RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVIEWING, INTERROGATING, OR POLYGRAPHING THE RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST TERRORIST

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Advisor

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVIEWING, INTERROGATING, OR POLYGRAPHING THE RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST TERRORIST

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John "The Penguin" Bingham, in reference to running says the miracle isn't that I finished. The miracle is that I had the courage to start. So it is with my pursuit of this Criminal Justice degree.

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Abstract

Recommendations for Interviewing, Interrogating, or Polygraphing

the Radical Fundamentalist Terrorist

Robert Francis Lewis

Under the Supervision of Dr. Susan Hilal

Statement of the Problem

This paper focuses on conducting interviews, interrogations, and polygraph exams on ethnic Muslims who are radical fundamentalist terrorists. It is important to note that the author neither suggests nor advocates that all ethnic Muslims are terrorists or have knowledge of terrorism.

September 11, 2001. Time stood still as we watched America fall under attack from 19 militant Islamic terrorists. Schmalleger (2005) describes the attacks as the most destructive criminal activity to have ever been perpetrated on U.S. soil.

Results of these attacks caused a major paradigm shift for law enforcement agencies in both the investigation of the crime of terrorism and the interrogation of the perpetrators of such crimes. Since September 11, 2001, the American national security apparatus to include law enforcement and intelligence agencies at all levels have found it necessary to modify traditional approaches of interview and interrogation techniques when applied to individuals involved in, or

suspected of, terrorist activities. This is corroborated by Gelles, McFadden, Vossekuil, Borum, and Fallon (2006). who state professionals have responded by adapting existing interview and interrogation strategies to meet new challenges. Terrorism is a global issue that eventually becomes a criminal justice (CJ) problem since terrorists engage in mass murder, bombing, arson, and hostage taking (Poland, 1986). In an attempt to understand terrorism, as a crime, and its causes, we must first understand terrorists. Terrorists tend to believe that their causes – whether they stem from ethnic, religious, or ideological convictions, have been undermined, exploited, or betrayed by powerful forces internal or external to their nation (Davis, 2001).

The problem for investigators and/or polygraphers is that this new enemy in the CJ system is unlike more "traditional" suspects. While we have many investigative tools in our CJ "toolbox," i.e. fingerprints, DNA, lineups, we have very little information on how to interview, interrogate, or polygraph the religious fundamentalist terrorist suspect. Hence, the problem to explore – developing a criminal or psychological profile of fundamentalist religious terrorists similar to what we have for serial murderers or rapists. How to interview, interrogate, or polygraph this "new" type of criminal? There are two key prerequisites for developing successful interview and interrogation strategies for Middle Eastern Arab militant Islamists who come to attention as investigative subjects: (1) knowledge of Arab culture and mindsets and (2) utilization of an overall planned systematic approach (Gelles, et al., 2006).

Methods of Approach

Methodology consists of secondary research, statistical application, and other data assimilated and analyzed to provide a study into the psychology and dynamics of religious fundamentalist terrorism. Potential sources for this approach include the Internet, books and

articles from various criminal justice, sociology, and psychology publications and government organizations.

Criminological theories will be explored to determine if any theory is applicable to the profile of a fundamentalist religious terrorist. This is important so that criminolgists, psychologists, and sociologists can better understand the motivation of one so willing to trade his or her life for ideological purposes. Additionally, this study will provide the methodology and framework on how to interview, interrogate, and polygraph the radical fundamentalist terrorist.

Results of the Study

During the Third Crusade (1188-1192), King Richard the Lion Hearted [of England] finds himself in possession of 2,700 Muslim prisoners whom he can neither feed nor ransom. In keeping with the traditions of the time, he executes them. This single act continues to live in the consciousness of every Middle Eastern Muslim today, particularly the radical terrorist. Therefore, prior to interviewing, interrogating, or polygraphing the radical terrorist, it is paramount that the psyche of the terrorist be understood. The root cause of terrorism is a complex social process having multifarious motivations. Because there is no one cause of terrorism, there is no one "best" way to conduct an interview, interrogation or polygraph of a radical terrorist suspect.

This study explores the chronology of Middle Eastern culture and the religion of Islam, the architectural structure of Islamic Law, the theoretical framework of terrorism, and the motivation, psychology, and philosophy of the radical terrorist in order to provide a frame of reference for interviewing, interrogating, or polygraphing the radical fundamentalist terrorist.

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Statement of the Problem

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a major paradigm shift occurred for law enforcement and intelligence agencies from the local to the federal level. To counter this new terrorist threat against United States (US) interests, Joint Terrorism Task Forces came into being. This confluence of law enforcement and intelligence personnel inherited a new mission - interview, interrogate and / or polygraph any individuals found to be connected with terrorist activities. Prior to 9/11, very few agencies outside selected federal agencies were tasked to "hunt down" terrorists. So while the new mission appeared straight forward, its execution posed great challenges. Unlike traditional street criminals interrogated or polygraphed by US law enforcement or intelligence personnel, radical terrorists undergo stringent training on how to withstand harsh questioning and learn countermeasures to employ against their interrogators. Hence, the greater challenge posed to those tasked to interview, interrogate, or polygraph these subjects and the need for an innovative interview and interrogation methodology to understand the psyche and motivation of the radical terrorist.

This research paper first discusses the chronology of Middle Eastern culture and the religion of Islam in order to provide a greater understanding of the evolution of the "new" terrorist criminal mindset. Next follows a discussion of theoretical architecture thus allowing the reader to capture the motivation, psychology, and philosophy of the radical terrorist. Finally, ways to best interview, interrogate and / or polygraph these individuals is explored. In polygraph the

collection of charts is only part of the entire interview (polygraph) process. To conduct a good polygraph exam, the examiner must first conduct a good pre-test interview. To obtain confessions following a deceptive polygraph exam, the examiner must conduct a good post-test interrogation. Therefore, this paper assists examiners, interviewers and / or interrogators to better question radical fundamentalists.

Professor Crenshaw (2005), Wesleyan University, poses the question – who are these "new" terrorists? She declares groups encompassed by this category are al-Qaeda, its offshoots, and other violent radical groups and that religion, primarily of those groups with millennial and apocalyptic ideologies, is the main precipitating factor. The new terrorists are said to have ambiguous goals on the systemic level and value destruction for its own sake. According to the new terrorist model, groups seek to kill as many people as possible and are particularly drawn to weapons of mass destruction (Crenshaw, 2005).

Radical terrorists exploit Islam to serve a violent political vision. Thus fueled by radical ideology and a false belief that the US is the cause of most problems affecting Muslims today, they seek to expel Western power and influence from the Muslim world and establish regimes that rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006). On the day of September 11, 2001, US President George Bush described the terrorists as faceless cowards and vowed to hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly attacks (AP, 11 Sep 2001, as cited in Walker, 2001).

These words by the President and many other political figures miss the mark. An infamous historical figure stated, "To sacrifice one's life for a belief hardly serves as a cowardly act. On the contrary, to die for one's belief has served as a clarion call for believers throughout history as

a duty to one's faith" (Hitler, 1925-26). Hitler, though detestable in his actions, was a charismatic leader, able to sway many people to not only follow his philosophy but to die in his quest for world domination.

Monsignor Vittorio Formenti, who edits the Vatican Statistics Yearbook (2008), states the 2006 world population as 6.5 billion with Muslims making up 1.25 billion of the total. Understanding that only a small percentage of Muslims make up the radical fundamentalist arm of Islam, even one half of one percent of the total leaves 6.25 million potential fundamentalist terrorists roaming the world. Hence, the consternation for law enforcement and intelligence agencies chartered to monitor and prevent terrorism.

Purpose of this Paper

Terrorism continues to occur throughout the world with greater frequency and lethality. The purpose of this paper is to create a workable model for law enforcement and intelligence personnel to interview, interrogate, and polygraph terrorist suspects either in the US or overseas. When the person across the table is a radical fundamentalist and the product of a different culture, approaches and dynamics of the interview process are modified. A broader-based byproduct provides colleagues and intelligentsia having an academic interest in religious fundamental terrorism with aspects of its causes and psyche as it relates to the CJ field and they synergize with intelligence and law enforcement personnel to explore the motivation behind religious fundamentalist terrorists. Finally, information from this study may spawn further research and studies into profiling the religious fundamentalist terrorist.

Significance of the Problem

It has been over seven years since the US experienced a terrorist attack on its soil. Though some progress in fighting terrorism is apparent, the long war appears to be far from over. Iran and Syria continue to meddle in the affairs of Middle Eastern countries; Iran threatens nuclear proliferation; Taliban forces are realizing a resurgence of power in Afghanistan; and, Israeli and Hezbollah forces recently battled to a stalemate in Lebanon. The US, despite minor strides from "The Surge" in Iraq, continues to be bogged down in an untenable war that has raged for over five years. According to Brookes (2006), we are dealing with a protean enemy. Terrorist recruiters, clerics, and the Internet radicalize today's terrorists both at home and abroad and now include women, pregnant mothers, and converts to Islam. Al-Qaeda, a terrorist *group* on 9/11, is now a global terrorist *movement*. Hence, Usama bin Laden (UBL) has become an inspirational leader to terrorist "disciples" around the world making Islamic terrorism more diverse geographically, less predictable overall, and more challenging to defeat.

Al-Qaeda and its acolytes continue to improve their operational techniques and tradecraft, including greater sophistication of their handiwork. They are already making tremendous use of the Internet for fundraising, passing operational information, sharing terrorist tradecraft information, and recruiting new members (Brookes, 2006).

America, its national security, and the American way of life are still squarely in the crosshairs of terrorist adversaries. The fact that a terrorist attack has not occurred on US soil in over seven years may have more to do with their inability to mount another such massive attack than their desire to strike. The hope that 9/11 was an anomaly and terrorism only occurs overseas in such places as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Europe are not based on reality. US law enforcement and

intelligence agencies fused their efforts in order to deter and detect terrorism. It is their ability to interview, interrogate, and polygraph these individuals that is instrumental in aborting these operations.

Methods of Approach and Limitations

This paper is the capstone of several months of scholarly investigation, three years of graduate study, and over twenty-seven years in the counterintelligence and counterterrorism fields with the US Army and Department of Defense. Methodology consists of secondary research exploring empirical, theoretical, and anecdotal data all of which was assimilated and analyzed to provide a study into the psychology and dynamics of religious fundamentalist terrorism and techniques for interviewing, interrogating and polygraphing the radical fundamentalist terrorist. Potential sources for this approach include the Internet, books, articles, and scholarly (peer-reviewed) journals from various criminal justice, sociology, and psychology publications and government organizations.

Criminological, as well as psychological, theories are explored to determine if any one theory is applicable to the profile of a fundamentalist religious terrorist. This is important for criminologists, psychologists, and sociologists to better understand the motivation of one so willing to trade his or her life for ideological purposes.

SECTION II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The following section is divided into nine parts beginning with key terminology (see Appendix for a more comprehensive list of terminology), etymology of the word, the definition of terrorism, and an illustration of the "stairway to terrorism." This is followed with a comparison of the Islamic legal system with the US common law system and contrasting the Islamic and US democratic processes as relates to their legal systems. Next are discussions about violence and psychological elements of Islamic terrorism, suicide bombings, and the typology of terrorism.

Key Terminology of Islam

Islam: The religious faith of Muslims indicating "submission to God."

Muhammad: (c. 570 – 632) An Arab religious, political, and military leader who founded the religion of Islam.

Muslim: One who adheres to the religion of Islam or one who submits to one God.

Sunni: Sunnis comprise the majority of the Muslim population. Leadership tends to be more secular, but the worship is more conservative.

Shi'ites (Shiites/Shia): This Muslim group, accounting for approximately 14% of all Muslims, split from Sunni over rightful succession to Muhammad.

Koran (Qur'an): The holy book of Islam.

Jihad: Has its roots in the Arabic verb "j-h-d," whose meaning is generally interpreted as "to endeavor, strive, labor, take great pains." The noun form generally refers to a struggle. According to some, it typically connotes a great effort in the struggle to maintain the straight path of Islam.

(Florida Department of Law Enforcement [FDLE], 2001; Key Terms in Islam, 2008)

The Etymology and Definition of Terrorism

The word terrorism did not enter the lexicon of speech until the French Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror (1792-1794) where it served to describe government sanctioned political violence intended to make the population "quake" or "tremble" [from the Latin word *terre*] (Navarro, 2005). The US has defined terrorism under the Federal Criminal Code. Chapter 113b, Section 2331, Part I of Title 18 US Code as:

> …activities that involve violent… or life-threatening acts… that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State and… appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and… (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States… [or]… (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States…"
> (Title 18 US Code, 2007)

The act of terrorism has been with us since humans found it practical to use violence or the threat of violence to exact compliance from a population. Thus for the totalitarian, the disenfranchised, the frustrated, or the radical extremist, it is an effective tool (Navarro, 2005). Clausewitz, a Prussian General from the 19th century who developed theories about the conduct of war, speaks of terrorism as "an act of violence intended to compel opponents to fulfill their will" (von Clausewitz, 1986, as cited in Navarro, 2005, p. 101). Religious violence throughout the world has dominated the first decade of the 21st century and appears will continue into the near future.

Stairway to Terrorism

Moghaddam (2005) visualizes terrorism as steps of a staircase. He provides a solid definition and explains why a better understanding of terrorism is critical to combating this global problem. The staircase metaphor enables the interviewer to put everything into perspective and learn how

a potential terrorist may traverse the staircase from the vast majority to the narrowly focused individual willing to trade his or her life in the furtherance of a political cause. Moghaddam (2005) explains how disaffected individuals climb to the first floor trying different doors in search of solutions to what they perceive to be unjust treatment. Without the option to voice public dissatisfaction and participate in meaningful decision-making, individuals become dissatisfied, begin to displace their anger toward a perceived enemy, and blame others (e.g., "America – the Great Satan") for their perceived problems and climb the stairs to the second floor. Individuals who develop a readiness to physically displace aggression and actively seek out opportunities to do so eventually leave the second floor and climb more steps to try to take action against perceived enemies. On the third floor, individuals develop a parallel morality, initiate a secret lifestyle, and dedicate themselves to changing the world by whatever means necessary. On the fourth floor, the terrorist passes the point of no return. Cell structure is further developed while loyalty to the terrorist organization is solidified and legitimized. The fifth floor is where terrorism takes place. Simultaneously, terrorists learn to distance themselves from the actual terrorist act thus allowing the moral disengagement from killing innocent civilians.

The Islamic Legal System

Understanding the Islamic legal system provides a frame of reference for the reader. Islamic law, unlike a common-law system, is not an independent branch of knowledge but an integral cog to Islamic religion and it is religion that defines the character of the social order of the faithful who create laws in the name of God (Vago, 2006). Islam means "submission" or "surrender" and implies that individuals should submit to the will of God, or *Allah*. Islamic religion provides guidelines for Muslim belief and includes *Shari'a* (the way to follow) law that

specifies the rules for believers based on divine command and revelation. Unlike other systems of law based on judicial decisions, precedents, and legislation, Islamic law is derived from four principal sources. They are the *Koran* – the word of God as given to the Prophet Muhammad, and the principal source of Islamic law; the *Sunna* – the sayings, acts, and allowances of the Prophet as recorded by reliable sources in the Tradition (*Hadith*); *Judicial consensus* – like precedent in common law, based on historical consensus of qualified legal scholars, it limits the discretion of the individual judge; and, *Analogical reasoning* - used in circumstances not provided for in the Koran or other sources (Grana, Ollenburger, & Nicholas, 2002). For example, some judges inflict the penalty of stoning for the crime of sodomy, contending that sodomy is similar to the crime of adultery and thus punishable by the same penalty.

Shari'a legal precepts can be categorized into five areas: acts commanded, recommended, reprobated, forbidden, and left legally indifferent. Islamic law mandates rules of behavior in the areas of social conduct, family relations, inheritance, and religious ritual and defines punishments for both heinous crimes and lesser crimes such as adultery, false accusation of adultery, intoxication, and theft. For example, in the case of adultery, the punishment is death by stoning; for theft, the penalty of hand amputation is often used. In some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, police exist under the Department of Vice whose job is to ferret out those who violate Islamic law.

Although such practices are susceptible to interpretations that can and do create conflicts between religious doctrine and human rights, they must be examined within the philosophy of Islam and in the spirit of true theoretical inquiry for justification – for even understanding that Islamic justice is based on religious and philosophical principles is quite alien to most Western

readers (Souryal & Potts, 1994, as cited in Vago, 2006, p. 18). Punishment and rules not defined by historical sources of *Shari'a* are left to decision by contemporary government regulations and Islamic judges. This practice permitted an evolution of *Shari'a* law to reflect changing social, political, and economic conditions (Vago, 2006).

Summary of Key Differences between Islamic and Western Democratic Law

As relates to democratic law, Islamic democracy rests on the principle of the popular *Khilafat* (a representative of *Allah* on earth) while Western democracy is based on the concept of popular sovereignty (Jamaat, 2008). In other words, in Western democracy the people are sovereign (autonomous; independent); In Islam, sovereignty is vested in *Allah* and the people are his caliphs or representatives. In the former people make their own laws; in the latter they follow and obey the laws (*Shari'a*) given by *Allah* through His Prophet, Mohammed. In one, the government undertakes to fulfill the word of the people; in the other, the government and the people alike submit to the will of *Allah*. Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority which exercises its powers in a free and uncontrolled manner, whereas Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine Law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of *Allah* and within the limits prescribed by Him (Jamaat, 2008). *Shari'a* law has some unique concepts. For example, in crimes against the person (murder or bodily injury), also considered sins against *Allah*, the victim or his male next of kin has the "right of retaliation." Thus, the male next of kin could execute the murderer after the trial (usually by cutting off his head with a sword in the public square). If someone lost the sight of an eye in an attack, he could retaliate by putting a red-hot needle into the eye of his attacker who had been found guilty by the law. Their concept of "just desserts" is truly that of "an eye for an eye." Islamic law also practices a "rule of

exactitude" where the retaliator must give the same amount of damage he received (Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2008).

It is important to remember that sanctions attached to violation of Islamic law are religious-based rather than civil or criminal-based. The fundamental principle of Islam is that of an essentially theocratic society, and Islamic law can be understood only in the context of some minimal knowledge of Islamic religion and civilization (Vago, 2006).

Psychological Elements of Islamic Terrorism

Definitions of "violence" in the social science literature are at least as plentiful as definitions of terrorism (Borum, 2004). Most focus on harm to others but could, in the case of suicide, encompass violence to oneself. So how does one bridge the gap between social science theoretical architecture and the individual charged to understand, interview, interrogate, and/or polygraph violent radical terrorists in the real world? Additionally, can acts of terrorism be thought of in the same terms as more traditional crimes? Fair questions. Borum (2004) in his study of the *Psychology of Terrorism* relates that violence takes many forms and is motivated by various factors for each individual in their particular space and time. He continues that violence is "caused" by a complex interaction of biological, social/contextual, cognitive, and emotional factors that occur over time. Some causes will be more prominent than others for certain individuals and for certain types of violence and aggression.

According to Gabriel (2006), the hatred, treachery, and violence of the *Koran* and the *Hadith* are reflected in the relationships between the rival power centers [Sunni and Shia – the two main branches of Islam] of the Islamist movement. While a substantial majority of the Arab world is Sunni, there are significant Shia minority populations in many Arab countries and they constitute

a majority in Iraq and non-Arab Iran. Additionally, a number of smaller sects and denominations of Islam (the Alawis, the Ismailis, and the Druze) co-exist in the Middle East.

Wahabism, also known by some as Salifism, is attributed to Muhammed ibn Abd-al-Wahab, an 18th century scholar from Arabia, who advocated a return to the practices of the first three generations of Islamic history. The al-Saud family adopted the orthodox practices of Wahabism and eventually created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In addition to being practiced and propagated by Saudi Arabia, Wahabism has been adopted by the Taliban [in Afghanistan] and the al-Qaeda terrorist network. All over the world from Pakistan and Indonesia to the US this version of Islam is preached at every institution built or supported by Saudi oil money (Alexiev, 2003; *Ain-Al-Yaqeen*, 2002; Stalinsky, 2002).

According to Wahabi Sunni religious doctrine, Shia Muslims are apostates from Islam, and therefore deserve death even more than Jews, Christians, and pagans. Furthermore, both the Sunni and Shia fundamentalists consider the nominally secular pan-Arab nationalist governments (Syria, Egypt, Iraq) to be apostates deserving of death. However, despite all of this intense mutual hatred and wholesale slaughter, Sunni and Shia terrorists will join forces with each other and with secular terrorist states, despite assumptions to the contrary by some (Gabriel, 2006) to oppose Western democratization. Saudi-supported Wahabism fuels hatred not only in its own *madrassas* (schools) and mosques toward the West's religious tolerances, relatively liberal social agenda, and permissive lifestyle but also onto campuses across the US where billions of "petrodollars" further the teachings of Wahabism and continue to spread anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment (Gabriel, 2006).

Regarding radical terrorists, Lanning (2002) explores the events of September 11th through the windows of psychological perspectives. One, *psychodynamic perspective*, explains the *fatwa* expelling all non-Muslims from Muslim land, and, behind it, the presence of American troops on sacred soil as conscious motives of al-Qaeda followers in fomenting anti-American sentiment. Another, *evolutionary psychology*, analyzes America's wealth and why this may lead to terrorism. Throughout history, inequality has bred resentment from those less fortunate. Many criminological theories have evolved from socioeconomic inequalities and their causal efficacy on crime.

Johnson and Feldmann (1992) explore the impact of terrorism from the perspective of forensic behavioral scientists. Using the concepts of Kohut's self-psychology to examine the roles that terrorist groups serve for individual members, they explain, from a self-psychology viewpoint, terrorist groups appear to be a stabilizing influence for people who feel alienated from, or abandoned by, their society. This view of terrorist development is consistent with Kohut's (1976, 1978a, as cited in Johnson & Feldmann, 1992) position that charismatic personalities and groups emerge in response to feelings of fragmentation within members of a group. Thus, the terrorist group replaces some missing psychological element for its members and thus provides intrapsychic structure. This premise is reinforced by Stahelski (2004) whose observations of modern terrorist groups reveal that some terrorists come from "broken" homes and / or have difficulty forming consistent group identities outside the home (school, workplace, etc.). He compares terrorist groups to cults in that most center on charismatic leaders and joiners of cults respond to the leader's message first at an emotional level, then later at physical and intellectual levels.

Johnson and Feldmann (1992) provide some psychological assessment of terrorists with borderline personality disorders and narcissistic subtypes being common denominators. They add that personalities with paranoid, antisocial, and sadomasochistic tendencies are also drawn to the violence fostered by terrorism. They go on to explain that the close-knit nature of most terrorist organizations may offer an alternative to the fears of rejection and self-doubts that mark a damaged or vulnerable self by instilling a degree of cohesion through a strong commitment to a set of beliefs. Terrorism also contains large components of glamour, excitement and danger. Hence, the terrorist may shun membership in conventional groups and instead favor affiliation with radical terrorist groups. The deleterious effects of terrorism for the individual are counterbalanced by the need to maintain cohesion at any cost. This formulation also explains the fierce devotion to the terrorist cause, because without the terrorist group another source of cohesion must be found (Johnson & Feldmann, 1992).

Post (1990, as cited in Reich, 1998, p. 25), in his paper on terrorist psycho-logic, argues that political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces, and that their special psycho-logic is constructed to rationalize acts they are psychologically compelled to commit. Thus Post's principle argument is that individuals are drawn to the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence and their special logic, grounded in their psychology and reflected in their rhetoric, becomes the justification for their violent acts.

Even the briefest review of the history of terrorism reveals how varied and complex a phenomenon it is, and therefore how futile it is to attribute simple, global, and general psychological characteristics to all terrorists and terrorisms (Reich, 1998). The following

discussion of what occurred almost 2000 years ago illustrates how terrorism was utilized to intimidate a government in furtherance of political or social objectives. Compare that with what continues to occur today.

An early terrorist movement in the Middle East, orchestrated by the Assassins, also known as Hashshashin, was an offshoot from the Ismaili sect of the Shia Muslims. After a quarrel as to succession in leadership in Cairo around the year 1090, the losing faction was driven from Egypt into what is now known as parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. There the dominant Sunni sect persecuted them so their charismatic leader, *Hasani-i Sabbah* sent dedicated teams to "eliminate" the Sunni leaders. The Sunnis named these teams *Hashshashin* derived from the Arabic word "*hassasin*" or hashish user, a drug allegedly ingested prior to their attacks. However, most Islamic scholars today believe this is unlikely and favor the etymology of *assassiyun*, meaning people who were faithful to the foundation (*assass*) of the Muslim faith. Another possibility is that they were named *hassansin*, after their leader, *Hasani-i Sabbah*. The Assassins also had political goals, but those were ultimately designed to serve primarily religious ends. They believed that Islam had been corrupted [not unlike some radical terrorists believe today]; and, using daggers, assassinated Muslim leaders who, they believed, represented and propagated that corruption. They sought not only the death of their enemies but also the publicity that the assassinations excited – publicity that, they hoped, would result in attention to their cause, recognition that it was just, and the bringing about of a new world, cleansed, and revitalized theological and social order (Reich, 1998).

Suicide Attacks

Atran (2006) posits suicide attack as the most virulent and horrifying form of terrorism in the world today. Ironically, suicide attacks account for a minority of all terrorist acts yet are responsible for a majority of all terrorism-related casualties, and the rate of attacks is rising rapidly across the globe (see figures 1 and 2). Islamist groups (known also as *jihadis*) claiming religious motivation carry out most of these attacks. Hoffman (2005) found that 80 percent of suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after the September 11 attacks, with *jihadis* representing 31 of the 35 responsible groups. More suicide attacks occurred in 2004 than in any previous year, and 2005 proved even more deadly, with attacks in Iraq alone averaging more than one per day, according to data gathered by the U.S. military (Macdonald, 2005).

Figure 1: Suicide Attacks Worldwide, Annualized by Decade



(Atran, S., 2006, The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly*)

Figure 2: Suicide Attacks Worldwide, 2001–2005



(Atran, S., 2006, The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism. *The Washington Quarterly*)

Suicide attacks have been a part of conflict throughout the history of the world, but most contemporary researchers mark the 1983 suicide attack by Hezbollah (a Shia-rooted organization) on the US embassy in Beirut, as the beginning of a modern era of suicide terrorism. Since that time, suicide terrorist attacks continue to occur worldwide with the most noteworthy for the US occurring on September 11, 2001.

An ABC news correspondent reported on September 20, 2008, a story about meeting a suicide bomber whose mission was thwarted. When asked what led him to attack, he responded it was his duty as a Muslim because "foreign invaders" were occupying Muslim land. When asked about the civilians he might kill, he said this is war and that US bombing raids kill civilians as well. The news correspondent commented that the individual was committed to the cause and showed no signs of regret.

Suicide attacks work because they are relatively inexpensive; there are likely to be no witnesses or subjects to interrogate thus reducing compromise to the terrorist group itself; and the psychological impact on the target population is devastating. As statistics bear out, this tactic has shown disproportionate lethality. Even excluding the 9/11 attacks on America, suicides attacks account for only 3% of all terrorist incidents, but are responsible for 48% of the terrorism-related deaths (Department of State 1983-2001).

Pape (2005) explains suicide attacks today serve as banner actions for a thoroughly modern, global diaspora inspired by religion and claiming the role of vanguard for a massive, media-driven transnational political awakening. Living mostly in the diaspora and undeterred by the threat of retaliation against original home populations, *jihadis*, who are frequently middle-class, secularly well educated, but often "born-again" radical Islamists, including converts from Christianity, embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity's violent salvation. Culturally uprooted and politically restless youth echo a stunningly simplified and de-contextualized message of martyrdom for the sake of global *jihad* as life's noblest cause. They are increasingly as willing and even eager to die, as they are to kill. In *Dying to Win*, Pape (2005) claims that foreign occupation is the root cause of suicide terrorism. He also provides a frame of reference for *Salifism* (a minority orthodox group within Islam). *Salafis* believe that the *hadith* (oral traditions) and literal readings of the *Koran* are sufficient guides for social law and personal life. The most militant among them, the *jihadis* (of which al-Qaeda is one) believe that all contemporary majority-Muslim countries with the exception of Afghanistan under the Taliban have strayed from the true path of Islam and that the only way back is through violent *jihad*. Self-forming cells of friends who swarm for attack, then disappear or disperse to form new swarms now

chiefly execute al-Qaeda terrorist actions. Studies by Leiken and Sageman (2004, as cited in Atran, 2006, p. 135) reflect more than 80 percent of known *jihadis* currently live in diasporic communities, often marginalized from the host society and physically disconnected from each other.

Suicide attackers see their mission as one of martyrdom, whether for their faith or the greater cause. Salib (2003) explains that in the case of *jihadis*, for example, the primary aim of suicide terrorists is not suicide, because to the terrorist group, suicide is simply a means to an end with motivation that stems from rage and a sense of self-righteousness. They see themselves as having a higher purpose and are convinced of an eternal reward through their action, i.e. rewards in paradise and feelings of heroic sacrifice, the desire to further the cause of Islam, and answer the highest calling of that religion. Family and loved ones typically support the behavior, and, if the event occurs, the family is honored. Not only does the family of a martyr gain forgiveness of their sins in the afterlife but also the supporting community often cares for them socially and financially (Borum, 2004). An imprisoned emir (ruler or chief in Islam hierarchy) responds that martyrdom for the sake of *jihad* is the ultimate *fardh 'ain*, an inescapable individual obligation that trumps all others, including four of the five pillars of Islam (pilgrimage, almsgiving, fasting, and prayer). This is a radically new interpretation of Islam, where only the profession of faith in *Allah* and his prophet count as equal to *jihad* (Atran, 2006).

Moreover, Atran (2006) explains those who believe suicide terrorism results from a single political root cause, such as the presence of foreign military forces or the absence of democracy, ignore psychological motivations, including religious inspirations, which can trump rational self-interest to produce horrific or heroic behavior in ordinary people. Those who believe that some

central organization such as the "old" al-Qaeda directs such suicide terrorists ignore the small-group dynamics involving friends and family that form the diaspora cell of brotherhood and camaraderie on which the rising tide of martyrdom actions is based. Simple explanations and solutions, based mostly on familiar research and policy paradigms but no first-hand knowledge or field experience capable of challenging them, may be more appealing and easier to grasp. They are liable to fail, however, because they ignore the underlying moral values and group dynamics that drive *jihadis* to suicide terrorism (Atran, 2006).

Typology of Terrorist Behavior

The religious fundamentalist, or radical Islamist terrorist, first and foremost subscribes to an *uncompromising ideology* (1st comorbid pathology of terror) or doctrine that has no room for compromise. Conversely, most people view the world as a place where we must all live and therefore accept that people, cultures, religions, etc. are diverse. For example, while the US is a Christian-dominated country, other religious beliefs and cultures are readily accepted. It is this capacity to adjust and accept that allows Americans to deal with all the permutations of life. This flexibility is what psychologists call "reality adaptation." Most people's thought process employs reality adaptation, but not terrorists who, in many ways, don't grow; they are stuck in the rut of their unbending ideology – a malignancy of the mind that is the principal comorbid psychopathology of terror (Navarro, 2005).

According to Stern (1996), it is anathema for a terrorist to compromise his ideology; an unacceptable condition in which there is no alternative view or equivocation. The 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center buildings is the result of uncompromising ideology against Western hegemony and the presence of Americans in the Middle East. Most terrorists

tend to be insecure and detached from, or rejected by, society. We see this in the thousands who "signed up" to fight for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1980's and who are still signing up to fight a holy *jihad* (Navarro, 2005).

For the True Believer, a mass movement or terrorist organization isolates them from the vagaries and hard work of life, from responsibility and the requirements of society. In the collectiveness of the terrorist organization they escape individual responsibility. They escape their blemished inchoate lives and take refuge within the brotherhood of other True Believers and in the certitude of their beliefs that renders them impervious (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

*Irreconcilable Fear***,** the 2nd comorbid pathology of terror, is a very powerful emotion. The 9/11 terrorists or suicide bombers apparently had no fear since they were willing to trade their lives for what they believed was a just cause. At the foundation of every terrorist is a deeper pathology - that of irreconcilable fears (Navarro, 2005). To deal with this fear, the terrorist psyche molds this fear into hatred thus externalizing (projecting) an inability to cope (Navarro, 2005). For example, UBL's fear of further Western hegemony in the Middle East manifests into hatred for Western culture and in particular the US. Hate thus becomes useful and is projected outward, while fears, debilitating fears, are subsumed by the need to vilify and vanquish (Navarro, 2005).

Fear creates anxiety that causes the terrorist to become frustrated. Living with irreconcilable fear, coupled with suppression of anxiety, leads to paranoia making the terrorist suspicious and hyper vigilant. Hence, they find refuge in terrorist organizations where they are relieved of individual responsibility and are free to be a part of something big.

Terrorist suspects with paranoid tendencies present as guarded, secretive, devious, and scheming, rarely willing to entertain alternative views (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Their thoughts are preoccupied with their ideology, leaving little room for anything else. In observing paranoids one notices they seem to know a lot about very little. For example, they launch into long perorations of esoteric historical facts, questionable legal concepts, i.e. who started the Middle East conflict, or insignificant minutiae, which is of dubious certainty or of no interest to anyone (Navarro, 2005).

In keeping with their paranoia, terrorists become what are called "wound collectors." The memory of terrorists is often remarkable in their ability to dig up events from centuries past. UBL often reflects on the inhumane treatment of Muslims during the time of the Christian Crusades almost 2000 years ago. For these types of people, recalling such events is useful as no issue ever dies or is put to rest. Consequently, there is no statute of limitations on suffering. Wound collection does serve a purpose – to support and vindicate, keeping all past events fresh, thus magnifying their significance into the present, a rabid rationalization for fears and anxieties within (Navarro, 2005).

*Passionate hatred***,** the 3rd comorbid pathology of terror, allows those who passionately hate to transform that which they hate into an object of insignificance – a nonbeliever becomes an infidel and a country becomes nothing more than a "demon" (Navarro, 2005). For those committed to terrorism, passionate hatred is utilitarian, as terrorism cannot exist without hatred and neither can terrorist organizations. Almost sixty years after Hoffer (1951) explained that hatred, when collectivized, not only brings individuals together, but can galvanize them against an external foe making them pathologically whole, we can apply this same comorbid to today's

terrorists. To hate powerfully is to have "kinship" with those who possess the same fears and animosity. Post (2004) says terrorism absolutely requires passionate hatred. Passionate hatred, according to Navarro (2005) also mixes well with the repugnant cocktail of malignant narcissism and psychological splitting. Additionally, passionate hatred has another unique quality in that it allows the terrorist to call upon a higher authority or deity to justify actions. UBL, for example, twists and turns the teachings of Islam to impose *Allah* (the Supreme Being of Islam), a higher being than his mere mortality, to invoke a holy *jihad* against the "infidels."

Another term often used in correlation with terrorism is "*prescribed violence*," the 4th comorbid of pathology. The word "prescribed' is utilized because the violence is not random or accidental; it is intended, and mandated by Islamic *fatwa* though misemployed by UBL, not a religious leader, whose charismatic appeal magnetizes those around him to follow his lead in hatred of Western hegemony. Groups like al-Qaeda thrive in this environment as they blindly follow the prescribed violence "with God on our side" (Navarro, 2005).

To be able to act out violently against an enemy under the umbrella of a cause is sublime. To do horrific violence on one's own, without a great ideology or the benefit of a movement is to merely commit a criminal act. Under the auspices of a mighty cause, however, the offender and the acts are thus transformed. Navarro (2005) posits that if UBL or his ilk could obtain nuclear weapons they would employ them without hesitation, secure in their mind, and more importantly, in their heart, that what they are doing is just before God just as the terrorist can murder, maim, or injure, and justify it all because it is done in the name of a higher cause.

The final additive to the admixture of an uncompromising ideology, irreconcilable fear, passionate hatred, and prescribed violence is *functional isolation*, or the 5th comorbid. Once a

terrorist isolates, he reaches the final plateau, the springboard to terror. It is this final and most significant phase where the terrorist becomes metastable. Social norms are called into question, extremist views are nurtured, and violent action is ideated.

In this isolation, the terrorist weaves violence into a schema where bombs serve as a "magical" solution to what the terrorist perceives to be a crisis. Isolation ensures the terrorist abandons family and gravitates toward new companions within the organization, abandoning the self and taking on the features of something greater. The importance of the group becomes primal. It cannot be overstated how powerful an influence others can have on an individual (Navarro, 2005).

The "rite of passage" bonds the terrorist to the group. After the initiation, training, and indoctrination, individuals transform and mutate into something mythical (Juergensmeyer, 2000). After this, they become "freedom fighters," "revolutionaries," "*jihadists*," or "martyrs" and it is this initiation process that provides the glue that binds, affixes, and guarantees their commitment and loyalty in the future.

The trained interviewer or interrogator will begin to recognize that terrorist recruits often follow personal abilities. For example, those who are proficient with firearms become the snipers or assassins. Those who feel comfortable around explosives learn to create improvised explosive devises (IED). Some will serve as couriers, administrators, communicators, and go-betweens and other less talented individuals become transportation platforms for IEDs (suicide bombers). Like a giant corporation, all will find their forte and contribute to the cause in their own way.

Summary

This section provides the reader with a solid database from which to draw when interviewing or polygraphing the "True Believer." The key to unlocking the terrorist's psyche begins with understanding differences between Middle Eastern and Westernized culture. Mastering the terminology of Islam helps establish rapport and emotes a concern for the subject to be interviewed. Familiarity of their legal system and psychological elements of Islamic terrorism contribute to the investigator's knowledge – an integral part of any interrogation or a polygraph post-test. Understanding suicidal bombing and typology of terrorism provides a glimpse into the psyche of the radical terrorist.

SECTION III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

In this section, social learning, neutralization (drift) and social bond theories are discussed and applied to terrorism. Following an overview of this theory is a discussion of other empirical data, motives and vulnerabilities of pathways to radicalization and terrorism, and profiling of the terrorist.

Social Learning Theory

This theory argues that people *learn* to engage in criminal activity, or in this case, terrorism. Sutherland, in his theory of differential association, explains why varying factors - like social class, broken homes, age, urban or rural locations, and mental disorders – are related to crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). In his nine propositions, he argues that criminal behavior is learned by interacting with others and particularly intimate personal groups. Additionally, the learning includes techniques of committing the crime, and specific direction of motives, drives, rationalizations, and attitudes (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001). Terrorists learn techniques of committing crime – perhaps by employing suicide bombers in airplanes or planting IEDs from others within their group or cell. The principle of differential association is that a person becomes delinquent/criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violations of the law (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001). In other words, a young person enamored by a charismatic religious leader such as UBL, coupled with a "noble cause" to rid occupying forces on holy Islamic soil, may easily be influenced to become a terrorist. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority and intensity. In the case of terrorism, the individual, through association with others sharing the same attitudes and

motivation, prioritizes behavior patterns that lead down the road to terrorist activities. Sutherland and Cressey (1960) explain that the process of learning criminal behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves all of the mechanics that are involved in any other learning process. The postulate on which this theory is based is that crime is rooted in the social organization and is an expression of that social organization (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001). A group may be organized for or against criminal behavior. Radical religious terrorist groups are obviously organized to engage in criminal (terrorist) behavior by justifying their cause in the name of God (*Allah*).

Neutralization (Drift) Theory

Sykes and Matza (2008), in the 1960's, developed a differential perspective on social control, which they call the Neutralization, or Drift, Theory and explain why some delinquents (or terrorists, in this case) drift in and out of delinquency. Their Techniques of Neutralization suggest that delinquents develop a special set of justifications for their behavior when such behavior violates social norms. Such techniques allow delinquents to neutralize and temporarily suspend their commitments to societal values, providing them with the freedom to commit delinquent acts. These five techniques – denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties – echo the terrorists' ability to disenfranchise themselves while at the same time appealing to a higher authority (*Allah*) for justification of their actions.

Akers' social learning theory is a reformulation and extension of Sutherland's differential association theory. In addition to Sutherland's propositions, Akers argues that crime may also be learned through imitation and differential reinforcement. Akers and Burgess (1966) retain the

concepts of differential associations and definitions from Sutherland's theory, but conceptualize them in more behavioral terms and add concepts from behavioral learning theory. These concepts include differential reinforcement, whereby "operant" behavior (the voluntary actions of the individual) is conditioned by rewards and punishments. They also contain classical or "respondent" conditioning (the conditioning of involuntary reflex behavior); discriminative stimuli (the environmental and internal stimuli that provides cues or signals for behavior); schedules of reinforcement (the rate and ratio in which rewards and punishments followed behavioral responses); and other principles of behavior modification (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). In other words, Akers social learning theory combines Sutherland's original differential association theory of criminal behavior with general behavior learning principles (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001). This can be observed in terrorists whose behavior is "acquired, repeated, and changed by the same process as conforming behavior" (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). Because of a terrorist's associations, he or she imitates behavior that violates social and legal norms.

The theories discussed thus far are from the sociological school. However, it is important with a topic like terrorism to also examine the social psychological dynamic such as found with Bandura (1977) who incorporates aspects of behavioral and cognitive learning into the social learning theory. Behavioral learning assumes that people's environment (surroundings) cause people to behave in certain ways. Cognitive learning presumes that psychological factors are important for influencing how one behaves. Social learning suggests a combination of environmental (social) and psychological factors influence behavior. Social learning theory outlines three requirements for people to learn and model behavior: retention (remembering what one observed), reproduction (ability to reproduce the behavior), and motivation (good reason) to

want to adopt the behavior. The social learning theory of Bandura emphasizes the importance of observing and modeling the behaviors, attitudes, and emotional reactions of others.

Bandura (2004) argues that self-sanctions play a role in the regulation of inhumane conduct. In the course of socialization, people adopt moral standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct. After personal control has developed, people regulate their actions by the sanctions they apply to themselves. They do things that give them self-satisfaction and a sense of self-worth. They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards because such behavior brings self-condemnation. Self-sanctions, thus, keep conduct in line with internal standards.

Bandura renamed his approach of the social learning theory to social cognitive theory and expanded upon his theory of observation in his classic "Bobo doll" study where a group of kindergarteners watch a film of an adult violently attacking an inflatable toy shaped like Bobo the Clown by hitting it, sitting on it, hammering it, and so forth. He then lets the children into the room with the Bobo dolls. The children imitate the adult's behavior, gleefully attacking Bobo (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961), and Bandura reveals how aggression is imitated through aggressive models.

Bandura (1990; 2004) argues that three factors have particular relevance and are supported by theory and empirical research both within and beyond a "social learning" framework. These three factors include moral justification, blaming victims, and dehumanizing victims. An explanation and application to terrorism is discussed below:

Moral Justification: One way to remove the barrier of self-sanction is to change one's interpretation or appraisal of events in order to justify the act. Terrorists typically have some

justification for their action, whether it is personally construed or derived from the group's ideology.

Blaming Victims: It is generally more acceptable to target aggression at people who are considered blameworthy or deserving of retribution or "justice." Terrorists' rhetoric is often riddled with accusations and grievances toward their adversary. Consider, for example, the case UBL makes for *jihad* against America: The call to wage war against America was made because America spear-headed the crusade against the Islamic *Ummah* [community], sending thousands of US troops [1990-91 Gulf War] to the land of the two Holy Mosques [Saudi Arabia]. This, over and above US meddling in Middle Eastern affairs, politics, and support of oppressive, corrupt, and tyrannical regimes.

Dehumanizing Victims: Whether or not there exists some innate prohibition against intra-species killing, it certainly seems reasonable to conclude that it is more difficult to behave inhumanely toward a victim with whom one can identify than one who can be completely vilified and objectified. Borum (2004) explains moral scruples are blocked from the beginning if one declares enemies "non-persons" and denies their human qualities.

The core elements in a "cognitive theory" of aggression derive from an area of study called "social cognition." The basic notion is that people interact with their environment based on how they perceive and interpret it. That is, people form an internal (cognitive) map of their external (social) environment, and these perceptions – rather than an objective external reality – determine their behavior (Borum, 2004). Crenshaw (1988) suggests that the principles of social cognition apply both to terrorists and to their organizations. She notes the actions of terrorists are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than objective reality. Perceptions of the

political and social environment are filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and memories.

Social Bond Theory

Hirschi's (1969) Social Bond Theory has two simple propositions – first, delinquency and social bonds are inversely related, and secondly, the concept of social bonds has four elements – attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief, which independently and in combination restrain criminal conduct (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Hirschi argues that youth can be attached to peers, teachers, and other adults. *Attachment* creates an emotional bond between youth and other people causing youth concern about what others think. Cullen and Agnew (2003) explain that when in a situation where the opportunity for trouble presents itself, they will be restrained from delinquency if they are concerned that such action will disappoint the other person or disrupt the relationship.

Much like rational choice theory, Hirschi suggested that there is a "rational component" to conformity, which he calls "*commitment*." Juveniles who are doing well in school and have bright prospects ahead are less likely to engage in acts that will jeopardize their future. Conversely, uncommitted youth – those with little or no stake in conformity – have nothing to lose and thus are free to break the law (Cullen & Agnew, 2003).

Hirschi's third element – *involvement* – contends that if you keep youth busy with worthwhile activities, i.e. school, sports, etc., there is little time left for getting into trouble. Finally, Hirschi (1969) argues that youth who believe that they should "obey the rules of society" are less likely to violate them. The social bond of "*belief*" is controversial because such beliefs or "definitions" are also central to differential association theory (or what Hirschi calls "cultural deviance"

theory). Hirschi contends, however, that an important analytical distinction could be made: while cultural deviance theorists like Sutherland focus on beliefs that positively value crime ("definitions favorable to violation of the law"), control theorists focus on beliefs that proscribe crime (Cullen & Agnew, 2003). Delinquency is not caused by beliefs that require delinquency, noted Hirschi (1969), but rather made possible by the absence of (effective) beliefs that forbid delinquency.

Application of Theories to Terrorism

Borum (2004) applies social learning theory to terrorism and suggests that behavior (e.g., aggression) is learned not only through one's direct experience, but also through observation of how such contingencies occur in one's environment. In this model, aggression is viewed as learned behavior. Accordingly, it is argued that through observation one learns consequences for the behavior, how to do it, to whom it should be directed, what provocation justifies it, and when it is appropriate. This concept is a perfect example of Sutherland's differential association discussed earlier. Oots and Wiegele (1985) posit that if aggression is a learned behavior, then terrorism, a specific type of aggressive behavior, can also be learned. They also note that the potential terrorist need only see that terrorism has worked for others in order to become aggressively aroused.

The cell structure of radical terrorism lends itself to Hirschi's social bond theory and its elements starting with *attachment*. Hirschi's perspective is that emotions serve to forge the bond and thus make it more difficult for youth to become delinquent and disappoint parents, teachers, or peers. However, that same logic serves terrorism cells in that youth, easily enamored by a charismatic leader such as UBL, may involve themselves deeper into the terrorist cycle so to not

disappoint their leader. This same concept was observed in the religious cult of the Branch Davidians and their cult leader David Koresh.

Hirschi's (1969) second element, *commitment*, is the rational component in conformity. For example, when a person invests time, energy, himself, in a certain line of activity – be it education, a business, or a solid reputation within the community – he makes a commitment or bond to society. To deviate, the person runs the risk of losing the investment and being ostracized by society. However, as young men follow the path paved by UBL, they do not feel ostracized because *their* society is that terrorist cell.

Hirschi's third element of social bond theory, *involvement*, or engrossment in conventional activities, lends itself well to the old saying "the devil finds work for idle hands." In other words, to the extent a person is engrossed in conventional activities, s/he cannot even think about deviant acts (Hirschi, 1969). However, young terrorists are often recruited and educated in the schools (*madrassas*) where they are inculcated with the belief that Islam will again rule the world and all those who oppose a world Islamic state become the enemy. Therefore, their involvement *is* terrorism.

Hirschi's (1969) last element is *belief* in, or the "buy in" to, society's norms. The deviant person feels no moral obligation to conform to society. Part of this "buy in" is that as a person "invests" in society, he or she is less apt to become enmeshed in criminal activity. However, because terrorists feel no obligation to conform to norms within society, they become more captivated with the life cycle of terrorism.

In addition to criminological theories, psychological researchers have applied statistical models to explain violence and identify its predictors. Literally hundreds of studies in

psychology, criminology, sociology, and other behavioral sciences have yielded significant risk factors for violence. Borum (2004) declares that while it may be tempting to apply these risk factors to terrorism, they are unlikely to be useful predictors. Although terrorism is a type of violence, risk factors tend to operate differently at different ages, in different groups, and for different specific types of violent behavior. For example, the factors that predict violent behavior in the urban gang member with a drug addiction often differ from those that predict violence among predatory child molesters or perpetrators of domestic violence.

Most of the risk factor research in the social sciences focuses on predicting "general violence risk" that Borum (2004) explains represents the likelihood that an individual might engage in any aggressive act toward anyone over a specified period of time. For example, in a meta-analysis study conducted by Bonta, Laws, and Hanson (1998) juvenile delinquency, family problems, antisocial personality, hospital admissions, violent history, institutional adjustment, adult criminal history, and marital status were found to be risk factors of general violence. However, according to Borum (2004), most people who have a collection of general violence risk factors will never engage in terrorism. Conversely, many known terrorists – including some field leaders of the 9/11 attacks – did not have a large number of key general violence risk factors, although they were actively preparing to engage in acts of terrorism. That the correlates of general violence and terrorism are different have at least two important implications: (1) it is likely that the causal (explanatory) mechanisms also are different; (2) one cannot reasonably use the risk factors from one to predict the other.

Motives and Vulnerabilities

Motive and vulnerability are among the key psychological factors in understanding whether, how, and who in a given environment will enter the process of becoming terrorists.

One's *motivation* for engaging in terrorism is often presumed to be the "cause" or ideology of the group. However, as Crenshaw (1985) notes, the popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by deep and intransigent political commitment obscures a more complex reality. The reality is that motives to join a terrorist organization and engage in terrorism vary considerably across different types of groups, and also within groups – and they may change over time.

Crenshaw (1985) suggests that there are at least four categories of motivation among terrorists: (1) the opportunity for action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material reward. Post (1990) expands on the premise and suggests that terrorism is an end unto itself, independent of any stated political or ideological objectives. His argument is that "the cause" is not the cause. The cause, as codified in the group's ideology, according to this line of reasoning, becomes the rationale for acts the terrorists are driven to commit. Indeed, the central argument of this position is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.

Horgan (2003) declares the quest to understand *vulnerabilities* should not be confused with a search for the "terrorist personality." Horgan (2005) framed the issue of vulnerability in perhaps the most lucid and useful way as factors that point to some people having a greater openness to increased engagement than others. Based on a review of the existing literature, three motivational themes - *injustice, identity*, and *belonging* - appear to be prominent and consistent. These themes [also helpful in interrogations] relate to one's potential openness or vulnerability.

Injustice: Perceived injustice has long been recognized as a central factor in understanding violence generally and terrorism specifically, dating back to some of the earliest writings. *Identity*: One's psychological identity is a developed, stable sense of self and resolved security in one's basic values, attitudes, and beliefs. Developmentally, its formation typically occurs in a crisis of adolescence or young adulthood, and is tumultuous and emotionally challenging. However, the successful development of personal identity is essential to the integrity and continuity of the personality (Crenshaw, 1986). An individual's search for identity may draw him or her to extremist or terrorist organizations in a variety of ways. One may fall into what psychologist Marcia (Borum, 2004) calls "identity foreclosure" where a role and set of ideas and values (an identity) are adopted without personal, critical examination. The absolutist, "black and white" nature of most extremist ideologies is often attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated world (Borum, 2004).

A similar mechanism is one in which a desperate quest for personal meaning pushes an individual to adopt a role to advance a cause, with little or no thoughtful analysis or consideration of its merit. In essence, the individual resolves the difficult question, "Who am I?" by simply defining him or herself as a terrorist, freedom fighter, *shahid* or similar role (Della Porta, 1992; Knutson, 1981). Taylor and Louis (2004) describe a classic set of circumstances for recruitment into a terrorist organization: young people find themselves at a time in their lives when they are looking to the future with the hope of engaging in meaningful behavior that will be satisfying and get them ahead. Their objective circumstances including opportunities for advancement are virtually nonexistent; they find some direction for their religious collective

identity but the desperately disadvantaged state of their community leaves them feeling marginalized and lost without a clearly defined collective identity (Borum, 2004).

Belonging: In radical extremist groups, many prospective terrorists find not only a sense of meaning, but also a sense of belonging, connectedness and affiliation similar to what one observes in criminal gang activity. Luckabaugh, Fuqua, Cangemi, and Kowalski (1997) conclude the real cause or psychological motivation for joining is the great need for belonging, a need to consolidate one's identity. A need to belong, along with an incomplete personal identity, is a common factor that cuts across the groups. For these alienated individuals from the margins of society, joining a terrorist group represents the first real sense of belonging after a lifetime of rejection, and the terrorist group becomes the family they never had (Post, 1984). This strong sense of belonging has critical importance as a motivating factor for joining, a compelling reason for staying, and a forceful influence for acting (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). This is not unlike the same social bonding observed in those who join a criminal gang such as the Blood or the Crypts. Hence, the terrorist group itself may provide security, similarly, found in family, by subjugating individuality to the group identity. A protective cocoon is created that offers shelter from a hostile world (Marsella, 2003). Observations of terrorist recruitment show that many people are influenced to join by seeking solidarity with family, friends or acquaintances (Della Porta, 1995), and that for individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or to violence (Crenshaw, 1988). Indeed, it is the image of such strong cohesiveness and solidarity among extremist groups that makes them more attractive than some prosocial collectives as a way to find belonging (Johnson & Feldman, 1992).

These three factors - *injustice, identity,* and *belonging* – often co-occur in terrorists and strongly influence decisions to enter terrorist organizations and engage in terrorist activity. Some analysts have suggested that the synergistic effect of these dynamics forms the real "root cause" of terrorism, regardless of ideology.

Pathways to Radicalization and Terrorism

As important as these motivational factors may be to understand fully the process of becoming a terrorist, motive cannot be taken in isolation from opportunity (Bruce, 1997, as cited in Borum, 2004, p. 26). Stated simply, people follow a pathway into (and often through) radicalization, terrorism and terrorist organizations. The pathway may be different for different people and can be affected by a wide range of factors. Bandura (1990) observes the path to terrorism as shaped by fortuitous factors as well as by the conjoint influence of personal predilections and social inducements. The transition into becoming a terrorist is rarely sudden and abrupt. Like other criminal activity, one does not just wake up one morning and make a conscious decision to become a terrorist. Rather it is a gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior that takes place. Luckabaugh et al. (1997) view this as one of the few general points of agreement in the field of terrorism studies, stating it is generally accepted terrorists do not become terrorists over night. They follow a general progression from social alienation to boredom, then occasional dissidence and protest before eventually turning to terrorism.

Terrorism, in this view, is not the product of a single decision but the end result of a dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a commitment to violence over time. The process takes place within a larger political environment involving the state, the

terrorist group, and the group's self-designated political constituency. The interaction of these variables in a group setting is used to explain why individuals turn to violence and can eventually justify terrorist actions (Borum, 2004).

How do extremist ideologies develop (radicalization) and ultimately translate into justifications or imperatives to use terrorist violence? One early model developed by Hacker (1983) framed the progression in three stages. The first stage involved an awareness of oppression. The second stage marked recognition that the oppression was "social" and therefore not unavoidable. The third stage was an impetus or realization that it was possible to act against the oppression.

Based on an analysis of multiple militant extremist groups with a span of diverse ideologies, Borum (2003) observes that there does appear to be some observable markers or stages in the process that are common to many individuals in extremist groups and zealous adherents of extremist ideologies, both foreign and domestic. The process begins by framing some unsatisfying event or condition as being unjust. The injustice is blamed on a target policy, person, or nation. The responsible party, perceived as a threat, is then vilified – often demonized – which facilitates justification for aggression. Borum (2004) describes the development of extremist ideas and their justification of violence in four simplistically labeled stages: [that could also be used for post-test interrogation theme material]

It's not right: The starting point is a grievance or sense of dissatisfaction, usually pertaining to some perceived restriction or deprivation in a person's environment. The nature of the undesirable condition may vary (e.g., economic, social, etc.), but those who experience it perceive it in some way as aversive.

It's not fair: An undesirable condition is not necessarily an unjust one. Perceptions of injustice usually arise when one comes to view the aversive condition in a comparative context – relative to one's own expectations or relative to how that condition does or does not affect others. This is similar to Gurr's (1968) concept of "relative deprivation," that he defines as the actor's perception of discrepancy between the value expectations [the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled] and their environment's apparent value capabilities. This discrepancy, perceived as unfair or unjust, prompts feelings of resentment.

It's your fault: We are socialized to believe that although "bad" things may happen in life, injustices typically don't occur without some cause. Lerner talks about a phenomenon he refers to as the "just world hypothesis," a human condition in which individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve and deserve what they get (Lerner & Miller, 1978). If they are the victims of injustice, it is assumed someone else is at fault for that condition. By attributing blame, those who have accumulated resentments now have a target or outlet for them.

You're evil: The stages reviewed so far describe a possible mechanism for developing hateful attitudes toward a group or institution. But most people who hate don't kill. What facilitates violence is the erosion of the psychological and social barriers that inhibit aggressive behavior even in the presence of aggressive impulse or intent. This may involve creating justifications for one's actions and/or dehumanizing the victims to some degree, such as by casting them as "evil."

(Borum, 2004, *Psychology of Terrorism*, p. 29, University of South Florida)

Although the model may have some heuristic value, it is not statistically derived. It also appears to account better for violent (militant) extremism, than for extremist ideology in general.

The Terrorist Profile

The term and concept of "profiling" has come to have many different meanings. In the context of the following discussion, the term "profiling" is not used to refer to the type of criminal investigative analysis that was refined by members of the FBI's Behavioral Science Unit (BSU). That kind of investigative profiling seeks to examine physical and behavioral evidence of an offense *after* it occurs and, based on that information, draw inferences about potential characteristics of the person who commits the crime. For example, after a number of rapes or murders are committed employing the same *modus of operandi*, the BSU profiling unit looks for commonalities of each murder or rape and establishes a profile of the individual they think may be the perpetrator. Conversely, from a counterterrorism intelligence perspective, profiling is primarily concerned with the identification and interruption of terrorist activity *before* an attack occurs. This poses a very different kind of operational challenge.

A law enforcement officer faces the Herculean task of identifying "terrorists" with the hopes of derailing or thwarting future catastrophic terrorist events. Some have assumed by examining

characteristics of people who have committed terrorist acts in the past (particularly if the number was large enough), it should be possible to delineate a demographic or psychological composite of common traits that could be used to spot a terrorist in an otherwise murky haystack of law-abiding citizens. A number of social science researchers have attempted to develop such a composite. Horgan and Taylor (2001) suggest academia has attempted to profile terrorists in a psychological sense or across socio-political dimensions.

One of the best known, most comprehensive, and most often cited of these efforts is a profile developed by Russell and Miller (1983) based on a compilation of published data regarding over 350 individual terrorist cadres and leaders across 18 different terrorist groups active during the 1966 – 76 time span. The prototype derived from their composite describes a young (22-25), unmarried male who is an urban resident, from a middle-upper class family with some university education and probably holding an extremist political philosophy.

Even the briefest reflection reveals a problem in that most individuals who fit that general description are not terrorists and will never commit an act of terrorist aggression. The problem of equally grave significance that could result from its use, however, is that that there are and will be people who are planning and preparing to mount a terrorist attack, who do *not* fit that profile (Borum, 2003). Silke (2003) warns the belief that profiling can provide an effective defense also seriously underestimates the intelligence of terrorist organizations. Indeed, sophisticated terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, actively seek to know the "type" of person who will attract suspicion and then scout and use operators who defy that preconception. Al-Qaeda expert, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna (2002), documents that the organization recruits members from 74 different countries and among at least 40 different nationalities.

Summary

Evidenced by the readings, no single theory has gained ascendance as an explanatory model for all types of violence. Perhaps the diversity in behaviors regarded as violent pose an inherent barrier to such a global theory. Social learning and social bond theories have received some of the most extensive empirical attention and support, but not specifically for terrorism. Terrorist violence is most often deliberate (not impulsive), strategic, and instrumental; it is linked to and justified by ideological (e.g., political, religious) objectives and almost always involves a group or multiple actors/supporters. These issues all add complexity to the construction of terrorism as a form of violence and challenge the emergence of a unifying explanatory theory (Borum, 2004).

Bottom line, there is no easy answer or single motivation to explain why people become terrorists. Similarly, the processes and pathways of *how* that happens are quite varied and diverse. Researchers have begun to distinguish between reasons for joining, remaining in, and leaving terrorist organizations, finding that motivations may be different at each stage, and not even necessarily relate to one another. There does appear to be some common vulnerability and perceptions among those who turn to terrorism – perceived injustice, need for identity and need for belonging – though certainly there are persons who share these perceptions who do not become terrorists.

Moreover, for the interviewer, interrogator, or polygraph examiner to combat terrorism and to have any chance of eradicating its insidious tentacles from choking the world, all must recognize the nexus between psychological theories, risk factors, terrorist typology and their overarching mission. Otherwise, with each step up the staircase another person is lost to the magnetic attraction of terrorism.

SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVIEWING, INTERROGATING & POLYGRAPHING THE RADICAL FUNDAMENTALIST TERRORIST

Introduction

When traversing the winding road of interviews and interrogations of the radical fundamentalist, it is always important to keep in mind the objective of the Islamist Jihadic Movement is to undermine the US and to destroy the West, who *jihadis* believe have victimized them and denigrated their religious and familial values (FDLE, 2001). Therefore, in order to disrupt or prevent such terrorist acts, interviews are only as good as knowledge of the adversaries. Understanding the Arabic thought process, different from that of the Western thought process, is critical when conducting an interview or attempting to elicit accurate and useful information from terrorist operatives and supporters. Armed with an understanding of Islamic culturality, and coupled with the theoretical architecture of terrorism, this section focuses the reader's attention on interviews, interrogations and polygraphs. As a frame of reference, the subtle nuances of interviews, interrogations, and polygraph are discussed: An *interview* is usually conducted of a person who is a "person of interest" or many times, a "walk-in" who may provide law enforcement or intelligence personnel with information of value. The *interrogation* is usually conducted of an individual who is suspected or accused of an illegal act. Contrast this with *polygraph*, voluntary in nature, which is utilized to verify information obtained from an interview or interrogation. This section uses the three terms – interviewer, interrogator, and polygraph examiner – interchangeably as the principles of collecting information are the same.

This section begins with a discussion of the Arabic thought process followed by basic tools of interviewing. Rapport building strategies and kinesics are discussed next followed by a subset

concerning the preparation for interviewing the radical fundamentalist. The reader needs to be familiar with a number of concepts when interviewing, interrogating or polygraphing these individuals. Therefore, a brief discussion of these concepts includes *Jihad*, Personality & Mindset, *Insh'allah*, Individualism versus Collectivism, Lying & Deception, "Good Intentions," Guilt versus Shame, and Linear versus Associative Thinking. The next subset discusses motivational themes, use of an interpreter, and assessing the individual.

Understanding the Arabic Thought Process

Gelles, et al. (2006) explain, as children, all humans think "associatively" jumping from idea to idea. Middle Eastern Arab culture values associative thinking and therefore, many Middle Eastern Arab males continue to think associatively as adults, jumping from point-to-point and place to place in a discussion. An interviewer must be cautious not to interpret this associative style of thought process as necessarily a means of deception. Western children, on the other hand, are schooled to move from associative thinking to "linear" thinking thus producing adults who often think in a sequential, goal-oriented manner, with one point following the next in logical order. The reader should not construe one process as being better than another. However, understanding the differences in thought processes, an interviewer or interrogator can use this knowledge to recognize deception when stories told by a person being interviewed appears rote, memorized, or otherwise superficially linear.

It is extremely important to be cognizant of not only what is said, but also how it is said. Too often, as Americans, many jump to the conclusion that if people understand some English, they must think like Americans. This is seldom the case. Just as in America, where people from

different parts of the country have a unique lexicon and regional pattern of cultural experiences, people from other countries reflect their unique cultural differences from that found in the US.

Basic Tools

The first objective in the information retrieval process is to draw out details from the deeper recesses of the subject's mind into the conscious level of the subject's awareness. This is conducted in a narrative-based interview atmosphere that has been shown to successfully produce more information in terms of volume and quality (Walters, 2003). To be successful at this, the interviewer must establish rapport with the individual. Therefore, as the investigator, always remain unbiased. In other words, personal opinions cannot be allowed to cloud your objective: to conduct the best interview, interrogation, or polygraph. In corroborating this statement, Walters (2003) declares the investigative interviewer should never enter the interview room with any preconceptions about the subject or the interview.

An Arab from the Middle East was likely raised in a culture where relationships are critical and shame is a key behavioral driver. In this culture, there is little individualism; the way the subject behaves and interacts with others defines who he is. Therefore, to access information of value, the interrogator must develop a connection and build a relationship with the subject. This takes creativity, flexibility, and versatility as opposed to a textbook mechanistic approach. If rapport develops between the interviewer and the subject, the subject is motivated to cooperate and ultimately share information (Gelles, et al., 2006).

Rapport Building Strategies

Building rapport sounds like a simple process. Every law enforcement or intelligence officer receives training on how to conduct interviews and interrogations. Learning the concepts and

applying them successfully allows the good interviewer to obtain information that perhaps others miss. The goal of an interview or polygraph pretest is to create an atmosphere where subjects feel relaxed enough to speak with the interviewer but not so complacent they are inattentive. This balance, according to psychologists, is defined as the Yerkes-Dodson Law where people perform best at a moderate level of arousal – not too stressed yet not too relaxed. Without overstating the obvious, the key to success in any dialogue between two people is the establishment of rapport. Psychiatrists Othmer and Othmer (1994) dissect rapport and provide six strategies that any interviewer can employ when establishing and maintaining rapport: putting the subject at ease, expressing compassion, assessment of subject, showing expertise, establishing authority, and balancing roles. These strategies, taught at the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment (DACA) to students from federal agencies attending the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD) Course, more commonly known as the polygraph course, can be adapted to any interview or interrogation. So wherever the word *examinee* is used, the word *subject* can be substituted. DACA (2007a) briefly describes each of these strategies:

1. *Putting the Examinee at Ease.* It is the examiner's job to project the image that any doubts and concerns are typical, respecting examinee's concerns.

Observation of Verbal and Nonverbal Signals. Rapport building starts with the introduction of examiner to examinee. Find out what the examinee prefers to be called and the proper pronunciation of his or her name. Observation of the examinee's verbal and nonverbal behavior is the beginning of the assessment process. Othmer and Othmer (1994) establish four categories of behavior and how they apply to rapport building.

(a) Territorial (locomotor). How does the examinee move in the new territory of the interview room? The timid normally avoid contact whereas intrusive examinees may speak loudly, show emotions, and "invade" your space. The Middle Eastern subject / examinee often exhibits this intrusive type of behavior.

(b) Behavioral (psychomotor). Psychomotor (mental and motor activities) behavior normally mimics the examinee's locomotor behavior. The timid examinee avoids eye contact while the intrusive examinee may try to gain control of the exam process.

(c) Emotional (expressive). Examinees' emotional state may be clearly apparent by gestures, facial expressions, eye contact, and/or tone of voice. S/he may appear jovial, reserved, or tense and it is not uncommon for tears to be present.

(d) Verbal. Employ active listening skills. Many new examiners become more overwhelmed with interview steps or format than with what is actually being said.

2. *Show Compassion*. If, over the years, an examiner becomes so cynical as to lose his/her sense of compassion, one can be assured that such a loss will have a negative impact on that examiner's effectiveness. Regardless of the case facts or the purpose of the test, the examinee is experiencing various degrees of stress. Empathizing goes hand-in-hand with showing compassion. If examinees vent about how an investigation is ruining their life, marriage, job, or reputation in the community, express a degree of empathy toward their situation.

3. *Assess Insight - Become an Ally*. Assessing the examinee's insight into the reason for the examination or his/her understanding as to why s/he has become a suspect is important for a number of reasons:

- Misconceptions can be resolved;

- An understanding as to the examinee's views regarding honesty and integrity is helpful in question formulation;
- Obviously distorted views may be indicative of an untruthful examinee;
- The examiner should project impartial objectivity. Examiner does not formulate a final opinion of truthfulness until the entire examination is completed.

4. *Show Expertise*. Regardless of whether it is your first interview or number one thousand, the examinee must be convinced of your capability of rendering a conclusive opinion concerning his or her truthfulness. Your knowledge of PDD, issues being tested, and psychology and physiology demonstrate your expertise in the field.

5. *Establish Authority***.** Establishing authority is taking control of the interview. This control starts immediately, from the initial handshake, to directing examinee where to sit, to reviewing the outcome of the interview or exam. Many new interviewers or examiners come on too strong and overstep their authority. Those who strongly project they know it all often times jeopardize rapport, collect inconclusive charts, and usually fail to obtain a confession.

6. *Balance Roles*. The effective examiner is an actor who balances the roles of empathic listener, expert, and authority throughout the interview. Like a chameleon, s/he switches these roles according to the needs of the subject and the direction of the interview. Unfortunately, many interviewers lock into one stereotype and let that dominate the interviewing style. However, successful interviewers learn to balance their roles and adjust as necessary.

(a) <u>The Empathic Listener</u>. The empathic listener does an excellent job of putting the subject at ease and expressing sensitivity and compassion. Beware, though, as remaining in this role can

spell danger if the interviewer fails to notice signs of behavior normally indicative of deception, believing absolutely everything that is stated, and / or develops an emotional closeness without professional distance.

(b) The Expert. The interviewer who remains in the expert role may feel that empathy is a waste of time. The expert may ride the high horse of knowledge with an air of infallibility, e.g. I'm the best examiner in the government. Confidence is an essential element in all good interviewers or examiners but overconfidence can lead to major mistakes.

Othmer and Othmer (1994) provide a checklist for rapport building that is easily adaptable to in-room use: Put subject/examinee at ease; Recognize their state of mind; Address their stress; Help them overcome distrust; Curb their intrusiveness and rambling; Encourage them to talk; Express empathy; Communicate to them your familiarity with their situation; Express your intent to help them; Recognize the subject's / examinee's attitude toward his or her situation; and Adjust your role to the subject's / examinee's role.

Understanding Kinesics as It Relates to the Radical Fundamentalist

The establishment of rapport takes time as the interviewer discusses non-threatening topics, but it has a critical purpose – to allow the interviewer to establish the 'constants' in the subject's normal behavior. According to Walters (2003), a Subject Matter Expert and author of *Kinesic Interview and Interrogation Techniques*, the interviewer must establish a normal, or "constant," of behavior for each subject. Accurate assessment of a person's behavior can be made only after establishing this reference point. As the interview proceeds, look for both verbal and non-verbal cues from your subject. Research has revealed that over 38% of voice tone and 55% of general body language impacts on communication (Mehrabian, 1971). Therefore, be cognizant of

subject's behavior patterns. While any obstruction of speech, whether physical or symbolic, is a sign of stress and possible deception (Walters, 2003), one behavior, in and of itself, should not be construed as a sign of deception. Rather, look for clusters of behavior. According to Walters (2003), any change in a person's constant or normal level of eye contact, which is a timely response and part of a cluster, can be a sign of stress and possible deception.

In the 1970's the FBI's BSU began to rely on "profiling" criminals to aid in resolving crimes, particularly serial murders or rapes. Congruent to the FBI's efforts was extensive research into human behavior by social scientists, psychologists, and criminologists. The very same behavioral science gives insight into the most effective methods of interviewing and is based on quality scientific study and research. The most successful interviewers are those who realize that different methods and approaches are necessary for different types of individuals who are interviewed (Walters, 2003). In other words, whether your interview is of a bank robber, murderer, or terrorist subject, orient your interview approach to each individual if you expect to be successful. A static universal approach to all subjects in all interviews in all settings is not always productive (Gudjonsson, 1992).

Preparing for the Interview of the Radical Fundamentalist

This subset discusses how to apply the above principles when interviewing, interrogating, or polygraphing the radical fundamentalist. A pre-requisite, according to Gelles, et al. (2006), for successful interviews with radical fundamentalists is careful and systematic planning. Other professionals such as analysts and behavioral psychologists may assist in extrapolating information about the subject's background, culture, terrorist ties, and any other pertinent information helpful in the interview process.

When interviewing terrorist suspects, recognize that their mindset is the polar opposite of friendly, discerning, open-minded people. The terrorist's mindset is intractable, made up, stubbornly resilient, and unbending, even when confronted with reality. This mindset refuses to compromise and, in fact, readily feeds and nourishes itself with the intoxicating elixir of equally narrow, close-minded ideas and thoughts. This makes for a very stubborn individual who more than likely will be argumentative, unyielding, and usually unpleasant (Navarro, 2005).

At the beginning of the interview, questions of an investigative nature are purposely avoided. This is done to allow subject and interviewer an opportunity to develop a bond on matters unrelated to the investigation. This neutral discussion may revolve around something as simple as a World Cup soccer game. Also offer food (dates, almonds, cookies, chocolate) and beverages (tea, coffee, juice) to help build good will and, perhaps later, be used as an incentive. Another productive line of inquiry involves the subject talking about his native country and upbringing.

This rapport-building strategy takes time to develop so patience must be exhibited as subjects often go on extended diatribes or feel the need to vent. Avoid reflexive or emotional responses to diatribes, never meeting hostility with counter-hostility, but rather listening acutely to discern emotional and motivational cues. Be mindful of any nonverbal signals remembering collective societies, i.e. the Middle East, thrive on personal relationships (Gelles, Borum, & Palarea, 2004).

At the same time, employ active listening skills and recognize emotional and motivational cues to subject's thinking. This provides a window to subject's primary interests and concerns (worries about family, finances, commitment to *jihad* and spreading the word of Islam) (Gelles, et al., 2004).

As the relationship develops, deploy themes to facilitate elicitation of information. Dialogue may reach negotiation stages where favors may be granted to subject in order to obtain information. This *quid pro quo* arrangement will vary depending on subject's cooperation and interviewer's ability to grant those favors. The important factor is to maintain control of the interview and recognize that the subject may employ insults or outbursts to disengage the interview. Therefore, stay on course remaining confident and compassionate and do not let a subject's attitude or failure to communicate as a 'Westerner' (linear thinking) cause frustration or anger (Gelles, et al., 2004).

When preparing for any interview, certain factors are considered - case review, the subject, your experience level, time availability, and information to be garnered from correctional officers, guards, or staff members. Additionally, some specific considerations impact an interview or polygraph examination of the Mideast militant radical - age, because of the Arab culture's respect for elders and seniority, along with gender and language. While our American culture sees gender as transparent, the Mideast culture is a patriarchal society and many males see females as property, not their equals. An Arab male will not feel compelled to speak with a female, especially a young female who he may see as the same age as a daughter.

The Concept of *Jihad*

Because we are dealing with religious fundamentalism, it is imperative to understand the concept of *jihad* – a concept that is central to many Islamic extremist ideologies and justifications for violence (Euben, 2002). The meaning of that term, however, has been a matter of considerable debate (Gould, 2005). It is important to note here that this principle and centerpiece of Islamic extremist doctrine – that there is a duty mandated by God to kill or destroy

all "unbelievers" – is a relatively new development in Islamic history. While the faith of Islam has existed for more than 14 centuries, this violent strain of Islamist ideology has held a sizeable audience for less than a century. *Jihadism* is a modern phenomenon (Pipes, 2004).

In the current international security environment, there is consensus among US counterterrorism experts and policymakers that Sunni extremism – driving a call to wage *jihad* – currently poses the greatest threat to Western interests (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). The voice of these extremists can be heard in the words and deeds of al-Qaeda and its affiliated network. These groups, and the men behind them, have a rigid, narrow view of Islam and lack any tolerance for those whose beliefs contrast from theirs. They oppose Jews, Christians, and even less strident Muslims (Borum & Gelles, 2005). Their exclusive rigidity and fundamentalism alone, however, are not sufficient to give rise to a security threat. Rather, the threat arises from the belief that they have a duty to wage holy war against, and violently exterminate, all persons who do not share their beliefs (Gelles, et al., 2006). In recent times, the US has been viewed as the primary villain because it has sided and conspired "against Muslims" in numerous conflicts around the world (e.g. Israel, East Timor, Serbia, South Philippines, etc. (Lewis, 2003). In actuality, the opposite is true. The US has come to the aid of Islamic entities, i.e. Kuwait (1990-91); Somalia (1994, though the US was driven from there); and Bosnia (1998-99).

Personality and Mindset

Do not confuse the terms personality and mindset. These terms are not synonymous. One's *personality* is a distinctive pattern of thought, emotion, and behavior that defines one's way of interacting with the physical and social environment, where as *mindset* is a fixed mental attitude

or a fixed state of mind (Hudson, 1999). In trying better to define mindset, the term becomes more meaningful when considered in the context of a group. Each group will have its own distinctive mindset, which will be a reflection of the top leader's personality and ideology, as well as group type (Hudson, 1999). For example, the basic mindset of a religious terrorist group, such as al-Qaeda or Hamas, is Islamic fundamentalism.

Concept of *Insh'allah*

Understanding the cultural history and pathways through which individuals commit to radical Islamist ideology is pivotal to success in the interview or exam room. For example, something as basic as day-to-day existence is at polar opposites for western and eastern cultures. While many Westerners see themselves as being in control of their own destiny, many Middle Easterners believe that much of what occurs in their lives is left to fate. The concept, known as "*insh'allah*" (God Willing), becomes an acceptance of a life over which they have no control.

Individualism versus Collectivism

The US was built on the concept of individualism. Arab society, conversely, evolved from centuries of nomadic existence where families lived together in tents across great expanses of desert sand. As such, their culture is oriented more toward collectivism than individualism. Their identification with the larger collective or group membership is more important in understanding and defining who they are than their personal traits or what they have accomplished. The individual's identity is based on family or tribal roots in addition to the group with whom s/he currently affiliates (Gelles, et al., 2006).

Lying and Deception

In a society built on "collectivism," relationships are important and a pillar to Arab culture. One's importance and social status is based on how others perceive you. Contrast this with traditional Western values that emphasize individual achievement and self-worth (Nydell, 1996). Therefore, building trust aids in building a relationship with the subject. Gelles et al. (2006) explains that because such stock is placed on collectiveness and social relationships, the Middle Eastern person avoids conflict and attempts to always portray himself in the best light even if that means insincerity and deception in order to preserve the relationship. Lying is acceptable and common in daily interactions with others, especially to maintain or restore personal image (FDLE, 2001). This concept becomes important in both interviews and polygraphs. Gabriel (2006) explains *taqiyya* or *kithman* – "lying," "deception," or "deceit" as a tactic encouraged by Islam in waging *jihad*.

"Good Intentions"

Another concept unique to Middle Eastern culture is that of "Good Intentions." In Western culture, it is important to "make good" on your promise. Conversely, in the Middle East, intentions matter more than actions. Saying you'll do something, whether or not you succeed, is more face-saving than to actually complete the action (Gelles et al., 2006).

Guilt versus Shame

Those from the Middle Eastern culture typically do not experience guilt in the same manner as Westernized cultures. Instead of fear of guilt, fear of shame motivates Middle Eastern to avoid engaging in wrongful or proscribed behavior (Gelles, et al., 2004). Hence, this might be the most important concept to grasp in Middle Eastern culture. In the West, people are taught from very

early in life, to feel remorse for transgressions, no matter how minor. This includes "owning up" for mistakes by confession to someone, taking responsibility for actions, and even compensating the victim. In Middle Eastern culture, however, guilt is a much less significant factor than shame (Triandis, 1995). Collectivist societies are more driven by the phenomenon of shame, a distressing emotion one seeks to avoid or has to bear for wrongful behavior. Shame is a social phenomenon based on others' judgments and perceptions, compared to guilt, which comes from conflict within the individual. This difference is important when preparing your interrogation strategy. Traditional Western (guilt-based) interrogation theory suggests that concealment and deception cause the subject to experience inner conflict and anxiety, which, along with guilt can be alleviated by confession and absolution (Gelles, et al., 2004). In contrast, shame is protected (not aggravated) by concealment. Because shame is "social," the subject may fear that disclosure (confession) may lead to judgment and shame, not to relief and absolution (Gelles, et al., 2004). Therefore, Militant Islamists may not feel shame or guilt for what occurred. If they experience shame, it is not for the actions themselves, but out of concern for how they may be perceived or evaluated by parents, family, or others they respect.

Linear versus Associative Thinking

Expanding on what was briefly discussed earlier, Middle Eastern persons are raised and acculturated to think associatively, rather than the linear, goal-oriented, structured, sequential way typical of Westerners (Nydell, 1996). Middle Eastern subjects, thinking associatively, appear to jump from point-to-point, as facts are "associated" with other facts. They go off on tangents as they think in "big picture" terms while the Western interrogator, a linear thinker, has trouble following this apparent nebulous story. When asked for specific dates, they may not be

able to provide a truthful answer. Though not intentionally being deceptive, they don't think in those terms but rather associate events with other facts such as the fall harvest, a full moon, a child's birth, etc. Finally, individuals from the Middle East tend to be emotional processors of information. As they take in information and experiences, they tend to organize the data and events around the context of relationships and collective value, rather than by topic or category (Patai, 2002).

Motivational Themes

Earlier, Borum (2004) discussed the three most consistent motivational themes found among extremist and terrorist recruits: *uncertain personal identity, a need for belonging, and perceived injustice*. In many reviewed cases of captured, arrested, and detained al-Qaeda members, these young men of the Muslim faith sought meaning, direction and structure in their lives. They sought connectedness with others to avoid the painful experience of isolation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

Gelles, et al. (2006) explain in a common scenario, a young man feeling alienated or disenfranchised may, "by chance," find a *connection* in the mosque closest to his home or befriend another Muslim man who facilitates the connection to a local mosque or group. This is the first step in a larger process that leads to developing a *commitment* to "*jihad*", capability as an extremist, and eventually, an *intention* to carry out a violent act in the service of *jihad*. Although the end result is a violent and destructive act that leaves much tragedy in its wake, the process of recruitment is a very genuine and personal process. This mirrors the "staircase theory" discussed earlier. Many who eventually join Islamic extremist groups view this as a solution to the more painful and intolerable psychological state of isolation (Gelles, et al., 2006).

Use of an Interpreter

If an interpreter is employed, the time frame increases exponentially. Extracting parameters from DACA (2007b), the interpreter must be fluent in both English and the target language with a native speaker of the target language preferred; have no speech defects; and be able to communicate at examinee's or interviewee's conversational level. Again, remembering that social status is very important in the Middle Eastern culture, the interpreter, if possible, should be equal or higher to the social level of subject. Hence, the education level of the interpreter should be considered along with tribal affiliations or caste strata. Ask if the interpreter has ever worked as a translator before, and, if so, in what capacity. Additionally, explore your interpreter's professional background, technical fields of expertise, and criminal and/or intelligence background. For example, if the subject is suspected of manufacturing biological or chemical weapons, it might be helpful to have an interpreter with a technical background in these sciences. Also, check prior employment or background that might impact in a positive or negative way. A Sunni Muslim interpreter whose family was killed by Shiite Muslims may not be the best fit for the interview or polygraph of a Shiite subject.

Take the time to train the interpreter. The interpreter must always follow your lead and be willing to subjugate his/her personality. An interpreter cannot be antagonistic toward the subject. Furthermore, the interpreter must translate exactly what is said. As such, the interpreter should emulate the tone, intensity, and emotion of all comments and questions. The interpreter cannot become "friendly" with subject nor can s/he interject any of his / her feelings into the interpretation. The interpreter should not carry on any side conversations with subject/examinee.

The last part of the interpreter training concerns proxemics of the interview or polygraph area, i.e. where does the interpreter sit in relation to examiner and examinee.

The bottom line is for the interpreter to become an integral part of the process while at the same time remaining only the "mouthpiece" for the language. This is not to denigrate the interpreter's status but rather to stay focused on the mission – collecting accurate and reliable information from the subject/examinee.

Assessment

The linchpin to a good interrogation yielding the most reliable information is a proper assessment of the individual. Therefore, the assessment process is conducted. Gelles, et al. (2006) posit that you should explore and assess three core areas:

- The pressures experienced by the subject based on fear of confinement, persuasiveness or the interviewers, and relationship conflicts between the subject and his colleagues and between the subject and his/her interviewers;
- The subject's perception of the strength and extent of information about him and evidence against him; and
- The degree to which the subject needs (or may be influenced to need) to sustain a position of respect and value in relation to the interrogator, especially in a relationship-based interrogation.

These three influences can be leveraged over time to elicit more information from the subject and to develop leads that corroborate the subject's story and yield additional information.

The next logical step in the process is to select the best interview or polygraph technique that will determine if the information provided by subject is reliable and accurate or just sentences transmitted in order to mitigate discomfort. The use of aggressive and controlling techniques during the interrogation of a militant Islamic subject is seldom successful. Aggressive techniques will generate information but such information may be disjointed and inaccurate. Furthermore, most radical terrorists have been trained to anticipate torture and resist questioning. Gelles, et al. (2006) explain that when an interrogator uses the techniques expected by the subject, it confirms that which subject expects, validates prior counter-resistance training, and serves to reinforce his obfuscation to providing reliable information. Thus, this perception of predictability may provide subject with a sense of control over the interview process whether or not actually applicable and increase his motivation to resist. By contrast, the rapport building strategy may perplex a militant Islamist subject and therefore make him more vulnerable to approaches (Gelles, et al., 2004).

A difficult part of the process for most interviewers is to exhibit an apparent concern for the subject's beliefs, motivations, and circumstances (Gelles, et al., 2006). Like the interrogator who sits across from the sexual child molester and has complete disdain for the individual's actions but must still create an atmosphere of empathy and trust for the perceived "victim" (molester), the interviewer of the radical terrorist must also play the role of empathetic listener to the subject's rhetoric of being justified in his pursuit of *jihad*. Gelles, et al. (2006) explain that given the nature of the actions and offenses potentially committed by a militant Islamist, the idea of being kind to him during an interrogation, let alone developing a relationship with him, may be difficult for some intelligence and law professionals to accept. Likewise, the polygraph examiner must create an environment during the pretest that enables him or her to develop a relationship of

trust with the subject. In some instances, professionals may feel such dislike or bias for the subject that they have difficulty controlling their own hostility or aggressive impulses. As difficult as it is, as a professional, you must suppress these feelings because whatever you emote in the room can have positive or negative effects on the interrogation or polygraph process.

Such an approach facilitates the information gathering process for two reasons. First, people tend to share their experiences with someone who is empathetic, who validates them, and who they feel understands them. Second, as stated earlier, relationships are a core component of the Middle Eastern mindset. So regardless of how you feel about subjects of terrorism-related investigations, it is critical that you treat and interact with subjects in a consistently fair and respectful manner.

An individual who is critically involved in terrorist activity will perceive the interviewer as at a psychological disadvantage and that he (the terrorist) is intellectually and psychologically superior to the law enforcement officer, particularly a government official representing a law enforcement entity of the US. In addition, this same type of individual may feel even more superior to the female government representative due to his view that women are significantly inferior to men. In either case, the subject's own belief of superiority can be used to your advantage (FDLE, 2001). For example, if the subject believes he is superior, then he is less likely to feel threatened by the interviewer. Persistent, straightforward, focused questioning under such conditions may elicit critical information. Attempts at eliciting remorse or guilt such as discussing or revealing photographs of victims of terrorism in an attempt to make the subject feel bad are likely to be unsuccessful and more apt to elicit emotions such as pride and accomplishment (FDLE, 2001).

Summary

This section provided the reader with the "nuts and bolts" of conducting the interview, interrogation, or polygraph of the radical fundamentalist terrorist. Success is measured in the ability to collect information germane to an investigation or that may provide answers to questions from a higher level of government. Understanding concepts presented will aid in establishing rapport with any individual. Knowledge of how an adversary thinks puts the interviewer at an advantage. Working with an interpreter poses unique concerns but knowing how to use an interpreter wisely will be beneficial when the situation presents itself. Like any skill set, learning to interview, interrogate, or polygraph radical terrorists takes time, effort, and the willingness to hone your skills as a professional.

SECTION V: CONCLUSION

Gabriel (2006) explains the West's biggest fault in communicating with Middle Eastern people is continuing to judge them and trying to negotiate according to Western practices. Every interview, interrogation, or polygraph that is conducted is unique. When dealing with human nature in an environment that is often adverse, or at a minimum stressful, it is important to adapt your approach for each individual. Over time, the rapport building (or relationship-based) approach will yield the best results in an interview, interrogation, or polygraph. The methodology behind rapport building, relationship-based interviewing will create, in most instances, understanding and respect between interviewer and subject that ultimately results in the subject providing useful and accurate information (Gelles, et al., 2006). Employment of the six rapport building strategies will assist in forging a bond of trust with subject. The ultimate goal of eliciting truthful and reliable information is instrumental in collecting evidence for court proceedings against the radical fundamentalist.

Investigators must discipline themselves to collect "bits of information" that may reveal future plans – sketches, pictures, laptop computers, PDAs, notebooks and other treasure troves of information. It is here that law enforcement may exploit the terrorists who are most vulnerable when in this mode of rehearsing for the next terrorist strike. The trained observer must always be on the lookout as the terrorist, when brought in for questioning, cannot "extinguish his ideation, hatred, or intent" (Navarro, 2005). Be cognizant of non-verbal behaviors as these clues are the window to the soul of the terrorist and may alert law enforcement and security personnel of potential terrorist activities.

Efforts as a nation must be directed at individuals whose passionate hatred and ideology compels them to destroy us. Individuals whose irreconcilable fears govern their lives and whose subscription to violence militates against compromise and reasonableness. We must focus on those who in isolation are aspiring to misdeeds. And most importantly, we must surgically target those malevolent charismatics who live among us, inspiring the impressionable to act out violently.

While no simple profile exists for radical terrorists, two decades of "blueprints" and anecdotal evidence reflect common behaviors and characteristics. By looking for these commonalities, investigators and polygraph examiners will be better prepared to identify terrorists, disrupt their activities, penetrate their organizations, and, hopefully, neutralize them before they act.

Borum and Gelles (2005) explain the influence of al-Qaeda is, and for the foreseeable future will be, the foremost threat to US national security and safety. The nature of that influence and threat has changed substantially, however, over the past 15 years, and continues to evolve as the network learns from its successes and failures and adapts to security and intelligence efforts designed to thwart them.

Most importantly, al-Qaeda has evolved from a group, to an organization, to a network, and ultimately –in its current form – to an international jihadist movement that embraces and promotes a virulent and militant anti-Western ideology (Gunaratna, 2003a; Raufer, 2003; Stern, 2003). Therefore, US law enforcement and intelligence personnel must adapt to the metamorphosis posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. From a behavioral perspective, understanding and monitoring these changes in structural and operational methodology have been and will continue to be critical to interrupting terrorism's forward

motion and to developing appropriate aims and effective strategies to defeat them (Borum & Gelles, 2005).

Navarro (2005) states hunting terrorists is no easy task. It requires keen intellect, the capacity to recruit sources, observational skills, the ability to interview and deal with the reluctant, as well as the willingness to intercede when necessary in a dangerous realm. He reiterates it can be done, it has been done, but only after understanding what is in the mind of the terrorist.

In this paper, many tools were provided to help you do your job better. Implement these tools and modify them to fit your personality in the interview or exam room. Michelangelo, at the age of 87, said, "*Ancora Imparo*" (I am still learning). To be a good interviewer, interrogator, or polygrapher, you must continue to grow, hone your skills, and be willing to learn from others. The challenge is daunting. However, by utilizing that which was discussed, a future terrorist attack may be detected or deterred.

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Appendix – Key Terminology and Facts about Islam

Islam: The religious faith of Muslims indicating "submission to God."

Muhammad: (c. 570 – 632) An Arab religious, political, and military leader who founded the religion of Islam.

Muslim: One who adheres to the religion of Islam or one who submits to one God.

Sunni Muslims: Sunnis comprise the majority of the Muslim population. Leadership tends to be more secular, but the worship is more conservative.

Shi'ites (Shiites/Shia): A schism developed in the late 7th century following disagreements over the religious and political leadership of the Muslim community wherein the Shi'ites broke away from the Sunnis. Iranian Shi'ites are led by Ayatollahs, who they believe to be from the same bloodline as Muhammad and Ali (Muhammad's son-in-law).

Ayatollah: An honorific title given to outstanding jurists of the Shi'ite sect of Islam. The word is derived from the Arabic term Ayat Allah, meaning "miraculous sign of God." The title has primarily been used in Iran where it also is associated with political leadership.

Ulemma: Religious scholars who decide policy for Islam. It is these scholars who issue fatwahs (religious edicts or rulings).

Umma: Community. Also nation and people. (People of Muhammed)

Koran (Qur'an): The holy book of Islam.

Hadith: Sayings and practices of Muhammad collected and handed down after his death.

Caliph: Successor to the leadership of the Umma.

Imam: One who leads the prayer of a group.

Jihad: Has its roots in the Arabic verb "j-h-d," whose meaning is generally interpreted as "to endeavor, strive, labor, take great pains." The noun form generally refers to a struggle. According to some, it typically connotes a great effort in the struggle to maintain the straight path of Islam.

Ka'bah: Islam's holiest shrine, a sacred sanctuary for all Muslims. The Ka'bah is a small building in the Holy Mosque of Mecca, nearly cubic in shape, built to enclose the Black Stone. Muslims look toward the Ka'bah during prayer.

Black Stone: Islamic belief is that the stone fell from Heaven and received by Adam who built a shrine for it. The stone, originally dazzling white, has turned black throughout time as it absorbed the sins of mankind. The prophet Abraham found the stone and re-built a shrine, as did Muhammad centuries later.

Hajj: Pilgrimage to Mecca, required at least once in the lifetime of those who are able physically and financially.

Ashura: The Day of Ashura commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein bin Ali, the grandson of Muhammad who was killed at Karbala in the year 680 CE.

Shari'a (Sharia): The code of law based on the Koran, teachings and examples of Muhammad

Islam and the Koran are based upon five tenets called the five pillars of faith. They are:

The Shahadah (profession of faith)

In Arabic means "testimony." This is the profession of faith and entry point to becoming a Muslim: "I bear witness that there is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet. The Shahadah is also incorporated into the call to prayer, recited five times a day, and whispered into the right ear of newborn babies. Hence, Muslims believe that everyone is born a Muslim.

The Salat (prayer)

The Muslim is called to prayer five times a day. The call to prayer is heard at dawn, midday, mid-afternoon, just after sunset, and about two hours after sunset. The Muezzin, a man appointed to call to prayer, climbs the minaret of the mosque, and calls in all directions, "Hasten to prayer." Today, many mosques utilize a loud speaker to carry the message.

The Zakat (charity)

Zakat is the collection of alms required of every Muslim in the amount of 2.5% of their remaining income, i.e. the income that one has following the purchase of life necessities. This money is then distributed to the poor or needy.

The Sawm: (fasting)

Fasting takes place throughout the ninth month of the Islamic calendar, Ramadan. During this month Muslim must abstain from food, drink, smoking, and sexual intercourse during daylight hours. It is a time for self-discipline, self-reflection, and empathy for the poor. Ramadan is also the month in which the Koran was first revealed to Muhammad.

The Hajj: (pilgrimage)

The Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca is required of every Muslim (if feasible) at least once in a lifetime. The Hajj begins in the seventh Islamic month of Dua Al-Hajah. On this day, the King of Saudi Arabia (considered to be the Custodian of the Holy Sites) opens the doors to the Ka'ba that is a symbolic reenactment of Muhammad's capture of the Ka'ba in 629 CE and the destruction of the pagan idols.

(Florida Department of Law Enforcement [FDLE], 2001; Key Terms in Islam, 2008; Emerick, 2002)