CULTURAL STRUGGLE ON THE PERUVIAN FRONTIER: CAMPA-FRANCISCAN CONFRONTATIONS, 1595-1752

BY

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PREFACE

The motivation for the present essay originated in a seminar directed by John L. Phelan, Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin. In the spring of 1968 Dr. Phelan and his students launched a series of indepth studies of social disturbances during Latin America's colonial period. As a member of that seminar, I was to investigate the 1742 Juan Santos movement which swept through the central montaña of Peru, including primarily the cultural area of the Campa Indians.

The fact became increasingly clear as my research progressed that it would be impossible to adequately explain Juan Santos and his movement without examining the Franciscan mission system which had first introduced Hispano-Christian Spain to the Campa aborigines and which had, ostensibly, provoked the native revolt. However, this background material had all but escaped the attention of the social historians. The details of the mission system developed by the Franciscans were still buried in scattered primary sources. By the time the seminar ended, I was able to present to my colleagues only a general outline of Franciscan activity among the

Campa. My treatment of the Juan Santos movement was equally defective; for I had been able to describe, in general terms, the chronological execution of the movement as well as its results and leadership, but the more crucial question of causation remained largely unanswered. Was the Juan Santos movement the overt reaction of the Campa to Spanish presence in their territory?

Implicit in the question of causation were minor unknowns. Among the Campa, what was the level of acculturation to Hispano-Christian culture? In quantitative terms, how significant was the Spanish commitment to the Campa enterprise? Why did the Franciscan missions fall before the pressure of open rebellion? Was, in fact, the Juan Santos movement a Campa rebellion?

Faced with the apparent lack of both published and manuscript resources with which to answer the array of remaining questions, I was on the threshold of abandoning the entire subject for a later date. At that very moment I met a second Wisconsin professor, William Denevan of the Geography Department. Dr. Denevan was engaged in a research project related to the ecology, use, and potential of the Peruvian savannas. As luck would have it, he had lived among the Campa and had trod their lands. Because of this familiarity he was able to provide new direction to my past research, as well as to fan my

enthusiasm for continued investigation.

Along with moral support and professional guidance, Professor Denevan put me in contact with Stefano Varese, in the Department of Anthropology at the Universidad de San Marcos. Professor Varese had recently published the first major study of the ethnology of the Campa, and in the course of his own research had utilized eighteenth century manuscripts powdered with the dust of obscurity. Hoping that the manuscripts could open new perspectives, I requested from Dr. Varese a representative sampling. He filled my request promptly, and together with pages of Xerox copies he included a personal note encouraging my investigations.

Both the manuscript material and Varese's counseling proved invaluable. From the assorted collection of eighteenth century documents, together with my own investigation of published sources, a story of human perseverance in the tropics emerged. It is that story which I tell in the following pages.

In the final analysis, the history of the Franciscans among the Campa and the saga of Campa responses to the advancing Europeans are but small parts of the history of Spanish Peru. Moreover, beyond the fact that much of what follows has never before been related in its entirety, there is nothing earthshaking in the telling.

Franciscan techniques among the Campa differed little from Franciscan techniques among other native groups. Campa responses to European presence were not, in substance, distinct from the responses of other aborigines.

What, then, is the purpose of the essay? Its major function is the evocation of a particular moment in history, and its intent is to show the preoccupations peculiar to one time and place. Essentially, this paper is a microhistory of an area long ignored by the professional historian; it is a collection of details and facts, the stock in trade of all historians, about one past moment in the montaña of Peru and not a comment on universal history. As such, it focuses on the uniqueness of the Campa enterprise, forsaking generalizations for specifics.

Besides catering to a personal fascination with the discovery and ordering of the facts of history, the story of Spain among the Campa hopefully will serve to amplify our understanding of the processes of intercultural contact. If our understanding of those processes is to be more than a glimmer, we must seek as much light as possible. The Campa enterprise is one source to be tapped; and, when viewed comparatively with other case studies, it can lead to the generalizations which serve to organize and explain the material of history.

Beyond that broader function, the following pages

should go far in suggesting counter positions to two growing myths. The first myth which has gained coin is that during the colonial period the sector of the Peruvian Oriente between Mainas and Mojos languished under Spanish disinterest. Such does not seem to have been the case. To the contrary, if the facts of the Campa enterprise are representative of other mission fields in the area, Spanish missionary involvement in the montaña was substantial.

A second myth has defined the Juan Santos movement as an American example of a millenial or messianic revolt. Under the pen of several Peruvian historians, the movement has even emerged as an early budding of Peruvian nationalism. Seen in the light of available data, neither interpretation seems accurate.

One last word. The bulk of this essay concentrates on the first half of the eighteenth century. Spain's commitment to the Campa field, measured both quantitatively and qualitatively, was strong during that period, and Campa reaction to the advancing cleric was more pronounced then than in earlier years. The events of earlier contacts from 1595 to 1700 merit concern and I shall not fail to mention them. Nevertheless, an exhaustive treatment of the earlier years must await a more systematic search of archival records. What I have tried to do with the

seventeenth century is to brush in its broader outlines and principal directions.

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'TIERRA INCOGNITA' EAST OF THE ANDES

CHAPTER I

STRUCTURE OF THE UNKNOWN

Prelude to Contact

On October 29, 1595, two Jesuits left the Peruvian town of Andamarca, a settlement anchored atop the eastern rim of the Andean Highlands. Their unmarked trail wound hazily eastward, into part of the unchartered territory of the tropical forest. Under orders of the Viceroy, Don García Hurtado de Mendoza, they were to reconnoiter sectors of the forest district east of Andamarca and to establish contact with the native inhabitants.

The two clerics, Juan Font and Nicolás Mastrilo, knew little about their destination. They were equally unfamiliar with the path they had to follow. Yet, with an intrepidity typical of the early conquistadores, both men blindly forged down the mountain slopes and pressed into territory virgin but to a few European eyes. The going was intricately rough, and Font, unaccustomed to the physical ardors of discovery, chronicled his difficulties with unabashed frankness:

> On the first two leagues out of Andamarca the trail moved up a steep incline--and so bitter

> was the ascent that we were hardly able to continue for lack of breath. A short distance from the top, we veered off onto an exceedingly narrow ledge, about five fingers wide and barely ample for a secure foothold. We then began to descend. This downward slope was covered with sheets of flagstone imbedded in the ground and, because of the sharp gradient, we were forced to inch along on all fours, grappling at the rock with the tips of our fingers and toes. Not only was this downward route exhausting, but also very dangerous--so much so that if we were to have slipped in our descent we would have been dashed to pieces in our unavoidable drop to the river below.
>
> We next began to trudge through marsh and mud--through chilled land and water which rose to the calves of our legs. ... The second day we made another four leagues--always through swampland, endlessly climbing and descending.[1]

Even on the third day, when the two Jesuits bridged the gap into the forest, the trail offered little relief. The densely packed woodland enclosed the advancing clerics in a tangle of branches and vines. At times the interlaced foliage forced the men to their knees, compelling them to crawl warily through the unyielding thickets. Step by step the physiological pressures mounted and sheer exhaustion turned human resolve into fear: "I was so tired, that I could barely move by myself; so thirsty, that I was choking. I wanted to sleep right there on the path...; but it was lightning and thundering, and I was afraid of the poisonous vermin of the forest. And most of all, I feared the thirst which racked my body."[2]

The active hostility of the environment contrasted

poignantly with the forest Indians. The natives whom Font and Mastrilo met after their four day battle into the selva were friendly and hospitable, docile almost to the extreme. Mastrilo was particularly moved by the apparent openness of the Indians, and seemed convinced that their quiet passiveness hid greater spiritual virtues. Revealing his Renaissance training, he idealized the Indians and their world. He saw the aborigines as simple children of God, living in happy relationships according to the Lord's design. The advent of seventeenth century realism, tinged with its slightly pessimistic undercurrent, had not as yet dampened the Golden Age concept of the Noble Savage, and had not as yet classified primitive society as a kind of dangerous anarchy. When Mastrilo came upon the Campa, the more idyllic view of primitive life faintly tinged his impressions: "In all the homes of these Indians we have found crosses; these natives are... the closest to Reason and well disposed to receive the Gospel."[3]

The moral bearing of the aborigines also impressed the missionary. "They have only one wife; stealing is unknown; there is no communual drunkenness."[4] This trinity of moral virtues would serve well the implantation of Christianity, and in the tropical forest of the Campa the Jesuits would be able to create through the mysteries

of Christian conversion a more perfect form of human life. Souls for the Church and subjects for the crown--these were the luring dividends available for an expanding Christian empire.

The Physical Environment

The region which had fought bitterly the arrival of the Jesuits spreads east of the Andean plateau, and forms part and parcel of the central montaña (lat. 9° - 13°s; long. 73° - 76° w) of present day Peru. While technically included in the tropical world on the basis of both its climate and vegetation, the district of the central montaña offers notable topographical contrasts to those lowland sectors of the South American tropics which have etched themselves into the popular conception of the tropical world. At the same time, the montaña itself lacks uniformity in vegetation, topography, and waterways for it encompasses a variety of distinct environments, each with a significantly different complex of climatic, topographic, and soil conditions. In turn, the several environments are further specialized into distinctive natural associations related to soils and topographical factors. Such a variety of environments and associations present, to the nonspecialist, an intricate maze in need of systematic analysis.[5] While the professional geographer has managed to bring a highly

sophisticated descriptive order to that maze, the purposes of this essay can be served with a more general view. Within the broadest possible outline, three environmental zones characterize the central montaña.

The jagged western edge of the montaña, called the ceja, nestles up the sharp escarpment of the eastern flanks of the Andes. This first zone, from sixteen to forty-eight kilometers wide, consists of highly broken landscape with steep gradients intricately dissected by fast flowing streams. Rugged, cloud-buried, and excessively humid, the precipitous strip of land bridges elevations from 4,000 to 2,500 meters. Characteristic vegetation includes Ericaceae (particularly in the upper ceja), bamboo, fern, and tree growth from scrub to trees twenty meters high.[6] Although usually narrow, the zone raises an effective barrier to easy passage from the Highlands into the forest, and makes swift communication between those two geographical situations difficult for even modern technology.

Stretching from the eastern base of the ceja is the montaña proper or the High selva, a continuous forest of mountainous terrain, deep jungles woven with undergrowth, and swift rivers threading their way to the Amazon. This more extensive zone extends from an elevation of 2,500 meters to about 1,000 meters. Within the broadleaf



Fig. 1.--Relief Map of Present Day Peru

evergreen forest peppered with tree fern and palms, fast growing trees reach thirty meters in height. The rivers of the montaña rarely overflow their banks: the river water cuts deeply into the land, and frequently pushes over rapids and through narrows. Indeed, the drainage systems of the central montaña, which forms the headwaters of the Lower Ucayali, are confined to restricted courses in contrast to the meandering waterways of the seasonally flooded lowlands below the montaña.[7] But, although seasonal flooding does not disrupt settlement, the river banks, because of the highly broken terrain, are not particularly suitable for flourishing social development based on extensive cultivation. Only a few alluvial terraces and an occasional pocket of open terrain provide flat land well suited for expanded settlement.

A third major zone in the central montaña district is an upland called the Gran Pajonal. This plateau-like structure of semi-deciduous forest, sub-xerophytic brush, and scattered grasslands (pajonales) rises almost as a natural redoubt in the triangle formed by the Perené, Tambo, and Upper Ucayali rivers. Surrounded by two complex spurs of the Cordillera Oriental--the Shira and Kitchungari mountains--and situated at an elevation of between 1,200 to 1,800 meters, the roughly 1,000 square kilometers of the Pajonal for years remained unassailable

to all but the native inhabitants. The scarcity of river courses further complicated movement within the rolling terrain.[8] Yet, in spite of its isolation, the Gran Pajonal supported at contact a sizeable native population along its ridge crests.

Throughout all of the central montaña two seasons split the calendar year. From roughly November through April is the period of maximum rainfall, or the winter months. The summer months, joining May and October, are drier, but precipitation continues to occur frequently, particularly in the ceja. The temperature ranges from about 20° centigrade around July to about 26° centigrade near November, although in the Gran Pajonal the fluctuation is somewhat less, ranging from 20° to 22° centigrade.[9]

CHAPTER II

THE NATIVE INHABITANTS

Cultural Patterns of the Campa

The component geographical zones of the central montaña shared a common denominator. A single native grouping of the Arawakan linguistic stock roamed a significant portion of the district, providing in its wanderings a sense of homogeneity to the environmental diversity. This grouping, the Campa Indians or ašaníŋka, was one of the more notable tribal assemblages along the entire stretch of the montaña from Ecuador to Peru. With a possible contact population of between 15,000 and 25,000, they were a major force in the High selva.[1]

Not only was the grouping imposing in size but also in terms of land. When Font and Mastrilo first stumbled into a tiny sector of the Campa domain, these hospitable Indians occupied some 70,000 square kilometers within the central montaña. At that moment of initial contact, the aborigines were scattered along a north-south axis which rose in the Gran Pajonal and ended at the juncture of the Metraro and Apurimac rivers, and on an east-west line from the Chanchamayo Valley to the Lower

Tambo. Most of the tribe apparently clustered along the banks and galeria forests of the principal rivers: the Chanchamayo, Perené, Pangoa, Ene, and Upper Tambo. Other Campa prowled the Gran Pajonal. By comparison, the ceja, which served as a barricade to Highland-selva contacts, was largely uninhabited, while the deeper forest areas away from the aquatic life of the river courses and land elevated above the 1,500 meter limit for yuca cultivation only felt the pressure of roving bands of Indians in search of wild game.[2]

Other aboriginal groupings settled in the district. The Amuesha Indians, another Arawakan language tribe and culturally similar to the Campa, squeezed between the ceja and the Pichis River, in the Palcazu River basin, and intermingled with the Campa in the rugged triangle of land formed by the Paucartambo-Perené waterways. Toward the east were Indians of the Panoan linguistic complex, including the Conibos, Comabos, and Mochobos, while the Arawakan-speaking Piros occupied a few pockets along the Tambo River. Yet, notwithstanding these occasional territorial infringements on the part of other forest tribes, the Campa culture dominated most of the central montaña.[3]

The two Jesuits, Font and Mastrilo, did not appreciate the cultural unity of the central frontier. Indeed, until well into the eighteenth century, few



(Based on S. Varese, La Sal de los Cerros)

Fig. 2.--Geo-Ethnic Distribution in Central Montaña at Contact

Spanish agents of conquest ever understood the distinct identity of the Campa or the network of integrants which fused the aborigines into a single cultural cluster. Where there were only Campa, the Spanish saw "Anti," "Anapati," "Chicheren"--a variety of river-derived names void of ethnic value, but indicative of Hispanic misperceptions.[4]

This minor failure stemmed in part from Spain's past experiences among peoples who had shaped their thousand and one items of behavior to a balanced and rhythmic pattern similar to its own. The tribes of the tropical world stood in sharp contrast to the Indians Spain had won along the Andes and in the Valley of Mexico. The Indians of the American highlands, and particularly those of the Inca and Aztec states, had been exceptional not only in the degree of sophistication of their sociocultural organization, but also in their assimilative features. Religion and language and, in the case of Peru, a common socio-political structure diffused over broad areas and provided a remarkable basis for cultural cohesion. Above all else, these numerous assimilative features were plastic ones. The Spanish mind could see them, touch them, and understand them, for they resembled in substance and form the assimilative features of Iberian Spain itself.

The cultural unity of the Campa Indians, in contrast, was not so evidently plastic. Religion did not

have its richly decorated images; government did not have its robed hierarchy; society did not have its elaborate structure codified and arranged in sprawling urban centers. Nothing was carried far enough among the Campa to give apparent body to their culture. To the Spanish observer tribal patterns, at best, appeared uncoördinated and casual. At worst, they appeared nonexistent.

The Campa's radical divergence from the stratification and cultural forms to which the Iberian mind could relate was not the only reason the Spanish failed to see integration. Spanish and Campa cultures differed not only in cultural forms, but because they were oriented as wholes in different directions. Each traveled along different paths in pursuit of different ends. Because of this contrast, and because the Spanish could not understand the end and means of the Campa because they could only judge them in terms of their own, the Spanish saw irrationality rather than integration, extreme scattering instead of unity, inconsistency in place of a ruling motivation.

The Campa's lack of plastic unity and their apparent motivational scattering and casual integration were largely reflections of aboriginal settlement patterns. As with many tribes within the humid tropics, the Campa lived in social units organized around the nuclear,

biological family. These units were small, with four, twenty, and occasionally fifty individuals, and separated spatially, one from the other, with perhaps one to five domestic houses to a clearing or residence site.[5] Within the community unit no apparent plan dictated the arrangement of the dwellings, nor were the community units themselves purposely arranged with respect to one another. On the other hand, ecological criteria at least partially determined the general positioning of the resident site. Besides proximity to the yuca fields, the availability of riverine-oriented animals was an important factor which led the River Campa to the banks of the waterways. In contrast, inhabitants of the Gran Pajonal who depended more on hunting than fishing for animal protein lived away from the rivers and on the savanna ridge tops. Yet even then ecology played its role for the ridge crests not only offered the Indians greater protection from the surprise attacks of their enemies but also greater freedom from insects and snakes.[6]

The nuclear family, in essence, lived where it could best maintain itself in tune to the particular environment in which it moved. Nevertheless, settlement, whether along the rivers or in the Gran Pajonal, was not permanent. When the local ecological balance shifted to its detriment, the family moved to another area where

game or fish were plentiful or where the soil was fresh or where weeds had not choked the cultivated fields. But sedentariness did not depend exclusively on ecological factors. Often social or religious reasons precipitated spatial changes. For example, the death of either a newborn child or an adult member of the nuclear family, fire, an epidemic, or the natural deterioration of the dwelling could occasion the abandonment of both house and field.[7] Yet these latter motives were not, in themselves, of sufficient importance to lead to long distance moves. In such cases the Campa frequently reëstablished their dwellings within reach of the original cultivated fields, near to the abandoned site. Only a brutal disruption between man and his environment, which could effect the level of his subsistence, or open warfare between man and man seemed significant enough to force major movement.

Connections among the scattered clusters of nuclear families were, by and large, unstructured. The Campa were not organized under the umbrella of a common socio-political frame which bridged the space separating the community units. Political power seldom extended beyond the confines of the settlement cluster. When it did, the foundation for that power was not institutionalized but rather based on an individual's prestige and skill. Subsistence was essentially a family affair, and seldom

demanded intercommunity action. Supra-family patterns of integration and organization involved no permanent social groupings of mixed membership: there were no known moieties, secret societies, clans, or totemic fraternities to serve as integrating mechanisms beyond the family itself.

Among the Campa, the community unit transmitted the values and goals of the grouping to the offspring, and it served as the primary social, political, and economic cell. And within that cell socio-political inequalities were neither pronounced nor complex. An adult particularly adept at hunting, fishing, fighting, or clearing lands might have enjoyed a certain limited command, but there were certainly no extremes of political domination and subordination. Community government was by persuasion, and effective leadership was possible only if a majority of the settlement complex was predisposed to follow a certain individual. The headman had neither tenure nor authority and few prerogatives.

The only other social role within the community unit which rested on broadened popular recognition and which was instrumental in decision making was that of the shaman or shiripiari.[8] As with the occasional headman, the shaman's power and privilege were functions of his personal skill and ability. Yet in contrast to the

headman, his prestige rested on magical and religious powers rather than on more functional ones. The shiripiari was also the custodian and interpreter of native traditions as well as the terrestrial representative of divine or supernatural wisdom. As such, he could act for the general community or to its detriment. He could control illness, conquer death, or kill by shooting disease-producing objects into the body of the enemy.

One Campa myth, dealing with the origin of the white man, hints at the importance of the aboriginal shaman:

> The viracocha /white men/ are inside a lagoon. Nearby live the ashaninka. One day a Campa heard the barks of a dog coming from the lagoon. "Good," he said, "I am going to fish for it," and he carried as bait some bananas. But bananas are food for men and the dog did not want to eat them. On the other hand all of the viracocha came out of the lagoon, and they began to chase the Campa and to kill them. They killed everyone. The lagoon dried up. The only one who lived was a shiripiari who was chewing tobacco.
>
> This shiripiari called tziho /a turkey buzzard, Cathartes aura/. "Look, the viracocha have killed all my brothers." "Where?" asked tziho. "There in the pajonal." Then tziho gave ivenki /a magic herb, Cyperus piripiri/ to the shiripiari and the latter killed all the viracocha. Only one saved himself and he fled down river and there at this time there are many viracocha. /Meanwhile/ tziho, in the pajonal, was eating the dead viracocha; he was cooking them and eating them.9

The shaman, custodian and interpreter of tradition and native custom, saves the general community. He acts

through the supernatural against those forces which would upset the status quo of the aboriginal culture.

The pattern of subsistence within the nuclear unit reflected close association with the natural environment. As simple horticulturalists, the Campa families rested upon the foundation of a slash-and-burn economy. The main source of food supply was sweet yuca (Manihot utilissima) and beans (Phasealus vulgaris), with hunting the major source of protein. Fishing seemed to have been important for the Campa near or on the major rivers, but of minor importance in the Gran Pajonal and other uplands. Nevertheless, there are indications that some Pajonal Campa took the availability of aquatic resources into consideration when they relocated their resident sites, particularly during the first years after European contact.[10]

In the central montaña, because of a low population density, there was little competition for land and little pressure for structural alterations in the maintenance process.[11] Technology remained uniformly simple, with reliance on the digging stick. Advanced techniques such as fertilization, terracing, and irrigation were not practiced nor were metal tools used.

The distributive mechanism was the self-sufficient family. Each family cared for its own fields, usually

located around the dwelling, and accepted responsibility for its own maintenance. Some division of labor punctuated the process. While men cleared and planted the land, women cultivated and harvested the crop. The men, in turn, hunted and fished. Labor patterns probably included also a limited craft specialization based on individual skills and on local variations in specific resources.[12] By and large, however, all individuals participated equally in the maintenance process, with little exchange of goods and services between households. The entire micro-population tended to function as a unit in most basic activities.

The pattern of family organization apparently varied little within the tribe. Thus poligamy, while occasional and perhaps a symbol of enhanced status, was practiced. Marital residence was patrilocal, although there was a marked tendency toward uxori-patrilocal residence for a short time immediately after marriage. The kinship system, on the other hand, remained matrilineal, and position descended in the female line, though the men were the actual incumbents.[13] Thus, within the family, the men held both power and prestige.

Mechanisms of Group Integration

The spatial scattering of the small nuclear units and the lack of institutionalized links would seem to

have severely taxed integration. The ecological separation of individual families; each unit's relative autonomy in organization, maintenance, and distribution; the absence of coördination mechanisms and of checks against possible localized fluctuations and against minor alterations in specific cultural traits--all these factors might have intensified the problem of cultural survival for the Campa grouping as a whole.

It is difficult to overemphasize the magnitude of the problem. The Campa were scattered, and it is not extreme to suggest that such scattering over a geographically diversified area could have broken the larger grouping into disoriented subgroups, each moving along its own independent path of organic evolution. Cultural items and traits are not imperishable. Customs, techniques, and beliefs can change, be replaced, or even lost. And no immutable law guarantees that the cultural configurations of a single biological unity divided by geographical particularism must ipso facto follow independent parallel development and convergence. Because the Pajonal Campa and the River Campa were part of the same linguistic family, and because they could have shared a common origin, did not mean that they had to develop cultural configurations identical in both content and form.

If the Campa grouping at contact was a cultural unity, what bound the autonomous units into a functioning whole? What gave, for example, the River Campa and the Pajonal Campa their sense of cultural identity, of tribal solidarity? One of the major problems of any culture is persistence. Through which mechanism did the Campa respond to the challenge of group survival over localized conflicts?

Language was one of the more important of the binding links which fostered tribal awareness and persistence. The Campa spoke a common language. And, in spite of probable dialectical variations, the language seemed to have been mutually intelligible throughout the broader complex.[14] This linguistic uniformity provided the physical mechanism for free intercommunication--without which the consciousness of unity, which is the psychological precondition for integration, could not have arisen.

A second factor that made for persistence was the religion of the Campa. Religion in many cultures has traditionally served to distinguish individuals of the closed group (the true believers) from outside peoples (the nonbelievers). Between the two there is frequently no meeting point, and ideas and institutions that hold in the one are often invalid in the other. The Campa were not an exception. They seemed cautiously zealous

of their own religious complex, were aware of its truth, and guarded against its exposure to the outsider.[15] At contact, the intensity of conservation was probably not acute; for, although most primitive religions rested on the assumption of their own verity, they had a tolerance for each other and had no compelling aim to encompass outside peoples. Yet, regardless of tolerance, tribal faith served to pinpoint unity and reinforce group identity by defining diversity in terms of a complex of beliefs. One is ašaníinka because he believes as the ašaníinka; one is atziri (other men), because he does not believe as the ašaníinka. The aborigines along the Perené, Ene, and Chanchamayo rivers and those in the Gran Pajonal were Campa and not atziri because they shared a religious complex formed by ceremonies and oral traditions distinct from those of other people.

Religious ceremonies, or the formal rites of faith, also functioned as an integrating mechanism. Although the Campa had only a few ceremonies, those they did have formed an integral part of their cultural patterns. Nocturnal dances, or reciprocal masato gatherings, offer a pertinent example.[16] During the long nights of the full or new moon, two or more nuclear families would gather to dance and to drink the fermented juice (masato) of the yuca plant. Announced in advance to neighboring

community units, it was an animated and colorful ceremony which involved its participants in patterned dancing and planned inebriation.[17]

In Indian terms the lunar ritual was more than a pagan orgy. On the spiritual or psychological plane, participation in the dancing and ritual drinking submerged each individual not only in a common experience but also in a common enterprise. As a result, ceremonies in Campa culture, as in most primitive societies, had a constructive end: they served to guarantee cosmic fertility; to regenerate time through a symbolic return into the formless; and to confirm reality through the repetition of acts and gestures revealed in mythical time by gods or heroes. By virtue of these ceremonies, society or the group was periodically regenerated and its being reaffirmed.[18] Because ritual had this constructive function and was not merely a personal experience in self-indulgence, the participants encountered a sense of unity derived from their common achievement.

To the aborigine, ceremony was fundamentally the act of social recreation in much the same way as sexual intercourse is the act of biological recreation. A sense of unity did not necessarily come from the act, but from the product of that act. Thus each individual Campa defined his tribal identity by virtue of his own active

role in the tribe's recreation, in much the same way as parents in Western civilization see their basic unity in terms of their own offspring.

At the social level the lunar ritual, in drawing together spatially separated family units, replaced the usual physical separation with momentary communal interaction. The participants sang together, laughed together, drank together, danced together, and talked to each other. These occasional interpersonal contacts with other nuclear families permitted, over time, the reinforcement, exchange, or diffusion of cultural traits and patterns. The mechanism worked toward perpetuation and persistence by checking unconscious divergence; or by reinforcing existing traits and forms; or by furthering the intratribal diffusion of new cultural inventions. Such traits, whether new or old, could have been any of a variety: fluctuations in fashions; affective elements such as fears, strivings, aversions, restlessness; motor habits, involving such things as techniques in pottery making or in weaving and coca chewing; technological elements or methods in subsistence.

In addition to language, religion, and ritual ceremonies, another mechanism served to bind the Campa: two voluntary associations. In both cases, the purpose of the associations was not precisely social, in the

strict sense of the word, but they served that end.

The first association had an economic function. Crisscrossing the territory of the Campa was a trade network along which the Campa moved raw materials (such as salt, or forest products) and items of native manufacture (pottery, cloth, arrows, etc.). The network, which included a chain of trading partners, enabled the aborigines to spread material culture.[19] At the same time, during the process of exchange, in the gestures and verbal interchanges which accompanied the usual bartering, cultural traits were once again checked, reinforced, or diffused.

The second voluntary association served a defensive end and, with the exception of the trading partnerships and ceremonial congregations, was the only other example of coöperative tribal organization beyond the immediate bounds of the family unit. Although the Campa had no known interfamily organizations of fixed membership which normally acted in some tribes as a vehicle for concerted action, they would band together on an ad hoc basis to carry out military campaigns. Such association was common during the years of Spanish presence among the Campa. Apparently, in preconquest time, the Campa also joined in concerted military action against the Incas.[20] In both instances, association, although temporary,

involved individuals throughout the territory occupied by the Campa. Ostensibly its purpose was the defense of tribal traditions and of tribal land against external influences and control; but, in addition, it served an integrating end. Not only did association provide the opportunity for the reinforcement or diffusion of traits, but the act of resisting, which in itself indicated at least a threshold of tribal awareness, implied a reaffirmation of the ašaníŋka against the outsider, and an awareness of "them" versus "us."

A final factor which generated an intensity of group identification was the precontact pattern of diffusion and change. Before the arrival of the Spanish, such a pattern had been largely intratribal, and worked through temporary associations, periodic group contacts, and intermarriage between extended family units. The Campa thus had remained in the montaña, little influenced by the Andean civilizations on the cold reaches of the western Highlands, or even by some of the more characteristic Amazonian developments which had spread among the riverbeds of the Upper Amazon basin.

This precontact isolation did not imply the absence of foreign incursions into Campa territory. From the west, before the Spanish had arrived in Peru, there were cases of Inca military excursions of conquest. Later,

during the first century of Spanish presence among the Andean civilizations, there were also examples of Highland emigrations into the montaña--movements of individuals or tribes who sought refuge from the Spanish.[21] From the east, the Piro had physically penetrated the area of Campa occupation and had etched out several pockets along the banks of the Tambo. But besides these few cases there were no extreme examples of foreign intrusion. Essentially ecological factors as well as organized native resistance diminished cultural transmissions from other peoples. Extratribal influence was principally in terms of culturally neutral items such as clothes (the cushma, a covering with slits for the neck and arms but no sleeves) and ornaments (some gold and other metal objects as well as coca chewing), and presented little danger to the socio-economic and cultural patterns of the Campa.[22]

This limited extratribal exchange, coupled with the effective geographical isolation of the Campa from other cultures, served as a factor in cultural cohesion and encouraged the historical continuity of Campa tribal traditions and patterns across time. With minimal inter-societal cultural transmission, the Campa never faced the crisis of profound innovation or change. Thus their cultural patterns had deep roots, a fact which gave the Campa a sense of historic identity and tended toward

persistence.

Campa society was not an example of extreme integration. Those mechanisms which bound the Campa and overcame geographical disorientation in no way forged the grouping into a tightly knit, homogeneous structure. Moreover, geographical particularism was not the only factor which worked against tribal unity. Intragroup hostility, although probably greatly diffused, operated to the detriment of tribal cohesiveness, particularly when it led to open warfare. But even when enmity was less pronounced its consequences were far from idyllic. For example, there seemed to have existed at least a modicum of antagonism between the River and Pajonal Campa which acted to reduce contacts between the two subgroups.[23] Nor would it be extreme to suggest that interpersonal relations were at times brittle, with the seeds of possible antagonism ever present. Nevertheless, tribal identity did exist; and the spatially scattered aborigines did have a concept of unity which was largely undisturbed by external forces. If the Campa were not tightly knit, they were at least conscious of their group identity. They knew who were Campa and who were not.

PART II

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRONTIER SOCIETY

CHAPTER III

THE ORDERING OF THE SPANISH ADVANCE: 1595-1708

Forays into the Campa Domain

Hispanic society during the first century of contact only occasionally rippled the tropical world of the Campa Indians. The one hundred years after Font and Mastrilo's journey into the unknown was for Spain and her frontiersmen a period of discovery and random exploration, and they made few substantive attempts to acculturate the Campa aborigines nor to incorporate their land into Spanish Peru. As a result, the seventeenth century brought little novelty to traditional Campa organization. The aborigines continued much as they had lived before the arrival of the white man.

The superficial nature of seventeenth century intercultural contact was not unique to the Campa frontier, for it reflected a fundamental change in Spain's pioneering spirit. By and large the spirit of risk and adventure that had dominated sixteenth century Spanish society had greatly diminished by the first decades of the seventeenth. Somewhat impetuous during the so-called Age of

Conquest, the Iberian conquistadores seemed to have settled into greater reflection and reasoned thought as the more structured native empires fell to the European invader. That change in attitude slowed the speed of territorial conquest; and, as an immediate consequence, the lands beyond the settled cores felt the impact of Spanish culture only when rumors of easy opportunity and quick profit drew the hungry stares of individual Europeans, or when the needs of Imperial defense forced the crown into movement.

Many frontier regions, particularly those of northern New Spain, filled the personal hopes of layman and bureaucrat alike. Yet the invasion of the marginal areas of the Empire was not always rewarding; and, when environmental poverty combined with Indian resistance, it was difficult to sustain the interest of the Spanish.

Thus was the case with secular expansion into the land of the Campa. On the central frontier of Peru, much as on the borderlands of the Plata region and in the Araucanian country, low material profits plus Indian resistance kept the colonists and conquistadores at bay. Only two exceptions disproved the general rule. In the decade of the 1640's a false rumor of gold stirred the cupidity of a handful of free-wheeling adventurers who hustled into the hills bordering the Lower Paucartambo

River. Several years later, in the wake of the boisterous prospectors, a number of Spanish colonists drifted into the Chanchamayo and Vitoc valleys. There, below the ceja east of the Province of Tarma, they anchored several small-scale agricultural complexes along the valley bottoms and on the hill slopes. But in neither case did contact have a lasting influence on the Indians.[1] The major thrusts of both the settlers and the renegade adventurers was an extractive one--exploitative moves against the land and its natural resources, with the Campa figuring only incidentally in the activities. Because the laymen were more interested in the material than in the human and because their labor needs were filled by Highland natives, the Campa were able to avoid exposure by physically withdrawing into the interior and raising their traditional barrier against deeper alien penetration.

In contrast to the lay colonists and secular adventurers, the Church, especially the Regular Orders, moved onto the frontiers largely irrespective of material rewards. Throughout the New World, missionaries played an active role in the invasion of the borderlands, or those areas marginal to Spanish socio-political control. In the more promising regions of New Spain they were part of a larger assault and moved with miners, ranchers,

farmers, traders, and soldiers. In the Campa area, however, they were the exclusive agents of assault, the only real adventurers of the sixteenth century and the only men who moved into the interior of the montaña.

In a rather strange twist, the Jesuits, in spite of Font and Mastrilo's early explorations, chose not to participate in the central montaña enterprise. During the seventeenth century, the Black Robes were the more disciplined of the Regular Orders, and their missionary zeal alone tamed wild frontiers which other Orders refused to or could not enter. In South America, for example, the Jesuits represented Spain along the Orinoco River, in the jungles and lowland reaches of Amazonas, and in the llanos of Mojos in the eastern lowlands of present day Bolivia.[2] Well disciplined and dedicated, and already in contact with the Campa, they seemed the natural agents of conquest. But when Font and Mastrilo returned to Lima in 1595, after their entrada into the central frontier, their superiors made no effort to organize a permanent mission to the Campa.

Font, undaunted by the icey responce, continued to push privately, and without the official approval of his superiors, for the conquest of the Indians and made several new entradas into Campa territory as well as a journey to Spain to lay his case before the king. Yet

the Society, obviously disturbed with Font's open disobedience and his unauthorized petitions before the royal Court, categorically refused to reverse its original position. The Jesuit head in Lima explained to the viceroy that the chief objection to the enterprise was the apparent sparseness of the native population. With the Society's position thus established, the King issued a royal injunction in 1602 prohibiting Font from further activity, and the Jesuits forced Font to publicly acquiesce to that final decree.[3]

If the Jesuits successfully avoided a commitment to the Campa frontier, the Dominicans did not. To the contrary, they seemed to have welcomed the opportunity to enter the tropical forest and to thus establish their own beachhead on the eastern borderlands.

The Dominicans' first moves into the world of the Campa began around 1646, when the viceregal government commissioned their Order to build a road from the Highland town of Monobamba into the southern end of the Chanchamayo Valley. Concurrent with the construction, the Dominicans succeeded in founding four mission centers along the advancing roadway. But after several years of quiet progress a native uprising, sparked by the El Dorado adventures of the late 1640's, forced the friars to withdraw to the Highland rim.[4] Undaunted by this

failure, the Order returned in 1655. Once again the Lima bureaucrats had commissioned the clerics to build a road into the Chanchamayo Valley, but this time from Tarma instead of Monobamba. Nevertheless, with the exception of two haciendas and several mission centers, the Dominicans were unable to devote their efforts to the tasks of Indian conversion within the forest.[5] The road absorbed its available resources, keeping the Order at the grindstone of manual labor and away from the dissemination of Christian salvation.

It was the Order of Saint Francis, the Observant branch, which managed to carry the name, if not the message, of the Iberian Christ into the Campa hinterland. The Franciscans were the first seventeenth century missionaries who entered the Campa field, some eleven years before the Dominicans, and were the only ones who succeeded in penetrating into the Campa domain beyond the eastern bank of the Chanchamayo River. In the Chanchamayo Valley alone they made three separate attempts to stabilize their efforts into permanent settlement: in 1635, under Fray Jerónimo Jiménez; between 1671 and 1674, under Fray Alonso Robles; and between 1691 and 1694, under Fray Domingo Alvarez. Yet each effort failed rapidly. The precarious mission centers which the Order managed to establish were simply unable to stand against the frequent

native insurrections; and the friars themselves were hardly more successful in escaping death at native hands.[6]

Concurrent with their attempts in the Chanchamayo area, the Franciscans shouldered an ambitious thrust into the broad expanse of land drained by the headwaters of the Pangoa River. Beginning in 1673 the Franciscan priest, Manual Biedma, founded a string of mission posts which worked their way from Andamarca, on the Highland rim, to the confluence of the Ucayali and Pachitea rivers. But in their push to the Upper Ucayali, Biedma and his fellow clerics stopped only long enough to mutter the blessings of Church and State to the curious aborigines along their path. The mission posts which they left in their wake were merely stepping stones for the robed explorers rather than stations for a missionary clergy. When Biedma met his death at Indian hands in 1687, his string of missions disappeared.[7] The Indians walked out of the posts and back into the forest. No one was around to stop them.

The simple truth of the matter was that, during the first century of contact, Campa and geographical resistance outbalanced European efforts. Whether he extracted, puttered, or muttered, where he prospected, built, or explored, the white man seemed unable or unwilling to crack the shell of the unknown. On more than

one occasion the aborigines rose to force the Spanish who did try back into the Highlands. And, although some Spaniards tenaciously returned after each Indian offensive, they never sunk their roots into the tropical forest. Exploration overshadowed conversion; the land enticed the Spaniards more than the native inhabitants did. By 1694 even the Franciscans, who had scattered outposts in the field, lost heart. They joined their compatriots in withdrawing to the Highland, as a handful of Campa began another periodic rampage. Thus ended the first one hundred years, with the Campa and the forest defiantly in control of the central montaña and with the Spanish licking their wounds on the Highland rim.

Imperial Attitudes and Responses

The seventeenth century was primarily a period of penetration rather than one of Hispano-Christian dispersion. The Europeans, and particularly the Franciscans, learned much about the land of the Campa frontier but sunk few roots into its soil. Without question, the conditions of environment and of the native populations, together with the friars' own inclinations toward exploration, severely limited European progress. Yet while local circumstances and individual preferences were significant, a major cause of the failure of that first period of conquest was the indifference of the imperial

bureaucracy toward the area.

The Spanish government, in many frontier areas of the seventeenth century, contributed handsomely to colonial advance. The friars, as Professor Bolton observed, were not only proselytizing agents of the Spanish Catholic Church but, correspondingly as the frontiers of settlement pushed into areas of the nomadic savages, they often served the Spanish government in purely secular affairs.[8] They became in many borderland districts military and political agents of the crown, acting to open and hold the peripheral regions for European colonization and to maintain the borders against foreign encroachment. In return for their role in Spain's pioneering system the Regular Orders received moral and material support from the secular State. Translated into concrete terms, that support took several forms: annual stipends; military protection; a garrison of armed soldiers; temporary protection against the growing encroachment of the Secular Church. The more vital the political and military ends to be served, the more liberal was the royal patronage.

In the case of the lowland territory of the Campa Indians, however, the incentives for colonial expansion were embarrassingly few. As in other borderland regions, marginal to Spanish control, the native inhabitants were

not sufficiently structured for Spain to incorporate into a functioning colonial organization.[9] In addition, as the seventeenth century had advanced, it had become increasingly questionable if the conditions of climate and environment, combined with the refractory nature of the Campa Indians, offered any hope for a stable secular expansion much beyond the Chanchamayo Valley. The area lacked material wealth and mining had little future; stock-raising, the cutting edge of expansion in New Spain, had not found an eminently favorable environment; and commercial agriculture faced a myriad of problems, not the least of which were high costs in an area so isolated from the centers of market and supply to the west. If the prospects for colonization were dismal, the threat of foreign encroachment never materialized. The Portuguese threatened other reaches of the tropical forest but left the central montaña unscathed.

The State, in the throngs of an economic depression and sorely committed in scattered reaches throughout the New World, seemed to have had little interest in underwriting an enterprise which promised so little return. The government directed its attention, its money, and its military to other sectors more vital to imperial interests and left the Campa field to the robed helpmates of Christ.

The indifference of the royal government, which

was based on pragmatic considerations of imperial interest and economy, placed almost the total burden of contact on the Regular Orders, and, in particular, on the Franciscans. Unfortunately, the Regular Orders were beset by a number of difficulties which seriously crippled their proselytizing activities beyond the rims of Christendom. As the seventeenth century advanced, those difficulties grew in intensity. A serious drop in the number and quality of entrants spread dangerously thin the ranks of the mission clergy; internal squabbles within Orders between American-born and Spanish-born friars sapped enthusiasm for religious conversion; strife between the episcopal hierarchy and the Regular Clergy led to the progressive displacement of the latter by the Secular Church; a growing laxity in moral standards within the Church as an institution fortered inertia, reluctance, and indifference to missionary work.[10] By the end of the seventeenth century, the main branches of the Peruvian Church had turned in upon themselves and upon Lima society, and showed little sustained anxiety for missionary success in the Campa controlled lowlands below the ceja.[11]

The indifference of the crown officials and the difficulties of the colonial Church did not directly affect the enthusiasm and zeal of the friars in the Campa field. Throughout the seventeenth century, in

sharp contrast to the situation within the core of settlement, local morale was high, and even approached the original humanist enthusiasm which had characterized the earlier spiritual conquest of New Spain. But frontier zeal alone was not sufficient to pacify native hostility and to forge individual successes into a unified Hispanic advance. Without greater support from the centers of imperial control (i.e. money, men, protection, and supplies) the men on the frontier could do little more than explore or retreat, depending on the dictates and whims of the Indians and their environment.

Mission Resurgence: Of Men and Plans

In spite of the rather uninspiring seventeenth century record of Hispano-Christian expansion into the central montaña, and the prevailing indifference of the State and colonial Church toward the central frontier, the dawn of the eighteenth century witnessed a revival of missionary activity in the forested domain of the Campa. In 1694 not all the Spanish had categorically written off the region, and its real and imagined lures seemed to mesmerize some European minds.

In the vanguard of the eighteenth century resurgence was the Franciscan Order, the very group which had carried the Cross into the Campa land during the first years of contact. Although in the past the Order had

repeatedly failed in its efforts, after 1708 it managed to successfully occupy the central frontier and to become almost its sole evangelists during the next half century. In two weaving columns the Franciscans marched down the ceja, one along the Chanchamayo and Perené rivers and one along the Pangoa River system, meeting in the high-rising Gran Pajonal.

The eighteenth century resurgence reflected to no small degree the recent revival of missionary zeal among the Franciscans. Thus in its origin the Campa mission system was part of the larger picture of mission resurgence which eventually carried the Order not only against the Campa but throughout the marginal reaches of the New World from California to Chile.

Unlike the Jesuits, the Order of Saint Francis had not escaped the tensions and demoralizing pressures of seventeenth century colonial society. The internal squabbles and social strife which had sapped the colonial Church of missionary zeal hit the Franciscan Order as well, and toward the end of the century it had lost much of its earlier crusading spirit and energy. In New Spain the decline, although noticeable, was not dangerously severe, for the friars were still able to carry out an impressive labor of evangelization in such areas as New Mexico, Lower California, Sonora, Coahuila, Río Verde,

and Nuevo León.[12] In Peru, in contrast, the decline threatened the very future of the Order as an agent of frontier contact. The friars' seventeenth century retreat from the Campa territory offered a pertinent illustration of that debilitating decline.

But if the deterioration of the Order's missionary zeal really threatened only Peru, it was yet a concern to many individual friars throughout the New World. Many missionaries even in New Spain saw the future of the Order in somewhat tarnished terms. What was needed, they felt, was tighter organization and a more thorough training in the tasks of frontier evangelization. Thus in the midst of a critical revaluation rose the idea of a mission college for the American enterprise of the Franciscans.[13] Between the idea and the fact spanned only a brief interlude: by 1683 the College of Santa Cruz de Querétaro had sunk its roots into the soil of New Spain, and was crouched for new conquests and missionary undertakings.

The mission college, in design and structure, was a school, a convent, and a governing institution rolled into one. Above all else, of course, it was an apostolic center for the training of missionaries, and especially of friars bound for the pagan world of <u>infieles</u>. Within its walled confines, its community was taught Indian

languages, prepared psychologically for the life of a frontiersman, briefed in the methods needed in conversion including medical skills and some agricultural knowledge, and informed about the problems unique to the field. But to the historical concept of the college as a training institute were added that of a convent where the community could maintain its spirituality; that of a retreat to which the field clerics could return for spiritual recuperation; and that of a hospital to which they could return for medical attention.

Beyond these more social functions, the college was a relatively autonomous institution, independent of the provincial ministers and loosely connected to the Congregation of Propaganda Fide in Rome. In addition, it enjoyed a number of Papal privileges as well as several royal privileges and those of the Order. These various special rights were extremely critical to its operation for they permitted its community greater mobility than was possible within the convent. The mission college, for example, could receive and train novices directly, without going through the normal channels of recruitment. Moreover, it could adopt its own rules, modify general or specific ordinances of the Order, and operate without the permission of the head of the province to which it was nominally assigned.[14]

Because of its structure and its various privileges, the college was uniquely capable of honing its community for the missionary task. Its members, who organized around a central base, proved a particularly zealous lot, and were able to meet the challenges of the new frontiers. So successful was Querétaro that other mission colleges soon rose to dot the New World: Guatemala (1694), Guadalupe de Zacatecas (1702), Puchuca and Mexico City (1733), to name but a few. Above all else, the college confidently led the Franciscan Order onto the frontier. Of all the Orders which had participated in the earlier spiritual conquest of the core areas, only the Franciscans survived to join the Jesuits in the peripheral zones. That the friars thus survived to compete with the Society must be attributed to the college regime.

In South America the first mission college was not established until 1758; but well before that date the spirit of the Franciscan missionary renaissance reached the Viceroyality of Peru. Its harbinger was Fray Francisco Jiménez de San José, a man trained in Querétaro and well indoctrinated in the new spirit and techniques.

As part of the general revival of Franciscan missionary zeal, Fray Francisco Esteres, the Apostolic Prefect of Propaganda Fide in Spanish America, assigned Francisco de San José to the Viceroyality of Peru in

1708. Fray Francisco arrived in Lima and persuaded the Province of the Twelve Apostles to assign him a convent so that he could attend to his new missionary responsibilities.[15] He spent the first year ordering the affairs of the missions among the faithful, and by 1709 he had turned his eyes to the central frontier, laying plans for a revival of Franciscan activity in that section of the tropical forest which had both befuddled and enchanted his predecessors. It was thus under the shadow of the Order's revitalization at Querétaro that the eighteenth century Campa enterprise began.

It is difficult to disentangle Fray Francisco, the man of flesh and bones, from the idealized image that Franciscan chroniclers have projected. Because of his persistent efforts in the eighteenth century missionary field, he has become in the pages of history somewhat of a mythical figure, a kind of ultimate figure as well as a symbol of the difficulties that racked the eastern frontier of Peru. Some would make of him a man for all seasons, a man who transcended particularities of time and place to etch his name on the roll of protean figures who guided Spain's American conquests.[16] But a more objective ordering of Fray Francisco's accomplishments tends toward a less heroic vision of the man and his deeds. Rather than a man for all seasons, he becomes a

man for the two seasons of the tropics; rather than a figure who transcends particularities of time and place, he becomes a figure uniquely suited for the particularities of his own time in the Campa frontier.

The specifics of his biography, although they run from place to place across borders and continents, did not mark him apart from the norm. Born in Mondeja, Spain, in 1654; son of a Castilian mother and father; military service in Flanders for seven years during the reign of Charles II; entered the Observant branch of the Franciscans in Burgos; assigned to the College of Santa Cruz in Querétaro, Mexico, in 1692; service in the missions of Central America and Colombia; and, between 1708 and 1734, Commissary of Missions on the Peruvian frontier.[17] And if the milestones in his life did not sift him out from his contemporaries, neither did his zeal and dedication to conversion. An indefatigable worker who strove day by day for the conversion of the forest Indians, Fray Francisco was no different from the other dogged friars who plied the eastern frontier during the first half of the eighteenth century.

What was noteworthy was that when the Franciscan Order transferred Francisco de San José to Peru in 1708 he was already a veteran missionary. He was familiar with the techniques of conversion among more primitive

Indians, understood the rigors of frontier life away from colonial society, and appreciated the need for training and discipline within the mission field. Such experience most decisively set him apart from the other eighteenth century missionaries to the Campa. The other clerics on the frontier typically entered the field as novices and thus were forced to pass time as apprentices in the tasks of conversion among nonsedentary tribes. Fray Francisco plunged into the central montaña having already mastered his art in the rugged stretches of the peripheral fields of New Spain, including Guatemala.

Equally significant was the nature of his early apprenticeship. Not only had Fray Francisco been assigned to Peru as part of the Franciscan revival, but he had begun his service in the New World under the regime of the mission college. As a consequence, he was a product of that apostolic resurgence. First in Querétaro and later in the mission college in Guatemala he learned his trade, both within the colleges and in the field, and reflected the new productive enthusiasm of the Order as a whole.

Experience in the case of Fray Francisco was most definitely the mother of invention. Because of his past years in the mission fields of other frontier regions and of his training under the college regime, the plucky

Franciscan was able to forge the eighteenth century Campa enterprise into a progressive program of Hispano-Christian advance rather than into a fractioned exercise in territorial expansion.

Coördination and centralization became the keystones to Fray Francisco's plan for positive advance. His first objective was to open a number of self-supporting mission districts within the central montãna, each with a series of advancing mission posts. He finally opted for a triple-pronged attack. The northern enterprise was carried out east of the Highland town of Huánuco among what turned out to be the Amuesha Indians. The central and southern prongs punctured the Campa domain: one line moved into the Chanchamayo Valley from the town of Tarma; the final zone stretched northeast of Andamarca into the upper reaches of the Pangoa River. Although the three adjacent districts were largely disconnected from each other within the field, administratively they were parts of a single conquest. Fray Francisco, as Commissary of Missions, directed progress on the three fronts: he personally coördinated field activities, mobilized material support for all three districts, and shouldered the responsibility for their maintenance and protection.

A second plank in his program was the establishment of a mission center to serve the men engaged in

contact and conversion. More specifically, Fray Francisco wanted to establish on the Highland rim a mission college, as he had seen it in operation in New Spain. The college was to serve both the Franciscan missions among the "faithful" as well as the Franciscan missionaries involved in the triple-pronged attack against the yet unconquered frontier. It was to function as a school for the training of missionaries and as a retreat to which the friars could periodically return for spiritual and physical recuperation.

Herewithin was Fray Francisco's strength. Neither mythical nor symbolic, he was an eighteenth century technocrat who, spirited by the Franciscan revival, labored to bring organization and purpose to a disrupted frontier. What in the past had been a series of individual expeditions launched randomly into the forest became under Francisco de San José three clearly defined institutionalized advances. If the Franciscans failed in the eighteenth century Campa enterprise, it was not because the plans were inappropriate nor because missionary enthusiasm was low.

CHAPTER IV

PATTERNS OF CONQUEST AND EXPANSION: 1709-1742

The Tarma Mission Circuit

The principal mission district on the Campa field, measured both quantitatively and qualitatively, was the chain of mission posts referred to in Franciscan records as the Tarma conversions. On the entire central montaña, it was the first area which the Order reëntered after the demoralizing events of the late seventeenth century, and the one to which the Spanish clung more tenaciously when Juan Santos began his offensive in 1742. Its stations were more patterned and more numerous; its Indians more Hispanized if not more Christianized; and its rate of expansion both more regular and stable.

Located east of the Highland Province of Tarma, the stations by 1730 stretched from the Chanchamayo Valley to beyond the mid-point of the Perené, several kilometers past the mouth of the Ipoki River.[1] The land area involved in the spread was approximately 2,700 square kilometers, or almost four per cent of the total Campa domain.

Franciscan expansion into that district falls into three periods. The first phase (1709-1713) was preparatory, and the overriding aim of the clerics was to secure the Chanchamayo and Lower Paucartambo valleys with permanent settlements. Under the cautious but unrelenting prodding of Francisco de San José and six fellow missionaries, two mission posts rose to anchor the initial beachhead: Cristo Crucificado de Cerro de la Sal and Patrocinio de Nuestra Señora de Quimiri. The Cerro de la Sal station, which was located along the eastern bank of the Lower Paucartambo several kilometers before its juncture with the Chanchamayo, apparently took root first; and, although an early epidemic swept the post of many neophytes, by 1713 it was administering to 585 Indians.[2] The friars installed Quimiri to the south of Cerro, at the southern end of the Chanchamayo Valley. It rose on a site which Fray Alonso Robles had chosen in 1673; and, strangely enough, Fray Francisco was able to occupy the very church structure which his predecessor had built almost forty years before. By 1713 Quimiri, too, was a functioning center of interculture contact, with Campa and mestizos from the Highland intermingling daily.[3]

During the same period, after the affairs in Cerro and Quimiri had stabilized to some degree, the Franciscans



Fig. 3.--Mission Stations of Tarma and Jauja (ca. 1742)

attempted to establish a third station several kilometers down the Perené River. This post, Purísima Concepción de Eneno, did not survive. Resentment of the local Indians was intense; and, fearing a native uprising against the post, Fray Francisco decided to abandon temporarily the operation.[4]

The momentary retreat did not long retard the advance of the Cross. The years between 1713 and 1726 saw the rapid expansion of the Tarma mission district well beyond the first failure at Concepción. By 1725 five stations had joined the two original posts: San Joaquín de Nijandaris etched a third point along the north-south axis between Cerro de la Sal and Quimirí; Purísima Concepción de Metraro, San Antonio de Eneno, San Francisco de Pichana, and San Tadeo de los Antes ran down the Perené River, carrying the spirited missionaries and their allies over one hundred kilometers into Campa heartland.[5]

The rapid expansion was not without its difficulties, however, and, in addition to local native resistance, disease proved to be a dreaded obstacle. Minor epidemics apparently had struck many of the mission centers from their inception; but, around 1722-1723, a major one ravaged almost all of the stations throughout the district. By 1724 the tolls in both Indian lives

and dispersals had cut deeply into the vitality of the Franciscan operations: either by falling into the hands of death or by fleeing the hands of the friars, a significant percentage of the mission Indians, in some cases, up to seventy per cent, escaped the pale of settlement. Thus, San Antonio de Eneno, which immediately before the plague had had over 800 inhabitant, toppled to 287; in Quimirí only 140 Indians remained; Cerro de la Sal, with under 100 neophytes, had drawn back to less than one sixth of its 1713 population.[6]

Even in spite of epidemics, Indian resistance, and other difficulties, the Franciscans managed to hold on to most of their past successes. In 1726 at least six stations, with the possible exception of Metraro, were still functioning, and many of the harder hit posts such as Cerro de la Sal began to show signs of recovering from the devasting blows of epidemic disease. Moreover, the 1722-1723 epidemic had left over 1,200 Indians bajo de campana (within range of the mission bell), with additional families scattered in congregated settlements beyond the bell but in periodic contact with the stations.[7]

The next sixteen years to the 1742 Juan Santos uprising was a period of moderate consolidation. After 1726, while their brothers in the Jauja district were scattering into virgin lands, the friars assigned to the

Tarma district showed less of an interest in territorial expansion beyond San Tadeo than in the stability of the centers they had already established. To a certain extent such an orientation reflected practical considerations. For one thing, the handful of friars assigned to the Tarma district were well occupied with meeting the more usual needs of the stations within the circuit, and could probably have ill afforded to raise their sights to virgin lands.[8] In the second place, by 1727, shortly after the settlement of San Tadeo, the friars from the southern district of Jauja had moved up into the Lower Perené area, thus cutting off what would have been Tarma's natural line of advance. Conditions within the circuit also probably determined priorities: at least one other epidemic between 1733 and 1739 whittled away at the neophytes, forcing the friars to replace the dead or the scattered Indians with new converts.[9] But for whatever reason, after 1726, the Franciscans in the Tarma district concentrated on expanding the radius of operations of the existing stations rather than on extending the boundaries of the frontier.[10]

Although the developing mission stations were the outstanding characteristic of the Tarma district, its lines of communication with the Highland helped to maintain stability within the field. For their day and age, the missions of the Tarma district were reasonably well

connected to the colonial society along the eastern rim of the Province of Tarma; and the precipitous drop between the two zones, while it did not vanish under eighteenth century technology, did not prevent vital circulation. Travel and transport were always exceedingly difficult, particularly for large expeditions. But travel the Spanish did, even when they spent the days grumbling, crawling through mud holes and along narrow passes, or walking behind stumbling pack animals laden with stores and tools for the missionaries.[11]

The principal route into the district was a trail, widened to accommodate pack animals, out of the town of Tarma (elevation: 3,060 meters). Following the river courses, the road ran through the towns of Acobamba and Palca, down the Palca River Valley, and finally into the Chanchamayo area and Quimirí (elevation: 777 meters). Over sixty kilometers in length and with a drop in elevation of about 2,300 meters, the trail took six to ten days to traverse.[12]

A secondary line branched off from the main route, and wound due east from Palca. This spur had been one of the major access routes into the Chanchamayo during the seventeenth century, and moved through Picoy, Maranioc, Pucará, and into the Chanchamayo Valley at its southern end. The so-called Vitoc route was neither

shorter nor easier than the Tarma road, but military expeditions sent against Juan Santos seemed to have used it on occasion for tactical reasons.[13]

Two additional routes, in the north, penetrated the ceja. One went from Huancabamba, through Oxapampa, and then into and down the Paucartambo to Cerro de la Sal. The second followed the Oxabamba River.[14] Frequently used during the seventeenth century, they were apparently not considered during the eighteenth.

Inside the district the friars and lay personnel relied heavily upon the rivers for lines of transport, especially the Chanchamayo and Perené rivers. Overland routes were few but those that did exist also followed the river courses, frequently skirting stretches where rapids and narrows limited navigability. Such was the case, for example, with the especially brutal sector of the Perené between its origin, at the Chanchamayo-Paucartambo juncture, and the station of Pichana, near Pampa Hermosa.[15] Along the Chanchamayo Valley, between the river and the ceja, there seem to have been a number of trails and paths crossing and crisscrossing, linking the several haciendas and the mission posts. Indeed, parts of the Chanchamayo River were spanned by bridges, although raft and canoe remained the principal and surest means of crossing.[16]

Unquestionably the major barrier to communication was not the ceja but the terrain below approximately 2,500 meters. With many of the stations stretched out along the Perené River, internal supply and transportation lines were extremely long. Between Quimiri, the terminus for the major Highland-selva route, and San Tadeo over one hundred kilometers met the traveler; and, even in the best of times, the journey from end to end absorbed both days and energy.[17]

The friars attempted to decentralize Tarma's linear transport route as early at 1720. They widened a trail between Sonomoro, the center of the Jauja missions, and Eneno.[18] This new connection not only tied the two districts together, but it also provided a line of communication from Andamarca, by way of Sonomoro, to the Upper Perené area. There is no indication, however, that the Spanish used the Sonomoro-Eneno trail with frequency.

Notwithstanding the problems of interior communications, the stations of the Tarma district showed an appreciable measure of stability and prosperity by 1742. Almost all of the stations had experienced, at a minimum, twenty years of uninterrupted operation, and native resistance no longer seemed to pose a threat to the continued stability of mission life. The Franciscans, on their part, were encouraged by the years of peace and

hopeful for future prospects. They had been able to hold their own in the Tarma mission area, and if they had not pushed ahead by leaps and bounds, neither had they been forced back onto the Highland rim.[19]

The Jauja Mission Circuit

The area wedged in the triangle formed by the Pango and Ene rivers and by the ceja below Andamarca constituted the second mission district of the Campa enterprise. Located northeast of the Province of Jauja, the several stations in the circuit were aptly referred to in mission records as the Jauja conversions. The stations operating on a permanent basis remained few in number and never matched those of the Tarma district, in spite of the fact that the circuit drew natives from a region about 1,500 square kilometers in area.

The Franciscans reëntered the territory in May of 1713, almost four years after Francisco de San José's historic expedition into the Chanchamayo. Fray Francisco, while he did not personally participate in the Jauna enterprise, drummed up enthusiasm for it in the town of Jauja. It was he who enlisted the two Franciscans who led the 1713 entrada, and it was he who secured the necessary materials and provisions for their advance.

Fray Francisco's two volunteers, Pedro Vaquero and Pedro de Ortiz de Tuesta, proved diligent and effective

workers. By July of 1713, after two frustrating months of native opposition, they finally were able to dedicate the Church in the station of Santa Cruz de Sonomoro. This first toehold rapidly widened and, largely through the influence and support of a local headman, the friars expanded their operations to two new posts: El Carmen and Nuestra Señora de la Purísima Concepción de Chavini.[20]

In contrast to the promising beginnings, the next thirteen years (1713-1726) passed with little expansive activity beyond the original nucleus. During the peak years of activity in the Tarma district, the friars in the Jauja circuit stayed put, exerting little effort to move out of the eastern headwaters of the Pangoa River. And within that territorial nucleus bound by the Masamari and Sonomoro rivers only Santa Cruz and Chavini survived, although not without difficulty. Along with the more usual problems of native restlessness and minor epidemics, the 1722-1723 plague which had festered in the stations of Tarma passed to the Jauja district with equal force. Of 733 Indians under the bell of Santa Cruz de Sonomoro before the epidemic, only 210 survived; Chavini, in a poorer location than Sonomoro, fell from 347 to 90.[21]

On one occasion in 1723, the friars did move northward, up the Pangoa River to the Perené; and, at

the point of land formed by the two rivers, they attempted to set up a new mission post, Jesús María. Under the direction of Fernando de San José, one of the original companions of Fray Francisco, the clerics experienced moderate success during the first months. Indeed, after the baptism of a local curaca named Fernando Torote, the station's future seem assured. But as later events suggested, Torote's conversion had been a tactical move and not a spiritual decision. Apparently Torote entertained little affection for the friars, and he had submitted to baptism only to gain their confidence. Behind the scenes and out of earshot of the Spanish, Torote helped to organize a rather Machiavellian plot, with a group of Piro Indians from the Tambo River, which led to the assassination of Fray Fernando, three other friars, and twenty Campa neophytes. After the 1724 death of the friars and their Indian companions, the remaining natives in Jesús María dispersed and the post fell back into the forest.[22]

As rapidly as the 1713 expansion had halted, the bleak years between 1713 and 1726 also came to an end. Around 1727 the Jauja friars moved back into the Lower Perené area, and there, between the Pangoa and the Ene, they finally began to dig in.

At the head of this new push into the north was a

young Frenchman turned Hispanophile turned Franciscan: Juan Bautista de la Marca. La Marca had come to Peru as a layman in the entourage of a Spanish engineer. Shortly after his arrival he left science for the Church, entering the Franciscan Order; and, after his final vows in 1726, his superiors sent him to the frontier post of Santa Cruz de Sonomoro. There he interned for a year while he learned the Campa language and studied-in-action, so to speak, the techniques of a frontier cleric. His lessons he learned well. In 1727 Fray Francisco ordered him north into the Lower Perené area, where he stayed until his death in 1735.[23]

La Marca's major objective in the north of the district was to secure the juncture of the Ene and Perené rivers. This assignment he failed to carry out. The spot, although militarily strategic, proved particularly debilitating to the health of both the Spanish and the Indians; and, almost immediately after setting the limits of the post of San Fermín, La Marca abandoned it. He did not abandon the northern area, however, and by 1730 two stations hung, although precariously, onto life: San Antonio de Catalipango and a partially restored Jesús María.[24]

At this particular moment, sometime between 1727 and 1730, expansive prospects in the northern area of

the Jauja circuit burst wide open. La Marca, preoccupied with Jesús María and Catalipango and for some reason having fallen spiritual heir to the post of San Tadeo as well, learned about the Gran Pajonal from his Indian charges. With the Gran Pajonal now in focus on the missionary horizon, the slightly lethargic, linear expansion of the Jauja district nervously fragmented. Between 1733 and 1736, the friars--La Marca, Espíritu Santo, Manuel Bajo, Cristóbal Pancheco, to name but a few--in the circuit almost neurotically shot off into a number of topohagiographic explorations not only into the Pajonal, but down the Tambo River as well.

The six year period for the Jauja circuit proper was unfortunate, for it drained the district of its already insufficient missionary clergy. Except for an abortive attempt in 1736 to found a mission station, Santa Bárbara de Parica, some distance southeast of Sonomoro, Franciscan activity bled northward out of the district.[25] Only Sonomoro and possibly Chavini maintained a significant staff. Jesús María and Catalipango became almost stepping stones to the lands beyond, and their Indians were used to help the Spaniards in that drive.

In March of 1737 some of the expansive euphoria momentarily shattered against a native revolt which aimed at expelling the Spaniards from the Jauja district.

Ignacio Torote, the curaca of Catalipango and the son of Fernando Torote, led a band of some twenty Indian malcontents against Catalipango, killing one Negro, four Indians, and a Franciscan lay brother (the only Spaniard in the station) and burning the church and convent. He then moved to Sonomoro, where several of the Franciscans, including Espíritu Santo and Manuel Bajo, had gathered to discuss plans for a new expedition to the Upper Ucayali River. Catching the entire station by surprise, the rebels added four Franciscans and three Indians to the list of dead. Although a militia formed of several Highland natives from Comas was able to halt Torote's band from sacking Sonomoro, they were unable to save Catalipango from total destruction. Moreover, seven months later, in November of the same year, Spanish troops arrived in the area to capture Torote and to help reconstitute some of the missions. They failed to even find Torote, who escaped through Jesús María into the land of the Piro Indians along the Tambo River, and only added to mission problems by draining the warehouses of food surpluses.[26]

Ironically, in spite of the destruction which came in Torote's wake, mission depression was short-lived. After 1737, interest in the Tambo and Ucayali regions grew even more intense. With the arrival of a new group

of missionaries from Spain, the friars in the Jauja circuit turned for a second time to the Tambo and Ucayali, and began to lay plans for the Christianization of the Piro and Conibo Indians.[27]

By 1742 the Franciscans had been able to restore a semblance of order to the Jauja district. Sonomoro was held by a newly constructed fort as well as a resident missionary staff, and its Indians seemed loyal to the Franciscans and their allies. Catalipango had been reëstablished, and, together with Jesús María, precariously held the northern limit of the Jauja circuit for the Church and State. But in comparison to the Tarma district, progress seemed more nominal than real, and the friars seemed more interested in territorial expansion than in mission consolidation. Only Sonomoro and Chavini of the four mission posts had managed to survive uninterrupted since their foundation. The northern sector of the district continued to teeter on the brink of failure, serving primarily as a springboard into the Gran Pajonal and, hopefully, for the Tambo and Ucayali as well.

Settlement of the Gran Pajonal

The Gran Pajonal constituted a distinct geographical zone within the central montãna. A plateau-like structure

of scattered grasslands, it rose, at an elevation of between 1,200 to 1,800 meters, in the triangle formed by the Perené, Tambo, and Ucayali rivers. Because of its geographical isolation from the river lowlands to the south, the region had remained virgin territory until the final years of the 1720's. Only when the Franciscans led by Juan de la Marca reached the Lower Perené River did they learn of the missionary potential of its vast terrain.

Once the Franciscans entered the Pajonal, however, they expanded rapidly. Within six years mission foundations scattered throughout the region, and by 1739 the pacification of the natives had seemed a fait accompli. Ten mission foundations with almost 2,000 neophytes set the Gran Pajonal apart from the two mission districts of Tarma and Jauja, where expansion had been slower and less visibly productive.[28]

Beyond mere numbers, the enterprise of the Gran Pajonal was equally unique in other respects. It had begun not as an independent advance from the Highlands, but as an appendix to missionary activity along the Perené River. The bearers of European culture were not, in the main, Franciscan missionaries, but Indian neophytes, Negroes, and other non-European elements. Finally, even after its apparent pacification, the area

never became an autonomous mission district for administrative purposes, but remained dependent on the circuits of Tarma and, especially, Jauja for material and human support. In spite of that dependence, however, it was after 1733 the most vitally expansive of the three areas.

Initial expansion into the area began around 1728 and lasted until 1733. Although Juan de la Marca had learned about the existence of the Gran Pajonal shortly after his arrival at the Lower Perené, he was too preoccupied with the burdens of his original assignments to personally enter the region. In his stead he sent several Indian neophytes from San Tadeo, including the local curaca Quiriña. Shortly afterwards, the stand-ins for the Franciscan returned to San Tadeo with two Pajonal headmen and a contingent of about seventy other Indians. But within a matter of days after their arrival at the Perené station sixty-nine of the emissaries had died of hemorrhages. Deeply concerned and convinced that the native deaths were due to the altitudinal differences between San Tadeo and the Gran Pajonal, La Marca sent the remaining natives back into the Pajonal, having first secured their word that they would begin to congregate several nuclear families into parcialidades, or community units which would serve as the basis for a mission station. To oversee the work, La Marca also sent several



Fig. 4.--Mission Foundations in the Gran Pajonal (ca. 1742)

Campa neophytes from San Tadeo.[29]

La Marca apparently had every intention of entering the Pajonal close on the heels of his auxiliary forces. Unfortunately, other work plus his own ill health forced the cleric to postpone his plans. In the meantime, he continued to maintain close contacts with the Indians of the region, met periodically with some of the headmen in the Perené stations, and even sent a lay brother, Miguel de Jesús, up into the area to report on local progress.[30]

It was not until 16 April 1733 that La Marca finally left San Tadeo with some twenty-five Indians and a military escort to tackle the new mission field in person. When he arrived in the Pajonal he found that the missionary auxiliaries had effectively laid the roots for the Franciscan advance. In the southern sector of the Pajonal below the Unini River, the Perené neophytes and several Campa headmen had formed a number of parcialidades, some already complete with church and convent and cultivated fields.

For the next two months until about the middle of June, La Marca systematically walked the entire southern sector, recording in detail the form and progress of the new frontier. He baptized children, preached to the adults, laid plans for future expansion, distributed

iron tools, and set up one or two additional posts. When he left the Pajonal there were five mission centers in the region: Aporoquiaqui, Tampianique, Sabirosqui, Corintoni, and Quisopango. Together, 887 Campa (including some 290 families) were reduced, with 288 baptized. Finally, to oversee future advance, he once again assigned several neophytes from the Perené area (from San Tadeo, Jesús María, Catalipango) to the new foundations to act as teachers and to instruct the Pajonal Campa in the Christian doctrine.[31]

Between 1733 and 1736 two other Franciscan expeditions entered the Pajonal. The first one was headed by Alonso de Espíritu Santo, Manuel Bajo, and Cristóbal Pacheco. Together with Mateo de Assia, the curaca of Eneno, and other armed neophytes, these three pioneers left in their wake six new mission foundations staggered between the Chicosa River, in the north, and the Unini River, in the south: Tihuanasqui, Cuichaqui, Caretegui, Capotegui, Pirintoki, and Camarosqui.[32] In 1736 Alonso de Espíritu Santo returned to the Pajonal, entering the region by way of the Chicosa River. As in his first entrada, Espíritu Santo baptized many of the natives, encouraged congregation, and, in general, checked on the progress of the Franciscan auxiliaries.[33]

After 1733 the friars attempted to maintain at least a

skeleton staff of Franciscan priests in the Pajonal. There were, however, never more than three friars in the region at any one time, and the enterprise continued as a monument to the dedication and allegiance of the native auxiliaries. By 1742 there were some fifteen rancherías in the district in addition to ten mission foundations--a real tour de force carried out in under fifteen years by recent converts to Christianity.[34]

The Mission Station in Form and Design

The mission post was both an outpost and agent of Hispanic expansion. Its function was to hold the front line of Spanish advance, to civilize the savage frontier, and to prepare the way for further colonization. It also emerged as the most characteristic enclave of Spanish life within the Campa domain and as a vestibule, so to speak, to colonial Peru. Established, thus, to serve the ends of conquest, the station in form and design reflected the urban orientation of the Spanish and their horror of random community organization.

The mission stations throughout the Campa frontier were similar in layout, differing not in concept but in degree of elaboration. The ground plan followed the grid pattern which colonial legislation had recommended for new foundations: a central plaza or square from which radiated straight streets. The houses of the

congregated Indians were laid out in an orderly pattern in the blocks formed by the radiating streets, while the church and mission house and additional workshops surrounded the central quadrangle.[35]

At variance with the norm were the newer mission posts. Because the degree of refinement depended on the length of contact, stations such as San Antonio de Eneno, Sonomoro, and Quimirí, by the 1730's, had evolved along the lines suggested in legislation.[36] In contrast, the posts in the Gran Pajonal appeared less structured and were frequently little removed from the more random arrangement typical of the traditional native settlements, with the church and mission house simply built on the edge of an existing native site. Yet these differences between the two areas were less the result of changing conceptions among the friars than of temporary expediency. As pacification advanced in the Gran Pajonal, so apparently did the tendency toward more structured mission posts.[37]

Within the patterned layout of the mission station, the church structure dominated the other architectural features. As a general rule, that structure was primitively constructed, rectangular in shape and built of wood and thatching.[38] There were exceptions. During the first stages of congregation, portable altars substituted for the more permanent structures.[39] At the

other extreme, the church in Quimirí, by 1724, had adobe walls plastered with mud, whitewashed both inside and out, and buttressed with caoba wood. A rather stately structure, eighty-four feet long and thirty-four feet wide, it had a center nave and two side aisles, several altars in addition to the principal one, and boasted a choir and sacristy.[40]

What truly called attention to the churches was not their form but their rich variety of moveable ornaments, vestments, and altar furniture. Paintings with religious themes and copper engravings; lamps and candlesticks; communion tables, some of alabaster from Huamanga; crucifixes of ivory, wood, and metal; images and figurines in a myriad of shapes, materials, and forms--decorated and colored; cloths, palls, corporales, frontales, and altar carpets; chalices, patens, chrismatories, reliquaries, wafer boxes, cruets; silver and gilded crowns, diadems, and orbs; gold and silver cases and leather covered chests; bronze, silver, and cast iron bells for the altars and the bell towers; plus the more traditional Eucharist garments, such as the chasubles and maniples, along with a variety of albas, surplices, amices, and girdles.[41]

Next to the church, and completing the ceremonial complex, rose the convent or mission house. A large multiple purpose structure, also built in the Campa

style, it served as the residence of the friars, as a boarding school (colegio) for the male children, as a dormitory for the orphans, and as a center where the clerics could gather to exchange ideas and lay tactics for expansion. In comparison to the church, its adornments were as humble as its construction with wooden tables, chairs, trunks, and similar utilitarian items.

The library was the one outstanding possession of the mission house. In an age where volumes were still somewhat scarce, the collections which the Order brought to the central montaña were moderately impressive. Copies of the Bible and books on theology were mixed with histories, biographies of saints, and ecclesiastical vocabularies. The station at Cerro de la Sal had twenty-nine separate volumes, including a work by Fray Luis de Granada, a biography of San Juan de Dios, a copy of the Concilio tridentino, several volumes of sermons, a brevario, and a couple of missals. Pichana had seventeen books; Eneno, twenty-four; and Quimirí, one of the older stations, rose to lead with ninety-two.[42]

Several of the stations had additional buildings. Not uncommon were warehouses for storing the iron implements and food surpluses. Kitchens might occasionally have formed separate units. In addition, many posts contained strongholds which were fortified, as in the

case of San Antonio, with cannons or small arms.[43] But other than the church and convent and the native houses, the only other common feature of the mission stations were the fields which circumscribed the settlements. Regardless of size or age, each station had its fields, planted and cared for by the Indian neophytes.

The mission station was not the only patterned settlement on the Campa frontier. In the area around the post spread other community units, called rancherías, which consisted of several congregated nuclear families under the more or less nominal control of the Franciscans. The rancherías, however, were exclusively resident sites with domestic houses and fields but without the ceremonial complex of church and mission house. Thus, for religious training and indoctrination, the members of the rancherías periodically came into the central mission station.[44]

Beyond the spatial arrangements, the precise relationship between ranchería and station remains, at this point, problematic. For various reasons the actual mission post, especially outside of the Pajonal, tended to remain small, with a maximum of between 200 to 300 inhabitants. The spread of disease was one factor which affected size. In addition, dependence on shifting cultivation must have hampered the development of more populous stations, while the lack of mission personnel

could also have contributed to smaller posts. As a possible result of these and other similar factors, the rancherías may well have held or received the overflow population of particular stations. When, for example, the population of a station passed its carrying capacity, the friars could have settled the excess in rancherías. In such a case, the new congregations would have been merely offshoots of the stations--a means of absorbing those whom the stations could not physically support, but whom the friars felt they could serve and instruct.

On the other hand, the rancherías might have represented an advanced stage of assimilation: congregated nuclear families who had passed through the station, received a modicum of training, and then moved into the rancherías after baptism. In this second case, the rancherías would have been communities of neophytes, settled outside of the post to make room for incoming natives.[45]

The population profiles of several of the stations offer some supportive evidence for both alternatives. The 1724 census for Cerro de la Sal, for example, records a total of eighty-four residents with the following distribution:

Family Units	14 (28 Indians)
Single Men	12
Male Children	22
Widows and Single Females	10
Female Children	12

Of the total population, over fifty individuals (about seventy-five per cent) fall into one of two categories: either they are dependent elements of the mission society (widows, children, orphans, single females) or they serve the church or friars in some subordinate capacity (colegiales, Highland Christians).[46] Such a weighted distribution, typical of other stations as well, leads to a logical suggestion that the stations were by social function more of a training center and refuge than a permanent resident site for all of the active mission population.

Santa Rosa de Ocopa: A Footnote to Expansion

At least in the Campa field, San Francisco de San José's design for mission advance proved adequate. Moving into Campa territory from two Highland points, his missionary staff established two chains of mission posts which by the early 1730's had anchored the Spanish, albeit precariously, at the juncture of the Perené and Ene rivers. Within another decade they had moved into the Gran Pajonal, and by 1742 there were some twenty operative centers of Hispano-Christian culture among the Campa.

Progress within the Campa field was not the only concern of Fray Francisco. He had entered Peru not only to attend to the Campa, but also to revitalize all the

Franciscan missions and to boost the waning enthusiasm of the friars for the tasks of evangelization. In concrete terms, the assignment involved the central montaña, as well as the mission areas of fieles along the Highland rim--that is, those mission districts in Peru which the Franciscan had not yet turned over to the Secular Clergy.

As the Order had discovered in New Spain, the apostolic college provided the more viable institutional framework for such a missionary resurgence. The college structure facilitated recruitment, offered the means for specialized training, and provided a centralized control over missionary activity. Its effect was to better prepare and direct the friars in their missionary undertakings. It was not at all unusual that Fray Francisco soon decided to transfer the mission college, as he had seen it in operation in New Spain, to the Peruvian frontier, and to use its structure as the framework for his own activity.

The mission college was the ideal toward which Fray Francisco and his missionaries strove, but the ideal proved forever illusive. Periodically the friars petitioned the crown for permission to establish an apostolic college; with equal frequency, the crown left the petitions unanswered.[47] Yet amid the petitions the friars did not lie dormant. If they could not have the moon,

they could at least find a place which would serve as an administrative center for the frontier and as a kind of operations center in the rear.

Even this second objective met obstacles, although in this case the responsibility for delay fell upon Fray Francisco and not upon the crown. When Jiménez had first entered the montaña in 1709, the Province of the Twelve Apostles had given him a convent at Huarás for use as a mission center. Fray Francisco did not refuse the offer, but he felt that because of its distance from the field it would prove an impractical base of operations.[48] Instead, he began to search for other arrangements more suitable for his own designs. Finally, in one of his travels, he came across the church and convent of Santa Rosa de Ocopa (at 4,500 meters in elevation), in the Valley of Jauja just north of Concepción. The location he found ideal, and he requested that the facilities be ceded to him.

In the fall of 1724 the Province of the Twelve Apostles responded favorably to the request. The Franciscan missionaries at last had their center. But the facilities at Ocopa were limited to one chapel, a convent with one narrow cell, and a small kitchen and were hardly ample for the mission staff. To rectify the physical limitations, Fray Francisco asked the viceroy

for a license to expand the original construction. The viceregal authorities had no opposition to granting the license, but, because of the difficult financial situation in the Empire at large, neither did they want to underwrite the improvements. Fray Francisco, however, guaranteed the viceroy that he would raise the necessary funds from private donation. Thus assured, the Marqués de Villa García relented to the request.[49]

Over the course of the next eight years Ocopa expanded to eight cells, a refectory, a small infirmary, and other similar offices. By 1732, with the physical plant almost completed, the Province of the Twelve Apostles, probably anxious to divest itself of direct responsibility for the frontier missions, officially assigned the central montaña to Ocopa.[50] From that year, Santa Rosa became the hub of Franciscan missionary operations for the entire central frontier, including the missions among the fieles of the Highland rim, the three circuits of the Campa field, and the Huánuco mission district among the Amuesha. Although it did not enjoy any of the special privileges of the apostolic college, it was equipped to function as a training center for all missionaries assigned to its jurisdiction. It also became the point from which all missionaries were sent out into the field and a retreat to which the weary or sick could

return for needed attention.

Santa Rosa de Ocopa survived the fall of the Campa enterprise; and, although after 1753 its community did not reënter the land of the Campa, it held on to an expanding area which stretched north to Cajamarquilla. Finally, in 1758, Ocopa received official approbation as a Collegium de Propaganda Fide and joined the growing list of Franciscan mission colleges.[51] With a new status, Ocopa and its community of missionaries expanded even more their horizons, giving root to other mission colleges in Bolivia and Chile. Into those later years, however, is woven yet another story related only marginally to the Campa frontier.

CHAPTER V

FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE FRANCISCAN MISSION: PROBLEMS AND FEATURES

Franciscan Strength

To civilize the elusive savage, the Franciscans needed a substantial number of personnel, with an enthusiasm for conversion, who would bring the Campa into the Spanish fold. The Order hoped to fill a large part of that need from its own ranks: two clerics were to be assigned to each operative station in addition to a number of reservists at Ocopa and in the field.[1] In better times and in other frontier regions the Franciscans did, indeed, approach the ideal. Unfortunately, the number of friars on the Campa frontier was always disturbingly inadequate.

During the entire contact period not more than one hundred Franciscans entered their names on the mission roster.[2] Moreover, for any given period, the number of clerics in the field, administering to the Campa, seldom exceeded twenty. At the very beginning of the advance there were sixteen friars in the Tarma and Jauja circuits.[3] Notwithstanding the fact that the frontier expanded after that initial beachhead, the number of

operants remained relatively constant. If anything, the 1730's even saw a slight decrease in the size of the resident staff. On the eve of the Juan Santos uprising, with the Franciscans spread from the Chanchamayo and through the Gran Pajonal, there were probably not many more than fifteen friars in a mission field over three times as large as the 1713 one.[4]

The widening gap between number of operants and number of stations was a basic handicap to Franciscan progress. Among other consequences, it retarded the consolidation of territorial gains and forced the friars to spread themselves thin. In the more successful frontier regions in New Spain, the Order characteristically assigned two friars to a single station: one took charge of internal and spiritual affairs, and the other oversaw the external and economic progress of the mission center. On the Campa frontier, the Order was simply unable to stabilize such a neat division of labor. In the stations of the Tarma circuit conditions were apparently the more favorable, frequently with one resident friar in each post. The Jauja conversions in contrast were not as well serviced, although Sonomoro seemed to have maintained two clerics while the other posts shared a highly mobile, itinerate staff. In the Gran Pajonal, however, conditions were abominable and, as late as 1739, there were just

three friars--Pedro Dominguez, Francisco Gazo, and José Cabanes--for the ten mission settlements.[5]

Complicating the matter was a fairly rapid turnover of missionaries. While it is difficult to determine the average length of tenure, only Francisco de San José survived longer than twenty-six years; a number of the more successful clerics barely lasted five. A major cause of the personnel displacements was localized native resistance. Although the mission Indians remained relatively passive, the cutting edge of the frontier beyond the pale of settlement at times provoked open hostilities. These localized incidents, while not frequent, were costly. Before 1730 at least seven friars fell through ambush or virtual assassination.[6] In the decades between 1730 and 1750, some eighteen Franciscans lost their lives at the hands of the Campa.[7] Ignacio Torote and his band, for example, killed five friars in 1737 alone. Among them were Manuel Bajo and Alonso de Espíritu Santo--two clerics who had tackled the herculean barriers of the Gran Pajonal and had succeeded in surmounting many of them. After 1742 Juan Santos and his followers cut even deeper into the mission staff by killing at least a dozen missionaries.

In addition to the natives, the environment of the tropical forest took its toll. Although most of the

friars seemed to have survived the hardships of the tropical climate, many found that their natural energies ebbed more rapidly in the montaña than in the sierra, and that periodic illnesses left them drained of resolve or temporarily incapacitated. As a consequence, all the mission staff was not always in physical condition to shoulder a normal share of the work.

When the natives and the environment were not raising havoc, the Franciscans took over and, through personnel rotations and job transfers, helped to cut away at the mission strength. The Campa field, it must be remembered, was only part of the Order's missionary enterprises. On occasion, when the needs in the non-Campa posts were particularly pressing, friars were moved from the Campa field into other regions. There were, moreover, administrative positions to be filled and the friars in the Tarma and Jauja circuits not infrequently left their posts to fill those vacancies. For example Joaquín Dutari left the Tarma district to take the post of liaison officer between Ocopa and Spain, while others moved from the field to the post of Commissary of Missions.

The reinforcements which dribbled into the Campa territory were never significantly numerous to counter personnel displacements and, at the same time, to augment

significantly the size of the field staff. By and large, they only replenished the ranks which Indian insurrection, the natural environment, and occasional transfers shrunk.

The Campa enterprise needed expanded, not replenished, ranks. But the whole program of personnel recruitment ran into maddening obstacles. On one hand, the Franciscan monasteries in Peru, still engaged in the dissensions and social conflicts of the capital and still underpopulated, could furnish few clerics for service on the frontier. When Fray Francisco first entered the Chanchamayo Valley, the Province of the Twelve Apostles had supplied him with six priests; later on it sanctioned the transfer of an occasional friar from the Highland monasteries. But the forces recruited in Peru were never, nor did they promise to be, substantial; and, as a consequence, the missionaries had to turn to the convents in Spain.

If conditions in Peru dampened the prospects for recruitment, the situation in Spain was not much better. Not that the crown lacked concern for the needs of the frontier. Almost immediately after the first stations in the field were established, Fray Francisco dispatched an urgent request to Madrid. His friars, he wrote, were "crucifying" him for more men; he needed, at a minimum, ten or twelve reinforcements to handle the growing burdens of expansion.[8] The Consejo de Indias acted

reasonably soon, and, on 16 January 1715, it assigned twelve men to the central frontier.[9] But between the date of authorization and the moment when the Spanish missionaries actually entered the field spread a long nineteen years. Transport difficulties and financial shortages, both of which were occasioned by the War of Succession and its turbulent aftermath, delayed the departure of the friars from the Peninsula. When they finally left in 1730, additional delays kept them away from the Campa until 1734. Even then, only about six of the twelve entered the field: two had failed to survive the hardships of the transatlantic crossing; several more were assigned to the Huánuco district; and some remained at Santa Rosa de Ocopa in the Valley of Jauja.[10]

Well before the first Spanish recruitments arrived in Peru, Fray Francisco had realized that the central frontier would need more than an even dozen if it hoped to maintain even a skeleton staff. Hence, in spite of the snags which were delaying the fulfillment of his first request, he petitioned the crown, in 1725, for a second group of reinforcements--twenty or thirty Spanish missionaries, in addition to the first twelve.[11] This second petition met with a colder reception from the king and it was not until 1734, a year after La Marca's

expedition into the Gran Pajonal, when Philip V finally dispatched a cédula authorizing the new request.[12]

Apparently the glowing reports about the Gran Pajonal, reports which Fray Francisco and Juan de La Marca had sent to Madrid, finally convinced the crown to act on Fray Francisco's 1725 petition. The two frontiersmen, desperately short of resources, embellished their description of the newly discovered territory, overemphasizing its material wealth, and suggesting that it was the natural bridge to the Amazon River and the world beyond. "It seems," wrote the King, "that the hour to convert the natives of that district has finally arrived."[13] And to speed the process, he promised some twenty new missionaries for the central frontier as a gesture of his new found faith in frontier prospects.

Once the crown had acted, the delays which prolonged the departure of the first missionary contingent did not detain the second. Both government finances and communication with the New World had improved; and the new recruits were whisked to Peru and to Santa Rosa de Ocopa under the personal escort of Fray Joaquín Dutari. By 1739, a number of those reinforcements--how many is not clear, perhaps a dozen--had definitely entered the Campa field.[14]

The rise of Juan Santos did not curtail Franciscan efforts to recruit missionaries in the Peninsula. The

obligations of the Order in other mission fields and the desire to drive Juan Santos out of the Campa districts only emphasized the need for additional friars. In 1744 the new Commissary of Missions, Fray Manuel Albarrán, requested thirty more missionaries; by the late 1740's Fray José de San Antonio, had upped the ante to seventy, and even traveled to Spain to personally lay his case before the court. This final petition brought limited results, and in 1752 a group of Franciscans arrived at Ocopa. By this time, however, prospects in the Campa field were dismal, and the mission circuits of Tarma and Jauja, for all practical purposes, were closed to the missionaries. In these circumstances, the Franciscans at Ocopa turned northward with the new reinforcements and began to lay plans for the conversions of Cajamarquilla.[15] The third Spanish contingent had, quite simply, arrived too late to benefit the Campa enterprise, for Juan Santos had acted before the crown.

Substitutes and Auxiliaries

With the support capability of the Order severely limited in spite of the active attempts at recruitment, the Franciscans in the Campa enterprise had to make suitable adjustments. Fortunately, they were able to compensate partially for the deficiencies within their ranks by relying on non-Europeans, particularly Negroes

and Indians. Each of the two groups enabled the friars to increase their effectiveness out of proportion to their actual numbers.

The Order had originally brought Negroes into the central montaña missions for their muscle and not their wits: the Africans were to perform the drudge work in the fields and to teach the Indian to use the plough and to care for the sheep and cattle.[16] From this subservient position, however, the blacks soon advanced in stature and in importance, and as early as 1721 their functions had expanded to such a point that they were engaged in a variety of tasks essential to the defense, provisioning, and maintenance of the Franciscan advance. They helped to open lines of communication; administered punishment to delinquent natives; accompanied the friars into the field outside of the mission posts, aiding in exploration and pacification; and became skilled artisans. "The Negro slave became," in the words of Antonine Tibesar, "the factotum of the missions--a responsibility which he discharged with loyality and efficiency and to the satisfaction of the friars."[17]

Socially the Negro stood between the Franciscan and the Campa. At least one black, Fray Francisco Javier de Jesús, wore the robes of Saint Francis--an honor categorically denied to the Indian. Moreover, the Franciscans

armed the Negroes for use as either their personal bodyguards or as an ad hoc defense unit against native restlessness. On occasion the blacks were more aggressive: during the 1737 Torote uprising, a Negro, Antonio Gatica, led a band of converts, mestizos, and other Negroes against the rebels and managed to stave off in the offensive action any threat against the missions along the Perené River. The Africans also acted as intermediaries between the friar and the Campa, and apparently served as go-betweens in some of the trading between cleric and native.[18] At other times they served as temporary custodians of several of the mission posts in the absence of a bonafide Franciscan.

How many Negroes were present in the Campa field is difficult to determine. The friars hoped to maintain at least one black at each mission station and it is highly possible that in the Tarma and Jauja conversions they realized their objective. Moreover, those who served the Campa enterprise were, no doubt, more permanent than the friars, and, on occasion, they even intermarried with the Indians. As a case in point, Antonio Gatica, the mission hero of 1737, married the sister of a Campa headman.[19] Thus, in both number and permanence, the Negro was a prime agent and auxiliary of the Franciscan.

While Franciscan use of the African in the central

montaña was somewhat innovative, their employment of the Indian neophyte was standard practice throughout the New World. On the Campa frontier and within the mission foundation, natives who proved particularly adept or quick--or, quite frequently, those who had received more intensive training--were used as intermediaries in instructing the other Indians. It was a form of deputized instruction which relied heavily on the children and younger male members of Campa society.

Besides their pedagogical functions, the Indians were also encouraged to care for the mission fields, to help maintain trails and bridges, and to aid in the preservation of order and the administration of justice. Outside of the station, neophytes and particularly the colegiales (young males under the tutorial care of the friars) accompanied the Franciscans in their explorations: they guided the friars through the forest, helped smooth initial contact with other Campa, and served as visible examples to the uncongregated native of the positive benefits of Hispano-Christian living.[20] Intermittently, mission Indians even preceded the friar into the wilderness and set the stage for the later entrance of the European. In the Gran Pajonal, the Franciscans also used the colegiales from the stations along the Perené River as post administrators and teachers in the absence of a

Franciscan cleric, no doubt a common practice in other areas as well.[21]

For the most part the Franciscans used Campa Indians, although others played an occasional role. During the first years of the mission enterprise, particularly in the Tarma conversions, Christian natives from the Highland and some mestizos assisted the friars in several ways. Fray Francisco, for example, used Highland elements to help hold and construct the mission post at Quimiri.[22] By 1724 mission records for that same station registered some thirty-seven serranos with, due to a recent epidemic, only ninety-seven Campa.[23] As late as 1730 the ratio had improved considerably, but the Highland Indians still accounted for approximately twenty percent of the station's population: one hundred and thirty-two Campa and thirty-six serranos.[24] Unquestionably the continued presence of the serranos was indicative of their usefulness. They served as examples in Christian living, while those who had special manual skills practiced their trade and, in the process, aided in teaching the Campa such specialized economic activities as mule driving, iron work, and carpentry.[25]

In contrast to the Highland Indians, the presence of other forest tribes in Campa mission territory was rare. Manuel Biedma, in the seventeenth century, suggested the use of the "panatahuas" (or Piros) from the

Upper Huallaga River for cargo bearers, soldiers, and ferrymen.[26] Nothing came of the plan, however, and the eighteenth century Franciscans made no effort to revive it. The Amuesha Indians, on the other hand, filtered in and out of the mission posts of the Tarma circuit, and even constituted a part of the total population of several of the centers.[27] But the friars did not purposely use the Amuesha to control or convert the Campa. Amuesha presence in the Campa field was a natural consequence of the traditional cultural and geographical proximity of the two tribes and not of Franciscan design.

Colonial Migrants To The Frontier

Neither by plan nor in practice did the Franciscans systematically attempt to separate their Indian charges from all contact with other Europeans. Quite the opposite. On the Campa frontier, the missionaries encouraged the participation of nonclerical segments of the Spanish population. The friars coöperated with the montaña settlers, proposed government sponsored settlement programs, and pleaded for military foundations. Underlying the Franciscans' permissive attitude toward civilian and military expansion into Campa heartland was an implicit belief in the usefulness of secular elements in achieving growth changes in indigenous society. Soldiers and

colonists would not only help the missionaries to hold the frontier, but they would also help the friars to correct primitive anarchy through the discipline of rational progress. Both groups could be valuable auxiliaries in the conquest and acculturation of the Campa.

In spite of the Franciscan attitude toward military participation in the process of cultural expansion, soldiers never became a fixture on the Campa frontier. With the sole exception of a garrison in the fort of Santiago at Sonomoro, organized military contingents remained stationed in the Highland provinces of Tarma and Jauja and were dispatched to the Campa field only to defend the missions against overt Indian rebellions (such as the 1737 Torote uprising); to help, in the initial stages of contact, with construction; or to serve the friars as defensive escorts during their exploratory expeditions into unchartered territory. There is no indication that professional troops were ever quartered in or near mission stations as standard operating procedure, nor that the military typically intervened for ends other than strictly defensive ones.

These circumstances contrasted sharply with the situation on the northern borderlands of New Spain. In northern Mexico, the garrisoned fort was a distinctive institution of the Spanish frontier community. It was

characteristically staffed by some sixty soldiers plus their families, servants, and a collection of hangers-on. In addition to the defensive function of the fort, the soldiers whom it housed carried out punitive expeditions against Indians; helped in the daily administration of the mission station; served as mail carriers; and acted as escorts, police, and guards for both the missionary and the lay pioneer.[28]

On the Campa frontier the garrisoned presidio was noted more for its absence. In 1737, after almost thirty years of missionary activity, the Spanish constructed their first fort at the station of Santa Cruz de Sonomoro, in the Jauja conversions. The Indian uprising led by Ignacio Torote, which only months before had killed several friars at Sonomoro, graphically demonstrated the need for a military foundation within the central montaña; and Lima generously responded with four artillery pieces (catapults) together with fifteen soldiers.[29] Yet, the Santiago presidio was a poor imitation of the model in New Spain. No small community of wives, children, and servants clustered around the solitary soldiers. Even Lima ignored the fort after its foundation, and barely concerned itself with its provisioning and maintenance. By 1751, when Juan Santos and his cadre turned to the Pangoa area, conditions in the fort were

so deplorable that the slightly bedraggled soldiers abandoned their posts and fled to Andamarca without so much as firing a shot.[30]

The military situation on the frontier was not indicative of Franciscan interest. No doubt to the consternation of the government officials, the Order bombarded the crown and its representatives with a chain of assorted appeals. Through all of the requests ran a single theme: the friars wanted soldiers in the field and forts to house them.

Many of the individual requests for military foundations were quite specific, calling for various presidios at strategic positions within Campa territory. In addition to the fort at Sonomoro, which was a key post in the Jauja conversions, the Franciscans wanted seven other permanent garrisons: one near or at Cerro de la Sal, with fifty soldiers to guard the area and to control Indian mining of the salt; a fort at the beginning and end of each of the principal routes into the Tarma conversions, to protect the Highland-montaña lines of communication; a presidio at the junction of the Ene and Perené rivers, to monitor Indian movement along the two waterways; and a garrison in the Gran Pajonal, for the strategic defense of that newly discovered territory.[31] Besides the tactical function of the presidios, the friars

felt that the military foundations could serve also as temporary retreats for them and their Campa neophytes in times of native rebellion.[32]

The Franciscans tried to promote military permanency in the field by suggesting to the crown that the families of the soldiers, whether they were Spanish, Indian, or mestizo, be allowed to settle within the forts.[33] They also requested that the troops which served the Campa frontier be removed from the control of the corregidores of the Highland towns of Tarma and Jauja. Under the system of troop control which operated in the central montaña, military forces were normally dispatched to the Campa frontier at the discretion and expense of the corregidor of either Tarma or Jauja, depending on the mission circuit which needed the support. But the Franciscans found the arrangement unsatisfactory for they felt that the provincial officials were overly prudent in meeting local needs beyond the Andes. As an alternative, they wanted the crown to appoint for each of the two conversions a Gobernador y capitán de guerra who, subject only to the viceroy or the Audiencia of Lima, would deal exclusively with the military needs of the mission field under their auspices.[34]

Almost without exception, the crown ignored all requests from the central frontier for administrative

reform and increased military assistance. Instead of acting on the petitions, Madrid, on occasion, referred them to the Peruvian viceroy, with the instruction that he examine "conditions" to see if the requests were reasonable and worthy.[35] The Lima government, on its part, apparently did not find conditions worthy for it never actively attempted to alter the status quo. Only after 1742 did Lima venture to extend military power into Campa territory on a permanent basis. The one obvious exception, the Santiago presidio, proved abortive and, indeed, never enjoyed the enthusiastic support of anyone save the friars.

If the military remained on the rim of the mission field, the colonists never moved east of the Chanchamayo River. The Chanchamayo and Vitoc valleys, at the western edge of Campa territory, were areas of considerable agricultural development from the very beginning of the eighteenth century drive. Small settlements--Huancabamba, Paucartambo, Vitoc, Collac, Pucará, Comas, Andamarca--topped the forest rim and haciendas stretched into the surrounding valley bottoms. In the Vitoc region there were some half dozen large haciendas of sugarcane, cacao, tobacco, coffee, coca, rice, beans, and several kinds of fruit; along the banks of the Chanchamayo, agricultural complexes centered in the vicinities of Quimirí (Don Juan

de Dios Berrios, Don Ignacio Correa, Don José de Arredo); Nijandaris (the hacienda of Don Agustín de Salcedo), and Cerro de la Sal (the hacienda of Baltazar Cortijo, married to a Campa woman).[36] Yet, outside of these marginal regions, agricultural production and development never penetrated into the interior of the Campa territory.

The primary importance of the colonial settlements in the Chanchamayo and Vitoc valleys, from the point of view of the Campa enterprise, was that they served as trading centers. The Campa exchanged freely and without Franciscan control products of the montaña for foodstuffs and items of colonial industry (jerky, cheese, garlic, aguardiente, and iron implements).[37] There was also a limited use of Campa labor by the Spanish colonists, although the major work force evidently came from the Highlands.

Not only did the colonists stay west of the Chanchamayo, but they made few, if any, attempts to initiate a spontaneous colonization in the interior.[38] Hence, perhaps as a result of the low initiative of the individual colonists, the Franciscans, in the late 1730's and early 1740's, suggested to the crown that it undertake, at its own expense and initiative, the establishment of an agriculturally based settlement in the Gran Pajonal. With forty Spanish families and an additional 12,000 pesos, to

purchase necessary tools and equipment and to supplement family income until the settlement was completed, the project could easily get underway. The Audiencia issued a license for the founding of the settlement, but refused funds to put the whole proposal into motion. Without financial backing from the government, the program passed from the drawing board into the wastebasket, along with all immediate prospects for colonial settlement in the deep interior of the Campa domain.[39]

The Franciscans did not forget the project. In 1745, when Juan Santos had totally devastated mission progress in the Gran Pajonal and was raising considerable discontent in the Tarma conversions, Fray José Gil Muñoz, one time Commissary of Missions, smugly reminded the crown of its failure to underwrite the colonial enterprise in the Gran Pajonal--hinting at a direct correlation between the success of Juan Santos and government disinterest in Franciscan plans for colonization.[40]

In spite of their first failure, the friars recommended in 1750 a new area for a government sponsored settlement project: the land around Cerro de la Sal, in the triangle formed by the Perené and Paucartambo rivers. The crown should, wrote Fray José de San Antonio, "grant a general amnesty to all those who, for their misconduct, wander as fugitives from their homes and families," with

the sole provision that those granted a royal pardon go to the Cerro area to settle for a minimum of ten years.[41] A curious proposal, it, too, met little reception from the government officials.

The royal government, by its failure to act on Franciscan requests, precluded significant military and colonial expansion into the Campa field before 1742. Such exclusion courted Franciscan displeasure, but the Order on the frontier had neither the capabilities nor the power to reverse political decisions. Yet it is difficult to default the crown. In part, at least, bureaucratic response reflected the traditional apathy of the government toward the low incentives of the Campa frontier. On the other hand, it had much to do with the financial difficulties which had long plagued the Viceroyality. Troops and forts were costly, and official colonization projects were a luxury beyond the normal functions of the colonial government. With a scarcity of funds and an abundance of demands, the viceroy had to weigh all requests with an eye toward tactical priority and future return. Prior to Juan Santos, Franciscan military requests for the central montaña--with the Portuguese barrelling down in the north and in the south and with social unrest inside the established colony--hardly tipped the viceregal scales. And the civilian

settlement proposals, without greater backing from the colonists, could not be seriously entertained by anyone except the slightly idealistic missionaries.

Financial Problems

Maintenance of the eighteenth century advance depended on more than human numbers. Another critical factor was material support. The friars in the central montaña, as their brethren in other borderlands from the Piritu missions in Venezuela to the missions in Upper California, found that the eighteenth century missionary advance placed a greater responsibility upon their shoulders than had their past activity in the core areas. Without the encomendero or the appropriate royal official to help in pacification and acculturation, the frontier cleric faced almost alone the demands of exploration, pacification, construction, and provisioning, as well as his traditional responsibility for native conversion. To meet the new demands, the friar needed more than faith and spirit. At every turn the Franciscans saw material needs threatening to block their march toward conquest: iron tools, implements, and forges; churches, schools, trails, and bridges; ornaments, altar regalia, paintings, and books; soldiers, friars, and slaves. All of those items cost money. Money for conquest. Money for expansion. Money for conversion.

Theoretically, one potential source of income was the local environment. If the friars could tap the resources of the forest perhaps they could turn potential into a base of material support. But the conversion capabilities of the Franciscans were severely limited for they rested almost exclusively on an agricultural system little removed from the simple shifting cultivation of the aborigines. Although the friars made every attempt to rationalize native agriculture in order to increase production beyond the minimum needed for local consumption, marketable surpluses did not rise appreciably. Given the poor conditions of the soil, the low potentials of available technology, periodic social instability, the small size of congregated settlements, and the inadequacy of the interior lines of communication, a low ceiling existed on the level of attainable output from the frontier. Turning the Campa enterprise, from within, into a money-making concern was an impossible dream.[42]

That ceiling on frontier productivity forced the Franciscans to look elsewhere for material support. But outside of the field their extractive capabilities were equally limited for they were a Mendicant Order, bound by both individual and corporate vows of poverty. Here, the paradox. Franciscan operations in the peripheral frontier needed capital: the Order repudiated all funds which

would have conflicted with its Rule but which would have promised a relatively steady income geared to the fluctuations of the market-at-large.[43] Hence necessity and vow forced the field clerics to rely exclusively on private donations and government subsidies to obtain the materials needed for the advance. What the friars could not beg they would have to do without.

At least according to the public ledger, however, the Franciscans had little difficulty in obtaining government support. In the first place, the Audiencia of Lima had defrayed the costs of the initial penetrations.[44] Beyond that, on Franciscan request, the crown had intervened by 1715 to furnish an annual royal subsidy of 2,000 pesos for each conversion.[45] All of this was over and above the government's support of all military excursions into the frontier, and of the expenses incurred in transporting missionary reinforcements from Spain to the field.[46] In conjunction with government assistance, the friars could also accept private donations which, although sporadic, helped to liquidate extraordinary expenses such as the alterations at Santa Rosa de Ocopa.

Nevertheless, between the public ledger and the account book of the friars were notable discrepancies. Lima's apparent generosity from 1709 to 1713 had been to the tune of only 6,000 pesos for all of the <u>montaña</u> conversions and not just for the Campa field. Fray Francisco

openly deplored the niggardly attitude toward the frontier enterprise, and quipped that it probably would not occur to the authorities in the capital to help the missions even that much during the next six years.[47] It was to rectify the viceregal frugality that Fray Francisco requested an annual subsidy from the crown. But the royal order did not alter the inclinations of Lima. The Peruvian officials simply shelved the royal order, and made haste to convert Fray Francisco's quip into fact.

Neither time nor mission progress produced a radical alteration in the level of support. The only significant change was that the relations between Lima and the friars, which had in the past been relatively passive, steadily grew more acrimonious.

The Franciscans were particularly irritated, and for good reason. From 1723 through 1744, according to the calculations of the Order, the clerics on the central frontier had received only 21,000 pesos of the 126,000 accumulative amount owed to them by law. The deficit for the three conversions of Tarma, Jauja, and Huánuco swarmed somewhere around 105,000 pesos.[48] In regard to the Campa conversions alone, the deficit between the promised income (84,000 pesos) and the amount received (about 14,000 pesos) was 70,000 pesos for the twenty-one year period; and translated into effective buying power, that amount

represented a considerable loss. For example, the 1739 settlement program in the Gran Pajonal plus construction of a fort at the Ene-Perené juncture was pegged at about 16,000 pesos.[49]

In 1738, as the deficit continued to grow, the friars made one half-hearted attempt to collect part of what the crown had promised them. The procurador of the Order in Madrid requested that the king assign the tribute of two Highland towns to the missions of the central frontier. Madrid, however, did not act on the request and the Order apparently abandoned it as a result.[50]

The only effective recourse open to the Franciscans was to remind the crown of the conduct of Lima. In turn, the king commanded the Peruvian viceroys to meet with due speed the limit of their financial obligations.[51] And so the cycle went--with the Franciscans grumbling to the crown, the king writing to Lima, and the viceroy acting independently of royal injunction. Finally, in 1744, the crotchety Marqués de Villa García broke the cycle by lashing out at the Franciscan imputations of mismanagement: the friars were complaining about finances, wrote the viceroy, to justify or explain away their failures in the field. Nevertheless, he did admit, although inadvertently, that Lima had indeed not complied with royal injunction. Just during the first eight years of

his tenure as viceroy (1736 - 1744), he had backlogged almost 22,000 pesos![52]

Villa García's revelation did not resolve the dilemma. The whole affair was a classic example of the gap between the derecho of royal legislation and the hecho of conditions on the front, as well as of the decentralization of the decision-making in the Empire.[53] In this case, major priorities in the Viceroyality effectively limited the availability of funds for the Campa frontier. In spite of Franciscan protests and crown commands, the Lima authorities continued to dribble out the money at their own pleasure and consonant with the broader needs of the Viceroyality as they saw them.

CHAPTER VI

PROCESSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROLLED ACCULTURATION

The Ends of Contact

The end concern of the Franciscans in the central montaña was assimilation of the natives--the social, political and cultural fusion of the aborigines into the Hispano-Christian mold. The outlook of the friars remained inclusive and overwhelmingly one way, with assimilation understood not as a perfecting of native traditions nor the diffusion of parts of Spanish culture but as a total renewal of the aboriginal life style through an elimination of precontact patterns.

Although motivated by the ideal, the friars in the Campa field set more concrete objectives based on the implicit realization that to assimilate the Campa they would first have to acculturate him.[1] Translated into specific terms, acculturation implied converting the Campa to Christianity; rationalizing the mechanisms of production and subsistence; and introducing the natives to the salient responsibilities and forms of Spanish citizenship, including stratification. These changes or alterations were

not spontaneous but purposively directed and controlled by the missionaries themselves. They were conscious processes of acculturation.

While efforts to consummate change began at the moment of contact, it was in or around the mission station where more intensified acculturation took place. The station played, as a consequence, a pivotal role in the friars' cultural assault upon the Campa frontier, and became the most characteristic field institution second to none. It was simultaneously a place of religious instruction, a polytechnic school, and a civic center; and either within its confines or under its shadow the Indians heard, saw, and practiced Spanish life.

Religious Conversion

Of the three objectives, the friars saw the imposition of Christianity as the more basic of their responsibilities and the first step toward the eventual assimilation of the Campa. The "soap and bleach of the Holy Gospel" removed the "stains of barbarism."[2] After the Indian had passed through the religious wash, economic and social acculturation would follow naturally for such was the efficacy of proselytization and conversion.

If conversion to Christianity was the first step toward assimilation, baptism was the first step toward

the new religion. And because baptism became the conscious symbol of entrance into the Church, the Franciscans in the Campa field were reasonably cautious about administering the initiatory rite without preliminary instruction. The only prominent exceptions were the children, particularly those under ten years of age. In contrast with their attitude toward the baptism of adults, with the children the Franciscans threw caution to the wind. Without delay they baptized babies and the very young, frequently even before setting up the mission station. As a case in point, Juan de la Marca, in his 1733 expedition into the Gran Pajonal, immediately administered the sacrament of baptism to about one quarter of all the natives in the five major parcialidades:

Parcialidad	Population	N° Baptized
Aporoquiaqui	107	26
Tampianique	277	106
Sabirosqui	167	44
Corintoni	161	42
Quisopango	175	70
Total	887	288

All of the 288 Campa baptized by La Marca were children, with most of them under seven years of age.[3] The same pattern held even during the early years of the eighteenth century advance: caution with the adults and precipitancy with the young.

It was only after prebaptismal instruction when

the friars baptized the vast majority of the adults. Unfortunately, the precise nature of the training is not at all clear. Probably the content of the instruction remained summary and reduced to the essentials of dogmatic Catholicism, although it certainly included an awareness of the major obligations of a Christian life.[4] Nevertheless, hazy though it may have been, a lesson in the catechism was essential for admitting the mature Indians to baptism and the Church.

How many Campa did the Franciscans actually baptize between 1709 and 1742? In the Tarma and Jauja circuits--primarily as a result of personnel shortages, and Indian deaths and desertion--the friars managed to baptize only about eighty per cent of the total number with which they or their auxiliaries had worked.[5] Numerically, the neophytes may have hovered between 30,000 and 40,000. In the Pajonal, although the ratio of baptized Indians to total mission population was undoubtedly lower, the accumulative number of neophytes very likely approached 8,000. Thus, for all three Campa districts, the friars, as an estimate, baptized from 40,000 to 50,000 Indians during the eighteenth century enterprise. The absolute maximum probably did not pass 100,000.[6]

After baptism the Franciscans continued the indoctrination in an effort to supplement initial training

and to curb native relapses. Those who remained within the posts received training on a daily basis; those in the outlying areas came into the centers only on weekends.[7] But regardless of frequency, the format of instruction as embodied in the Doctrina cristiana was identical. The Indians learned to recite from memory, in their own language, the Pater Noster, the Ave Maria, the Apostles Creed, the Salve Maria, the Commandments of God and those of the Church, the meaning of the seven sacraments, the General Confession, the Minor Catechism, and the Acts of Contrition.[8] Nevertheless, the level of the more intensive training was not high, and the emphasis fell on external performance and not on an increased understanding of the Christian Creed.[9] The concerns of baroque Catholicism had indeed penetrated even the raw frontier.

Only the children systematically received a more closely supervised and careful instruction. Above all others, the more adept males were brought into the mission house, to live as boarders under the direct control of the friars, and given additional training not only in the doctrine but also in Spanish arts and letters. They were taught, besides, to serve the friars in the mission house and at Mass. Called colegiales, many of these boys learned to read and write Spanish as well as

a smattering of Latin.[10] From the monastic schools could have come the only Indians whose comprehension of the new religion would have passed superficiality; yet as a group the colegiales were not numerous and, with the lack of missionaries, the quality of their training was unavoidably defective when compared to that of their counterparts in other reaches.

The implantation of Christianity involved more than baptism and catechumenal indoctrination. The reception of other sacraments, especially matrimony, penance, and the Holy Eucharist, was part of the spiritual life of all Christians, and their administration was necessary to buttress native commitment to the principles of the living Church. Of the three, marriage was indispensable. In its administration, however, the friars met few obstacles, for polygamy had not been widespread in the aboriginal society.

Difficulties seemed to arise only after administration of the sacrament. On occasion the friars reported cases in which a Campa had left his lawful household to live with another woman. Although always disconcerting to the friars, such a break in Christian morality was actually infrequent, and it posed little embarrassment to mission discipline. The clerics or their Indian auxiliaries simply hunted the offender down and brought him

back to his first family, probably flogging him as an example to the other neophytes.[11] Fray Juan de la Marca expressed some doubts as to whether a forced return was justifiable from the canonical point of view, but he finally concluded that "if we ought to follow the 'those whom God hath joined together let no man put asunder,' etc., the nullity of the second marriage is obvious."[12] Such a conviction was generally held by the other friars as well, for they all refused to tolerate even an occasional dissolution of a Christian marriage consecrated by God.

If the Franciscans methodically administered the sacraments of baptism and marriage, they did not do so with those of penance and communion. As a result, the latter were of slight importance to the spiritual life of the Campa neophytes. Apparently the friars met the minimum requirements, as established by the Catholic Church, for the administration of the two sacraments, filling only the Easter obligation of the converted natives.[13] The obvious exceptions were the seriously ill or dying.

The Franciscans employed both the direct and indirect methods of instruction in order to establish Christianity. In religious and moral indoctrination, the friars hoped to influence the natives to lead a Christian life through the example of their own conduct and deeds

as well as through the force of their preaching. But the direct or active approach, especially in the face of pressing shortages, was not always viable. Hence, to expand their personal effectiveness the friars relied on intermediaries to instruct many of the Indians and to safeguard native progress after baptism. In the beginning they might have used an occasional Highland native or mestizo; soon they substituted either the colegiales or other Campa neophytes who resided under the discipline of the station and appeared particularly adept or influential with their fellow Indians.[14]

To compliment catechumenal indoctrination, whether direct or deputized, the Franciscans used art, such as painting or music. Painted canvases apparently served as illustrations for the concepts presented in the Doctrina: in Eneno, for example, the double paintings of the retable depicted a soul in Heaven and a soul in Hell--visually underscoring the pleasures of the one and the horrors of the other.[15]

In addition to functional art the friars relied on ritual and plastic decoration. The "pomp and magnificence" of the Campa mission was hardly comparable with that of the spiritual conquest of New Spain described by Robert Ricard.[16] Yet, even into the borderlands of the central montaña, the Franciscans injected as much solemn pomp

and material display as money and distance would allow.

Most of the magnificence centered in the mission post, and the ritual which most frequently punctuated the routine was Mass. For its celebration the friars used the rather rich variety of moveable ornaments, vestiments, and altar furniture which the stations held in inventory. By encouraging singing and music, they hoped further to embellish the service and increase native fervor.[17] On Saturdays a procession was organized: chanting the rosary, the Indians escorted an image of the Virgin out of the church and through the mission post.[18] During Holy Week and on feast days additional processions and displays expanded the more usual range of ritual activities. But whenever held, the rituals and processions were intended to increase Indian devotion and respect for Christian service and to maintain the enthusiasm of the natives for their new pattern of spiritual life. They were pedagogical devices which formed an integral part of Franciscan methodology.

Settlement and Its Implications

While religion served as the nucleus of mission life, religious conversion was not the only means to the acculturation of the Campa. A second process was congregation or reduction, through which threaded an implicit program of societal reorganization. Congregation not only

facilitated the transfer of Christianity, but it was also, in the Spanish mind, a precondition for civil development in its broadest meaning.

The first structural requirement for resettlement--whether in a station, rancheria, or parcialidad--was a growth change on the subsistence level. In order to congregate nuclear families, native subsistence had to be rationalized: agricultural productivity had to be raised to such a point so as to insure not merely the self-sufficiency of the expanded communities but also to provide surpluses. The immediate need was to give rise to more and surer subsistence in order to maintain population clustering beyond aboriginal patterns. Toward that end the friars introduced iron tools to aid field management and to expand both individual and communal output, and encouraged the clearing and planting of larger areas. On the other hand, there is no indication that the friars earnestly attempted to alter the nature of the agricultural system. The slash-and-burn method held sway after contact as it had before. Mission agriculture represented quantitative (or growth) and not qualitative (or developmental) changes in aboriginal cultivation.

The friars' major qualitative innovation in native subsistence was the introduction of livestock, particularly cattle, pigs, and sheep.[19] On their part, the

Campa, a nonpastoral people before the arrival of the Spanish, accepted stockraising passively. The native domain was not eminently favorable to pastoralism: the climate was unfavorable to the preservation of pastoral produce; tropical grasslands were rare except in the Gran Pajonal, and there they were low in food value.[20] And because of the limitations of the physical environment combined with native passivity, pastoralism spread slowly and made few significant contributions to native subsistence.

The European introduction of livestock was not unrelated to the attempts of the friars to congregate the Indians. The Campa before contact relied on hunting and fishing as their principal source of animal protein, and among the non-River Campa hunting played a major role in regulating tribal movement. Scarcity of game, for example, would have forced the Pajonal Campa to relocate their settlements in areas where game was more plentiful. In contrast, the mission Indians who were congregated in permanent settlements could not easily follow the moving game. Thus pastoralism theoretically would have become a principal source of protein to replace or to supplement precontact sources. Mission settlements along the major rivers could have relied on fishing; but domesticated livestock among the Pajonal Campa and among those Indians

removed from the river banks would have been a basic requirement for permanent settlement.

In spite of the real importance of pastoralism to long term mission stability, stock raising spread slowly. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that pastoralism, limited though it was, met a growing opposition as its destructive effects rose out of proportion to its benefits. The Pajonal Campa, as a case in point, were particularly opposed to pigs because they raised havoc in the fields.

While the friars did not attempt to change the system of agriculture, they did try to introduce new food crops into the central montaña, and there are indications that some of the plants were reasonably well accepted by the Campa. A variety of seed crops, various vegetables, and some fruits certainly entered through European intervention; the cultivation of maize, although widely known by native peoples throughout the montaña before contact, was probably encouraged by the friars.[22] But whatever the variety and extent of crop introduction, Franciscan intent was not a qualitative change in native dietary patterns, for the friars gave little thought to dietary or nutritional problems and even less to the modern preoccupations with a balanced diet. To the contrary, they were overly impressed with the display and availability

of food resources, and felt that the tropical world of the Campa provided abundantly. Juan de la Marca reflected the general opinion of his fellow clerics when he wrote of the irresistible luxuriance of the central frontier:

> I only praise God's grandeur, which permits His creatures, without preference, to enjoy His infinite Providence. ...These rivers...abound in a variety of fish. ...Game also abounds, as a consequence of which the Indians trust in daily providence, believing it superfluous to guard supplies for the following day. ...They raise roosters only because their crowing awakens them in time to fish. ...In addition, this montaña is well stocked with an infinite variety of fruits, during all seasons. For all of these reasons, the natives can live everywhere.[23]

In actual fact, the food problems which on occasion plagued the missions were the result neither of environmental deficiencies nor of the system of subsistence. The Europeans themselves caused most of the periodic shortages. The expansion of the slash-and-burn cultivation of yuca and beans, together with the traditional supplements from hunting and fishing, proved adequate to maintain mission settlements, except when either epidemic disease or an unexpected but temporary rise in the European population (i.e. a Highland military expedition) hampered field upkeep or reduced the supply of stored food.[24] Such was the case in 1737 when both an epidemic and the Torote uprising, which brought Spanish forces into the frontier, led to a near famine in several of the stations.[25]

Settlement led to another growth change in the

economic sphere: increased specialization of skills and occupations at the individual level. In precontact society there was some specialization; but in mission society the friars actively encouraged yet a greater variety. Much of the specialization was probably still divided along sex or age lines with, for example, the older men devoting themselves to the manufacture of tools while the younger ones hunted, fished, or worked in the fields. But, in addition, those with special skills met a wider range of craft occupations: carpentry, iron working, commerce, teaching, stock raising, agriculture. Along the same vein, the friars altered the traditional pattern of sex division of field labor. In the mission settlement the men did more work in the fields than they had previously done, and were responsible not only for clearing the land and planting but also for cultivating and harvesting the crops.[26]

Congregation led to a qualitative change in the precontact socio-political structure of the aborigine. Particularly in the older mission centers, the friars assigned to many mission Indians a secular role within their microcommunity in an attempt to create a social structure similar in concept to that of Spain. While in actual practice the administration of the station was theocratic, the Franciscans encouraged the Campa to act

out roles of command and stratification, and attempted to institutionalize privilege and prestige by means of reward. With Franciscan intervention and direction, a native's status within mission society was to become a complex function of both his personal skill and abilities and his community role. And to further the process the missionaries created socio-political offices: curacas, alcaldes mayores, fiscales, alcaldes de campo, regidores[27] Mere occupancy of an office, particularly that of curaca, gave rewards which an Indian's personal attributes alone might have denied him in the aboriginal grouping.

Techniques of Control

To penetrate the central frontier, to expand the mission field, to congregate the natives, and to establish functioning centers of Hispanic life, the Franciscans needed ways and means of controlling the behavior of the Campa Indians. Correspondingly as the friars first impinged on Campa life, the natives placed barriers to the cross-societal diffusion of European cultural elements. The Campa did not rush headlong into Franciscan arms nor did they respond enthusiastically to the disciplines of mission life; they retreated, dodged, hid, and resisted. Therefore, if the Indians would not freely accept innovation and change, the Franciscans would have to take the initiative. Coercion and enticement were two means to

the end.

Coercion was not a preferred technique of control. From the very beginning of their advance the clerics abjured the use of brute force in effecting initial congregation and conversion, and relied heavily on gentler forms of persuasion. Partially, of course, Franciscan preferences reflected cold reality: without permanent military support and given the forbidding immensity of the Campa domain into which the Indians could flee with impunity, coercion as a standard technique had built-in limitations. But beyond that fact, the clerics sincerely courted the voluntary interest of the Campa and they understood that force ran counter to their purposes.[28]

After baptism and resettlement Franciscan qualms in respect to the use of force did lessen considerably, and punishment by whipping was not uncommon. But such coercion, when used against the neophyte, was not seen by the friars as compulsion, but rather as an educational and protective method. Within the peripheral societies formed under Franciscan direction it became a legitimate corrective to prevent deviant social behavior (such as wife abandonment) or to maintain the organized stability of interpersonal relations.[29] It was not used as a means to force assimilation but as a way to preserve the status quo of the new social structures overtly accepted by the majority of the neophytes within and around the

mission communities.

By personal preference the Franciscans enticed or persuaded, and the principal inducement was the promise and distribution of iron tools. Not bullets shot from guns but iron implements given from an open hand marked Franciscan passage into the tropical world of the Campa.

The introduction of iron tools represented a significant technological advancement to the peoples of the selva, and it often led to an invincible tyranny among those who discovered their uses.[30] In regard to the Campa, the consequences of the "revolution of the ax" were not as drastic as among some tropical forest tribes. Iron implements increased native productivity in subsistence, but there is no evidence to suggest that they changed basic structural configurations. Nevertheless, the Indians avariciously devoured the wide variety of tools which the friars introduced; and many accepted contact, resettlement, and mission life solely in exchange for axes, machetes, hoes, and picks.

The missionaries, to be sure, found it difficult to supply native demand. Into the Tarma conversions alone, in the year 1721, they brought 83 axes, 468 knives, more than 4,000 needles, 200 machetes, and 110 kilos of crude iron--all for the use of Campa neophytes within the operative stations.[31] So extended was the demand for

implements that the friars set up forges in several stations in order to produce new tools and to maintain old ones, and instructed the Indians in the trade of iron work.

While iron tools were the major means to enticement, salt also played a role. Even as early as the seventeenth century the friars felt that salt might be an open sesame into the Campa field.[32] One reason for that view was that the mineral played an important part in the precontact trading patterns of the Indians, particularly of those along the Chanchamayo and Perené rivers.

Several kilometers north of the juncture of the Paucartambo and Perené rivers and near the station of Cerro de la Sal were salt deposits, about 3,500 feet above the valley, which were highly esteemed by the Campa.[33] Each year during the summer or dry months (July, August, and September), the Campa Indians from many areas journeyed to the deposits to obtain salt. Sometimes in numbers as great as five hundred, they cut the salt into blocks which they then carried to rafts along the Paucartambo. From there the natives transported the salt down river to their homes. Economically, salt played a major role in tribal trade, with the Campa exchanging it for other products. After contact salt also became a

medium of exchange in the Highland-selva trade and was used by the Campa to obtain iron tools from Highland merchants.[34]

The economic significance of the salt at Cerro did not escape Franciscan attention during the eighteenth century. From the beginning of their montaña advance, the robed pioneers believed that European control of at least the area along the Chanchamayo and Perené rivers would be contingent on Franciscan control of its salt deposits. Anchored at Cerro de la Sal, the friars would quite simply deny salt to the Indians if they refused to coöperate in their own cultural extinction, for only mission Indians would be granted free access. As José de San Antonio euphemistically explained to the King, by controlling the salt deposits, the Spanish could "draw that heathen, by means of friendly relations and communication, to the society of our Saint Francis."[35]

Events of the eighteenth century slightly tarnished the friars' designs. Because of personnel deficiencies, they were never able to successfully regulate movement into and out of the Cerro de la Sal region; the crown officials, on their part, rejected Franciscan requests for military and colonial foundations at the deposits. As a consequence, mining continued with and without Franciscan authorization.[36] But evidence, admittedly meager, suggests that the mere presence of the Franciscans at the

mines did restrain some trading, with a resultant decrease in the availability of salt. Thus, by the decades of the 1730's and 1740's and especially in the Gran Pajonal, the friars were able to use salt as a secondary inducement even though they were unable to control its source.[37]

After initial contact the friars found additional means of persuasion moderately effective. The ritual of the Church was one; protection from other hostile natives was another; the supply of certain products such as cheese, salted meat, and some condiments yet another.[38] But iron tools remained, far and away, the more effective form of bribery.

The friars, in addition to coercion and persuasion, judiciously used individual natives to conquer the frontier. In particular, they sought out local headmen, and made every effort to gain their trust as a key to the masses.

The use of curacas as intermediaries of conquest had a long tradition. In the core areas of the Spanish Empire, the missionaries had encountered Indian societies which were socially stratified, and which resembled in form and substance Iberian Spain. The curaca among those Indians held an institutionalized role which commanded a broad base of power and privilege.

When the missionaries spread into the borderland regions they had in mind the organization of the more structured Indians, and quite naturally gravitated toward the techniques which had proved effective among both the sierra natives of Peru and the Indian societies in the Valley of Mexico. The Campa did not, however, have such elaborate socio-political structures. Nevertheless, in spite of the limited base of power and privilege of the headmen, many of the native curacas (or canabiri, as La Marca called them) proved remarkably effective in helping the friars draw the Campa into mission life. In all three mission districts, a headman's acceptance of the Franciscans led to the establishment of a Spanish beachhead. Perhaps as a result of visible successes, as well as their desires to actively increase native socio-political stratification, the friars continued to court headmen with the greatest deference and respect. To the coöperative ones they gave additional tools and offered institutionalized positions of authority within the mission communities.[39]

With equal diligence and to the same ends the friars courted the children. They quite frequently separated the young males from their families, lodging them inside the mission house. Under Franciscan command, the children became unwitting hostages ransomed at the price of native coöperation.[40] Later, through training,

the earlier hostages often turned into proselytizing agents of Hispano-Christian culture, winning over other natives to the Spanish way.

The use of coöpted Indians to help control the other natives was not limited only to the headmen and the children. To defend the established mission societies, the friars armed adult neophytes and formed them into ad hoc militia units. In the absence of organized garrisons from the Highlands, these local militias were the major safeguards against the more militant Campa or other disruptive Indians.

Coercion, enticement, and coöptation, in one form or another, became the principal techniques of control, and in combination the friars used them with measured success to regulate the behavior of the Campa. But the Franciscans needed ways and means of controlling not only the Indians but the environment as well. Unluckily, the environment of the montaña presented obstacles to eighteenth century man. A vacuum outside of the outer limits of colonial life, the central frontier threw vastness and impenetrability at the robed pioneer and drained him of energy and force. Without greater technology, the friar could entertain few hopes of either conquering or controlling the land of the Campa. What he did was learn to live in the environment as it was and not as he would like it to be. Even then the lesson of coexistence was difficult

to learn. In the end the friar was forced to rely on the river courses for theirs was the only ecology he could enter. The rivers became both the lifeline and the backbone of the eastward march, and the friars infrequently strayed far from their banks. Only in the Pajonal did they venture overland, but there the situation was reversed: the river corridors were utterly unassailable while the interfluve offered the best means of advance.

If the friars could not hope to control all parts of the Campa domain, they did attempt to protect the parts they had entered. To that end they used the mission stations as defense outposts against hostile natives by locating the stations at strategic points along the lines of the advance. Quimirí held the southern end of the Chanchamayo Valley and the terminus of the principal route into the Tarma conversions; Nijandaris anchored the northern end of the Chanchamayo and the main transport line to the Perené; Jesús María dominated the juncture of the Perené and Pangoa rivers; and so on down the line.[41] Each station was positioned with care and thought and with an eye toward the strategy of defense and control. In much the same way, the transport lines which the friars built or refined were intended as a means of holding the mission territory. They widened

trails to accommodate pack animals around the unnavigable sections of the waterways and constructed bridges across the rivers whenever possible. The entire effort aimed at a single end: to maintain at least a threshold of interacting communication between the Highland and the forest and within the mission field.

PART III

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CAMPA FRONTIER

CHAPTER VII

THE JUAN SANTOS MOVEMENT

Patterns of Response to Contact

Onto the Campa soil the Spanish pioneers hurled fragments of the Hispano-Christian culture that had developed in the core areas of the New World. Those fragments, which in potential promised to give rise to a new society in the central montaña, represented organizing concepts and a life style different in many respects from aboriginal norms. Thus faced with an alien culture, the Campa stood neither idly nor in quiet vigil as the Europeans advanced into the native domain. To the contrary, they actively responded both individually and as a group to the swelling tide of conquest. The responses, however, were varied and ranged from overt resistance to voluntary participation.

During the seventeenth century, Spanish expansion into the Campa field provoked a significant increase in the precontact level of aboriginal insurgence. The years between 1630 and 1694 glittered with numerous examples of Indian revolts which rhythmically forced the Spanish back onto the rim of the Highlands. There seemed to have

existed among the Campa an automatic defense of their cultural and territorial autonomy, and whenever they were confronted with a threat to their continued independence they responded forcefully and with determination. This defensive attitude prior to the arrival of the Spanish had kept the Indians out of the imperial orbit of the Incas. In a similar fashion, during the seventeenth century, it kept the region beyond the pale of Western civilization.

The defensive attitude of the Campa soon melted under the pressure of the eighteenth century Franciscan advance. Correspondingly as the friars sunk their roots into the central frontier--after weathering the first wave of native opposition--the Indians actually discarded their protective militancy. By 1713 a new pattern of Indian reaction had emerged. Having failed to dislodge the eighteenth century friars, many natives now countered with an outward acceptance of mission life. Others, especially those who could not adopt to the new cultural fragments, simply withdrew deeper into the forest, away from the cutting edge of the intrusion. In effect, acceptance or peaceful withdrawal replaced open hostility as the characteristic response to intercultural contact and diffusion.

Militant resistance continued only on the forward

edge of the advancing frontier, where mission life yet remained a threat and not a fact. As a case in point, between 1713 and 1720 the banks of the Perené above the Ipoki River provided the stage of open conflict between friar and Indians, while the Chanchamayo Valley and the area along the Masamari and Sonomoro rivers, in the Jauja mission district, nestled into apparent social stability. After 1723 the stage of open conflict shifted to the Lower Perené, between the Pangoa and Ene rivers, leaving the Upper Perené in the relative calm of cultural interaction. But over time, as the realm of heathendom receded before the Franciscans, even that marginal hostility diminished in frequency, and resignation gradually seemed to replace aggression. Prior to 1742, for example, the settlement of the Gran Pajonal provoked not a single case of overt native opposition to the implantation of the alien culture.

After 1713, even when the native response was overtly hostile, it was largely spontaneous--totally indigenous and accidental. The native uprisings did not respond to an organic plan of cultural revival but rather were spirited reactions of individuals to momentary pressures. A typical case occurred in 1719 several kilometers down the Perené River, near the newly established station of Purísima Concepción de Metraro. Several friars, with

a small force of Negroes and several Spaniards, had pushed into the untamed area in search of natives to bring into the established mission foundations. The Indians, under the pressure of imminent contact, suddenly pounced upon the advancing clerics, killing two lay brothers. Successful in their ambush, the Indians then fled further down the Perené. But beyond the cost in Franciscan lives, the incident did not retard further contact, and within a matter of months the region and its inhabitants passed into the orbit of the Franciscan mission system.[1]

To the social stability of the mission field there was only one major threat from the Campa: the 1737 Torote uprising. In March of 1737 Ignacio Torote, the curaca of the mission station of Catalipango, organized a band of about twenty-one malcontents, seventeen of whom were neophytes. The revolt was, in the true sense, an endeavor for the precontact cultural revival of the Campa, and had as its presumed objective the explusion of the Franciscans from the Jauja mission circuit.

Secretly organized by Torote, the revolt caught the Franciscans off guard. Within a matter of weeks the rebels managed to raise considerable havoc by spreading both destruction and death. In spite of its organization and objectives, the Torote revolt failed to

mobilize additional native support.[2] Thus the uprising remained the enterprise of a handful of social malcontents--perhaps an early example of social bandrity--rather than a Campa movement to dislodge the Franciscans from the frontier.

Although the Campa did not respond in a hostile fashion to the eighteenth century mission system, they did not completely accept it either. Under their apparent adjustment ran a current of passive resistance to aspects of mission society. How significant the passive resistance was is not clear, but there are indications that the Campa refused to abandon some of their precontact rituals such as the lunar ceremony. They also seemed to have resisted the spread of pastoralism; the friars' early attempts to control ritual drinking; and the Franciscan practice of separating the male children from their families. But the Franciscans, on their part, responded effectively to many Indian demands and did not hastily push the neophytes into compliance. With the lunar ritual and communal drinking bouts, for example, the friars worked out a compromise: they would make no effort to prohibit the traditional ceremonies, but they would not permit the children to attend.[3]

The missionaries' receptiveness to compromise was, in part, a consequence of their own misperceptions of

Campa culture. The lunar and drinking ceremonies were not identified in the minds of the friars with native religious patterns: they were interpreted merely as forms of traditional Indian diversion; and because they did not conflict with Hispanic morality and ritual the friars allowed them to continue. Such a view certainly contrasted with Spanish practice in other contact areas. Among the Aztec and Inca societies the Spanish correctly identified many pagan ceremonies with native religious complexes and beliefs, and they sought to stamp out or to restrict them. Among the Campa, however, the Franciscans failed to see the pagan religious identification of the ceremonies for they failed to understand or to see native religion. The friars tended to view the Campa as a people without a religion, and as a result they could not possibly appreciate the religious connotations of ceremonies such as the lunar and drinking rituals.

The receptiveness of the friars to compromise did not extend to polygamy. Polygamy quite clearly ran counter to Christian ethics, and on that issue the friars refused to budge from their prohibition.[4] At the same time, the Franciscans continued to separate the male children from their families, and there are indications that some Campa might have initially attempted to conceal their offspring to avoid separation.[5] But such practice

was not widespread and probably disappeared shortly after contact.

Among anthropologists one opinion is that, for natives at the organizational level of the Campa, mission life was almost a substitute for native organization. The clear implication of such a theory is that, because adjustment to mission life did not require a qualitative or developmental alteration in aboriginal cultural patterns, the natives as a social unit did not feel their cultural autonomy threatened, and thus did not respond negatively to its discipline. They accepted both Christianity and increased socio-political and economic stratification because such cultural elements involved neither a structural change in nor destruction of aboriginal configurations.[6]

The substitution theory is most useful, and it helps to explain why a handful of friars was able to accomplish much in such a short time. On the other hand, although acceptance of mission life might not have threatened the organizing structures of native culture, mission society did generate pressures which unquestionably produced a greater state of anxiety among the Campa than had precontact society and which, potentially, could have led to overt hostility.[7]

Epidemic disease was one such pressure generated by the environment of mission life. Within the mission

foundations disease periodically spread with devastating consequences and threatened the biological survival of the natives. At the same time there was a tendency, within the station, toward a breakdown in the Campa's traditional ethnic isolation as Negroes, other forest tribes, Highland mestizos, and even Spaniards entered the precontact marriage pools.[8] Thus both disease and marriage patterns worked slowly to change the demographic structure of aboriginal society. There is no evidence to suggest that that structure changed radically under the shadow of the Franciscan mission, but nevertheless the potential for change was there.

Iron tools also increased social tensions or anxiety to the extent that they increased the aboriginal level of individual competition. The use of iron tools spread rapidly among the mission Campa and were sought after by the natives. The friars, however, distributed the tools to the natives on the basis of individual performance. Such a practice often led to marked competition, with its successful and unsuccessful competitors and its feelings of personal victory and failure. Hence, competition for reward introduced a dimension of intragroup conflict largely absent from precontact society.

At yet another level, the friars actively attempted to replace the omnifunctional social systems of the

nuclear family with communal specialization. But this attempt cut into the traditional functions of the family unit and, as a result, pushed the family into the position of a subgroup within a broader community. One of the more important consequences of the entire process was that the friars assumed part of the responsibility for the education of the young, thus absorbing part of a role which had been the exclusive prerogative of the nuclear unit.

All of these factors--demographic changes, competition, specialization--are indicative of the pressure-producing elements present within mission life. None of them represented a radical divergence from precontact patterns, but within mission society they tended to generate increased mental pressure or anxiety among the neophytes.

All societies have channels for reducing tension. Not infrequently, when an alien dominant population has, indirectly through contact, caused an increase in social pressures, the more primitive grouping rebels.[9] The Campa seemed to have responded in a different way. Rather than withdrawing from mission society by overt rebellion, the Indians tended to accept more enthusiastically its organizing, group centered structures--particularly the religious and political ones.

What ever the reason for the patterns of Campa response to contact, the natives did not, as a rule, rebel openly against the invading Franciscan system. Much as the Guaraní in the Jesuit Province of Paraguay, the Campa had little difficulty in adjusting to mission life once their initial efforts at defense proved ineffective in ebbing the tide of conquest.

Juan Santos: The Man and His Goals

The Franciscans' impact upon the Campa had been substantial, and by the fourth decade of the eighteenth century the socio-political and religious forms of the Hispanic world seemed to have aroused some Indian loyalty. The early years of Campa hostility had faded into the past. Only an occasional localized incident of open unrest marred the quiet stability which apparently characterized the Campa frontier.

On the very threshold of success, the Franciscan mission among the Campa suddenly disintegrated and then withered away. Literally without warning, a Highland mestizo, Juan Santos Atahualpa, raised the standards of revolt on a frontier noted for its relative social tranquility, and within a decade militarily forced Spain's definitive evacuation of the region. Without the mission system to check deculturation, the Campa soon reverted to their precontact cultural patterns and resumed their

traditional protective militancy against alien culture contact and diffusion.

Juan Santos, the man linked closely to the Franciscan decline and Campa resurgence, was by blood a mestizo who had been culturally assimilated into the Spanish society of Highland Peru.[10] Although written history has preserved little factual information about his early years, he claimed to have been educated under Jesuit auspices, presumably in the Colegio de Caciques in Cuzco; to have traveled to Spain and to Africa in the personal service of a Jesuit missionary; and to have entered the Gran Pajonal in May of 1742 in the company of a Piro Indian named Bisabequí.[11] As an educated mestizo he spoke and wrote Spanish as well as Quechua and had a smattering of Latin, at least enough to recite prayers in that language.[12]

Beyond these random probabilities, it is indeed difficult to sift fact from legend. Both the Spanish and the Indians were quick to equip Juan Santos with a mythical biography, complete with divine origin and supernatural prowess, and he himself seemed little concerned with resisting his deification at the hands of others. He rapidly emerged as an aesthetic who avoided all extremes in personal indulgence, following a life as austere as that of Saint Francis himself.[13] Even after

his victory the popular memory continued to modify the individual events of history, promoting the transformation of Juan Santos from an historical figure into a mythical hero.

Adding to the problem of historical accuracy were the frontiersmen who might well have had a vested interest in enlisting strong crown support against the rebels. To insure a maximum of military action against the unsettled Campa domain, the men on the frontier seemed to have overemphasized the threat posed by Juan Santos by overstating his trans-Andean influence and his personal nefariousness. Thus rumors quickly spread to the royal court that Juan Santos, immediately prior to his appearance in the Gran Pajonal, had traveled the length of the sierra between Cuzco and Cajamarca, mobilizing the Indians caciques of the Highlands for a general native uprising. Some informants saw a clear relationship between colonial unrest and the forest-based movement of Juan Santos: the mestizo's plan was to spark open rebellion in the montaña among the more primitive Indians, and then to carry that spark up into the Highlands, igniting the tinder of latent discontent among his own people.[14] In a similar category of questionable rumor was the popular voice raised against the morality of Juan Santos: many claimed that he had murdered his old Jesuit master, and that he

had fled to the montaña seeking asylum from Spanish justice.[15]

The details of his early life have little real importance, however. What does matter is that, whether he entered the montaña to flee Spanish law or to launch an already planned campaign against Spanish political control of the Highlands, Juan Santos was clearly somewhat of a marginal figure who chose to resist the pressures of his own society by open rebellion from without. He found the avenues of adjustment followed by the vast majority of his fellow mestizos impossible to tread: He opted for revolt as the means to resolution of personal conflict and hopelessness. And, it was in the Gran Pajonal, away from his natural environment, where he raised the standards of insurrection.

From the mission station of Quisopango, Juan Santos mounted an early but dynamic campaign of propaganda which spread directly and purposely to Franciscan ears. The material of that campaign was clearly revolutionary and revealed the final aims of its author. In content, however, it bore no relationship to the contact situation in the Campa field, and it seemed decidedly out of place in the montaña.

In messianic fashion, Santos called himself a divine emissary of God, declaring that his ordained

mission was the liberation of the Indian race. Heaven had sent him to the montaña to organize for revolt.[16] He planned to expel the Spanish from colonial Peru, and then to reconstitute the Inca Empire with its authoritarian but paternalistic political system. Claiming to be a direct descendent of the Inca Atahualpa, he rested his own power and prestige upon the authority of his presumed royal forebearers. Because of his royal blood, he would head the new Indian state, and thus emerge as the living symbol of Indian unity.[17]

But his political mission was not merely the reconstitution of an indigenous empire. Once he had politically liberated the Indians of Peru, he would liberate them socially. He saw the Spanish system in the New World as unnaturally coercive, and hoped to free his people from their social debasement under Hispanic control. To that end, he would outlaw personal slavery and government tyranny. The drudgery of forced labor in the plantations, obrajes, and bakeries would end.[18]

Juan Santos planned to maintain the framework of Christianity. But as many mestizos before and after him he had sifted from the culturally ladden motifs of Spanish Catholicism the transcending ideology and force of the Primitive Church. Onto that primitive core he grafted his own spiritual motivations. The new religion,

part Western and part Indian, had become for him the pre-eminent point of crystalization for his own world vision, and he intended to use it as a mechanism of socio-political organization, binding tribal and cultural distinctions into an exclusive ethnic unity. Quite simply, he would use the hybrid Christianity as the base for the re-construction of the Inca state.[19]

In a strange sort of way, Juan Santos was a religious conservative. His opposition was not to Catholicism, but to the nationalistic ecclesiastical policy of the Spanish Church. To counter that policy he planned to create a native clergy, and to expel the more Spanish of the religious Orders. On the other hand, he made no attempt to sever his proposed native Church from the universal one. He respected the international structure of Catholicism, and hoped to obtain the approval of Rome for the Church he would establish after his victory against Spain. It is perhaps in his subordination to the Vatican that history must see his approval of the Society of Jesus. To help educate his people he would permit the Jesuits free access to his kingdom, for he felt that the more international Order would be of great use in setting the foundations for his native Church.[20]

Juan Santos and the Campa

In program and stated objectives the Juan Santos

movement was clearly Andean. Juan Santos' interests in the central frontier were tactical: he planned to use the area and its native peoples as a base from which to spring onto the Highland rim.

Although even the eighteenth century Franciscans appreciated the trans-Andean implications of the Santos' program many observers have attempted to see a direct relationship between the Franciscan mission system and the birth of the 1742 uprising. As early as 1744 the Spanish bureaucrats on the frontier suggested to the king that the cruelty of the friars and their unjust treatment of the Campa had fermented the revolt.[21] That link between the Franciscans and the Juan Santos uprising continued into the twentieth century with only moderate changes.[22] The argument now runs that for the Campa the shock of culture contact had been severe--that the eighteenth century Franciscan mission system, based upon force and armed coercion, was both suppressive and disruptive. The Campa, under the environmental pressures of the intruding system, had reached a threshold of despondency and a feeling of inescapable frustration. At this critical point Juan Santos reached Quisopango, and as a Campa prophet he promised a release from the impasse through open rebellion and a return to aboriginal configurations.

Contrary to tradition, the evidence does not support

the argument. The Franciscan mission system did not rest upon force; the Campa had not reached threshold despondency; Juan Santos did not preach Campa revival. Indeed, if the revolt had been a conscious nativistic revival it would have logically originated among the more acculturated sectors of the native grouping. But in fact, the first converts to Juan Santos were the Campa from the Pajonal--precisely the Campa who were less acculturated and who had maintained fewer direct contacts with the Franciscans.[23] Those natives in the older mission centers along the Chanchamayo and in Sonomoro did not ally themselves with the rebels until after Juan Santos had forced the Franciscans out of the frontier. Even then, many of the older neophytes joined the friars in their retreat.[24]

The Juan Santos movement appears less an example of a nativistic revival, or a conscious endeavor on the part of the Campa to reverse acculturation, than a carefully wrought campaign of a displaced mestizo to spur the Highland Indians into open rebellion. Those Campa who followed Juan Santos did so, in part, not because of the stress of their social system, but because Santos had been able to coöpt particularly influential natives.

In this process of coöptation, Juan Santos coincidently followed Franciscan precedent. Much as the

Franciscans before him, he drew to his side--using the same methods of both coercion and persuasion--several Campa headmen, building strength for his movement on their prestige and influence. Almost characteristically, many of the caciques had occupied positions within the mission society. One particularly powerful headman was Mateo de Assia, the cacique of the station of San Antonio de Eneno. Assia had been a trusted servant of the friars along the Perené, and had become a valuable auxiliary in the extension of the frontier society. For his service the friars had rewarded him with a position within the mission community, and he had responded with an unfailing loyalty. But personal allegiance weakened under two crushing blows. One was the death of his family in the 1737 epidemic which swept the stations along the Perené.[25] The second was an affront to his own dignity. Shortly before the arrival of Juan Santos to the Pajonal, Assia had been ordered to whip a neophyte who had been found guilty of polygamy. When Assia objected to the punishment, the friar ordered that three lashes be given to him for his "bad example" in questioning mission discipline. Assia was bitter over the incident, and made no efforts to hide his feeling.[26] Perhaps as a result of his personal alienation, he joined Juan Santos in August of 1742. With him he brought many Indians from the Perené

area.

Other caciques also joined Juan Santos. Among them were Mateo Luís Sánchez, Don Piñate and Don Honofre--all, evidently, respected men within the frontier missions. As in the case of Mateo de Assia, their defection brought other Campa into the rebel fold.[27]

In spite of the inescapable fact that some Campa did follow Juan Santos, those natives did not provide the bulk of his support. Far more significant were the Indians from the Highland rim. In increasing numbers which greatly disturbed the viceregal officials, the serranos along the edge of the Highland swept down into the forest to join Juan Santos in his moves against the Spanish.[28] They proved effective rebels, and kept the Chanchamayo Valley in a constant state of turmoil. So marked was the exodus that in March of 1744 the corregidor of the Province of Tarma published a ban against serrano desertions, backing the prohibition with a penalty of immediate death.[29]

There were other components to Juan Santos' force. The Negro Antonio Gatica and at least seven other Africans allied themselves with the rebels.[30] A handful of Piro Indians from the Upper Tambo and a group of about six Conibos from the Ucayali also provided supportive strength.[31] But the other elements in no way equaled the numerical importance of the Highland natives. If

the program of Juan Santos was trans-Andean, by late 1742, when he had moved the rebel front to the Chanchamayo Valley, the human composition of his force smacked equally of a Highland revolt.

While the Campa Indians did not, as a tribe, play an active role in Juan Santos' movement, neither were they unanimous supporters of the Spanish. As individuals many backed the Europeans up to the final years of the movement, and a few followed the Franciscans in their definitive withdrawal to the Highlands. The Campa in the area of Sonomoro proved the more loyal, and under their cacique, Bartolomé Quintimari, they offered continuous resistance to the revolt.[32] But in general the vast majority of the Campa seemed passive observers of the conflict, and they swayed easily to the side that controlled their land. In spite of the fact that their future hung in the balance, they contributed little to either Spain's victory or defeat. As the chameleon, they changed to suit the dominant environment; and only when Juan Santos was at their side did they raise their hands against the white man.

Warfare in the Tropics

The actual confrontation between Juan Santos and the Spanish spanned ten years from 1742 to 1752. Yet, in spite of the length of the movement, both direct

contact between the two forces and the theatre of action were limited. When Juan Santos first raised his cry to arms in May of 1742, the Franciscans abandoned the Gran Pajonal and the Perené River area, retreating to the Chanchamayo Valley and the station of Sonomoro. Juan Santos and his cadre immediately filled the vacuum and by August of 1743 they had entrenched their forces in the Chanchamayo Valley. There, at the very heart of Spanish control, the primitive rebels became an irritant to continued stability. Between 1744 and 1751 only Sonomoro remained in Spanish hands.

For most of the decade Juan Santos showed little interest in the southern sector of the Jauja district. To the contrary, he concentrated his efforts along the rim of the Province of Tarma--a strategy which forced the Spanish to concentrate their efforts on the same area. As a result, the scene of active confrontation remained unchanged until 1751.

The apparent strategy of Juan Santos was to carry his movement onto the Highland plateau, to find a spot along the Tarma rim through which he could move his forces out of the high selva. He never found the appropriate spot. Thus frustrated in his strategic designs, he decided to move against colonial Peru at a new point. In the summer of 1751 he marched to the

station of Sonomoro in the southern mission district; forced the Spanish and Indian defenders to evacuate the area; and then prepared for a military assault against the Highland town of Andamarca in the Province of Jauja.

In 1752 Santos launched his final offensive. The Andamarca campaign, however, brought the rebel forces a major defeat. The Indians bridged the gap into Andamarca, but the climate of the Highlands and the resistance of the Highland people posed barriers to a rebel victory. Unable to consolidate his objectives, Santos marched back into the montaña. The Spanish, on their part, did not follow the rebels but opted instead for a policy of containment. By 1753 the movement died, with both sides renouncing their previous hopes for military success.

The struggle between Juan Santos and the Spanish took place within the territory of the Campa Indians, in the environment of the tropical forest. Although Juan Santos threatened at every turn to carry his crusade up into the Highlands, it was not until 1752 that he made an abortive attempt to carry out his threat. Thus, if the Spanish had hoped to defeat the primitive rebels, they would have had to do so on the terms dictated by the Indians and forest alike. But the viceregal officials failed to mold their tactics to the new situation, and they moved against their enemy with a form and style ill suited to the time and place.

Juan Santos led a guerrilla band in the tactics of guerrilla warfare: surprise attacks, followed by rapid retreats; raiding bands which expanded for combat and then dissolved after victory.[33] He and his forces remained eminently illusive and engaged the Spanish only when the odds of victory were beyond question. They moved through the forest with speed and agility, and stayed in one area only until the Spanish committed themselves to a new expedition. Then, as the Spaniards moved to execute their attack, the rebels hit at a point unprotected by military force. It was a method of warfare which threw uncertainty into the ranks of the Spanish and drew them into the defensive.

If the Spanish could only guess at the whereabouts of Juan Santos, the rebels knew with pinpoint accuracy each movement of their enemy. They used Highland Indians as spies to check Spanish progress and to report the form and content of Spanish mobilization.[34] And once the alien military had entered the montaña, Indian scouts monitored Spanish troop movement.[35] Thus the Spanish lost the advantage of surprise to the surreptitious natives.

While Juan Santos relied on the tactics of guerrilla warfare, the Spanish thought in terms of pitched battles and military campaigns. They refused to change the strategy which had succeeded in the Highlands; and,

as a consequence, their periodic expeditions into the montaña were merely exercises in futility. To engage Juan Santos effectively, the Spanish needed mobile forces who could worm through the forest with the same agility as the rebels. But instead of small bands, they countered with military regiments and companies, whose supply lines determined where and how long they could go.[36]

Combined with unbending tactics and the use of more traditional military organization, the environment of the montaña severely hindered the Spanish. The forces of Juan Santos found little difficulty in adopting to the terrain and climate of the forest: their dress, armor, and weapons conformed to its demands, and their stomachs ran on its vegetation and animal life. Noting the Indians' balance with the land the viceroy wrote: "There are no rapids, however swift, which they cannot pass as the fish, nor mountain, however high and entangled with underbrush, which they cannot penetrate as the wild beasts; in the very forest they find their most enjoyable food in the vegetation, snakes, and filthy animals which inhabit it."[37]

Such harmony the Spanish did not achieve. In the dense jungles, firearms lost their advantage of range over long distances and proved no more effective than the wooden arrows, clubs, and spears of the Indians.[38] The

humidity and torrential rains ruined the gun powder and spoiled food supplies. The drop between the Highland and forest, together with the numerous rivers and broken terrain of the montaña, made troop movement tedious. The temperature weakened the resolve of the soldier and left him exhausted and demoralized; the climate weakened his body and left him ill. Moreover the Spaniard never learned to live off of the forest products, and what he could not bring with him he had to do without--on occasion to the point of near starvation.[39]

If the Indians and the environment were not formidable enough, low discipline and morale worked their way against a Spanish victory. The campaign against the forces of Juan Santos threw nothing but obstacles in the path of the common soldier. And, weakened both physically and morally by the environment, he found no promise of material rewards to compensate for physical discomforts and to serve as an incentive for service and resolve.[40] The Spaniard moved grudgingly into the Campa field, and when he reached his absolute threshold of discomfort he fled back onto the Highland rim, deserting his post without fear and before the helplessness of his officers. Those who stayed disobeyed orders at will, and demanded silver from the very pockets of the officers before performing even the most routine of tasks.[41]

Indian tactics, the physical environment of the forest, and low morale within their ranks led the Spanish into military defeat. Without ever really engaging Juan Santos in open battle, Spain fell hopelessly and definitively. Unable to defeat the rebels militarily in their domain and on their terms, the forces of the Empire simply withdrew.

There was yet one additional facet to the Spanish defeat. As in the past, the response of Lima to the central frontier was weak and sporadic. The viceregal authorities largely refused to intervene in the area, and hazily delegated the bulk of the responsibility to secondary officials in the provinces of Tarma and Jauja. This deliberate decision, however, was not totally a reflection of Lima's classic disinterest in the Campa enterprise. Conditions within the area of Spanish Peru greatly influenced the level of bureaucratic involvement on the eastern frontier. Between 1740 and 1744, during the war of Jenkin's Ear, an English squadron commanded by Vice Admiral George Anson threatened Peru from the Pacific coast; in 1746 an earthquake leveled Lima and Callao; in 1750 three Indian conspiracies--in Huarochirí, Lambayeque, and Centa--threatened the social stability of Spanish Peru and revealed the level of latent unrest within the established colonial society. Although Anson left the Pacific area, and the Limeños began to reconstruct

their city, and the 1750 conspiracies died before they put their plans into action--the pressures along the coast directed much of Lima's attention away from the situation on the Campa frontier.

The Campa, without the Franciscans, returned to their precontact pattern of life. The leader of the revolt, however, apparently did not long enjoy his new life of leisure. While recorded history did not closely follow Juan Santos after 1752, rumor soon spread that he had died in Metraro, sometime between 1752 and 1766.[42] But the details surrounding his death were equally obscure, and by 1775 word again passed among the Spanish that Juan Santos was yet living among the Campa.[43] If he did indeed survive beyond 1766, he lived well secluded from the Highland world into which he was born.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RISE AND FALL OF A FRONTIER SOCIETY

The Rhythm of Expansion

Filled with a vigor characteristic of youth, and blushed with a recent revival in missionary dedication, a handful of intrepid Franciscans broke the frontier wilderness of the central montaña of Peru. Between 1708 and 1742 the robed pioneers labored to transform the realm of the Campa Indians into a Christian appendix to colonial society.

Valley by valley into the tropical world these harbingers of Hispano-Christian culture advanced the Spanish banner of conquest. Within two decades they had succeeded in stretching the boundaries of the Empire from the eastern rim of the Highlands to the northern edge of the Gran Pajonal. And they had not merely explored the vast expanse of land, they had occupied it with over twenty mission stations.

If the mission foundations held the Campa domain in the political orbit of Spanish Peru, they also held the natives under an umbrella of Hispano-Christian culture. Within their structured confines the friars

indoctrinated the Indians in the basic tenants of Spanish Catholicism, trained them in agriculture and basic manual crafts, and introduced them to more elaborate structures of socio-political organization. By 1742 a part of the total Campa population found itself in an intermediate state between preliterate barbarism and European civilization.

The eighteenth century friars performed amazing feats in the Campa domain; and if they finally failed to consolidate their successes it was not because their efforts were feeble but because they had labored under a marked degree of insecurity. In the eighteenth century, Spanish motives for expansion east of the Highlands were primarily strategic: a conscious effort to halt the intrusion of Brazil. Where Brazil intruded, the colonial bureaucracy tried to respond with material and human resources for Hispanic settlement.[1] But in the central frontier the threat of Portuguese expansion never materialized; as a result, the viceregal government in Lima held back its support.

At the same time other pressures affected Franciscan security. Their numbers were insufficient in spite of their vigorous efforts at recruitment; epidemic disease struck the field with uncomfortable frequency; the rugged environment cut away at their

stamina and resolve.

Yet notwithstanding the obstacles, the Franciscans had little difficulty in adjusting the Campa to mission life. Primarily through persuasion, and with the assistance of auxiliary forces of Negroes and Indians, the friars were able to control the natives; and the Campa responded with an outward acceptance of the disciplines of settlement.

At the very moment when the Franciscans felt success to be within their grip they tasted the bitter wine of defeat. In 1742 a Highland mestizo, Juan Santos Atahualpa, appeared on the Campa frontier to raise the standards of insurrection against colonial Peru. Juan Santos, in fact, had little interest in the Campa as a people, although he intended to use their land as a springboard onto the Andean plateau. For ten years he fought a spirited campaign to transform his dreams into fact but he failed to reach the Highland rim. During his battle, however, he disturbed Franciscan activity within the Campa field to such a degree that the friars were forced to abandon their enterprise. When the mission system dissolved the Campa readily reverted to their precontact state. The marks of Hispano-Christian culture faded from the Campa frontier. Almost two centuries of work were at an end.

Although as a consequence of the Juan Santos

movement the Campa easily readjusted to a life isolated from European contacts and returned to their aboriginal patterns, the revolt was neither a Campa uprising against Hispano-Christian culture nor a native move against the Franciscans. Rather, it was the carefully planned response of a Highland mestizo to the pressures of colonial Peru. If the Spanish military had responded more effectively to its challenge, the movement of Juan Santos would have entered the pages of history as simply a kind of localized resistance to contact.

Spain suffered defeat because her agents were unable to meet the Indians on their terms and in their environment. Forced to withdraw, the Spanish remained permanently on the edge of the Campa land. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, after the creoles had won the independence of the New World, that the white man managed to reënter the Campa territory, along the Chanchamayo River. With the construction of a fort at San Ramón in 1847 the Chanchamayo area was at last reopened, although not without occasional violence, to Western settlement.[2] But even then the hinterland remained isolated from the Highlands, and the Campa continued to show open distrust and hostility to all foreign penetration. Today that isolation has only partially been overcome.

An Hypothesis by Way of Conclusion

It was perhaps the rapid return of the Campa to their precontact patterns of organization which has led many critics to ignore the significant accomplishments of the Franciscan mission system. A major argument is if, indeed, the level of acculturation among the mission Campa was notable, why did the Indians revert easily to their aboriginal structures after the Juan Santos movement forced Spanish withdrawal?

The question is basic, and applicable not only to the Campa domain but also to other regions where Spanish withdrawal witnessed the rapid return of native peoples to essentially previous patterns of organization. In many of the Jesuit republics--for example, in Mojos, in eastern Bolivia--there were similar cases of a drastic reversal of cultural evolution.

Although the answer still remains in the air, the Campa experience affords an interesting hypothesis which might well prove valid in other mission areas.

The Franciscan program of acculturation concentrated almost exclusively on the male members of Campa society, and it was perhaps that male sector which reached the higher level of acculturation. On the other hand, the principal transmitters of intracultural patterns were the women--a phenomena characteristic of most tropical

forest tribes. As long as the Franciscans remained in the Campa area, they were able to short circuit the traditional avenues of culture transfer, thus, in effect, coöpting the cultural role of the female segments of the population. The friars controlled not only the culture content of the mission society, but its transferable processes as well.

With the Franciscan withdrawal, the women were able to resume totally their traditional functions as the principal transmitters of culture. Moreover, largely unacculturated in comparison to the men, they were able to impart the Campa heritage in a relatively pure form free from contamination. Had the Franciscans concentrated equally on the women, the reversal of cultural evolution might well have been less complete.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

NATIVE POPULATION OF STATIONS
IN THE TARMA CONVERSIONS
BY SELECTED YEARS

Station	1713	1724	1725	1730	1736
Quimirí	N.D.	140	N.D.	132	201
Nijandaris	---	16	N.D.	21	27
Cerro de la Sal	585	84	230	97	119
Metraro	---	N.D.	N.D.	N.D.	73
Eneno	600	287	330	243	237
Pichana	---	256	260	103	175
San Tadeo	---	400	400	255	259
Total	1185	1183	1220	851	1091

Sources: 1713: Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in HMFP, II, 52.

1724: Clemente de la Cruz, Padrón y disposiciones de los cinco pueblos a que se han reducido los ocho que tenía la conversión del Cerro de la Sal, 1724, BN/SM. The figure for Cerro de la Sal comes from a 1722 Razón, signed by Bernardo Chauarria, BN/SM.

1725: Tena, Misiones, in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 96-97.

1730: Amich, CHTFS, pp. 108-109.

1736: Resumen de los pueblos, familias y almas que tiene la conversión del Cerro de la Sal, 1736, BN/SM.

TABLE 2

NATIVE POPULATION OF STATIONS
IN THE JAUJA CONVERSIONS
BY SELECTED YEARS

Station	c. 1721	1724	1730	1733	1736
Sonomoro	766	210	230	N.D.	137
Chavini	347	90	116	N.D.	219
Jesús María	---	---	---	150	310
Catalipango	---	---	200	130	130
Total	1113	300	546	280	796

Sources: 1721 and 1724: Memoria y padrón de las almas que habitan en este pueblo de Santa Cruz de Sonomoro, 1724, BN/SM. Memoria y pardón de las almas que habitan en el pueblo de Nuestra Señora de la Pura y Limpia Concepción de Chavini, 1724, BN/SM.

1730: Amich, CHTFS, p. 108.

1733: La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM.

1736: Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 82.

TABLE 3

NATIVE POPULATION OF MISSION FOUNDATIONS
IN THE GRAN PAJONAL
BY SELECTED YEARS

Station	1733	1736	1739
Aporoquiaqui	107	111	43
Tampianique	277	278	244
Sabirosqui	167	270	N.D.
Quisopango	175	177	N.D.
Tihuanasqui	---	222	N.D.
Cuichaqui	---	78	N.D.
Camarosqui	---	272	N.D.
Pirintoki	---	103	N.D.
Caretegui	---	123	N.D.
Capotegui	---	72	36
Total	726	1706	323

Sources: 1733: La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

1736: Resumen de los pueblos, familias y almas que tiene la conversión del Cerro de la Sal, 1736, BN/SM.

1739: Simón Gazo, Padrón de los indios cristianos e infieles, 26 November 1739, BN/SM.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

BN/SM: The Departamento de Investigaciones Bibliográficas, Manuscritos y Libros Raros, Manuscript Section of the Biblioteca Nacional, Lima.

CHTFS: José Amich, Compendio histórico de los trabajos, fatigas, sudores y muertes que los ministros evangélicos de la seráfica religión han parecido por la conversión de las almas de los gentiles, en la montaña de los Andes, pertenecientes a las provincias del Perú (Paris: Librería de Roca y Bouret, 1854).

FLJSI: Francisco A. Loayza, Juan Santos, el invencible: Manuscritos del año 1742 al año 1755 (Lima: Editorial Miranda, 1942).

HMFP: Bernardino Izaguirre Ispizúa, Historia de las misiones franciscanas y narración de los progresos de la geografía en el Oriente del Perú (14 vols.; Lima: Talleres Tipográficos de la Penitenciaria, 1922-1929).

JERG: Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, Relaciones geográficas de Indias, 1881-1897, edited by José Urbano Martínez Carreras (3 vols.; Madrid: Atlas, 1965).

MJL: Víctor M. Maurtua, Juicio de límites entre el Perú y Bolivia (15 vols.; Barcelona, Imprenta de Henrich y Compañía, 1906).

MPFO: Historia de las misiones de fieles é infieles del Colegio de Propaganda Fide de Santa Rosa de Ocopa (2 vols.; Barcelona: Imprenta Peninsular, 1883).

RANP: Revista del Archivo Nacional del Perú (Lima).

CHAPTER 1: STRUCTURE OF THE UNKNOWN

1. Juan Font to Joan Sebastián, 5 November 1595, in JERG, II (1885), 102.

2. Juan Font to Joan Sebastián, 5 November 1595, in JERG, II (1885), 103.

3. Nicolás Mastrilo to Joan Sebastián, November 1595, in JERG, II (1885), 104-105.

4. Nicolás Mastrilo to Joan Sebastián, November 1595, in JERG, II (1885), 105.

5. Joseph A. Tosi, Jr., in Zonas de vida natural en el Perú (San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas de la OEA, Zona Andina, 1960), has an excellent analysis of the several zones both within and outside of the central montaña.

6. Tosi, Zonas, p. 7. Edmund Eduard Hegen, Highways into the Upper Amazon Basin: Pioneer Lands in Southern Colombia, Ecuador and Northern Peru (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1966), p. 18. For an eyewitness description of the ceja boardering the Chanchamayo Valley see William Lewis Herndon and Lardner Gibbon, Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon (Washington, D.C.: Taylor and Maury, 1854), I, 79. Padre Font's account, cited above, is an equally vivid description of the ceja just east of Andamarca.

7. Two principal drainage systems lace the central montaña. The waterways of the Pachitea (formed at the confluence of the Palcazu and Pichis rivers) drain the northern sector. The headwaters of the Upper Ucayali drain the southern sector. This second system includes the Chanchamayo, Paucartambo, Perené, Pangoa, Ene, and Tambo rivers. The Huallaga River, which threads its way north to the Marañon, cuts across the northwest corner of the central montaña; it is, however, of secondary importance.

8. For a detailed description of the Gran Pajonal see M. S. Chrostowski and W. M. Denevan, The Biogeography of the Gran Pajonal of Eastern Peru: A Reconnaissance Study (Montreal: McGill University, in press /1970/).

9. Chrostowski and Denevan, Biogeography, p. 21. The ONERN publications, particularly the Evaluación e integración del potencia económica y social de la zona Perené-Satipo-Ene (2 vols; Lima: ONERN, 1963-1964), provide additional information.

CHAPTER II: THE NATIVE INHABITANTS

1. Population estimates of the Campa at contact are tentative. The present population according to Ralph W. Eichenberger, "Una filosofía de salud pública para las tribus indígenas amazónicas," América Indígena, XXVI (April, 1966), 119, is between 10,000 and 15,000. Stefano Varese, La Sal de los Cerros (Lima: Universidad Peruana de Ciencias y Tecnología, 1968), p. 14, suggests 20,000 as a possible maximum. William Denevan, in a personal communication, has suggested the more substantial figure of from 25,000 to 30,000. Certainly the contact population was at least as high as the present level; but primary sources do not support estimates much above 30,000. I am inclined to accept 25,000 as a contact maximum, with a probable minimum at 15,000.

2. Stefano Varese, Cerros, p. 11, suggests a contact extension of some 100,000 square kilometers. This figure includes territory west to the Pachitea River and north to the confluence of the Pachitea and Upper Ucayali. Sources which I have consulted seem to hint at a more restricted territorial spread--with the areas of higher population density along the Chanchamayo, Perené, and Ene rivers. See, in particular, Pablo Joseph de Arriaga, Annua de la Compañía de Jesús, Tucuman y Perú, 1596, in JERG, II, 86-113; Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, Entrada y Misión a los Andes de Jauja en 1602, in JERG, III, 257-275; Juan Bautista de la Marca, Diario y padrón de la gente del Pajonal, 1733, BN/SM.; testimony before General D. Alonso de la Cueva Messia, 1687, in RANP, II (1921), 393-410; Fernando Rodríguez Tena, Misiones de la Santa Provincia de los Doce Apostoles de Lima, quoted in Dionisio Ortiz, Oxapampa: Visión histórica y desarrollo de la provincia de Oxapampa, en el Departamento de Pasco (Lima: Editorial San Antonio, 1967), pp. 81-84; Nicolás Mastrilo to Rodrigo de Cabredo in Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en el Perú, by Rubén Vargas Ugarte (Burgos: Imprenta de Aldecoa, 1963), I, 409-411.

3. See Figure 2 of this essay for the geo-ethnic distribution in the central montaña. The Piros were mainly clustered outside of the cultural area of the Campa, along the Upper Urubamba River. Other tribes of

the Panoan linguistic complex, such as the Shipibos, evidently had little or no contact with the Campa. For the contact distribution see La Marca, Plano del Paraje San Fermín de Enne, [1733?], BN/SM., and Varese, Cerros, p. 55.

The Machiguenga, a Campa related tribe, remained separated from the Campa. There was apparently little interaction between the two peoples in spite of their common language. For a recent report on the Machiguenga see Andrés Ferrero, Los Machiquengas: Tribu selvática del sur-oriente peruano (Lima: Editorial OPE, 1966).

4. For an example of Spanish practice see José Amich, CHTFS, p. 108; Izaguirre, HMFP, I, 197-198. The practice outlived the Spanish Empire: see Antonio Tovar, Catálogo de las lenguas de América del Sur (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1961), pp. 128-129.

It is interesting to note that the word "Anti" is the origin of the term "Andes," and that at least during the seventeenth century it referred to the Campa Indians east of the towns of Jauja and Andamarca. See Varese, Cerros, pp. 29-31, for more detailed information about the origin and changing meaning of the word.

5. Francisco de San José to Viceroy, 5 June 1730, BN/SM., Izaguirre, HMFP, VI, 286. Testimony before General D. Alonso de la Cuera Messia, 1687, in RANP, II (1921), 393-410. Nicolás Mastrilo to Rodrigo Cabredo in Vargas Ugarte, Historia de la Compañía de Jesus en el Perú, I, 409-411. Juan de la Marca, Diario y padrón, 1713, BN/SM. Juan de la Marca to Commissary of Missions, 1713, BN/SM.

6. For site locations in the Gran Pajonal see Chrostowski and Denevan, Biogeography, pp. 62-63. Juan de la Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM., offers historical evidence to support Chrostowski and Denevan's observations about present resident site locations.

7. Varese, Cerros, p. 16. William M. Denevan, personal communication.

8. Varese, Cerros, p. 133. Seventeenth and eighteenth century sources make no reference to the shaman. His role escaped Spanish attention.

9. This myth was reported by Stefano Varese, from the oral traditions of the Pajonal Campa. See Varese, Cerros, pp. 124-125. In his Spanish translation, Varese tried to preserve the original flavor of the myth as well

as its linear syntax. My own translation of the Spanish version is not as faithful.

10. La Marca, Diario y padrón, BN/SM.

11. Robert L. Carneiro, "Slash-and-Burn Cultivation Among the Kuikuru and Its Implications for Cultural Development in the Amazon Basin," in The Evolution of Horticultural Systems in Native South America, ed. by Johannes Wilbert (Caracas: Sociedad de Ciencias Naturales, 1961), pp. 60-62.

12. Gerald Weiss, in a personal communication, 28 October 1968. Professor Weiss' observations about craft specialization were in reference to present patterns among the River Campa. Historical uniformities in the Campa material culture would seem to indicate that such patterns also defined precontact society.

13. Varese, Cerros, pp. 17-18.

14. Weiss, in a personal communication to the author. Alan K. Craig, "Brief Ethnology of the Campa Indians, Eastern Peru," América Indígena, XXVII (1967), 223-235, presents a divergent view, and feels language is not a positive organizational factor.

15. Varese, Cerros, p. 25.

16. In addition to the lunar ritual there were at least two other rituals: the ritual initiation of the female child at puberty, and the burial ceremony.

17. Izaguirre, "Descripción histórico-geográfico de algunas tribus orientales del Perú," Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Lima, XLV (1928), 206-207.

18. Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, translated by William R. Trask (New York: Pantheon, 1954), pp. 17-34, 88. John L. Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), p. 54.

19. Weiss, personal communication, 28 October 1968.

20. Antonio Vásquez de Espinoza, Compendio y descripción de las Indias Occidentales (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1948), pp. 535-536.

21. Izaguirre, HMFP, I, 125-126.

22. Julian H. Steward, "Tribes of the Montaña: An Introduction," in The Tropical Forest Tribes, Vol. III of Handbook of South American Indians, ed. by J. H. Steward (6 vols.; New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1963), pp. 508-510.

CHAPTER III: THE ORDERING OF THE SPANISH ADVANCE: 1595-1708

1. Testimony before Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, pp. 101-103. Testimony before Martín Pérez de Goyas, 1657, in RANP, XX (1956), 66-84, 317-340. Testimony before Alonso de la Cueva Messia, 1687, in RANP, II (1921), 391-410. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 22-24. Ricardo García Rosell, Conquista de la Montaña (Lima: La Prensa, 1905), p. 14.

2. For a brief summary of the activity of the Jesuits in Spanish America see the introduction of Magnus Mörner to The Explusion of the Jesuits from Latin America, ed. by Magnus Mörner (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), pp. 11-16.

3. Cédula, 25 May 1602, in La Iglesia de España en el Perú: Colección de documentos para la historia de la Iglesia en el Perú, ed. by Emilio Lissón Chavés (Lima: Editorial Católica Española, 1946), IV, 478-479. José Teruel to Viceroy, [1602], in Vargas Ugarte, Historia de la Compañía, I, 405-409. Jiménez de la Espada, JERG, III, 269-271.

4. Testimony before Martín Pérez de Goyas, 1657, in RANP, XX (1956), 66-84, 317-340.

5. The Dominicans played a restricted role in Spain's expansion into the montaña. Only among the Canelo Indians did the Order establish a productive beachhead.
For the 1655 entrada of the Order into the Chanchamayo see Testimony before Juan Astudillo Masuel, 4 July 1661, in RANP, XXI, (1957), 82-98. Also see Cédula, 12 March 1718, in MJL, XII, 268-274.

6. Diego de Córdoba y Salinas, Crónica franciscana de las provincias del Perú, ed. by Lino G. Canedo (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1957), pp. 444-454. Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 74-89.

7. Varese, Cerros, pp. 46-54.

8. Herbert E. Bolton, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish American Colonies," American Historical Review, XXIII (1917-1918), 42-61. Constantino Bayle, "Las misiones, defensa de las fronteras," Missionalia Hispánica, VIII (1951), 417-503.

9. Charles W. Arnade, "The Failure of Spanish Florida," The Americas, XVI (1959-60), 271-281.

10. Antonine S. Tibesar, "The Alternativa: A Study of Spanish-Creole Relations in Seventeenth Century Peru," The Americas, XL (1955), 282-283. Phelan, Quito, pp. 265-268.

11. Charles Gibson, Spain in America (Harper and Row: New York, 1966), p. 83.

12. See the introduction of Lino G. Canedo to Fray Isidro Felix de Espinosa, Crónica de los colegios de Propaganda Fide de la Nueva España, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1964), p. xix.

13. Canedo in his introduction to Espinosa, Crónica, p. xx.

14. P. Borges, "Mission College," New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1968, IX, 905. Canedo in Espinosa, Crónica, pp. xvii-xxix. Francis Borgia Steck, "Los colegios misioneros franciscanos en la América española," Ensayos históricos hispanoamericanos (Mexico: Abside, 1940), pp. 55-74.

15. Espinosa, Crónica, p. 784.

16. A succint but idealized treatment of Francisco de San José can be found in Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 11-97. An earlier but similar study is unraveled in MFPO, I, ix-xxix.

17. The details of Fray Francisco's life are well documented. There is some confusion as to when he arrived in Mexico, but Espinosa, Crónica, p. 784, clearly puts the question to rest.

CHAPTER IV: THE CAMPA ENTERPRISE IN FORM AND STRUCTURE

1. Francisco de San José to Commissary General of the Indies, March 1721, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 96.

2. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in MPFO, I, xxiii. For the approximate location of Cerro see Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 83, 97; José Gil Muñoz to King, 12 September 1745, in FLJSI, p. 77.

Location of even the approximate position of the stations is difficult. Of some use is the map drawn by Manuel Sobreviela in 1790 (see HMFP, II and VII). I have tried to cross-compare primary sources but without better ground surveys the problems remain insurmountable. Indeed, probably only archeologists can solve the enigmas.

3. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in MPFO, I, xxiii. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 75.

4. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in MPFO, I, xxiii. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 134.

5. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 108-109. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 96-97. Francisco de San José to Commissary General of the Indies, March 1721, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 95-96.

Purísima Concepción de Eneno and San Antonio de Eneno appear to have been the same station; when San Antonio became the accepted name is not clear, for even after its refounding ca. 1721 the name Purísima Concepción de Eneno still appears.

6. Clemente de la Cruz, Padrón y disposiciones de los cinco pueblos a que se han reducido los ocho que tenía la conbersión del Cerro de la Sal, por causa de las epidemias, hecho desde 15 de agosto que empezó a visitarla el comissario dellas Fr. Francisco de San Joseph, nombrado por secretario de la visita al P. Difinidor Fr. Clemente

de la Cruz, August 1724, BN/SM. Antonine S. Tibesar, "San Antonio de Eneno," Primitive Man, XXV [1952], pp. 36-38.

7. See Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 96-97. Also see Table 1 in the appendix to this essay.

The fate of Metraro is not clear from existing records. The 1720's might well have been difficult ones for the post, but 1736 records do include it as an operative station with a resident missionary.

8. For more on personnel shortages, see below, Chapter V.

9. Joseph Skinner, ed., The Present State of Peru: Comprising Its Geography, Topography, Natural History, etc. (London: 1805), p. 453.

10. In 1733 the Dominicans turned over to the Franciscans the station of Chanaza. Located about 9 kilometers from Quimirí, in the western edge of the valley of the Chanchamayo River, Chanaza contained about 431 Indians--perhaps Campa. Little more is known about the post, except that by 1742 it had ceased to exist. See Diario en el cual se da noticia individual de lo acaecido en el viaje o entrada, que por orden del Excelentísimo Señor Virrey de estos Reinos, el Marqués de Villa García se ejecutó, October-November 1743, in FLJSI, p. 35. Also see the map copied by José de San Antonio and reproduced in FLJSI.

After 1733, with the effective occupation of the Gran Pajonal, some of the posts in that area were assigned to the Tarma circuit. Nevertheless, the Tarma missionaries did not take an active part in the Pajonal enterprise; and even though some of the stations were administratively part of the Tarma district, its missionaries came from the Jauja circuit. Tarma's major contribution to the Pajonal enterprise was an occasional neophyte.

11. For a vivid account of the movement of a 1742 military expedition into the Tarma area see Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, pp. 19-39.

12. Skinner, Peru, p. 450. Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, pp. 19-35. The road which the Dominicans built in the seventeenth century followed approximately the same course but took only two days to travel: see Testimony before Martín Pérez de Goyas, 1657, in RANP, XX (1956), 66-84.

13. Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 84. Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 21.

14. Skinner, Peru, p. 450. Testimony before D. Alonso de la Cueva Messia, 6 March 1687, in RANP, II, 391-410.

15. Guillermo Faura Gaig, Los ríos de la Amazonia peruana (Callao: 1962), pp. 355-356.

16. See, for example, Francisco de San José to Commissary General of the Indies, March 1721, in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 96.

17. By raft, downstream, it took five hours to cover the distance between Eneno and Pichana. See Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 96. The return trip, against the current, could be twice as long.

18. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 26.

19. The last available population statistics for the Tarma conversions date from 1736. At that time, a little over 1,000 Indians were settled within the stations. Fluctuations between 1736-1742 were apparently minor, although if anything there had been a slight decrease due to the probable epidemic ca. 1737. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that the population of the seven stations in 1742 was below 1,000. See appendix to the present essay.

20. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in HMFP, II, 53.

21. Miguel de Jesús, Memoria y padrón de Sonomoro, 1724, BN/SM. Miguel de Jesus, Memoria y padrón de Chavini, 1724, BN/SM.

22. Alonso de Espíritu Santo, [Certificación], [1736], BN/SM. Ortiz, Reseña histórica de la montaña del Pangoa, Gran Pajonal y Satipo: 1673-1960 (Lima: Editorial San Antonio, 1960), pp. 32-33.

23. Ortiz, Reseña, pp. 38-39.

24. La Marca, Plano del Paraje San Fermín de Enne, [1733], BN/SM. For details of the local "palace revolt" see also Ortiz, Reseña, p. 33; and La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM.

25. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 89, mentions the Santa Bárbara de Parica attempt. Later, in 1737, Fray Fernando de Jesús was in the area because of the Torote rebellion. He encouraged the Campa of the area to congregate once again, and promised them a missionary, but nothing more came of the post even then. See also Ortiz, Reseña, p. 41.

26. For the Torote uprising, see Amich, CHTFS, pp. 160-170; HMFP, II, 85-89; Daniel Valcárcel, Rebeliones indígenas (Lima: Editorial P.T.C.M., 1946), p. 42-46. Also see Tibesar "San Antonio," pp. 38-39.

27. In 1739 the Franciscans, under Fray José Cabanes, made an entrada into the land of the Piro Indians. An epidemic, however, broke out and the Piros forced the Franciscans to retreat, although the friars still kept alive their interest in the northern areas.

28. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 151. Resumen de los pueblos, familias y almas que tiene la conversión del Cerro de la Sal, [1736?], BN/SM. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 127-128.

29. Juan de la Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM. There is some confusion as to the nature and composition of the early efforts in the Pajonal. La Marca's account in this letter conflicts with Izaguirre's: see HMFP, II, 79-81.

30. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 21 February 1733, BN/SM.

31. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM. Corintoni merged with Sabirosqui before 1736.

32. Resumen de los pueblos, [1736?], BN/SM. HMFP, II, 81.

33. Alonso de Espíritu Santo, Padrón, 25 August 1736, BN/SM. Espíritu Santo, Padrón de la nueva Gente, [1736?], BN/SM.

34. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 151. Ortiz, Reseña, pp. 48-49.

35. Ordenanzas of 1573 in Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de

América y Oceanía (42 vols; Madrid: 1864-84), XVI, 142 ff.

36. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 30.

37. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

38. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 97.

39. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

40. Diego de Herrera, Padrón de indios amages, 27 August 1724, BN/SM.

41. For a typical example see Clemente de la Cruz, Razón del pueblo de San Francisco de Pichana, 5 September 1724, BN/SM. Also: Miguel de San José, Memoria y padrón de las almas que habitan en el pueblo de Nuestra Señora de la Pura y Limpia Concepción de Chavini, 1724, BN/SM.

42. For the catalogues of the libraries of Cerro de la Sal and Pichana see Bernardo Chavarría, Razón del pueblo de Christo Crucificado del Cerro de la Sal, 31 August 1722, BN/SM; and Clemente de la Cruz, Razón del pueblo de San Francisco de Pichana, 5 September 1724, BN/SM. Also see Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 31.

43. Inventario de las alhajas de la iglesia y trastes del convento de este pueblo de Eneno, 8 May 1732, BN/SM. Francisco de San José to Commissary General, March 1721, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 92, 96.

44. Francisco de San José to Commissary of Missions, March 21, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 95-96. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM. Alonso de Espíritu Santo, Padrón de la gente que Dios misericordo se ha dignado alumbrar y atraer al conocimiento de nuestras verdades evangélicas, 25 August 1736, BN/SM. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 136, 151. Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 27-28. Ortiz, Reseña, pp. 48-49.

45. Miguel Venegas, Noticia de la California y de su conquista espiritual hasta el tiempo presente, 1739 (3 vols; Madrid: 1757), II, 158-161, describes such a practice in Baja California.

46. Bernardo Chauarría, Razón del pueblo de Cristo Crucificado del Cerro de la Sal, 31 August 1722, BN/SM.

47. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, pp. 134-135, 137, 139, 145-146.

48. Amich, CHIFS, p. 152. MPFO, I, xxvi.

49. License, 12 March 1725, in Ortiz, Reseña, pp. 461-462. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 462.

50. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 63.

51. Papal Bull of Clemente XIII, 18 August 1758, in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 463-465.

CHAPTER V: FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE FRANCISCAN MISSION

1. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 153.

2. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 41, 83, 105. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 96-97. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 108-109. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in HMFP, II, 52-53.

3. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in HMFP, II, 52-53.

4. For an indication of Franciscan strength between 1730-1742 see Amich, CHTFS, pp. 108-109; and the map included in the letter from José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI.

5. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 172-128.

6. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 41, 57-58.

7. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 145. José de San Antonio to King, 10 April 1747, in HMFP, II, 293.

8. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in HMFP, II, 53. Cédula, 12 March 1718, in MJL, XII, 268-274, mentions a second letter from Fray Francisco, dated 8 December 1713 and requesting, specifically, ten or twelve friars.

9. Cédula, 12 March 1718, in MJL, XII, 272.

10. Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 100. Oritz, Reseña, p. 35.

11. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 137. Cédula, 22 December 1734, MJL, XII, 258.

12. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 260, 267.

13. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 265.

14. Skinner, Peru, p. 460. Valcárcel, Rebeliones indígenas, p. 46.

15. José Patricio de Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barrenechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, p. 51. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 144. Amich, CHTFS, p. 170.

16. The following discussion of the presence and use of Negroes rests heavily on Antonine S. Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 32-34.

17. Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 33-34.

18. Manuel de Santo and Domingo García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 6.

19. Marqués de Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 57.

20. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM.

21. La Marca, Diario y padrón, BN/SM.

22. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in HMFP, II, 52.

23. Diego de Herrera, Padrón de Indios Amages que han quedado vivos en este pueblo del Patrocinio de Nuestra Señora de Quimirí, 27 August 1724, BN/SM.

24. Amich, CHTFS, p. 108.

25. Diego de Herrera, Padrón de Quimirí, 27 August 1724, BN/SM.

26. Manuel Biedma, quoted in Ortiz, Reseña, p. 24.

27. See Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 32.

28. Gibson, Spain, pp. 191-192.

29. Skinner, Peru, p. 460.

30. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 167-168. Also see José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 148, for an indication of the condition of Santiago ca. 1750.

31. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, pp. 146-147. José Gil Muñoz to King, 12 September 1745, in FLJSI, pp. 82-83. José Patricio de Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barrenechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, pp. 51-52.

32. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 138.

33. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 148.

34. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, pp. 137-138, 141. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 265-266. The latent antagonisms between the Franciscans and the corregidores came through clearly during the Juan Santos uprising.

35. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 267.

36. Antonio Raimondi, El Perú (3 vols; Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1876), II, 26, 329-330. Testimony before Don Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, pp. 90-103.

37. Raimondi, El Perú, II, 330. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

38. Varese, Cerros, pp. 62-63, mentions a document, in the Ocopa archives, which indicated that some Spaniards did request a license to colonize the Campa lands--perhaps an example of spontaneous colonization.

39. José Gil Muñoz to King, 12 September 1745, in FLJSI, p. 80.

40. José Gil Muñoz to King, 12 September 1745, in FLJSI, p. 83.

41. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, pp. 147-148.

42. Juan de la Marca complained frequently about mission shortages. For an example see La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM.; La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 1733, BN/SM. For a general discussion of the market potentials of forest agriculture see Pierre Gourou, The Tropical World, translated by S. H. Beaver and E. D. Laborde (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 76-88.

43. Antonine S. Tibesar, "The Franciscan Doctrinero versus the Franciscan Misionero in Seventeenth Century Peru," The Americas, XIV (October, 1957), 119.

44. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in MPFO, I, xxv.

45. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 263. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 134. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in MPFO, I, xxv.

46. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 260. Ortiz, Reseña, p. 43. Marqués de Castelfuerte, 12 March 1725, in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 462.

47. Francisco de San José to King, 25 November 1713, in MPFO, I, xxv.

48. José Gil Muñoz to King, 12 September 1745, in FLJSI, pp. 80-81. José Patricio Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barrenechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, p. 51.

49. José Gil Muñoz to King, 12 September 1745, in FLJSI, p. 83.

50. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 141.

51. Cédula, 22 December 1734, in MJL, XII, 263, 267. Cédula, 13 March 1751, in MJL, XII 274-275.

52. Marqués de Villa García to King, 28 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 69.

53. Phelan, Quito, p. 82.

CHAPTER VI: PROCESSES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROLLED ACCULTURATION

1. I have used Kroeber's concept of 'assimilation' which places the process as one of the results of 'acculturation.' Writes Kroeber: "Since acculturation basically is the acceptance or borrowing of material from one culture by another, it always involves some approximation between the two cultures. But there is no reason why such approximation should continue into assimilation. Normally, we may expect assimilation only when the outlook of one society is inclusive and when this society is definitely the stronger and its culture the more advanced." See A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology: Culture Patterns and Processes (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 236.

2. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 22 April 1731, BN/SM.

3. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

4. Manuel Bajo, /Certificaciones/, /1736/, BN/SM. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

5. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 136. The percentage is based on figures cited by Fray José from a 1732 visita to the central montaña.

6. These numbers are tentative. The available data is not adequate to arrive at a really serviceable figure. For some indication of the number of neophytes see José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, pp. 136, 150. In a 1732 visita 12,000 neophytes were recorded as having been baptized between 1709 and 1732. For the period 1630-1750, Fray José mentioned that 125,705 neophytes had died. Both figures included the conversion of Tarma, Jauja, and Huánuco, but not the Gran Pajonal.

7. Ortiz, Oxapampa, pp. 95-96. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

8. The Campa catechism was not distributed to the natives, but transmitted orally by the friars. Consequently, the only published Doctrina in Campa which survives dates from the late nineteenth century: see Gabriel Sala, Diccionario, gramática y catecismo castellano, inga, amueixa y campa, in HMFP, XIV, 457-467. There are indications, however, that Campa Doctrinas were in use as early as the seventeenth century: see Ortiz, Reseña, p. 10. Juan de la Marca also wrote a Doctrina, a grammar, a dictionary, and other texts of a doctrinal nature in the native language: see Varese, Cerros, p. 62. La Marca's manuscript apparently did not survive--nor did those of the seventeenth century.

9. Amich, CHTFS, p. 146.

10. Ortiz, Reseña, p. 48. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 31. In the census of the mission stations, the colegiales were frequently listed separately.

11. Testimony before Don Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, pp. 85-105. La Marca to Viceroy, 22 April 1731, BN/SM.

12. La Marca to Viceroy, 22 April 1731, BN/SM.

13. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 21 February 1733, BN/SM.

14. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 11 November 1730, BN/SM. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

15. Antonio de la Hoz, Razón del pueblo de la Purísima Concepción de Eneno, 3 September 1724, BN/SM. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 30.

16. See Robert Ricard, The Spiritual Conquest of Mexico, translated by Lesley Byrd Simpson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 176-193.

17. Ortiz, Reseña, p. 48.

18. Miguel de San José, Memoria y padrón de las almas que habitan en este pueblo de Santa Cruz de Santa Cruz de Sonomoro, 1724, BN/SM. Miquel de San José, Memoria y padrón de las almas que habitan en el pueblo de Nuestra Señora de la Pura y Limpia Concepción de Chavini, 15 October 1724.

19. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 138. Manuel de Santo and Domingo García

to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 6. Francisco de San José quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 96. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 33.

20. See Chrostowski and Denevan, Biogeography, for a more detailed discussion of the Pajonal grasses.

21. Manuel de Santo and Domingo García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 6.

22. Francisco de San José quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 96. Testimony before Don Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, p. 91. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

23. La Marca, Plano del paraje San Fermín de Enne, [1733], BN/SM.

24. See Amich, CHTFS, p. 146.

25. Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 38-39.

26. David P. Werlich, "History of the Montaña" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota), Chapter VII, p. 13.

27. Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 28-30. Also see La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

28. Viceregal officials accused the Franciscans of using undue force against the Campa: See José Patricio Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barrenechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, p. 52. The accusation, however, seems unjust, and available evidence does not support it. The friars' use of armed troops, for example, during initial penetrations was purely a defensive measure and they were not used to coerce the Campa.

29. Testimony before Don Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, pp. 85-110. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 22 April 1731, BN/SM.

30. Alfred Métraux, "The Revolution of the Ax," Diógenes, XXV (1959), 28-40.

31. Francisco de San José to Comisario General de Indias, March 1721, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 95.

32. Manuel Biedma was an early exponent of this strategy. See Ortiz, Reseña, p. 24, for excerpts of a

letter, written by Biedma, in which the friar explains his plans for mission advance.

33. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 83. Skinner, Peru, p. 450. The Cerro de la Sal extends east to join the Kitchungari Mountain Range.

34. Much of the information about the salt trade comes from a series of testimonies presented on 6 March 1687 before Don Alonso de la Cueva Messia, Corregidor y Justicia Mayor of Tarma, by a group of colonists from the Chanchamayo area: see RANP, II (1921), 393-410. Also see testimony before Martín Pérez de Goyas, Corregidor y Justicia Mayor of Tarma, 1657, in RANP, XX (1956), 66-84, 317-340. The article by Antonine S. Tibesar, "The Salt Trade Among the Montaña Indians of the Tarma Area of Eastern Peru," Primitive Man, XXIII [1950], pp. 103-109, is an excellent summary of the documentary evidence and treats the subject in great detail. See also Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 83. Felipe Guacra Paucar, La descripción que se hizo en la provincia de Xauxa, May 1582, in JERG, I, 171.

35. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 146.

36. Tena, Misiones, quoted in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 97.

37. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM. La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 21 February 1733, BN/SM.

38. For an example of the products given to the natives see La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.; Ortiz, Reseña, p. 50.

39. José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 134; Amich, CHTFS, pp. 102-103; La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.; La Marca to Commissary of Missions, 21 February 1733, BN/SM.; Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 25-26.

40. In "San Antonio," p. 31, Tibesar notes that the separation of sons from their fathers was frequently resented by both parties.

41. See La Marca, letter draft, [1732], BN/SM., for an indication of the thought that went into the foundations of mission posts. See also Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 26.

CHAPTER VII: THE JUAN SANTOS MOVEMENT

1. Francisco de San José to Commissary General of the Indies, March 1721, in Ortiz, Oxapampa, p. 96.

2. For a more detailed discussion of the Torote rebellion see Ortiz, Reseña, pp. 42-45.

3. La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 7. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 31.

4. La Marca to Viceroy, 22 April 1731, BN/SM.

5. Such, at least, was the case in the Gran Pajonal. See La Marca, Diario y padrón, 1733, BN/SM.

6. For a clear statement of this position see Elman R. Service, "Indian-European Relations in Colonial Latin America," American Anthropologist, LVII (June 1955), pp. 416-423.

7. The concept of "environmental pressure" was suggested by Dr. Charles E. Mann, Department of Anthropology, University of the Americas, Mexico, in a personal communication to the author.

8. Tibesar, "San Antonio," pp. 32-35. Raimondi, El Perú, II, 330.

9. Kroeber, Anthropology, pp. 245-246. Charles E. Mann in a personal communication to the author.

10. H. Jorge Von Hassel, "Las tribus salvages de la región amazónica del Perú," Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Lima, XVII (1905), 66, offers the only divergent opinion in regard to Juan Santos' ethnic origin. Hassel claims that Santos was a Campa from the Gran Pajonal, trained by the Franciscans as a means of dominating the other Indians. This view seems extreme.

General opinion was that Juan Santos was born in Cuzco: see Manuel del Santo and Domingo García to the Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 2.

Others claimed he was born in Ayacucho (Raimondi, El Perú, II, 331) or in Cajamarquilla (reported by a spy for Juan Santos in the Diario of a 1743 entrada, in FLJSI, p. 29).

11. Secretary to Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 38. José de San Antonio to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, FLJSI, p. 2.

12. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 4. Amich, CHTFS, p. 146-147.

13. Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 29, 33-34. Marqués de Villa García to King, 16 August 1747, in FLJSI, p. 67.
For an example of Spanish contributions to the myth see José de San Antonio to King, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p. 153, who reports that the Church profetized Juan Santos' uprising in 1739.

14. José Patricio de Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barranechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, p. 50. Santo and García, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 3.

15. HMFP, II, 109. Testimony before Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, p. 95.

16. Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 67. Amich, CHTFS, p. 146. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 110.

17. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 2. Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 33. Amich, CHTFS, p. 147.

18. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, pp. 4-5.

19. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, pp. 2-3. Amich, CHTFS, p. 148.

20. Amich, CHTFS, p. 148.

21. José Patricio de Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barrenechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, p. 52.

22. See the bibliography attached to this essay.

23. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 6. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 110.

24. José de San Antonio, Relación lastimosa de las cruelísimas muertes que dieron los apóstalas y gentiles de varias naciones a los pp. misioneros apostólicos del Colegio de Misiones de Ocopa y Provincia de los Doce Apostoles de Lima en el Reyno del Perú, 10 April 1747, in HMFP, II, 294-296. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 162. Skinner, Peru, p. 460.

25. Tibesar, "San Antonio," p. 39.

26. Testimony before Don Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, 8 October 1745, in FLJSI, p. 87.

27. Secretary to Benito Troncoso: Diario, in FLJSI, pp. 34, 38. Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 58.

28. Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, in FLJSI, pp. 27-28. José Patricio de Arbeiza y Elizondo and Manuel de Barrenechea to King, 14 March 1744, in FLJSI, p. 51. Amich, CHTFS, pp. 153-154.

29. Marques de Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 64.

30. Amich, CHTFS, p. 149. Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, in FLJSI, p. 34.

31. Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, in FLJSI, p. 29. Santo and García to Commissary of Missions, 2 June 1742, in FLJSI, p. 3. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, p. 121.

32. José de San Antonio, Relación lastimosa de las cruelísimas muertes, 10 April 1747, in HMFP, II, p. 294-296. Ortiz, Reseña, pp. 55, 57. Amich, CHTFS, p. 168.

33. José de San Antonio to Commissary of Missions, 11 June 1750, in FLJSI, p.156. Amich, CHTFS, p. 160.

34. Secretary to Benito Troncoso de Lira y Sotomayor, Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 28.

35. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 123. Secretary of Benito Troncoso, Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 35.

36. Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, 1743, in FLJSI, p. 24. Marqués de Villa García to King, 16

August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 66. Alfonso de Santa de Ortega to Juan de Tecla Santa, 30 May 1747, in FLJSI, pp. 122-123.

37. Marqués de Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 65.

38. Marqués de Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 65.

39. Marqués de Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 66.

40. This lack of material incentive was a major complaint of the soldier. See Marqués de Villa García to King, 16 August 1744, in FLJSI, p. 66.

41. See Secretary to Benito Troncoso, Diario, pp. 23, 30, 44.

42. Izaguirre, HMFP, II, 184.

43. MJL, V, 303-309.

CHAPTER VIII: THE RISE AND FALL OF A FRONTIER SOCIETY

1. Constantino Bayle, "Las misiones, defensa de las fronteras," Missionalia Hispánica, VIII (1951), 417-503. C. R. Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 291-292. Phelan, Quito, pp. 34-37.

It must be emphasized that during the first half of the eighteenth century--as well as during the later decades of the seventeenth--Spanish efforts to stop the Portuguese expansion were not particularly successful. Even in areas such as Mainas and Mojos, the crown, whose administration was somewhat chaotic, responded slowly to frontier needs.

2. Albino Carranza, El valle de Chanchamayo (Lima: Imprenta Liberal-Unión, 1894), pp. 24-25. Izaguirre, HMFP, VII, 111-112; XII, 152. W. L. Herndon and L. Gibbon, Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon, (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Taylor and Maury, 1853-1854), I, 204.

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THE CAMPA AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT

Physical Geography

Several general treatments of Peruvian geography are readily available. David A. Robinson's Peru in Four Dimensions (Lima: American Studies Press, 1964) is a lucid account which embraces a number of topics from government through agriculture. Although Robinson concentrates on economic development in the Republican period, his description of the physical setting affords an adequately comprehensive view. In Highways into the Upper Amazon Basin: Pioneer Lands in Southern Colombia, Ecuador, and Northern Peru (Gainesville, Florida: University of Florida Press, 1966), Edmund Eduard Hegen treats the humid tropics in greater detail, with a full descriptive handling of the various phytogeographic zones within the broader area. Guillermo Faura Gaig deals with Los ríos de la Amazonia peruana (Callao: 1962), and has amassed a wealth of detail to delight all perspective Amazon river boat captains.

Zonas de vida natural en el Perú (San José, Costa Rica: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas de la OEA, Zona Andina, 1960) by Joseph A. Tosi, Jr., is particularly impressive in its approach. Based on and oriented to Leslie R. Holdridge's system of ecological analysis, Tosi's work discusses the various "natural life zones" in Peru, and provides the basis for a comparative analysis of the environments of the country. Nevertheless, its scientific organization makes it a difficult tool in the hands of an historian unfamiliar with the Holdridge system. Helpful in untangling the model's web is Joseph A. Tosi, Jr. and Robert F. Voertman's "Some Environmental Factors in the Economic Development of the Tropics," Economic Geography, XL (July 1964), 189-205, as well as L. R. Holdridge's Life Zone Ecology (San José, Costa Rice: Tropical Science Center, 1967).

Localized studies of the central montaña, until recently, were especially slender. The area had had its share of explorers and scientific travelers, but available

work seemed impressionistic and superficial. In recent years, however, such things as reconnaissance surveys of soils and vegetation, botanical and geological studies, and ecological investigations have grown, promising a satisfactory increase in reliable information. In particular, the Peruvian Instituto Nacional de Planificación, Oficina Nacional de Evaluación de Recursos Naturales (ONERN) has turned its scientific interest to the central montaña. Two publications of ONERN contain vital information: Evaluación e integración del potencia económica y social de la zona Perené-Satipo-Ene (2 vols.; Lima: ONERN, 1963-1964), and Inventario, evaluación e integración de los recursos naturales de la zona del río Tambo-Gran Pajonal (Lima: ONERN, 1968).

The work by Marshall S. Chrostowski and William M. Denevan, The Biogeography of the Gran Pajonal of Eastern Peru: A Reconnaissance Study (Montreal: McGill University, in press [1970]), offers additional material and data about the Gran Pajonal. Its organization and approach make it a basic study, more serviceable to the nonspecialist than the ONERN volume over the same area.

A number of less scientific investigations, published before the ONERN reports, still provide useful information:

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The Campa Indians

Few good ethnological studies dealing with the Campa Indians occupy library stacks, for only in the last years have anthropologists and ethno-historians turned to the central montaña with a critical eye. The recent establishment of the Centro de Investigación de Selva of the Instituto Raúl Porras Barrenechea, Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, will certainly promote valuable investigations and works related to all the peoples of the Amazon area. Indeed, a current project of the CIS is the publication of a multi-dimensional volume treating the Campa and their environment; however, as of June 1969, that project remained tacked to the drawing boards of the several contributors.

First published between 1944 and 1949, the Handbook of South American Indians, edited by J. H. Steward (6 vols.; New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1963), is still the starting point for all work on the South American tribes in spite of its early appearance. The article by J. H. Steward and Alfred Métraux, "Tribes of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Montaña," in volume III (The Tropical Forest Tribes), offers a comprehensive survey of Arawakan tribes, although comments about the Campa are slim.

For details, the researcher can turn to La Sal de los Cerros (Lima: Universidad Peruana de Ciéncias y Tecnología, 1968), by Stefano Varese. A professional anthropologist and the current director of CIS, Varese has written a reasonably thorough and eminently critical account of the Campa in both time and space. Based on field research carried out in the Pajonal, the volume stresses cultural patterns rather than more material aspects of Campa society, and offers keen insights into the unity of the tribe.

Morris G. Caldwell and John Calhoun in "The Culture of the Campa Indians of South America," Scientific Monthly, XXXIV (March, 1932), 238-242, present a solid treatment of the material culture of the tribe. For that reason, the article remains as an excellent companion to Varese's study.

Two researchers have concentrated on specific groups within the Campa tribe. Alan K. Craig in "Brief Ethnology of the Campa Indians, Eastern Peru," América Indígena, XXVII (1967), 223-235, assembles a variety of information about the Campa of the Shira Mountain Range,

but lack of detail undercuts the value of the article. Gerald Weiss, in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Florida, Boca Raton, easily earns the reputation as the leading expert on the River Campa, and has a wealth of knowledge in his personal files. He has been most generous in discussinghis material--providing background and leads of incomparable importance.

Even armed with reliable ethnological studies, reconstruction of Campa culture at contact is difficult. Contemporary works must be supplemented by a careful examination of early sources written by missionaries or lay pioneers. Much of the official correspondence, for example, is salted with a number of references of use to the ethnologist. At times the Franciscans and their fellow pioneers proved themselves discerning observers of native societies. But, unfortunately, they more frequently saw native life through glasses colored by ethnocentric preconceptions and prejudices and, as a consequence, pre-twentieth century records must be screened with caution. Even later accounts--such as Fray Manual Navarro's La tribu Campa (Lima: Imprenta del Colegio de Huérfanos San Vicente, 1924)--do not necessarily provide reliable ethnological material.

An exclusive reliance on more descriptive works cannot always afford a comprehensive view of the dynamics of Campa life nor can it always offer insights into the processes of culture change. Other published studies, many of a theoretical nature, must be utilized for those ends.

When used together, Pierre Gourou's The Tropical World: Its Social and Economic Conditions and Its Future Status, translated by S. H. Beaver and E. D. Laborde (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), and Melville J. Herskovits' Economic Anthropology: The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1965) are key handbooks to the economic behavior of nonliterate societies in the tropics. Mircea Eliade, particularly in Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), focuses on the archaic ideology of ritual repetition and provides a platform for understanding the internal dynamics of primitive religion. Gerald Lenski's Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966) must certainly become a masterpiece of theory about social organization and stratification, and is serviceable for societies at all levels of socio-political development.

Two works dealing exclusively with culture change are absolutely essential for an understanding of acculturation and its processes. They are A. L. Kroeber's Anthropology: Culture Patterns and Processes (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963) and Julian H. Steward's Theory of Culture Change (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1955).

The following books and articles, although of varied quality, contribute to a broader view of the Campa either as a group or in contact with Spanish society. Of maximum value are the studies by Robert Carneiro, William Denevan, Donald Lathrap, and Julian Steward.

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THE FRANCISCAN MISSION PERIOD

Manuscript Sources

Part of the documentation for this essay was sent to me by Dr. Stefano Varese from the manuscript section of the Biblioteca Nacional in Lima. The items, although limited in number, were impressive in quality. Many of the documents yielded useful information about specific stations or regions, and included census data as well as mission inventories.

The outstanding single document of the bundle was Juan de la Marca's Diario y padrón de la gente del Paxonal, que el P. Fr. Juan Baptista de la Marca actual missionario congregó al gremio de Nuestra Santa Madre la Iglesia Católica Apostólica Romana, etc. año 1733. A priceless day by day record of the first European expedition to the Gran Pajonal, it supplied sixty-five pages of valuable insights into Franciscan techniques and procedures throughout the central frontier. Several pieces of correspondence between La Marca and his superiors also covered subjects of particular interest for the reconstruction of the Campa enterprise.

Printed Sources

The classic Franciscan missionary historiography of the Peruvian Oriente is Bernardino Izaguirre Ispizúa's fourteen volume Historia de las misiones franciscanas y narración de los progresos de la geografía en el Oriente del Perú (Lima: Talleres Tipográficos de la Penitenciaria, 1922-1929). A true labor of love, monumental in its proportions and unrivaled in its completeness, Izaguirre has woven into his narrative an exorbitant number of original accounts, letters, descriptions, and maps--all dealing with Franciscan activity in the forest of Peru between 1619-1921.

Two recent attempts at a synthetic history of only the central montaña are the studies by Dionisio

Ortiz: Reseña histórica de la montaña del Pangoa, Gran Pajonal y Satipo: 1673-1960 (Lima: Editorial San Antonio 1961); Oxapampa: Visión histórica y desarrollo de la provincia del Oxapampa, en el Departamento de Pasco (Lima: Editorial San Antonio, 1967). The chapters which deal with the Franciscan mission to the Campa resemble in format and structure the work by Izaguirre: narrative interwoven with extensively quoted primary sources. Ortiz has included, however, several letters and reports not published in Izaguirre's classic.

While the modern studies by Izaguirre and Ortiz interpolate primary source material into their own descriptions, the reverse is true of Juan Santos el invencible: manuscritos del año 1742 al año 1755 (Lima: Editorial Miranda, 1942), edited and compiled by Francisco A. Loayza. Essentially a collection of correspondence between the lay and ecclesiastical figures in the frontier and the crown officials in Lima and Madrid, all of the items touch on the Juan Santos movement. Nevertheless, although all were written between 1742 and 1755, many supply information about the entire eighteenth century Franciscan mission as well.

An equally valuable collection of sources, compiled and edited by Víctor M. Maurtua, can be found in Juicio de límites entre el Perú y Bolivia (15 vols.; Barcelona, Imprenta de Henrich y Compañía, 1906). It is particularly strong in royal cédulas, although it would also serve as a base for a more detailed study of events in the seventeenth century. The volumes merit an even closer sifting than I had time to give them.

A variety of documents appear in several journals. Particularly rich in the Revista del Archivo Nacional del Perú, published in Lima. Volume II (1921), 393-410, for example, contains a 1687 testimony, presented by a number of lay pioneers in the Chanchamayo Valley, which clarifies much about the salt trade and early colonial efforts on the region east of Tarma; the testimonies presented by Antonio de Olmedo in volume XX (1956), 66-84, and by Diego González de Valdosera in XXI (1957), 82-98, are the only sources available for information on Dominican activity in the Chanchamayo area.

The classic journal published by the Sociedad de Amantes del País of Lima, Mercurio peruano de historia, literatura, y noticias públicas que da a luz la sociedad académica de amantes de Lima, fills some of the gaps left open by the other sources, although its real value lies

in mission fields other than the Campa one. The Present State of Peru: Comprising its Geography, Topography, Natural History, etc., edited by Joseph Skinner (London: 1805), has an excellent English translation of the relevant sections of the Mercurio in its appendix, and is generally more accessible than its model.

Three Franciscan chronicles contain material relevant to the missionary activity among the Campa. Diego de Córdoba y Salinas' 1651 Crónica franciscana de las provincias del Perú, edited by Lino G. Canedo, O.F.M. (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1957), throws light on early Franciscan explorations in the Chanchamayo Valley--notably the 1635 Jerónimo Jiménez expedition. Its continuation, Compendio histórico de los trabajos, fatigas, sudores y muertes que los ministros evangélicos de la seráfica religión han parecido por la conversión de las almas de los gentiles, en la montaña de los Andes, pertenecientes a las provincias del Perú (Paris: Librería de Roca y Bouret, 1854) by José Amich, covers the history of the central frontier from 1635 to 1771. Completing his work in 1768, Amich was a contemporary of many of the early missionaries and he had visited personally the frontier. Although the treatment is slightly hagiographical and far from impartial, much of the data came from the archives of the convent of Santa Rosa de Ocopa and has since disappeared.

The third chronicle is Fernando Rodríquez Tena's Misiones de la Santa Provincia de los Doce Apostoles de Lima. Unfortunately this history--also a fabric of original documents--remains in manuscript at the Biblioteca Nacional in Lima. Portions of it, however, appear in the Ortiz volumes. Judging from those excerpts, it looms as an invaluable study, and would certainly have added greater dimension to the present essay.

A fourth chronicle picks up the history of the College of Santa Rosa de Ocopa from 1771, where Amich left off. Written by Fernando Pallares and Vicente Calvo, the Noticias históricas de las misiones de fieles é infieles del Colegio de Santa Rosa de Ocopa (Barcelona: Imprenta de Magriñá y Subirana, 1870) adds little about the early Franciscan enterprise. In 1883 the Franciscans in the College of Santa Rosa de Ocopa published the Historia de las misiones de fieles é infieles del Colegio de Propaganda Fide de Santa Rosa de Ocopa (2 vols.; Barcelona: Imprenta Peninsular, 1883). In fact, the two volumes were simply the Amich and Pallares-Calvo chronicles reprinted under a new general title. As an introduction,

however, the Franciscans included an extensive, although idealized, biography of Francisco de San José.

Marcos Jiménez de la Espada in his Relaciones geográficas de Indias, edited by José Urbano Martínez Carreras (3 vols.; Madrid: Atlas, 1965) has some excellent selections relating Jesuit activities in the central frontier. First published between 1881-1887, the third appendix in volume II, 86-113, reproduces the 1596 Jesuit Annual Letter, which describes Font and Mastrilo's 1595 entrada and includes copies of the two Jesuits' own communications; volume III, 257-275, continues with a description of Font's abortive efforts to convert the Campa.

Antonio Raimondi, the distinguished Peruvian geographer, had an expert knowledge of the montaña. In volume II of his El Perú (4 vols.; Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1876) he provides detailed information about the economic history and development of the Chanchamayo-Vitoc regions in the first half of the eighteenth century.

Fray Isidro Felix de Espinosa's Crónica de los colegios de Propaganda Fide de la Nueva España, edited by Lino G. Canedo (Washington, D.C.: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1964), contains a few facts about Fray Francisco de San José and provides a point of departure for placing the Campa enterprise of the Franciscans into a wider perspective.

Secondary Sources

The following works cover a variety of topics: synthetic histories of Spanish expansion; histories of the Peruvian montaña; studies of Christian expansion and evangelization; treatments of missionary methods and techniques; institutional studies; cultural, economic, and social investigations. Some are theoretical, others analytical, and a few purely descriptive. All provided background for the present essay, and many filled holes left unplugged by the primary sources. I have not, however, included all the sources consulted nor some of the standard works of reference.

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THE JUAN SANTOS MOVEMENT

Printed Sources

Primary source material touching on the Juan Santos movement is limited. The only printed collection of sources is Francisco A. Loayza's edition of Juan Santos, el invencible: manuscritos del año 1742 al año 1755 (Lima: Editorial Miranda, 1942). The single volume contains about one hundred and fifty items--mostly official correspondence interspersed with an occasional sworn testimony, personal diary, or family letter.

Following hard upon the heels of Juan Santos, José Amich wrote his Compendio histórico de los trabajos, fatigas, sudores y muertes que los ministros evangélicos de la seráfica religión han parecido por la conversión de las almas de los gentiles, en la montaña de los Andes, pertenecientes a las provincias del Perú (Paris: Librería de Roca y Bouret, 1854). In its composition, Amich relied heavily upon the same type of material published by Francisco Loayza. Many of the same items are reproduced in both works, although Amich did include a few documents which presumably had disappeared when Loayza began his compilation.

Synthetic Accounts

Amich connected the various documents related to the Juan Santos movement with his own narrative. Thus, in many respects, the Compendio can be considered as the earliest synthetic account of the revolt. In tone, Amich was unabashedly pro-Franciscan; in approach, he was purely descriptive. Within his narrative there threads no concern for an analysis of the dynamics of the uprising nor for an investigation of its causes. He defends the friars, damns the rebellious Indians and then proceeds to relate the chronology of defeat.

After Amich other writers and/or scholars turned to the revolt. Among them were Antonio Raimondi, El Perú (4 vols.; Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1876); Manuel de

Mendiburu, Diccionario histórico-biográfico del Perú (8 vols; Lima: 1874-1890); and Bernardino Izaguirre Ispizúa, Historia de las misiones franciscanas y narración de los progresos de la geografía en el oriente del Perú (14 vols.; Lima: Talleres Tipográficos de la Penitenciaria, 1922-1929). Without exception, however, all of them followed in the leader's footsteps-- frequently down to his commas and periods. The tone was still pro-Franciscan and the format was still descriptive. Not even Izaguirre reordered what had become the official treatment.

Loayza ushered in stage two. In his preface to the source collection and in his footnotes to the documents, he turned the official treatment inside out. The friars and their cohorts became the villains and the Indians, the heroes. Indeed, Loayza glorified the natives and saw the movement as among the first stirrings of independence and spiritual revival: a precursor of Tupac Amarú, a symbol of the indomitable spirit of the New World aborigine.

The synthetic treatments of the revolt which appeared after Loayza's manuscript collection echoed the new pro-Indian orientation, following now his commas and periods. Daniel Valcárcel, Rebeliones indígenas (Lima: Editorial P.T.C.M., 1946); José A. Vallejo Fonseca, "La lucha por la independencia del Perú: la rebelión de 1742," Revista del Archivo Histórico de Cuzco, VIII (1957), 232-292; Conrado Juániz, El inca ladino: Juan Santos Atahualpa (Madrid: Editorial Cisneros, 1960); Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Tupac Amarú: la revolución procursora de la emancipación continental (Cuzco: Editorial H. G. Rozas, 1963). While Amich and his school blamed the viceregal officials for the revolt, the pro-Indianists blamed both the crown and the Franciscans; while the first group saw the Campa as luckless barbarians living in dangerous anarchy and as pawns of Juan Santos, the second group saw the natives as noble and virtuous rebels freely unified against a degenerate Empire. But besides the tone and shift in emphasis, nothing else had changed. The same data was still being marshalled chronologically within the same format and with no attempt at significant analysis.

To what has become the new line of emphasis there are two exceptions: Dionisio Ortiz and Stefano Varese. In Reseña histórica de la montaña del Pangoa, Gran Pajonal y Satipo: 1673-1960 (Lima: Editorial San Antonio, 1961) and Oxapampa: Visión histórica y desarrollo de la provincia del Oxapampa, en el Departamento de Pasco (Lima:

San Antonio, 1967), Ortiz reverts to the original focus and defends the Franciscans. He does not see the Juan Santos movement as among the first cries for American independence but rather as the final revolt of a primitive and misguided people against a progressive civilization. Juan Santos forced the Campa back into barbarism, destroying in the process the corrective discipline of Hispano-Christian control.

Dr. Varese moves in yet another direction. Neither pro-Spanish nor pro-Indian, he sees the Juan Santos uprising in anthropological terms: a negative, but overt, response of the Campa as a grouping to culture contact--to Hispanization or acculturation or assimilation. The movement thus symbolizes the failure of the Franciscan attempt at cultural mestizaje in the central frontier: "Un intento de mestizaje cultural en la selva del Perú," Revista Histórica, XXVIII (1965), 145-148; La Sal de los Cerros (Lima: Universidad Peruana de Ciencias y Tecnología, 1968), and "La rebelión de Juan Santos Atahualpa: un movimiento mesiánico del siglo XVIII en la selva peruana," Cuadernos de Antropología, V (December 1967), 1-9. And, although Varese's admiration of the Campa is apparent, he neither condemns nor glorifies either side of the movement.