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Does *No Child Left Behind* Place a Fiscal Burden on States? Evidence from Texas

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Abstract:

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 requires states to establish goals for all students and for groups of students characterized by race, ethnicity, poverty, disability, and limited English proficiency, and requires schools to make annual progress in meeting these goals. In a number of states, officials have argued that increased federal education funding is not sufficient to cover the costs imposed by the new legislation. In this paper, we use data from Texas to estimate the additional costs of meeting the new student performance standards. We find that these costs substantially exceed the additional federal funding.

Introduction

The *No Child Left Behind Act of 2001* (NCLB) requires that states establish academic performance goals for all students and for separate groups of students characterized by race, ethnicity, poverty, disability, and limited English proficiency. The legislation mandates annual testing of all students in grades 3 through 8 and testing at least once in grades 10 through 12. The legislation also requires that schools make annual progress in meeting state-determined student performance goals. By 2013-14, the NCLB law mandates that 100 percent of students in each sub-group perform at a *proficient* level as determined by test standards established by each state. Those schools that fail to meet their *adequate yearly progress* (AYP) goals will be subject to sanctions. To help states meet the requirements imposed by NCLB, over the past two years Congress increased federal funding for elementary and secondary education by nearly 40 percent.

No Child Left Behind has been extremely controversial. Although some of the criticism is based on philosophical objections to frequent student testing, much of the criticism, especially from state and local officials, has focused on the high costs of implementing the law and meeting the accountability standards. In some states that have not previously conducted frequent and uniform standardized testing, the financial burden of establishing a student accountability system is seen as burdensome. In other states, concern has been voiced about the high costs of assuring that all students are able to satisfy the new academic performance standards.

According to a recent survey, about 30 states have concluded that increased federal funding is not sufficient to cover the costs imposed by NCLB (Willen, 2004). Legislation is pending in a number of states to limit state participation or seek greater flexibility in the implementation of the federal law (Olson, 2005). Individual school districts in several states have actually decided to forgo federal Title I funds rather than comply with the provisions of NCLB. In mid-May 2004, the Attorney General of Wisconsin issued a written opinion that asserted that Wisconsin may have no obligation to implement the provisions of *No Child Left Behind* if the costs of implementation exceeded the amount of money provided by the federal government (Lautenschlager, 2004). In effect, the Attorney General suggested that it would be appropriate for the state's Department of Public

Instruction or local school districts to sue the federal government in order to get out of the responsibility for implementing the law.

Over the past year, a number of studies have appeared that address the question of whether NCLB is an unfunded or under-funded federal mandate. Not surprisingly, these studies come to very different conclusions about the costs of funding NCLB. As pointed out by William Mathis (2004), one of the reasons that the studies differ is that the authors use quite different definitions of what is meant by fully funding NCLB. One approach is to focus primarily on the actual costs of implementing the accountability standards mandated by NCLB. An example of this approach is a study prepared by Accountability Works for the Education Leaders Council (2004). The core of that study is an assessment of the “hard” costs of implementing NCLB. These hard costs include the additional costs of expanding student accountability systems, of implementing testing, and of operationalizing various reporting requirements mandated by NCLB. The authors of the report conclude that increased federal government funding for education exceeds in every year the “hard” costs of implementing the legislation. An underlying premise of this study, and a similar one by Peyser and Costrell (2004), is that the improved student performance mandated by NCLB can in large part be achieved by implementing various education reforms, most of which can be financed by reallocating existing school district spending.

Another approach that has been taken in several national studies is to assume that the cost of fully funding NCLB is the amount of money authorized by Congress. For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures (2004) published a *Mandate Monitor* in which they point out that the gap between the amount the President proposed to spend for Title I grants to local school districts in fiscal year 2005 and the amount authorized by NCLB is in excess of \$6.8 billion. Also, in a discussion of unfunded mandates, Lav and Brecher (2004) point out that in the four years since the passage of NCLB, the amount of money appropriated by Congress was over \$30 billion less than the amount that Congress had authorized. As recognized by these authors, however, there is no reason to believe that the level of authorized funding provides any real information about the “true” cost of fully funding NCLB.

A similar statutorily-based approach is to use “cost factors” specified in the NCLB legislation as a guideline for the amount of money needed to fully fund the new

law. Specifically, the formula used to allocate “targeted” Title I-A grants stipulates that local school districts in each state are eligible for grants equal to 40 percent of average per pupil spending for each school age child living in poverty.¹ According to calculations made by the Congressional Research Service, the 40 percent formula implies fiscal year 2004 funding of over \$30 billion, an amount that is nearly two and a half times the actual amount of funding for Title I-A in 2004 (National Education Association, 2004). Although the Title I allocation formula may reflect Congressional intent, there is again no reason to believe that the extra costs of closing the academic achievement gap for poor children is the same in each state, or that the 40 percent number is reflective of the actual costs.

A serious shortcoming of all the studies mentioned above is that they don’t address what may well be the largest cost associated with achieving the goals of NCLB, namely, the additional costs of improving the educational performance of children so that they can meet the academic performance standards mandated by NCLB. Although NCLB specifies both the frequency and subject areas of student testing, each state is responsible for developing its own set of examinations, determining the scores that are required to pass each exam, and determining the percentage of students required to pass each exam, each year. The costs of meeting the “adequate yearly progress” requirements of NCLB will thus depend not only on the detailed academic standards and testing regime utilized, but on the size of the academic achievement gap in each state between current student performance and the student achievement levels needed to meet these standards. For this reason, estimates of the costs of achieving the standards mandated by NCLB must be done on a state-by-state basis.

Although a number of studies have been conducted in individual states on the costs of achieving “educational adequacy,” these studies, which are often conducted in conjunction with school finance court cases, have generally not been designed to explicitly estimate the costs associated with assuring that all students meet the adequate yearly

¹ In states where average per pupil spending is below 80 percent of the U.S. average, the 80 percent level is used, and in states where average per pupil spending is above 120 percent of the U.S. average, the 120 percent level is used.

progress standards set out in NCLB.² The one exception that we are aware of is a recent study of the additional costs of meeting the student achievement requirements of NCLB in Ohio, conducted by William Driscoll and Howard Fleeter (2003). Their study is based on the assumption that extra educational programs will be required to increase the test scores of students who are currently performing substantially below state academic standards. They estimate these “intervention” costs by “costing out” a set of specific educational programs targeted to students who currently have the lowest scores on the standardized tests administered in Ohio. Although the authors warn that the numbers are not directly comparable, they estimate that NCLB will generate additional annual costs of about \$1.4 billion, while federal funding to Ohio associated with NCLB increased by less than \$50 million.

In this paper, we directly address the question of whether the additional costs of meeting the student performance standards mandated by NCLB exceed the recent increases in federal education funding. The cost estimates in this paper are for Texas, a state that educates about one-tenth of all public school students in the U.S.

Texas is a good state in which to study the costs of NCLB. Since the early 1990s Texas has been collecting annual measures of student academic performance and developing a system that holds schools directly accountable for the educational performance of their students. In fact, the basic elements of the Texas accountability system were the foundation for the *No Child Left Behind Act of 2001*. This head start suggests that the costs of meeting the NCLB requirements will be lower in Texas than in many other states. Thus, if we find that NCLB created an unfunded mandate in Texas, this would suggest that NCLB is probably creating fiscal burdens in a large number of other states.

Although the Texas accountability system is well established, there is very little connection between how well school districts and their students perform, and the allocation of state financial resources to school districts through the state’s Foundation School Program (FSP). Until recently the core of the Texas accountability system was student performance on a series of standardized reading, writing, and mathematics tests, known as the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). Starting in the 2002-03 school

² For a comprehensive review of various types of adequacy studies—“professional judgment”, “successful schools”, and “cost function” studies-- that have been conducted throughout the country over the past decade, see Baker, et al., (2004).

year, the state adopted a new set of tests called the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS). These tests, which now include a science test, will be linked with tougher standards for promotion from grades three, five, and eight, and a new 11th grade exam that will be required for graduation. Although meeting these new, more rigorous academic standards will require the expenditure of additional money in some school districts, the school funding system in Texas has not been changed to reflect the fiscal implications of the changing accountability system.

This paper will employ a statistical approach to estimate the minimum amount of money Texas school districts need to achieve state and federally mandated student performance goals. Specifically, we estimate a *cost function* for K-12 education in Texas. A cost function allows us to quantify the relationship between per-pupil spending for education, student performance, various student characteristics, and the economic and spatial characteristics of school districts. Thus, by estimating a cost function, we are able to determine how much a school district with, for example, a large number of children from poor families must spend in order to meet the state-determined student performance standards.

In the next section of this paper, we describe the procedure we followed in estimating an educational cost function for K-12 public education in Texas. We detail the data used and discuss briefly some important statistical and estimation issues. In the following section, we report on the results of our cost function estimates. We then provide estimates of the additional amount of money that would be required by school districts in Texas to satisfy various state and federal NCLB accountability standards. We also discuss a number of costs that we were unable to include in our analysis. We then compare our estimates of the additional costs of fulfilling the requirements of NCLB with the increases in federal Title I funding since the passage of NCLB. We compare not only the state totals, but data on changes in Title I allocations and on additional costs associated with NCLB at the individual school district level. We conclude with a brief discussion of whether the finding that additional costs exceed increases in federal funding justifies a conclusion that NCLB has imposed an unfunded federal mandate on the state of Texas.

Estimating a Cost Function for K-12 Education in Texas

Estimating cost functions provides a practical way to identify and quantify the factors that influence the costs of education, where the *output* of school districts can be measured using multiple measures of student performance. By estimating a cost function based on data on K-12 school districts, we can characterize in detail the relationship between spending per pupil by school districts and various measures of student performance, while also taking account of the characteristics of each school district's student body, other characteristics of the school district, such as size, and the prices the school district must pay for inputs into the education process.³

We follow the approach found frequently in the literature of estimating a log-linear cost function using data for K-12 districts in Texas. For reasons to be explained below, our measures of student performance are for the 2001-02 school year. Our dependent variable is thus per pupil expenditures in that year. Because spending on transportation and food services are not directly related to student academic performance, these two categories of spending are excluded from our measure of per pupil spending.

Student Performance Measures

Although student performance can, in principle, be measured in various ways, most states measure how effective school districts are in improving the academic performance of their students by relying on standardized exams. Furthermore, the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 explicitly requires that all states develop accountability systems based on assessment tests. Texas has long had a well-developed testing system for the majority of students. Until 2002-03, all students in grades 3 through 8 and in grade 10 were tested in the spring of each year as part of the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). In 2002-03, the TAAS was replaced with the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS), a more rigorous test, and testing was extended to students in grades 9 and 11. Passing rates on the TAKS are the primary basis for ratings within the Texas accountability system.

³ In algebraic terms, a cost function can be represented by the following equation: $E_{it} = h(S_{it}, P_{it}, Z_{it}, F_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}, u_{it})$, where per pupil expenditures, E_{it} , are specified as a function of public school outputs, S_{it} , a vector of input prices, P_{it} , the characteristics of the student body, Z_{it} , other characteristics of the school district such as its size, F_{it} , a vector of unobserved characteristics of the school district, ε_{it} , and a random error term u_{it}

For this paper, one of our measures of student achievement is passing rates on these standardized exams. In estimating our cost function, we focus on annual changes in passing rates; that is, we utilize a *value-added* approach. We believe that it is appropriate to use a value-added measure of student academic performance in estimating a cost function because a primary objective of schools is to improve, on an annual basis, the knowledge and skills of students. An additional reason for using a value-added measure of student performance is that both NCLB and Texas accountability standards call for students to make *adequate yearly progress* towards the achievement of the accountability standards.

Ideally we would like to estimate a cost function using two years of data from the tests that are currently in use, the TAKS. Unfortunately, because the accountability standards did not apply to the first year TAKS results, to calculate a value added measure using the TAKS, it will be necessary to wait until the results from the 2004-05 tests are available. As we can only measure student improvement by comparing test scores in one year with the test scores for the same students in the next year on a comparable set of exams, we have no choice but to base our cost function estimates on test score results from the last two years in which the TAAS exams were administered. The cost function we estimate thus includes for each school district the average passing rate on the TAAS reading and mathematics exams administered to students in grades 5 through 8 and in grade 10 in 2001-02. To create a value-added measure, these results are compared to the average passing rate on the TAAS administered to students in 2000-01.⁴

Although we estimate our cost function using TAAS scores, an important objective of this paper is to predict the costs of achieving a number of different student performance standards that are measured in terms of passing rates on the new TAKS exam. As the TAKS exams are more difficult than the TAAS, and the passing standard for the TAKS is different than the passing standard for the TAAS, using the results from a cost

⁴ Because testing was not done in the 9th grade, to create a true value-added measure we would need test score results for grades 4 through 7 in academic year 2000-01 and for grade 8 in 1999-2000. As we did not have access to precisely these data, we used as our lagged test score variable, the average passing rate on the TAAS reading and mathematics exams administered to students in grades 3 through 8 and 10 in 2000-01. Although these data do not perfectly match the cohort of students for whom we have test score data in 2001-02, they provide a good proxy and they provide a good indicator of the average student performance in each school district in the previous year. It is also important to note that the data we use are exactly the data used by the state's accountability system to calculate adequate yearly progress.

function estimated with TAAS passing rates would seriously under-predict the costs associated with achieving a given passing rate on the TAKS.⁵ To deal with this problem, prior to estimating the cost function, we will convert the TAAS passing rates to TAKS rates using a methodology to be described later in the paper. In effect, we will base our cost estimates on the passing rates that a school district would have achieved if the TAKS had been in place in 2001-02.

Not all students take the TAKS exams. Some students in special education programs take the State-Developed Alternative Assessment (SDAA) instead. We therefore include the passing rate on the SDAA exams as an additional outcome measure. The Texas accountability system and *No Child Left Behind* also includes standards for grade completion and dropout rates for students in grades 7 through 12. As an indicator of school districts' success in graduating students, we include the annual retention rate, defined as one minus the dropout rate, as an additional output variable.⁶ As a final school output variable we use the percentage of graduating seniors who achieve a score of 1100 or above on the SAT or a score of 24 or above on the ACT.⁷

The statistical estimation of a cost function should take special account of the fact that while decisions by local school boards to raise the level of student performance presumably will require additional spending, decisions concerning per student spending are likely to directly influence student performance; that is, per pupil expenditures and student performance are simultaneously determined. To deal with this simultaneity, we estimate our cost function using two-stage least squares.⁸

⁵ The raw score that a student needs to achieve in order to be considered passing is at a different cutoff for the TAKS than for the TAAS.

⁶ Although the accuracy of the dropout rate has been questioned, we decided to include these data in our analysis primarily because dropout rates are part of both the state and NCLB accountability standards, and efforts to reduce dropout rates (or increase retention rates) will presumably contribute to the costs of education.

⁷ The 1100 criterion for the SAT and the 24 for the ACT were established by the Texas Education Agency.

⁸ As instruments for the endogenous school output variables, we draw upon a set of variables that are related to the demand for public education. Following a long literature on the determinants of local government spending, we model the demand for public education as a function of school district residents' preferences for education, their incomes, the tax prices they face for education spending, and the intergovernmental aid their school district receives. To the extent that the median voter model provides a reasonable explanation for school district spending decisions, it is appropriate to use median income and the tax price faced by the median voter as instruments. We also include as instruments several socioeconomic variables that may be related to the preferences for public education. These include the percentage of households with children, the percentage of household heads who are homeowners, and the percentage of adults who have earned a four-year college degree.

Teacher Cost Index

Teachers are the single most important factor in the production of education and not surprisingly, teacher salaries account for the largest share of school expenditures. In our estimation of education cost functions, we include only teacher salaries, excluding explicit treatment of other public school employees. It is important to recognize that teacher payrolls are determined both by factors under the control of local school boards, and factors that are largely outside of their control. In setting hiring policies, districts make decisions about the quality of teachers that they recruit and these decisions have obvious fiscal implications. For example, a district can limit its search for new teachers to those with advanced degrees, to those with high grade-point averages or to those with a certain number of courses in their teaching specialty. Teacher salary levels are generally determined through a process of negotiation with teacher unions, and school boards have a substantial impact on the outcome of these negotiations. At the same time, the composition of the student body, working conditions within schools, and area cost-of-living play a potentially large role in determining the salary a school district must offer in order to attract teachers of any given quality. These factors will be reflected in student and district cost variables, to be described below.

Our goal is to isolate factors that contribute to higher levels of education spending, but are outside the control of local school districts. To accomplish this goal we use an index of teacher costs developed by Lori Taylor (2004). Her index separates variations in compensation arising from uncontrollable district characteristics (such as area cost of living) from variations arising from factors that districts can influence (such as teacher experience and educational background).

Student Characteristics

There exists a quite large literature that has demonstrated that it costs more to educate students from economically disadvantaged families, students with various mental and physical disabilities, and students with limited proficiency in English, than students without these disadvantages.⁹ In fact, these higher costs have been recognized in the de-

⁹ Cost function studies that have found that school districts with high concentrations of students with these characteristics face higher than average costs include Downes and Pogue (1994), Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger (1996), Duncombe and Yinger (1998), Reschovsky and Imazeki (2003), and Imazeki and Reschovsky (2004).

sign of the state's Foundation School Program (FSP), which allocates additional funds to school districts with students who are from economically disadvantaged families, who qualify for "special education", or who enter the schools with limited proficiency in English. To measure the number of children from economically disadvantaged families, we use the percentage of students who qualify for the federal government-financed Free and Reduced Price Lunch program or other public assistance. It should be noted that *No Child Left Behind* includes a requirement that students classified as economically disadvantaged must show adequate yearly progress towards meeting the state's accountability standards. For purposes of meeting this requirement, Texas identifies students as economically disadvantaged if they are eligible for free or reduced price meals under the National School Lunch and Child Nutrition program (U.S. Department of Education, 2003).

We also include in our cost function a measure of the percentage of students in each district who have been identified as limited English proficient (LEP), and two measures of disabilities – the percentage of students who are classified as having a learning or speech disability, and the percentage of students who are classified as having any other kinds of disability.

Both *No Child Left Behind* and the Texas accountability system explicitly require districts to meet student performance standards not only for all students, but separately for subgroups of White, African-American, Hispanic and economically disadvantaged students. Although separate outcome (student performance) measures for these subgroups are available, the fact that they are quite highly correlated means that we are not able to explicitly include these separate student performance measures in the cost function we estimate. However, as higher scores for any given subgroup will contribute to higher average scores, the impact of each subgroup is implicitly part of the average passing rate that we include in the cost function. Because we expect that the cost per student of meeting the accountability standard will vary by subgroup, we need to account for the relative size of each subgroup within each school district. The percent of students who qualify for the Free and Reduced Price Lunch Program already captures the importance of the economically disadvantaged subgroup. We include the percentage of students who are African-American and the percentage of students who are Hispanic as variables in the cost function to account explicitly for the importance of these two groups.

School Characteristics

Finally, to account for the possibility that different levels of resources may be needed to provide a high school education as compared to an elementary school education, we include the proportion of each school district's student body that is enrolled in high school. Previous research on the question of whether higher proportions of students enrolled in high school leads to higher average costs has been inconclusive, with some studies finding higher costs and other studies finding lower than average costs. It is important to point out that this variable can be difficult to interpret because the percentage of a district's total student body enrolled in high school may reflect higher than average dropout rates in some districts or higher rates of student transfers to other public or private schools.

There exists a long history of research on economies of scale in public education. In a recent review of this literature, Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger (2002) present strong evidence that small school districts have higher costs per student than larger school districts. Although the results are less conclusive, they also provide some evidence that per student costs are higher for large districts. Following standard practice, to reflect potential diseconomies of scale associated with both small and large school districts, we include each district's enrollment and enrollment squared in the cost function.

Efficiency

Some school districts may have higher per pupil expenditures, not because of higher costs, but because they are not using their resources efficiently. A number of authors have used complex statistical techniques to attempt to identify spending that is high relative to spending in districts with similar performance and costs.¹⁰ The measurement of school district efficiency using these statistical methods is, however, highly sensitive to the way that school district output is measured. Thus, for example, in school districts that emphasize vocational education, or arts and music--subjects not directly measured by standardized tests--money spent on these alternative educational objectives will be counted as inefficient spending.

¹⁰ See, for example, Duncombe, Ruggiero and Yinger (1996), McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993), and Deller and Rudnicki (1993).

Rather than attempting to measure efficiency directly, in this paper we address the issue of efficiency by assuming that school districts will operate more efficiently if they face a competitive local educational market. Lori Taylor (2000), after reviewing the literature on government competition, concludes that, “Almost across the board, researchers have found that school spending is lower, academic outcomes are better, and school-district efficiency is higher where parents have more choice in their children’s education provider.” (p. 7) To measure public school competition, we use a Herfindahl index. This index, which has also been used by Hoxby (2000), is constructed on the assumption that metropolitan statistical areas can be used to define local “markets” for education.¹¹ The index increases with the amount of competition so if district efficiency is correlated with the amount of competition that the district faces, then we would expect spending to be lower in districts with higher values of the Herfindahl index.

Cost Function Results

We estimate the cost function for K-12 education using data for academic year 2001-02.¹² We restrict our estimation to K-12 school districts, of which there are 975 in Texas.¹³ Because of missing data, we were forced to drop 148 K-12 districts from our estimation sample. The 827 districts that remain in our sample, however, educate 98.3 percent of all students in Texas. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 827 districts that are used to estimate the cost function. For each variable, the table displays the average (mean) value of the variable, the standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum values.

¹¹ A Herfindahl index for school districts in market k can be calculated using the following formula:

$$\text{Herfindahl Index} = 1 - \sum_i \left(\frac{\text{enrollment}_i}{\text{enrollment}_k} \right)^2$$

For a market with just one district and no competition, the index will equal zero. For a market with n equally-sized districts, the index will equal $1 - 1/n$. Thus, the index approaches 1 as the number of districts, and presumably competition, increases. For districts that are located outside of metropolitan statistical areas, the market is defined by the county.

¹² The data for the lagged test scores are for 2000-01.

¹³ In addition to the 975 K-12 districts, there are also 65 elementary and high school districts, for a total of 1040 districts.

The results of the cost function estimation are shown in Table 2.¹⁴ In general, all coefficients have the expected signs. Each of the outcome measures has a positive sign, indicating that it costs more to achieve higher levels of performance. Since lagged scores are a proxy for past levels of student achievement, high scores mean that districts can spend less to achieve any given level of educational progress. The cost variables generally have the expected signs and most of them are statistically significant. In particular, the percentage of minority students and students eligible for free and reduced-price lunch are positive and statistically significant. Consistent with previous studies, we found a U-shaped relationship between per-pupil spending and school district size; with our estimates, average costs are lowest in a district with 50,906 students. At that point, costs begin to rise again. We also find U-shaped relationships between per-pupil spending and the percentage of LEP and disabled students. These results suggest economies of scale in the specialized programs provided for these students. Any district with even one LEP or special education student is required to provide extra services for that student, thus, when there are few such students, the per-pupil costs could be quite high. For LEP students, these services can range from tutoring to a full bilingual curriculum. If there are more than 20 LEP students in an elementary grade, the district must offer a bilingual program. Given these requirements, it is not surprising to find that economies of scale can be found for at least lower levels of LEP students. The coefficients on the LEP variables indicate that these economies of scale can be found for districts having up to 67.6 percent of their students receiving specialized services; after that, costs begin to rise. For students with disabilities other than learning or speech disabilities, economies of scale stop at only 8 percent, perhaps indicating the more individualized services that such students may require.

In contrast to some other studies, we find that costs are *inversely* related to the percentage of high school students in the district. There is no compelling reason why we would expect costs to be higher in school districts with a larger share of high school students, especially since class sizes tend to be substantially lower in elementary school grades. The higher costs associated with high schools, for example, for science laborato-

¹⁴ The fact that all variables are measured at the district level, and districts vary greatly in size, introduces the possibility that the error terms are not random but are correlated with district size. We therefore weight the regression by district enrollment.

ries and for extensive computer facilities, are likely to be reflected in higher capital, rather than operating costs. One additional explanation for the negative relationship between the percent of high school students and costs may reflect the possibility that highly-motivated students leave schools with heavy concentrations of “high-cost” students. Although we can’t observe student motivation, the departure of these “low-cost” students would reduce the percent of high school students in a district and also tend to raise the average cost of educating the remaining students.

Finally, the negative sign on the Herfindahl index provides a measure of school district inefficiency. The result indicates that, as expected, school districts located in areas of the state where there is more competition among schools tend to operate more efficiently. It should be noted, however, that this variable is not statistically significant.

The Construction of a Cost Index for Texas School Districts

Estimating a cost function provides information about the contributions of various characteristics of school districts to the costs of education. The calculation of a cost index allows for the summarization of all the information about costs into a single number for each district. For any given accountability standard, a cost index can be constructed that will indicate, for each school district, how much money that district must spend, *relative to the district with average costs*, for its students to meet the accountability standards.

Actual school district spending will vary not only because of differences in student and district characteristics that influence costs, but also because school boards in some districts, presumably reflecting the preferences of the district’s residents, will choose to provide a quality of education that exceed the state’s accountability standards, or choose to provide courses in areas not covered by the state’s accountability standards. Actual spending can also differ from the costs of education if districts are operating inefficiently.

Thus, our objective in constructing a cost index does not involve consideration of the current spending level of school districts, but rather the calculation for each district of the minimum amount of money it will need to achieve any given TAKS accountability standard, given the district’s student and district characteristics. In this section of the paper we present the results of calculating a cost index using two alternative accountability

standards. The use of different standards will not affect the relative ranking of districts in terms of their costs, but will change the cost index values.

To calculate the cost index value for any given district, we use our estimated cost function coefficients to calculate how much the district would have to spend given the amount of student performance gain it must provide in order to fulfill the chosen accountability standards, the actual values of its student and district characteristics, and with the exception of the Herfindahl index, the statewide average values of the other variables in the cost function. For the Herfindahl index, our measure of efficiency, we use the 90th percentile value. This means that the cost index values for each school district are calculated on the assumption that the school district operates with a high degree of efficiency. The calculations described above result in what might be called a *hypothetical* level of spending for each district. To determine the cost index value for any particular district, we divide the hypothetical spending number for that district with hypothetical spending in a district with average characteristics. If we assume that the per pupil cost of education to meet some given accountability standard is \$7,500, then a school district with a cost index value of 1.1 will need to spend \$8,250 (\$7,500 times 1.1) to reach the accountability standards. Another district with a cost index value of 0.9 will be able to meet the standards at a cost of \$6,750 (0.9 times \$7,500).

A prerequisite to calculating a cost index is determining an accountability standard. The current NCLB accountability standards, which are established by the State Board of Education with the approval of the U.S. Department of Education, are based primarily on results of TAKS exams. There are several elements involved in determining these standards. First, the state must decide what grade on any examination will be considered passing (which we refer to as the passing standard), and second, decisions must be made about what passing rates, or increases in passing rates, will satisfy or define the standard (which we refer to as the passing *rate* standard).¹⁵ As explained previously, our cost function is estimated using TAAS test score results. In order to predict the costs of meeting a given passing rate standard on the TAKS, we must first convert performance on the TAAS to the higher passing standard associated with the TAKS. As the TAKS is

¹⁵ In addition to the test scores, the Texas accountability standards also include graduation rate and attendance rate standards.

phased in over the next few years, the passing standard will increase each year until it reaches the panel recommendation level in 2005. We use data for TAAS passing rates that have been converted to passing rates defined in terms of the 2005 TAKS panel recommendation passing standard. The conversion is based on a conversion schedule developed by the Texas Education Agency that indicates how a given score on the TAAS correlates to expected performance on the TAKS (e.g., a student would need a particular TAAS score in order to have passed the TAKS at the 2005 panel recommendation). See Gronberg et al. (2004) for a full description of this conversion.

The Texas Consolidated State Application Accountability Workbook (U.S. Department of Education, 2003) lists passing rate targets for each year that will satisfy the requirements of *No Child Left Behind*. For school year 2005-06, all students in all grades and in all sub-groups (economic disadvantaged, African-American, White, and Hispanic) need to achieve a TAKS passing rate of 53.5 percent on the reading/language arts examination and a 41.7 percent passing rate on the mathematics exam, or make “acceptable progress” towards those goals. In calculating a cost index value for each school district we started with a TAKS passing rate standard of 55 percent.

Although the target is 55 percent, the Texas accountability system also allows for the fact that some districts may be so far below the standard that expecting them to reach the standard in such a short time period is unrealistic. According to the Commissioner of Education, districts that do not meet the absolute performance standard can still be characterized by the Commissioner as *Academically Acceptable* if they demonstrate sufficient test score improvement (Texas Commissioner of Education, 2004). This improvement is measured as the gain necessary to reach the accountability standard in a set number of years. The *No Child Left Behind* legislation refers to this requirement for annual improvement as *adequate yearly progress*. We incorporate this into our calculations of cost in the following way: in calculating the cost of meeting the accountability standard, all school districts that had a TAAS converted passing rate of less than 52 percent were assigned a required gain of one-third of the difference between the 55 percent standard and their current passing rate.¹⁶ School districts with passing rates between 52 and 55 percent

¹⁶ The U.S. Department of Education has approved a definition of adequate yearly progress (AYP) that require at least a 10 percent annual reduction in the percentage of students **not** passing each test (Texas

were assigned a required gain of the full difference between their current passing rate and 55 percent. Descriptive statistics of the resulting cost index are displayed in the first column of Table 3.¹⁷

The average cost per student assuming the 55 percent passing rate accountability standard is \$6,972, measured in 2002 dollars. If we add to that number average per pupil spending for transportation and food services of \$559 (amounts that were excluded from the spending data used to calculate the cost function), the average per pupil cost of achieving the 55 percent standard is \$7,531. In order to put this number in 2004 dollars we use the percentage change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (2004) Employment Cost Index for all civilian workers between the first quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of 2004. According to that index, over this two-year period costs rose by 7.9 percent. Thus, in 2004 dollars, the average cost per pupil of meeting the 55 percent standard would be \$8,126.

Because NCLB requires that the passing rate standard used to define adequate yearly progress increase each year until it reaches 100 percent by 2013-14, we have also calculated a second set of cost index values based on a TAKS passing rate standard of 70 percent. Although Texas school districts will not have to meet this standard for several more years, the 70 percent is the 2005-06 standard for a school district to be considered a *Recognized* district by the Commissioner of Education (Texas Commissioner of Education, 2004). In calculating the cost index, the required gain in passing rate was set equal to one-third of the difference between 70 percent and the actual passing rate for all districts except those with current rates between 67 and 70 percent. The required gain for these districts was the entire gap between their current passing rate and 70 percent. The results of these calculations are shown in the second column of Table 3. Following the same procedure outlined above, the average cost per pupil of achieving the 70 percent standard would be \$11,378.

Education Agency, 2004). This definition of AYP yields quite similar results to the definition we use in this paper.

¹⁷ We calculate our cost index for 968 school districts. These districts educate 99.6 percent of all public school students in Texas. We are able to calculate cost index values for more districts than we use in estimating our cost function because we include districts that are missing one of the outcome values. For the alternative assessment test, the SAT/ACT measure, and the retention rate variable, we substitute the average values—something we do anyway in calculating the cost index. For districts missing the TAAS score, we set it equal to the sample average (TAKS converted) rate of 53.3.

Table 3 demonstrates that there is a wide range of costs across school districts in Texas at both the 55 and 70 percent passing rate standard. The lowest cost school district could meet the standard at a cost of almost half of the district with average costs. On the other hand, the district with the highest cost would need to spend over three times more than the district with average costs to meet the accountability standards. This wide range of costs, however, reflects the impact of a few districts. If we rank school districts by their cost index values, the district at the 10th percentile level has costs about 25 percent below average, while the district at the 90th percentile, i.e. only 10 percent of districts have higher costs, has costs that are 28 percent above average.

To provide an indication of how the cost index varies across school districts characterized in different ways, we have divided school districts into quintiles defined in terms of the percentage of poor students in each district and district size. In defining quintiles we weight districts by student enrollment so that each quintile contains twenty percent (one fifth) of all Texas K-12 students. Thus the first poverty quintile includes the 133 districts with the lowest percentage of poor students and these districts enroll approximately 20 percent of all public school students. Table 4 displays the average cost index value (based on the 55 percent passing rate standard) in each quintile, in addition to the minimum and maximum cost index value in each quintile.

The data in Table 4 show quite clearly the importance of poverty (and poverty related factors) in the determination of cost index values. Thus, the average cost index in the lowest poverty quintile is 0.73, and all but three school districts in this quintile have cost index values less than one. By contrast, the average cost index in the highest poverty quintile is 1.4, and almost all the school districts in this quintile have cost index values substantially higher than one.

Table 5 displays student weighted quintiles of district size. We observe that the 775 smallest K-12 districts (out of the 968 districts for which we calculate cost index values) educate only 20 percent of public school students. The 8 largest districts in the state also educate 20 percent of public school students. The data in Table 5 indicates that the average cost index in the smallest district quintile is 1.03. There is however a tremendous variation in the costs faced by small districts. For some small districts, other factors, such as the characteristics of their student body, compensate for small size and result in low

cost index values. In other small districts, especially in rural areas, diseconomies of scale caused by small size combine with large numbers of economically disadvantaged and LEP students, resulting in very high cost index values. Table 5 also shows that while the average cost index value in the largest district quintile is 1.02, there is a wide range of costs among the largest districts.

The Estimation of the Costs of Meeting Accountability Standards

In this section, we draw upon the results of our cost function estimation and our cost index calculations to provide estimates of the **additional** costs that will be required to meet the accountability standards. We will then discuss several reasons why we believe these cost estimates provide a systematic under-estimate of the total additional cost of meeting the education accountability standards mandated by the state and by the *No Child Left Behind* legislation.

The calculation of additional costs needed to meet the accountability standards parallels the procedure we followed in constructing the cost index. School districts that have TAKS passing rates that are equal to or greater than 55 percent require no additional money to meet the standard. For districts with TAKS passing rates between 52 and 55 percent, we calculate the cost of moving from the current rate to the 55 percent passing rate, and for districts with current passing rates below 52 percent, we calculate the cost of moving one-third of the way to the 55 percent standard. The one-third gain is a measure of the required annual improvement mandated by the Texas accountability system.

In order to determine the cost of any given improvement in passing rates, we use our cost function results to calculate, for each school district, the predicted cost of achieving the actual passing rate and then subtract that cost from the predicted cost of meeting the passing rate goal. For example, a school district with a 40 percent passing rate would need to raise its passing rate to 45 percent, i.e. one third of the way to 55. The *additional* cost of achieving this required annual improvement would be the difference between the predicted cost of achieving a 45 percent passing rate and the predicted cost of achieving a 40 percent passing rate.

The additional cost calculations are made using data from 2002. We again use the Employment Cost Index to transform the cost calculations into 2004 dollars. Our calcula-

tions indicate that the additional costs of achieving a 55 percent passing rate standard are \$1,736 million. This amount is equivalent to \$425 per pupil. We also conduct a similar calculation on the basis of a 70 percent passing rate standard. If that standard were in place, we estimate that Texas school districts would face \$4,919 million of additional costs, or \$1,205 per pupil (again measured in 2004 dollars).¹⁸ To put these cost numbers in perspective, the \$1.7 billion additional cost of meeting the 55 percent passing rate standard represents 6.2 percent of total public school revenue in 2004, while the \$4.9 billion cost of meeting the 70 percent standard is equivalent to 17.6 percent of total 2004 revenue.¹⁹

Although the additional cost estimates presented in the previous paragraph represent large amounts of money, there are several reasons why we believe that these numbers provide a systematic underestimate of total additional costs necessary to meet the accountability standards imposed by *No Child Left Behind*. First, in estimating costs, data problems forced us assume that a school district met any given passing rate standard if its overall passing rate exceeded the standard. In fact, a central tenet of the *No Child Left Behind* legislation is that for a school district to meet an accountability standard, every subgroup of students within a school district must meet the standard. For the purposes of NCLB, these subgroups include African-American, Hispanic, White, economically disadvantaged, special education, and LEP.

Although we are not able to provide a precise estimate of the cost of having all sub-groups of students meet the Texas accountability standards, we are quite certain that our estimates of additional costs provide a significant under-estimate of the cost of every sub-group meeting the passing rate standards. We reached this opinion by examining the data from a number of individual school districts. Consider, for example, the Fairfield Independent School District (ISD). This district with around 1,600 students just exceeded the 55 percent passing rate standard, and thus according to our calculations would

¹⁸ Not surprisingly, costs rise quite rapidly as student performance standards are raised. At a 90 percent passing rate standard, additional costs would equal \$10.6 billion.

¹⁹ In a cost function study completed for the Texas legislature, Gronberg, et al. (2004) conclude that the average cost per pupil of achieving the 55 percent passing rate standard is \$6,403, a figure that is over 15 percent lower than our estimate of average per pupil costs of meeting the same standard. Because they ignore a large set of other student performance standards plus various curriculum requirements that school districts must meet, Gronberg and his colleagues are able to argue that most school districts have more than enough money to meet the student performance standards mandated by NCLB.

not require any additional spending to meet the 55 percent passing rate standard. When we examine the TAAS passing rate data for the sub-groups, however, we observe that the passing rate for African-Americans was 7.8 percent below the overall TAAS passing rate, the rate for Hispanics was 13.4 percent the overall rate, and the rate for economically disadvantaged students was 8.9 percent below the overall rate.

The clear implication of these numbers is that Fairfield ISD will have to spend additional money to bring the passing rates of these sub-groups of students up to the required passing rate standard. Although we are unable to assign a particular number for the required additional costs, our cost function results imply that everything else equal, it will cost more than average to improve the educational performance of African-American, Hispanic, and economically disadvantaged students.

A second reason why we underestimate the costs of meeting the accountability standards is that our cost estimates are based on a subset of the standards facing school districts. Recall that our measure of student performance is the average score on the reading/language arts and mathematics exams. The actual accountability standards require that students meet the passing rate standards on each exam. A close look at the test score data suggests that in a number of districts an average passing rate above the standard reflects a relative high passing rate on the reading exam and a low (below standard) passing rate on the mathematics exam. This suggests that in these districts, additional resources will need to be devoted to improving performance on the mathematics exam.

The TAKS accountability standards for 2005-06 also include passing standards for social studies and science examinations. NCLB requires testing of students in science and social studies beginning in 2007. In addition, there are new examination-linked standards for promotion from grades 3, 5, and 8, and a new 11th grade examination that will be required for graduation. Although we can provide no empirical estimate of the additional costs associated with meeting these standards, it is difficult to believe that there will be no additional costs involved.

Is No Child Left Behind an Under-funded Federal Mandate?

According to the U.S. Department of Education, the core of its financial support for NCLB comes through the funding of Title I, the department's grant program that is

targeted to districts with disadvantaged children. In the three years since the passage of NCLB, the federal government has increased its allocations to Title I from \$8.2 billion in fiscal year 2002 to a proposed \$12.6 billion in fiscal year 2005, an increase of 55 percent. The allocation of Title I funds to Texas during this three-year period rose at an even faster rate —75.3 percent. The increase in Title I funds to Texas equaled \$519 million to a total proposed fiscal year 2005 allocation of \$1.2 billion.

A simple comparison of the \$519 million three-year increase in Title I funds to our \$1.7 billion estimate of the additional funds required to meet the *No Child Left Behind* adequate performance standards suggests very clearly that the costs of achieving the student performance goals established by NCLB are substantially higher than the amount of additional federal funds that have been provided over the past three years and, given the large federal deficit, probably larger than any additional federal education funds that are likely to be provided in future years.

Furthermore, while Title I allocations are made to nearly all Texas school districts, our \$1.7 billion estimate consists of the sum of additional costs in the 567 school districts that were not already meeting the 2005 standard of a 55 percent passing rate on the TAKS exam. Recall that districts that had already achieved a 55 percent passing rate were not considered in need of additional funds. As 16 percent of the \$519 million three-year increase in Title I allocations went to the 401 districts in our sample that were already meeting the student performance standard, the difference between the \$1.2 billion additional costs and the availability of Title I funds is even greater than indicated by the aggregate numbers.

The aggregate data also do not tell us how Title I funds are distributed across districts within Texas. In order to see how the three-year increase in Title I funds compares to the additional funds needed to bring individual districts up to the 55 percent passing rate standard, we compared the increase in Title I funds for each district to the additional funds needed by that district. Specifically, we created a ratio of these two numbers, where a ratio of one would suggest that the additional costs of meeting the standard are fully covered by the increase in Title I funding. Table 6 shows the distribution of this ratio across districts with different costs by comparing pupil-weighted quintiles of the cost index. Although there are 567 districts that we predict would require additional funds, in

96 of these districts Title I funds *decreased* between 2002 and 2005. These 96 districts were dropped from the analysis in Table 6.²⁰ Only three of the lowest-cost districts both required additional funding and had an increase in Title I funds. On average, Title I funds covered a little more than one-third of the additional costs in the remaining districts but as Table 6 shows, there is no clear pattern as to which districts received the highest share of Title I funding increases relative to costs. Districts in the highest-cost quintile, however, were funded on average at slightly lower levels than districts with lower costs.²¹

Although in our view these numbers tell an interesting story, do they prove that (at least in Texas) NCLB is a seriously under-funded federal mandate? The answer to this question depends in part on the answer to another question: **What educational policies would Texas have pursued in the absence of NCLB?** We might also want to ask what policies is Texas likely to follow in the future if Congress were to eliminate the major provisions of NCLB? If the argument can be convincingly made that Texas will continue to pursue rigorous standards for the educational improvement of all its students even if NCLB were to disappear, then the claim that NCLB is forcing Texas to pursue policies that it wouldn't otherwise pursue is undercut, and NCLB should not be considered an unfunded mandate.

On the one hand, the fact that Texas established its student accountability system nearly a decade before the passage of NCLB, and that this system was recently made more rigorous with the establishment of the TAKS exams, suggests that Texas was and continues to be willing to administer a strict student and school accountability system. On the other hand, the state's share of education funding has been falling rapidly in recent years, from 47 percent in 2000 to about 38 percent in 2004. Rather than pursuing policies to increase the funding of public education in Texas, Governor Perry and many members of the legislature appear to be devoting most of their energies to pursuing policies that would mandate large property tax reductions. In this policy environment, it seems unlikely that the governor or the legislature would devote sufficient additional resources

²⁰ There were also two districts, Eden CISD and Northside ISD, that had such large increases in Title I funding, and relatively small additional costs, that their ratios were 252.4 and 198.3, respectively. Because these were such outliers, they are not included in Table 6.

²¹ Predicted additional costs of meeting the academic accountability standards were generally very low in school districts where the ratio of increases in Title I to predicted additional costs substantially exceeded one.

to public education, unless pressured to do so by the demands of NCLB or by the courts.²²

What is the Federal Role?

The past few years have been a period of severe fiscal pressure for most state governments. Although the recession that began in 2001 was mild by historical standards, state government revenues fell dramatically, leading to large budget deficits in most states. While state revenues have begun to grow again, in 2005 they still remain below their pre-recession levels. The combination of a) pressure to increase spending, especially for Medicaid; b) a shrinking sales tax base (relative to the size of the economy) due to increasing internet and mail-order sales; and c) efforts to shrink the federal deficit that involve large cuts in grants to state and local governments, is likely to result in a continuation of annual state budget crises in 2005 and into the future (Kalambokidis and Reschovsky, 2005).

This prospect of continued fiscal problems in many states, coupled with renewed efforts in a number of states to place limits on property tax revenues, suggests to us that many states, left on their own, would not develop the accountability systems nor implement the higher education performance standards mandated by NCLB. In this paper, we have demonstrated that closing existing achievement gaps and ensuring that students meet state-imposed standards for an adequate education will involve increased expenditures on K-12 education, and, if Texas provides a guide, the federal government is providing only a small portion of this necessary extra spending.

If Texas, a state that implemented both annual student testing and an accountability system more than a decade ago, must spend more money in order to close its achievement gap, it seems highly likely that most other states will also need to increase their investment in K-12 education if they are to meet the goals set out in NCLB. There is also little question that this additional spending will place a substantial fiscal burden on most state governments.

²² In Texas, the prospect of judicial intervention is quite real. In September 2004, a district court ruled in *West Orange-Cove v. Neeley* that the Texas system of school finance was unconstitutional because it failed to provide school districts with adequate revenue to eliminate the achievement gap among racial groups and between economically advantaged and disadvantaged children. The ruling is being appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.

The unanswered question is how the costs of improving public education in the U.S. should be split between the federal government and the states. On the one hand, education is a core responsibility of state government, arguably its most important function, and one that is enshrined in most state constitutions. Furthermore, the residents of most states would probably agree that large differences in the educational performance of children from poor and non-poor families, and between white and minority children constitutes evidence of failure of their state's system of public education. This suggests that within our federal system of government, it is appropriate for state governments to take primary responsibility for the education of its children. Independent of federal regulations, evidence of achievement gaps should spur states to take whatever steps are necessary to close those gaps.

On the other hand, the fact that some states have an above-average proportion of "high cost" students, and the fact that some states have fewer fiscal resources than others, suggests that for equity reasons, the federal government should be playing a role in helping finance the efforts of state governments to close their achievement gaps. Also, the fact that the nation's economic growth is in part a function of the human capital of all its residents, independent of where they live, provides an economic efficiency argument for federal involvement in the financing of education. How big that federal role should be is a difficult political question. Its answer is at the core of any national debate about the nature of our federal system.

Table 1**Descriptive Statistics, 827 K-12 School Districts**

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum Value	Maximum Value
Per pupil expenditures, 2001-02 (excludes transportation and food)	\$6,826	\$1,432	\$4,412	\$20,493
2001-02 TAAS passing rate, converted to TAKS 2005 standard	53.3	10.9	18.5	88.2
Composite lagged TAAS pass rate, 2000-01	91.2	5.0	63.7	99.8
Percent of graduates who performed above criteria on SAT or ACT	12.9%	8.5%	0.0%	57.2%
Passing rate on state-defined alternative assessment	71.4	14.4	6.7	100
Annual retention rate	99.5	0.6	96.3	100
Teacher wage index (monthly wage)	\$2,400	\$125	\$2,176	\$2,777
Percent of students eligible for free and reduced price lunch	47.3%	18.9%	2.5%	98.1%
Percent of students with learning or speech disabilities	10.8%	3.0%	3.6%	23.9%
Percent of students with other disabilities	3.1%	1.5%	0.2%	24.5%
Percent of students who are black	8.8%	12.5%	0.0%	84.3%
Percent of students who are Hispanic	30.1%	27.2%	0.2%	99.8%
Percent of students with limited English proficiency	10.8%	9.2%	0.0%	58.9%
Percent of students enrolled in high school	29.6%	3.4%	19.9%	58.5%
Student enrollment	4,874	13,148	186	210,670
Herfindahl (efficiency) index	0.608	0.220	0.000	0.887

Table 2		
Education Cost Function, 2001-02		
827 K-12 School Districts		
Dependent variable: Log of expenditures per pupil		
Independent variables	Coefficient	t-statistic
Intercept	-5.71	-0.92
2001-02 TAAS passing rate, converted to TAKS 2005 standard	2.39*	2.81
Composite lagged TAAS pass rate, 2000-01	-0.034*	-3.86
Percent of graduates who performed above criteria on SAT or ACT	0.005	1.51
Passing rate on state-defined alternative assessment	0.107	1.62
Annual retention rate	0.017	0.05
Teacher wage index (in logs)	0.829*	3.98
Percent of students eligible for free and reduced price lunch	0.431*	4.27
Percent of students who are black	0.36*	4.25
Percent of students who are Hispanic	0.313*	4.93
Percent of students with learning or speech disabilities	1.25*	2.56
Percent of students with other disabilities	-0.35	-0.28
Percent of students with other disabilities squared	2.06	0.21
Percent of students with limited English proficiency	-0.634*	-2.83
Percent of students with limited English proficiency squared	0.469	1.33
Percent of students enrolled in high school	-0.45**	-1.80
Log of student enrollment	-0.28*	-6.02
Square of log of student enrollment	0.013*	5.57
Herfindahl (efficiency) index (in logs)	-0.006	-0.57
Sum of squared residuals	12.324	
* indicates statistically significant at the 5% level		
** indicates statistically significant at the 10% level		

Table 3		
Distribution of Education Cost Indices		
	Cost Index With 55 Percent Passing Rate	Cost Index With 70 Percent Passing Rate
Mean	1.00	1.00
Standard Deviation	0.31	0.36
Minimum	0.52	0.61
Maximum	3.62	4.24
At 10th Percentile	0.73	0.74
At 90th Percentile	1.28	1.34

Table 4				
Cost Index Values by Poverty Quintiles				
Student Weighted Quintiles	Number of School Districts	Cost Index Values		
		Average	Minimum	Maximum
1 (lowest)	133	0.73	0.52	1.02
2	256	0.88	0.67	1.56
3	283	0.98	0.70	1.71
4	214	1.19	0.79	2.70
5 (highest)	82	1.40	0.93	3.62
Total	968	1.00	0.52	3.62

Table 5				
Cost Index Values by District Size Quintiles				
Student Weighted Quintiles	Number of School Districts	Cost Index Values		
		Average	Minimum	Maximum
1 (smallest)	775	1.03	0.55	3.62
2	125	0.87	0.52	1.40
3	40	0.92	0.53	1.17
4	20	0.85	0.60	1.34
5 (largest)	8	1.02	0.69	1.33
Total	968	1.00	0.52	3.62

Table 6**Title I Funding Ratio by Cost Index Quintiles**

Student Weighted Quintiles	Number of School Districts	Average Cost Index	Title I Increase / Predicted Additional Cost		
			Average	Minimum	Maximum
1(smallest)	3	0.73	0.18	0.107	0.24
2	75	0.83	0.42	0.001	4.50
3	122	0.93	0.36	0.011	1.37
4	115	1.04	0.44	0.001	8.12
5 (largest)	156	1.38	0.27	0.002	2.90
Total	471	1.09	0.36	0.001	8.12

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