources should be allocated to particular groups;

(g) what innovations should the community undertake in the management of its resources;

(h) what contributions and by whom should be provided for developing the management of community resources;

(i) during what periods of the year and by whom should private and communal boreholes be used;

(j) what is the maximum total number of livestock which may water at the boreholes;

(k) what is the maximum number of animals any one individual should be allowed to water;

(l) what is the maximum fee a borehole owner should be allowed to charge for watering the stock of other people;

(m) where and what facilities (schools, healthposts, offices, etc.) should be introduced in the community;

(n) whether or not, according to assessment of performance, residents want to keep or change their extension staff.

(See also Sandford 1980:50-52.)

On virtually all of these points, rural communities cannot currently make effective decisions nor are they in full control of any of these issues. Community inputs are limited to suggestions or proposals (e.g., drift fencing), but ultimately all land/water locations and allocations and drift fencing projects are subject to formal application and approval by the Land Boards. Thus, effective decentralization of these controls to the community level could become a powerful means for both strengthening leadership and community decision processes and raising the communities' incentive to plan and manage their own area.

6.2.4 Comprehensive Information at SLB Constituency Level. This study also shows that, while considerable information and knowledge can be drawn from the active participation of community residents, to be effective resource management must also encompass a broader geographic area (see **6.1.5.6**). On the other hand, the provision of general infrastructure and services, the demarcation of communities and grazing boundaries, and the integration of cattlepost residents are all issues that can be settled only within the broader context of several communities. On the other hand, there is evidence that SLBs have little ecological knowledge of their areas, do not know most remote lands areas in their constituencies, and tend to confine their visits to residential areas. The beginning of a solution to these problems could be found in encouraging and supporting the SLBs in developing a more thorough comprehensive knowledge of the communal areas in their respective constituencies. Most of this knowledge can be acquired by systematic consultation with local residents and by gathering with them the following information in each community of the SLB constituency:

(a) systematic identification with and by local residents of land-use needs and constraints in the arable and livestock sectors;

(b) water supply characteristics and shortages;

(c) characteristics of local infrastructure and problems;

(d) population characteristics of permanent residents in cattleposts and lands areas with their reasons for residing permanently in those locations and under what conditions would they rather settle elsewhere;

(e) characteristics of rural industrial potential and constraints;

(f) inventory of additional resource requirements/constraints as applicable (e.g., wildlife or fishing requirements, firewood shortages, handicraft material, tree conservation, etc.);

(g) basic understanding of community organization and residents' attitudes to management of community resources;

(h) basic assessment of resource management capacity of village institutions.

This information collected in close collaboration with community residents can be supplemented by compiling other technical documentation available from District, Agriculture, and various Headquarters Departments (e.g., inventory and sketch maps of drift fencing projects from the AD(LR); soil surveys data; range ecology monitoring; water points and agricultural surveys; rural industrial surveys; aerial photography interpretations; and any other pertinent study to the area). Finally, objectives and strategies presented in District and national plans can also provide valuable general directions for local planning.

This exercise may ultimately provide both most answers to current SLB concerns (see **6.1.5.3**) and elements of solution for the demarcation of community and grazing boundaries, with the appreciable advantage of involving the rural dwellers in finding solutions to their own problems.

6.3 Recommended Elements for a Resource Management Strategy

6.3.1 Preliminary Note. The urgency of providing the necessary technical and training support to the Land Boards cannot be too strongly emphasized. The small effort currently devoted to local resource management and land-use planning in communal areas may lead steadily to ecological disaster. And, if one considers the amount of financial support allocated to the cattle industry in comparison to that allocated to planning and managing land resources, it would not be entirely wrong to say that disaster is actually subsidized. It is therefore important that land-use and resource-management issues be seriously addressed and the necessary means provided in order to alleviate these problems.

6.3.2 Elements of a Strategy. Any resource management strategy under the existing legal structure of land administration is likely to face the basic dilemma of having to achieve what traditional communities seemed to accomplish quite well, with only two to three SLB officers operating in areas almost as large as subdistricts. The decline of community control and planning mechanisms for managing local resources results in the SLBs having the difficult task of developing satisfactory knowledge of ecological, social, and political conditions necessary to plan effectively the communal areas. These are some of the facts confronting resource management attempts. If resource management is to improve, all means must be taken both to integrate rural communities in local resource management planning and to provide the necessary support to the Land Boards.

From this study, it appears that resource management could be improved considerably by decentralizing controls to the community level, including

relevant traditional elements and the knowledge of rural residents in the planning exercise and gathering comprehensive information in broader SLB constituencies with the active participation of the residents.

In relation to these potential elements, it is **recommended** that a resource management pilot project be initiated in the Mahalapye Subordinate Land Board area. This area appears to be appropriate, since Mahalapye is the second major center of Central District, has high livestock concentration, and extensive arable agriculture. Mahalapye SLB has also had to deal with a number of critical land-use issues (e.g., Moshopa) and may therefore have developed more experience than other SLBs.

6.3.2.1 Resource Management Committee Membership. It is **recommended** that:

(a) A Resource Management Committee be established, formed of all SLB members, two additional members (to be appointed), one DO(L) (possibly the new one to be recruited for the subdistrict).

(b) The DO and Tribal Authority (Mahalapye) serve as advisory members to the committee in customary matters.

6.3.2.2 Fundamental Objective. The fundamental objective of the project is to investigate, study, and gather information in full collaboration with community residents with intent of improving planning and management of local resources in the SLB constituency.

6.3.2.3 Plan of Operations. In order to achieve this objective, the three following steps are **recommended:**

STEP 1: Decentralization of Controls. That the necessary measures be taken, by the Minister of Local Government, the Main Land Board, Council, and District authorities for facilitating the decentralization of the controls listed in **6.2.2** to the communities of Mahalapye SLB constituency.

Decentralization of controls is quite unpopular among some policy-makers. In addition, some controls relating more directly to controlling stock quota per owner may also appear quite unrealistic since the general population (including many important national policy-makers) currently does not see resources as finite. This problem appears to arise partly from the fact that current grazing areas are fairly extensive and not well demarcated and, therefore, no one can really see the finite nature of the resource, but partly also from the fact that residents have no power to enforce any restriction in their area. The management of Sajwe Dam (**5.3.4.3**) appears to indicate, in contrast, that when a group is functional and in full control of its facility, members do find ways and means to impose the necessary restrictions. It can therefore be argued that a community with functional institutions and provided with adequate enforcement power in a well-demarcated area may equally find ways and means of preserving its resources.

A. Unit of Enforcement. For effective decentralization, both the unit and the strategy of enforcement must be defined.

(1) **VDC/Kgotla.** The VDC, of which the chief (and his **kgotla**) is an **ex officio** member, already is the official village body responsible for planning and coordinating village development. The VDC must, therefore, be given the executive power to take effective decisions with the villagers on planning and managing their resources.

(2) **Subordinate Land Board.** The SLB, as outlined in **Step 2**, becomes the joint planning and resource management body working in close collaboration with rural communities to stimulate local planning and providing guidance in conformity with the directives of the Tribal Land Board.

B. **Enforcement Mechanisms.** Community decisions, to be effective, must derive from the power actually to enforce those decisions. Thus, the following mechanisms appear necessary and are therefore **recommended** for empowering the VDCs to enforce community decisions:

(1) that community plans drawn in collaboration with the SLB, as outlined in **Step 2g** and further revised (**Step 3b**), be ratified by the Tribal Land Board and made official community management policies;

(2) that any further modification of the community plan be made with the consent of both the community at large and the SLB, and that the Tribal Land Board be notified;

(3) that the VDC become the official responsible body accountable to the Land Boards and District Council for ensuring the implementation of the community plan by all village residents;

(4) that both Tribal and Subordinate Land Boards discharge their duties and obligations granted to them under the Act and Regulations, subject to approved community plans.

STEP 2: Rural Communities as Resource Management Base--that rural communities (as defined in 2.2), with their respective village, lands, and grazing locations, become the primary base for resource management. The findings show that the farmers under the traditional management system adapt to environmental constraints (**3.2.2**), and currently there is evidence in all communities studied that farmers themselves still know best when fences ought to be built, grazing land protected, water preserved, or arable land extended. The most successful terms of current management also are those based on community/group-wide consensus (e.g., drift fencing, communal wells) because the traditional ward system still is the best acknowledged means of organizing common activities pertaining to the general membership. These factors give, therefore, good grounds for recommending that communities become the primary base for resource management.

In this second step, it is **recommended** that the Resource Management Committee:

(1) Organize a first round of consultations with each village government body (i.e., VDC/chief, plus extension workers) in order to inform them of the Resource Management Program and establish a schedule for future consultations with community-wide membership.

(2) Organize, at the set time and dates, a second round of consultations in order to explain and discuss the program with the communities at large.

(3) Conduct additional information sessions, as necessary, until the residents fully understand the aim and objectives of the program and its implications.

(4) Also adequately inform the communities about the roles, purpose, and functions of Land Boards and other institutions involved in the management of local resources (e.g., land utilization, conservation committees, range ecology, DOL, AO(LR).

(5) Brief the communities on objectives and content of current district and national land policies.

(6) Emphasize at all stages of the information/consultation process that resource management is the joint responsibility of both residents and Land Boards, and continually demonstrate to the residents that this is so (see **6.2.1**).

(7) Encourage the communities to produce a simple "mental" resource management plan for each community area, based on the community's perceptions of spatial distribution of local resources and on general consensus, which could, at a later stage, be sketched by the committee. (The list provided in **6.2.3** could serve as a guide.)

(8) Compile, in the meantime, any other pertinent information available on the constituency, as outlined in **6.2.3.**

(9) Summarize and make a sketch map of all community plans; note all requirements and constraints mentioned and locate them geographically on a constituency map (e.g., water sources, arable requirements, grazing constraints, land shortages, possible new settlements, ~~etc.~~).

(10) Compile and analyze all the findings as outlined in **Step 3.**

STEP 3: Drafting of Resource Management Proposals--that in accordance with the findings and analysis, the Resource Management Committee attempt to draft resource management proposals for the constituency. It is not possible, at this stage, to tell precisely what these proposals might be. However, these proposals ought to aim at either enhancing resource conservation in the overall constituency or alleviating the specific constraints identified. Very likely some of these proposals will deal with: drift-fencing management, location and management of water sources, demarcation of community and grazing boundaries; issues dealing with planning the livestock sector, reducing livestock numbers, improving livestock management, rehabilitation of the range

capacity; introduction of forage crops, control of poisonous plants (mogau), land/water shortages, etc.

The compilation and analysis of the global findings will likely show that a number of community plans may not be entirely compatible with the overall constituency planning requirements. It is therefore **recommended** that, before drafting proposals, the Resource Management Committee:

(1) Present the results of its analysis to each community in the constituency.

(2) Present and discuss incompatible community plans with the communities concerned and clearly explain the reasons why/how their plans ought to be modified.

(3) Also consult with the appropriate officers and staff (and other resource persons) directly implicated in all proposals to be drafted.

(4) When community plans are compatible and in agreement with constituency planning, resources be allocated in accordance with respective community plans, unless counter to government or Land Board regulations.

6.3.2.4 Implementation Requirements. In order to implement this project, a number of requirements must be fulfilled.

(1) **Political Support.** One controversial, yet quite powerful, element proposed clearly is the decentralization of controls to the local level. It must be reemphasized, however, that this step is not intended to take away any power or authority from the Land Boards, which are by law the acknowledged custodians of the land. Land resources still are common patrimony of all Batswana. Given the appreciable knowledge rural residents have of their areas, every Motswana, the work of the Land Boards could ultimately benefit from the active involvement of rural communities in planning and managing communal resources. Yet, rural residents will not likely take serious part in local planning unless they can make effective decisions and have some control over their resources. In this perspective it is therefore **recommended** that **the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, the Tribal Land Board, Council and district authorities give full support to the decentralization of controls (listed in 6.2.3) to the communities of Mahalapye SLB constituency, so as both to strengthen the leadership and decision-making power of village institutions in those communities and to raise their incentive to plan and manage community resources in collaboration with the Land Boards (see 2.6.4 and 6.2.3).**

(2) **Staffing and Transport.** For implementing this project, it is **recommended** that:

(a) two additional members be appointed on the Mahalapye SLB for at least the period of the fieldwork;

(b) a DO(L) be recruited to provide guidance and technical support to the SLB team;

(c) the DO(L) and at least two SLB members (interchangeable) constitute the fieldwork team;

(d) the team be provided with a 4X4 vehicle for its fieldwork.

(3) **Training Requirements and Material.** Given the extensive consultations suggested and the foreign character the resource management concept has among rural residents, it is important that field workers be well prepared, information sessions cautiously planned, and training material carefully selected. It is therefore **recommended** that:

(a) The Resource Management Committee, under the guidance of the DO(L) and in consultation with the Main Land Board, Tribal Authority, and other appropriate resource persons, first make a clear and simple summary of:

- current land policies;

- specific roles and functions of the Land Boards;

- roles and functions of conservation committees and range ecology and Land Resources Officers;

and make sure that there is consensus among themselves on all these points.

(b) Consultation/information sessions on land utilization, resource conservation, or other be planned and designed in collaboration with Non-Formal Education staff or other competent resource persons and on the basis of appropriate extension material, e.g., **A Handbook for Facilitators** (J. Stanley, K. Rick, and F. Zufferey, 1983).

(c) Information sessions primarily aim at stimulating the general participation in land-use discussions with the villagers and avoid confronting the communities with preconceived plans.

(d) Appropriate visual aids be utilized (e.g., posters, flip charts, slides) to illustrate various types of land use, instead of maps which virtually no resident understands.

6.3.3 The Unit of Planning

6.3.3.1 A Definition. This topic was for the first time addressed in a Land Use Planning Seminar (RDU 1982:2-3) where there was general agreement that land-use planning in communal areas ought to be defined in terms of a community, although the term "community" remained unspecified. This study suggests that rural communities, with their respective village, lands, and grazing locations, be the base for resource management for the reasons mentioned in **6.3.2.3, Step 2**, and that, in addition, more comprehensive information ought to be compiled at SLB constituency level in order to guide community planning from a broader geographic area. Thus, in this approach, the planning "unit"

no longer is a static or a monolithic entity such as a village or subdistrict area, but rather becomes a dynamic planning process initiated in rural communities--the resource management base--gradually expanding to SLB constituency levels and guided by the ecological and institutional resource potential of and according to the constraints of the constituency.

6.3.3.2 Principle of Flexibility. This process requires a great deal of flexibility at both community and SLB constituency levels until communities can be clearly defined and demarcated, and because each SLB constituency will develop plans dictated by a variety of constraints, means, and resources that may not necessarily be identical to those in other constituencies. It is therefore important that SLBs not be stifled by rigid or unilateral policies from their Main Land Board or ministry, but rather be supported and guided in that process.

Constituencies are no more static or monolithic than the community base. Resource management findings may well require adjusting current SLB "boundaries" to constraints, resources, or management needs which may presently overlap in several constituencies. No clear map of SLB boundaries has yet been drawn for the district. SLB constituencies are based on old tribal territories which not only overlap with District Council, tribal, and district administrations, but ultimately have little meaning for resource conservation, planning, or management. In relation to this problem it is recommended that **the SLB constituency boundaries (to be soon revised and mapped) be drawn in accordance with resource management findings around manageable numbers of well-demarcated communities with related resources clearly defined, forming preferably homogeneous ecological units or homogeneous resource management units rather than areas based on tribal ties.**

Thus, flexibility at all levels must be the rule, and it is strongly advocated that, whatever the "planning unit" may ultimately be, it not be a standard unit used uniformly throughout the communal areas.

6.3.4 Concluding Note. A common emphasis often expressed in current ministerial, district, and Land Board circles is "to design a good land-use plan" or even "to brief government," expecting that government will suddenly produce a "Grand Design" which can then be implemented at every level. The proponents of this theory clearly expect a ready-made plan, which can be formalized and then enforced at the local level, to be **the** answer to land use and resource management problems. This report also emphasizes the need for planning communal resources but, instead of awaiting a ready-made plan to use, it advocates actually **making the plans** with the full knowledge and participation of local communities and to extend it gradually to broader management units. Decentralization of controls and active participation of rural residents are the key elements in this approach which can both raise incentive in local planning and management and provide most answers to the SLBs' current concerns.

APPENDIX 1

CENTRAL: RESEARCH GUIDELINES ON LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

1. Kgotla Background Information

Most of this information will have to be collected from respective headmen, except in Section III. Prior to interviewing the headmen concerned, however, a detailed inventory of all **kgotla** and sub-**kgotla** should be drawn.

I. Kgotla Inventory

1. List names of all **kgotla** and respective sub-**kgotla**.
2. Name of each headman and sub-headman.
3. List all advisers to each **kgotla** and sub-**kgotla**.

II. Headmen Interview

The interview itself could include some of the following information.

A. Historical Background of the Kgotla

1. Any information known on the origin and past history of his people since they settled in the village (where they came from, why they chose that area, original families, chronological chieftainship, dates, assimilation and settlement conflicts, etc.).
2. What is the present membership in his **kgotla**?
3. Have "foreign" families joined his people? Who are they? Why and when?

B. Personal Profile

1. Give a general background of the headman, i.e., age/occupation/education/number of years in office/why and how did he become headman (birth, elected, appointed, etc.)?
2. Observe his status. Does he give the impression to be in a better financial position than the average citizen (type of house/farming implements/tractor), car/shops/general appearance, etc. (other status symbols)?

3. Is he or is he not related to the royal family, local chief, other chiefs, headmen, MPs, government or civil servants, etc.?

   If yes, what degree of relationship do they have with him and what is their occupation?

4. Does he have any other membership in other village committees or local institutions (FC, VDC, Fencing Group, etc.)?

   If yes, in what institution and what position does he occupy?

C. **Jurisdiction**

1. What are his essential duties as head/sub-headman? (List all.)

2. What kinds of cases fall directly under his jurisdiction and what are those that must be referred to higher authority? (List; explain; give examples.)

3. How many cases were reported to him during the past year and what cases were they? (Describe specifically all cases.)

4. How often does he hold meetings with his people? (Weekly, monthly . . . .)

5. What are the issues that require **kgotla** meetings? (List all; explain.)

D. **Relationship to Other Kgotla**

1. To what extent does his **kgotla** collaborate with the others and the main **kgotla**?

2. Find out what tasks they do collaborate and for what ones they operate separately? (List all; explain.)

3. Find out to what extent collaboration is effective. If there are conflicts, what are the reasons for those frictions (political, tribal, competition, leadership, other)?

4. What impression does the headman have of the chief's influence and leadership in the community? (If good, average, or poor, ask and list all reasons at all times.)

E. **Problems**

1. Ask and list all problems the headman faces in his position and find out causes of those problems. (Such a question will require a lot of probing. Virtually never does a leadership face no problem.)

2. Find out what solutions could be envisaged. (List; explain.)

III. Authority

In order to get some sense of the kind of authority and respect the headman (including chiefs) has among his people, it would be good to interview informally a number of people (15 or more) in each **kgotla** and try to find out from them:

- how good, influential, and responsible their headman is;
- how much they like/dislike him and why;
- what kind of problem they may have with his leadership performance and why. (If no problem, also ask reasons.)

This kind of question could be brought about in a very informal way during various social gatherings (e.g., "parties," dances at private homes, "shebeens," or any other suitable social occasions).

From informal talks, new informants often are identified and, depending on the importance of the information discussed, you may find it worthwhile to check or complement that information with the very people concerned.

Equally important is to recheck that information with your "key informants," listed in your private check list.

Note:

Success in gathering this kind of information requires a great deal of tact, insight, and common sense. Success will depend on several important factors (skills) you may want to develop:

1. Your ability to assess the climate of a general conversation, i.e., your ability to sense if, when, and how such topics could best be brought into the conversation without offending anybody present or causing anyone to withdraw. To that effect, a reasonable knowledge (as good as possible) of the group has proved helpful to avoid asking the wrong questions to the wrong people at the wrong time.

2. Success will also depend on your own perspicacity and insight into issues being discussed, so as to identify the root causes of a problem and discard what is irrelevant.

3. Finally, the degree of reliability of such information will largely depend on the extent of your determination to clarify those issues, by making the necessary cross-checks and follow-ups in order to reach maximum accuracy.

2. VDC: Background Information

I. Origin and Membership

1. When was the first VDC established? [date].

2. Establish chronological membership of Executive Officers from beginning to date with respective occupation. (Elections are normally held every two years.)

3. Establish present complete membership:

   - elected members (list all with respective occupation);
   - ex-officio members (list all with respective occupation);
   - co-opted members (list all with respective occupation).

4. Who and how many present members have multiple memberships? (List all and specify what memberships.)

II. VDC Interview

A. Self-Help, Fundamental Objective

1. Find out what is the general understanding of "self-help" among VDC membership. (How do they understand it; how do they define it?.)

2. How does VDC organize self-help assistance from villagers? (Describe their strategy with all successive stages of implementation.)

3. What VDC members have done/do to set an example of responsible self-help among the community? (Be specific.)

4. In their opinion, how appropriate/inappropriate is a self-help approach to generate development in the community? And why?

C. Committee Status

1. Find out how often VDC meets (weekly, monthly . . .).

2. Establish the average attendance to meetings (check minutes).

3. What are presently the most urgent needs VDC has identified in the community? (List all in order of priority.)

4. Which of those needs is VDC trying to meet first?

5. How does VDC try to meet those needs? (Specify all projects being implemented and any other strategy adopted.)

6. What financial resources has VDC raised to date in the community and how? (Check financial records.)

7. To what extent are local skilled people being employed in community projects? (Check if previous skill survey has been conducted and take records.)

8. What successful projects have so far been completed? (Describe.)

9. What were projects undertaken that failed? And why?

Council

10. What additional projects have been suggested to Council so far? (Describe and indicate date of submission response and stage of implementation.)

11. Was the Councillor briefed on those projects? (If yes, indicate when and find out how important a role he did play in them.)

12. Has VDC requested any other financial or technical assistance from Council? (If so, what assistance, for what projects, date, response and action from Council.)

13. Has VDC contacted any other government agencies (extension, health, education, etc.) to improve services in the community? (List all agencies consulted, date of consultation, and progress made.)

14. How often does VDC report to **kgotla** on its activities?

C. **The Role of Coordination and Management**

First - From Executive Officers

1. Find out from Executive Officers what is their overall Village Development Plan. (Describe in detail, specify priorities, long-term, short-term objectives etc.)

2. Find out from them the specific role every village organization is expected to play in their village plan. (Among village organizations, leaders are included: chiefs, headmen, councillors, ACDO, AD, FWE, VA, HT, FC, VHT, SWC, PTA, BCW, 4B, YWCA, Land Board representatives, and possibly others.)

3. Ask and list all difficulties VDC faces in its effort to coordinate the activities of their village organizations. (State all problems raised and try to find out why they arise.)

Second - From Village Leaders

In a second stage, cross-check that information collected from the Executives with each village organization leader in the community.

Find out from each leader how effective VDC coordination is, and what are, according to them, the problems involved. List all and be as specific as possible.

Third - From the Community at Large

If VDCs are established to "serve the community" and meet "the real needs of the community," the community alone is in a position to tell objectively whether VDC actions actually reflect what people want. For that some clipboard work may be useful. A random number of villagers (10 families or more per **kgotla**) should be interviewed and asked some of the following questions:

1. How important is VDC for you? And why?
2. In your opinion, what role should VDC play in the community?
3. Are current VDC projects meeting your needs? (If yes, how?)
4. Were you informed and consulted on such projects? (If yes, how?)
5. What does self-help mean to you? (Definition.)
6. In your opinion, is it important to have self-help activities taking place in the village? And why?
7. Do you take part in self-help projects? (If yes, in what way? If no, why not?)
8. In your opinion, how could VDC be made more effective?

NOTE:

- For this section, use questionnaire provided as a basic tool, but also cross-check that information with informal talks.
- Keep in mind and consult again, Note on Kgotla Guidelines.

CENTRAL: VDC BACKGROUND INFO QUESTIONNAIRE
(to be used with guidelines in Third Section)

NO. .....

Village: ..... Kgotla: .....

NAME: ..... Enum: ..... Date: .....

1) How important is VDC to you? very ..... medium ..... not at all .....
   Reasons: .....
   .....

2) In your opinion, what is the role of VDC in the community?
   .....
   .....
   .....

3) Are current VDC projects meeting your needs?
   Yes ..... How? .....
   Partially ..... Why? .....
   No ..... Why? .....

4) Were you informed and consulted on such projects?
   Yes ..... How? .....
   No .....

5) What does self-help mean to you? .....
   .....
   .....
   .....

6) In your opinion, is it important to have self-help activities taking place in the village?
   Yes ..... Why? .....
   .....
   No ..... Why? .....
   .....

7) Do you take part in self-help projects?
   Yes ..... In what way? .....
   .....
   No ..... Why not? .....
   .....

8) In your opinion, how could VDC be made more effective?
   .....
   .....

9) Do you wish to add any other comments on VDC activities or performance?
   .....
   .....

3. Farmers Committee (FC): Background Information

A. Origin

1. Why did FC start in the village?
2. When was its early start (date), and when did it actually begin to operate?
3. Who were the founding members? (List.)
4. Why and how were they chosen? (Give background, occupation, and multiple membership of those individuals.)

B. Status of Present Committee

1. Establish present membership. (List all committee members and give respective functions/duties in the group.)
2. Has anyone resigned from the committee? (If yes, list who they are and find out from them why.)
3. What is their contribution to date (cash, material, other)?
4. How many sub-groups does FC manage (e.g., fencing groups, dam groups, smallstock groups, tick control groups, 4B)?
5. What are the projects implemented and future projects? (List in chronological order with dates and describe briefly.)
6. What assistance did FC receive from regional staff and when (cash, material, technical advice, demonstrations, etc.)?
7. What training did FC receive to date and when?
8. Translate bylaws (on separate sheet).

C. Management

1. What is the essential role of FC and what are its responsibilities? (List and describe.)
2. How does FC organize itself to carry out this role? (Describe, explain strategy, witness performance.)
3. Who plays the most influential role in FC and why? (List, give background and multiple membership.)

D. Relation to Other Groups

1. How does FC relate to VDC, chiefs, headmen? (Explain.)
2. What is the degree of collaboration/conflict between them? (Explain, give examples, witness performance.)

E. Problems

1. What were/are the major problems faced by FC from beginning to date? (List all.)

2. Why did such problems arise? (Explain.)

3. What is the most crucial problem they are facing today and why?

4. What are possible solutions?

4. Agricultural Sub-Groups: Background Information

Note: Agricultural sub-groups in Central District generally include: tick control groups, smallstock dosing groups, dam groups, B/H Syndicates, cooperatives, 4B, normally all under FC management. On those groups, except for fencing groups, the following information would be useful?

1. Date group began.

2. Membership of group (number of registered members).

3. How is group managed? (Specify if by FC or by own committee.)

4. If sub-group is under FC, find out relationship between FC and group and possible problems.

5. How much is joining fee?

6. How many registered members have paid their fees?

7. Total funds raised to date and material contributed by group.

8. Facilities and implements used by group. (Describe implements, i.e., use of dip tanks, spray race, crushes, dosing guns, hand pump.)

9. What are their dipping/dosing fees (if applicable)?

10. How often do they use that facility? (Give dipping/dosing records for the past year.)

11. How much stock did it involve? (Give number of cattle/smallstock treated in the past year.)

12. Describe project status. (Indicate stage, interest stage, proposed stage, planning stage, application to Sub-Land Board, completed, etc.)

13. Do they use other facilities or equipment (e.g., from veterinary offices, AD, DAO's Office, other)?

14. Have they received any grant assistance or do they intend to apply for it? (Specify.)

15. What training has group received to date? (Indicate any technical support, demonstrations, and dates.)

16. Translate bylaws, if any (on separate sheet).

17. Have they any other related project (e.g., the same group may have a fencing project, dams, or operate with joint borehole allocation from Land Boards)?

18. What are the most crucial problems they presently face? (List all and explain.)

19. What are possible solutions envisaged?

5. Fencing Group: Background Information

A. Origin

1. Why did a fencing group start in the village?

2. When did it start?

3. Who were the founding members? (List.)

4. Who were/are the major personalities in the group? (Give background of each of those individuals.)

5. What influence did they have in the group? (What was/is their major contribution or area of influence?)

B. Group Status

1. When did the group apply to Sub-Land Board?

2. When was the fencing project surveyed and by whom?

3. Present membership. (List all members and indicate where they stay.)

4. Has anyone withdrawn from group? (If yes, list who they are and find out from them why they left the group.)

5. What are the fees imposed on the participants or households?

6. What is the group contribution to date (cash, material)?

7. What assistance did the group receive (grant, material, other)?

8. What training did members/group follow?

9. Translate bylaws.

10. Length of the fence (to be done with coordinator).

11. How often does the group meet? (Check records if available.)

C. **Management and Technology**

1. How is the group managed (own committee, FC other)? (List management committee members; give background of each individual.)

2. How does group organize itself to fence? (Explain.)

3. What are the methods used? (Describe.)

4. List and indicate skills of all skilled or professional people in the group.

D. **Group Relations**

1. How does group relate to FC, VDC, chief, headmen? (Explain.)

2. What is the degree of collaboration/conflict between them? (Explain; give examples; witness performance.)

E. **Problems**

1. What were/are the major problems encountered by group from the beginning to date? (List all problems.)

2. Why did such problems arise?

3. What are possible solutions?

6. Voluntary Village Organizations: Information

Note: Among these organizations, the most common ones include PTA, BCW, YWCA, 4B (if not managed by FC), Red Cross, VHC, SWC, and possibly others. From these, some of the following inquiries could provide useful information:

1. How often does the institution meet? (Check records when available.)

2. Date organization started and by whom.

3. Establish present committee. (List; give occupation of each member and multiple membership.)

4. Why did such an organization develop in the community?

5. What is their essential role and major activities? (List and describe all projects.)

6. What have they so far achieved?

7. What are their future plans?

8. What resources do they have (cash, material), and how do they raise them?

9. What level of training and expertise does the organization have? (Specify training and skilled members and what skills.)

10. How do they relate to VDC, chiefs (headmen), and what support do they get from them?

11. What are the major problems they face and why?

12. What are possible solutions?

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH GUIDELINES

Central District

1. **Basic Map**

   1. Name and draw approximately each lands area on map (to be provided).

   2. Name and draw approximately adjacent grazing areas of the village.

   3. Identify and locate approximately the significant water sources in each area, including cattleposts (types and names).

2. **Arable Lands** (Interview of best identified respondents for each area)

   1. Who is predominantly plowing in each respective area? (Specify **kgotla**, groups, other patterns.)

   2. How and why did those people start plowing in that particular area? (Find basic history of each area--was it designated by chief [who, when], other factors involved.)

   3. How was/is inherited land divided and redistributed among family members? (Describe--who gets what, what is the woman's share as compared to that of other family members.)

   4. Currently, how is arable land allocated? (Describe procedure.)

   5. What influence/role do the headmen, chiefs, VDC have in current land allocation?

6. To what extent is land self-allocated? What do chiefs and other community leaders think about this form of allocation?

7. Can one apply for land anywhere in the village lands area? (If not, establish conditions, criteria, and procedures currently used.)

3. **Grazing Areas** (Key respondents of each area)

1. Give basic history of each grazing area. (See item 2.2 above.)

2. Which are those associated with the village? Since when?

3. Which are the most recent (dates) and how were they obtained (explain)?

4. Are any grazing areas shared with other villages (which, when)?

5. Is there a common grazing pattern from one area to the other (from which area to which area and when)?

6. Is there any control over grazing resources (**modisa/naga**)? (If yes, who directs it, who enforces it?)

7. What are people's perceptions of overgrazing? What are their suggestions to overcome it?

4. **Water** (Key respondents of each area)

1. From your map:

- list by lands area all essential water sources;
- indicate name of source/location, type, ownership;
- specify use (domestic, communal, both); use chart provided.

2. Establish for each lands area what succession/rotation of water sources was used throughout the year (i.e., during plowing season, between planting and harvesting, after harvest).

3. Are those shared:

- with other lands areas (which, when)?
- with cattlepost residents (which, when)?
- with other villages (which, when)?

4. Are common decisions taken to move/rotate from one source to the other? (If yes, how are they taken and who enforces them?)

5. From your inventory (in item 1--sheet provided), take one type of each source and establish:

- what decision process was involved in opening such sources;
- who was responsible for doing the work;
- under whose leadership and supervision.

6. Currently is the construction of wells and other water sources the responsibility of each lands area or of the whole community?

7. How do people go about opening new water sources? (Indicate who makes the decisions, who implements, who supervises, and who is responsible for maintenance.)

8. Are there stock-watering limitations at any water source or can one water as many cattle as one wants? (If yes, indicate the number of authorized stock for each source applicable, how those decisions are made, who enforces them and how.)

5. **Specific Problems** (Maape-Kgagodi)

1. Establish the detailed history of the village boreholes.

2. Identify all major problems that have led to the current lack of water in the village (leadership competition, roles of Council, Senior Tribal Authority, etc.).

6. **Conflicts**

With the help of the chiefs' allocation inventory, identify cases of conflict and interview the implicated people to find out causes of conflict. (Cross-check this information with other potential respondents.)

7. **Questionnaire**

In order to have a more objective opinion of the Land Board's perception, involvement, and performance in the community, apply randomly provided questionnaires (10 or more families per **kgotla**).

LAND AREA _____ **WATER SOURCE CHART** (to be used in section 4)

								[for private sources only]			
NAME	**TYPE**	**OWNERSHIP**	**USAGE**	**TIME USED**	**WHO BUILT IT?**	**DATE BUILT**	**DATE OF ACQUI-SITION**	**FEES CHARGED**	**SHARING**	**TIME USED**	
source/ location	dam pan b/h	communal private	domestic livestock both	(months) from to	names, agencies				By whom? area/ village/ c.p.	(months) from	to
1.											
2.											
3.											
4.											
5.											
6.											
7.											
8.											
9.											
10.											
12.											
13.											
14.											
15.											
16.											
17.											

NOTES:

COMPLEMENTARY QUESTIONNAIRE ON RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (CENTRAL)

NOTE: This information would need to be gathered from the community at large, i.e., ±10 families per lands area) and from all community leaders, chief, chairmen of all community organizations, and extension staff.

NAME: _____ VILLAGE: _____ NO._____

OCCUPATION: _____ LANDS AREA: _____

ENUMERATOR: _____ DATE: _____

LANDS:

1. Would you like to settle permanently at the lands in the future?

   Yes _____ No _____ Why? _____

   _____

2. If services (water, roads, schools, clinics) were provided at the lands, would you rather stay permanently at the lands?

   Yes _____ No _____ Why? _____

   _____

3. Should government provide more services at the lands _____ village _____?

   Which ones? Village _____

   Lands _____

LIVESTOCK:

4. What is currently done by government to help livestock owners? (List all.)

   _____

   _____

5. Do these services help? Yes _____ No _____

   If yes, how? _____

   If no, why? _____

6. What are the most important things government ought to do to help livestock owners? (List in order of priority.)

_____

_____

_____

6a. How should such livestock services be provided? (Explain.)

_____

_____

6b. How should such services be managed?

by government _____ community _____ both _____ other (specify) _____

Government: Who? _____

How? _____

_____

Community: Who? _____

How? _____

_____

Other: Who? _____

How? _____

_____

OTHER RESOURCES:

7. Is firewood plentiful? _____ average? _____ scarce? _____

If scarce, how and who should control firewood resources?

Who? _____

How? _____

8. Are you aware of any mineral deposit in your area? Yes _____ No _____

Which? _____ Where _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

8a. Who should exploit them? _____

8b. How? _____

_____

LAND BOARD:

9. Is the current Land Board system of land and water allocation:

BETTER _____ or WORSE _____

than the traditional system?

Why? (Explain.) _____

_____

_____

10. What are the essential **qualities** and **defects**/shortcomings you identify in SLB?

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

11. How often did SLB come to visit your area during the last year?

_____

12. **Any other comments?**

APPENDIX 2

WARDS AND HEADMEN CHARACTERISTICS IN KGAGODI AND MOSHOPA VILLAGES

KGAGODI WARD CHARACTERISTICS

Ward	Headman	Headmanship Succession Since 1902	Original Families[c]	Foreign Families[a]	Family Units[b,c]	Total Population[b,c]
Kgagodi	Monnatlala	Phalalo; Kgagodi (1915; Molokoane (1953); Monnatlala (11/53)	2	3	22	151
Modibana	Tshereletso Kentshitswe	Ditshabo; Kepaletwe; Tshereletso	6	2	37	226
Moetlapele	Kgomotso Pitso	K.Pitso Moetlapele; Senyopa Sapeng Marekwa; Kgomotso Pitso	2	0	19	175
Mhaladi	Rankwaela Noge	Tselapedi; Mhaladi; Kabasia; Noge; Gabatsoswe; Rankwaela Noge	3	2	30	218
Mokatane	Kehakgametse Modikane	Nkape; Moganane; Mokatane Kehakgametse	7	0	14	52
Mosokwane	Selelo Mokaathobolo	Mokaathobolo Toiwa; Pharebatho (1943); Selelo Mokaathobolo (1971)	3+	3	41	241
Khapane	Kedisaletse (vacant)	assimilated to Mosokwane	8	2	-	-
Lekjame	Kenyatse	Kgosi Mone Thadibe; Tshikini; Moroke; Kenyatse	4	0	21	143
Magwaneng	Kelapile Lesolame	Magwaneng; Lesolame; Kelapile Lesolame	9	0	15	98
		TOTALS	**44+**	**12**	**199**	**1,304**

+ Exceeds number; others not remembered.

[a] From headmen's interview.

[b] From the Fencing Study (see Zufferey 1982).

[c] Family unit defined as the "small **lelwapa**," i.e., each family unit in the yard ("big **lelwapa**").

[d] Includes only permanent residents and dependent schoolchildren; cattlepost residents excluded.

KGAGODI HEADMEN: PROFILE

Name	Born	Nature of Headmanship	Years in Office	Education
Monnatlala (Kgagodi W.)	1911	royal descent	28	-
Kentshitswe T. (Modibana W.)	1939	royal descent	6	Form II
Pitso K. (Moetlapele W.)	1932	royal descent	1	-
Noge R. (Mhaladi W.)	1929	royal descent	8	Old Standard 6
Moganane K. (Mokatane W.)	1928	royal descent	33	Old Standard 6
Mokaathobolo S. (Mosokwane W.)	1920	royal descent	10	-
Kedisaletse (Khapane W.)	?	royal descent	absent, administered by Mosekwane	
Lesolame (Magwaneng W.)	1915	royal descent	16	-
Kenyatse (Lekama W.)	1919	royal descent	11	-

MOSHOPA WARD CHARACTERISTICS

Ward	Headman	Headmanship Succession	Original Families[a]	Foreign Families[a]	Family Units[b,c]	Total Population[b,d]
Ksosing (Main W.)	Morulanyi Lekgetho	Moshopa; Morulanyi; Lekgetho; Lechaina; Morulanyi Lekgetho	4	4	21	100
Shabang	Letsibogo Mompati	Raisaka; Kebonye Raisaka; 7 years vacant; Letsibogo Mompati	3+	5	included in Toteng	
Toteng	Kgosietsile Ramukapane	Toteng; Moitoi-Khuduthou; Ramukapane; Kgosietsile Ramukapane	5	4	78	481
Moroka	Keipurile Gabanakgosi	Leanatso; Boikanyo; Babanakgosi; Sepelete Sebeletse; Lesego (1935); Keipurile Gabanakgosi	15	4	34	232
Thipana	Balemetse Bakae	Mogami Ditshito; Ditshito Mogami; Seboke Ditshito; Bakae Seboko (1954); Balemetse Bakae (June 1980)	included in Moroka		39	246
Mmotlana	Gaokgabelwe Monthe	Kgogobi Lesarwa; Galerekwa; Dibodu Kgogobi; Lerubisi; Olefile; Mosola Ramothwa; Gaokgabelwe Monthe	4	0	33	194
		TOTALS	**31+**	**17**	**205**	**1,253**

+ Others not remembered.

a From headmen's interview.

b From the Fencing Study (see 1.2).

c Family unit defined as the "small **lelwapa**," i.e., each family unit in the yard ("big **lelwapa**").

d Includes only permanent residents and dependent schoolchildren; cattlepost residents excluded.

MOSHOPA HEADMEN: PROFILE

Name	Born	Nature of Headmanship	Years in Office	Education
Morulanyi L. (Kgosing)	1914	royal descent	5	-
Letsibogo M. (Shabang W.)	1950	royal descent	3	Standard 7
Kgosietsile R. (Toteng W.)	1901	royal descent	31	-
Keipurile G. (Moraka W.)	1911	royal descent	41	-
Balemetse B. (Thipana W.)	1937	royal descent	1	-
Gaokgabelwe M. (Mmotlana W.)	1922	royal descent	2.5	-

APPENDIX 3

DOCUMENTS FROM MOSHOPA DRIFT FENCE CONTROVERSY

Report of the Moshopha trip undertaken on the 9th of September, 1981

Moshopa drift fence (western side of the village)

An investigation into the allegation that the Moshopa West drift fence is following a line formerly opposed by Sekgoma T. Khama was conducted by the following persons: Mr. K. Garekwe, Land Board chairman; Mr. Bob Mannathoko, DO(L); Mr. M.G. Maforaga, PAO(L).

The drift fence allocation had been approved and allocated by the Mahalapye Sub-Land Board. When the complaint reached the Main Land Board, some Land Board members went to the disputed area and diverted the line to the northeast.

The investigation ensured that the Moshopa community deliberately neglected the Board's ruling; poles were being lined and more holes dug. Recent footprints were seen on the ground, marking immediate departure. A certain Mr. Oraletse Mosupiemang, a manager of Mr. Khama's cattle, accompanied the Land Board delegation.

The team than proceeded to Moshopa village to talk to the headman, with a view of investigating whether or not there was an afterthought which provoked the adamant, aggressive decision that had led to the violation of the amicable agreement reached at the former meeting.

The headman, Mr. Morulane Lekgetho, when found, told the team that he never liked to discuss anything with anybody unless he had someone present to bear witness in the future. This statement was honored; he called a number of people, but some could not wait and started going away. The few who remained were: Messrs. Kennekae Mokibise, O. Metseyabeng, Seabi Thosani, Olekantse Monageng, Omponye Tebagano.

Before we could start, the headman justifiably complained that the Land Board did not inform him when it planned to visit his village. He complained that this was the second such visit which had been done without notice. He further adamantly stated that, since Mr. Mosupiemang was among us, the issue we had brought was undoubtedly connected with the western drift fence which had long been rejected by Mr. Mosupiemang by his keeping quiet.

After listening to the above statement, which was repeated several times, the delegates demanded from the headman an answer to the following question:

"Since an agreement was concluded that the line should be realigned northeast of the gate and toward a certain pan, did the community later have another meeting and raise any facts against the agreement which purported resistance?"

The answer was: "I made the above decision to construct a fence separating cattle from fields in terms of government policies, and this cannot be challenged by any authority. During the planning period Mr. Khama was at every time informed and gave no response; the Mahalapye Sub-Land Board accepted this, so it is final. We are going to continue with fence construction since we have not accepted any realignment."


The representatives informed the headman to tell the team that the fence construction on the western line could continue only according to the accepted diversion; if this were unacceptable, then the line should stop until the Land Board had convened yet another meeting--to be attended by the Land Board, the Mahalapye Sub-Land Board, and Mr. S.T. Khama--on a date to be decided.

Mr. Mokibise stood in surprise. The headman said that the issue was well settled and that he himself had accompanied the men sent on his behalf.

One gentleman, who refused to give his name for record, pugnaciously said that he was going to continue the line after all, irrespective of whether the Land Board agreed.

The team left the **kgotla** (Moshopa) at 15:30.

Rough sketch



M.G. Maforaga
Principal Administration Officer (Lands)
Ngwato Land Board

cc: Senior Administration Assistant, Mahalapye
Headman, Moshopa village
S.T. Khama, Selibe Phikwe
Ngwato Tribal Authority
District Commissioner, Serowe

From: Chief Morulanyi Lekgetho, Moshopa

To: Principal Administration Officer (Lands), Serowe

Date: 26 September 1981

Re: **Answer to Ngwato Land Board on Moshopa Drift Fence Report**

Dear Sir:

We kindly acknowledge receipt of your "Report of the Moshopa Trip" concerning your investigation undertaken on 9 September 1981 regarding the western section of our drift fence.

A few fundamental elements in your report, however, still remain rather unclear for most Moshopa residents, and its threatening tone appears to be based either on inaccurate information or on false assumptions.

We would like to emphasize that our drift fence project is not and has never been undertaken in a spirit of "aggression" or of "violation of the Land Board's rulings," as stated in the report. We are well aware of your ultimate responsibility and jurisdiction over land allocation and approval; we equally know that your task is not an easy one.

Our drift fence project was initiated by the Moshopa community through a long consultation process (2-1/2 years) among residents themselves and Sefhare people (our neighbors) not to defy your authority but because our very survival significantly depends on it. Crop damage is increasing every year, and everyone here knows that "Tsie e fofa ka moswang." Thus, after winning community support, the drift fence was actively promoted by our FC and VDC, the DAO/Mahalapye East, and me. A fencing committee was elected, and in the winter of 1980 the whole fence (including the western section) was formally approved by the Mahalapye Sub-Land Board. In addition, two weeks ago our DAO submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture an AE10 Project Memorandum requesting additional funds (P4,173.80) to complement our community's contributions to the project. We honestly feel that, if welfare is to improve in Moshopa, the drift fence must be completed as soon as possible.

With regard to the controversy over the western section of the fence, three fundamental elements remain completely unexplained to the Moshopa community and do not seem to have been answered in your report. Satisfactory answers to the following questions may well promote greater understanding and collaboration between our community and Land Board authorities:

1) The Moshopa community still is very anxious to know what Mr. S.T. Khama's specific complaints are since for over 2-1/2 years he has not

once attended any of our community meetings concerning the project, despite repeated invitations.

We hope you realize that **kgotla** consultation in my village is still an important process for dealing with community matters, and if anyone has a grievance with community decisions he ought to have the decency to express his objections in our **kgotla** meetings prior to complaining privately to higher levels of authority.

2) Moshopa residents further wonder why the Ngwato Land Board overruled the project approval granted by our Mahalapye Sub-Land Board without any reason or word of explanation given to the very people concerned.

3) Finally, what your sketch describes as "S.T. Khama's b/hole" has always in our understanding been a Council borehole but which over the years has seemed to become Mr. Khama's own property.

The Koromong area (western section) already served as a Moshopa cattlepost before even Pilikwe village was established and before the arrival of Tshekedi Khama in 1953. As far as we know, Koromong is still the communal area of Moshopa. Thus, one wonders how an individual, however important he may be, can claim a communal area as his own property.

Second, the so-called "S.T. Khama b/hole" was actually sunk by Council in 1952 in order to provide water to the great number of Moshopa residents gathered in that area at that time. In 1956, in the presence of Mr. Gasebalwe Kgamane (Tribal Authority/Ramakgonami) and with Chief Lekgetho of Moshopa, Tshekedi Khama agreed to share this Council borehole with Moshopa residents because he had found the Pilikwe boreholes to be too far from his Koromong cattlepost. The borehole was shared only temporarily with Moshopa, however, since Mr. Khama moved his cattle to Nata one year later. In 1968, when Mma Leapetswe (Mr. Khama's mother) moved her cattle from Chadibe to Koromong, she renewed Mr. Khama's agreement with Chief Lechaina of Moshopa. This agreement has not been honored. The very same year this Council borehole was equipped with private engine, a pump, and pipings; ever since the borehole has become the Khama family's own property, seemingly with the tacit consent of our Land Board authorities.

In the process the community not only loses access to one of its vital water points but also is being asked to abandon an additional portion of its communal territory for what we regard as biased and unjustified reasons.

However, we are very grateful for your giving us once more the opportunity to express our views on the fence realignment.

The so-called "agreement" assumed in your report was in actual fact never reached and certainly was not "amicable." Whenever previous investigations were carried out, nobody in Moshopa, including myself, was informed. **Kgotla** meetings had to be called in haste and for <u>ad hoc</u> purposes, thereby gathering only 12 to 15 uninformed people on the spot. No one can consider such meetings to be representative of general community concerns and interests.

But, since such an opportunity was given, a general **kgotla** meeting was held on 24 September 1981 in the presence of our AD, Mr. Musi, in order to discuss once again the acceptability of such realignment. Two hundred eighty-six people attended, and all found this realignment to be unacceptable. This figure speaks for itself. The massive turnout of people who came to speak against the fence realignment hopefully shows that "agreement" is far from being reached and that the proposed alternative is quite unpopular.

We therefore gladly accept your kind offer to hold another meeting with your officers, Mahalapye Sub-Land Board representatives, and Mr. S.T. Khama himself, at your own set time and date, as long as we are notified sufficiently in advance to be able to inform the community at large. In addition to the participants you have suggested, we would to be honored with the presence of some CCC members and Mma Leapetswe herself.

While waiting for your notice, we sincerely hope that community concerns and interests will ultimately prevail in your final decision.

Sincerely yours,

AD Musi (Chadibe, Sefhare, Moshopa)
for Chief Morulanyi Lekgetho

Chief Morulanyi Lekgetho

Chairman, VDC

Chairman, FC

Chairman, Fencing Group

cc: Permanent Secretary, MLGL
Commissioner of Lands, MLGL
Senior Rural Sociologist (TGLP), MoA
MP Mr. Sebeso, Mahalapye
District Commissioner, Serowe
Council Secretary, Serowe
District Officer (Lands), Serowe
Principal Administration Officer (Lands), Serowe
Chairman, Ngwato Land Board, Serowe
Senior Administration Assistant, Mahalapye
Ngwato Tribal Authority, Serowe
Chairman, Mahalapye Sub-Land Board, Mahalapye
Senior Councillor, Tswapong South, Mr. G. Mack Bathuleng, Radisele
Moshopa Councillor, Mrs. S. Mathare, Machaneng
Chief Oteng Suping, Sefhare
RAO, Serowe
DAO, Mahalapye East
GDOs, Serowe
AO(LR), Serowe
Mr. S.T. Khama, Selebi-Phikwe
Mma Leapetswe, Serowe

Minutes of Moshopa Kgotla Meeting with Ngwato Land Board on Drift Fence Realignment

Moshopa, 27 October 1981

Following the Moshopa community's response (29 September 1981) to the Ngwato Land Board's initial report (9 September 1981), an extraordinary meeting was called by the Ngwato Land Board (NLB) in Moshopa's main **kgotla** on 27 October 1981 to debate differences on the fencing issue.

Attendance

After the opening prayer performed by a local minister, Chief O. Suping (Sefhare) began the meeting at 9:00 a.m. by introducing the following officials: Principal Administration Officer (Lands); Ngwato Land Board chairman; Ngwato Land Board secretary; Mahalapye Sub-Land Board chairman; Mahalapye Molaudi; local Councillor; Pilikwe Sub-Tribal Authority; DAO/Mahalapye East; AD (Chadibe, Sefhare, Moshopa).

Local attendance was estimated at over 350 residents.

Despite the NLB's promise (cf. Report) to include Mr. S.T. Khama in this meeting and the Moshopa community's suggestion to invite Mma Leapetswe, none of the Khama family attended, though Mr. Khama himself had spent that very day at his Koromong cattlepost in Moshopa.

Debate

NLB — The Ngwato Land Board chairman (chair of the meeting) opened the debate by asking residents to explain why they had persisted in working on the western section of the fence against his approval. He made clear that he disagreed with the Mahalapye Sub-Land Board's approval of the project.

He gave no reasons for his disapproval, however, either to the Sub-Land Board or to the residents themselves.

Community — The community responded tnat:

1) their decision to pursue fencing had been formulated with the consultation, mutual understanding, and formal approval of the Mahalapye Sub-Land Board;

2) this reversal of decision was a ruling which was enforced by the NLB in complete disagreement with the community and for rather unclear reasons.

NLB — The chairman restated that there had been a previous agreement with Chief Morulanyi and "a few other people" (cf. Report).

Community — Chief Morulanyi and other residents strongly denied that statement. The chief stated that the NLB's visits had been made without notice, that such meetings had to be called in haste and for ad hoc purposes with the gathering of only a handful of uninformed people, and that therefore none of those encounters could be said to be truly representative of general community concerns (cf. response letter).

Chief Morulanyi explained that during the last investigation he had been compelled almost violently by NLB officers to gather a few residents on the spot in order to comply with NLB requests despite his own and others' attendance at a village burial that day.

Chief Morulanyi made clear that he could not agree with the fence realignment without valid explanation and without community consensus. Then, rather shocked by the untactful consultation procedures of government officials, Chief Morulanyi alleged that he had decided to remain silent and that NLB members had interpreted his silence as consent.

AD — The AD then tried to orient the debate toward the specific issues of the controversy by pointing to three fundamental questions raised in the community's letter, i.e., reasons for S.T. Khama's complaints, reasons for the NLB's reversal of project approval, the fact that a Council borehole had become Khama's own property.

NLB — The NLB initially denied having received any such letter. But when the AD began to read from his own copy, the NLB acknowledged its being in possession of such a document.

Even though the community letter was a direct answer to the NLB's report, the NLB positively refused to address any of the questions raised on the grounds that those problems were not the object of the meeting and that any of those concerns should be channeled first to the Mahalapye Molaudi and not directly to the NLB.

Furthermore, the AD was reprimanded for having raised such questions since he himself was not a Moshopa resident. The AD and the **kgotla** were told that, after having spoken once, participants should refrain from speaking a second time.

A rainstorm eventually interrupted the debate. Before dispersal, the NLB chairman forcefully restated that the community had to follow his decision and not that of the Sub-Land Board.

Residents as forcefully voiced their disagreement with his decision.

The meeting ended in general disagreement and discontent.

- Moshopa Community
Fencing Group Secretary

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