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## Acknowledgements

This study was conceived, developed, and completed under the guidance of Professor H. Peter Krosby, to whom I am deeply grateful. His encouragement and constructive criticism has been a great help. I must also thank Miss Ruth Sanderson, Library technician in the Documents Section of the University of Wisconsin Memorial Library, for her valuable assistance in locating much of the material included in this study. Most of all I am forever indebted to my wife Dorrie for her patience and forbearance as well as for countless hours of editing and typing. I am marginally indebted to four million Finns, whose spirit and lofty ideals inspired this study.

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## Introduction

In response to press criticism of Finnish foreign policy in the autumn of 1961, Max Jakobson, one of Finland's most articulate spokesmen, wrote:

Opinion in Finland has been somewhat dismayed and even depressed by reactions of the press in the West... This is not because the reactions have been unfriendly: on the contrary, I have noticed that comment here has been sympathetic towards Finland---rather like obituary notices. In fact, it is the ease and speed with which Finnish independence has been written off in the press here that has depressed the Finnish people. It seemed to me at least, when reading the foreign press comment, that the immediate reaction to the Soviet note to Finland of 30 October was to assume that this probably would be the end of Finnish independence. As a matter of fact, we ought to be used to this kind of reaction. Finland was written off in 1939 because we fought, and in 1940 because we made peace; in 1941 because we were too anti-Soviet, and in 1944 because it was thought we were giving in to the USSR too much.

Ever since the end of the last war Western observers seem to have had a great deal of difficulty in fitting Finland into the accepted scheme of things in Europe. The existence of this small, neutral, and practically unarmed nation---a western democracy---next door to the Soviet Union has appeared to many as something like an Indian rope trick which defies the law of nature.<sup>1</sup>

This "Indian rope trick" by which Finland has maintained her independence is really no miracle at all. It is simply the strict adherence to a realistic policy of neutrality called the "Paasikivi line," or in more up-to-date usage, the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen line."

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<sup>1</sup>Max Jakobson, "Finland's Foreign Policy," International Affairs, Vol. 38, March, 1962, p.196.

This foreign policy derives its name from two of Finland's post-war presidents; Juho Kusti Paasikivi, who served from 1946 to 1956, and Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, who succeeded Paasikivi in 1956 and remains in office in 1967. Paasikivi also served as Prime Minister in two governments during the presidency of Gustaf Mannerheim.

Paasikivi, who was well respected in Moscow, had been named Prime Minister because he was thought to be the only Finn capable of convincing the Russians that Finland's attitude towards them had changed.

The assumptions on which the Paasikivi line was based are as valid in 1967 as they were in either 1944 or 1946. The first of these assumptions sprang from the experiences of World War II, which had shown Finland that the vital interests of the Western Great Powers did not extend to the Eastern Baltic. Therefore if Finland tied her foreign policy to the West, it would hang by a very fragile thread. And not only would a Western oriented policy have been rather tenuous from a logistical viewpoint, it would also, in effect, have been an open provocation of the Soviet Union, an aspect which is also part of a second assumption.

This assumption holds that Finland is strategically vital to the USSR. Aside from the expansionist political aspirations of Russia, it is obvious that the Soviet leaders would not have tolerated Finland's alignment with powers considered to be hostile to the USSR. So, from a strictly military point of view, the Soviet leaders could not allow a serious

threat to exist on their Northwest border. Recognizing that, Paasikivi reasoned that as long as Finland's government was truly friendly to the USSR, and did not allow any other state to threaten the USSR through Finland, this little country might escape the fate of Poland and Hungary.

On the basis of these two assumptions Paasikivi determined his course of action. A Western alliance was ruled out, and the end result of Soviet "alliances" with other Eastern European nations precluded the possibility of Paasikivi proposing a similar fate for his country. The obvious alternative was neutrality, but Paasikivi realized that it would be difficult to convince the Russians of Finnish intentions. A mere declaration would not suffice--- Finland would have to prove her neutrality by deeds.

A first step would be the scrupulous fulfillment of the reparations obligations imposed by the Soviet Union. Paasikivi insisted on this, despite the heavy sacrifices for his countrymen, until they were paid in full.

A second step would be to avoid becoming entangled in conflicts between the Great Powers. A good example of Finland's adherence to this policy came in the summer of 1947. Finland had been invited to participate in discussions of the Marshall Plan, a United States initiative strongly opposed by the USSR. Though Finland certainly could have used any aid made available, and though most Finns were undoubtedly in favor of participation, the official statement issued by the Foreign Relations Committee was, in part: "the Marshall Plan

having become the source of serious differences of opinion among the Big Powers, Finland, desiring to remain outside the areas of conflict in Big Power politics, regrets that it does not find it possible to participate in the said conference."

A third step would be to refrain from provoking the Soviet Union by carefully conducting domestic affairs. To that end Paasikivi invited Communists into the two cabinets he formed, and as President, his first Prime Minister was Mauno Pekkala, a dissident left-wing Social Democrat. Paasikivi also imposed government censorship on material judged to be overly critical of the USSR.

Fearing that the rest of the world would view his policies as being too pro-Soviet, he attempted to strengthen Finland's neutrality by applying for membership in the United Nations. The fact that Finland was kept out of this body by a Soviet veto is evidence that the Soviet Union hardly considered Finland a satellite, or even a friend, despite the misconceptions of the American press on this point.

Events of the year 1948 provide additional insight into Paasikivi's foreign policy. In February, Paasikivi received a letter from Joseph Stalin which suggested that discussions between the two countries concerning a mutual assistance pact be instituted at once. The note was rendered more ominous by references to the recent Soviet pacts with Rumania and Hungary, and by the coup which had just taken place in Czechoslovakia.

There being no realistic alternative, Paasikivi accepted

Stalin's suggestion, and in April a ten year "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" was signed.

Finland was immediately consigned by Western commentators to the Soviet camp, and the impression created by the press reports of this period has influenced Western public opinion ever since. But a close examination of the Agreement reveals that most of the pessimism is unfounded. The Finnish Pact is quite different in content, if not in name, from the treaties signed by Hungary or Rumania. The USSR seems to have accepted at this early date the difference between Finland and Eastern Europe. In fact, this Mutual Assistance Pact has been cited by many observers as an affirmation of, rather than a departure from Finland's policy of neutrality. In any event, it has served as the most notable guideline in the formation of Finnish foreign policy.

Another noteworthy event for the Finns was an abortive Communist coup which was supposed to take place while government leaders were in Moscow. On the eve of their departure, the Communist Minister of the Interior warned the Finnish military commander to expect "trouble from the left." The commander understood the implications of the warning and his subsequent actions eliminated the possibilities of a successful coup, if one had indeed been planned. These events resulted in heavy losses for the Communists in the Parliamentary elections, and contributed to the dismissal of the Minister of the Interior, depriving the Communists of their most

powerful government position.

On the basis of the Paasikivi line, Finland's relations with the USSR remained relatively good for more than ten years after the signing of the 1948 Pact. The most significant events of the decade were; the signing of a treaty returning the Porkkala naval base to Finland and extending the "Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance" for twenty years, and Finland's entry into the United Nations, both of which took place in 1955.

Also in this year, Finnish participation in the Nordic Council was made possible by Soviet assent, assent that had not been forthcoming when Finland first breached the subject in 1954. Adherence to the Paasikivi line was plainly resulting in benefits for Finland.

But in 1958 the Soviet Union unleashed a diplomatic and economic offensive against Finland, presumably as retaliation for Finland increasing her trade with the West. A coalition government fell because certain members were unwilling to serve in a cabinet which was unable "properly to safeguard Finland's interests in the area of relations with the USSR." Subsequent Soviet statements disclosed however, that Khrushchev objected to the composition, and not necessarily to the program of the cabinet.

After this crisis ended in early 1959, Soviet-Finnish relations improved and remained on a good basis until the Autumn of 1961. Finland was even able in March, 1961, to affiliate with the European Free Trade Association, which

required a major Soviet concession. But on 30 October, the Finnish ambassador in Moscow received a note, which to some observers indicated that the Paasikivi line had failed.

The note requested that military consultations be commenced between the USSR and Finland to prepare for a possible West German attack through the Baltic. The Soviets invoked the provisions of the 1948 Mutual Assistance Pact, and suggested that West Germany threatened not only the USSR, but also Finland. President Kekkonen, then on a visit to the United States, stated that the note was not a cause for alarm, but simply a normal diplomatic procedure. Despite dire Western predictions to the contrary, Finland emerged from the crisis intact.

In retrospect, it is possible that the Soviet leaders were really worried about West Germany, but it is likely that other considerations influenced the Soviet actions. To some observers, this offensive was simply a means of influencing the 1962 presidential elections. A rival to Kekkonen had emerged, and it was surmised that the USSR wanted to insure the re-election of a man that Moscow regards as highly as it did Paasikivi. That this was actually the case is unprovable, but the pressure did result in the withdrawal of the other presidential contender, and Kekkonen was easily re-elected.

Since 1962 Soviet-Finnish relations have improved steadily and at the same time have not proved to be an obstacle to improved Finnish-American relations.

Early in 1966 a government was formed which included both Social Democrats and Communists, a significant development in two ways. Soviet opposition to Social Democratic leadership had prevented their effective participation in post-war governments, and domestic opposition had kept Communists out of the government since 1948. This government enjoys wide parliamentary support, and has not seen fit to make the least alteration in the Paasikivi line. This government will probably continue at least until the presidential elections of 1968. The Russians will not have to make their preference known in this election, and it is highly unlikely that they will actively interfere as they did in 1961.

In any event it is unlikely that the Finns, the great majority of whom support the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, will invite Soviet displeasure by replacing the man whose name their foreign policy bears.

The events described above are some of those that have established the limits within which Finland is free to conduct her foreign policy. The events before 1956 served as a guide for Finland's first votes in the United Nations, and subsequent occurrences have helped to refine their voting patterns in the General Assembly, as well as their foreign policy in general.

That strict adherence to the Paasikivi line has been instrumental in keeping Finland free should be obvious. That Finland's actions in the United Nations are a reflection of, or at best, an extension of, this Paasikivi line, should

emerge from the following pages.

Obviously, a study of this nature cannot include treatment of all Finland's actions in the United Nations. The questions examined here were subjects of consideration in the General Assembly and are limited to those important enough to be classified as "Political and Security Questions." The writer has attempted to be as objective as possible in the selection of topics to be studied, and at the same time include all questions which provide useful information about Finland's foreign policy.

## CHAPTER I

### The Suez Crisis and UNEF

To understand the Suez Crisis of 1956 one must be cognizant of at least the general history of the Suez Canal, as it was the seizure of this canal which ostensibly caused the crisis.

The idea of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, once a reality under the Pharaohs, was considered periodically by several European nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Because of imagined technical obstacles, it was given no practical application, until a French engineer and diplomat took up the cause in mid-nineteenth century. This Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, obtained two concessions from the viceroy of Egypt, which made possible the building of the canal. In 1854 he obtained the territorial rights for the canal. In 1856 he obtained authority to organize a company which would have the right to operate the canal for 99 years. This second concession stated that passage through the canal was to be open to ships of all countries, providing that they paid the passage fees.

The work on the canal was difficult, and it was not opened until 1869. From the day of its opening the canal assumed major international importance. On several occasions

during the following 19 years, one country or another would express anxiety that its enemy of the moment would seize the canal and prohibit its ships from using it.

Despite the clause guaranteeing free passage in the original accord, most of the major maritime powers met in Constantinople in 1888 to reaffirm this guarantee. They agreed on a convention which "guarantees for all time freedom of passage through the canal for all ships of all nationalities, without discrimination in peace and in war."

The ownership of the Suez Canal Company was originally envisioned to be held by citizens of several nations, but because of the refusal of Great Britain and the United States to have anything to do with it, the great majority of the stock was held by French individuals and by the Egyptian government. Theoretically, under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt in 1875 sold her shares to the Government of Great Britain, who in fact, if not in law, controlled Egypt.

World War I provided Britain with the excuse to establish a protectorate over Egypt, which lasted until 1922. In that year an Egyptian monarchy was established, which, under British tutelage, existed until 1951. A successful rebellion of young army officers forced King Farouk to abdicate in July, 1951, and by early 1952 a military dictatorship under Gamel Abdel Nasser was firmly in power. In June, 1956,

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<sup>1</sup>D. G. Watt, Documents on the Suez Crisis (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957), p. 35.

Nasser was "elected" President in a plebiscite, setting the stage for the events on which this chapter is based.

The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 was precipitated on 26 July, when Nasser proclaimed his intention to nationalize the canal. He promised compensation to the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company but specified neither when the compensation would be made nor in what currency it would be paid.

Between 29 July and 2 August representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States met in London to discuss the matter. Believing that the Egyptian action threatened the free use of the canal, they invited the signatories of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and other nations which used the canal to a conference in London. Ostensibly, this conference was called to establish operating arrangements under international control.

Before the conference could open, Nasser carried out his threat and seized the canal and property of the Canal Company. The United Kingdom and France refused to pay tolls to the Egyptian authorities, and with the assistance of the United States succeeded in freezing all Egyptian financial accounts.

On this note the London Suez Conference, attended by 22 countries, opened on 16 August. Egypt did not attend, insisting that the conference had no right to discuss the status of territory, which was an integral part of a sovereign

nation.<sup>2</sup> Finland, offering no official explanation, did not attend, though her Scandinavian neighbors did. It is possible that Finnish leaders saw a large power conflict developing and wanted no part of it.

The USSR, much to the delight of its new friend, announced that it generally favored Egypt's position, and that it had strong reservations about the London Conference.<sup>3</sup> Eighteen of the conferences eventually agreed on a program which was presented to the Egyptian government on 3 September. The USSR, India, Ceylon and Indonesia did not endorse the proposals. Had Finland attended she would indeed have been placed in a Great Power conflict.

After considering the proposals, Egypt rejected them on 9 September and immediately issued proposals of her own, which were turned down by a Second Suez Conference as being too ambiguous.<sup>4</sup>

On 12 September France and the United Kingdom informed

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<sup>2</sup>France and the United Kingdom did not dispute Egypt's legal right to nationalize the property, though other canal users did. The central problem concerned interpretation of the Convention of 1888 which guaranteed open use of the canal by all nations.

<sup>3</sup>In the summer of 1956 the United States rejected Nasser's plea for aid to build the Aswan Dam and refused to sell Egypt the arms she wanted. Nasser then turned to the USSR and received both military and economic aid, a development which caused no small amount of consternation in the United States.

<sup>4</sup>When it became apparent that Egypt would reject the proposals of the London Suez Conference, which had already adjourned, a second conference was called to consider further action.

the United Nations Security Council that Egypt had unilaterally abrogated existing treaties, and, in view of her continued refusal to negotiate on the basis of the London Conference Proposals, this constituted a manifest danger to peace and security.

On 15 September, in a letter to the Security Council, the USSR declared that the military threats and preparations of France and the United Kingdom, made possible by the support of the United States, were solely for the purpose of exerting pressure on Egypt, and could only be regarded as an act of aggression.<sup>5</sup> The USSR further condemned the proposals of the London Conference and stated that, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, Egypt's actions were entirely legal. The Soviet Union also threatened to intervyene with whatever force was necessary if any power violated Egyptian sovereignty.<sup>6</sup>

The situation was obviously becoming more complicated, and since negotiations outside the UN had not produced a workable solution, France and the United Kingdom formally requested that the matter be brought before the Security Council. Egypt countered this move, with Soviet backing, by submitting her own request for a meeting to consider the Anglo-French actions against her. The Security Council avoided taking sides in the matter by including both items on the agenda.

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<sup>5</sup> United Nations, Security Council Documents (hereafter cited as SCD), Security Council Official Records (hereafter cited as SCOR), 11th Year, Number S/3645, p. 28.

<sup>6</sup> SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Number S/3645, p. 30.

Finland had not taken a stand on the dispute during the London Conference negotiations,<sup>7</sup> and since she was not on the Security Council she would not have to take a position during the deliberations of that body. But a knowledge of the proceedings of the Security Council is nevertheless helpful in understanding Finland's future votes in the General Assembly because the basic positions of both the USSR and the United States were stated clearly. It is reasonable to assume that Finnish leaders studied carefully the actions of the Security Council and attempted to plot the course they would take if called upon to express their nation's views.

From 26 September to 13 October the Security Council considered the question, and on the 13th unanimously approved a resolution stipulating that any settlement of the Suez question would have to meet the following requirements:

- (1) There should be free and open transit through the canal without discrimination, overt or covert-this covers both political and technical aspects;
- (2) The Sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
- (3) The operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of any country;
- (4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
- (5) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
- (6) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the

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<sup>7</sup>Finland's only action was to attend a meeting in Stockholm in September, at which the representatives of the Scandinavian states urged that the dispute be handled by the United Nations. D. C. Watt, Documents, 37.

Suez Canal Co. and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions for the payment of sums found to be due.<sup>8</sup>

Egypt accepted these requirements and from this date until the end of October, negotiations to implement these requirements were held between Egypt, United Kingdom, and France. These negotiations came to an abrupt halt on 29 October, as the crisis entered a new phase.

On this date the United States informed the Security Council that Israel's army had attacked Egypt and had penetrated far into Egyptian territory. The United States requested an immediate meeting to deal with this aggression.<sup>9</sup>

The Council concurred, and four meetings were held between 30 October and 1 November, to which the representatives of Israel and Egypt were invited.<sup>10</sup> At the first meeting, the United States representative insisted that the Council act on this breach of the peace, and order the Israeli forces to withdraw across the armistice lines established in 1949.<sup>11</sup>

Israel defended her actions, stating that they were in retaliation for Egyptian harassment in the form of Fedayeen

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<sup>8</sup>SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Number S/3675, Resolutions, p.7.

<sup>9</sup>SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Letters, S/3706.

<sup>10</sup>SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Summary Records of Meetings 747-750.

<sup>11</sup>In 1949, at the end of armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, an armistice line was agreed upon by both Israel and the Arab States and guaranteed by several other nations.

raids. Egypt stated, predictably, that this alibi was complete nonsense, and that Israeli's actions constituted an unprovoked aggression.<sup>12</sup>

In the next meeting France and United Kingdom stated that the hostilities were **endangering** free passage through the canal, and if Egypt and Israel did not disengage themselves and withdraw within 12 hours, British and French forces would intervene, in order to protect the rights of canal users. In view of the short time limit, Egypt requested a special evening meeting to consider both the act of aggression by Israel and the threat of force by France and the United Kingdom.<sup>13</sup>

At this meeting both the United States and the USSR introduced separate draft resolutions, both more or less moderately worded, calling upon Israel to withdraw. Both resolutions were voted upon and both defeated by the negative votes of France and the United Kingdom.<sup>14</sup> Without having accomplished anything, the meeting adjourned until the next afternoon.

At the next meeting (Afternoon, 31 October) it was reported that France and the United Kingdom had begun bombing military targets in Egypt, and that Egypt had closed the canal by

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<sup>12</sup>SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Summary Records of Meeting 748.

<sup>13</sup>SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Summary Records of Meetings 749 and 750.

<sup>14</sup>SCD, SCOR, 11th Year, Resolutions, (S/3710 and S/3717).

sinking ships in it. Developments had reached a crucial point, and Yugoslavia proposed that since the Security Council could not act because of the veto power of France and the United Kingdom, an emergency session of the General Assembly should be called to handle the matter.<sup>15</sup> The representative of Yugoslavia invoked the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the Korean Crisis. This procedural resolution passed over the negative votes of the United Kingdom and France, and the Secretary General summoned the special session.<sup>16</sup>

Prior to the convening of the First Emergency Special Session, Finnish newspapers had for some time speculated about the impact that United Nations Membership would have on Finnish foreign policy. Most envisioned no radical departure from the "Paasikivi Line," though some hoped that a modification which gave Finland a greater degree of "true" neutrality would be possible. Many also wrote that recent events, such as the return of Porkkala, and Russia's permission to join the United Nations, heralded a new era of freedom for Finland. And though difficulties in maintain-

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<sup>15</sup>It is interesting that Yugoslavia should invoke the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, in view of the Communist position on this event.

<sup>16</sup>SCD, SCOR, ~~11th Year~~, Resolutions, S/3721. This resolution is also interesting because the Soviet Union failed to vote against it. She was later to explain her negative votes on the UNEF by insisting that the Assembly had no power to create the force, yet it was that that was the express purpose of calling a special session.

ing a neutral position would be encountered, the newspapers reflected the opinion that Finland could live up to her pledges to both the Soviet Union and to the United Nations.<sup>17</sup>

At the first meeting of the General Assembly the representative of the United States introduced a draft resolution, which Finland found it possible to vote for. In addition to introductory material recognizing that Israel, France and the United Kingdom were guilty of aggression, the resolution provided that the General Assembly would: (1) urge that all parties engaged in hostilities in the area agree to a ceasefire and halt the movement of forces and arms; (2) urge the parties to the Armistice Agreements to withdraw behind the armistice lines, (3) appeal to other states not to delay the implementation of the resolution, (4) urge that as soon as the cease-fire was effective, the Suez Canal should be reopened, (5) ask the Secretary General to observe the compliance with the resolution and to report to the United Nations. This resolution reached a vote early on 2 November, and was adopted by a vote of 64 to 5 with 6 abstentions. Mr. Gripenberg, the Finnish representative, could vote affirmatively because the proposal was supported not only by a great majority, but also by both the United States and the USSR.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Kent Forster, "Finland in the United Nations," Journal of Central European Affairs, v. 21, 1962, p. 466.

<sup>18</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, (hereafter cited as GAOR), 1st Emergency Session, Annexes, Resolution 997 (ES-I).

In the meeting of 3 November the Secretary-General reported, as he was asked to do by Resolution 997, that Egypt and Israel had both agreed to the cease-fire on the condition that all other parties did so also. But the United Kingdom and France declared that they would not stop their actions until Israel and Egypt agreed to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace.<sup>19</sup>

On 4 November the Assembly considered and adopted two proposals—one submitted by 19 non-aligned countries, the other by Canada—both intended to implement the resolution of 2 November. The 19-Power draft resolution was really just a more strongly-worded edition of Resolution 997, but the Canadian proposal called upon the Secretary General to submit a plan for a United Nations military force.

For reasons that are not clear, Finland joined the other Scandinavian countries in abstaining on the 19-Power resolution though both the United States and the USSR voted affirmatively. And on the Canadian resolution, which called upon the Secretary General to set up a military force, Finland and the other Scandinavian countries voted affirmatively while the Communist bloc abstained. Both proposals were passed by overwhelming majorities. On both resolutions Finland's votes were different than those of the Soviet Union, but neither of the resolutions affected Russia's vital interests. And on one of them Finland voted contrary to both

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<sup>19</sup>GAOR, 1st Emergency Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 5, No. A/3267.

the United States and the USSR, which seemed to indicate a substantial degree of neutrality.<sup>20</sup>

The Secretary General had anticipated the request of the Canadian resolution and had already prepared a plan for the proposed force which he presented immediately. Next day, 5 November, Canada, Norway and Columbia submitted jointly a resolution establishing a United Nations Command and authorizing the Canadian Major General E. L. Burns of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to begin recruitment of officers. Finland continued to support the force and voted affirmatively, along with the United States. Though Russia abstained, it can not be said that this was a direct confrontation, since Finland's vote merely indicated she was in favor of an action of which the Soviet Union did not approve. This Finnish supported resolution asked the Secretary General to take the proper steps to set up the force and urged him to report back as soon as possible.<sup>21</sup> Late on 4 November he asked several representatives, including that of Finland, if their governments would be willing to participate in such a force. He received his first answer the next morning. It read as follows:

I have the honor to inform you that immediately after our conversation yesterday regarding Finnish assistance in the setting up of an emergency international United

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<sup>20</sup>GAOR, 1st Emergency Session, Annexes, Resolutions 998 and 999 (ES-I).

<sup>21</sup>GAOR, 1st Emergency Session, Annexes, Resolution 1000 (ES-I).

Nations force I contacted my government. This morning I received a communication from the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that my Government in principle gladly agree to your suggestion. They would thus be willing to authorize and facilitate recruitment on a voluntary basis of Finnish military personnel for such a command and preferably for a unit consisting of troops from the Northern Countries of Europe.

(Signed) G. A. Gripenberg<sup>22</sup>

After hearing the report of the Secretary General, in which the above letter was included, the General Assembly considered a proposal offered by seven members, among them Denmark and Sweden. In essence, the resolution was a reaffirmation of the various resolutions passed previously, but included more specific instructions in regard to the organization, administration, and duties of the Emergency force. This resolution was only slightly different than the resolution proposed by Canada, Norway, and Columbia, and predictably, the voting pattern was similar. Finland, still on an independent note, voted with the United States in favor of the measure, while the USSR and her satellites again abstained.<sup>23</sup>

In a situation which did not really involve a Great Power conflict, Finland voted affirmatively with both the USSR and the United States on a resolution which expressly condemned Israel and called upon France and the United Kingdom to get out of Egypt.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>GAOR, 1st Emergency Session, Memeographed documents, No. A/3302/Add.1.

<sup>23</sup>GAOR, 1st Emergency Session, Annexes, Resolution 1001 (ES-I).

<sup>24</sup>GAOR, 1st Emergency Session, Plenary Meeting 572.

Outside the Emergency Session there was considerable activity resulting directly from the Session's accomplishments. Immediately after Resolutions 1000 (ES-I) and 1001 (ES-I) had been passed, the Secretary General approached the Government of Egypt about allowing the force on her soil. After consultations in which the Secretary General clarified the objectives of the force, Egypt consented and recommended that the forces be transferred to Egypt at once.<sup>25</sup>

Immediately it became apparent that Finland's offer of help, along with 23 other offers would be accepted. The original answers were rather nebulous so the Secretary General asked these 24 nations to clarify at once the size and type of military assistance they were prepared to put at the forces' disposal. Finland answered:

Upon instructions received and with reference to my letter of the 5th inst. I have the honor to inform you that the Finnish Government will put a contingent of some 250 men at the disposal of the United Nations international Emergency Force in pursuance of Resolutions 998 (ES-I) and 1000 (ES-I), adopted by the General Assembly on 4 and 5 November. I am to add that it is the understanding of my government that the Emergency Force will not be used for any other objective than the one set out in the above mentioned resolutions, that the Finnish unit will not be stationed in foreign territory without the permission of the State concerned, that the question of the costs for the unit will be subject to an agreement between the Finnish Government and the United Nations. My Government also understands that the assignment of the Finnish unit will be for a limited time only and therefore determined exclusively by the needs arising out of the present conflict in the area in question.<sup>26</sup>

(signed) G. A. Gripenberg

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<sup>25</sup>GAOR, 11th Regular Session, Annexes, A/3375, Agenda Item 66, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, A/3302/Add. 21, Agenda Item 66, p. 4.

The letter has been quoted in its entirety for two reasons. Firstly, of all the letters received by the Secretary General concerning the UNEF, this was the only one which qualified its offer of a contingent to the UNEF. Secondly, the last two paragraphs expressed very nicely the caution with which Finland has had to exercise her foreign policy, and is representative of her stand in the United Nation.

General Burns met with the Secretary General several times to explain the tactical needs of the proposed force. Eventually the offers of 10 states were accepted, while the offers of the other 14 states were kept in reserve. Logistical support was offered by the United States, Switzerland, and Italy, which facilitated the transport of the troops to Egypt. The first contingent of the UNEF arrived in Egypt on 15 November. By the end of the month there were 3000 men in Egypt, and the force had reached its full strength of 6000 men by 1 February.<sup>27</sup>

As more and more men arrived the UNEF could gradually carry out the task for which it was created. On 21 November there were enough troops to move from their base across the cease-fire line into Port Said. On 30 November they had crossed the Suez Canal and in a few days had taken up positions between Israeli and Egyptian lines. The Force super-

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<sup>27</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, A/3302/Add.1-30 and Add. 4/Rev. 1, Agenda Item 66.

vised the exchange of civilian internees between Egypt and the United Kingdom, effected the exchange of Israeli and Egyptian prisoners of war, and assumed control of area as the Anglo-French forces withdrew.<sup>28</sup>

By 22 December the Anglo-French military force had completely withdrawn from Egypt and the Israeli forces were gradually withdrawing. Without question, the UNEF had succeeded in restoring the peace to the area and in separating the Israeli and Egyptian armies. It had established a buffer zone, and it could be said that it was accomplishing its mission.<sup>29</sup>

Throughout this period the troops of Finland contributed as much as those of any nation. This is an example of what Finland in her restricted geo-political position could accomplish in the arena of international politics. That Finnish soldiers could take an active part in a project of which the Soviet Union disapproved indicated that Finland had added a new dimension to her cautious foreign policy.

Even considering the establishment of relative peace in the area, the question of the Suez and the UNEF was by no means settled, for now began the squabble over the financing of the operation. The Secretary General, in a report of

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<sup>28</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, A/3384 and Add. 122, Agenda Item 66.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

21 November, discussed the financial and administrative arrangements for the force. He outlined the provisional arrangements that had been made concerning the Chief of Command, personnel, and logistics, and he acknowledged his own authority for all administrative and financial arrangements for the force, including agreements with Governments concerning troops and supplies. He also proposed specific measures for financing the force.<sup>30</sup>

Finland's position on the financing of the force had been made clear in previous statements by Gripenberg. In line with her attitude on the whole crisis she chose not to split hairs over who the aggressor had been, but instead she accepted the thesis that responsibility for world peace rested on all United Nations members, and therefore the costs of the force should be shared by all members.

A few days later the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Secretary General which established temporary financing for the Force. Finland was among the 52 nations voting for the resolution, while the nine Communist-bloc countries voted against the measure.<sup>31</sup> Thirteen nations abstained. This bill (1) authorized the Secretary General to establish a UNEF Special Account, with funds outside the regular United Nations Budget; (2) established the account in

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., A/3383.

<sup>31</sup>Only at this point did the USSR introduce her argument that the General Assembly had no power to set up a military force.

the amount of \$10 million; (3) authorized the Secretary General to establish rules and procedures for the account and to advance from the working capital of the General Assembly such funds as were immediately needed; and (4) requested the 5th Committee (Budgetary) to make further arrangements for financing the UNEF and report back to the General Assembly.<sup>32</sup>

The question was duly considered by the 5th Committee in many meetings extending over several weeks. Many proposals for financing were offered, among them the familiar Soviet proposal that the United Kingdom, France, and Israel should foot the bill since they were the aggressors, and another that since the force was voluntary the contributing nations should pay their own expenses. The opinion of the Secretary General and a majority of the nations was that in view of the fact that the UNEF was organized by the Assembly independent of the policies of any one nation the expenses should be shared on the basis of the regular 1957 scale of assessments.<sup>33</sup>

During this debate the representative of Finland, made a lengthy speech which while presenting Finland's views, was also representative of all the nations participating in the UNEF, and expressed the opinion of the majority of the General Assembly. She pointed out that Finland was among those actively engaged in the Force. A special meeting of the

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<sup>32</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1122 (XI).

<sup>33</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Summary Records, 5th Committee, Condensed from meetings 538, 540, 541, 544-47, 553, 555, 557.

Finnish Parliament had passed a special law authorizing the use of Finnish troops for that purpose, all at a financial cost. She expressed approval of the principle of the UNEF but requested further clarification of the apportionment of the costs. She pointed out that all the nations contributing troops were small, and it would be unjust if these nations had to bear the financial burden alone. She endorsed the Secretary General's proposal that the expenses of the Force should be borne by the United Nations.<sup>34</sup>

At the end of the debate the Fifth Committee arrived at a resolution which was proposed to the General Assembly in plenary session on 21 December. The draft resolutions proposed that (1) the expenses of the UNEF be apportioned among the member states to the extent of \$10 million in accordance with the 1957 scale of assessments; (2) the decision would not prejudice further apportionment of expenses; (3) a committee of 9 nations examine the question of apportionment and report as soon as possible. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 62 to 8 with seven abstentions. Predictably Finland voted affirmatively; the Communist-bloc voted against the measure.<sup>35</sup>

During the next two months the administrative arrangements for the UNEF were more fully developed by the Secretary

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<sup>34</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Summary Records, 5th Committee, Meeting 544.

<sup>35</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1089(XI).

General in agreement with the nations concerned. The committee established by Resolution 1089 (XI) to deal with the financing problem was also working on a proposal. After being approved by the Special Committee, and then the 5th Committee as a whole, the proposal was adopted, and the report requested by Resolution 1089 was presented to the General Assembly in Plenary Session.<sup>36</sup>

The draft resolution presented by the 5th Committee proposed to authorize the Secretary General to spend up to \$16.5 million, invite member states to make voluntary contribution, authorize the Secretary General to take any steps necessary to get the necessary capital pending receipt of contributions, and to place the budget item on the agenda of the General Assembly session.<sup>37</sup> As might be expected, the USSR and her allies voted against the measure, while almost all the other nations, including Finland, voted for it.

While the financial question was being studied, other resolutions concerning the crisis were also considered. Four of these deserve to be mentioned, none of which involved a direct Finnish-Soviet confrontation. On 24 November, a resolution was submitted which requested Israel, the United Kingdom, and France to comply immediately with previous resolutions, and castigated these three nations for having

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66. <sup>36</sup> GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, A/3560/Add.1, Agenda Item

<sup>37</sup> GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1090 (XI).

failed to do so previously. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 63 to 5, with 10 abstentions. Finland, and the United States voted with the majority, as did the USSR and Eastern European nations.<sup>38</sup>

On 19 January and 2 February, 1957, similar measures were proposed to the Assembly, and the result in both cases was adoption by large majorities (74-2).<sup>39</sup> Also on 2 February, a resolution which called upon Egypt and Israel to respect previous agreements and proposed special measures to be taken by UNEF to carry out its goals was voted on and passed. Finland voted affirmatively and the USSR abstained.<sup>40</sup>

The work of the 11th Session on this matter was considered completed and the Session adjourned soon after. From this point on the deliberations of the General Assembly in regard to the UNEF were largely of a financial nature. A short summary of the accomplishments of these sessions follows.

In the 12th Regular Session of the General Assembly, the Secretary General submitted a report on the developments of the Middle Eastern situation since the 11th Session had adjourned in March. This report, given on 9 October, 1957, appraised the functions of the UNEF and raised the problem

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<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., Resolution 1120 (XI).

<sup>39</sup>The United Kingdom and France were not censured in this Resolution because they had completed their withdrawal.

<sup>40</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Resolutions 1123 (XI) and 1124 (XI).

of financing. The report described the tactical success of the UNEF in keeping the peace, but emphasized that the expense was greater than expected. It was obvious that the General Assembly would have to appropriate additional funds if the force were to continue.<sup>41</sup>

The USSR and her allies continued to oppose any solution which would apportion the expenses over the whole Assembly membership. They retained their original opinion that France, the United Kingdom and Israel should bear the costs because they were the aggressors.<sup>42</sup>

Finland also maintained her position on the matter and to that end co-sponsored a draft resolution which (1) approved the report of Secretary General in regard to financing; (2) approved those sections of the report which authorized the Secretary General to reimburse the contribution countries for any extra costs up to the end of 1957 and beyond; (3) decided that the costs of UNEF should "be borne by Members of the United Nations in accordance with the scales of assessments...for 1957 and 1958;" (4) asked the 5th Committee to examine the question further.<sup>43</sup> The resolution was adopted by a vote of 51 to 11 with 19 abstentions. Finland voted for the measure while the Communist bloc voted solidly against it.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, Annexes, A/3694, Agenda Item 65.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>See Forster for different interpretation.

<sup>44</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1151 (XII).

The 5th Committee did examine and discuss the matter further and the Finnish representative gave a short speech in the meeting of 6 December, 1957. He pointed out that almost all costs incurred by the Finnish contingent of the UNEF were "extra costs" to the Finnish government. The "Finnish unit was created solely for the purpose of the UNEF" and if "Finland had not been asked to put a contingent at the disposal of the UNEF, none of the members of the contingent would have received any pay." He referred to paragraph 2 of Resolution 1151 which stated that the UN should reimburse participating governments first.<sup>45</sup>

Though this question was to be discussed at each of the next five sessions, the patterns of debate and the voting results of each session were almost identical with the 12th Session.

At each session a representative of Finland spoke either in plenary session or in the 5th Committee, reiterating essentially the established Finnish position. At each session the budget for the UNEF was debated and eventually approved by voting margins similar to that of Resolution 1151 (XII). Finland always voted affirmatively and the USSR always voted negatively.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> GAOR, 12th Session, Summary Records, 5th Committee, 639th Meeting, Speech by Mr. Tuominen, p. 215.

<sup>46</sup> GAOR, 13th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1263(XIII)  
 13th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1337(XIII)  
 14th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1441(XIV)  
 15th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1575(XV)  
 16th Session, Annexes, Resolution 1773(XVI)

Finland took her place in the United Nations on the same day that she cast her first vote. The summons to attend the 1st Emergency Session came unexpectedly, and there was no time to prepare a detailed program on the Suez issue. This may have been the reason why the Finnish votes during the first few days appeared to reflect Finland's conscience more than political prudence. For those Finns who opposed the cautious "Paasikivi Line," these votes seemed to herald a new era of unfettered neutrality. And indeed, if only the votes on the Suez Crisis were to be considered, one would be hard pressed to find any evidence of Finland being influenced by the position of the Soviet Union. But these votes are not representative when one considers Finland's hundreds of other votes on dozens of subsequent issues.

More importantly, it should be emphasized that none of the votes on the Suez Crisis contained an express condemnation of the Soviet Union or her policies. When Finland's votes opposed those of the Soviet Union, they generally indicated that Finland did not endorse a particular solution proposed by the Soviet Union.

Considering the realities of her geographic and political situation, Finland's voting record on the Suez Crisis was understandable, even admirable. Even more deserving of praise was Finland's decision to participate in the peace-keeping force sent to the Near East, and her determination to keep her contingent there despite the financial burden.

On this question, Finland did all that she reasonably could to maintain peace and reduce tensions.

## CHAPTER II

### The Hungarian Question

Four days after casting their first United Nations vote at the Emergency Session, Finnish representatives faced problems of an entirely different nature. No longer was it merely a matter of endorsing a position the Soviet Union disapproved; involved now was a direct condemnation of the actions of Finland's neighbor to the east.

As in the case of the Suez Crisis, Finland was not directly involved until the summoning of an Emergency Session. But also as in the case of that crisis, much had occurred in the General Assembly and which clarified the positions of the principal powers. Finland paid close attention to these developments and a brief summary of Security Council actions is necessary for a full understanding of Finland's subsequent votes.

On 27 October, 1956, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States formally asked that the Security Council meet to consider the situation in Hungary, because foreign military forces were violently repressing the rights of the Hungarian people. The USSR categorically opposed consideration of the

problem stating that it was solely a domestic affair of the Hungarian Government. Here, within the first two speeches<sup>1</sup> was revealed an unreconcilable difference between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. On 28 October the Council, still seized by the Suez Crisis, voted to include the question "The Situation in Hungary" in its agenda. The vote was 9 to 1 (USSR), while Yugoslavia abstained.

The Council met four times between 28 October and 4 November, 1956 to consider the problem. It immediately became evident that Security Council would be able to take no effective action due to the veto power of the Soviet Union. The meetings consisted almost exclusively of exchanges of invective between the Western delegates and those of the Soviet Union, but it was not until 4 November that the United States presented a resolution invoking the "Uniting for Peace"<sup>2</sup> resolution to call a second Emergency Special Session.

Finland was rapidly approaching a profound dilemma, for while the Hungarian problem contained elements of much greater danger to the individual Finn, he nevertheless was much more likely to take a strong position on this issue than on the Suez Crisis. The largest Finnish newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, accurately reflected the opinion of most Finns, when it printed: "The sympathy of the world is on the side of those who suffer and who are victims of bloodshed in Hungary."

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<sup>1</sup>SCD, SCOR, Plenary Meetings, 11th Year, Meeting 746.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Meeting 750.

The article continued to point out that Soviet intervention was obvious and that the United Nations should do something about it.<sup>3</sup>

Within a few days a Hungarian relief program had been organized and within a week individual Finns had contributed 18,000,000 Finnmarks, as well as clothes, food, and medicine. This relief program was not officially supported by the Finnish government, but nevertheless indicated where the sympathy of the Finnish people lay.<sup>4</sup>

But it soon became evident that the Finnish government could not reflect the opinion of the Finnish people. The first resolution was presented to the General Assembly by the representative of the United States and contained the following; a condemnation of the use of Soviet military force in Hungary, a demand that the Soviet Union cease its attack on Hungary and withdraw its forces from Hungary without delay, a demand that Hungary permit UN observers to enter her territory and travel freely therein, and a request that all members of the United Nations give humanitarian aid to the Hungarian people. To vote in favor of this resolution would have invited the hostility of the USSR, as well as the indignation of the Finnish Communist Party, and a vote against it would have been contrary to the wishes of the great majority of Finns. Confronted with this dilemma the Finnish delegate

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<sup>3</sup>Quoted by "Forster", p. 467.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

abstained from voting, as did fourteen other nations, while 50 states voted affirmatively and the Soviet bloc of eight voted against the resolution.<sup>5</sup>

This vote triggered immediate reaction from the whole spectrum of Finnish press, and the editorials reflected positions from complete approval to vehement disapproval. Some people were confused at the difference between this vote and the votes on the Suez Crisis, while others professed to understand the need for caution on the Hungarian problem. It was repeatedly emphasized by Finnish papers that Finnish sympathies were unquestionably with the unfortunate Hungarians.<sup>6</sup>

Though the above vote caused much discussion in Finland, it was not near as difficult a decision as confronted the Finns five days later on 9 November. Three separate resolutions were introduced on that date, each containing a different degree of condemnation of the USSR. A clarification of Finland's position was unavoidable. The first, Resolution 1005 (ES-II), was presented by Cuba, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan and Peru and contained several paragraphs which either identified the USSR as an aggressor or called upon the Soviets to cooperate with the UN, and was by far the most strongly worded proposal.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>GAOR, 2nd Emergency Session, Plenary Sessions, Summary Records, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup>Forster, p. 468.

<sup>7</sup>GAOR, 2nd Emergency Session, Annex, p. 6.

The United States introduced the second resolution which, though not as demanding as the Five Power resolution, singled out the Soviet Union for condemnation in five of the seven paragraphs contained in the resolution.<sup>8</sup> The third resolution of the day was proposed by Austria, and though it acknowledged the suffering of the Hungarians, it did not assess responsibility for the suffering. This resolution further called upon all member states to render humanitarian aid to the Hungarian people.<sup>9</sup>

With all three of these resolutions before the Assembly and the vote imminent on all of them, many representatives rose to explain their nation's positions on the resolutions. After hearing most of these explanations, the Finnish representative made the following statement:

The Finnish delegation will abstain from the vote on the five-power draft resolution calling for Russian withdrawal and free elections only because we do not find it possible to associate ourselves with the formulation of some of the paragraphs of the draft resolution. We shall vote in favor of the draft resolution presented by Austria. In this connection, we should like to emphasize Finland's fervent hope that Hungary and the Soviet Union will be able to agree on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and on the safeguarding of the fundamental human rights of the Hungarian people, in a way corresponding to the traditions of freedom which have existed in that country for many centuries.<sup>10</sup>

As indicated, Finland voted affirmatively on the Austri-

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<sup>8</sup> GAOR, 2nd Emergency Session, Annex, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> GAOR, 2nd Emergency Session, Plenary Sessions, Summary Records, p. 66.

an resolution, which was adopted by a large majority.

On the five-Power resolution, Finland abstained, as indicated in Gripenberg's speech, but not before a separate vote on each of the paragraphs. The records which show the paragraphs Finland voted for provide additional information as to Finland's precise position.

The first paragraph, which contained the phrase: "the violent repression by the Soviet forces of the efforts of the Hungarian people to achieve freedom," received 50 affirmative votes and nine negative notes, but Finland, because of the direct condemnation of the USSR, abstained with fifteen other states.<sup>11</sup>

The second, which expressed approval of Hungary's struggle for freedom and independence, received Finland's affirmative vote, though the Soviet bloc voted solidly against it.<sup>12</sup>

The third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble, as well as the first, third and fourth operative paragraphs all contained statements with which Finland found it prudent not to associate herself.<sup>13</sup>

But on the last paragraph of the preamble: "Considering that the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungarian territory is necessary," Finland voted affirmatively,

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 77

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 78 and 79.

as well as on the second operative paragraph which asked that free elections be held under United Nation auspices.<sup>14</sup>

The speech above was quoted at length because it represents the stand that Finland would take not only on the Hungarian question, but on almost all major problems confronting the United Nations for several years. On the one hand the Finns identify with the cause of freedom, national independence, and democracy and on the other they refrain from an open condemnation of the Soviet Union. But this speech could have contained a comment about the pending United States resolution which it did not.

This resolution, as mentioned above, contained provisions such as:

Considering that the military authorities of the USSR are interfering with the distribution of food, medical supplies urgently needed by the Civilian population in Hungary:

1. Calls upon the USSR to cease immediately actions against the Hungarian population...
2. Calls upon the Hungarian authorities to facilitate, and the USSR not to interfere with (humanitarian assistance) and to cooperate fully with the United Nation...

Considering that, as a result of the harsh and repressive action of the Soviet armed forces...<sup>15</sup>

One would think, that in view of Finland's position on the other two resolutions a resolution such as this could not receive Finland's vote. But it did indeed receive Finland's support without qualification or explanation. Finland voted affirma-

<sup>14</sup>  
Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>15</sup>  
GAOR, 2nd Emergency Session, Annex, p. 7.

tively with 52 other states, the Communist bloc voted against it, and 13 countries abstained.<sup>16</sup>

On 10 November, the day after the votes on the three resolutions treated immediately above, the United States resolution which requested inclusion of the Hungarian question on the agenda of the 11th Regular Session was presented. Despite vehement Hungarian and Soviet protests Finland voted for the resolution which was passed by a majority 53 to 9, with eight abstentions.<sup>17</sup>

Of the twelve votes which contained material critical of the USSR or which the USSR opposed on 9 and 10 November, Finland abstained on exactly half. The other six, some of which contained express condemnations of the USSR, all received Finland's vote, and Finland did not once support the Soviet Union.

As the voting record reflected political prudence rather than moral convictions, the Finnish position inevitably drew criticism at home and abroad. On the one hand the Communists thought it deplorable that Finland had voted for measures which condemned the Soviet Union, while on the other extreme, the right wing press considered Finland's actions much too conciliatory to the USSR. Between these positions were several newspapers which noted the dilemma of the Finnish delegation and generally supported the decisions of the dele-

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<sup>16</sup>GAOR, 2nd Emergency Session, Plenary Sessions, p. 80.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 87.

gation. The hope was expressed that Finland would not be placed in such a difficult situation in the future.<sup>18</sup>

But their hopes were in vain for the Soviet Union attempted to prevent the inclusion of the Hungarian Question on the agenda of the Eleventh Regular Session. As might be expected, the United States and most of the other members of the UN were in favor of considering the matter. In the end, Finland voted with the majority of 62 for inclusion, while the Soviet Union voted against it.<sup>19</sup>

A situation similar to that of 9 November confronted the Finnish delegation on 21 November. On this occasion there were again three resolutions before the General Assembly, and as on the 9th there was the choice between a strongly worded resolution and a mildly stated resolution.

A Cuban resolution accused the Soviet Union and present government of Hungary of genocide and of mass deportations of Hungarian citizens, and included the familiar demand that Soviet forces be withdrawn from Hungary and UN observers be allowed to enter Hungarian territory.<sup>20</sup>

Another resolution, submitted by Ceylon, India and Indonesia, used phrases like: "certain Member States" instead of "Hungary and the USSR" and urged that UN observers be allowed

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<sup>18</sup>Forster, p. 476.

<sup>19</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Plenary Meetings I, p. 23..

<sup>20</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, A/3357/Rev. 2, Agenda Item 67, p. 6.

to enter Hungary to ascertain whether deportations had been taking place.<sup>21</sup>

The third was presented by Denmark, Argentina, Belgium and the United States and was chiefly an appeal for humanitarian assistance to the Hungarian people. As in the Austrian resolution of 9 November no responsibility for causing the Hungarian suffering was assessed.<sup>22</sup> Hungary was still unhappy, though, and proposed a series of amendments to the resolution, all of which tended to make the Hungarian government appear blameless.<sup>23</sup>

Each of the Hungarian amendments was voted on separately and each was defeated in turn. Finland voted against all of them, thereby taking a stand against a proposal that the Soviet Union, for all practical purposes, had authored.<sup>24</sup> After the amendments had been defeated the vote on the original resolution was taken and Finland joined 68 other nations to pass it, while only the Soviet bloc plus Sudan failed to vote affirmatively. Here, on essentially one issue, there were five Finnish votes which countered those of the Soviet Union.<sup>25</sup>

On the Cuban resolution Finland abstained because of the language of the draft, but it was carried by a vote of 55 to

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., A/3368/Rev. 3, p. 8.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., A/3<sup>3</sup>w74/ p. 12.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., A/2214, p. 12.

<sup>24</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Plenary Meetings I, p. 194.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 195.

10 with 14 abstentions.<sup>26</sup> But on the three-Power draft, which implicitly criticized Hungary and the USSR, Finland voted affirmatively with a large majority while the Warsaw Pact Countries voted against it.<sup>27</sup>

Again, the result of Finland's treading of the tight-rope in regard to measures inimical to the well-being of the Soviet Union, was an uproar in the Finnish Press. And, again as on 9 November, the Finnish delegation was criticized by the Communists as being anti-Russian, while other papers were aroused at Finland's failure to censure the deportations of Hungarian citizens. Again, the hope was expressed that Finland would not have to face another situation like this one.<sup>28</sup>

Finland's reply to the request for humanitarian aid (contained in A/3374) is instructive when considered with those of other nations. Finland's reply, in part, was:

All relief supplies from Finland to the people of Hungary will be given through the International Red Cross. the total contribution from Finland is estimated at about 130 million marks. So far...(assistance)...has been delivered in accordance with the instructions of the Red Cross Co-ordinating Committee in Vienna. All further aid will be given through the same channel.<sup>29</sup>

On the surface this answer is not particularly noteworthy, but when compared to the replies of most of the non-

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 187.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>28</sup>Forster, p. 471.

<sup>29</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 67, p. 18.

Communist world, a distinct variance is obvious. Other western nations offered to take Hungarian refugees; Finland did not. Other western nations included a condemnation of the Soviet Union in their replies; Finland did not. Almost all other western nations gave money through a UN agency; Finland did not. In summary, though expressing their sympathy with the Hungarian rebels, the Finnish government was careful to avoid ascribing political motive to their offer of help.<sup>30</sup>

Not until 4 December 1956 did another vote on the Hungarian question confront the Finnish delegates. On this date a draft resolution submitted by 14 Powers was brought to the floor of the Assembly. This measure censured the Soviet Union and Hungary in varying degrees in every paragraph and ordered the Secretary General to arrange to dispatch observers to Hungary. In the face of wording such as this Finland found it prudent to abstain, while 54 affirmative votes buried the negative votes of the Eastern European bloc.<sup>31</sup>

On 12 December a similar resolution was submitted by 20 Western Powers which Finland found impossible to support. Like the 14-Power resolution, this one passed by a large majority as the Communist countries voted negatively. The wording of this resolution was very similar to that of Resolutions 1004 (ES-II) and 1005 (ES-II) and Finland abstained on

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 14-24.

<sup>31</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Plenary Meetings I, p. 527.

this resolution as she had on the forementioned two.<sup>32</sup>

The last resolution concerning the Hungarian question to be considered at the Eleventh Regular Session of the General Assembly reached a vote on 10 January 1957. It was sponsored by 24 nations, most of them Western, and reflected the free world's opinion of the events in Hungary. It contained, in addition to the usual condemnation of Hungary and the USSR, a provision which established a committee of Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay to investigate the situation and keep the United Nations informed accordingly. The delegation of Finland found it necessary to abstain on this vote, presumably because of the phrase: "situation created by the intervention of the USSR, through its use of armed force, in the internal affairs of Hungary..." And as on many previous occasions, this resolution passed by a vote of 59 to 8 with 10 abstentions.<sup>33</sup>

In the Session of the General Assembly which has been labelled "11th Session Resumed" and was held in the autumn of 1957, only one controversial resolution was passed. It was proposed by 37 powers and was based on the report of the Special Committee on Hungary. This report was a "scathing indictment" of Soviet activities in Hungary and the resolution reflected this indictment. For Finland to vote for this mea-

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<sup>32</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 67, p. 27, A/3436/Rev. 2.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 44, A/3487/Rev. 1.

sure would have been far more of a provocation than a positive vote on most of the resolutions of the 11th Session. But in spite of this severe criticism of the USSR, only the Soviet bloc voted negatively, and only eight joined Finland's abstention, while 60 nations voted condemnation on the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Government.<sup>34</sup>

Consideration of the question in the 12th Regular Session was brief, and produced no important votes, and the 13th Regular Session produced only one. This resolution, introduced by the same countries that authored the Resolution of the 11th Session(Resumed), was not so harshly worded but still openly condemned the Soviet Union and the Hungarian Government. In addition it denounced the execution of Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter. As previously, the only negative votes came from Eastern Europe, but 5 more countries joined Finland in abstaining to bring abstentions to fifteen.<sup>35</sup>

The 14th Session, (1959-1960), saw some renewed exchanges of invective, but again there was but one resolution passed concerning the Hungarian Question. And as might be expected, the same voting results were tabulated, with the exception that two more countries left the affirmative rolls and joined Finland in abstaining.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>GAOR, 11th Session (Resumed), Resolutions, 1133(XI).

<sup>35</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, Resolutions, 1312 (XIII).

<sup>36</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, Resolutions, 1454 (XIV).

In the face of the continued refusal of the USSR to do anything about the requests and demands of the General Assembly, the Assembly again, in both the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Sessions passed resolutions condemning the Soviet Union and the Kádar Government of Hungary. But by now, other non-Communist countries joined the Eastern European bloc in voting negatively, while the number of abstentions rose to 32 in 1961, to 43 in 1962, and the number of affirmative votes was reduced accordingly.<sup>37</sup>

For realistic considerations, the Hungarian Crisis per se was over when the Kadar Government assumed power. Though they certainly did not approve of this government, or the way it came to power, it is difficult to believe that very many countries actually thought the actions and pronouncements of the United Nations would have any effect on the Kadar Government, let alone the Soviet Government. To be sure, the Hungarian Crisis provided excellent propaganda for the United States and other nations which could benefit from exposing the realities of the Soviet system of democracy and national independence, but not all countries can benefit from this.

It is quite obvious from speeches in the United Nations and from the world press that very few people in any non-Communist country had any doubt about who the aggressor in Hungary was. The non-Communist world spoke in near unanimity

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<sup>37</sup> GAOR, 16th Session, Resolutions, 1741 (XVI).  
GAOR, 17th Session, Resolutions, 1857 (XVII).

in its denunciation of the deplorable events. The difference between countries in this respect was that some realized the utter uselessness of acrimonious condemnations, and by not contributing to this acrimony, they strove to make the best of a bad situation, while other countries, like our own, understandably exploited the situation.

Though the unique geo-political position undoubtedly influenced the decisions of the Finnish policy makers, one must credit them with at least some perspicacity for their actions. They did all they dared while they thought it might do some good, but they gave up this exercise in futurity when the fait accompli became apparent.

Finland could certainly derive nothing of value by continuing to denounce the USSR. On the contrary, Finland risked losing Soviet goodwill, which is almost as important to Finland as it is to Hungary. Finland revealed the location of her sympathies on several occasions and there is no reason to believe that these sympathies were forgotten with the passage of time. Not even an intelligent Russian could have had any real doubts about the true convictions of the Finnish people and its government, and one can be sure that Finnish efforts to please (or at least not to displease) the Soviet Government did not go unnoticed in Moscow. And this last is what is so vitally important <sup>to</sup> Finland. She must be certain that Russia notices her. And if she has to go out of her way occasionally to assure the Soviet Union that Finland values Soviet friendship, it is a small price indeed to pay for per-

sonal freedom and national integrity.

## CHAPTER III

### Disarmament and Related Questions

As befitting a small, virtually disarmed nation sharing a boundary with one of the two major heavily armed powers, Finland is intimately concerned with the question of disarmament. In the mid-1950's Finland's armed forces were still limited to that permitted by the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of 1947. This meant that her army was scarcely larger than a national police force, her air arm was not capable even of adequate defense, and her navy consisted of a few obsolete vessels of small tonnage.

For a nation which has proclaimed its absolute neutrality and has ostensibly conducted its affairs as if it would never again even consider getting involved in armed conflict, this almost helpless, disarmed condition might seem understandable, even natural. But when one considers that her neighbor to the East would almost certainly be involved in any major conflict, Finland's status becomes more meaningful, for she is undeniably vital to the strategic interests of the USSR. In a wartime situation her status as a virtual power vacuum would last about as long as it would take for Soviet tanks to roll across the border.

Most Finns are aware that their country could not live if assaulted by the USSR, so it is very much in their interest

that the USSR does not become involved in a war. And as the arms race is one of the most ominous developments of the Cold War, the cessation of this race would remove a major cause of tension, thereby reducing the danger of Soviet military involvement, thereby reducing the danger to Finland herself.

Though basically the rationale behind all of Finland's foreign policy initiatives and responses, within or outside of the United Nations, the syllogism above is very clearly illustrated by Finland's speeches and votes on the disarmament question as considered by the United Nations.

The idea of national disarmament as a means of preventing war has been considered for many decades, but not until the present century did it advance from philosophical speculation to realistic consideration. The question was treated regularly by the League of Nations, but conventional diplomacy was also employed towards this end during the inter-war period. World War II illustrated the absolute necessity of preventing further major wars, and when the birth of the atomic era raised the spectre of the annihilation of mankind, statesmen everywhere recognized the urgency of the situation.

Fittingly, the first item on the agenda of the United Nations was disarmament, and Resolution 1(I), devoted to the disarmament question, was passed unanimously by the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> Incidentally, the major obstacle to agreement on

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations Publications, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47, (Lake Geneva, New York, 1947), p. 142.

disarmament ever since appeared in this first session. The obstacle, that is, the varying positions on inspection, was erected in a debate between the representatives of the United Kingdom and the USSR. In the ensuing decade before Finland took her place in the United Nations this conflict over inspection provisions had become almost an annual ritual with the major Cold War adversaries, the United States and the Soviet Union, leading the opposing forces.

Finland, kept out of the United Nations by the vagaries of the Cold War, was spared from the necessity of taking a position on disarmament until 1957. After expending much time and energy disposing of the Hungarian and Suez Crises, the General Assembly prepared to resume its oldest argument, and this time Finland was present to take part.

Early in 1957 the General Assembly was presented with draft resolutions concerning disarmament by several nations. The Soviet Union submitted three, each containing a different degree of controversy, apparently attempting to get credit for at least one disarmament effort. To counter this Soviet offensive, Canada, Japan and Norway jointly submitted a resolution with which the Soviet Union did not agree.<sup>2</sup> The squabble which followed was fought along bloc-lines, and the non-aligned nations were reluctant to enter the conflict. Many of these nations expressed their desires and opinions, and Finland's position, as explained by her delegate, George A.

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<sup>2</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 22, p. 1-9.

Gripenberg, is representative of many of the world's smaller states. He stated that his delegation hoped the Disarmament Commission would soon find the way to an international agreement concerning the cessation of test explosions of nuclear weapons. His delegation was fully aware of the problems involved, but thought that human ingenuity could find the means to escape the peril which threatened humanity. In that respect the Finnish delegation fully associated itself with the draft resolution put forward by the USSR to the effect that test explosions of nuclear weapons should be discontinued forthwith (the least controversial of the Soviet resolutions). If, however, agreement could not be reached on this point, the Finnish delegation was in favor of an agreement on a moratorium in the testing of nuclear weapons, as proposed by Sweden, or of an agreement on establishing a system of registration of tests, as had been proposed by Canada, Japan, and Norway.<sup>3</sup>

This may appear to be a perfect example of fence-straddling, and in an ordinary sense it would be defined as just that, but in view of Finland's avowed intentions of supporting "practical solutions" and avoiding provocation of either East or West, it takes on a deeper significance. Finland was not voting in favor of the Soviet proposal just to ingratiate herself in Moscow or to compensate for voting affirmatively, on the three-Power proposal; she voted that way because she

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<sup>3</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, 1st Committee, 829th Meeting, p. 84.

could associate herself with the ideals expressed in the resolution. And her vote on the three-Power resolution was likewise not a sop thrown to the West; Finland endorsed the humanitarian considerations of this resolution. In the end, however, all three resolutions were discarded, and an emasculated compromise resolution was adopted unanimously by the Assembly.<sup>4</sup>

During the 12th Session of the General Assembly eleven different draft resolutions bearing on various aspects of the disarmament question were considered. Some dealt with the broader aspects of the disarmament question. Others dealt with more specific matters such as: suspension of nuclear tests, the Disarmament Commission, and the education of peoples to the danger of the armaments race. Indicative of the scope of this question and therefore of this chapter is the official label of the item as considered by the United Nations; "Regulation, Limitation, and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments: Conclusion of an International Convention (Treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction."

In the face of such a bewildering array of proposals Finland would have a wide choice when the time came to vote on the proposals, but still she found it necessary to explain her position. Mr. Ralph Enckell said that Finland was pre-

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<sup>4</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 22, p. 10.

pared to support any reasonable and practicable proposal provided it was supported by the Great Powers on whom progress towards disarmament primarily depended. It was evident that no proposal being considered would obtain unanimous support and his delegation did not want to support any move which might widen the differences between the Great Powers or harden their positions. Finland would vote for the Yugoslav draft and for one of the Indian drafts. Finland would also support certain parts of other proposals acceptable to its delegation.<sup>5</sup>

True to her promise, Finland did not support any measure which was in the least controversial excepting that of India. This measure received Finland's vote as well as those of the Soviet bloc and several non-aligned nations, but was defeated by vote of 34 to 24 with 20 abstentions.<sup>6</sup> On this resolution Finland was aligned with the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav draft resolution was withdrawn by its sponsor.

The rest of the resolutions before the 12th Session did, however, provoke controversy and Finland's voting record reflects this. A Soviet proposal which urged voluntary cessation of tests did not even get past the 1st Committee where it was defeated by 45 to 11; Finland's vote was among the 25 abstentions.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, 1st Committee, 892nd Meeting, p.133.

<sup>6</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, Plenary, 718th Meeting, p. 467.

<sup>7</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, 1st Committee, 893rd Meeting, p.140.

On a 24-Power resolution which urged the establishment of effective international controls, Finland abstained while the Soviet bloc voted negatively. This resolution nevertheless passed by a large majority.<sup>8</sup> An amalgam of all the resolutions which had passed the 1st Committee was presented to the General Assembly in Plenary session on 14 November 1957. This also contained a provision for international inspection and the Soviet Union voted against it. But in Plenary Session the measure passed and Finland abstained, as she had in the First Committee.<sup>9</sup>

Japan introduced a resolution in the 1st Committee which called for suspension of nuclear tests and would enforce it with inspection teams. This received only 18 affirmative votes while the USSR and the United States voted against it, and Finland abstained.<sup>10</sup>

In other action of the 12th Session, Finland abstained, with one exception, on every measure which reached a vote either in 1st Committee or in Plenary meetings. This exception was a resolution drafted by Belgium, which requested that the United Nations compile and disseminate information on the dangers of nuclear testing and nuclear war. The Soviet Union opposed the measure because it "did not pro-

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 892nd Meeting, p. 138.

<sup>9</sup> GAOR, 12th Session, Plenary, Resolution 1148 (XII), p. 461.

<sup>10</sup> GAOR, 12th Session, 1st Committee, 893rd Meeting, p. 140.

vide for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of the stocks of such weapons, the suspension of nuclear test explosions, the reductions of armaments and armed forces, or the abolition of military bases on foreign soil." The Soviet delegate apparently did not believe that in the absence of the measures he mentioned, a partial measure might be helpful. Despite vehement Soviet opposition which labeled this resolution as an effort of "the Western Powers to continue the armaments race," and despite its avowal not to support any measure which would increase tension, Finland voted affirmatively against the negative votes of the Communist bloc. The measure passed by a huge majority of 71 to 9 with 1 abstention.<sup>11</sup>

Another example of Finland's care not to be too closely associated with the Soviet proposals occurred when the Albanian delegate proposed that Finland be a member of an enlarged Disarmament Commission. Mr. Enckell promptly asked for the floor and stated that while Finland agreed with the idea of a disarmament commission, since the question had become a source of conflict among the Great Powers, Finland could not participate in such a body.<sup>12</sup>

Thus Finland had been able to avoid seriously provoking the Soviet Union on the disarmament question despite the

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<sup>11</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 24, Resolution 1149 (XII), p. 19.

<sup>12</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, Plenary, 718th Meeting, p. 476.

number of decisions Finland's representatives had to make. During the 12th Session Finland was probably more susceptible to criticism on this matter than she had been on her Suez and Hungarian crises votes. But it must be emphasized that Finland's position on disarmament was considered beforehand and if Finland reacted to pressure or public opinion at home it was probably in favor of the West.

In the fall of 1958 Finland was very much handicapped by a severe crisis at home caused by Soviet economic and diplomatic pressure. And her votes during the 13th Session reflected anxiety about the state of Soviet-Finnish relations. The voting record for the 13th Session contains not a single Soviet-Finnish conflict on the disarmament question. In fact, it could be said Finland carried her conciliatory policy to ridiculous extremes, abstaining on such procedural votes as whether or not to close debate, or whether to vote first on one resolution rather than another.

In October, 1958, 15 nations introduced a resolution calling for the immediate discontinuance of nuclear testing until proper controls had been established. The resolution contained additional provisions, but none making definite proposals concerning controls or inspection, thereby making the resolution unpalatable to the Western Powers. Departing from her abstention policy of 1957, Finland voted affirmatively with the sponsors and the Soviet-bloc while the West's opposition defeated the measure.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 64, A/c,1/L. 202, p. 20.

Finland returned to a slightly more independent stance on the next vote, which was on a resolution proposed by the USSR. This resolution requested the United States, United Kingdom and the USSR to reduce their military budgets by 10-15% and to allocate the money saved for assistance to underdeveloped countries. Only Indonesia and the Warsaw Pact countries voted affirmatively, 39 voted negatively, and Finland plus 31 other nations abstained.<sup>14</sup>

Seventeen western nations presented a resolution on 10 October, which though considerably longer, contained little more than the Soviet resolution mentioned immediately above. On this measure, however, the voting pattern was reversed with the West voting affirmatively and in the majority while only the Soviet bloc voted against it. Finland, along with such countries as France, Israel, Japan, and Sweden, abstained.<sup>15</sup>

On an Irish resolution which established an ad hoc committee to study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, Finland voted affirmatively along with the USSR and 36 other nations. There were no negative votes, but the United States and most of the West abstained.<sup>16</sup>

Finally reaching plenary session, the deliberations of

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., A/c., 1/L.204, p. 21.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., A/c.1/L.205, p. 21.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., A/c.1/L.206, p. 22.

the 1st Committee resulted in one resolution of 4 parts being presented to the General Assembly. Each of the 4 sections was voted on separately, and though the voting results were different on each, all 4 passed by large majorities. On A and B Finland abstained and on C and D she voted with the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

The final act of the 13th Session on the disarmament question was to reject a draft presented by 14 non-aligned countries. Again reflecting their anxiety to please the Soviet Union, Finland voted with the Communist bloc on a measure that was defeated by the Western nations.<sup>18</sup>

The only speech made during the 13th Session which concerned the disarmament question was by Johannes Virolainen in the 1st Committee. He said that his delegation was willing to support any efforts designed to bring about "reasonable and practicable" solutions in the field of disarmament. He thought that any decision on the disarmament question should have the support of the great Powers and regretted, in that connection, it was unfortunate that the People's Republic of China had not been admitted to the United Nations. His delegation hoped that the "nuclear powers" could agree on the cessation of nuclear tests, but that partial measures were only legitimate when they constituted a sincere effort

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<sup>17</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, Plenary, 779th Meeting, Resolution 1252 (XIII), A, B, C, and D, p. 430.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., A/L.250, p. 430.

to reach the ultimate goal, the strengthening of peace and security.

After pointing out that his government's views on disarmament had been expressed at the Nordic Foreign Minister's meeting and had been recently reaffirmed by President Kekkonen, Mr. Virolainen continued. Though it was essential to put an end to nuclear testing, it should not be forgotten that the race in conventional armaments was a terrible danger and a heavy burden on the peoples. He therefore hoped that the parties concerned could find a compromise solution so that true progress could be made.<sup>19</sup>

This essentially was what Gripenberg and Enckell had said in previous years but there were slight departures in this speech, possibly added for the benefit of Soviet-Finnish relations. For instance, never before had Finland brought up the subject of Red China's absence from the UN other than in meetings devoted to that question. Virolainen's statement that "partial measures were only legitimate when they constituted a sincere effort to reach the ultimate goal" was also presumably intended for Soviet ears, because the principle Soviet objection to most of the Western sponsored resolutions was that they were only half measures, designed to prolong the "balance of terror." Though possibly stated from conviction, the reference to the reduction of conventional arms was unusual for Finland, and of particu-

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<sup>19</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, 1st Committee, 461st Meeting, p. 100.

lar interest in this session because the USSR had been pushing for an agreement on the reduction of manpower stationed in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

The speech and voting record of Finland on this question in the 13th Session might appear to many Americans as the epitome of cynicism. But when it is realized how absolutely imperative it was at this time to prove to Russia that Finland had not abandoned the "Paasikivi Line," we should be capable of appreciating why she went more out of her way than usual to please her neighbor to the East.

In the autumn of 1959, when the 14th Session of the General Assembly convened, the Finnish-Soviet "crisis" had been over for several months. The new government apparently had Soviet approval, trade negotiations and exchange had resumed, and Kekkonen and Khrushchev were again drinking vodka and hunting bears together.

One might expect a cautious return on Finland's part to a more unrestricted policy of neutrality, and that is precisely what happened.

Of considerable relief to those in Finland responsible for foreign policy decisions was the fact that most of the resolutions voted upon in the 14th Session, were completely emasculated by the time they reached the plenary sessions, and contained very little that either the West or the Soviet Union might object to. These resolutions are of little concern to this study since they did not cause any difficulties for Finland, so they will be passed over in favor of a more comprehensive treatment of those few resolutions which did

provoke an Ease-West voting split.

There were only three such resolutions and they all came to a vote on 20 and 21 November 1959. The first of these was in direct reaction to France's announcement that she intended to join the nuclear club by exploding a device in the Sahara Desert. This resolution invoked the resolution of 1958 which called upon nations to voluntarily cease testing. (France voted against that resolution.) The total operative content of the resolution was: "Requests France to refrain from such tests." Finland, along with all the Nordic countries, as well as the Soviet bloc and many non-aligned nations, voted affirmatively and buried the negative votes of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States by a margin of 51 to 16 with 15 abstentions.<sup>20</sup>

The following day a draft resolution of Ireland was presented, containing among other things, a suggestion that a 10 member disarmament committee be formed, a proposal which the Soviet Union was against. More importantly this resolution contained a proposal for "an international agreement, subject to inspection and control." Finland had never before advocated "inspection and control" in the face of vehement Soviet opposition, but she did indeed vote in favor of this resolution which passed by a huge majority. Only the Soviet bloc plus China and France did not vote for this mea-

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<sup>20</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, Plenary, 840th Meeting, Resolution 1379(XIV), p. 506.

The score so far in the 14th Session was one Finnish vote with the Soviet Union, one vote opposed, one vote against the United States, and one vote with. In avoiding the obvious "two out of three" situation which might result on the next vote, Finland was helped by the United States. This multi-Power resolution really contained nothing controversial, but many of the Western countries abstained because of an implied criticism of France. Finland voted affirmatively as did 59 other states, including the Soviet Union, but the United States and the United Kingdom merely abstained, thereby precluding the possibility of Finland having to vote against them.<sup>22</sup>

Thus Finland, aided by circumstances, returned to a more pronounced neutrality in 1959. The only speech which Finland made was provoked by the resolution censuring France. Immediately after the vote, in which Finland voted for censure, Mr. Enckell rose to explain that the vote was not meant to be the least discriminatory towards France, Finland was simply very concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons to any country.<sup>23</sup>

One might expect, considering the relative stability of Soviet-Finnish relations, a continuation of the policy of 1959.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., Resolution 1380 (XIV), p. 590.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 842nd Meeting, Resolution 1402B(XIV), p. 600.

<sup>23</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, 1st Committee, 1053rd Meeting, p. 149.

when the 15th Session met in 1960. And that is generally what happened. The traditional voting blocs on the disarmament question seemed to be breaking up and new alignments developing. There were only three major resolutions adopted and on each of them Finland voted with the Soviet Union. But also voting with the Soviet Union were the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and a great majority of the members of the General Assembly. All three resolutions passed by huge majorities with only the United States, France, Belgium, Spain, and Turkey consistently abstaining. There were no negative votes on any of the resolutions.<sup>24</sup> Though Finland did not vote against the Soviet Union in this session, there is no reason to suspect that she was influenced by the Soviet position, in view of the near-unanimity of the balloting.

In the autumn of 1961 when the 16th Session was meeting, Finland was again in the throes of another political crisis ~~at home~~, and again it was prompted by the Soviet Union. But in this session Finland's desire not to provoke the Soviet Union was not as obvious as in the 1958 Session. Possibly merely a coincidence, it is nevertheless extremely interesting that Finland's votes which opposed the Soviet Union all came before 30 October, the date on which the Finnish-Soviet crisis began, and after this date, Finland relied increasingly on abstention. For instance, on 27 October 1961 Finland

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<sup>24</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 960th Meeting, Resolutions 1576 (XV), 1577(XV), 1578(XV).

voted affirmatively on a NATO sponsored measure which singled out the Soviet Union for censure because of its announced intention of exploding a nuclear device. Russia had stated in the debate on this resolution that she considered this resolution as an aggressive act, directed against her by the NATO countries. In view of this, Finland's vote is indeed surprising.<sup>25</sup>

On 6 November Finland registered another vote against the Soviet Union, but since the vote was also against the United States and the United Kingdom it would tend to reinforce rather than reduce Finland's neutral position.<sup>26</sup>

Two days later Finland returned to her policy of abstention on a resolution of the United States and the United Kingdom. The USSR was opposed because the measure implied censure of its recent tests. And though Finland had voted on 27 October for a direct censure of the Soviet Union in regard to testing, now she abstained because of implied censure.<sup>27</sup>

On 24 November Finland was confronted with the familiar situation of having to vote on two very similar resolutions, both backed by the Soviet Union, but one very much opposed by the West. Finland voted with the Soviet Union on a resolution which the West abstained on, and which received no

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<sup>25</sup>GAOR, 16th Session, Plenary, 1043rd Meeting, Resolution 1632 (XVI), p. 527.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 1047th Meeting, Resolution 1648(XVI), p. 568.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 1049th Meeting, Resolution 1649(XVI), p. 606.

negative votes. And on the second, which the West voted against, Finland abstained, but so did the Scandinavian countries.<sup>28</sup>

In the early sixties the newly independent "third World" nations began to exercise their independence and growing influence by sponsoring resolutions on disarmament, previously, the apparent prerogative of the power-blocs. The balloting on most of these found the United States and the Soviet Union voting together in the minority, while Finland joined this Afro-Asian group on many occasions. The acrimony of the early debates on disarmament has been notably absent the last several years, and on every resolution which caused a split between the East and the West, Finland abstained. The resolutions passed were chiefly repetitious of previous ones and very little new material was introduced. A notable exception was the proposition of President Kekkonen just prior to the convening of the 18th Session that Scandinavia be made into a nuclear-free zone. This proposal was discussed and lauded, but eventually it was decided that the matter was a regional one, which the Nordic countries had to decide themselves. This was not a particularly astute observation since the countries concerned had already made the decision.

The disarmament question, of all the topics considered by the United Nations, should provide the most accurate in-

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 1063rd Meeting, Resolution 1652(XVI) and 1653(XVI) pp. 806 and 808.

indicator of Finnish foreign policy because of the length of time it has been considered. The Suez and Hungarian crises both took place over a relatively limited period, and equally importantly, both took place during the same period, thus eliminating the possibility of studying Finland's voting patterns on a long range basis for a particular situation. The disarmament question has been considered at every session, since Finland has been a member and Finland has had to express its opinion on measures that the Soviet Union disapproves of. One could, by selecting isolated examples, "prove" that Finland was either pro-Soviet or pro-Western on this issue depending on his personal bias. But when all (or at least, all available) documents are studied, it is quite apparent that Finland strived very conscientiously to follow the dictates of the "Paasikivi Line." With the exception of 1958 session, explained above, Finland carefully balanced her pro-Soviet votes with pro-West votes, and in almost every case where there was a deep, unreconcilable difference between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union Finland avoided both horns of the dilemma by abstaining.

A comparison of voting patterns would be helpful, but in this case, impossible in a meaningful way. As in most questions before the United Nations, the only completely consistent voting bloc is that of the Warsaw Pact Countries. The NATO countries registered voting splits more times than they voted together. Even the United Kingdom and the United

States voted differently on many occasions. On a strictly statistical basis, not altogether that meaningful in the opinion of the author, Finland voted more times with Sweden than with any other country. Closely following Sweden in this respect were Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. Somewhat further down the list were both the USSR and the United States, with the USSR having only a very slight edge on the United States.

One can be legitimately skeptical of these statistics if they were used to assign Finland to any block voting or otherwise, but it is very obvious that statistics can not be used to place Finland in the Soviet bloc on this issue.

That Finland carefully considered, and was affected by, the position of the Soviet Union on the question of disarmament is obvious and understandable, but a statement to the effect that Finland's votes were dictated by Moscow finds no support in any available evidence.

## CHAPTER IV

### The Congo Crisis

The Congo, a former Belgian territory in Central Africa, became independent on 30 June, 1960. On 5 July a mutiny broke out in the army and acts of violence were committed against Belgian officers and civilians. This violence caused a mass exodus of Belgian administrators and other educated persons which resulted in the breakdown of services and communications and the stoppage of economic activity. On 10 July, without the agreement of Congolese authorities, Belgian troops were flown from Europe and occupied several cities and towns. As this was occurring, Moise Tshombe proclaimed the independence of the Province of Katanga with himself as President. Officials of the Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu, requested that United Nations troops be dispatched immediately to deal with the external aggression and to put an end to the Katangese secession.

The Secretary General called the Security Council into session and on 14 July it adopted a resolution calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorizing the Secretary General to provide the Congolese Government with such technical and military assistance as might be necessary until the Congolese military could meet their responsibilities. Concomitantly the Council rejected three Soviet amendments

which would have condemned Belgium for aggression and limited the United Nations military assistance to troops drawn from African states.

The Secretary General then set up the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and placed it under the authority of an on-the-spot commander. This force, made up of soldiers from the smaller states, was ordered to not intervene in domestic affairs of the Congo. As the UN troops arrived, the Belgian soldiers left, and by September there were no Belgian troops in the Congo. The Secretary General refused to let ONUC be used to put down the Katangese rebellion and thus he attracted the enmity of Premier Lumumba and Lumumba's supporter, the Soviet Union.

On 5 September 1960, additional troubles were brought about when Kasavuba dismissed Lumumba. Lumumba, in turn, announced that Kasavubu was no longer President. To complete the drama, army chief-of-staff Joseph Mobutu seized political power on 13 September. The country quickly dissolved into four opposing sections, each with its own army. With no de facto government to deal with, ONUC carried out its mandate by co-operating with whatever forces were in control of a particular area. Their chief concern was to prevent a blood-bath of regional or tribal warfare.

The Security Council could not cope with this new development due to the veto power of the Soviet Union, and on 17 September the 4th Emergency Special Session was called.

Though the Soviet Union had approved of the Security

Council's decision to send troops to the Congo, the Soviet representative opened the Emergency Session with a vitriolic attack against ONUC, Belgium, "colonialist NATO," and against Dag Hammarskjöld personally. He alleged that ONUC had not lived up to its mandate and that Hammarskjöld had perverted the purpose of the Security Council resolution. The United States, in contrast, praised the work of the Secretary General and generally approved of the activities of ONUC. Immediately the battle lines had been drawn, and Finland, faced with this knowledge, listened with apprehension to the debate. But for all the verbiage and energy expended in this 4th Emergency Session notably little was accomplished. Only one resolution was considered, that introduced by 17 Asian and African nations. The Soviet Union attempted to attach two amendments but was forced to withdraw them by the adverse opinion of almost every country represented. In the closing minutes of the final meeting of the Emergency Session the resolution was brought to a vote and adopted by a majority vote of 70, among them Finland. The only countries not voting in favor of the resolution were France, the Union of South Africa, and the 9 Communist members.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately upon adjournment of the 4th Emergency Special Session, the 15th Regular Session was convened, but consideration of the Congo Crisis did not begin until November. The initial discussions, lasting for many days, were taken up completely by the dispute as to which government, or which

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<sup>1</sup>GAOR, 4th Emergency Session, Plenary, 863rd Meeting, p. 102.

persons actually represented the citizens of the Congo. As might be expected, views on this subject varied considerably with different factions backing each of the four claimants of the General Assembly seat. Of course the Soviet Union and the United States could not support the same candidate, and the bickering soon as concentrated on just the two factions backed respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Russians proclaimed that the "Government" of Prime Minister Lumumba was the only legal representative of the Congo, while the United States favored the men appointed by President Kasavubu.

The Credentials Committee had recommended that the Kasavubu (Leopoldville) faction be recognized as the representative of the Congo, and this recommendation, in the form of a draft resolution, was ostensibly what the ensuing debate was about. The vehemence of the mutual Soviet-American denunciations was as vitriolic as in any debate in the United Nations, but for sheer invective, it was far exceeded by the diatribe launched by the African countries against each other. (About half the African states supported Lumumba, the other half supported Kasavubu.)

Finally on 22 November 1960 the General Assembly voted to: "accept the credentials of the representatives of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville)..." by a vote of 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions. Not surprisingly, Finland was among those abstaining.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 924th Meeting, p. 978.

A month elapsed before another draft resolution on the Congo crisis reached the voting stage. This resolution, originally proposed by Pakistan, Senegal, and Tunisia, contained proposals for financial arrangements for ONUC. In the resolution was the recognition that "expenses involved in ONUC constitute 'expenses of the Organization' and that the assessment thereof against Member States creates binding legal obligations on such states to pay their assessed shares." Also included in the resolution was the decision "that the amount of \$48.5 million shall be apportioned among the Member States on the basis of the regular scale of assessments."<sup>3</sup>

These two provisions were particularly sticky ones for the USSR, since it had voted (in the Security Council) to send a force to the Congo. Now the Soviet delegation could not rationalize as they had on the Suez Crisis, but they soon developed the argument that they had no obligation to pay their assessment because ONUC had not carried out the mandate of the Security Council. And since ONUC was not doing what the Soviet Union thought it should be doing, it would therefore receive no support from the USSR.

Finland, as she had indicated on the Suez Crisis, was of the conviction that expenses incurred by a United Nations body should be borne by all Member States. Finland voted affirmatively with the United States while the Soviet bloc voted negatively. The total vote was 45 to 15 with 25 ab-

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<sup>3</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 49/50, p. 47.

stentions.<sup>4</sup>

The resolution mentioned above covered financial arrangements for the period from 14 July to 31 December 1960, and agreement would have to be reached for future financing also. In the same meeting therefore, another resolution, similar in every respect to Resolution 1583 (XV), but with the time period specified, was presented and passed by almost an identical margin. Finland voted affirmatively on this one also, and the Soviet Union repeated its negative vote.<sup>5</sup>

The 15th Session adjourned until March 1961 when the argument over the Congo resumed with increased fury. It quickly became evident that Finland would soon have to make a choice between Soviet-backed and American-backed proposals, and that it would have to vote on not one controversial resolution, but four.

The first of these, submitted by 21 Afro-Asian nations, condemned Belgium or Belgian activities in every paragraph. The sponsors were: "Convinced that the central factor in the Congo situation is the continued presence of Belgian military forces." The resolution further called upon Belgium to withdraw immediately and called upon Member States to do what they could to insure this withdrawal. This was generally the line that the Soviet Union had been pursuing, so understandably the resolution got the backing of the Soviet bloc.

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<sup>4</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 960th Meeting, Resolution 1583(XV), p. 1504.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., Resolution 1590(XVI).

Finland voted with the Soviet Union, but so did Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland. Only five countries voted against the measure, while France, United Kingdom and United States abstained. The total vote was 61 to 5 with 33 abstentions.<sup>6</sup>

The second resolution was authored by some of the same countries but was of an entirely different nature. This resolution did not condemn Belgium even once, an omission which the Soviet Union did not like; it appreciated the work of the Secretary General and extended his powers, and urged other actions which the Soviet Union regarded as serving "colonialist purposes." Because of the moderation of the draft, the Soviet Union tried to amend every paragraph. Finland voted against all of these Soviet amendments. On this one resolution Finland voted contrary to the Soviet Union 12 times, not counting the vote on the resolution as a whole. Finland voted affirmatively on the resolution, which was supported by all Western countries and many Afro-Asian nations. The Soviet block, accompanied by a few African states voted negatively and 23 countries abstained.<sup>7</sup>

The next item on the agenda was a Soviet draft resolution which included some of the provisions they would have liked to tack on to Resolution 1600(XV). The Soviet representative was quite eloquent in his plea that his res-

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<sup>6</sup> GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 985th Meeting, Resolution 1599(XV), p. 324.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., Resolution 1600(XV), p. 326.

olution be adopted, but to no avail. The draft was defeated by a vote of 53 to 29 with 17 abstentions. Finland opposed the draft as did the West.<sup>8</sup>

The fourth and last resolution of the day was drafted by Ceylon, Ghana, India and Morocco. Though it was controversial, it did not involve a Soviet-American conflict. The resolution proposed to establish a commission to investigate the deaths of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues. The measure was adopted with Finland voting affirmatively, while both the Soviet Union and the United States abstained.<sup>9</sup>

One cannot accuse Finland of bowing to the USSR on the first resolution (1599) in view of the wide support it received, and it was not really a vote against the United States because that country merely abstained. The second and third resolutions are a different story however. On these Finland voted with the United States, against the USSR on 14 occasions, and 13 of these were votes against amendments or resolutions authored by the Soviet Union herself. The fourth resolution (1601) did not provoke a great power split and if anything, indicates Finnish independence from both camps.

Just previous to the consideration of the items treated immediately above, Finland had voted in favor of a temporary financing resolution, which the Soviet Union opposed.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., A/L.341, p. 326

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., Resolution 1601(XV), p. 327

<sup>10</sup> GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 973rd Meeting, Resolution 1595(XV), p. 152

But the problem of financing had not been solved satisfactorily, and on 21 April the Assembly considered two additional resolutions. The first of these was a lengthy and highly detailed proposal that defined the precise financial arrangements for ONUC and the precise assessments of the Members. The resolution was defeated the first time it was voted upon, with Finland voting for the measure and the Soviet Union voting against it. The second time however, it passed by a vote of 54 to 15 with 23 abstentions with Finland again voting affirmatively and the Soviet Union in opposition.<sup>11</sup>

The second resolution was conceived during the discussions on the Congo crisis, and discussed as an integral part of this question, but the provisions had a far wider application. From a measure which would have dealt with the Congo Crisis alone this draft was changed by amendments into a proposal for a new financial body of the United Nations. The USSR was totally opposed even to consideration of the resolution and voted negatively in the balloting. The measure, however, was adopted by a majority of 44 to 13, with 32 abstentions, Finland voting affirmatively.<sup>12</sup>

Gradually political control was reestablished and by the end of 1961 the chief remaining problem for ONUC was Mr. Tshombe's province of Katanga, which had not been reconciled

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<sup>11</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 995th Meeting, Resolution 1619(XV), p. 506

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Resolution 1620(XV), p. 508

with the rest of the Congo. ONUC remained on duty until relative peace and quiet reigned in the Congo. As far as further action in the General Assembly is concerned, after the 15th Session, it consisted almost entirely of financial and administrative details and roughly the same voting patterns resulted as had emerged in 1961. Finland maintained her position, established as far back as the Suez Crisis in 1956, that United Nations actions were the responsibility of all Member States.

An obvious, and very logical, comparison that can be made is one between the Suez and Congo crisis. In many respects they were similar, and in equally many respects they were quite different. In each a military force had been sent to establish peace, but ONUC was set up by the Security Council with the USSR concurring, while UNEF was ordered by the General Assembly with Soviet opposition. Many other similarities and divergences could be noted, but the comparison of central concern to this study is that of Finland's votes on the respective crises.

As in the Suez Crisis, Finland's votes were generally for resolutions that were truly constructive. Finland abstained from, or voted against, all measures sponsored by either the East or West which consisted solely of a moral judgment or denunciation without a recommendation of some action. In both crises Finland was far enough removed to remain rather dispassionate throughout the preceeding, but the Congo crisis evidences a more independent voting record

on Finland's part. Though it is impossible to select one resolution from the Suez Crisis and one from the Congo Crisis, compare Finland's votes and arrive at any meaningful conclusion, it is nevertheless quite evident, that when considered as a whole, there are more voting disparities between Finland and the USSR on the Congo Crisis.

If viewed in terms of voting blocs, Finland on this particular question voted consistently with a number of non-aligned nations. More significantly, Finland and Sweden *voted* together on every opportunity and they were joined by Denmark and Norway on most ballots. On this question, as much as on any, a Scandinavian voting bloc was apparent.

## CHAPTER V

### Other Questions

Considering the dozens of questions which have been dealt with by the United Nations, and further considering that only four have been treated comprehensively in the present study one might assume that this chapter will be incredibly long and unduly comprehensive. But neither is the situation, because of the fact that only on a few of the remaining questions did a serious great-Power conflict develop, and on even fewer did it involve Finland.

Anyone who reads the newspapers could recall several issues that have been treated by the American press as "crises," and for which the positions of the Great Powers have been analyzed. But something that the newspapers often fail to point out is that these "positions" are often merely bargaining positions, and that what eventually emerges as a compromise constitutes the real position of the respective nations. And in this respect, many of these questions which would supposedly entail a Great-Power conflict are actually the basis for universal agreement when finally presented to the General Assembly. And of course, when this does occur, Finland is not placed in the position of having to choose sides.

But in those few questions which did indeed cause Great-

Power differences, it does not necessarily follow that because Finland supported one of the Powers, she was being influenced by that Power. The person making such an assumption would be guilty not only of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning, but would also be denying that Finland had shown any initiative whatsoever in the formation of her own foreign policy. One of Finland's eminent statesmen summarized it very concisely shortly after Finland's entry into the United Nations: "We would actually be living in a very strange kind of world if a state had to refrain from pursuing its own interests on the ground that others might also benefit."<sup>1</sup>

That statement should be kept in mind when examining Finland's votes on such questions as Algeria, Cyprus, Korean elections, South Africa and "apartheid," Yemen, and Oman, and above all, the perennial debate over the admission of Red China to the United Nations. These particular topics will be analyzed in some detail in the present chapter.

#### The Question of Red China

Several years before Finland's entry into the United Nations she had recognized the People's Republic of China and had maintained regular diplomatic relations with Peiping. Though the volume of trade between Finland and Red China was not great, economic agreements also existed. Finnish leaders,

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<sup>1</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, 1st Committee, 935th Meeting, p. 402, Speech by Enckell.

forced to face hard reality in other situations, did not forsake that reality on this issue. To Finland, it was, and is, inconceivable that a lasting international agreement of any nature can be achieved while one third of the Earth's people remain outside the scope of such an agreement.

In the debate over an Indian proposal, Mr. Enckell again was the spokesman for the Finnish delegation. He stated, among other things, that:

In joining the United Nations, we pledged ourselves to contribute to the success of the organization. We have consistently striven to avoid all such measures as might engender, prolong or deepen, any kind of conflict. We want to look particularly for practical and acceptable solutions which might reasonably be conceived as improvements. In order to do so we consider it necessary to recognize the real facts on which to base our common endeavours to promote international understanding. In defining our attitude on this question, we have been led by the same constructive spirit. Finland recognized the People's Republic of China many years ago. Finland is among the many countries which have normal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. There is not for us, therefore, and there could not reasonably be, any question as to the right of the legitimate representatives of China to their seat in the United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

Similar speeches were made by the representatives of such neutral countries as Sweden, India and Indonesia, and by such NATO countries as Norway and Denmark. Nevertheless, the measure, which "decides not to consider...any proposals.. to seat the People's Republic of China," passed by a vote of 44 to 28 with 9 abstentions.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, Plenary, 753rd Meeting, p. 74.

<sup>3</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, Plenary, 755th Meeting, Resolution 1239(XIII), p. 107.

Though Mr. Enckell made the speech quoted above in the 13th Session, similar situations had arisen in both the 11th (1956-57) and 12th (1957-58) Sessions. In both cases, Finland supported Red China's bid for membership.<sup>4</sup>

In 1959 Mr. Enckell again repeated his delegation's views as to the representation of China, and again his remarks were in vain as a majority rejected his recommendations.<sup>5</sup> In each ensuing session of the General Assembly the question was raised and disposed of after receiving the same kind of treatment. But more importantly, the absence of Red China was very pointedly illustrated by the incongruity of condemning a country which supposedly did not exist, as happened in the debates over Tibet.

#### The Question of Tibet

Early in 1959 there had been a great influx of Tibetans into Nepal and India, among them the Dalai Lama, the religious leader of Tibet. They reported that they were fleeing from Red Chinese aggression. According to the refugees, Red Chinese troops had occupied their land, had forced thousands of Tibetans into unpaid labor on military construction, had massacred other thousands of Tibetans, and had made a systematic attempt to destroy the religion and culture of the Tibetan

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<sup>4</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Plenary, 580th Meeting, Resolution 1108(XI), and GAOR, 12th Session, Plenary, 686th Meeting, Resolution 1135(XII).

<sup>5</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, Plenary, 803rd Meeting, Resolution 1351(XIV), p. 95.

people. An International Commission of Jurists had been formed to investigate the situation, and its report largely supported the charges of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan refugees.

On 28 September 1959, Malaya and Ireland requested that the question of Tibet be included in the agenda of the 14th session of the General Assembly. In the debate over the inclusion of the item many countries expressed their views as to the admissability of consideration by the United Nations. The item was placed on the agenda and on 20 October discussion of the topic began in Plenary meetings.

Representatives of various nations explained their positions on the question and three distinct groups were soon discernible. The largest group was made up of European and American nations, and supported unequivocally the right of the United Nations to consider the question. The second group was the familiar tight-knit family of Eastern European states who were totally opposed to consideration of the Tibetan Question because it was exclusively within the jurisdiction of China. The third group, chiefly non-aligned countries but including France and the United Kingdom, sympathized with the Tibetan people, but had serious doubts as to the practicality of United Nations consideration.

In defense of the position of the third group, Mr. Enckell's speech was as representative as any of this group:

Many delegations have expressed serious doubts about the competence of the United Nations to deal with the matter.

now before us. The Finnish delegation shares these doubts. We feel moreover that the absence from our midst of the representatives of the People's Republic of China is bound to make any discussion of this matter one-sided and purposeless. We did not deem it possible to vote for the inscription of this item on our agenda.

I am bound, however, to refer here to the deep feelings aroused in Finland by the reports of the present situation in Tibet. We have in Finland a deeprooted conviction in the right of all peoples to their own lives in undisturbed peace, whatever be their size, their status, or their location. We dearly hope that this right will be universally respected. We also hold in high respect the fundamental rights and basic liberties of man.

He continued to say that he did not see how the discussion of the present item would further peace or reduce the tensions of the Cold War. He announced that his delegation would therefore abstain on the voting.<sup>6</sup>

This speech contained some of the same elements that were present in Gripenberg's speech during the Hungarian Crisis, but whereas the abstention on that issue was clearly because of the Soviet position, on the Tibetan question the abstention apparently was the result of an independently arrived at decision. The speech also contained the familiar statement of Finnish adherence to freedom and independence, which was no less applicable here just because Finland doubted the legality of the actions of the United Nations.

In spite of Soviet opposition and neutral misgivings the resolution was adopted on 21 October by a vote of 44 to

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<sup>6</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, Plenary, 831st Meeting, p. 475

9 with 26 abstentions.<sup>7</sup>

The question of Tibet was discussed in the meetings of the 15th Session, (1960-61) and a resolution was introduced by Thailand, Malaya, and Ireland, but because of the pressure of other work it was not considered until the very end of the Session in April, 1961.<sup>8</sup> There was time only for one meeting and the resolution (A/L.344) did not reach a vote.

In the 16th Session, (1961-62) Malaya and Thailand again proposed that an item entitled "The Question of Tibet" be included in the agenda, and after much haggling it was adopted. The Western nations reiterated their position that the United Nations was competent to handle the question in view of the intervention of "one state in the affairs of another" and because the crime of genocide was being perpetrated by the "government of that state." (A few meetings previously, some of the same nations had maintained that Red China was not a state.) The Soviet Union countered as she had in previous sessions, and the nations which had abstained previously, repeated their misgivings.

When the vote was finally taken, 56 nations voted for the resolution, 11 voted against, and 29 nations, among them Finland, abstained.<sup>9</sup> Amazingly, when the question was raised in subsequent sessions, the West did not choose to make pro-

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 834th Meeting, Resolution 1353(XIV), p. 528

<sup>8</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 898th Meeting.

<sup>9</sup>GAOR, 16th Session, Plenary, 1005th Meeting, Resolution 1723(XVI), p.

paganda out of it, and did not insist on including it in the agenda. Why certain delegations allowed reason to prevail on this issue is not readily discernible. Though it may appear that Finland did not give sufficient support to the cause of Tibetan liberty, it was not because the Finns approved of Red Chinese actions. A more reasonable answer was provided by Mr. Enckell's speech, which has been quoted above.

#### The Korean Question

Finland's position in regard to the dispute over the status of Korea can be summarized very concisely. She wanted to stay out of the conflict. In the first session that Finland attended, the question was a burning one, and in the 22nd Session, (1966-67), the Korean question was on the agenda. There have been several resolutions introduced in each of the dozen sessions Finland has participated in, and on every one of them Finland has abstained. Whether the resolution was introduced by the USSR, the United States, Sweden, India or any other country, or whether the resolution was destined for overwhelming passage, or decisive defeat, Finland abstained. That this is a reflection of Cold-War tensions is obvious, and even Finland herself does not attempt to rationalize her actions.

#### The Algerian Question

Finland's voting record on the recurrent Algerian question, if not as lengthy, is at least more varied.

In the 11th Session, (1956-57), there were several resolutions concerning Algeria considered and some were adopted, but the only three causing any controversy were voted on in the 1st Committee. The first, sponsored by Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand expressed "the hope that France and the Algerian people will endeavour, through appropriate negotiations, to bring about the end of bloodshed and the peaceful settlement of the present difficulties." For reasons that are not at all clear, the draft caused a Great-Power split, and Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Ireland abstained. The final vote was 37 to 27 with 13 abstentions; the Soviet Union supported the bill and the United States was opposed.<sup>10</sup>

The second resolution was sponsored by eighteen non-aligned nations and contained a certain degree of censure for France. The Soviet Union backed the resolution which was defeated by rejection of the operative paragraphs. On both paragraphs Finland voted against the Soviet Union and with the United States and the Nordic Countries. The vote was 34 against, 33 for, and 10 abstentions.<sup>11</sup>

The third resolution, consisting of the statement:

"The General Assembly, having heard the statements of the French and other delegations, and discussed the question of Algeria, expresses the hope that a peaceful and democratic solution will be found."

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<sup>10</sup>GAOR, 11th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 62, A/3537, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

was sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Dominion Republic, Italy and Peru. Finland, Scandinavia, and the West supported this simple plea, but the Soviet Union and her allies, as well as the Arab Nations voted against it. The vote was 41 to 33 with 3 abstentions.<sup>12</sup> Thus in the 11th Session, on this question, Finland registered three votes against the Soviet Union and one abstention.

The 12th Session, (1957-58) considered only one controversial resolution on the Algerian question. This resolution was very similar to the last resolution of the 11th Session (examined immediately above) and the same voting split resulted. Finland and the West voted affirmatively; the Soviet bloc voted negatively. As the final vote was 37 to 37 with 6 abstentions, the resolution was not adopted.<sup>13</sup>

As she had done on the disarmament question, Finland abruptly changed her voting behaviour on Algeria in the 13th Session, (1958-59). Supposedly because of her troubles at home, Finland abstained on resolutions which she would have supported in previous years. Both resolutions considered in December, 1958 caused Great-Power differences and Finland abstained on both.<sup>14</sup>

By the fall of 1959, when the 14th Session met, the discussions had taken on a new tone. Now the draft resolutions

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> GAOR, 12th Session, 1st Committee, 926th Meeting, p. 342.

<sup>14</sup> GAOR, 13th Session, 1st Committee, 1023rd Meeting, p. 382, and Plenary, 792nd Meeting, p. 627.

introduced were much more comprehensive than before, and, in essence, recognized the right of Algeria to be independent. The Western nations did not agree with this and strongly opposed the resolution. But the "third world's" strength was evident on this measure as they joined the Communist bloc in adopting the resolution. Finland, Sweden, and 15 other nations abstained.<sup>15</sup>

By 1960 Finland had evolved from voting against the Soviet Union, to abstaining, to finally voting with the Soviets on essentially the same resolution. Finland was not being forced to do this; the situation in Algeria had undergone drastic alterations, and the question of Algerian independence was no longer a subject of idle speculation. The United States had not, however, adjusted its position, so in the 15th Session Finland voted with the Soviet Union and against the United States.<sup>16</sup> The fact that the rest of Scandinavia also voted with Finland, indicates the extent to which this change was of Finland's free will, and the result of the altered situation.

Despite the opinion of the Western World in regard to Algeria's right to be independent, the Algerians soon made this a moot point by achieving independence. On their entry into the United Nations in 1962, the Finnish delegate, Mr. Merikoski, welcomed the representatives of Algeria in the name of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland and Austria.

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<sup>15</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, 1st Committee, 1078th Meeting, p. 277.

<sup>16</sup>GAOR, 15th Session, Plenary, 965th Meeting.

His speech was articulate, if not altogether candid.

...We have awaited this day for many long and painful years. In our conscience and in our hearts we have acutely felt the violence, the scope, and the magnitude of the Algerian tragedy. Deeply conscious as we are of our responsibilities in the community of nations, sincere friends of both Algeria and France, we have done our utmost to contribute to the termination of that fratricidal struggle which for so long has drenched the soil of your country with blood.<sup>17</sup>

### The Cyprus Question

The question of Cyprus, as considered by the United Nations, consists of two distinct situations. The first, having its origins in the early 1950's, concerned the problems Cyprus faced in its quest for independence, which finally was achieved in 1960. The second, which began in 1964, was caused by the dispute between Greek and Turkish elements among the Cypriot citizens. On neither crisis did Finland take any startling foreign-policy initiatives, but the pre-independence crisis raised some controversy which Finland had to face.

Before 1957, the problems of Cyprus had not provoked a resolution in the General Assembly, but in that year a Greek resolution, introduced in the 1st Committee provided what had been missing. But the controversy was not necessarily of the traditional Cold War nature. On the voting which resulted, the Soviet bloc, Ireland, and many non-aligned countries supported Greece, while the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the rest of Western Europe were in

opposition. Finland, the United States and 23 other nations abstained, in one of the most unusual voting splits in the history of the UN.<sup>18</sup>

In 1958, much the same resolution was introduced, but it was just one of several resolutions before the General Assembly. The others were proposed by various groups of nations, with no particular reference to traditional Cold War splits. The three contending parties in this dispute were all members of NATO and each submitted a draft resolution at the opening of debate on the question. In addition to the resolutions of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; Columbia, Iran, Mexico each submitted one, and then a 10-Power joint resolution was submitted. In only one instance was a great Power conflict involved and Finland abstained when it was voted on. In fact Finland abstained on the vote on every resolution, but aside from the one Great-Power split, so did the United States. Thus this first Cyprus Crisis provides little useful information in regard to Finland's policy. About the only statement that could be made is that Finland certainly did not follow the Soviet line. The establishment of voting blocs on this question is impossible, as even the Scandinavian countries were split on every vote.<sup>19</sup> It is possible that many nations

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<sup>18</sup>GAOR, 12th Session, 1st Committee, 934th Meeting, A/C.1/L.197, p. 935.

<sup>19</sup>GAOR, 13th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 68, Report of 1st Committee, p. 15.

obeyed the dictates of their conscience on this question, but such an assertion is impossible to document.

The second Cyprus crisis, though caused by the same basic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, was of a considerably different nature. Cyprus was an independent nation in 1964, and her democratic institutions were supposedly working well. The ostensible immediate cause of violence was a constitutional conflict over the status of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The British, who still had troops in Cyprus, suggested that they be replaced by a peace keeping force made up of contingents from NATO countries, since all disputants were members of that Organization. The Cyprus Government, however, insisted that the peacekeeping force be under the direct control of the United Nations, and accordingly, the Security Council set up UNFICYP for a limited time. Thus the General Assembly was spared from the responsibilities of setting up a force. And, as Finland was not a member of the Security Council, she happily did not have to support the resolutions of either side. It is clear nevertheless where Finland stood on this issue, since she was one of the first countries to offer a contingent for UNFICYP, and about 1000 Finnish soldiers took part in the operation.

The only General Assembly action on this question took place in 1965 at the 20th Session, and was chiefly a statement of fact. The "third world" proposed and adopted the resolution over the negative votes of Albania, Turkey, and

the United States, while Finland, the Soviet bloc, and the entire West abstained. The voting pattern on this question again possibly reflected votes of conviction, rather than pure political expediency.<sup>20</sup>

#### South Africa and Apartheid

Another of the "Great Problems of the United Nations" which has been considered annually, but which is no closer to a solution now than it was 20 years ago, it is the question of South Africa and "apartheid." As was the case in regard to the admission of Red China, Finland's policy on South Africa has been a very consistent one. The great majority of resolutions adopted by the Assembly have been simply moral condemnations of the South African Government. In keeping with her policy of not supporting moral judgements on any issue Finland has abstained on every such resolution since her entry in 1956.

On 9 November 1959, Max Jakobson, member of the Finnish delegation, explained Finland's position in a meeting of the Special Political Committee. He said that his delegation shared the conviction that the practice of racial discrimination and segregation was a denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The principle of equality was enshrined in the tradition, law and social practice of his country, which found any form of intolerance repugnant. His delegation had no doubt as to the validity of the principles of the draft

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<sup>20</sup>GAOR, 20th Session, Plenary, 1402nd Meeting, Resolution 2077 (XX).

resolution being considered, but it had certain reservations in regard to the competence of the United Nations in view of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. (Provision for non-interference in the domestic affairs of States.) He thought that negotiations and conciliation would succeed better than the mere repetition of resolutions which attempted to pass judgement on that country, and only served to worsen relations with the one agency that had the power and means to tackle the race conflict in South Africa-namely the Government of South Africa.<sup>21</sup>

Finland's speeches and votes in subsequent sessions emphasized this position but added little new material. One alteration was significant, however. Beginning in the 15th Session, (1960-61) additional resolutions calling for economic sanctions have been introduced, and were always vociferously supported by the Soviet Union. Finland has consistently voted against these resolutions, as has the United States.

A corollary of the South Africa Question is the question of South West Africa. This territory was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations, and confirmed by the United Nations shortly after its formation. The chief dispute was, and is, caused by difference in opinion between South Africa and the rest of the world over the status of South West Africa. This dispute is generally outside the scope of this study because most of the action taken has been in the Committee on South West Africa, a body that is not an integral part

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<sup>21</sup>GAOR, 14th Session, Special Political Committee, 147th Meeting, p. 98.

of the General Assembly. The only reason for mention at all is that Finland was elected to this body in 1956 and was very active in promoting conciliation. In subsequent years, Max Jakobson played a dynamic role in the work of this committee, recently becoming chairman. This is but one example of Finland's many efforts to promote peace and understanding in United Nations bodies other than the General Assembly.

#### Questions Relative to United Nations Organs

Periodically throughout the twenty year history of the United Nations attempts have been made to alter the size or character of bodies set up by the original Charter. This has occurred many times since Finland has been a member, and some have entailed Great-Power conflicts, particularly those that proposed to increase the size of the Security Council.

On those proposals which would have given either side in the Cold War a notable advantage Finland abstained, but on most, regardless of what camp made the original proposal, Finland voted against the Soviet Union. This series of votes, which extend from 1956-1964 is not particularly helpful to this study because very few of these resolutions actually contained provisions that affected the vital interests of any of the Great-Powers. The long range effect of all these measures, a trend which Finland could certainly support, was the gradual increase in the power and influence of the non-aligned nations.

Though statistics will show a great number of Finnish

votes which opposed those of the Soviet Union, it would be hazardous to state that this was in direct reaction to Soviet policy. It is probable that this is another area in which Finnish leaders feel relatively free to express their convictions, even though some of them might irritate the Soviet Union.

#### Question of Oman

The question of Oman is a fitting conclusion to this chapter because it is a development of the 1960's and one is likely to remain on the agenda of the General Assembly. It also provides evidence of what may be a cautious alteration of Finland's United Nations policy.

The question was first on the agenda of the 15th Session, but because of the time shortage, no definitive action was taken, other than to place the "Question of Oman" on the Agenda of the 16th Session.

In the 16th Session, (1961-62) the question was considered at two Plenary meetings and at seven meetings of the Special Political Committee where all the real action took place. To summarize the essence of the conflict in Oman one could reasonably state that it was caused by Arab nationalism, fanned by Gamel Abdel Nasser. The Arabs accused the British of colonialism and economic exploitation of the Arab residents. Britain's argument was that she had a right to be there, having been invited by local leaders to help put down a rebellion. Furthermore, Britain argued, Oman was an integral part of the Sultanate of Muscat, whose leader was on good terms with the

British.

The Soviet Union and its East European comrades jumped on the Arab anti-colonialist band wagon and denounced Britain.

In a fairly rare show of unanimity, all of non-communist Europe supported the United Kingdom, as well as the United States and the Commonwealth Countries. In the Special Political Committee voting, which requires a simple majority, the Arab-led bloc found enough support among the African nations to pass the resolution over the negative votes of the West, including Finland.<sup>22</sup> But in Plenary meetings a 2/3 majority is required, and the measure was rejected by a vote of 33 to 21 with 37 abstentions. Finland's votes again countered those of the Soviet Union, on a resolution authored by the Soviet Union.<sup>23</sup>

In 1962 the question of Oman was again considered by both the Special Political Committee and a Plenary meeting and the results were almost identical to those of 1961. The measure passed the Committee, but failed of adoption in the General Assembly. On both occasions Finland registered votes which countered those of the Soviet Union.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> GAOR, 16th Session, Special Political Committee, 306th meeting, A/SPC/L. 78, p. 234.

<sup>23</sup> GAOR, 16th Session, Plenary, 1078th Meeting, A/5010, p. 1029.

<sup>24</sup> GAOR, 17th Session, Special Political Committee, 357th Meeting, A/SPC/L.88, and 17th Session, Plenary, 1191st Meeting, A/5325.

In the 18th Session the 4th Committee handled the question rather than the Special Political Committee, and here a completely new situation developed. No longer was the initiative taken by the Arab or Communist nations, but by the Latin American nations. The resolution which they submitted was very moderate and was a sincere effort in the direction of conciliation. It did not name Great Britain as an aggressor, and simply appointed a committee to study the question. The only negative vote cast in the balloting was that of the United Kingdom, so Finland's affirmative alignment with the Soviet Union is not particularly notable.<sup>25</sup>

The question received very little treatment in the 19th Session, pending completion of a report on Oman and no votes resulted. IN 1965 however, the Arab-led bloc re-emerged with a strongly worded resolution demanding that British troops get out of Oman, and that all forms of British domination be eliminated. The Soviet Union gave wholehearted support to the resolution, and was even more insistent on its adoption than were the sponsors. The resolution was adopted by a large majority of 61 to 18 with 32 abstentions. Again Western (and Northern) Europe voted negatively and the only desertion from the ranks of the supporters of Britain, was France who abstained.<sup>26</sup> This vote took place late in December 1965, and

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<sup>25</sup>GAOR, 18th Session, Plenary, 1277th Meeting, Resolution 1948 (XVIII).

<sup>26</sup>GAOR, 20th Session, Plenary, 1399th Meeting, Resolution 2073 (XX).

thus is the last vote chronologically to be considered in this study. The voting disparity between Finland and the Soviet Union was obvious and consistent on this issue, and the possible implications of this will be discussed in the final Chapter.

### Conclusion

What then is the result of Finland's participation in the United Nations? Has Finland been able to significantly alter the Paasikivi line within the framework of the United Nations? Or, on the contrary, has the Paasikivi line been so rigid that Finland's votes and statements are only a reflection of it?

Some observers have stated that participation has made new interpretations of the Paasikivi line possible, and superficially this statement is correct. But a close examination reveals that these changes in interpretation are so subtle that they actually only provide more precise limits to areas previously undefined. Though exceptions to the rule exist, the examples studied above provide rather conclusive evidence that the principles embodied in the Paasikivi line govern Finland's actions in the United Nations to the same extent that they govern any other aspect of Finnish foreign policy.

If that is indeed the case, do Finnish votes serve the interests of the Soviet Union, as several Western critics have charged? In an incidental way, yes. But the main consideration is not Soviet interests, but Finnish interests. That Finnish interests are sometimes the same as Soviet

interests is a fact of geography and politics which Finland cannot change. It is not subservience to Russia, but the basic requirement of protecting Finnish independence that determines Finland's actions. The late Foreign Minister, Ralf Torngren once wrote that, "The foreign policy of a small nation can have but one purpose: the safeguarding of its independence and security. The means employed to this end must be adapted to circumstances over which it can have only marginal control."<sup>1</sup>

There is, of course, no way of proving that Moscow does not dictate Finland's votes, but neither can the opposite be proved. On the contrary, the many Finnish votes which opposed those of the Soviet Union indicate that Finland voted with considerable freedom. That Finland usually abstains from condemning the USSR is probably the result of Finnish prudence rather than Soviet interference.

This does not imply, however, that Finland's votes reflect Finnish opinion. The events of the Hungarian tragedy indicate this disparity rather plainly. And during the crisis periods of 1958 and 1961 the disparity between convictions and actions were more apparent than at other times. Or at least Finland took greater pains not to offend the Soviet Union. It is reasonably certain that had Finland not exercised prudence on such questions as Hungary and Korea, the Soviet Union would have made its displeasure known in Helsinki.

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<sup>1</sup> Ralf Torngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39 (July, 1961), p. 601.

Happily, confrontations between the Great Powers have not occurred nearly so often in the last five years as they did during the 1950's. And consequently Finland has not been put on the spot so often. Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war erupted, the problems in Oman and Yemen provided the most controversy. (The Vietnam war has been avoided in the U.N. both by the United States and the USSR.) As indicated in Chapter V, Finland has voted against the Soviet Union on the Oman question in several instances where she would not have done so five years ago. The scanty records which have been distributed to date on the Middle East War also indicate that Finland is pursuing a more independent course than she did in 1956-57.

Despite the cautious Finnish initiatives mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it would appear that, in the absence of any drastic change in the international situation, Finland's policy will continue along the Paasikivi line. For above all, the Finns are realistic, they have no delusions of grandeur, they are aware that Finland's impact on the world is limited. But they also believe that they can make a contribution to world peace, and it is this belief which caused President Kekkonen to explain Finland's purpose in the United Nations, in the following terms:

We consider that it is our task here to narrow differences, to seek constructive solutions, rather than sharpen or sustain existing conflicts or create new ones. We in Finland are, to a large extent, a nation of cooperators; and we know that true cooperation is best advanced by strongly independent minded individuals. We believe in the possibility of harmonizing through conciliating

dissimilar interests for the benefit of all.  
 Rather than as judges we see ourselves here as physicians;  
 it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it  
 is rather to diagnose and to try to cure.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the narrow differences between the two sides of the proceeding, the presence of an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding, Finland's contribution to the world above all, its grandeur, its limited contribution, its President, and the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup>GAOR, 16th Session, Plenary, 1040th Meeting, Speech by the President of Finland.

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Second Committee

Third Committee

Fourth Committee

Fifth Committee

Sixth Committee

Seventh Committee

Eighth Committee

Ninth Committee

Tenth Committee

Eleventh Committee

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Fourteenth Committee

Fifteenth Committee

Sixteenth Committee

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August 3, 1967