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Dilemmas of Protest Strategy:

A Case Study

by

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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

(Sociology)

at the

University of Wisconsin

1970

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P1852

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I. INTRODUCTION

Any organization which is seriously concerned with social change faces the problem of defining the goals of the organization in a way which consistently encompasses immediate ends as well as more abstract structural and cultural goals. Implicit in a statement of goals is a range of alternative strategies for social change. The choice of goals and strategies will have a major influence on the breadth of the base of the organization and thus on its potential effectiveness.

This general point can be illustrated by the history of any social movement. The opposition to the Vietnam War will serve as well as any to demonstrate that this study of the Contract Buyers League in Chicago is not an isolated example.

In May of 1970 the President of the United States ordered troops to be sent into Cambodia. This event, along with the killing of four Kent State University students by National Guardsmen, mobilized anti-war forces all over the country. In Madison, Wisconsin, there were a wide range of organizations pursuing various strategies within the anti-war movement.

The wide spectrum of organizations reflected the various perceptions of the problems involved, and the resulting variation in the goals and strategies pursued. Basically, the choice had to be made between the single issue of ending the Vietnam War, and the broader issue of changing the system which perpetuates war and exploitation. The former is generally related to a liberal, or reformist analysis of the problem while the latter could be characterized as radical or revolutionary.

Liberals perceive decision-making in this society to be made among politicians who are responsible to their electorate. Their focus is on the middle levels of power, where they believe there is a plurality of interests being represented. Thus the problem lies with the electorate, not the system.

The radicals believe that important decisions are made by corporate and military interests outside the political arena. An issue which seriously challenges the existing priorities and the resulting allocation of resources in the society is suppressed before it ever reaches the arena of discussion and decision-making. A radical strategy tries to demonstrate the inter-relationships of specific problems and how they are necessarily a product of the capitalist system.

The choice of goals and strategy centering on the Vietnam issue had an important effect on an organization's ability to draw a strong base of support. The widest base of support came from those individuals who perceived

the Vietnam War as the single most important issue. Fewer individuals were willing to accept the perspective that in order to prevent future Vietnams, major structural and value changes had to be made in the society.

Thus, in choosing the goals and strategies to be pursued, an organization had to consider the breadth of support which would be necessary in order to make a strategy effective. The dilemma facing those organizations which favored structural change was that they could not get an effective base of support without sacrificing their goals. The dilemma inherent in the choice of goals and strategies is a recurring phenomenon in contemporary social protest and seems worthy of further study by those who are concerned with the dynamics of social change.

This paper is a case study of the Contract Buyers League, an organization in Chicago currently facing the dilemma of choosing goals and appropriate strategies. It chronicles the history of their battle, and considers the conditions which have affected the perceptions of leaders and members and thus the group decisions concerning goals and strategy.

The Contract Buyers League (CBL) is an organization of over six hundred blacks who are taking action to remedy the fact that they have been exploited in the contracts on which they are buying homes. The organization has split over the dilemma inherent in the choice between alternative goals. On the one hand, they could limit their goal to a specific issue which might win them substantial relief but create only a minimal amount of change in the system which has allowed them to be exploited in the first place. On the other hand, they could make a moral issue out of the more fundamental, but abstract problem of a system which allows people to be exploited. While encompassing a broader goal, this latter strategy runs the risk of failing to accomplish any concrete success.

A group of CBL members, primarily from the west side of Chicago, have chosen to limit their goal to the renegotiation of their contracts at a fair price. The assumptions and perceptions which have led them to make their decision are not uniform. On the one hand, some members feel that the way to accomplish social change is through the gradual but constant process of attacking specific injustices in the system. Other members have chosen the single issue goal because they do not believe that there could ever be substantial changes made in the system and therefore they are hoping only to find personal relief for their problem through the CBL organization.

Another group of individuals, primarily consisting of members from the south side of Chicago, has decided to broaden their goals to include the demand for a fundamental change in the system such that government will be "by and for the people." More immediately then, this goal requires that people take power into their own hands and demand, rather than petition for, the rights which should already be theirs. The most profound dilemma in such a "power to the people" movement is that, as long as it remains non-violent, it requires massive coordinated support. The more potentially effective the projected strategy, the greater the risks involved and the fewer the people who will commit themselves, thus diminishing the power of the people.

Because CBL began as an organization of individuals facing a common problem with a unified goal and strategy, study of the development of the organization will allow us to isolate the key variables which have been most responsible for the divergence in the choice of goals and strategy. First, I will consider some of the methodological problems of such a qualitative case study.

II. METHODOLOGY

Access to the Contract Buyers League in Chicago was gained through cooperation with Northwestern University. The University's Department of Urban Affairs is helping in the preparation of questionnaires and interviews which will be used as evidence in the CBL court case. Entering with the Northwestern students, I was given complete access to activities and information on the west side. Through continuous contact, I built up relationships of trust and cooperation with the black leaders and most of the white staff. On the west side, I conducted eight tape recorded interviews and had numerous casual but informative conversations. From these interviews I was able to reconstruct much of the history of CBL as well as the perceptions of the leaders.

I attended three general CBL meetings on the west side and three on the south side. From these meetings I was able to observe the relationships between the leaders, members and lawyers, as well as the problems which concerned these people most and the manner in which they discussed them.

Access to the south side CBL was not as easy as on the west side. Suspicion and tension on the south side is demonstrated by the fact that in the middle of the second south side meeting I attended, a man stoop up and said, "I don't want to alarm anyone, but there is a young lady over there writing down everything we're saying, and I think maybe we should ask her what she's doing here." However, the Chairman proceeded to say that they had nothing to hide, and that anyone was welcome to their meetings.

With a certain amount of hesitancy at the beginning, the south side leaders gave a a very cooperative interview. They claim that they have received little attention or assistance from white people since the southwest split occurred. Thus, they were most likely a little suspicious of me,

and also wishing to make a good impression. They wanted to know when I would finish my "book," and hoped that I would write the truth, their side, about what had happened. Thus, in a press conference type atmosphere, their interviews reflect their formal political attitudes as leaders in the CBL.

A conversation with two south side women who have continued to hold out was brief but altogether reasonable and informative. The interview with the south side woman who had resumed payments was extremely cooperative and detailed. She appeared to always search for accuracy and truthfulness in her responses. She said she was caught in between the south-west split and did not know who to believe. Her reliability as an unbiased informer was reflected by the information she was able to give supporting various points of view.

The major difficulty encountered in this research project, was that of trying to reconstruct the dynamics involved in the events which occurred. Since I was not present at the time when these events occurred, I had to rely completely on the accounts of leaders, staff, and members. Most participants, however, have a somewhat limited view of what has occurred, and can best explain how they personally were involved, with little attention to how decisions were arrived at. Even in the accounts of their own perceptions of what was happening, new experiences and hindsight may consciously or unconsciously alter their previously held perceptions.

However, there was much overlapping of information from different interviews, so that what has been pieced together is fairly reliable. I am not attempting to offer a complete explanation for the events which have occurred, nor am I claiming that the information gathered from my interviews reflects the attitudes of all the contract buyers. Rather, from the interviews I have tried to determine some of the factors and perceptions which have had important effects on the events which occurred.

The approximate boundaries of the neighborhood involved in the south side CBL are 79th to 115th and Vincennes on the west to Wabash on the east. The west side boundaries are Cermak on the south, Lake Street on the north, Laramie on the west and Western on the east. Because these areas do not fall neatly into census tracts, I have only estimated the averages from a combination of census tracts which most closely approximate the area. On the south side, I averaged the data from the blocks within these boundaries that indicated a high concentration of blacks.

On the west side, only 16 percent of the housing is owner occupied, as compared to 75 percent on the south side. Thus, while the census material reflects characteristics of the neighborhoods on the west side, it most likely is not a reflection of the characteristics of west side CBL members. They are somewhat of an elite in the sense that they "own" homes.

TABLE I

Interviews Held and Meetings Attended

A. Interviews

West Side

black chairman
 black co-chairman
 white student organizer
 4 white staff
 black member - part time staff

South Side

black chairman
 black co-chairman
 black woman member, not presently holding out payments
 2 black women members, presently holding out payments

B. Meetings Attended: June 1970 - August 1970

3 South Side Saturday night CBL general meetings
 June 27, July 11, Aug. 1 - approximately 45 people attending

3 West Side Wednesday night CBL general meetings
 June 24, July 8, July 15 - approximately 150 people attending

2 small West Side meetings (broken down according to sellers)
 June 26 - approximately 15 people attending

West Side staff meeting - June 22

2 Meetings for training interviewers for West Side court case - June 23,
 June 27

Morning in court with West Side case - June 26

West Side staff party - July 11

3 occasions in West Side office for several hours - July 9-11

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTRACT BUYERS LEAGUE

The original problem around which the Contract Buyers League was created was that of contract buying. According to research done by CBL staff and volunteer organizations, many blacks who are buying homes in Chicago are paying a "race tax" which may frequently be greater than \$10,000. This race tax is a function of institutionalized racism which allows exploitative speculators to make tremendous profits from blacks trapped in the ghetto. With the existence of segregated housing, speculators find it easy to buy homes at less than market value prices from white home owners who have become panicked by block-busting tactics.

These homes are then sold to unsuspecting blacks on contracts which are designed to exploit them in every possible way. The prices of the homes are often inflated more than \$10,000 above their real value. High interest rates are charged over extended periods of time. The contracts do not allow the buyer to build up equity in his home, and he may lose everything if he misses only one payment. He does not receive title to the property until the last payment is made; and yet, all of the responsibilities for the upkeep of the building are his. Often speculators sell homes with numerous and expensive building code violations unknown to the buyer, which are then to be paid by the buyer rather than the seller.

Institutionalized racism has trapped the black man and prevented him from finding any alternatives to exploitative contracts. The policies of the Federal Housing Administration and of lending institutions, and the patterns of segregated housing are the most blatant features of institutionalized racism in housing. The Federal Housing Authority, until 1967, carried out the practice of "red-lining" areas in which they considered the

economic life of buildings to be too poor to qualify for loans on mortgages. Banks would not make mortgage loans to black people, claiming that they were poor risks, or that the property was unsound.

With segregated housing patterns, blacks were restricted to a choice of homes in the ghetto where the property would always be considered unsound. Thus, even if they had good credit ratings, mortgages were not available to blacks and they had no choice but to buy homes on contracts. Without a fair market to compare with, blacks were not even aware of the extent to which they were being exploited in the prices and terms of their contracts. Perhaps the most appalling aspect of institutionalized racism that is coming to light as a result of CBL research is the exploitation of contract buyers by lawyers who have been hired to assure the buyers that they are getting a fair deal.

The idea for an organization of buyers to challenge real estate contracts in Chicago was originally planted by white seminary students who had been living in Lawndale, a black neighborhood, since June of 1967. These students were involved in a project, the purpose of which was to become familiar with the problems of the area, to research the causes of these problems, and to bring the residents together and provide information and services to them, so that they might solve these problems collectively.

The students had become aware of the burden that contracts were causing the people in the community, but they had been unable to find any blacks who were responsive to the problem and willing to initiate some action. They remained inactive on the issue until Mrs. Ruth Wells came to them with the difficulties that she was having getting a mortgage.

Mrs. Well's contract stated explicitly that after she had paid a certain amount of money, she was entitled to change from a contract to a mortgage. Having paid more than the necessary amount, Mrs. Wells went to her seller

and requested such a change. He responded by informing her that there would be numerous expenses required in the change, including a \$1500 charge. Her lawyer explained that the \$1500 was for insurance. Because insurance costs were included in her monthly contract payments, Mrs. Wells, whom I interviewed, was very irritated with this explanation. The lawyer would only tell her that she had to pay, and he offered to arrange the payments in monthly installments. She responded that she did not need him to arrange anything further for her. He said he would not advise that; to which she replied that she would not be needing his advice anymore.

Lacking confidence in legal aid, Mrs. Wells called a prominent clergyman for advice. He referred her to the students, who then helped Mrs. Wells get an appraisal on her home. It was discovered that though she had bought the house for \$23,000, it was currently valued at \$13,500. This came as an even greater surprise because of the fact that she and her husband had added a considerable number of improvements to the home: new back porches, new wiring, new roof, new steps, modernized kitchen and bathroom.

The students persuaded Mrs. Wells to visit the seller of her home. She asked him to renegotiate her contract at a fair price. When he offered to drop only some of the expenses required in the process of going from a contract to a mortgage, Mrs. Wells refused to accept his offer. The next day, she and the students began picketing the seller's office and going to talk to his neighbors.

Mrs. Wells and the students also began talking to people door to door in the community and recruiting them to Wednesday night meetings. Though it was the students who were largely responsible for the organizational strategy by planting ideas and using gentle persuasion, the effectiveness of the strategy was dependent upon the community blacks. It wasn't until Mrs. Wells began telling her story at meetings that people began to discuss and ask questions.

Going door to door, CBL members encountered some people who already understood the problem, but were either too ashamed or too apathetic to do anything about it. Many people simply refused to admit that they did not have a mortgage to their house. The white students had the most difficult time because of the reputation earned by exploitative, fast talking white salesmen. For this reason, a white usually canvassed the neighborhood with a black. In order to gain the confidence of the people, and convince them that they were not being talked down to, the black CBL members would tell their own stories of how they had "been taken." And because of research they were doing on real estate they could often tell a person what price his seller had paid for his house.

Though most CBL members had never before been involved in any Civil Rights activity, enthusiastic stories from returning picketers led to growing participation in the picketing. Membership in the organization grew sharply when the first seller agreed to renegotiate his contract. Morale was high, and the people were optimistic that continuous picketing would crack the sellers. Such a new found feeling of power must have made many CBL members elated.

The excitement that Mrs. Wells felt was conveyed as she enthusiastically related the following story of a visit she and a student made to a bank.

I asked to see the president and they told me he wasn't in yet; he hadn't arrived from his home in the suburbs. A man, he said he was the vice president, offered to speak with me. I explained our problem and the exploitation in contract buying. I asked him to give me the name of a seller who was hiding behind the bank's trust number. I said I had a pretty good idea of who this man was, but I just wanted to be sure. So the vice president told me the problem was neither here nor there. The function of a bank is to serve people by providing trust numbers, and none of this was any of the bank's affair. I told him, "well, it should be your affair; as long as you work in the area." How can he stand to look out the window at all that filth? He has to take some responsibility

for this community. So I said, "I only came to ask. Tell your president that tomorrow morning my friends and I will be here at 9:00 A.M. with our picket signs." Then up bounced the president; got there all the way from the suburbs in just a few seconds. "Did you know you can't picket a bank?" he said. "Not that there's a law or anything, it's just not done. People would come in and take out there money, and there could be a run on the bank." I told him "yes, I understand perfectly." He took the trust number and said he'd call me. I told him to be sure to call that evening, and not to have his secretary call; I wouldn't recognize her voice. That night he called.

By the end of the summer of 1968 there were approximately 600 members in CBL. About 200 of these members had been coming over to the west side neighborhood of Lawndale from the south side of Chicago. Eventually, the south side people decided to begin holding meetings on Saturday nights on the south side; however, many continued to come also to west side meetings.

Mrs. Wells and another woman were hired as staff workers in the summer, and in the winter there were enough funds available, primarily from religious organizations, to fund the chairman and vice-chairman of the west side in full time positions. Other white student-age workers were added gradually to the staff throughout 1969.

After the first few renegotiations, picketing did not move many other sellers to negotiate. Jack, the student who was most responsible for the organization of CBL, decided it was time to try to break the sellers through legal action. He discussed the problem with many OEO "war on poverty" lawyers. but they insisted that there was nothing they could do. The staff had the free services of one lawyer, but he told them that the problem was too great for any single lawyer to handle alone and would require the services of a whole law firm.

Jack held a meeting inviting lawyers of the Chicago Bar Association. A prominent attorney became interested in the problem, and eventually volunteered the free services of his law firm. This law firm then recruited a black law firm to work with them on the case.

The law firms were beginning to think about filing a suit in Federal Court when CBL members decided to withhold their monthly contract payments. They felt the sellers would feel more pressure to negotiate if they were not getting their payments. On December 1, 1968, 327 families withheld their payments, and, by January, 595 families had joined the hold-out.

On January 20, 1969, the law firms filed two complaints before the United States District Court. The complaints are class actions, dealing with the plaintiffs together as one class, and applying to other individuals in the same situation even though they are not named as plaintiffs in the law suit. The complaints charged that the sellers supported and exploited the existence of residential racial segregation and the resulting artificial scarcity of residential housing available to Negroes for their own profit. In legal terms the contract buyers were willfully and wrongfully deprived of their rights to equal protection of the laws, and prevented from having and exercising the same rights enjoyed by white citizens to purchase and hold real property.

With the continuation of the hold-out, the district court judge claimed that it was neither in his jurisdiction to force CBL members to make their payments nor to protect them from eviction proceedings. His statement was, however, interpreted by CBL members to mean that their "hands would be unclean" in court as long as they continued the payment strike.

As the economic boycott began to take effect, the sellers complained that they did not have enough money to continue making payment on their mortgages, insurance and other costs of the homes. Many sellers had begun to discuss settlements of contracts, and the contract buyers felt optimistic that the sellers would renegotiate. This optimism, and the threat of "unclean hands" made by the judge, led the members to agree to resume their

payments under an order drawn up by their lawyers. This order obligated the sellers to put aside 50 percent of the payments, from which mortgage, insurance and other costs would be paid, and from which the remainder would be put in the bank in an escrow fund. The lawyers had drawn up the order and encouraged CBL members to pay back because of the time that was consumed in the lower courts dealing with forcible detainer and entry act cases.

But in the three months following the resumption of payment, none of the sellers agreed to renegotiate contracts. And according to CBL, the sellers did not put any money into the escrow fund. The CBL leadership began contemplating another hold-out. Small meetings were held with CBL members to discuss how they felt. The common feeling was that without the payment strike, the sellers would not renegotiate, and that the payment strike should be resumed.

The second hold-out began in July 1969. It united CBL members and gave them a renewed enthusiasm. Attendance at Wednesday night meetings rose as people came to hear the impressive amount of money which was growing in the escrow fund each month.

The attorneys for the sellers began to send out eviction notices to the people. They began the procedure on the south side, where the homes were generally single dwelling units and would not involve evicting more than one family. On the west side evictions would be more complicated because flats within homes are commonly rented out.

CBL picketed the court building, and the people felt that they had been assured that they would not be evicted. Their lawyers were in the process of challenging the forcible entry and detainer act in the state Supreme Court. They were trying to change the law to allow people the right to present their defense before they are evicted. However, the courts eventually ordered the sheriff to take action, and he began evictions in December of 1969.

According to a west side staff member, the evictions were initially "scenarios" which gave CBL good publicity and met with everyone's approval. There was an understood agreement that there would be no violence. CBL was notified when there was to be an eviction, and a telephone communications system was set up so that by the time of an eviction, a large crowd of CBL members could be at the site. The sheriff evicted the families and removed their furniture. Then the people would move the families and the furniture right back into the house. The sheriff would then arrest the people for trespassing, and they would go to court and pay the fine.

However, along the way, some south siders apparently signed false names to their trespassing charges in court. This made the sheriff angry, and he decided not to tell the people in advance where the evictions would take place. When 150 CBL members got to an eviction site, they found 200 of the sheriff's men. One woman who was evicted described the scene as looking like a "young war." She said, "they wouldn't have needed that many sheriff's men and policemen if there had been armed criminals inside. And they were just four families; husbands, wives and children."

There was no way that CBL members could reinstate the evicted families into their homes. Guards were stationed there after the police left. In addition to losing their homes, each family was charged with eviction fees and court costs totaling close to \$2,000.

There was a great deal of tension and discouragement. By March, about 55 of the original 230 persons holding out on the south side, had resumed their monthly payments. By April, twenty families had been evicted. About 140 south side CBL members remained in the payment strike.

Anticipation of the evictions was varied. Some individuals claim that when they began the payment strike, they committed themselves to the possibility of eviction. Others admit that they never really thought they would

be evicted. One woman said she thought that they would not begin evictions because the ruling on the right to present defense before being evicted was still pending in the Supreme Court. She was sure the court would wait for that ruling, hear their defense, and declare that the payment strike was justified.

This woman thought it was only reasonable to expect the judge to rule in their favor.

I thought the judge would give justice; by this I mean I thought the judge would say to the seller, "Now look, you all got this in higher court, in Supreme Court. What you people do, put this money in a bank, proving to the real estate that you have this money (we weren't putting it in the bank at that time), and you real estate lawyers wait until this case is heard before you set these people out." And I thought Mayor Daley, being the Mayor, would say, "Now look, these people have fair fight in court."

She still couldn't believe she would be evicted when she was summoned to court.

I said, "Your Honor, you mean to tell me, I have over \$15,000 in that house, they have \$10,000 clear, and I have made improvements on that home, and they have over-charged me, and we come to you for justice to say who's right and who's wrong, and you mean to say that you refuse to hear our side of it, and you give us 15 days to get out doors?" He says "I'm sorry lady, my hands are tied - 15 days."

There I am on the street with six foster children, no husband and no job. All we wanted the judge to do is say we have the money, we want the sellers to the table to right the wrong they have done. The judge says "fifteen days."

IV. THE SPLIT OVER STRATEGIES

In April 1970, the lawyers and the south and west side leaders met with the Mayor to negotiate a solution which would prevent further south side evictions. The Mayor proposed a compromise whereby all those who had been evicted could be reinstated in their homes, with all charges and fees dropped, if the buyers would resume payments. The sellers would be required to put \$50,000 plus \$500 monthly in an escrow fund in the bank. The proposal was agreed upon and signed by all sides.

However, when the Mayor's proposal was presented at the south side meeting, there was a vocal minority which resented the decision. They challenged the right of the leadership to sign such a proposal without first conferring with CBL members. The proposal was criticized because there was no guarantee that the sellers would not take their money out of the bank after the buyers had paid up. They also felt that \$50,000 was not sufficient to cover 200 homes. It was equivalent to putting down an average of \$250 per home, while each home had an overcharge of at least several thousands of dollars.

Because the courts had delayed so long on the legal proceedings and then had allowed the evictions, many people felt they would not win the court case in the end.

Everything has shown us we won't get justice. If there had been any justice, if the judges hands weren't tied by the system, he'd say "She's in the higher court, waiting on trial, so what's wrong with you, you can't wait? The trial's gonna come up. I'm going to give the lady more time; wait until the case is heard." You got a law, expecting the law to back you up, expecting to be heard; we haven't been heard, we haven't had a day in court.

We're not asking for favors, we're asking for justice. Any case could be heard before two years.

Some members felt that because they would lose the court case in the end, it would be wise to keep the money they had accumulated in the payment strike so that it could be used to buy a new home.

Some of these members claim that they were not really losing anything by being evicted. The homes are not theirs now, and they do not think that they ever will be. They say that their payments go up every year for what the sellers claim are taxes; and yet their principal declines only slightly. One woman claims that she has been buying her home for seven years at 6 1/2 percent interest and has credit for only \$1,700 on the principal, and a balance of \$21,000 out of the original \$26,000. At this rate, she feels, she will never have possession of the deed to her home.

Although they had signed the Mayor's proposal, the south side leadership quickly changed their stand and came to the support of the people who opposed the proposal. It is difficult to know at what point a moral strategy became the goal for the south side, but it seems likely that the evictions demanded a courage and commitment which could not then be easily turned around. To accept a compromise which would give back only what one had already decided to sacrifice in order to get something greater, would create a tremendous psychological dissonance. To continue to make a sacrifice which apparently would never succeed in accomplishing its original purpose would demand the creation of a new and greater goal. According to the south side chairman, "When we lost our homes, we changed our values; a lot of people haven't lost their homes, and they're still concerned with their chicken shacks."

The west side leadership and the CBL lawyers tried to convince the people that the Mayor's offer was a good one. The west side leaders supported the proposal because they wanted those families who had been evicted to be reinstated. They feared that having lost their homes, there would be no contracts to renegotiate. People who were evicted would not benefit from the law suit, which they felt would be won, nor would they be eligible for future plans of financing and rehabilitation through government subsidies.

Rumors spread that the west side leaders were "on the take" from the Mayor, and that one of the leaders had received a new car and a government job in exchange for "selling out" the south side. There was general confusion, and no vote was taken even though, according to the west side staff, the Mayor had said that if the organization voted against the proposal he would re-open negotiations. The schism may have been exacerbated according to west side staff, by a black lawyer, who in a condescending manner urged the people to accept the proposal without further discussion. Some members may have reacted more militantly because of his approach.

This lawyer, who apparently was also responsible for influencing a considerable number of people to end the hold-out, urged the people to decide individually, what the best course of action would be for themselves. This may have contributed to the general confusion, in which no one knew what anyone else was doing. The decision seems to have been made individually rather than as a social decision. On one block where 16 CBL families lived, 12 families were evicted, and of those 12, five resumed payments.

It is difficult to determine how many families continued to hold out. According to south side CBL leaders, about 90 families were evicted before the end of July 1970. Of the original 20 families evicted, 9 of those accepted the Mayor's proposal and resumed payments. Some of those who resumed payments had more obvious reasons for doing so than others. One woman had six foster children, and no husband. Other families felt it was too much of a burden to double up with relatives. Of those who remained in the hold-out, some simply felt their payments were too much to handle, and were willing to give up their homes in hopes of finding a better deal elsewhere.

Within the remaining meetings in April, the schism between those who accepted the proposal and those who did not became solidified. Name calling

rose to a high level, and the west side leaders and staff stopped attending meetings on the south side. Some south side members who had resumed payments continued to come to west side meetings, but most seemed to drop out of CBL activity altogether.

In May 1970 eight west side CBL members were evicted from their homes. The west side leadership sought an arrangement similar to the one offered to the south side by the Mayor, but the sellers of the west side homes would not agree to it. As the west side organization contemplated whether to continue the payment strike and face subsequent evictions, the judge for the west side court case announced that if CBL members did not resume their contract payments, they would be dropped from the law suit. This announcement was in direct contradiction to the judge's previous declaration during the first hold-out, that he could neither force the buyers to make their payments, nor protect them from subsequent evictions if they chose to continue the payment strike. Both the CBL members and the lawyers felt this judgment was unfair. The right to justice in the legal system should not depend on whether one has made payments on his home.

However, with the encouragement of their leaders and lawyers, the west side members voted to do what was required to remain in the law suit. The decision was not made without serious doubts in the minds of many west side members. At subsequent meetings, individuals speaking against the resumption of payments received loud applause. According to west side staff and leaders, just about every individual who has brought his money in to pay back, has done so with great reluctance and many questions.

Although the judge for the south side court has never made it explicit whether or not members who do not resume contract payments will be dropped from the plaintiff class, the south side chairman claims that they do not believe the courts will offer a remedy to their problem. In June 1970, a

university professor who is an outspoken critic of the courts presented a fact sheet to the south side CBL. The thrust of his presentation was that the head of the law firm representing CBL had previously "torpedoed" civil rights cases by representing and losing them.

According to the professor, this lawyer, as well as the head of the black law firm and many of the judges, have conflicting interests in the case.

If the Contract Buyers were to win their suits, the resulting effects would or could cause numerous Chicago area banks to close their doors. By a series of odd circumstances, the CBL litigation has been instigated by lawyer-bankers purporting to represent CBL, and the law suits were submitted to be heard and adjudicated by banker courts, presided over by bank owners, bank stockholders, and bank directors. ("Who Represents Who in the Contract Buyers League?" 6/6/70).

However, while constantly denouncing the lawyers and the judges, the south side CBL had quietly decided to remain in the law suit. The chairman, somewhat apologetically, suggested that they might as well "take a free ride." Also, he claims, if anyone starts suing anyone, they will be protected behind the law firm. "They want to know who our players are, and this way, if we remain in the law suit, they won't know who we all are."

With the original goal being the renegotiation of contracts at fair prices, CBL strategy began with a conventional civil rights movement approach. Sellers and bankers were asked to negotiate and when they declined to do so they were picketed. This strategy continued for eleven months, accomplishing only the limited success of a few renegotiated contracts.

Thus it seemed necessary to enter a second stage of strategy. CBL attempted to apply economic pressure on the sellers by refusing to make monthly contract payments. This action was soon accomplished by a third strategy, that of taking legal recourse through the process of filing law suits charging the sellers with committing illegal practices, and recommending the fair settlement of contracts for all blacks suffering from this unjust situation, as well as the CBL plaintiffs.

The striking contrast between the economic and legal strategies highlights the basic dilemma of maintaining consistency in goals and strategy. The economic strategy is an action demanding "power to the people." Its effectiveness rests on the ability to gain wide and sustained participation and commitment. In contrast, the legal remedy rests in the hands of a few legal experts and the energies and skills of a paid staff which carries out the essential routine work which is required for a victory in the courts. Rather than power to the people, compliance with "the system" is essential for a legal victory. It is the basic incompatibility of the two approaches which prevents CBL from continuing with this unified strategy. Thus a choice had to be made between them.

V. PERCEPTIONS OF THE SYSTEM

One cannot examine the development of the opposing strategies in CBL without considering the various perceptions held by CBL leaders of the American "system." These perceptions, interacting with unforeseeable circumstances, to a great extent determine the goals and strategies of an organization. In turn, the consequences of these strategies provide feedback which affects one's perception of the system.

Originally the goal which unified the west and south sides was immediate and concrete. The people desired the renegotiation of contracts such that the buyer would pay a fair price, and the seller would make a fair profit. When the lawyers filed the law suit, the goal became broader and more abstract. The possibility now existed to make a law that would create a precedent and thus would prohibit similar exploitation everywhere.

This goal served the important function of building unity around an issue which was completely selfless and socially significant. It became the justification for patience in the long, boring court process. But as a goal, it is definitely of secondary importance. This is clear from the individual testimony of the leaders, and from the fact that if at any point the sellers should decide to negotiate the court proceedings will be dropped.

Perceptions of the legal system are varied. Among the leadership on the west side, there are those who believe that a court victory would have significant reverberations throughout the system. These are essentially the white student leaders. They see the need for extensive structural change, but think that the only possible way to effect such change is by organizing around single issues, such as contracts, which demonstrate blatant injustices.

However, the black leadership on the west side is much more cautious in their judgments of a legal victory. They are confident that they will win the court case, but they are not sure that the significance of such a

victory goes beyond the renegotiation of contracts at fair prices. Their experience with policemen and courts has led them to believe that the legal system does not serve either black or poor people. They are skeptical that any victories could change that system.

Some west side CBL members and most south siders are skeptical that even the CBL case can be won in court. Their experiences with the long drawn out court case which has lasted over a year and a half, and with the evictions which to them were a clear case of inhumane injustice passed down by the courts, had led them to believe there can be no justice. Their experiences lend credence to the accusations against the lawyers and judges. They believe these men are intimately involved in the system and cannot act to change it. As the chairman of the south side put it, "When you're part of something, how can you help but protect what you are a part of?"

But even if there were to be a victory in the CBL court case, such a victory would have no effect on the system, according to the south side leaders.

There are enough laws on the books now to adequately protect all the people in this country. We don't have to go to court.

Remember the 1954 school desegregation order? And tell me what has happened? Desegregation when white people want it.

You see that building there? It should be closed, it has so many building code violations. All these buildings should be closed according to the law.

Thus in the judgment of the south side leadership new laws in the present system are ineffective and meaningless. The system is not designed to ensure justice and allow social change. They feel they have learned this through all the efforts they have made in the last two years.

If laws were set up to protect the people, they wouldn't be in the bind they're in now anyway; the federal government did not look out for the people the way they should have. The real issue is, is this government for the people or against them? If we have to go through all this procedure, then government can't be for the people.

The court proceedings are a slow, tedious, and unnecessary process, not designed to serve the people.

They take census in America, and have statisticians who know all this stuff. They know what the situation is, they don't need to take questionnaires. So why do they got to put people through all this; its like being on welfare. If you had God handling the case in this bureaucracy, there would be nothing he could do!

The assumption underlying a "power to the people" movement is that the system does not function for the people. Justice is compromised in the interests of the status quo which is maintained by the very biases in the system which keep the rich in power, and the poor, poor. Therefore, to demand justice and power to poor people by working through a system controlled by rich people carries an inherent contradiction.

This contradiction is faced most acutely by the lawyers who must represent the people in the system. In order to represent their clients successfully within the legal system, the lawyers must compromise some of their clients' interests. For example, dependency forces the lawyers to apologize for valid criticisms of the system made by CBL members. It also leads them to support strategies which meet the approval of the court. The legal system is concerned with maintaining the status quo until a court decision is passed down. Thus the lawyers must advocate a strategy aimed at maintaining the status quo, which at least temporarily, reflects the interests of the sellers.

The following are excerpts taken from a motion by the CBL lawyers to extend the trial date:

During the past several months, several news articles and certain releases of the Contract Buyers League have been critical of the courts and their ability to provide speedy and fair justice for black people. None of the releases of the Contract Buyers League have been intended to be critical of this Court for not setting this case down for an early trial. The lawyers of plaintiffs have emphasized to their clients that preparation of this case for trial is a long and arduous task and that certain delays prior to the trial was to be expected....

While the matter of the hold-out of monthly installments is indeed complex because of the number of attorneys, buyers, and differing circumstances involved, plaintiffs' counsel are attempting and will continue to attempt to resolve the matter of rent withholding and consequent evictions which concern the buyers who are the parties-plaintiff to this action. Plaintiffs' counsel will exert all efforts possible to bring about a resolution of the withholding of the monthly payments, including negotiations with the sellers' attorneys and with the Mayor of the City of Chicago. (Italics supplied)

The west side leadership is not as critical in their perceptions of social change in the system. They have a vague notion of an abstract framework which consistently relates one isolated problem with another. They understand that rich whites keep poor whites and blacks at each others' throats with racism, and that "this is no accident; people do this for profit." But they are willing to give the system one more chance. And in doing so, they must comply with the system; they must be careful not to go into court with "unclean hands."

According to the co-chairman of the south side, to change the system, "you have to have a change of heart, because blacks can't do it alone." The attitudes of whites must be changed, "because the white people is the leaders of the system." Obviously, this sharply contrasts with the principle of self-determination.

One white student working with the west side, believes that the south side has failed to keep a "healthy self-interest:"

Their motive at this point is revenge against Universal Builders and whites. Healthy goals are trying to build something up, like buying homes at a fair price. Their motivation is negative, hatred instead of love. CBL people want a dignified way of living, to get something good. They're not motivated to put people out of business; they want the sellers to get a fair profit.... The south siders are struggling to find their identities. They don't know whether to be violent and militant; they don't know what militant means; are we supposed to get our guns and shoot? Is this the way to be a Black Man today? The west siders have less of a problem of identity.

VI. DILEMMAS IN CHOOSING STRATEGIES

There are two considerations to be made in the choice of strategies. The first consideration is that of a judgment concerning the moral implications intrinsic to a long range social-political strategy, regardless of its immediate consequences. In contrast, the second consideration is that of pragmatism: that of weighing the immediate costs and practical effectiveness of the alternative outcomes of the opposing strategies. When these two considerations conflict, the fundamental dilemma becomes that of weighing the long range value of a strategy against its immediate costs and effectiveness. The differences between the two considerations approach the level of quantitative vs. qualitative change.

In the process of failing to renegotiate their contracts successfully, the south side's goal shifted. This study cannot explain this process in great depth. It can only suggest that as the south side CBL members became more disillusioned with the "system" as a result of the evictions, they became increasingly aware of the need for fundamental changes going beyond their particular problem. And as they began to articulate the need for these changes, they may have become more firmly committed to their own criticisms.

When their strategy failed to achieve the immediate goal of renegotiation of contracts, emphasis was naturally shifted to the value of the strategy for its intrinsic moral worth and long-range political value. According to the south side CBL vice-chairman, "We want CBL to be a beacon for others to see. We've set a pattern for what poor people can do with nothing; we gave up the nothing we had." The goal then centered on the process by which people demand, rather than beg, for the rights which they should already have. The consequences of pursuing this goal constitute a direct

challenge to the existing allocation of resources and political power in the larger society.

Thus this strategy is not an isolated activity but is seen in the context of a larger movement. At the Saturday night meetings the south side chairman will remind the people that "if everyone in this country just sat on their asses for one day, the people could end the war in Vietnam." Thus the south side CBL considers itself to be setting an example of the kind of moral discipline which will eventually lead to fundamental change in this society.

We've cultivated a group of people that put something on the line. We've let everybody know we're not going to let anybody make us do anything. This is dangerous. This society is not ready to deal with anything like this. They can't harm us now; we've past that stage.

There is no way to evaluate the effectiveness of a strategy in terms of such long-range abstract goals. One can only speculate about alternative consequences. One might consider what the consequences are of a movement that fails. In trying to demonstrate the power of self-determination, there is the risk of actually confirming to people that they are powerless. The chances for such a failure are great considering the tremendous risks involved and the difficulty in recruiting enough people actually to create an effective power base. The south side does not consider this problem openly, but they do admit the need to recruit more people, "in order to get more power to the people we've got."

While the south side's goals have become abstract the west side's have remained single issue oriented and pragmatic. However, they still consider the possibility of leaving the law suit and resuming the hold-out. The dilemma is in knowing which strategy will most effectively lead to the successful renegotiation of contracts.

There are a number of reasons that weigh in favor of the resumption of the payment strike. While the west side leaders believe the law suit will be won, there is the possibility of drawn out appeals going on for years. Many contract buyers presently are suffering hardships in meeting their payments. Some buyers have already paid more than their homes are worth, and there is the possibility that sellers could shift their funds to someone else's account and declare bankruptcy, thus making it difficult for buyers--in case of a legal victory--to collect refunds.

However, the law suit offers a more secure solution. The costs of an unsuccessful payment strike could be very severe. In addition to losing homes, there are eviction and court fees totaling close to \$2,000 per family. In the mind of the co-chairman of the west side, such costs do not constitute winning. Such losses are not good for morale and cohesion either. Having a pragmatic approach to strategy, the co-chairman of the west side did not even favor the resumption of the second hold-out.

It was dangerous and unwarranted after filing a law suit; we'd have to give it up, which we did. We should have remained paying. I didn't like the idea of starting something and then having to give it up, under some pressure. You lose the confidence of the people. They'll say "Didn't you know these things before? Didn't you know we'd have to pay back? How come now you're changing?" Because in the second hold-out we lost eviction fees, court costs; so we lose in this process. If we're in this to win we should win, not lose. In the hold-out, we lost.

The dilemma faced in the consideration of the immediate costs of the alternative strategies is reflected in the fact that both the south and west sides have internal disagreements. The only way to get immediate relief from the burden of high payments is to hold out. And if the court case is lost, the hold-out will have allowed families to have saved enough money to buy new homes. While this is south side policy, many west siders have expressed reluctance at paying back. And while it is the west side policy

that the loss of homes through evictions is too high^{a price} to pay, many south siders have made the same decision.

In the trade-off between long-range goals and immediate costs, the most obvious problem is that the effects and costs are not known for certain. And even if one were able to estimate the costs and effects of a strategy, one would have to face the dilemma of deciding at what point the personal sacrifice is too great for an abstract cause. There are various reactions to this dilemma.

For example, the south side leaders claim that "material things are really nothing," and "houses are no more than chicken coops." They have asserted that this is even more true on the west side, "for everyone knows the houses on the west side aren't worth paying nothing for." But some west side members are not so willing to accept that there is wisdom and moral value in giving up one's home. Mrs. Wells reaction was:

Is this man saying this for real? "Our stuff is so fine, but you don't have anything, anyway." But to be if I only have a cardboard box to sit on, that's the only thing I have to sit on, so I like my cardboard box like you like your stuffed chair, because that's your chair, and this is my box. So whatever I have is mine, and I care for it as much as they do theirs.

VII. STRUCTURAL FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF GOALS AND STRATEGIES

The split between the south and west side may have been historically inevitable. There have been few, if any, organizations which have ever been able to transcend the deep rooted rivalry between west side and south side. Even small west side children who have never been outside their neighborhoods will say that south siders are snobs. The south side is the black man's suburbia. In the area where south side CBL members live there is green grass instead of broken glass.

In seeking to find an explanation for the various perceptions and the diverging goals and tactics of the south and west sides, we can examine the structural characteristics which distinguish the two communities. Considering the income levels, condition of the areas and the degree of exploitation involved, the results are not what one might be inclined to expect.

According to the 1960 census, the median income of the west side was \$4,800 as compared to \$7,000 on the south side. 17 percent of the housing on the south side is owner occupied as compared to 16 percent on the west side. About 22 percent of the housing on the west side was substandard. Most south side CBL homes were constructed by the same builder as late as 1957. Even though the west side homes are older, because of more drastically inflated prices and higher interest rates, west siders often pay higher monthly payments than south siders. However, west siders generally rent out a flat of their homes which helps contribute to their monthly payments.

Thus, those who have been exploited more in their contracts, have taken the less militant stand. The west siders have lower incomes, and yet have undertaken to pay more severely inflated prices for their homes. Some west side CBL members have already paid more than the real value of their homes, and yet are no where near the end of their payments or the possession of the

deed. In contrast, the injustices committed against the south side are not nearly as blatant.

In fact, the CBL attorneys were even hesitant to file a law suit concerning the south side, fearing that the south side builders have buried their profits beyond discovery. Because the homes are new, block busting is not involved, and the inflation of prices is not so obvious.

The lawyers were further aggravated by the accusations coming from the south side. If they drop the case, they would prove that the accusations aimed at them were true by default. If they take the case and lose, the accusations are directly "verified." If the case is won, the accusers may say it was because of fear of being exposed.

One wonders whether the south siders consciously or unconsciously feel that their case is not a clear one, and therefore, do not want to depend on a systematic legal approach to the problem to which they have become so emotionally committed.

Other important structural variables to look at are place of birth and education. Most west siders have migrated from the south, commonly Mississippi and Alabama, within the past twenty years. In contrast, south side residents tend to be second generation Chicagoans who have moved out from the near south side rather than the west side. Place of birth is related to the level of education and sophistication. According to the 1960 census, the median number of years of education for west siders was 8.7, as compared with 12 for the south siders. Higher education is related to the ability to grasp issues at an abstract level. Thus it is not surprising that at the south side meetings, the participants frequently discussed problems from the point of view of a broader sociological context, rather than as isolated issues.

The level of sophistication resulting from education and cultural background has affected the communities' responses to the problems of contract buying. For example, on the west side, there are over 2,000 persons included in the plaintiff class of the law suit and yet many of these people do not know anything about CBL. When a letter was sent out to 60 persons telling them that their seller had offered to renegotiate their contracts, only one person responded.

However, participation is not directly related to sophistication. On the south side where the level of sophistication is higher, the membership is lower. While a common builder constructed 1300 homes on the south side, CBL was able to attract only 200 of these homeowners. In this situation the homeowners are capable of understanding the problem. However, the level of sophistication may inhibit the people from admitting that they "have been taken." Thinking that they have left the ghetto, these people may not want to face the possibility that they are still being exploited.

Age was definitely a characteristic distinguishing the west side CBL from the south side. South side CBL members were on the average at least ten years older than west side members. Also, of those within the south side CBL, the younger ones tended to hold out while the older ones were more likely to resume payments.

There are a number of pragmatic reasons why such a division according to age might occur. Those members who are younger have most likely bought their homes more recently than older members. On the south side, members commonly bought their homes around 1963 while on the west side, most members bought their homes between 1959 and 1963. Young home buyers, not having put in as many payments and repairs on their homes, stand to lose less than old home buyers. They may also be in a better position to seek out new homes,

which they may now buy with FHA help (now that the 1967 ruling has made discrimination illegal) or with a government subsidy program.

Age and educational level create a number of subcultural effects. For example, many of the south side women were Afro hair styles, while only a few have been seen on west side CBL members. Hair styles may or may not reflect an awareness of cultural-political movement to liberate the black man. An awareness and participation in such a movement would make an individual more receptive to a militant stance and give greater social meaning to such activity. Age, education, and awareness of the black "revolution" are factors which are likely to influence an individual's perception of the "system," and his interpretation of the alternative solutions to the problems involved in contract buying.

VIII. LEADERSHIP AND COHESION

Age, income, education and condition of the neighborhoods are structural differences which may have contributed to the split between the west and south side. In addition to these structural variables, there are a number of circumstantial factors related to leadership which have enhanced the likelihood of such a split occurring.

Because CBL was originally organized on the west side and had the support of students and religious leaders from that area, it remained the base of the organization after the south side joined. Considering the natural rivalry between the two neighborhoods, and the fact that the south side is considered to be a "better" neighborhood, it is not surprising that this created friction. Even before the south side was organized there was dissension. When Mrs. Wells spoke to a large group of south side people, explaining the problems in contract buying, a woman asked why the south side should join with the west side when they "could do it on their own."

While most of the white staff and volunteers worked in an office in the Loop, there was an office on the west side also, where the chairman and co-chairman of the west side were working full time for CBL. There were no south siders working in the office. Though the south side leaders were invited to staff meetings, they never came. They claim that they had no voice in decision-making and were expected to carry out the orders handed down by the west side chairman. During the evictions, though all of the action was on the south side, CBL activity was always channeled through the west side leadership. These circumstantial factors, combined with the structural differences already discussed, laid the groundwork for the eventual split between the south side and the west side.

Once this split occurred, there were significant differences in the internal cohesion of the two factions. While the south side has become divided over the choice of strategies, the west side has been able to maintain its unity. Although many of the west side members have expressed reluctance in following the west side strategy, their commitment to the organization and the realization of the importance of internal unity, has motivated them to stand behind the leadership.

The leadership has cultivated this loyalty by carefully listening to the opinions of the membership. Small discussion meetings are frequently held for this purpose. The west side leadership has constantly stressed, "No matter what we do, we all got to stick together."

As indicated earlier, the west side leaders have taken a pragmatic approach to the goals of CBL. They are basically cautious and thoughtful people not easily caught up in flamboyant rhetoric. A group of white students challenged the west side strategy when the vice chairman expressed a fear that certain actions might lead to violence. The students accused him of being soft. His reply touched at the ultimate question of costs: "Alright, you be the one to decide who will be the first to die."

Working closely with the lawyers, the west side leadership feels confident that the law suit will be won. They have decided to give the system one more chance. Thus, when members express reluctance at resuming their monthly payments, the leadership stresses the importance of following the legal requirements and "keeping their hands clean."

While religion does not seem to be related to the different choice in goals and strategy made by the two CBL factions, leadership from both groups used religion for the function of stimulating participation and strengthening cohesion. Probably due to the differences in age, education and background,

the west side meetings are filled with many more references to religion, the need for patience, perseverance and prayer than the south side meetings.

For example, when the west side attendance was getting low after the hold-out had ended, Mrs. Wells spoke inspiringly to the people reminding them that if things seemed slow now, to remember that there was nothing before CBL. She recounted the story of how a year and a half ago, she had so fearfully gone to her seller to request that he renegotiate her contract. She prayed to God that morning to give her a sign that would help her recognize what was the right thing for her to do. When the seller showed her the paper that was supposedly the costly insurance policy, Mrs. Wells saw the man's hands trembling like a leaf. She knew that this was God's sign to her that this man had all along, quite consciously been cheating her. From that moment on, she committed herself to fight this injustice to the end. As Mrs. Wells told her story and convictions, many people swayed their bodies back and forth in agreement, and at the end there was tremendous applause, and the spirit in the room was unmistakably "uplifted."

Though it is possible that a religious motivation is inclined to be a conservative one, it is not hard to imagine this fervor channeled just as easily into a supportive function for a more militant stand. Religion can be used to justify and strengthen any cause.

The south side leadership has used a more pragmatic attitude to try to spur the people to action. They are constantly reminded, in contrast to the west side, that prayer will not get them anywhere; they must personally take responsibility and work to solve their problems.

The situation on the south side also presents a contrasting pattern of influence between members and leadership. On the south side, a vocal segment of the membership exerted a decisive influence on the strategy. This

influence was demonstrated most clearly when the leadership presented the proposal offered by the Mayor. Although the leadership had already signed the proposal, the emotion of the CBL meeting motivated them to change their position.

The leadership on the south side admits that CBL's experiences over the past two years has greatly affected their perceptions regarding the "system's" response to the issue of contract buying. The original perspective of the south side chairman is reflected in the fact that he is a Chicago policeman who led an illegal raid on the apartment of the head of the Black Stone Rangers Gang for some alleged parking tickets two years ago. This change in perceptions is also apparent from the statement of the south side vice-chairman who said, "I was so brainwashed to think that the system would work; I was just waiting for someone to fix everything."

When the south side leadership decided to join the vocal segment which wanted to continue the hold-out, the organization split. The strategy decided upon demanded personal sacrifices too great for many people to accept. Thus, strategy was defeated before it was ever implemented by the loss of an effective base of power.

IX. CONCLUSION

A major dilemma in social protest arises when the approximate strategy for long range fundamental change in the system is not compatible with the strategy necessary for achieving immediate tangible results. By aiming for fundamental changes in the system an organization may alienate those whose support is needed to achieve immediate ends. However, by achieving immediate ends, a strategy which does not challenge existing priorities within the system may actually serve to strengthen the system rather than change it.

There are two factors which influence the choice between long range and short range goals. The first is an ideological one, dependent upon one's perception of the social system; the second is pragmatic: a consideration of the costs involved.

Those individuals who give priority to the long range goals believe that the problem is inherent in the system. They consider it necessary to achieve the long range goals in order to attack the causes of the specific problem. The specific problem is only a symptom and therefore to deal with it alone is not sufficient to prevent the reoccurrence of similar problems.

On the other hand, some of those individuals concerned with achieving the short range goals believe that the system can be changed most successfully by attacking specific problems. Others who give priority to the immediate goals feel that the system is potentially responsive, and it is not necessary to have major structural change.

Due to its efforts to appeal to a broad base and not alienate potential support, the short range strategy risks the possibility of the co-optation of its original goals. This co-optation may result in only partial or superficially fulfilled demands. On the other hand, the costs involved in a long range strategy are such that they may incur serious personal sacrifices.

Without the possibility of immediate tangible rewards, it is difficult to sustain personal commitments to such a strategy.

The effectiveness of any strategy becomes diminished if it does not have massive support. With little knowledge or understanding of the complexities involved in social change, there is rarely an assurance or demonstration that long range goals can be achieved through protest. On the other hand, without such protest it seems unlikely that the impetus for social change would ever occur.

In light of the dynamics of CBL's experiences, it appears that both structural factors and previous attempts at social reform have played a decisive role in the development of perceptions concerning social change and the resulting goals and strategies. While structural factors are useful in analyzing the emergence of goals and strategies, the feedback effects of the pursued strategies challenge previous assumptions about the nature of the social system and thus lead to the revision of goals and strategies. Thus the effects of social protest on the perceptions of individuals and organizations involved in such activity play a very important role in social change.

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Aug 17, 1970