

RUSSIA AND THE IONIAN ISLANDS 1798-1807

THE CONQUEST OF THE ISLANDS AND
THEIR ROLE IN RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

BY

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PREFACE

The Russian protectorate over the Ionian Islands (Septinsular Republic) is one of those innumerable acorns buried in history, lost in obscurity because there was no sprout. The very obscurity of the Ionian protectorate, Russia's first Balkan satellite, was what initially attracted my attention. The brief history of the ill-starred Septinsular Republic is a fascinating page of European history in itself; but Russia's connection with that republic is even more so. It was Imperial Russia's first and last venture as a Mediterranean power.

Russia's protectorate over the Ionian Islands has received remarkably little attention from historians of all nations. Greek historians have understandably concentrated on the French and British occupations, which had a much greater impact on the course of Greek history than did the brief Russian protectorate. In France during the Bourbon Restoration the publication of several memoir accounts of French soldiers who served in the Ionian Islands caused a fleeting interest in the Septinsular Republic. Although Russian historians have neglected the Ionian protectorate, Admiral Ushakov's conquest of the Ionian Islands in 1798-1799 recently received considerable attention as a result of the Soviet Union's postwar nationalistic interest in Russia's naval history.

It is only because of the recent interest of Soviet writers that this study is possible. The publication of Admiral Ushakov's correspondence, totaling three volumes, has made possible a more balanced study of the early years of the Septinsular Republic. For the later years, it is necessary to rely on published archival material which is adequate for a study of the role of the Ionian Islands in Russian foreign policy, but not for a comprehensive study of the internal aspects of the protectorate. Because of the unavailability of most of the papers of the Russian consul at Corfu and because of my limitations in not knowing Greek or Italian, I have restricted myself to the diplomatic aspects of the protectorate, commenting on the internal situation only when necessary to make related events intelligible.

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Michael B. Petrovich who directed my interest to this area, aided me in procuring rare books, and offered his welcome criticism.

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INTRODUCTION

With the Treaty of Campo-Formio (October 17, 1797), imposed by the victorious French Republic upon a still formidable Austria, the once puissant Republic of St. Mark was partitioned. In accordance with Article V of the treaty,¹ the Venetian possessions in the Levant passed to France. The only remnant of the far-flung possessions of fifteenth-century Venice was a group of islands located off the western coast of Greece and known variously as the Ionian Islands, the Seven Islands, or the Venetian Islands. The Ionian Islands included Corfu (Kerkira),² Santa Marua (Levkas), Cephalonia (Kefallinia), Paxo (Paxoi), Ithaca (Ithaki), Zante (Zakinthos), and Cerigo (Kithira) plus scores of islets. Included in the territory of the Ionian Islands were four towns located on the Greek coast opposite the islands: Parga, Preveza, Vonitsa, and Butrinto (Vutzintro).

The population of the Ionian Islands at the end of

¹Alexandre de Clercq, Recueil des traités de la France (Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 1880), I, 336.

²The name in parenthesis is the modern Greek appellation. Since the Italian names are still current in English, they will be used throughout the text.

the eighteenth century was approximately 200,000.³ Although only 1,117 square miles in land area, the Ionian Islands extend over 300 miles from the Strait of Otranto to the southern tip of the Morea. Cephalonia was the largest and most populous of the islands and Zante the wealthiest, but Corfu was the most important by virtue of its historic role as the seat of government and its strategic significance. The fortress of Corfu, comparable to Malta in strength, enabled Venice to maintain her prestige in the Levant long after the substance of her power had disappeared. The small island of Cerigo, situated off Cape Malea over 180 miles from Zante, was not historically or geographically a part of the Ionian chain. Cerigo was joined administratively to the Ionian Islands after Venice lost the Morea and Crete.

Venice procured the Ionian Islands piece-meal between 1386 and 1684, competing with the Ottoman Turks for the Angevin territories in Greece and the islands. The coastal

³ Baron Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, Memoirs on the Ionian Islands, Considered in a Commercial, Political, and Military Point of View (London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1816), p. 407. Estimates of the population of the Ionian Islands have varied widely, with an estimate by J. P. Bellaire running as high as 242,543 (Précis des opérations générales de la division française du Levant /Paris: Magimel and Humbert, 1805/, p. 449). British statistics after 1815, given in C. Willis Dixon (The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland /London: Longmans, Green, 1939/, p. 230) suggest that the lower estimates are more accurate.

towns were not permanently secured until the Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac) in 1718. The Venetian government displayed more sagacity in administering the Ionian Islands than it showed with respect to the other, more transient, possessions in the Levant. An alliance with the Ionian aristocracy and toleration of the Orthodox Church were the cardinal principles at the base of Venetian administration. The Ionian nobles, largely Italian in origin, were bribed by Venice with a carte blanche in dealing with the lower classes. Superficially educated at the universities of Padua and Bologna and living as absentee landlords in the towns, the nobles were divorced from the lower classes by caste, religion, nationality, and language.

Suffering under harsh feudal practices and Draconian Norman codes, a legacy of the Angevin period, and prey to extortionate Venetian commercial practices, the Ionian peasants were worse off than their compatriots on the mainland.⁴ A mitigating factor was the near equality of the Orthodox Church. The Catholics, concentrated among the nobility and the townspeople and numbering about 10,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century,⁵ enjoyed precedence; but the Orthodox hierarchy had official

⁴William Miller, "The Ionian Islands Under Venetian Rule," English Historical Review, XVIII, No. 70 (April, 1903), 217.

⁵Gaston Levy, La Condition internationale des Iles Ioniennes depuis le Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à nos jours (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1901), p. 5.

standing and was treated with respect by the Venetian authorities. In return, the Venetian governors demanded that the Orthodox priests use their influence to quell refractory elements, usually by a liberal use of excommunications. Relations between the Catholics and the Orthodox were amicable. On ceremonial occasions the clergy of the two rites held joint services. Toleration did not extend to the Jews, who numbered one-eighth of the urban population. Although not officially persecuted, the Jews suffered under onerous restrictions.⁶

During the heyday of the Venetian Empire, when Venetian admirals championed the cause of Christendom and when the government functioned with at least a modicum of justice, the lot of the Ionians was tolerable.⁷ But with the twilight of the empire and the concomitant degeneration in administration, markedly accelerated after Passarowitz, the Ionian Islands subsided into nearly a century of stagnation. It was upon such a static and torpid society that the disciples of the French Revolution so abruptly intruded in 1797. Feverish and convulsive innovations by the French

⁶J.-A. Romanos, Histoire de la communauté israélite de Corfou (Paris: 1892), cited by Emmanuel P. Rodocanachi, Bonaparte et les Iles Ioniennes (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1899), p.13.

⁷Countess Dora d'Istria, "Les Iles Ioniennes sous la domination de Venise et sous le protectorat britannique," Revue des Deux Mondes, XVI (July 15, 1858), 395.

in sixteen months of hectic rule weighed little in balance against six centuries of Venetian rule. The heavy legacy of Venice was oligarchic rule, gaping social cleavages, corruption, venality and ignorance among all classes.

The French secured de facto possession of the Ionian Islands three months before the Treaty of Campo-Formio. After the signing of the preliminary Treaty of Loeben (April 18, 1797), which did not provide for the partition of Venice, the French commander in Italy, General Bonaparte, ordered the immediate preparation of an expedition to go to Corfu.⁸ On June 12 General Gentili sailed for the Ionian Islands with a squadron of 31 ships carrying 1,200 French and 800 Italian troops. Through fear of an occupation of Corfu by Britain in an attempt to forestall the French, the expedition was shrouded in secrecy. A peaceful disembarkation was accomplished on June 28 by means of a ruse. General Gentili persuaded the last Venetian proveditore-generale that the French were coming to reinforce the Venetians, not replace them. The fortress of Corfu, with 600 cannon brooding on its ramparts, fell to the French without a shot, although the tricolor was not raised until the islands were formally annexed in accordance with the Treaty of Campo-Formio.

General Bonaparte sent to the Directory a highly

⁸General Bonaparte to General Baraguey d'Hilliers, May 26, 1797. Napoleon I, Correspondance de Napoléon I^{er} (Paris: Henri Plon, 1859), no. 1825, III, 67.

colorful account of Gentili's reception.⁹ According to Bonaparte, Gentili was met on the shore by a huge, enthusiastic crowd of Corfiotes with the Protopappas of Corfu¹⁰ at their head. The Protopappas, alluding to the former glory of the Ionian Greeks and beseeching the French not to despise their ignorance, presented to the astonished French general a copy of Homer's Odyssey. Antoine Arnault, who accompanied the expedition in the capacity of Gentili's civilian adviser, recorded a more reserved account, observing that the crowd was silent and troubled.¹¹ However, the deep-rooted hatred of Venice by all but the higher nobility soon caused the initial reserve to give way to enthusiasm. Arnault's ringing proclamations, introducing all the semantic trappings of the French Revolution into the provincial Ionian Islands, promised an end to suffocating Venetian oppression. Aversion for an alien occupation was lessened by Gentili's evocations of the glories of classical Greece, a tactic expressly ordered by Bonaparte.¹²

⁹ General Bonaparte to the Directory, August 1, 1797. Ibid., no. 2061, III, 215-216.

¹⁰ The Protopappas of Corfu, holding episcopal powers from the Patriarch of Constantinople, was the highest Orthodox prelate in the islands. Venice never permitted the use of a higher title.

¹¹ Antoine V. Arnault to General Bonaparte, July 5, 1797; Antoine V. Arnault, Souvenirs d'un sexagénaire (Paris: Duféy, 1833), III, 378.

¹² General Bonaparte to General Gentili, May 26, 1797. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 1830, III, 68.

The news of the presence of the French at Corfu spread electrically to the other islands. At Cephalonia, an especially detested Venetian proveditore was put to flight by a mob before the arrival of a single French soldier. At Zante, the French consul was able to organize a national guard unassisted by Gentili's troops.¹³

In the feverish first days of the occupation, the Golden Book of the Ionian nobility was ceremoniously burned by exultant peasants and townspeople, the stone lions of Saint Mark were cast into the sea, a "Liberty Tree" was planted on the esplanade of Corfu, and on Ithaca, the mythical home of Ulysses, "Vive la République" was etched on the stones of the ancient Arethusan fountain.

In the months prior to annexation, the islands were administered by General Gentili assisted by councils on each island which were representative of all classes and religions. With revolutionary fervor Gentili reorganized the organs of criminal and civil justice, established the first public schools in the islands, and set up the first printing press. Compulsory peasant labor in the government salt works was ended, excessive Venetian imposts were removed and the burden of taxation was shifted more equitably onto the upper classes. The debts of the preceding government

¹³A. L. Castellán, Lettres sur la Morée et les Iles de Cérigo, Hydra et Zante (Paris: H. Agasse, 1808), II, 131.

were disavowed and salaries of officials were reduced. First the provisional government of Zante and then the other island governments in succession applied for annexation to France. In the heady first months of the occupation, the people as a whole favored annexation.¹⁴

In a decree dated November 7, 1797, General Bonaparte established the permanent government of the Ionian Islands.¹⁵ In contrast to the status of the islands under succeeding foreign occupations, during the first French occupation the Ionian Islands were an integral part of the French Republic. The French Constitution of 1795 was applicable and the Ionian Islands were divided into three departments: Corcyre,¹⁶ Ithaque, and Mer-Egée. However, there was a significant difference between the departments of the Ionian Islands and those of France. The three Ionian departments were subordinate to a French commissioner-general, who was, in effect, a governor-general. Although Ionians were supposedly destined to occupy posts in the departmental administration, the shortage of administrative talent among the Ionians and the desire of the French for haste in remolding Ionian society resulted in a swarm of patronizing

¹⁴Paul Gaffarel, La Politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830 (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908), Part II, p. 210.

¹⁵Decree of General Bonaparte, November 7, 1797. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 2326, III, 404-405.

¹⁶Corcyra was the classical name for the island of Corfu.

French officials descending on the islands and occupying all important posts. While the slow work of organizing a government on all levels proceeded in the first half of 1798, each month brought shattering changes. Bonaparte summarily abolished feudalism by decree. All restrictions on Jews were removed, the jury system was hesitantly introduced, and books in monasteries were appropriated for use in Corfu's first public library.

The permanent machinery of government was not fully functioning until August 1798. Within weeks afterwards the functions of the departmental administrations were suspended in favor of rule by decree. The Ionian Islands, which for a century had been outside the international current of events, were swept for a second time within a year into the vortex of European politics. In the short year of their occupation, the French had not had enough time to mold the Ionian Islands in the image of Directory France. Likewise, opposition to France among the islanders had not yet had time to crystallize around a single standard or personage. When the Ionians had begun to see the French as the revolutionaries they were, instead of merely as an antidote to Venetian rule, there was a ground swell of opposition among all classes. The future course of the Ionian Islands, however, was not in the hands of either the French or the Ionian people.

CHAPTER I
THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE

If Napoleon had been content with the acquisition of only the Ionian Islands, the French sojourn at Corfu might have been of longer duration. However, the imaginative Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy regarded the Ionian Islands only as a base for future operations. In a lengthy letter to the Directory, Bonaparte explained the value and function of the Ionian Islands:

These islands of Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia are of more importance for us than all of Italy together. I believe that if we were forced to choose, it would be better to give Italy to the Emperor and keep the four islands It is vain for us to want to maintain the Ottoman Empire; we shall see it fall in our own day. The occupation of those four beautiful islands will be for us a means of either supporting or undermining it.¹

Succeeding acts of Bonaparte indicated that he was interested only in undermining the Ottoman Empire. Immediately after the occupation of the islands, protestations of firm friendship were exchanged with the Pasha of Scutari (Shkodër).² Bonaparte was particularly interested in the potentialities of an alliance with Ali Pasha of Yanina

¹General Bonaparte to the Directory, May 27, 1797. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 1836, III, 73.

²General Bonaparte to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 16, 1797. Ibid., no. 2106, III, 236.

(Ioannina), who held sway from the Gulf of Corinth to the wilds of Macedonia. Under orders to cultivate Ali Pasha,³ General Gentili sent Adjutant General Rose to Yanina in July 1797 for that purpose. Rose was fêted by Ali and he married a Greek in Ali's court. The Metropolitan of Yanina and the sons of Ali Pasha danced the Carmagnole; the atmosphere could not have been more congenial.⁴ Taking advantage of the eagerness of the French for good relations, Ali obtained from Gentili permission to navigate in the Ionian Sea, a privilege which had always been denied him by Venice. Ali used this permission to plunder and massacre the Christian inhabitants of two coastal towns which were inaccessible by land. The entente was cemented by the flow of French arms to Yanina. In return, Ali supplied foodstuffs to the islands, which had never been self-sufficient agriculturally. The Rose mission was followed by that of Captain Scheffer in January 1798. The intimacy of Ali and the French was demonstrated when French artillery officers accompanied Ali's troops in a campaign against the Pasha of Vidin.

³General Bonaparte to General Gentili, November 10, 1797. Ibid., no. 2343, III, 420.

⁴François Pouqueville, Histoire de la régénération de la Grèce, comprenant le précis des événements depuis 1740 jusqu'en 1824 (Paris: F. Didot, 1824), I, 115.

Bonaparte's diplomatic offensive was not limited to Albania and northern Greece. Zonetto Grigorakis, Beg of the Maina,⁵ hearing of Bonaparte's victories in Italy, sent an emissary to Bonaparte in June 1797. The emissary was enthusiastically received; and Bonaparte saw new vistas of opportunity opening in the Morea. It was but a step from Zante to the Morea, and the Morea would be an ideal base, in Bonaparte's estimation, for undermining the Ottoman Empire.⁶ Bonaparte's interest in expansion in Greece explains the anomaly of naming the southernmost department of the Ionian Islands the Mer Egée when none of it was in the Aegean Sea. On July 20, 1797, Bonaparte sent a mission to the Morea, headed by Dino Stephanopoli, a Corsican of Maniote descent. Stephanopoli was charged with investigating the conditions in the Morea and establishing contact between Gentili and the Maniotes.⁷

With French missions materializing in the Morea and Albania, the Porte became alarmed. When the French ambassador at the Porte, Aubert Dubayet, had notified the Porte of the French occupation of the Ionian Islands, the Porte

⁵The semi-autonomous Maina region, located in the Morea on the Matapan peninsula, was inhabited by a warlike and clannish people of Greek, Slavic and Albanian descent. The Maniotes elected their own chiefs, but paid tribute to the Turks.

⁶Jean Savant, "Napoléon et la libération de la Grèce," L'Hellenisme Contemporain, IV (1950), 330-331.

⁷Spyridion Pappas, "La Mission des Stéphanopoli en Grèce," L'Hellenisme Contemporain, X, no. 2 (February, 1950), 148-158.

had accepted the event graciously. The Sultan had issued a firman enjoining the Pasha of the Morea not to hinder trade with the islands.⁸ However, in the latter part of 1797 evidence of French intrigues mounted ominously. Hasan Pasha, governor of the Morea, reported to the Porte the declarations of the French evoking the glories of Greece and promising their restoration.⁹ The secret missions dispatched from the Ionian Islands did not escape the observation of Hasan Pasha. The assurances of the French ambassador at Constantinople did not remove visions of an independent and powerful potentate at Yanina and of the Morea erupting in rebellion led by the doughty Maniotes.

Unfortunately for Bonaparte, the Porte and Great Britain were not the only powers sensitive to French activities in the Levant. The Russian Chancellor, Prince Aleksandr Bezborodko, as early as December 1797 expressed alarm at the potential danger in the proximity of the French to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰ Until that time, the

⁸P. Pisani, "L'Expédition russo-turque aux Iles Ioniennes en 1798-1799," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, II (1888), 198.

⁹Reports of Hasan Pasha, quoted in Ahmed Jevdet Pasha, Vekayi-i Devlet-i Aliyye (Istanbul: 1868), VI, 248-249, 282-284, cited by Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," Journal of World History, I, no. 1 (July, 1953), p. 120.

¹⁰Prince Bezborodko to Count S. Vorontsov, Dec. 13, 1797. Nikolai I. Grigorovich, ed., Kantsler Kniaz' Aleksandr Andreevich Bezborodko v sviazi s sobytiiami ego vremeni. Vol. XXIX of Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva (St. Petersburg: 1881), 390.

Ionian Islands, as distinct from Greece, had not attracted the attention of the Russian government. In the Austro-Russian negotiations of 1783-4, Catherine had allowed Joseph II a free hand in the Ionian Islands. Several factors, however, combined to cause Russia to take a keen interest in the events occurring in the Ionian Sea. By the Treaty of Jassy (Iași) in 1791 Russia had achieved the Dniester frontier and her superior fleet ensured Russia dominance of the Black Sea. However, the continued security of Russia's extensive Black Sea coast was dependent upon the other Black Sea power or powers being in a relatively weak state. A Franco-Turkish alliance in itself would not have been a particularly threatening development because the two nations had been allied since the reign of Francis I. But with the French occupation of the Ionian Islands, French troops were within operational distance of the Straits for the first time. Among the alternatives open to the French in pursuing an aggressive policy in the Levant were replacing the Turks at the Straits or forcing an alliance upon the Porte by the terms of which French troops could operate in the Black Sea. Either of the alternatives posed a dire threat to Russia.

Trade was another factor in Russia's increasing interest in the Ionian Islands. A Russian company had been organized in 1756 to trade with Venice and Italy. The Treaty of Küçük Kainarji (1774) allowed Russian merchantmen to

pass through the Straits, with a resultant increase in trade.¹¹ The Treaty of Jassy forced the Turks to cease hindering the implementation of the commerce clauses of the treaty of 1774. Between 1779 and 1797, Russian exports from Black Sea ports increased phenomenally from 161,690 rubles to 1,929,198 rubles.¹² Increasingly toward the end of the eighteenth century, vessels owned by Greeks or subjects of secondary states flew the Russian flag in the eastern Mediterranean.¹³ Strategic imperatives and increasing Mediterranean trade with the concomitant obligation to protect the flag impelled Russia at the end of the eighteenth century to look beyond the Straits. In many respects, the involvement of Russia in the Ionian Islands symbolized for that empire a broadening of the Eastern Question from the narrow confines of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

In the early months of 1798, the Russian government feared that the Porte would seek security through an alliance with France directed against Russia. Only seven years

¹¹N. L. Rubinstein, "Vneshniaia torgovlia Rossii i russkoe kupechestvo vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v.," Istoricheskie Zapiski, LIV (1955), 346.

¹²John J. Oddy, European Commerce (Philadelphia: James Humphreys, 1807), I, 167.

¹³Report of Adjutant General Kushelev to Tsar Paul, May 9, 1797. Stepan F. Ogorodnikov, ed., Materialy dlia istorii russkago flota, Vol. XVI (St. Petersburg: Tip. Morskago Ministerstva, 1902), no. 157, p. 97.

before, Russia had imposed a peace treaty upon Selim III. France as yet had extracted no territory from the Porte, whereas Russia had been doing so methodically for nearly a century. In 1794 the Russian ambassador to the Porte, Count Kochubey, had tried to convince the Turks of the threat posed by revolutionary France. Meeting with no success, Kochubey described the Turkish ministers as "Jacobins" who displayed "a partiality for the French demagogues."¹⁴

By February 1798, Tsar Paul was persuaded that France, from her vantage point at Corfu, was meeting with success in pressuring the Turks into an offensive alliance against Russia.¹⁵ Russian merchant captains who had passed the Straits brought to Black Sea Ports disquieting reports of Turkish fleet movements.¹⁶ Russian estimates of the ultimate intentions of the French were highly imaginative and disconnected from questions of logistics. The Russian Chancellor stated that he was "convinced" that the French were preparing an expedition

¹⁴ Count Kochubey to Count A. R. Vorontsov, August 25, 1794. Arkhiv Vorontsova, XVII, p. 80, quoted in Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la Révolution française (Paris: Plon, Nourrit, 1892-1903), IV, 248.

¹⁵ Tsar Paul to Admiral N. S. Mordvinov, February 15, 1798. Ogorodnikov, XVI, no. 304, p. 215.

¹⁶ "Zapiski o raznykh predmetakh otnosiashchikhsia k Turtsii v 1797 i 1798 g.", Slavianin, VII (1828), pp. 356-361.

to Poland by way of the Black Sea and Moldavia.¹⁷ Since Tadeusz Kościuszko had been defeated only three years before, the situation could become explosive in the event of the appearance of a French army in Podolia.

To counter a still largely imaginary threat, on February 15¹⁸ Paul ordered the Black Sea fleet to prepare for action.¹⁹ When rumors of extensive French military preparations at Toulon reached St. Petersburg, the Tsar ordered the commander at Sevastopol, Vice-Admiral Fëdor F. Ushakov, to cruise between Sevastopol and Odessa to intercept a French fleet expected in the near future.²⁰ Ushakov cruised with twelve warships along the Black Sea coast throughout April and May, with orders to engage the French or Turks the moment they left the Bosphorus. As late as June, 1798, Ushakov was uncertain whether he would have to engage the French, the Turks, or both.

Paul and Bezborodko exaggerated the Porte's historic hatred of Russia and underestimated her recent but growing fear of France. The same French actions which had frightened the Russian Court, particularly the preparations at

¹⁷Prince Bezborodko to Count A. R. Vorontsov, June 9, 1798. Grigorovich, p. 400.

¹⁸All dates are according to the Gregorian calendar.

¹⁹Tsar Paul to Admiral N. S. Mordvinov, February 15, 1798. R. N. Mordvinov, ed., Materialy dlia istorii russkogo flota; Admiral F. F. Ushakov. Dokumenty. (Moscow: Voenno-morskoe izd., 1952), II, no. 1, p. 3.

²⁰Tsar Paul to Admiral Ushakov, April 20, 1798. Ogorodnikov, XVI, no. 326, p. 224.

Toulon, frightened the Porte equally if not more. In December 1798, General La Salcette, who had temporarily replaced Gentili as commander in the Ionian Islands, issued a proclamation referring to the bright future of the Greek people. The Porte protested the inflammatory proclamation to the French chargé d'affaires and ordered a levy of troops.²¹ Soon after, inhabitants of the Morea warned the Porte through the Patriarch that the French intended to attack the Morea. In reaction, the Sultan sent reinforcements to that pashalik. False rumors subsequently reached Constantinople that the Morea had already fallen to the French.²² On May 20 Bonaparte sailed from Toulon with the French Mediterranean fleet and 36,000 troops, destination unknown.

Since the first of the year the Russian ambassador to the Porte, Vasilii S. Tomara, had been importuning the Sultan to take heed of the French threat. As French proclamations and intrigues persisted and ominous news continued to arrive from Toulon and the Morea, the Turkish ministers began to listen with greater attention to the plenipotentiary

²¹Pisani, p. 201.

²²"Zapiski otnosiashchikhsia k Turtsii," pp. 361-362.

of their hereditary foe.²³ By the middle of April, a novel atmosphere of cordiality toward Russia on the part of Turks on all levels was experienced by Russian visitors to Constantinople.²⁴ As certainty increased that the Toulon fleet was destined for the Levant and not Ireland, Selim III instructed his foreign minister, Ahmed Atif Effendi, to prepare a memorandum for the Divan on the international situation. The Turkish minister recommended joining an Anti-French coalition.²⁵

On July 7, 1798, the Porte learned simultaneously that Malta had fallen to the French on June 11 and that the French fleet had been sighted off Crete. Several days later, the Pasha of Cyprus reported that on July 1 the French had taken Alexandria. After the fall of Malta, Napoleon had sent his aide-de-camp Captain Lavalette to Ali Pasha with an offer of alliance.²⁶ The position of the Porte was critical. The pashas of Berat, Delvino, and Scutari were apprised of the grave situation and instructed to undertake military preparations. Then, for

²³Enver Zuja Karal, "Yunan Adalarının Fransızlar tarafından işgali ve Osmanlı-Rus münasebatı 1797-1798," Tarih Semineri Dergisi, I (1937), p. 116, cited by Lewis, pp. 120-121.

²⁴"Zapiski otnosiashchikhsia k Turtsii," p. 362.

²⁵Report of the Reis ül-Küttal, in Ahmed Jevdet Pasha, VI, p. 311, cited by Lewis, p. 121.

²⁶Count Antoine-Marie Lavalette, Memoirs of Count Lavalette. 2nd ed. (London: Colburn and Bentley, 1831), I, pp. 386-387.

the first time in its history, the Ottoman Empire sought an alliance with Russia. On July 27 the Porte requested that a Russian fleet be sent to protect the Straits.²⁷ In spite of Bonaparte's avowals that the invasion of Egypt did not necessarily involve the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish government feared that the Battle of the Pyramids (July 21) was but the first battle on the land road to the Straits. The Porte also knew that Russia was interested, temporarily at least, only in stopping the French. France, not Russia, was the clear and present danger. The historic foes bowed to the dictates of the immediate situation.

Ushakov learned of the destination of the French on July 30 and reported to St. Petersburg. Although the immediate danger to Russia was over, Paul realized that the danger was still present, only once removed. The same reasons for action against the French remained, with the difference being that the Porte would be an ally of Russia instead of a tool of France. Paul was particularly incensed by Bonaparte's decree of June 17, 1798. After the fall of Malta, Bonaparte stated that all Ionian Greeks having any kind of relations with Russia would be condemned to death and that all Greek vessels flying the Russian flag would be

²⁷ V. S. Tomara to Tsar Paul, July 27, 1798. Dmitrii A. Miliutin and Aleksandr I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, Istoriia voiny 1799 goda mezhdru Rossiei i Frantsiei v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Pavla. 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1857), I, 67.

sunk.²⁸ Bonaparte's aggressive acts violated the de facto state of peace which had existed between Russia and France since Paul's accession. Bonaparte's acts, together with Paul's new interest in Malta and his old hatred for revolutionaries, caused the Tsar to decide on war.

On August 5 Tsar Paul ordered Ushakov to proceed immediately to the eastern entrance to the Bosphorus and await instructions from Tomara.²⁹ On August 8 Paul instructed Tomara to offer the Sultan 70,000 troops for taking Vidin.³⁰ Pazvant-Oglu, the powerful and virtually independent pasha of Vidin in western Bulgaria, was a potential ally of the French. Emboldened by the promise of Russian support, the Porte on August 10 issued a Hatti-Sherif ordering the raising of a large levy of troops. On August 14 the Porte ordered the seizure of all French vessels in the Levant.³¹ Upon the reception of news of Nelson's defeat of the French at Aboukir, the Porte confined the French legation to its embassy. It is significant that in spite of the invasion of Egypt the Porte had

²⁸Decree of General Bonaparte, June 17, 1798. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 2687, IV, pp. 168-169.

²⁹Tsar Paul to Admiral Ushakov, August 5, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 52, 53.

³⁰Tsar Paul to V. S. Tomara, August 8, 1798, Miliutin, I, 67-68.

³¹Admiral Nelson to William Wyndham, August 21, 1798. Viscount Horatio Nelson, The Dispatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson (London: Henry Colburn, 1845), III, 109.

not yet dared to sever completely relations with France. The delay demonstrated how dependent the Porte was upon Russia.

The Tsar's orders to the fleet reached Sevastopol on August 15. Vice-Admiral Fedor F. Ushakov, second in command of the Black Sea Fleet, was entrusted with the command of the squadron destined for the Straits. One of a remarkably few outstanding naval officers produced by Russia, Ushakov was 53 years of age at the commencement of the campaign. Born, like Suvorov and Kutuzov, a member of the lesser gentry, Ushakov had had considerable military experience. In both of Catherine's Turkish wars he held independent commands. Although patronized by Potemkin and at one time commander of the imperial yacht, Ushakov was not a courtier. His advancement was due to his considerable ability, particularly in the field of revolutionary naval tactics. As a rear-admiral in the war of 1787-92, Ushakov won a fleet engagement off Cape Kaliakra which was instrumental in persuading the Turks to open negotiations.³² At the Battle of Kaliakra, Ushakov employed the two column attack later employed with such success by Nelson. Ushakov's skill and energy in waging naval warfare in the Black Sea won him the respect of the Turks and the title "Ushak Pasha."

³²"Vzgliad na voennyya deistviia Rossii na Chernom more i Dunae, s 1787 po 1791 god., " Slavianin, VIII (1829), 474.

After the Treaty of Jassy, Ushakov was commander of the recently developed naval base at Sevastopol and in 1793 he received his vice-admiral's flag. Extremely austere in habit and reserved in manner, Ushakov was devoted to his profession. Knowing no foreign language and writing Russian only poorly, Ushakov lacked the sophistication of the upper nobility. He was particularly distinguished among his colleagues in the Imperial navy by the solicitude which he constantly showed for the welfare of his crews. Because of Ushakov's connection with Potëmkin, Paul was personally antipathetic toward the vice-admiral, but the Tsar overcame his personal feelings in order to appoint the most experienced and proven officer of the Black Sea Fleet as commander of the Mediterranean squadron.

On August 24, 1798, Vice-Admiral Ushakov sailed from Sevastopol with provisions for four months. The fleet³³ consisted of six ships-of-the-line and seven frigates mounting a total of 794 cannon and carrying 7,410 seamen and 1,700 troops.³⁴ Although Ushakov took with him slightly more than half of Russia's naval strength in the Black Sea, the Russian Chancellor conceded that it was not

³³Ships-of-the-line: Sv. Pavel (flag), Sv. Troitsa, Zakharii i Elizaveta, Bogolavlenie Gospodne, Sv. Petr, Mariia Magdalina. Frigates: Grigorii Velikiia Armenii, Mikhail, Navarkhiia, Soshestvie Sv. Dukha, Kazanskaia Bogoroditsa, Nikolai, Schastlivyi.

³⁴Ogorodnikov, XVI, no. 464, pp. 285-286.

a particularly formidable squadron.³⁵ Ushakov took the cream of the Black Sea fleet, in both ships and men, but the condition of the vessels caused Ushakov great anxiety.³⁶ With the exception of the Sv. Petr and the Zakharii i Elizaveta, the warships were over fifteen years old. Poorly and hastily constructed, with rotting timbers and uncoppered bottoms, the Russian vessels were inferior to even the Turkish warships, which had been built by French shipwrights. Ushakov's greatest asset was his captains, most of whom served under him in the last war. Many of his captains, most notably D. N. Seniavin, were destined for a place in Russian naval annals in their own right.

On August 3 Ushakov arrived off the Bosphorus and dispatched word of his presence to Tomara. Tomara had been conducting negotiations with the Porte for a preliminary agreement. Still wary with respect to the unexpected Turkish alliance, the Russian government wanted to make sure that once Ushakov got through the Straits, he could get back again.³⁷ Otherwise, Russian naval superiority in the

³⁵ Prince Bezborodko to Count Vorontsov, Aug. 26, 1798. Grigorovich, 406.

³⁶ Admiral Ushakov to Count G. G. Kushelev, Aug. 16, 1798. Dmitrii M. Afanas'ev, "K istorii Chernomorskago Flota (1768-1816)," Russkii Arkhiv, 1902, no. 2, pp. 236-237.

³⁷ Count G. G. Kushelev to Admiral Ushakov, August, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 85, pp. 91-92.

Black Sea would be seriously threatened. Accordingly, on August 20 a Russo-Turkish preliminary convention was signed at Constantinople whereby Russian warships would have the right of passage through the Straits and, in the event of a treaty of alliance not being signed, would have unhindered passage back to the Black Sea. In addition, the Porte was to provide port facilities and undertake quarantine measures.³⁸

Having received Tomara's instructions to enter the Straits, Ushakov dropped anchor off Constantinople on September 5. The Turks gave "Ushak Pasha" a triumphant welcome. Immense crowds on the banks shouted acclamations and the Sultan sent lavish gifts to the Russian officers and crews. Ushakov wrote to Paul: "I encountered everywhere an excellent welcome, full of esteem and good will as well as unlimited confidence As far as one can determine, the Sublime Porte and all the people of Constantinople are quite delighted by our arrival."³⁹ While the Russian vessels were anchored off Constantinople, the Turks, inveterate enemies of the Russians a few years before, gathered in large crowds along the shore to listen to the songs of the Russian sailors aboard the ships.

³⁸Pisani, p. 205.

³⁹Admiral Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Sept. 9, 1798. Ogorodnikov, XVI, no. 406, pp. 259-260. Ushakov's account is supported by the observations of Chevalier Butet, a French prisoner at Constantinople (Pisani, p. 204).

Encouraged by the presence of Russian warships, the Porte completely severed relations with France. On September 21 the French chargé together with all embassy personnel was escorted by 800 janissaries to the forbidding Fortress of the Seven Towers. The Porte justified its declaration of war on September 25 by pointing to the invasion of Egypt and to French actions in sending agents into the Morea and the Archipelago who spread "manifestoes of the most insidious tenor."⁴⁰ Russia finally severed relations with France a month later, on October 31.

On September 8 Ushakov and Tomara met with the Grand Vizier and the Reis Effendi to determine a course of action. The British ambassador, J. Spencer Smith, attended the conference. When in the spring the Reis Effendi had recommended taking action against the French, he had specifically recommended joining an anti-French coalition and not just allying with Russia. With a third power, such as Britain, as a member of the alliance, the Porte would be less apprehensive in her new role as an ally of the Russian Empire.

In deciding upon a plan of campaign, Ushakov had only vague instructions from the Tsar. In instructions dated August 18, Tsar Paul had ordered Ushakov to unite with the Turkish fleet and operate against the French in the eastern Mediterranean, coordinating his activities with the British

⁴⁰ The Annual Register (London: T. Burton), XXXXI (1799), p. 72.

naval commander in the area.⁴¹ The conference decided, upon the suggestion of Ushakov, to expel the French from the Ionian Islands.⁴² The occupation of the Ionian Islands by the French had been the initial cause of alarm to the Porte and Russia. As long as the French remained there, they were in a position to undermine the Ottoman Empire either through military operations or by intrigues with dissident pashas. Even with the addition of Turkish warships, the modest size of the forces at Ushakov's command limited his operations. The lack of a large number of landing troops precluded a large-scale descent on the Italian coast, whereas a campaign in the Ionian Islands allowed the most effective employment of warships. With the French Directory hard-pressed to supply troops on several fronts, and with the expectation of assistance from the Ionian people, the conquest of the Ionian Islands promised to be an obtainable objective.

The British commander in the Mediterranean, Admiral Nelson, wanted Ushakov to operate off the coast of Egypt, thereby relieving British warships for use in the western Mediterranean.⁴³ The British admiral also had another, less

⁴¹Tsar Paul to Admiral Ushakov, Aug. 18, 1798. Ogorodnikov, XVI, no. 391, p. 253.

⁴²Admiral Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Sept. 9, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 79, pp. 81-83.

⁴³Admiral Nelson to Lord St. Vincent, Nov. 7, 1798. Admiral Nelson to J. Spencer Smith, Dec. 17, 1798. Nelson, Dispatches, III, 166, 204.

worthy, reason for desiring the Russians to go to Egypt; Nelson planned to conquer the Ionian Islands himself. He had established contact with dissident Ionians and had written a proclamation to the islanders for use upon his arrival in the Ionian Sea.⁴⁴ However, after the Battle of Aboukir, the French naval threat in the Levant was over. Moreover, it could not have escaped Ushakov's calculating mind that in the event of the Russians' not going to Egypt, Nelson would have no choice but to continue the blockade of Alexandria. As a palliative to the British, the conference decided to send a small detachment of frigates and gunboats to Egypt. The decision to go the Ionian Islands instead of Egypt caused Nelson to be extremely bitter and suspicious toward the Russians. In the two years that Ushakov operated in the Mediterranean, relations between the Russian and British admirals were icily formal.

At the conference in Constantinople it was agreed that Ushakov would be in command of the combined Russo-Turkish fleet. The Turkish contribution was to consist of four line-of-battle ships, six frigates, four corvettes and fourteen gunboats, commanded by an experienced officer, Vice-Admiral Abd-ul Kadir Bey. The combined squadron was

⁴⁴Admiral Nelson to Lord St. Vincent, Sept. 27, 1798. Admiral Nelson to the Inhabitants of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante and Cerigo, Oct. 9, 1798. *Ibid.*, III, 134, 147-148.

to commence operations without waiting for the signing of a formal treaty of alliance. The pashas in Greece and Albania were to be instructed to provide provisions to the allied fleet and, if called up, troops.

Immediately after the termination of the Constantinople conference, Ushakov's squadron weighed anchor and dropped down to the Dardanelles, after receiving deafening farewell salvoes from the guns of Rumeli Hissar. At the western entrance to the Dardanelles, Ushakov's fleet united with the squadron of Kadir Bey. Ushakov inspected the Turkish warships placed under his command, and although impressed with their French construction, he was astonished by their condition.⁴⁵ The Turkish vessels were in a state of disorder and filth. The crews were off the streets of Constantinople and the rate of desertion was astronomical. The Turkish officers were without maps, there was no medical corps whatsoever, and on the thirty-four Turkish ships and gunboats there was only one compass. Ushakov was obliged to furnish Kadir Bey with interpreters and signalmen. The disorder and lethargy of the Turks compelled the impatient Russian admiral to delay his departure for ten days. On October 1, the impressive fleet of 47 vessels, ranging from majestic eighty-six-gun line-of-battle ships to sluggish gunboats, entered the Aegean with bowsprits

⁴⁵Admiral Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Sept. 17, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 94, pp. 98-100.

directed toward Cerigo, the nearest of the Ionian Islands.

While the combined fleet was plowing through the blue Aegean, negotiations for a treaty of alliance continued at the Ottoman capital. The Russian negotiator, Vasilii S. Tomara, was credited by Kochubey, his predecessor at Constantinople and subsequently Russian foreign minister, with being well versed in the ways of the East.⁴⁶ Posted to the embassy at Constantinople in 1797, Tomara had had considerable experience in the Levant. He had been with the Russian embassy to the Porte in 1774 and had undertaken diplomatic missions to Georgia and to Persia. A man of some intellectual attainment, Tomara figured among the personages in Joseph de Maistre's Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg. The attitudes and talents of Tomara were to play a role almost as great as that of Ushakov in influencing the history of the Septinsular Republic.

The tedious negotiations came to fruition in the Treaty of Constantinople, signed January 3, 1799.⁴⁷ The preface to the treaty emphasized that the alliance was defensive in nature. The two empires were to have "the same friends

⁴⁶ Arkhiiv Vorontsova, XIV, 9, quoted in Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, ed., Graf Pavel Aleksandrovich Stroganov (1774-1817) (St. Petersburg: Ekspeditsiia zagotovleniia gosudarstvennykh bumag, 1903), II, 206n.

⁴⁷ Gabriel Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de L'Empire ottoman (Paris: Cotillon, 1900), II, 24-27.

and the same enemies." (Art. I). The provisions of the Treaty of Jassy were reaffirmed. (II) The possessions of the two empires were mutually guaranteed, with Egypt specifically recognized as being under Ottoman dominion. (III) No agreement was to be made by one signatory with a third party which would be detrimental to the interests of the other signatory. (IV) The heart of the treaty is found in articles V through IX: in the event of an attack upon one of the signatories, the other signatory would furnish assistance either in the form of troops or in subsidies, as determined by the attacked party. Russia obtained passage through the Straits by the provisions of Article X which stipulated that for the duration of a common war, all ports would be open to the warships of the signatories. Other nations were invited to join the alliance (XII) which was to be in effect for eight years, subject to renewal. (XIII)

In a supplementary secret treaty, the amount and type of Russian assistance to the Porte was elaborated.⁴⁸ The Russian fleet sent to assist the Porte was to be six ships-of-the-line and six frigates. The Straits were to be open only to the Russian fleet and the Porte was to provision the fleet at the rate of 600,000⁴⁹ piasters every four

⁴⁸ Miliutin, III, 79-80.

⁴⁹ Approximately 40,000 pounds sterling.

months. (Art. I) In the event of an increase in French strength in the Levant or the attack of another power, Russian assistance to the Porte would be increased and would include land forces if necessary. (VI, XI)

As a result of the treaties with the Porte, Russia was able to send a substantial naval squadron into the Mediterranean with secure lines of communication and supply and with expenses largely defrayed by the Porte. Ushakov's campaign in the Mediterranean was to be markedly different from previous Russian ventures into that area. Unlike Orlov in 1770, Ushakov would not have to rely tenuously on British and Portuguese dockyards or operate constantly in hostile waters while in the Levant. The treaty of January, 1799, made Russia for the first time a Mediterranean power, albeit by the grace of Selim III.

In accordance with Article XII of the treaty, other powers acceded to the Russo-Turkish alliance. On December 29 Britain signed a treaty of alliance with Russia and on January 16 with the Porte.⁵⁰ The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies allied with Russia on November 29 and with the Ottoman Empire on January 21.⁵¹ Bringing other nations into the

⁵⁰Georg F. Martens, Recueil des traités d'alliance, de paix, de trêve (Göttingen: Dietrich, 1817-1835), VI, 557-561; VI, 568-573.

⁵¹Ibid., VI, 534-538; VI, 575-578.

alliance was not only the result of the Porte's desire for security against Russia. Paul had a high personal regard for the King of Naples.⁵² The support of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was a keystone of Russian foreign policy throughout Paul's reign. With the expansion of the war against France into a continental war, the Mediterranean theater rapidly became secondary. Consequently, the Russian Court welcomed the British subsidy of 250,000 pounds down and 75,000 a month.

Affixing seals to a diplomatic instrument could not remove centuries of hostility between Russia and the Porte; the mutual suspicion remained. Nor could Great Britain be unaware of the far-reaching significance of the Straits being open to Russian warships. Since Pitt's Ochakov speech in 1791, fear of Russian expansion to the south had been growing among certain circles of the ruling gentry. The Tsar had cautioned Ushakov to be extremely tactful with the sensitive Turks, warning that in helping the Turks he should avoid being burdensome.⁵³

After Ushakov had sailed for the Ionian Sea, Tomara sent him a lengthy and highly revealing letter on the aims

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Sir Charles Whitworth, British Ambassador to Russia, to Lord Paget, Dec. 28, 1798. Sir Arthur Paget, The Paget Papers; Diplomatic and Other Correspondence, 1794-1807 (London: Heinemann, 1896), I, 145.

⁵³Tsar Paul to Admiral Ushakov, Oct. 6, 1798. Ogorodnikov, XVI, no. 419, p. 264.

of Russian foreign policy with respect to the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴ The Russian ambassador disclosed to Ushakov that the Russian Court was not at all sure of its impromptu ally. As a means to increase the Porte's dependence on Russia, the Russian admiral was directed by Tomara to give free rein to the Turks in waging savage warfare. Although Ushakov, himself, was to observe meticulously the rules of warfare, he should not impose such conduct upon the Turks. If Kadir Bey treacherously wanted to break a capitulation agreement and mistreat French prisoners, Ushakov was not to condone such actions, but neither was he to interfere. If the Ionian Campaign should end with complete success and a descent could be made on the Italian coast, Turkish irregulars were to be unleashed upon the countryside, free to pillage and blight the coast of the Cisalpine Republic. The obvious objective of Tomara was to inflame the French public against the terrible Turk while at the same time giving an incentive to the Turkish warlords to continue a remunerative war. Both of the anticipated results would increase the dependence of the Porte upon Russia. It is to the credit of Ushakov that Tomara's cunning directive was ignored as much as the necessity of maintaining harmonious relations with the Turks permitted.

⁵⁴V. S. Tomara to Admiral Ushakov, Nov. 24, 1798. Mordinov, II, no. 181, pp. 197-200.

The Porte was equally wary of the alliance. One of the factors which had prolonged the negotiations for the treaty was Russia's desire to commit land troops in support of the Ottoman Empire. Paul was particularly impatient to send a substantial army against Pazvant-Oglu of Vidin. The Porte refused the offer on the grounds of not wanting Christians to fight Moslems,⁵⁵ but it had Russian Christians in mind. In spite of the refusal, the Tsar ordered General Michelson on the Dniester to be prepared to march in the event of a reconsideration by the Porte.⁵⁶ Kelim Effendi, Ottoman minister to Naples, confided to Nelson his apprehensions with respect to the alliance. The Russian decision to proceed to the Ionian Islands instead of Egypt, the most threatening theater, was particularly disturbing to the Ottoman diplomat.⁵⁷

Admiral Nelson anticipated nothing but trouble from Ushakov's expedition to the Ionian Islands. He disclosed his fears in a letter to the British ambassador at Constantinople, S. Spencer Smith, stating: "The Porte ought to be aware of the great danger at a future day of allowing

⁵⁵V. S. Tomara to Tsar Paul, Sept. 11, 1798. Miliutin, I, 67-68.

⁵⁶Tsar Paul to General Michelson, Feb. 7, 1799. Miliutin, III, 101.

⁵⁷Admiral Nelson to J. Spencer Smith, Dec. 17, 1798. Nelson, Dispatches, III, 204-205.

the Russians to get footing at Corfu" ⁵⁸ Nelson's pessimistic view of the Russo-Turkish alliance was shared by Lord Elgin, the successor of Spencer Smith at Constantinople:

The post we have taken of becoming a party in the alliance is by no manner of means a sinecure, and independent of any actual service to be rendered, it is no easy matter to support Turkey in the ordinary occurrences so as to prevent the great disproportion between the two powers from increasing further It is probable that the Emperor himself may disclaim all views of conquest on Turkey, but I defy a Russian agent to divest himself of the idea that by working for that object he is performing the most essential service to his sovereign ⁵⁹

Yet another power, Austria, viewed the Ionian expedition with displeasure. Austria had refused to join the Russo-Turkish alliance, much to the chagrin of the Tsar. ⁶⁰ Since Joseph II Austria had been interested in the Ionian Islands. The ambitions of Austria had been whetted immediately after the French occupation of Corfu when a group of disaffected Ionian nobles secretly dispatched an emissary to Cattaro (Kotor) asking the Austrian admiral to occupy the Ionian Islands. ⁶¹ It was only a desperate act of a small clique, turning to Austria because she was the

⁵⁸ Admiral Nelson to J. Spencer Smith, Oct. 26, 1798. Ibid., III, 160.

⁵⁹ Lord Elgin to Lord Paget, March 8, 1800. The Paget Papers, I, pp. 186-187.

⁶⁰ Aleksandr A. Vasil'chikov, Les Razoumovski, Vol. II: Le Comte Andre Razoumovski (Halle: Tausch and Grosse, 1894), Part II, p. 364.

⁶¹ Gaffarel, p. 207.

nearest power, but it was the beginning of an "Austrian Party" in the Ionian Islands. Posing as the heir of the Venetian Republic by virtue of the Treaty of Campo-Formio, Austria put in a claim for the Ionian Islands. However, Austria's pretensions were promptly and emphatically rejected by Paul.⁶²

Because of the wariness of the Turks, the thinly veiled hostility of Admiral Nelson, and the intrigues of Austria, the diplomatic aspects of Ushakov's command promised to equal, if not overshadow, the military aspects. Ushakov had an independent command militarily, and by force of circumstance, he had to become a plenipotentiary as well. Unlike Suvorov, Ushakov was not under the watchful eye of a Hofkriegsrat. St. Petersburg was over 2,000 miles away. Moreover, Ushakov was left for months at a time without any instructions from the Russian ambassador at Constantinople. For a Russian commander, Ushakov enjoyed great latitude of action, with the concomitant awesome responsibility.

⁶² Tsar Paul to Count A. Razumovskii, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, Nov. 9, 1798. Miliutin, III, 102-103.

CHAPTER II

THE IONIAN CAMPAIGN: THE PROMENADE

Four days after leaving the Dardanelles, the Russo-Turkish fleet dropped anchor off Hydra where provisions were taken aboard and final tactics were perfected. As had been agreed at the Constantinople conference, Captain A. A. Sorokin was detached from the combined fleet for service off Egypt. With two Russian and two Turkish frigates and ten Turkish gunboats, Captain Sorokin reached Alexandria by way of Rhodes on October 20. For over a month Sorokin assisted the British squadron off Egypt, although not without friction.¹

Ushakov's plan for expelling the French from the Ionian Islands was quite simple. The Ionian Islands were strung out like a string of beads along the western coast of Greece. Ushakov planned to occupy each island in succession, beginning with the nearest, Cerigo, and climaxing the campaign at Corfu in the Strait of Otranto. A less cautious naval commander, such as Nelson, would probably have selected Corfu as the first objective. The conquest of the lesser islands would have little value if Corfu remained in hostile hands. Moreover, the time

¹"Zhurnal plavaniia otriada A. A. Sorokina u beregov Egipta," Mordvinov, II, no. 216, pp. 241-242.

consumed by a methodical conquest of the lesser islands would allow the French time to strengthen their position at Corfu. Ushakov did not make Corfu his first objective because he was not counting on the element of surprise and because a siege of Corfu without possession of the lesser islands would make his lines of supply from the Morea vulnerable to French vessels based at Zante or Cephalonia. More important, Ushakov was guilty of an error second in gravity only to underestimating one's enemy; he overestimated the strength of the French in the islands. He overestimated both the number of French troops and the strength of their positions, including the formidable fortress of Corfu. Corfu had been besieged without success by Turkish fleets and armies in 1536, 1571 and 1716. Because the armies of the French Republic were on the defensive in Italy and Germany, a Russian victory at Corfu would have resulted in the lesser islands withering on the vine. But to Ushakov it was not yet at all clear whether the French were on the defensive or preparing an offensive in the Levant. In the latter event, the possession of only Corfu would place the expedition in an exposed position.

The Russian admiral would have been spared much of his anxiety if he had been aware of the deplorable state of the French defenses in the Ionian Islands. General Chabot, who became French commander in the islands in

January 1798, did not learn of the Porte's declaration of war until October 3, by which time Ushakov had already reached Cerigo. Chabot, who had not anticipated that Russia would ally with the Porte and dispatch a squadron to the Mediterranean, was completely surprised by the turn of events.² He had been left without directives or information from Paris. His persistent demands for reinforcements, munitions and money had been ignored by the Army of Italy, by then more concerned with the threat in northern Italy. The situation was rendered even more ominous for the French by the rupture of relations with Ali Pasha, with the resultant threat to the exposed coastal towns and to the supply line from Albania. Evaluating the battle of Aboukir and Russia's promise to aid the Porte, Ali Pasha saw an opportunity to realize his dream of acquiring the four wealthy coastal towns and possibly even an island or two. Allying with the French at that juncture, when Russo-Turkish mastery in Greek waters was assured, promised Ali Pasha nothing but prolonged hostilities with little hope of success. By contrast, honoring his commitments to his suzerain presented possibilities of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the French. In consequence, the offer of alliance brought by Captain

²J. P. Bellaire, Précis des opérations générales de la division française du Levant (Paris: Magimel and Humbert, 1805), p. 377.

Lavelette was ignored and, in August, Ali seized French vessels in the Gulf of Arta.³

Chabot had at his disposal in the Ionian Islands less than 4,000 troops, including Ionian and Italian auxiliaries.⁴ Ironically, General Bonaparte, who had been most responsible for the French occupation of the islands, was in a large measure responsible for their loss. While still commander of the Army of Italy, he neglected to strengthen adequately the island defenses. By invading Egypt he exposed the islands to retaliatory attacks. Moreover, after the invasion of Egypt, Bonaparte's insatiable demands for provisions diverted the harassed Directory from sending assistance to Chabot.⁵ Not only was Chabot critically short of troops, the fortifications on the islands were in a lamentable state. After inspecting Zante, Cephalonia and Santa Maura in August 1797, General Gentili reported that those islands had no means of defense whatsoever. As a result of the negligence and peculation of Venetian officials and because of frequent earthquakes in the area, the fortresses were almost in ruins.⁶ Due to an acute lack

³ François Pouqueville, Voyage en Morée à Constantinople, en Albanie, et dans plusieurs autres parties de l'Empire ottoman, pendant les années 1798, 1799, 1800 et 1801 (Paris: Gabon, 1805), III, 103.

⁴ Bellaire, p. 256.

⁵ Gaffarel, Part II, p. 226.

⁶ General Gentili to General Bonaparte, August 1797, quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 103.

of funds and building materials, the French could do little to remedy the situation.

Upon receiving news of an imminent attack, Chabot had to make the agonizing decision of which islands to defend. He elected to defend all of them and the coastal towns in addition. Chabot has been severely censured for deciding to scatter his 4,000 men among the islands and thereby risking his ability to defend Corfu, the most important position.⁷ Chabot decided to defend the lesser islands for the same reason Ushakov decided to attack them; neither commander knew how the over-all military situation in the Mediterranean was developing. Chabot did not know whether he could expect reinforcements for offensive action or whether he was to conduct a purely defensive campaign, holding out as long as possible with what resources he had. Without specific information from the Directory he hesitated to abandon his advanced but exposed positions. A particularly important consideration in the dilemma of the French Revolutionary officer was that he was not defending an advanced military post on foreign soil; since November 1797 the Ionian Islands had been an integral part of the French Republic.⁸ However justifiable his actions

⁷ Bellaire, pp. 375-376; Charles Botta, Histoire d'Italie de 1789 à 1814 (Paris: P. Dufart, 1824), IV, 48; Rodocanachi, p. 128.

⁸ Bellaire, p. 377.

or noble his intent, the thousand troops garrisoning the lesser islands were desperately needed to man the long ramparts of Corfu.

Since Chabot had decided to contest each island, the attitude of the Ionian people would be of cardinal importance. If the defenders were reinforced by thousands of Ionian volunteers, as the Venetians had been in 1716, the French position would be more tenable. If the inhabitants joined the Russians, the expulsion of the French, from the lesser islands at least, would be simply a question of time.

By the autumn of 1798, the Ionian people were thoroughly and irrevocably alienated from French rule. The Ionian aristocracy had been hostile toward the French from the moment the tricolor appeared in Corfu harbor. The stagnant Ionian society under Venice had been a utopia for the impecunious but proud Ionian aristocracy. Only complete independence would have given the nobility more power. The impact of the French Revolution had not filtered down to the insular lower classes, but the nobility, educated in northern Italy, had presentiments of what the French would bring in their train. Their apprehensions were fully justified. The nobles immediately lost their monopoly of municipal offices. Compulsory peasant labor was abolished and taxes were imposed on the nobility. Bonaparte's abolition of feudalism by decree was the crowning blow to

eighteenth-century Ionian society. Through lack of time the decree was never implemented, but the threat and the intent was clear. As a result, the nobility never gave the French a period of grace.

As soon as the French arrived, the nobles began seeking outside assistance from any possible quarter. The nobles and their partisans banded together under the turbulent leadership of the lawyer Scordilli, whose actions began to undermine the French government in the first months of the occupation.⁹ The French retaliated by imprisoning prominent Ionian nobles, among whom was Antonio Capodistriass, the father of the future foreign minister of Russia. In November 1797, an assassination attempt was made on Eugene de Beauharnais, son of Josephine Bonaparte.¹⁰

The nobles shared their power over the Ionian masses with the Catholic and Orthodox hierarchies, particularly the latter. The attitude taken by the Archbishop and the Protopappas of Corfu would be crucial. The Catholic clergy was hostile to the French from the start because of their ties with the nobility and their instinctive fear

⁹Botta, III, 73.

¹⁰Eugene de Beauharnais, Mémoires et Correspondance politique et militaire du Prince Eugène (Paris: Michel Levy, 1858-1860), I, 34-35.

of the French atheists. Moreover, the Catholic Church lost its position as the state church. In spite of French promises of protection, Catholic churches were often sacked, with revered relics ending up around the necks of French soldiers. The radicals of Corfu agitated in the name of equality for an end to church titles and pomp. The French dealt severely with the growing Catholic opposition. Archbishop Fenzi was summarily exiled to Dalmatia, a measure which brought temporary tranquility at the price of increased antagonism.¹¹

Since the Catholics numbered only ten percent of the population, the relations of the French with the Orthodox Church were of much greater significance. In the honeymoon period of the French occupation, the Protopappas of Corfu wrote to General Gentili that the doctrines of the French Revolution were in harmony with the teachings of his Church.¹² At first the Orthodox clergy revelled in its new state of equality with the disestablished Catholic Church. Soon, however, realization dawned that it was the equality of contempt. The Orthodox learned from experience what the Catholics had already known--the French were not anti-Catholic, they were anti-religion. The French treated

¹¹Bellaire, p. 165.

¹²Protopappas Pietro to General Gentili, August, 1797. Quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 52.

the religious beliefs and superstitions of the Orthodox with unconcealed scorn. On one occasion when the relics of St. Spiridion¹³ were paraded through the streets of Corfu, French sailors mockingly referred to St. Spiridion as a "mummy", and street fights broke out as a result.¹⁴ Arnault, who supervised the establishment of the provisional government, referred to St. Spiridion as "that holy carcass."¹⁵ With horror the devout Orthodox observed the French working on Sunday, refusing priests when ill, and refusing to put crosses on tombs. Relations became explosive when the French began talking of forcing the Orthodox clergy to wear tricolor cockades and of expelling priests who were not natives of the islands. The French openly declared their desire to secularize several of the monasteries and they actually transformed the Church of Kosario into a barracks. More ominous than the harassment of the clergy was the possible effect of French rule upon the next generation. The French had opened primary schools, set up

¹³St. Spiridion, the patron saint of Corfu, was Bishop of Cyprus during the reign of Constantine the Great. His relics were taken from Constantinople to Corfu in 1453. The saint was widely credited with saving the city from the Turks in 1716.

¹⁴Quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 27.

¹⁵Arnault, III, 114.

printing presses, and opened a public library. If a generation were reared in an atmosphere of freethinking, the damage to the position of the clergy would remain long after the French had departed.

Finally realizing the true significance of the French Revolution brought to their doorstep, the Orthodox clergy combined its efforts with the Catholic clergy in an attempt to undermine the French government. A rallying cry for the opposition was provided when the French appointed Jews to municipal offices. The French had removed all restrictions on the Jews and accorded them absolute equality. The Catholic archbishop and the Orthodox protopappas refused to take their seats on the municipal council because of the presence of the Jews. When Arnault remained adamant, a clamorous crowd of 500 Corfiotes had to be dispersed by troops.¹⁶ The Jews were ardently loyal to the government, but the cost for the French was great. The anti-French party had found an ever popular rallying cry and the Orthodox-Catholic alliance had been cemented.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the majority of the Ionian people were still loyal either to the nobility or the Church. For those who were not obedient, the economic power of the nobles and the formidable powers of the priests could be brought to bear. Consequently,

¹⁶ Antoine Arnault to General Bonaparte, July 29, 1797. Arnault, III, 384.

the alienation of the clergy and the aristocracy doomed any chance for the impatient French to remold Ionian society in a few short years. A hint of what the anti-French party could do was given in an incident at the end of July 1797. Arnault was prevailed upon to place a French guard at the tomb of St. Spiridion in order to protect the valuables kept there. As soon as the guards were in place, word was spread that the French were plundering the tomb. Although Arnault forced the Protopappas to declare the real reason for the French guard, French prestige among the devout of Corfu fell precipitately.¹⁷

The lower classes did not have to rely on rumors spread by the nobility and the clergy to become disenchanted with French rule. The French had been gaily welcomed on their arrival because of the widespread hatred of Venice and because of the perennial hope for betterment through any change at all. Once the French had been in the islands for several months, the townspeople and peasantry could observe and reflect at leisure. They observed French troops quartered upon the inhabitants, haughty French officials issuing proclamations in a foreign tongue, and promises of self-government being repeatedly postponed. The political rights so spectacularly announced were steadily eroded, ending with military rule.

¹⁷ Antoine Arnault to General Bonaparte, July 29, 1797. Arnault, III, 384.

The French had not come to the islands as munificent benefactors; the provisional government functioned only by means of a loan floated in Ragusa (Dubrovnik). During the whole period of the occupation the French were critically short of funds for salaries and public works. Moreover, the Ionians felt the heavy hand of the efficient French police. The French were determined to stamp out the blood feuds, vendettas, and the anarchic practice of conducting business through bravi. The French largely succeeded in their objective, but at the cost of appearing as oppressive conquerors. The superstitious masses were further alienated when, to general consternation, an epidemic broke out among the cats of Corfu. Who but the French could be responsible for such a bizarre and portentous occurrence?

The changing international situation contributed to the steady erosion of French popularity. Early in 1798, the French fleet at Corfu mysteriously sailed away. It was known that the French had ceded Padua to Austria after having promised the people that Padua would be incorporated into the Cisalpine Republic. Could the French be trusted not to make a deal with the Turks or do something equally distasteful? By allowing Ali Pasha to navigate in the Ionian Sea the French had aided in the sack of two Christian villages on the coast.

After the fall of Malta, there was a brief upsurge of French popularity.¹⁸ Being a part of a rising power in the Levant would make French rule more tolerable. However, Aboukir shattered that illusion. Instead of being the promised entrepôt for commerce between France and the East, the Ionian Islands were called upon to send provisions to the stranded French in Egypt.¹⁹ Instead of the expected halcyon days of security against the Turks and Barbary corsairs through French protection, the Ionian Islands were more vulnerable than they had been for a century.

Even in the autumnal months of French rule, the French enjoyed a degree of support from some elements of the population. Out of gratitude the Jews were loyal to the French Republic. The more literate segments of the middle class in the larger towns found much to praise in the French administration. Under the auspices of the government there were several articulate "Jacobin" clubs in the islands, notably at Corfu and Argostoli. To the last there were several hundred Greek volunteers in the French army. However, the overwhelming majority of Ionians were not only thoroughly disenchanted with French rule, they were sullenly hostile. In July 1798, the secretary of

¹⁸Bellaire, p. 166.

¹⁹General Bonaparte to General Chabot, Aug. 3, 1798. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 2962, IV, 313.

the French commission supervising the establishment of the government reported that revolutionary cries against the nobles and the church were no longer heard in the coffee houses of Corfu.²⁰ The French had lost the battle for the minds and hearts of the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands, and the defeat would speed the loss of the islands as well.

More than one nation was courting the favor of the Ionian people, so imperiously squandered by the French. Both Austria and Great Britain were on the sidelines awaiting an opportunity. However, Austria was Catholic, had no ties with the islands, and had no fleet. A strong fleet was a prerequisite for acquiring and holding the islands. Britain had the fleet and the desire, but not the time. French activity in Naples and Egypt prevented Nelson from executing his plan of expelling the French from the Ionian Sea. However, there was another power, Russia, which had the historic ties, the fleet, the desire and the time to win over the Ionian people and evict the unwanted masters from the islands.

The French received early warnings of the attitude of the Ionians toward Russia. On July 31, 1797, only twenty days after the French arrived at Zante, a crowd of Zantiotes shouting "Long Live Paul I!" raised the Russian flag

²⁰ J.-B. Paris to the Directory, July 8, 1798. Cited by Rodocanachi, p. 44.

and congregated in the town of Zante. The French garrison had to disperse the demonstrators with force.²¹

Only a month after the French occupation of Corfu, Arnault observed that the Orthodox clergy was pro-Russian and would like to see the islands pass under Russian protection.²²

The strongest bond between the Ionian people and Russia was community of religion. Centuries of Catholic rulers had reinforced the religious consciousness of the Ionian Orthodox, whereas Russia was indisputably the leading Orthodox state. As did the rest of Greece, the Ionian Islands often sent their best prelates to Russia. Eugenios Bulgaris, one of the most distinguished men-of-letters produced by Corfu, was invited to Russia by Catherine II and was appointed Metropolitan of Kherson in 1775.²³ From 1779 to 1806, Bulgaris lived at the Russian Court. Another native of Corfu, Nicephorus Theotoki, was appointed Metropolitan of Kherson in 1779 and was later translated to Astrakhan.²⁴

Ionian Greeks entered Russian military service as well. Many were a generation removed from the Ionian

²¹Rodocanachi, p. 47n.

²²Antoine Arnault to General Bonaparte, July 29, 1797. Arnault, III, 384.

²³Jourdain, "Eugenios Bulgaris," Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne, XIII, pp. 491-493.

²⁴N. Barsov, "Nikifor Feotoki," Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, XLI (St. Petersburg: 1897), pp. 85-86.

Islands by the time of Ushakov's campaign. After Küchük Kainarji substantial numbers of Cephalonians emigrated to the new Russian province of the Crimea.²⁵ Some Ionian Greeks were in Russia only temporarily. Members of the lesser Orthodox nobility, particularly of over-populated Cephalonia, would go abroad for several years to make their fortune and then return to their native island. The Venetian government endeavored to end that practice but was not successful. The Greek merchant families of the Ionian Islands, particularly of Zante and Cephalonia, had commercial ties with their counterparts in Russian Black Sea ports. After Russia won permission for her merchantmen to pass the Straits, Ionian ships often flew the Russian flag. However, the commercial ties of the Ionian Greeks to Russia were of less consequence than those of the other Greeks because of the tight Venetian monopolies of olive oil exports and shipping facilities.

The Ionian Greeks had demonstrated their attitude toward Russia in both of Catherine's Turkish wars. In the war of 1768-1774, many Ionian Greeks crossed to the Morea to take part in the revolt.²⁶ Admiral Spiridov was off Zante in February 1770, and received valuable

²⁵Miller, p. 236.

²⁶Miller, p. 236.

assistance in spite of Venetian prohibitions. Count Demetrio Mocenigo, one of the leading Orthodox nobles of Zante, aided Orlov with maps, spy reports, provisions, and a detachment of 300 men.²⁷ For his actions, Count Mocenigo was imprisoned by the Venetians. Count Bulgari, head of the most prominent Orthodox family of Corfu, gave comparable assistance to the Russian fleet.²⁸

In the war of 1787-1791, Ionian Greeks fitted out privateers to prey upon Turkish commerce. A Russian general was sent to Ithaca to direct the operations of mainland Greeks. Lokrian Androutsos, the father of Odysseus of fame in the Greek war for independence, sought refuge and Russian protection in the Ionian Islands after fighting for Russia in Greece.²⁹ Liberan P. Benaki, nephew of a metropolitan conspicuous in the Morean revolt of 1770, volunteered for service with Orlov's fleet in 1771, and in 1783 he was appointed Russian consul at Corfu, a post which he held for twenty-seven years.³⁰ Benaki personified the close bonds between Russia, the rebellious mainland Greeks, and the Ionian Islands.

²⁷Petr Bartenev, "Graf Motsenigo; episod iz pervoi turetskoi voiny pri Ekaterine II-i.," Russkii Arkhiv, 1878, no. 12, pp. 413-425.

²⁸Pavel P. Svin'in, Vospominania na flote (St. Petersburg: V. Plavil'shchikov, 1818), I, 245.

²⁹Miller, p. 236.

³⁰"Benaki, Liberan Panaiotovich," Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar, II, pp. 685-686.

When Ushakov reached the Ionian Islands, it was a veritable homecoming for many of his officers. Ushakov's secretary, Major George Palatino, was a native of Cephalonia and a veteran of the war of 1787-1791. Three natives of the Ionian Islands were among the officers most decorated for valor during the Ionian campaign.³¹ Many of the prominent officers in the subsequent Septinsular army, notably Major Ivan Vlagopoulo, arrived with Ushakov. Moreover, there was a substantial number of Greeks, not necessarily Ionians, in Ushakov's fleet. Captain Anton Alexiano, captain of the ship-of-the-line Bogoiavlenie Gospodne, was a native of the Archipelago who joined Orlov's fleet in 1770.³² One hundred and fifty hardy sailors from Hydra sailed in their own vessel to assist Ushakov against the French. Tsar Paul gave Ushakov special permission to take Greeks into Russian service.³³

The hatred of the French by the Ionians and the strong and diverse bonds between the islands and Russia would alone have been sufficient to assure Ushakov a hospitable reception. Nevertheless, further incentives were thrown onto the scales. The Russian admiral carried

³¹Admiral Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 9, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 154, p. 158.

³²Stepan Ogorodnikov, "Aleksiano, Anton Pavlovich," Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar, II, pp. 1-2.

³³Tsar Paul to Admiral Ushakov, Oct. 6, 1798. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVI, no. 419, p. 264.

with him two proclamations, one in his own name and one from the Patriarch of Constantinople. Ushakov's proclamation, written in Russian, Turkish and Greek, invited the Ionian people to assist the Russo-Turkish fleet. The proclamation promised that after the expulsion of the French the customs of the Ionians would be respected and that the islanders would have a voice in determining their future government.³⁴ Patriarch Gregory's proclamation, which represented the French as atheists and brigands, exhorted the Ionian people to take up arms against the French and also held out to the people the expectation of self-determination. The Patriarch specifically stated that if the islanders so chose, they could have a government comparable to that of Ragusa.³⁵ Thus when Ushakov's fleet arrived in the Ionian Sea, he had at his disposal more than a fleet. His armory included the unstinting support of the Ionian people. The Ionian campaign was not to be a conquest, but a liberation.

Ushakov's tactics were put to the test at Cerigo. On October 5, while still at Hydra, Ushakov detached two Russian frigates under Captain A. A. Shostak with instructions

³⁴Proclamation of Admiral Ushakov to the Inhabitants of the Venetian Islands; Miliutin, III, pp. 101-102.

³⁵Report of a Deputation of the Ionian Senate to Admiral Ushakov, May 27, 1799 (Enclosure). Mordvinov, II, no. 377, p. 512. Rodocanachi, p. 120.

to proceed ahead of the fleet to Cerigo. Shostak was to send the proclamations to the Cerigotes by cutter and, upon his arrival at Cerigo, summon the French to surrender.³⁶ Cerigo, which had a population of over 7,000, was garrisoned by only 86 men, a quarter of whom were Italians. Only two small forts defended the island: Ft. St. Niccolò with 8 cannon, located on the east coast, and Kapsali with 14 cannon, located a short distance inland from Ft. St. Niccolò.³⁷ The French commander, Captain Michel, had been prevented by English cruisers from learning of the declaration of war until it was too late to remedy the sad state of his defenses. Half of the cannon of Kapsali were still unserviceable when, on October 7, Captain Michel learned that anti-French proclamations were being disseminated among the islanders. The next day the French captain ordered Ft. St. Niccolò evacuated and issued a counter-proclamation, significantly asking the people only to be neutral. Just as the guns of Fort St. Niccolò were being spiked, Captain Shostak's frigates entered the bay, gunports open and cannon booming. In the French retreat from Fort St. Niccolò to Kapsali, all the Italian soldiers deserted. The unreliability of the

³⁶Admiral Ushakov to Captain A. A. Shostak, Oct. 5, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 113, pp. 114-115.

³⁷Bellaire, pp. 429-430.

Italian troops would be a constant problem for the French. Fort St. Niccolò was immediately occupied by Shostak and Kapsali was isolated.

As soon as word of the approach of the allied fleet was known on Cerigo, several notables of the island sailed in a small cutter to meet Ushakov. The Cerigotes pledged their loyalty to Ushakov and supplied detailed information on the strength and dispositions of the French.³⁸ The main body of the fleet arrived at Cerigo on October 10. Since the French refused a summons to surrender and because Kapsali was out of range of the warships, Ushakov was forced to order a descent in force. On the day of Ushakov's arrival, 300 Russian marines and 250 Turks together with siege guns were landed and Kapsali was invested. Building siege works on the heights surrounding Kapsali in the face of spirited fire from the French occupied two days. To mislead the enemy, Captain Michel mounted on the walls of Kapsali all the unserviceable cannon on the island. After the Russian siege guns were in place, a ten-hour bombardment crumbled the parapets and silenced the French cannon. When the storming of the fort was imminent, Michel decided to negotiate. Ushakov, who had characteristically ordered bloodshed held to a

³⁸Miliutin, I, 98.

minimum,³⁹ accorded the French extremely liberal terms. Ringed by siege guns and 600 troops, the fort could easily have been taken by storm. However, Captain Michel had won Ushakov's respect by his hopeless resistance. The French received honors of war and were to be sent to France on parole at Ushakov's expense. The Turks were forbidden to plunder the personal effects of the French prisoners and the pro-French inhabitants of Cerigo were to be protected from any retribution.⁴⁰

The first engagement had ended auspiciously. Losses on both sides had been inconsequential. The French had been valiant but realistic; the Russians had been determined but magnanimous. The Turks, however, were perplexed by the meticulous rules of eighteenth-century warfare. On one occasion during the siege, Turkish soldiers violated a white flag. After the surrender, the Turkish admiral proposed to Ushakov that the French be slaughtered instead of foolishly allowed to return to France to fight another day.⁴¹ Ushakov greeted the suggestion with unconcealed indignation, much to the surprise of the Turkish admiral. More than once during the campaign, the bewildered Turks

³⁹Adm. Ushakov to Capt. Nikonov, Oct. 9, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 115, p. 116.

⁴⁰Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Oct. 21, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 122, pp. 121-124.

⁴¹Miliutin, I, 114.

were given cause to wonder just who was allied to whom.

Ten days after the fleet had left the Dardanelles, the first of the seven islands was securely in the hands of the allies. French resistance had been less than expected. More important, the Ionian people had proven to be loyal to the cause of the allies. French letters of marque would no longer use Cerigo as a base for operations in the Aegean. Ushakov's lines of communication and supply around the Morea were secure. Ushakov received the Order of St. Aleksandr Nevskii, awarded by the Tsar less for the conquest of a small island than as an expression of approval for the auspicious beginning of the campaign.

The administration of Cerigo after its conquest was of great significance for the future of the Ionian Islands because the pattern established at Cerigo was repeated as other islands were occupied. Ushakov left a garrison of 11 Russians and 11 Turks. Throughout the campaign Ushakov studiously treated the sensitive Turks with equality. Half of all captured standards were sent to the Sultan and an equal number of Turks and Russians were left on the islands, although a Russian officer was always left in command. The Russian commander appointed for Cerigo, Lieutenant Diamanti, was instructed by Ushakov to treat the inhabitants with all consideration.⁴²

⁴² Adm. Ushakov to Lieut. Diamanti, Oct. 15, 1798.
Ibid., II, no. 120, p. 121.

The civil administration of the island was left in the hands of the inhabitants. By proclamation Ushakov gave the island autonomy, pending future decisions after the end of the campaign. Three or four magistrates were to be elected from among the nobility, the merchant class, and other property owners.⁴³ Although the majority of the people were still excluded from participation in the government, the inclusion of the wealthier commoners was a marked change from Venetian rule. The enfranchisement of the middle class was all the more remarkable coming from a servant of the Autocrat of All the Russias. Ushakov, at least, was taking Russian and Turkish promises seriously. Moreover, the Russian admiral prudently wanted to avoid dissatisfaction on the island which might cost him time and men.

The next objective of the combined fleet was the island of Zante, which was the third largest of the Ionian Islands in area and had a population of 40,000. The city of Zante, with 15,000 inhabitants, was the outlet for the fertile plain of Zante which produced currants for the London market.⁴⁴ Zante was incomparably more important than Cerigo; consequently, Ushakov expected a stubborn resistance on the part of the French. The city of Zante

⁴³ Proclamation of Ushakov to the Inhabitants of Cerigo, Oct. 14, 1798. *Ibid.*, II, no. 119, pp. 118-119.

⁴⁴ William Goodisson, A Historical and Topographical Essay upon the Islands of Corfu, Leucadia, Cephalonia, Ithaca and Zante (London: Underwood, 1822), p. 169.

was the only defensive position on the island. More a roadstead than a harbor, Zante was defended by five coastal batteries and a fortress of 62 guns, located down the coast out of range of warships. Built centuries before by the Venetians and weakened by warfare and frequent earthquakes, the fortress was scarcely formidable enough to frighten Barbary corsairs.

The French garrison, commanded by Major Vernier, numbered 444 men and 47 officers.⁴⁵ If the French had had sufficient provisions, modern fortifications, and the support of the populace, Vernier could have delayed Ushakov's progress for weeks, since there were only 1,700 Russian troops in the fleet. However, none of the three conditions were present when the first units of the allied fleet appeared.

Ushakov departed from Cerigo on October 17. The progress of the fleet was delayed by one of the legendary tempests off Cape Matapan. The old, unwieldy Russian vessels suffered severely from the buffeting of the storm. As was done at Cerigo, Captain Shostak, armed with proclamations, was sent ahead of the fleet with a squadron of frigates.⁴⁶

Proclamations were not needed to incite the Zantiotes against the French. A pro-Russian party on the island, led by the Protopappas of Zante and including leading

⁴⁵Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 1, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 124, pp. 129-130.

⁴⁶Adm. Ushakov to Capt. A. A. Shostak, Oct. 23, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 124, pp. 129-130.

nobles and even government functionaries, had been agitating with increasing boldness for several weeks. Even before the sighting of the allied fleet, Zantiotes were openly declaring that they would welcome the Russians.⁴⁷ Proclamations and promises by the desperate French had no effect on the islanders. For the devout peasantry, there was no hesitation in choosing between a French commander and the Protopappas, particularly if the latter was supported by the feared nobles.

The island remained tranquil until a merchantman brought word that the Russo-Turkish fleet had been sighted beating around Cape Coron, off the Morea. Panic struck the city. The women and children fled to the countryside to escape the horrors of the expected bombardment. Major Vernier dispatched speedy Greek vessels to determine the location of the enemy fleet, but the pro-Russian conspiracy had long tentacles. The Greek captains reported to the suspicious French commander that no enemy warships had been sighted.⁴⁸ In the countryside, the nobles and their partisans daily became more insolent and bold.

When the frigates of Shostak were sighted from Mt. Scapo on October 24, most of the remaining inhabitants of the city joined those who had fled earlier. Greek

⁴⁷Bellaire, p. 446.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 447.

officials in the departmental and municipal governments joined their compatriots in the interior. Vernier dispatched troops to man the coastal batteries and called out the Zantiote National Guard, which had been organized and trained by the French. Several hundred Zantiotes, mainly of the bourgeoisie, rallied to the tricolor and were employed in patrolling the city streets. However, the Zantiote volunteers proved to be unreliable.⁴⁹ Because of the hostile countryside, the French were in a state of siege before a single Russian soldier disembarked.

Shostak's frigates entered the roadstead and took up station off Grionero, one of the coastal batteries. Vernier had resolved to defend the five coastal batteries, but during the previous night an event occurred which completely changed the complexion of the situation. Eight thousand armed peasants, coming from all parts of the island, assembled at a rendezvous in the interior.⁵⁰ In view of the population of the island, the number of insurgents showed clearly that the revolt had taken the proportions of a mass uprising of the kind the French were to experience in Apulia and Spain.

At the first light of dawn the peasant army proceeded

⁴⁹Rodocanachi, p. 121.

⁵⁰Bellaire, p. 449.

to the outskirts of the city of Zante. At the same time, the rebels established contact with the fleet. In a cutter flying the cross of St. Andrew, a band of nobles met Ushakov as he approached Zante. Ushakov learned that, unlike the inhabitants of Cerigo, the Zantiotes did not intend to play a passive role. Thousands of eager peasants, armed to the teeth, were prepared to assist Ushakov expel the French. Ushakov gave the emissaries Russian standards and ordered the peasant army to be ready to coordinate its attack with a Russian landing.⁵¹

The aroused peasantry did not wait for a landing. After the appearance of the frigates, Vernier received a delegation from the rebels. The rebel spokesmen declared that if the French should oppose a Russian landing, the rebels would attack immediately. Vernier went to the municipal building to plead with the Greeks still in the government. Failing there, he sent an emissary to the rebel camp to implore the insurgents to remain neutral.⁵² Meeting with no success, Vernier reluctantly ordered the evacuation of the coastal batteries and a retirement to the fortress. As soon as the withdrawal was perceived by the rebels, thousands of disorderly peasants streamed

⁵¹Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 1, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 141, pp. 143-144.

⁵²Bellaire, p. 450.

through the city gates. Well placed cannon in the streets held the insurgents at bay until an orderly retreat had been effected by the French.

The escape of the French enraged the vengeful rebels, who vented their frustration by ransacking government buildings. All the prisons were opened and public records were burned in the streets. Still not satiated, the rebels pillaged the houses of actual or alleged pro-French Zantiotes and then overran the Jewish quarter, burning property and slaughtering the defenseless Jews.⁵³

The first Russian contingent landed after the fury of the populace had been spent. As 700 troops waded ashore, the Zantiotes flocked to the point of disembarkation to greet the Russians. Many plunged into the water to help the soldiers carry their burdens ashore.⁵⁴ Great was the consternation of the Zantiotes when fiercely dressed janissaries splashed ashore. The Turkish warships had been flying Russian flags and the emissaries sent to Ushakov had wisely not been introduced to Kadir Bey. It took all of Ushakov's persuasive powers to convince the Zantiotes, who hated the Turks more than the French, that he was in absolute command and that the Turks were needed allies, not conquerors.

⁵³Rodocanachi, pp. 121-122.

⁵⁴Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 1, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 141, p. 144.

From the fortress the French fired on the troops as they landed. Major Vernier, however, was not as plucky as young Captain Michel had been at Cerigo. As allied troops continued to land and as thousands of peasants milled about near the crumbling walls of the fortress, Vernier foresaw a massacre of his troops. When battle lanterns were lit in the enemy camp, presaging a night attack, Vernier decided to negotiate. The French commander sent an officer to the home of a Greek to negotiate a surrender with Shostak. Significantly, the French officer wore civilian clothes when passing the lines. By morning, terms of capitulation had been agreed upon. The terms were not as generous as at Cerigo. The French received honors of war, but they were not to be paroled to France. Moreover, the French had to surrender all "loot" taken from the islanders.⁵⁵

Ushakov was handicapped during the surrender negotiations by the attitude of the Turks. For the Turks, prisoners sent to Constantinople were prized trophies of war. The Turks had received no prisoners at Cerigo and demanded their share at Zante. Ushakov had instructions from Tomara to divide the prisoners, but even apart from such instructions, Ushakov recognized the need to placate his ally. Furthermore, the French had not earned his respect by a spirited

⁵⁵Ibid., II, no. 141, p. 145.

defense as at Cerigo. The 500 French prisoners were divided equally between the two allies. Ushakov generously granted permission for the French officers, together with their families, to return on parole to France. In the period before the prisoners were sent to the mainland, Ushakov carefully protected them from the islanders, who wanted to tear them to pieces.⁵⁶ In contrast to Cerigo, no protection was extended to the pro-French Zantiotes, who fled the island as best they could.⁵⁷

The French prisoners which were sent to Sevastopol to await exchange fared well, but those handed over to the Turks suffered an appalling fate. The prisoners were landed at Patras and subjected to a fifty-two day forced march overland to Constantinople. François Pouqueville, who visited in Constantinople the French prisoners from Zante, found them chained by pairs in a dank dungeon. Subsequently, the prisoners were condemned to labor as oarsmen on Turkish galleys.⁵⁸ According to the British ambassador at Constantinople, the Porte wilily claimed the right to treat the French as brigands since Bonaparte, when invading Egypt, had claimed that France was not at war with the Porte.⁵⁹

⁵⁶Bellaire, p. 452.

⁵⁷Rodocanachi, p. 123.

⁵⁸Pouqueville, Voyage, II, 145, 158.

⁵⁹Lord Elgin to Adm. Nelson, Jan. 20, 1800. Lord George Spencer, Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1794-1801 (London: Navy Records Society, 1924), IV, 33.

The day after the capitulation, Ushakov with a numerous retinue stepped ashore at Zante to a tumultuous welcome. To the fervent acclamations of a huge crowd and the joyous ringing of church bells, Ushakov proceeded through the streets. Flowers were strewn in the path of the procession and the houses were bedecked with carpets, silks and flags. Thousands of armed peasants waved poles topped with a cross of St. Andrew, while their wives distributed wine and food to the Russian soldiers and sailors. Mothers forced their reluctant children to kiss the hands of Russian officers. Ushakov was overwhelmed by the warmth of his reception.⁶⁰

The Turks did not share in the festivities, although Turkish officers were in Ushakov's retinue. The more enthusiasm the Greeks showed toward the Russians, the more sullen the Turks became.⁶¹ Observing the hostile mood of the Turks, Ushakov summoned the city leaders and told them to accord to Kadir Bey the same welcome as was being accorded the Russians. The Zantiote leaders reluctantly agreed and delegated subordinates to carry out the distasteful task of offering the hated Turks the hospitality of the city.

Ushakov remained at Zante for ten days to organize a provisional government. On October 29, a petition signed

⁶⁰Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 21, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 178, p. 191.

⁶¹Ibid.

by twenty-two prominent Zantiotes was presented to Ushakov requesting that a provisional government be established under Russian auspices. The petition further requested that a detachment of Russian soldiers be left at Zante to maintain order.⁶² In response, Lieutenant M. N. Vasil'ev was appointed commander of the Zante fortress, with a detachment of 14 Russians and 14 Turks. Ushakov cautioned Vasil'ev to treat the Zantiotes with the utmost consideration and instructed him to raise troops from among the inhabitants to augment his token force.⁶³ In addition, Ushakov appointed Major Dandri as adviser to the provisional government of Zante.

After the French surrender, the Russian admiral convoked a meeting of the leading citizens of the island and explained to them his intention of establishing a provisional government modelled on that of Cerigo. While the meeting was in progress, a crowd gathered in the square outside to await the results. When word filtered out to the crowd that Zante was to have autonomy and a government elected from among Zantiotes, the crowd began shouting that it did not want self-government under the Zantiote nobles. They clamored instead for direct annexation to

⁶²Petition of Zantiotes to Adm. Ushakov, Oct. 29, 1798. Ibid., II, No. 128, pp. 131-132.

⁶³Adm. Ushakov to Lieutenant M. N. Vasil'ev, Oct. 30, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 131, pp. 134-135.

Russia.⁶⁴ The Zantiote lower classes feared that if the island were not directly administered by Russia, they would again be prey to the aristocracy as under Venice. Moreover, how could a weak native government prevent the return of the French or an attack by Ali Pasha? Ushakov could only turn a deaf ear to pleas for annexation. The future of the Ionian Islands was in the hands of St. Petersburg and Constantinople; Ushakov had no instructions on that subject. Furthermore, the pleas for annexation came from a plebeian mob.

To govern Zante, Ushakov appointed three archons who were to rule jointly with an elected council. In a joint proclamation by Ushakov and Kadir Bey, the propertied middle class was given the franchise as well as the aristocracy. In filling government offices, a balance was to be struck between the two classes.⁶⁵ As was demonstrated at Cerigo, Ushakov was determined that the nobility would not monopolize the government.

The first official act of the newly elected President of Zante, Count Macri, was to send a letter to Tsar Paul

⁶⁴Egor P. Metaxa, Zapiski flota kapitan-leitenanta Egora Metaksa (St. Petersburg: 1915), p. 51, quoted in Evgenii V. Tarle, "Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom More (1798-1800)," Sochineniia, Vol. X. (Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959), pp. 128-129. Adm. Ushakov to Count Kushelev, Nov. 21, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 178, p. 195.

⁶⁵Proclamation of Adm. Ushakov and Adm. Kadir Bey to the Inhabitants of Zante, Oct. 30, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 120, pp. 133-134.

expressing the gratitude and friendship of the Zantiotes.⁶⁶ In the few days Ushakov remained on the island, he took an avid interest in the administrative affairs of Zante. The Russian admiral set up quarantine regulations by proclamation. To the surprise of the Zantiotes, Ushakov declared that French debts to the islanders would be honored by Russia, although each case would be judged on its own merits.⁶⁷ Several weeks later, when a judicial system was functioning, Ushakov instructed Major Dandri to make sure that the trials of pro-French Zantiotes be conducted in an "unbiased" rather than a vindictive spirit.⁶⁸ Ushakov's measures with respect to the French debts and pro-French Zantiotes were indicative of the kind of viceroy Tsar Paul had sent to the Ionian Islands.

While at Zante, Ushakov became enmeshed in a duel of nerves with Ali Pasha of Yanina which had significance far beyond the immediate campaign. The attack on the islands by Ushakov was only one front in the campaign to expell the French from the Ionian Islands. A second front had been opened by the fickle Pasha of Yanina. Although a month

⁶⁶Adm. Ushakov to Count Macri, Nov. 30, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 193, p. 213.

⁶⁷Adm. Ushakov to Major Dandri, Oct. 31, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 136, p. 138.

⁶⁸Adm. Ushakov to Major Dandri, Dec. 7, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 199, p. 221.

before the Porte's declaration of war Ali had seized French vessels in the Gulf of Arta, he continued to play a double game. While massing troops around Butrinto, on the coast opposite Corfu, Ali opened negotiations with the French. Ali proposed that in return for sending troops to assist the French defend Corfu, the French cede to him the four coastal towns and Santa Maura.⁶⁹ General Chabot ignored the proposal and, on September 13, ostentatiously visited Butrinto to inspect its defenses. To cause a diversion in Ali's rear, Chabot endeavored without success to incite the Pasha of Delvino⁷⁰ and the warrior republic of Souli⁷¹ against Ali Pasha. The reason for the Pasha of Delvino's refusal is of significance. The pasha told Chabot's emissary that the French cause was lost because the Ionian people were not warlike and, moreover, it was well known that most of them were partisans of Russia.⁷²

⁶⁹ Rodocanachi, pp. 99-100.

⁷⁰ Delvino (Delvinë), an Albanian town of 8,000 located 12 miles inland from the coast, was ruled by Mustapha Pasha, a personal rival of Ali Pasha. Ali Pasha had been steadily encroaching on the territory of Delvino and neighboring Valona.

⁷¹ The minute Christian state of Souli, a confederation of 66 mountain villages located between Yanina and the coast, was nominally subject to the Sultan. From 1790 to 1803, Ali waged almost continual warfare against the ulcer in the middle of his dominions.

⁷² Bellaire, p. 281.

The disdainful attitude of Chabot and his efforts to ally with Ali's hereditary foes confirmed Ali in his opportunistic decision to support the Porte against the French. Before opening hostilities, Ali vindictively lured Adjutant General Rose, temporary commander at Corfu, to his camp on the pretext of reopening negotiations. Upon his arrival, Rose was put in chains and sent to Constantinople as a sign of Ali's unflinching loyalty to the Sultan.⁷³ On October 10, Ali's army attacked Butrinto. The next day, Chabot arrived with 300 reinforcements and rashly counterattacked. For six days there was sporadic fighting along the heights behind the plague-infested little town. The Greek troops in French service, which were to fight so poorly against the Russians, displayed great courage against the troops of the hated Pasha of Yanina.⁷⁴ The French were too few to hold the Butrinto perimeter indefinitely. Consequently, when Chabot learned of the fall of Cerigo, he ordered the evacuation of the town.⁷⁵ On October 16 the cannon were spiked and the fortifications razed. The Christian inhabitants, after burning their houses, sought refuge on Corfu from Ali's wrath. The evacuation of Butrinto tarnished the prestige of French

⁷³Ibid., p. 258.

⁷⁴Report of General Verrières, Archives de la guerre (179), cited by Rodocanachi, p. 106.

⁷⁵Bellaire, pp. 271-272.

arms at the very moment when Ushakov's fleet was entering the Ionian Sea.

Ali's determination to seize all the coastal towns and Chabot's unwise decision, mainly as a point of honor, to defend them insured a repetition of the Butrinto drama with the same results. However, the Butrinto engagement was only an entr'acte compared to the struggle for Preveza, Ali's next objective. Preveza, with 8,000 Orthodox inhabitants, was the most important of the coastal towns, since it was the entrepôt for Epirus and Acarnania.⁷⁶

Ali sent 11,000 men under his son, Mukhtar Bey, to attack Preveza. The town was situated on a long promontory connected with Epirus by an isthmus between the Ionian Sea and the deep Gulf of Arta. The French constructed earthworks across the narrow isthmus atop the ruins of the ancient city of Nicopolis. Preveza was defended by 810 men, including 250 volunteers from Preveza and 60 from Souli, all under the command of General La Salcette.⁷⁷ The volunteers from Preveza, demoralized by Ali's agents, were unreliable.

Mukhtar Bey arrived at the isthmus on October 22 and attacked two days later. On the day of battle, shrieking Albanians charged down from the heights, striking terror

⁷⁶Vaudoncourt, p. 82.

⁷⁷Pisani, p. 210.

in the ranks of the volunteers. The Prevezan volunteers holding the center broke and fled in complete disorder. With the French line broken and enveloped, Ali's troops overran all the redoubts and streamed across the isthmus, eddying around pockets of French resistance. The French suffered an overwhelming defeat. Both French generals were captured together with 163 French soldiers. Nearly 300 Frenchmen fell on the field of battle. Captain Tissot, with 80 French soldiers, made a hopeless stand in the streets of Preveza. By the end of the day, only 7 of the 80 remained alive.⁷⁸

The city of Preveza was thoroughly sacked and the inhabitants were tortured at will by Ali's victorious soldiers. Neat pyramids of severed heads rose in the streets of the town. All those who had survived the carnage and had been unable to flee to the islands were rounded up and sold like cattle.⁷⁹ A visitor to Preveza in 1801 found only 500 people in a town which formerly had 8,000.⁸⁰ The French prisoners were subjected to every indignity that the experienced soldiers of Ali could conceive. Some were forced to chop off the heads of children, others were tortured by drunken soldiers or imprisoned under

⁷⁸Botta, IV, 55.

⁷⁹William M. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece (London: J. Rodwell, 1835), I, 507-508.

⁸⁰Edward Dodwell, A Classical and Topographical Tour Through Greece During the Years 1801, 1805, and 1806 (London: Rodwell and Martin, 1819), I, 54-55.

insufferable conditions. Subsequently the French prisoners were marched barefoot overland to Constantinople, forced to carry in sacks the heads of their fallen comrades. Assaulted in every village and often fiendishly tied to the tails of galloping horses, most of the prisoners died en route, but all of their heads were nailed to the gates of the Seraglio.

Vonitsa, on the Gulf of Arta, fell to Ali without a shot. Three days after the capture of Preveza, Ali sent the Metropolitan of Arta to Vonitsa to persuade the 2,100 Orthodox inhabitants of the town to submit. The terrified inhabitants hastened to oblige and sought Ali's favor by slaughtering the small French detachment in the town.⁸¹ With the submission of Vonitsa, three of the four coastal towns were in the firm hands of Ali. For his victories against the French, Ali was made a pasha of three tails by the Sultan. When word spread of the plundering of wealthy Preveza, thousands of Moslems flocked to Ali's standard. Within a few days after Preveza, Ali had an eager army of over 15,000, with more men arriving daily.⁸²

The obvious objective of Ali was Parga, the last French position on the mainland. A town of less than 3,000 inhabitants, Parga was situated on a rocky promontory jutting out into the Ionian Sea halfway between Butrinto and Preveza. The territory of Parga, six miles in

⁸¹Thomas S. Hughes, Travels in Greece and Albania. 2nd ed. (London: Henry Colburn, 1830), II, 157.

⁸²Pouqueville, Histoire de la Grèce, I, 139.

length and two miles in width, was cut off from the rest of Epirus by almost inaccessible mountains. Parga was not a channel for grain going to the Ionian Islands as was Butrinto, nor strategically situated as was Preveza, but it traditionally had close military and commercial ties with the Souliotes and Paramithians.⁸³ Whoever possessed Parga was in a position to incite and supply potential enemies of pashas in Albania and northern Greece. By taking Parga, Ali could cut the supply line of Souli.

With his usual dissimulation, Ali promised to overlook the past unfriendly acts of the town if the Pargiotes would deliver to him the heads of the French soldiers garrisoning Parga.⁸⁴ The Pargiotes, distrusting from experience the promises of Ali Pasha, refused to answer Ali's letter. A second letter from Ali received a firm and spirited refusal.⁸⁵ The Pargiotes negotiated an alliance with Souli and were preparing for a siege when word arrived of the presence of a Russian fleet at Zante. Regarding this as nothing less than divine intervention, the Pargiotes immediately sent a deputation to Ushakov.

⁸³Paramithia, a mountainous canton inhabited by about 15,000 Moslems, was located between Parga and Yanina. Although nominally a dependency of Ali Pasha, the Paramithians like the Souliotes were fiercely independent.

⁸⁴Rodocanachi, p. 115.

⁸⁵Leake, I, 525.

Upon arriving at Zante, the deputies implored Ushakov to save their town from Ali Pasha by extending Russian protection, if not citizenship, to the Pargiotes. The Russian admiral regretfully declared that he was not empowered to make a special arrangement for Parga and that Ali Pasha, who had a firman from the Sultan to occupy the coastal towns, was an ally of the Tsar.⁸⁶ Upon hearing this, the deputies from Parga fell on their knees before Ushakov and tearfully declared that if Ushakov refused to protect them, they would kill all their women and children and fight, with daggers if necessary, to the last man. The pathetic demonstration of the Pargiotes profoundly moved Ushakov, as it did the members of his staff who witnessed the scene.⁸⁷ Ushakov's compassion for his coreligionists outweighed his hesitation to provoke Ali Pasha, whose help he would need to reduce Corfu.

To the delight of the Pargiotes, who kissed his hand, Ushakov agreed to allow Parga to raise the Russian flag.⁸⁸ Ushakov stipulated that the Pargiotes must also raise the Turkish flag and that they should cultivate the good will of Ali Pasha. Ushakov had taken a courageous step. Since the coastal towns were claimed by the Porte, a Russian flag flying over Parga would stir the wrath not only of Ali Pasha,

⁸⁶Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Nov. 17, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 166, pp. 169-170.

⁸⁷Metaxa, pp. 129-130, quoted in Tarle, p. 137.

⁸⁸Adm. Ushakov to the Inhabitants of Parga, Nov. 5, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 144, pp. 147-148.

but also of Paul and Selim III.

While extending Russian protection to Parga, Ushakov attempted to maintain amiable relations with the Pasha of Yanina. In this endeavor, the Russian admiral displayed considerable diplomatic acumen. In a letter to Ali Pasha,⁸⁹ Ushakov argued that the Pargiotes were not only allies of Russia, but also of Ali Pasha and the Sultan. Ushakov assured Ali that the town was friendly if not devoted to the renowned Pasha of Yanina. The Russian admiral ended his letter with pointed references to his conquest of Cerigo and Zante. Ali could do no more than rage against Ushakov, who had removed Ali's justification for sacking Parga.

The French at Parga, who had been relegated to the role of a third party in the affair, peacefully evacuated the town upon the request of the inhabitants. In accordance with Ushakov's advice to assuage the anger of Ali, Parga sent a deputation to the pasha's camp. Once the delegates were within the camp, Ali forced them to sign a treaty by which Parga became subject to the Porte. Although no Turks were to be allowed in the town, Parga would have to pay a tribute of 200 florins.⁹⁰ Parga immediately disavowed the treaty, stating that the flags sent by Ushakov and Kadir Bey were already flying over the Parga fortress. In reply, Ali menacingly marched toward Parga.

⁸⁹Adm. Ushakov to Ali Pasha, Nov. 6, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 146, pp. 149-151.

⁹⁰Leake, I, 525.

Ushakov soon learned that only threats, not subtle diplomatic notes, were effective with Ali Pasha. Not only was Ali still threatening Parga, he also seized and imprisoned the Russian consul at Preveza. Incensed by Ali's actions, Ushakov wrote another, markedly different letter to Ali.⁹¹ In blunt words Ushakov informed Ali that he and Kadir Bey were dispatching Russian and Turkish soldiers to garrison Parga in order to insure its protection. Moreover, Ushakov curtly informed Ali that he was sending an officer to Preveza with orders to return immediately with the Russian consul. The Russian admiral warned that if the execution of his orders were impeded, a packet boat would immediately be sent to Constantinople to inform the Sultan and Tomara. Furthermore, Ushakov hinted that he might be forced to take extreme measures.

Ushakov's emissary, Lieutenant Metaxa, met Ali at Preveza. After vehement protests against Russian interference in the coastal towns, Ali agreed to surrender the consul and to accept Ushakov's solution with respect to Parga.⁹² Threats had worked when bonds of alliance had not. During Ali's conversation with Metaxa, the pasha had inquired if Ushakov was the "Ushak Pasha" who had defeated the Turks in 1790.

⁹¹Adm. Ushakov to Ali Pasha, Nov. 9, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 157, p. 161.

⁹²Metaxa, pp. 140-141, quoted in Tarle, p. 141.

Ushakov had saved one of the coastal towns from Ali Pasha, but at the cost of antagonizing the most powerful pasha in the Balkans. The situation of the town was anomalous. Ali held a firman from the Sultan, an ally of the Tsar, giving him permission to occupy Parga, but there was a Russian detachment in Parga with the express purpose of preventing it. Ali was enraged, but his actions were limited to appeals to the Porte for redress and to attempts to bribe Kadir Bey and members of Ushakov's staff.⁹³ The Russian admiral wrote letters filled with compassion for the Pargiotes to the Tsar, the Russian Foreign Minister, and Tomara in an attempt to justify his actions and to win support for the cause of Parga.⁹⁴

The fate of a couple of thousand Pargiotes was inconsequential compared to the possible effects of the incident on the campaign. As a result of the incident, Ali would be less willing to assist Ushakov in a siege of Corfu. In long range terms, a hostile Epirus promised the Ionian Islands a stormy future. The Parga incident had not resulted in an open break between Ushakov and Ali, but another test of wills would come as the fleet approached Santa

⁹³ Leake, I, 526-527.

⁹⁴ Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 21, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 178, pp. 192-193. Adm. Ushakov to F. V. Rostopchin, Nov. 21, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 176, pp. 189-190. Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Nov. 17, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 166, pp. 168-169.

Maura. The island of Santa Maura, separated from the mainland by only a fordable channel, was claimed by Ali as being in his sphere of interest.

On the day after the surrender of the fortress of Zante, Ushakov sent a strong squadron to Cephalonia, the largest of the Ionian Islands.⁹⁵ The squadron, commanded by Captain I. S. Poskochin, consisted of the line-of-battle ship Sv. Troitsa, two Russian frigates and one Turkish frigate. Poskochin dispatched a cutter ahead of his squadron to Cephalonia with two Russian officers on board who were natives of the island. The two officers were to land and establish contact with the pro-Russian party on the island.⁹⁶

Located twenty miles north of Zante, Cephalonia had over 60,000 inhabitants on its 290 mountainous square miles. The two chief towns, separated by the deep Gulf of Livadi on the south coast, were the capital, Argostoli, and its rival, Lixouri, each of about 5,000 population. The island was defended by only two fortresses: Argostoli and Assos. The fortress of Argostoli, located on a mountain southeast of the city, boasted three bastions, all in good repair.

⁹⁵ Adm. Ushakov to Capt. I. S. Poskochin, Oct. 25, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 125, p. 130.

⁹⁶ Ivan S. Poskochin, "Zhurnal Kapitana 2-go ranga Poskochina, komandovavshago otriadom rossiiskikh i turetskikh voennykh sudov, vedennyi pri zaniatii ostrova Chefalonii, s 14-go po 23-e oktiabria 1798 goda," Slavianin, VIII (1829), pp. 245-246.

The fortress of Assos, built in 1595 on the northern coast, had suffered from the elements as badly as had the Zante fortress. The island was garrisoned by 350 men under Major Royer.⁹⁷ All the troops were concentrated in Argostoli and Lixouri, where coastal and street batteries had been hastily erected.

Anti-French sentiment was even stronger on Cephalonia than on Zante, partly because of Cephalonia's long tradition of lawlessness and partly because French rule had been more oppressive. Lacking sufficient funds, the French on Cephalonia had resorted to forced requisitions, with the resultant cycle of protests and retribution.⁹⁸ A widespread anti-French conspiracy, reaching into government offices, had for several weeks been preparing for a general insurrection upon the approach of the Russian fleet.⁹⁹ When a Russian cutter brought Ushakov's proclamation to the island, preparations were accelerated.

Count Spiro, leader of the rebels in the commune of Livato, circulated the proclamation over the island. Learning of this, Major Royer dispatched the commander at Argostoli, Captain Desmures, with 100 men to seize Spiro and his papers at Livato. Forewarned, the count eluded

⁹⁷Bellaire, p. 455.

⁹⁸Rodocanachi, p. 123.

⁹⁹Bellaire, p. 454.

Desmures, who had to be content with seizing the inflammatory papers. Desmures then proceeded to a neighboring village to apprehend another leader of the rebels. However, his second quarry had also been warned by sympathizers within the government. As soon as Desmures's detachment left the village, it was surrounded by 1,100 armed peasants, led by the two nobles Desmures had been sent to seize. The French captain, knowing his men were needed by Royer, returned all the papers he had seized in exchange for an unhindered return to Argostoli.¹⁰⁰

The rebellion was now in the open; the French no longer were in control of the countryside. On October 24 an isolated French detachment in Argostoli itself was disarmed by rebels working in collusion with Greek officials.¹⁰¹ On the same day, the Orthodox clergy of the city made a solemn procession through the streets of the capital demonstrating their solidarity with Russia. That evening 2,000 armed peasants arrived outside the city. The next day, lookouts on the heights behind the city sighted enemy warships off the Zante coast. Major Royer called a military council to determine a course of action. After heated debate the council decided to evacuate the island.¹⁰² The

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 456-457.

¹⁰¹Rodocanachi, p. 123.

¹⁰²Bellaire, p. 455.

initial plan was to evacuate all the garrison by sea, but the rebels were strong enough in the city to prevent the procurement of the necessary shipping without a bloody encounter. As a result, 150 men under Major Royer sailed for Corfu in a prize taken earlier and 200 men under Captain Desmures began a march overland to Assos on the north coast.

As soon as the French had left Argostoli the rebels entered the city and, joining with the townspeople, proceeded to the main square where they replaced the French flag with the Russian standard. At that time Poskochin arrived offshore. A boat flying the Russian flag immediately put out from the city to intercept the Russian commander. When informed of the French evacuation, Poskochin landed a detachment of 24 men.¹⁰³ The landing party united with 500 armed Cephalonians and secured the abandoned fortress of Argostoli. That evening the notables of Lixouri visited Poskochin's ship and, after informing the Russian commander that the French had also evacuated Lixouri, returned to their city with a token detachment of 10 Russian soldiers. Poskochin then dispatched contingents along the coast and inland to secure the interior. Everywhere the Russians were welcomed enthusiastically.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³Poskochin, p. 247.

¹⁰⁴Poskochin, pp. 250-251.

The next day, the Russian garrisons in Argostoli and Lixouri were increased to 120 men and 30 men respectively. Unexpected trouble was brewing on the island. The rebels were sacking the homes of actual or alleged "Jacobins" and threatened to get completely out of control. Poskochin ordered the rebels to disarm themselves since their services were no longer required, but his instructions were disregarded. Seeing that the plundering of the houses of pro-French Cephalonians was turning into a general sack of the city by the frenzied peasants, Poskochin ordered frigates to take up stations inshore with guns trained on Argostoli.¹⁰⁵ Under the threat of a bombardment the violence subsided. The Tsar's cannon had saved the Jacobins.

Poskochin, well informed of the destination of Desmures, dispatched warships to Assos and sent a Cephalonian, Count Metaxa, overland with a contingent in pursuit of the 200 Frenchmen. By that time Desmures would have welcomed the appearance of Russian troops. At a pass halfway on the forty-mile road to Assos Desmures was confronted by 4,000 armed peasants who opened fire on the French column. The French, surrounded and outnumbered twenty to one, were forced to negotiate. The leader of the rebels, a peasant

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 256.

of patriarchal appearance and demeanor, allowed the French to proceed upon condition that they surrender all their arms, clothes and personal effects.¹⁰⁶

Completely helpless and demoralized, the French troops continued their march through the rugged and hostile countryside. They were refused water at every village and avalanches of rocks were pushed down in their path. The defenseless veterans of the campaigns in northern Italy were constantly threatened with massacre by surly peasants. The French would have been slaughtered or else lost their way in the maze of mountain paths if an Orthodox priest had not restrained the peasants and shown the grateful French the path to Assos.

Upon reaching Assos the French found their path barred by armed inhabitants of the town. Again a priest intervened and had the French imprisoned in the Assos church. The next morning another band of peasants approached the town with the intention of massacring the French, but were prevented by the townspeople who wanted the credit for turning 200 Frenchmen over to the Russians.¹⁰⁷ A ship sent by Poskochin arrived at Assos, and the captain took the bedraggled French under Russian protection. A Russian officer severely scolded the peasants for

¹⁰⁶Bellaire, pp. 463-465.

¹⁰⁷Bellaire, pp. 468-469.

mistreating the French. The experience of the French in their march to Assos was incontrovertible proof of the profound hatred of the French by the vast majority of Ionians. It also presaged a turbulent future for any subsequent government of the island.

None of the French troops garrisoning Cephalonia escaped to Corfu. Royer's detachment which had set sail for Corfu was driven by adverse winds to take shelter in a small port on Santa Maura where the French were made prisoners by the inhabitants who had also risen against the French. The prisoners taken on Cephalonia were sent to Patras and divided between the allies as at Zante.

On October 28 Poskochin, together with the commanders of his ships, made a solemn entry into Argostoli. He was met at the city gates by the Orthodox clergy bearing crosses and all the nobility of the area. To the ringing of church bells, salvoes from the warships and the firing of rifles by enthusiastic Cephalonians, Poskochin entered the church for a service celebrating the deliverance of the island from the French.¹⁰⁸ On November 3 Ushakov arrived at Argostoli and received a welcome comparable to that accorded Poskochin.

The day after his arrival Ushakov was presented with

¹⁰⁸Poskochin, p. 254.

a list of Cephalonians who had collaborated with the French to the last moment. Ushakov declared that if any action at all should be taken against those unfortunates, they should be given a trial at a later date. Ushakov's action was in stark contrast to Nelson's act of hanging Admiral Caracciolo from a yardarm in the Bay of Naples.

Ushakov left a detachment of Russians and Turks, under Lieutenant Riabinin, to garrison the island.¹⁰⁹

To govern Cephalonia until the end of the campaign, Ushakov set up the same type of administration that was functioning on Cerigo and Zante.¹¹⁰ Ushakov took the added precaution of leaving a warship at Argostoli. With its larger population and its tradition of strife between the countryside and the towns, between the nobility and the peasantry, and between rival cities, Cephalonia promised to be the most difficult of the islands to govern.

The small island of Ithaca, with 7,000 inhabitants, fell to the allied fleet without a shot. Of all the islands, Ithaca was the least hostile to the French. Ithaca was not plagued by sharp social stratification as were the

¹⁰⁹ Adm. Ushakov to Lieut. Riabinin, Nov. 6, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 147, pp. 151-152.

¹¹⁰ Proclamation of Adm. Ushakov and Adm. Kadir Bey to the Inhabitants of Cephalonia, Nov. 7, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 150, p. 154.

other islands. During Venetian rule the island had become depopulated and in order to encourage resettlement the peasants were given their own land.¹¹¹ The small French garrison of 25 men under Captain Millet had not weighed heavily on the people. When Cephalonia fell to the Russo-Turkish fleet, the Ithacans sensibly offered Captain Millet the ships to leave the island. The French commander graciously accepted the shrewd offer and quietly sailed off to Corfu.¹¹² When Captain Giovanni Vlassopoulos, a Greek in Russian service, arrived at Vathi, the capital of Ithaca, the Russian flag was flying over the city.

By the end of October, 1798, the French had been expelled from four of the seven islands and all of the coastal towns. Until this point the Ionian Campaign had been for the Russo-Turkish fleet a tranquil and steady procession from island to island, punctuated only rarely by the sharp report of a cannon. The threat of force had subdued one island, the inhabitants had delivered three others, and no Russian blood had been shed over the coastal towns. However, the easy phase of the campaign was now behind the fleet. Over the horizon lay two islands which would require protracted sieges. Still further beyond was the domain of Ali Pasha, who was nursing a grudge in his tent at Preveza, watching and waiting.

¹¹¹Goodisson, p. 111.

¹¹²Bellaire, pp. 274-275.

CHAPTER III

THE IONIAN CAMPAIGN: THE SIEGES

The fleet's last objective before Corfu was Santa Maura, the second strongest position in the Ionian Islands. Equal to Zante in area, Santa Marua had 18,000 inhabitants. The northern tip of the island was separated from the mainland by a channel only 300 feet wide and never more than seven feet deep. The capital, Santa Maura, a town of 5,000 inhabitants, was located near the northern entrance to the channel. The Santa Maura fortress and the large harbor of the capital made the island a strategic prize. The fortress was situated on a tongue of land jutting into the channel to the north of the city. The land side of the fortress was defended by a wide and deep moat. The high, stone curtains of the rectangular fortress were strengthened by nine formidable bastions mounting a total of 57 guns. The fortress, commanded by Major Mialet, was garrisoned by 501 men with provisions for a month.¹ Both in strength of position and size of the garrison, Santa Maura was the most formidable fortress yet encountered by the fleet.

¹Bellaire, p. 475.

On October 29, while still at Zante, Ushakov dispatched a squadron to besiege Santa Maura.² The squadron was commanded by Captain D. N. Seniavin, who was destined to equal if not overshadow Ushakov in Russian naval annals. Seniavin had under his command a mixed squadron composed of the Sv. Petr 74, Navarkhia 40, Ibrahim 74 and Mehemet Bey 32, with 674 Russian and Turkish troops on board. As on the other islands, Ushakov instructed the squadron commander to incite and unite with the natives of the island.

The inhabitants of Santa Maura were as anti-French and pro-Russian as the inhabitants of the other islands and for the same reasons. However, they had an additional reason--fear of Ali Pasha. The island was caught in a three-way struggle between Ali Pasha, the French and the Russians. Since the French could still be counted upon to defend the island against Ali Pasha, the islanders did not want to weaken the French before the arrival of the Russians was imminent.

When Ali marched against Preveza, he sent agents to Santa Maura who disseminated proclamations inciting the people to revolt when Ali attacked the island.³ After the battle of Preveza, fought only twelve miles from Santa Maura, hundreds of fleeing Prevezans sought refuge on the

² Adm. Ushakov to Capt. D. N. Seniavin, Oct. 29, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 129, pp. 132-133.

³Bellaire, p. 472.

island. They spread their panic like a contagious disease. Boats full of refugees from Preveza were pursued by Ali's ships and many would have been captured if a Russian officer had not intervened. Captain Vlassopoulo learned at Ithaca of the threat to Santa Maura and sailed for that island in a swift brig. On route, he intercepted Ali's flotilla which had just captured several boats crowded with Prevezan refugees. Captain Vlassopoulo, flaunting his Russian uniform, hastened aboard the flagship of the flotilla and in the name of Admiral Ushakov demanded the release of the refugees.⁴ Ali's commander, nonplused by the unexpected apparition, bowed to the Russian uniform and released all the refugees.

Since the Russian fleet would soon reach the island, Ali had little time to obtain his objective. Not content with attempting to incite a revolt, Ali tried to negotiate with Major Mialet. If the French would surrender Santa Maura to his troops, Ali Pasha promised to pay 30,000 gold pieces and to send the French garrison to Ancona.⁵ Major Mialet ignored the offer. When the fortress subsequently surrendered, Ali's incriminating letters fell into the hands of Ushakov, who forwarded them to Tomara.⁶

⁴Hughes, II, pp. 158-159.

⁵A. L. Shapiro, Admiral D. N. Seniavin (Moscow: Voennoe izd. Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1955), p. 78.

⁶Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, April 20, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 357, p. 487.

On October 27, Ali sent a letter to the Greeks in the municipal government of Santa Maura offering his protection in return for their assistance against the French. The town officials informed Major Mialet of the letter, but added that he could not count on the islanders for assistance since they were awaiting the arrival of the Russians to protect them against Ali Pasha.⁷

Although the islanders would not help the French, they were prepared to defend themselves. The townspeople and peasants armed themselves and gathered by the thousands at the southern end of the island. To gain time, one of the leaders of the islanders, Count Angelo Orio, entered into time-consuming negotiations with Ali Pasha through Ignatius, the Metropolitan of Arta.⁸ A bizarre situation had developed. Ali's army was encamped across the narrow channel opposite the fortress. Only the guns of the fortress prevented Ali's troops from wading across to the island. The armed inhabitants of the island were assembled at the other end of Santa Maura determined to fight Ali Pasha but not to help the French. A Russo-Turkish squadron was approaching which would attempt to expell the French while preventing Ali Pasha, an ally, from getting a foothold on the island.

⁷Bellaire, pp. 473-474.

⁸Leake, III, 13.

On October 29, the municipal government of Santa Maura, apprised by Russian agents of the imminent approach of an allied squadron, informed Major Mialet that it was ending its functions and demanded that all French troops retire to the fortress.⁹ In view of the strength of the islanders, the French commander had no choice but to agree. The next day a Russian flag was ceremoniously raised in the town square of the capital. Incensed by this act of treason, Major Mialet ordered cannon trained on the town in preparation for a bombardment. Before his orders could be executed, a spokesman for the rebels approached the fortress walls and informed Mialet of the capture of Royer's detachment from Cephalonia. The spokesman warned the French commander that if he fired on the town, Major Royer and his men would be massacred. Again Mialet had no choice but to agree.

On October 30 Seniavin arrived off the southern end of the island. The next day, Seniavin received on board his ship Count Orio and ten other notables of the island, who promised Seniavin their wholehearted support.¹⁰ On

⁹Bellaire, p. 474.

¹⁰"Zhurnal plavaniia kapitana 1 ranga D. N. Seniavina, vedennyi na korable Sy. Petr vo vremia osvobozhdeniia ostrova Sv. Mavry ot frantsuzov," Mordvinov, II, no. 194, p. 214.

November 1, Seniavin sailed north to besiege the fortress. Upon Major Mialet's refusal to surrender, Seniavin landed 390 Russian and Turkish marines and sailors under Count Voinovich. The inhabitants greeted the landing force with joyous acclamations and volleys of gunfire. When the troops entered the town, they were met by the Orthodox clergy in sacerdotal vestments. The priests blessed the Russian troops and sprinkled their guns with holy water.¹¹

The next day Seniavin landed cannon for the siege works. Four batteries were hastily constructed, three in a semi-circle around the land side of the fortress and one across the channel on Ali's territory. Although the arrival of the fleet was a keen setback for Ali, he did not protest the erection of the battery. Trying a new tack, Ali offered Seniavin troops for storming the fortress. Although the Russian commander was in dire need of assault troops, he also knew the danger in allowing Ali Pasha to gain a foothold on the island.¹² Consequently, he declined Ali's offer. Instead, Seniavin called upon the islanders to supplement his landing force. Within a few days over 300 islanders were manning the batteries and working the big guns.

¹¹A. Viskovatov, "Vzятие острова Святых Мавры Капитаном 1-го ранга Сениавиным в 1798 году," Slavianin, VII (1828), p. 314.

¹²Shapiro, p. 79.

Beginning on November 3, the batteries commenced a sustained bombardment of the fortress. The monotonous cannonade was interrupted only by Seniavin's repeated summons to surrender. Although Seniavin offered the French garrison honors of war, he would not offer the French parole back to France, a point on which Mialet was adamant.¹³ The Turkish commander advised Seniavin to agree to any terms and then massacre the French after they had stacked their arms. Seniavin indignantly replied that such conduct was "barbarous", to which the Turk rejoined that "it was not barbarous at all, but rather a stratagem."¹⁴

To the disgust of the Turks the bombardment continued. The effectiveness of the bombardment was considerably reduced because the siege guns were too far from the fortress. Moreover, the Russians fired at the strongest part of the walls. Storming the fortress was out of the question since, in terms of trained troops, Seniavin was barely superior to the French within the fortress. On November 9, the French made a sortie against the siege lines. The 300 attacking troops were turned back with heavy losses by the withering fire of the siege guns.

¹³Viskovatov, p. 318.

¹⁴Quoted in Viskovatov, pp. 318-319.

On November 10, Ushakov arrived at Santa Maura with the main fleet. After inspecting the siege works, the Russian admiral had only praise for Seniavin's dispositions. Ushakov ordered the bombardment intensified and warned Major Mialet that if the French did not surrender on Seniavin's terms, he would accept Ali's offer of 11,000 troops and not one Frenchman would be shown quarter.¹⁵

Two more days of bombardment persuaded Major Mialet to surrender. Most of the fortress cannon had been silenced by the fire of the besiegers. Twenty per cent of his men were out of action, the wounded were without medicines, and the garrison had provisions for only a few days. Moreover, several thousand more islanders had arrived at the Russian camp in response to an appeal by Ushakov.¹⁶ On November 15, after a fifteen-day siege, the French marched out of the fortress with honors of war, but without permission to return to France on parole.¹⁷ The prisoners were divided between the allies, but Ushakov magnanimously paroled all the officers and ordered that the prisoners sent to Patras be treated with humanity.¹⁸ The garrison

¹⁵Adm. Ushakov to Major Mialet, Nov. 12, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 158, pp. 161-162.

¹⁶Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Nov. 18, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 170, pp. 175-176.

¹⁷Viskovatov, pp. 322-323.

¹⁸Adm. Ushakov to Capt. K. Konstantinov, Nov. 17, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 168, p. 173.

at Santa Maura raised the total number of French prisoners taken by the fleet to over 1,500.

Ushakov established a provisional government at Santa Maura comparable to those of the other conquered islands. However, the Russian admiral appointed a native, Count Angelo Orio, as military commander of the island.¹⁹ The appointment of Count Orio was indicative of the partial return to the type of government which had existed under Venice. A Venetian by birth, Count Orio served as a rear-admiral in the Venetian navy and was the proveditore of Cephalonia for two years. While Ushakov was willing to broaden the base of government by extending the franchise to the merchant class, the aristocracy still played the leading role in Ushakov's scheme of government.

Ushakov left a garrison of 14 men on the island. Seniavin, with the Sv. Petr and the Navarkhia, remained at Santa Maura temporarily to supervise the establishment of the government and to maintain order. Before he departed from the island on November 18, Ushakov assured the islanders, still frightened by Ali's army, that if Ali Pasha made a threatening move against Santa Maura, he would be treated as an enemy of the Tsar.²⁰

With the fall of Santa Maura, all but Corfu was in

¹⁹Adm. Ushakov and Adm. Kadir Bey to the Inhabitants of Santa Maura, Nov. 17, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 167, pp. 172-173.

²⁰Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Nov. 17, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 166, p. 171.

the hands of Ushakov. Paxo, an island of 5,000 inhabitants located halfway between Santa Maura and Corfu, was undefended and surrendered to the Russians without incident. Islets such as Kalamo and Kastro likewise fell effortlessly to the allies. From Santa Maura, Ushakov sailed directly to Corfu to besiege a fortress which had not been taken in over four centuries.

The island of Corfu, situated at the mouth of the Adriatic Sea, is 37 miles long and 17 miles wide with an area of 229 square miles. The island is separated from the coast of Epirus by a narrow channel varying in width from 2 miles in the north and south to 15 miles in the center. The population of the island at the end of the eighteenth century was approximately 55,000. The town of Corfu is situated on a high promontory jutting out into the central bay on the island's east coast. The town's population numbered 14,000, including 4,000 Catholics and 2,000 Jews.²¹ The port of Corfu was one of the most spacious in the Levant.

The fortifications of the town were a product of centuries of improvement. The Old Citadel, perched on a rocky height at the end of the promontory and separated from the town by an esplanade, was built by the Genoese in the thirteenth century and later strengthened by the

²¹ Arnault, III, 110.

Venetians. In 1537 the fortress successfully withstood a siege by Barbarossa. Forty years later, the city walls were strengthened and a fortress, known as the New Citadel, was built at the northern end of the city walls. In the year of Lepanto the town withstood another Turkish siege. By 1614, Corfu was considered impregnable by contemporaries.²² In 1671 the town was fortified with all the intricate defensive devices which were current in seventeenth century Europe.

In 1715-16, the fortress withstood its last great siege. For forty days 30,000 Turks besieged the town. The spirited and successful defense, led by Count John Matthias von der Schulemburg, won the admiration of western Europe.²³ After the siege, Marshal von der Schulemburg benefited from experience and strengthened the fortifications still more. On the heights in front of the city walls, three forts were built: Abraham, St. Salvatore, and St. Rocco. Those outworks were connected with the town by subterranean passages.

²² Henry Jervis, History of the Island of Corfu and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands (London: Colburn and Co., 1852), p. 126.

²³ Count Pierre Antoine Daru, Histoire de la République de Venise (Stuttgart: Charles Hoffman, 1828), V, 143-153.

Although the French found the fortress in a dilapidated state,²⁴ Chabot energetically renovated the old defenses and erected new ones. The little wooded island of Vido (Scoglio di Vido), located within cannon range of the Old Citadel, was fortified with five batteries. The fortress mounted 560 cannon, but many were unserviceable. By the end of the siege, the French had 450 cannon in operation. With its three lines of fortifications and strong natural position, Corfu was the equal of Malta.

Paradoxically the strength of the fortress was potentially one of its weaknesses. Both General Chabot,²⁵ French commander at Corfu, and Vladimir Bronevskii,²⁶ a Russian officer who inspected the fortress in 1806 observed that such extensive fortifications required a garrison of at least 10,000 men. At the beginning of the siege, the defenders numbered slightly over 3,000.²⁷

²⁴ Report of Commissioner-General Dubois to the Directory, April, 1799. Quoted in Pisani, p. 213.

²⁵ Quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 131.

²⁶ Vladimir B. Bronevskii, Zapiski morskago ofitsera (St. Petersburg: Morskaia Tipografiia, 1818-1819), II, p. 91.

²⁷ French estimates range as low as 1,800 men (Bellaire, p. 292), but include only the regular military establishment at Corfu. The garrison was supplemented by troops evacuated from Ithaca and Butrinto, by crews from the warships in the harbor, and by volunteers from pro-French Corfiotes and French civilians. At the surrender, 2,931 men laid down their arms, including 379 sailors (Adm. Ushakov to Tsar, Paul, March 20, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 312, pp. 421-422).

The backbone of the garrison was the 1,450 men of the 79th Brigade, seasoned veterans of the campaigns in northern Italy. The harbor defenses were supplemented by the ship-of-the-line Généreux 74, seven lesser warships, and the captured British frigate Leander 50. In August the Leander had been captured off Crete and taken to Corfu.²⁸ Corfu was provisioned with enough grain and wine for six months, but had a supply of meat, vegetables and medicines for only a few weeks.

The Corfiotes shared with the other Ionians an abiding hatred of the French. Since the French civil and military headquarters were at Corfu, that island felt the weight of French officialdom more than the others. After the news arrived that Ushakov was already at Cerigo, Commissioner-General Dubois supplanted the regular government with an extraordinary commission of seven members, all of whom were French.²⁹ Dubois also established a military commission to try any Ionians suspected of treason. On October 18, the French took the ultimate step and declared a state of siege at Corfu. At a time when the French should have been wooing the Corfiotes, the islanders were abruptly excluded from the government and subjected to arbitrary rule by decree.

²⁸Sir Thomas B. Thompson, "Biographical Memoir of Sir Thomas Boulden Thompson," The Naval Chronicle, XIV (1805), 1-12.

²⁹Bellaire, p. 272.

Dubois confidently issued an appeal for volunteers. Playing upon the hatred of the Corfiotes for the Turks, he proclaimed that an alliance between "the Cross and the Crescent" could not last.³⁰ Instead of the thousands of volunteers optimistically expected by Dubois, there were only enough volunteers, mostly Jews, to form two small auxiliary units.

When the disloyal behavior of the Cephalonians became known at Corfu, the French took more stringent measures, including the suppression of the native courts. An empty treasury impelled General Chabot to goad the Corfiotes still more by harsh financial exactions. The French general summoned to the fortress 32 notables of the island and demanded 60,000 thalers. When the Corfiotes balked, Chabot declared that those who did not pay their quota would be imprisoned on the Généreux for the duration of hostilities.³¹ Only the fiercely anti-French Count Antonio Capodistrias, who had been imprisoned by the French before, chose not to pay and suffered the consequences.

The latest French measures together with news of Ushakov's successes caused the ferment on the island to increase to explosive proportions. When Chabot learned

³⁰Quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 137.

³¹Rodocanachi, pp. 132-133.

that Corfiote nobles were slipping out of the city to arouse the countryside, he decided to take drastic measures. On October 22, as the streets were cordoned off by cavalry units and the garrison formed up in battle dress on the esplanade, Chabot decreed that all arms must be immediately surrendered to the French. Threatened with the death penalty in the event of refusal, the townspeople sullenly obeyed without incident.

In the countryside, the agitation of Capodistrias, Bulgari and other nobles and priests bore bloody fruit; the peasants refused to surrender their arms. The first test of strength between the peasants and the French occurred at Manducchio, a small hamlet within sight of Corfu. On the night of November 2 the Manducchiotes sent their wives and children into the interior of the island and took up positions on the heights opposite Fort Abraham. During the night their ranks were swelled by hundreds of peasants from neighboring villages. On the morning of November 3, Chabot awoke to find 1,200 defiant and well armed peasants daring the French to take their weapons.³² At 7:00 Chabot marched against Manducchio with 800 men and a field gun. Because the peasants had entrenched themselves so skillfully in the broken terrain and in the village houses, Chabot ordered the guns of the New Citadel

³²

Bellaire, pp. 285-286.

to bombard the village. In addition, 3 gunboats moved along the coast, raking the small harbor of Manducchio. After seven hours of combat, the hardy peasants were driven street by street back through their village. To punish the unexpectedly warlike Manducchiotes, Chabot ordered the village put to the torch.

The neighboring village of Benuzzi was likewise razed when the people refused to surrender their arms.³³ The execution of several Manducchiotes in front of their eyes persuaded the inhabitants of San Rocco and Kastradhes to deliver up their arms. Grain detachments encountered determined resistance. At Lebenizze, a French detachment of 15 men was attacked by 150 irate villagers.

The bitter reaction of the people to the bloodshed caused the flow of provisions to the fortress to slow to a trickle. When Manducchio was burned, an Orthodox monastery in the village was also gutted and its sacred objects carried off by French soldiers. Although the objects were soon returned, the damage had been done. The Protopappas of Corfu, himself, went into the countryside to incite the faithful against the atheistic French. The French had clumsily alienated even those Corfiotes who had previously been indifferent.

³³Botta, IV, 50.

The Manducchio uprising was tragically premature. Two days after Ushakov had sent Seniavin to Santa Maura, he dispatched a squadron under Captain Selivachev to Corfu.³⁴ Selivachev's squadron, comprising 3 ships-of-the-line and 3 frigates, was assigned the task of instituting a blockade of Corfu and making overtures to the Corfiotes. Selivachev arrived at Corfu on November 5, one day after the Manducchio uprising. Anchoring off Vido, Selivachev sent a Russian colonel to General Chabot with a summons to surrender. Although Chabot emphatically declined, he treated the Russian officer to a banquet and an opera, L'Entrée des Français au Kaire.

Chabot's resolve to defend Corfu to the last extremity was strengthened when, on November 6, the corvette La Brune slipped past Selivachev's warships and informed Chabot of the imminent arrival of 3,000 reinforcements from Ancona.³⁵ Encouraged by this welcome news, Chabot issued a stirring proclamation declaring that before Corfu would fall under the "yoke of the Crescent" the Corfiotes would see the French "die for them and with them."³⁶ This promise only terrified the hapless Corfiotes still more. Frightened by rumors that the French had mined the city and would blow it up if necessary, the townspeople streamed

³⁴ Adm. Ushakov to Capt. I. A. Selivachev, Oct. 31, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 137, p. 139.

³⁵ Bellaire, p. 292.

³⁶ Quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 138.

into the countryside, carrying their hatred of the French with them.

Selivachev had no difficulty establishing contact with sympathetic Corfiotes. The leading nobles and churchmen of the island visited the Russian commodore on his ship and pledged their loyalty and support. However, the Corfiotes were obsessed by fear of the Turks. The island leaders grandly promised Selivachev that they would raise up to 15,000 men if Turks were not landed on the island.³⁷ Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the Corfiotes, Selivachev was in no position to commit himself on that point.

Lacking troops, Selivachev was limited to blockading the town. A blockade was difficult because of the number of small, secondary harbors along the coast and also because of the harassing activity of the Généreux. In the early days of the blockade, the Généreux spiritedly sallied out against individual blockading ships five times, forcing Selivachev to keep his small squadron concentrated.

A week after the commencement of the blockade, Captain Poskochin arrived with 4 warships, enabling a tightening of the ineffectual blockade. On November 20, Ushakov himself arrived from Santa Maura with 4 liners and 2 frigates, raising the total number of ships off Corfu to

³⁷Capt. Selivachev to Adm. Ushakov, Nov. 12, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 160, pp. 163-164.

8 ships-of-the-line and 7 frigates. Ushakov instituted a tight blockade, forming a semi-circle around the promontory with Russian warships on the flanks.

Lacking a sufficient number of landing troops to invest the fortress, Ushakov had to be content with blockading the town while awaiting the arrival of troops from the mainland. When the islanders saw a detachment of Turkish troops disembark down the coast from Corfu at the Bay of Paleopolis, their ardor for the Russian cause cooled markedly. In some cases, Ushakov had to resort to threats of stationing Moslem troops in a village in order to persuade the villagers to raise the Russian flag.³⁸ However, the tight blockade forced the French to send foraging expeditions far into the interior of the island with resultant depredations. The havoc wrought by the French detachments caused the villagers to overcome their fear of the Turks and request protection against the French.³⁹

In response to requests of the Corfiotes, Ushakov dispatched Captain Kikin with 128 men to erect a small battery on Mt. Olivetto, located northwest of Manducchio within cannon range of Ft. Abraham.⁴⁰ The detachment was sup-

³⁸ Proclamation of Adm. Ushakov to the Inhabitants of Gorizza, Nov. 26, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 186, p. 207.

³⁹ Entry in Ushakov's journal, November 23, 1798. Mordvinov, II, No. 210, pp. 232-233.

⁴⁰ Entry for April 15, 1798, "Zhurnal admiralteistvekollegii," Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVI, no. 2766, p. 457.

plemented by island volunteers, who received their baptismal fire when repulsing a French sortie during the erection of the battery. A few days later, the inhabitants of Gorizza, to the southeast of the fortress, made a similar appeal to Ushakov. Although the Russian admiral was hesitant to commit himself near the fortress before the arrival of supporting troops, the promise of volunteers from the villages persuaded him to dispatch a small force of 12 soldiers and engineers with 3 guns to erect a battery on Mt. St. Pantaleone opposite Ft. St. Salvatore.⁴¹

With the aid of 2,000 armed villagers the battery was erected without incident and lazily began to bombard Ft. St. Salvatore. Many Cephalonians and Zantiotes who had come to Corfu with Ushakov were used in the new batteries and proved of value in maintaining harmonious relations between the villagers and the Russians. With the Mt. Olivetto battery to the northwest of the fortress and the St. Pantaleone battery to the southwest, Ushakov had begun to erect a fortified line across the base of the promontory on which the city was situated. A line of siege works anchored by the two batteries would eventually cut off the city of Corfu from the rest of the island.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Each day the French could see from the towers of the Citadel a Russian flag being raised over another village. Disturbed by the exodus out of the city, the French threatened the townspeople with imprisonment and confiscation of their property if they were caught leaving the city unauthorized. Virtual civil war raged in the countryside. Bands of peasants opportunistically posing as Jacobins ranged the interior of the island pillaging the houses of rich merchants and nobles.⁴² Their excesses continued until other bands were formed to combat them. Some of the counter-bands were partisans of Russia; others simply sold their protection to the highest bidder. Ushakov lacked sufficient troops to control the island completely in the face of French detachments and marauding brigands. The villages in the vicinity of the fortress suffered most, being prey to both French and Russian detachments in an endless cycle of retaliation. There could be no neutrals on the island; each village had to raise an incriminating flag of some kind.

The French vindictively made an example of the large village of Kastradhes. Situated on the coast between Ft. St. Salvatore and the Russian battery at St. Pantaleone, the village was vulnerable to both adversaries. After the

⁴²Rodocanachi, pp. 138-139.

arrival of the fleet, the people of Kastradhes had imprudently showed their hatred for the French. Individual French soldiers were mistreated and the villagers refused to sell foodstuffs. On November 28, Chabot occupied Kastradhes in force and methodically plundered the village. All the wine in the village was carried to the fortress, the valuable olive oil was sold to the Jews, and the rest of the booty was divided among the soldiers. Even doors and windows were carried off for use as firewood. The church was stripped of its ornaments, which were sold to Jews who in turn resold them to the outraged villagers. After the booty had been carted off, the village was levelled.⁴³ Ushakov witnessed from aboard ship the destruction of Kastradhes, but without troops he could only fire ineffective cannon shots.

In the last week of November, Russian and French activity was limited to a mutual probing of defenses. By a surprise attack, a small band of Albanians in Russian service penetrated into Ft. St. Salvatore, but were quickly driven back in a brisk engagement. To maintain the morale of his troops, Chabot conducted a series of minor operations against the enemy siege lines, which each day became more formidable.

When more Turks began landing at the Bay of Paleopo-

⁴³Rodocanachi, pp. 141-142.

lis and shot from the Russian batteries began falling on the town, Chabot decided to drive the enemy from their positions on St. Pantaleone. At 9:00 on the morning of December 1, 600 men and 2 field pieces moved against St. Pantaleone, which was defended by 17 Russians and 1,500 Corfiotes. The Corfiotes could not withstand the seasoned French veterans and all 1,500 broke and fled from the battery, whose guns were then spiked by the French.⁴⁴ Many of the fleeing Corfiotes were penned against the sea and slaughtered. A Zantiote noble, Count Mercati, was captured by the French and summarily executed for treason.

Flushed with his easy victory, Chabot ordered an immediate attack on Mt. Olivetto, which was defended by 340 Russians, 200 Turks and several hundred volunteers.⁴⁵ The volunteers proved to be as useless as at St. Pantaleone. Three French columns, totaling 1,000 men, moved through Manducchio toward Mt. Olivetto. In the face of a sudden rainstorm and stiff Russian resistance behind every tree and house, the French fought their way up the hill to the battery. With cannon firing grapeshot pointblank, the hand-to-hand combat raged inconclusively until Russian reinforcements arrived from the main camp at Potamo up the coast. The French effected a retreat in good order. One-

⁴⁴Ushakov's journal, Dec. 1, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 210, p. 234.

⁴⁵Entry for April 15, 1799, "Zhurnal admiralteistvekollegii," Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVI, no. 2766, p. 458.

third of the Russian defenders of Olivetto were casualties.⁴⁶

The engagement on Mt. Olivetto was the first significant encounter between Russian and French troops during the campaign. The Russians were impressed by the audacity and spirit with which the French attacked; the French were equally impressed by the ability of the disciplined Russian soldiers to cling stubbornly to a position in the face of superior numbers. The French were particularly impressed by the fear of Russians who had been captured during the engagement to be exchanged. The French were told by the disconsolate prisoners that Russians who surrendered without having been wounded would be severely punished. The French, ever sensitive to matters of that kind, gave captured Russians certificates explaining the circumstances in which they were captured.⁴⁷

The failure of the attack on Mt. Olivetto persuaded Chabot to discontinue for a few weeks sorties in force, particularly since Ushakov soon added troops and guns to the Mt. Olivetto battery and rebuilt the battery at St. Pantaleone. The fleet was steadily augmented in the remainder of December and early January 1799. On December 3, Seniavin arrived from Santa Maura with a line-of-battle

⁴⁶Ushakov's journal, Dec. 1, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 210, p. 234.

⁴⁷Rodocanachi, p. 145.

ship and a frigate. On December 20, Sorokin arrived with two frigates from Egypt. The blockade of Alexandria continued, but Sorokin had left because of insufficient provisions and because of friction with the British, who had expected more Russian assistance.⁴⁸ On January 10, 1799, Rear-Admiral Pustoshkin arrived from Sevastopol with 2 ships-of-the-line to reinforce Ushakov's fleet. Finally, a ship-of-the-line and a frigate returned from Patras, where they had convoyed prisoners. By the middle of January 1799, Ushakov had an imposing fleet of 12 liners and 11 frigates.

However, Ushakov was strong only at sea. The British were discovering at Malta that a naval blockade is a very inefficient way to reduce a fortress. Without troops to invest the fortress, activity in December was limited to skirmishes around the coastal batteries established by the Turks and Russians. On December 15, the Mt. Olivetto battery was increased to 10 siege guns and in succeeding days the reconstructed St. Pantaleone battery was increased to 30 guns. The Turks, intending eventually to link up with the Russian position in the north, began extending their line of fortifications inland from the coast to the south of Corfu.

⁴⁸"Zhurnal plavaniia otriada A. A. Sorokina," Mordvinov, II, no. 216, p. 242.

Beginning on December 12, the Russian batteries opened a bombardment of the town which never ceased until the capitulation nearly three months later. The effectiveness of the cannonade was seriously reduced by the Russian practice of firing in salvos, which enabled the French to time the salvos and reduce casualties.⁴⁹ French sallies, limited to a few hundred men, continually harassed the Turks and Russians in their efforts to improve the siege works. Turkish counterattacks frequently led to bloody skirmishes on the glacis on Ft. Abraham and Ft. St. Salvatore. Since the French still had numerical superiority in troops, however, all engagements in December and January were indecisive.

At sea, the fleet monotonously patrolled the Corfu Channel. On a sunny day the fleet presented to the Corfiotes a picturesque spectacle of towering ships-of-the-line bedecked with pennants methodically beating into the wind while tiny, colorful xebecs busily darted about the channel. Ushakov was merciless in keeping his ships on station in all weather. The Russian admiral was tormented by a double fear--the escape of the French ships at Corfu or the arrival of a relief expedition from Italy. When one of his captains complained of the difficulties of

⁴⁹Bellaire, p. 354.

maintaining his station, Ushakov sent him a scathingly sardonic letter and ordered him to make even more exertions on pain of disgrace.⁵⁰

The last weeks of December were the darkest of the campaign. With Corfu only partially besieged, there was no hope of the fortress being starved into capitulation, particularly since there was a distinct possibility that help would arrive from Ancona. The onset of winter with its stormy rains paralyzed siege operations and severely punished the exposed fleet. The winter of 1798-1799 was extremely rigorous in all of Greece.⁵¹ The winds in the Ionian Sea are predominantly northerly and westerly, but in winter the wind frequently blows from the east. As a result, Ushakov's weather-beaten warships were operating off a windward coast.

Unlike the well constructed Turkish vessels with their coppered bottoms, Ushakov's ships were not good sailers. The buffeting of wind and rain incapacitated several of his ships at a time. Ushakov's reports on the condition of his ships attracted the attention of the Tsar, who ordered improvements to be made in the future.⁵² In addition to the rigors of bad weather,

⁵⁰ Adm. Ushakov to Capt. I. A. Selivachev, Jan. 5, 1799. *Mordvinov*, II, no. 236, pp. 271-273.

⁵¹ Pouqueville, *Voyage*, III, 29.

⁵² Count Kushelev to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, Feb. 26, 1800. Ogorodnikov, *Materialy*, XVI, no. 633, p. 485.

sickness inevitably spread throughout the fleet and the troops ashore. The Corfu area was frequently swept by plagues, usually arising in the marshy Leftimo district. When working on the fortifications in 1797-1798, the French lost over 500 men from sickness.⁵³

The most serious of Ushakov's problems were not beyond human control. Since the commencement of the campaign, Ushakov had been tormented by a lack of provisions. The fleet was always short of munitions, funds, clothing, and essential foodstuffs. On one occasion, Ushakov's crews were on the verge of starvation.⁵⁴ Ushakov incessantly wrote to Tomara, the Turkish admiral, and Ottoman officials pleading for provisions.⁵⁵ The lack of adequate supplies was partially the result of the distance from Black Sea ports and Russia's lack of a maritime tradition and experience. Moreover, by 1799, there were multiple demands upon Russian resources. Suvorov's campaign in northern Italy, which was infinitely more important than the Ionian campaign, was a steady drain on Russia's resources. However, most of the fleet's provisions were supposed to come from the Porte. The Porte faithfully kept its treaty obligation to defray most of the expenses of the fleet. In

⁵³Goodisson, p. 31.

⁵⁴Adm. Ushakov to Adm. Kadir Bey, Nov. 26, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 185. p. 206.

⁵⁵Mordvinov II, nos. 175, 179, 211, 214, 229, 234.

November, Tomara received from the Porte 150,000 piastres, of which 100,000 were sent to Ushakov.⁵⁶

The Porte had also agreed to instruct the coastal pashas to furnish foodstuffs to the fleet, but the pashas, acting either by design or because of incompetence, did so only sporadically. Tomara finally prevailed upon the Porte to send a special official to Patras, the center for sending provisions, but the presence of another official only added to the confusion. Ushakov could have scoured the conquered islands for foodstuffs, but he refused to resort to arbitrary exactions. When he had the money, Ushakov bought supplies from the islanders, but foodstuffs were scarce. The islands were not agriculturally self-sufficient even in normal times. The acute and enduring shortage of supplies led Ushakov to write in exasperation, "In all history I cannot find an example where a fleet was left in such an extremity as we now find ourselves, far from home without any provisions at all."⁵⁷

While besieging Corfu with insufficient resources, Ushakov was called upon to play a role in other theaters.

⁵⁶ V. S. Tomara to Tsar Paul, Nov. 27, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 188, p. 209.

⁵⁷ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, April 9, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 340. p. 451.

The Russian minister to Naples begged Ushakov to send assistance to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which was threatened by the French.⁵⁸ The Tsar ordered Ushakov to send warships to Odessa to transport two battalions designated as the garrison of Malta after its capitulation. Two weeks later, Ushakov was instructed to send a squadron to Zara (Zadar) on the Dalmatian coast to convoy Russian troops destined to assist the King of Naples.⁵⁹ In January, the erratic Tsar ordered Ushakov to weaken his fleet still more by detaching 4 ships-of-the-line to defend Sardinia against the French.⁶⁰ Hesitant to disperse his fleet, Ushakov risked the Tsar's wrath and refused to send ships to Naples or Sardinia. The Tsar's ephemeral schemes kept Ushakov in a constant state of uncertainty as to the wisdom of committing troops on the island of Corfu.

The hostile attitude of Nelson added to Ushakov's difficulty in keeping his fleet concentrated at Corfu. Nelson did not want the Russians at Corfu in the first place. When the British admiral learned of Russian designs on Malta in addition, he wrote to one of his captains, "I hate the

⁵⁸V. V. Musin-Pushkin to Adm. Ushakov, Nov. 17, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 169, p. 175.

⁵⁹Tsar Paul to Adm. Ushakov, Jan. 9, 1799. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVI, no. 463, p. 282.

⁶⁰Tsar Paul to Adm. Ushakov, Feb. 4, 1799. Ibid., no. 474, pp. 344-345.

Russians."⁶¹ Throughout the siege, the British at Constantinople maneuvered to get orders for Ushakov and Kadir Bey to raise the blockade and split the fleet, sending detachments to Italy and Egypt.⁶² Nelson corresponded freely with Kadir Bey, although the Turkish admiral was a subordinate of Ushakov. Nelson urged Kadir Bey to send ships to Messina or Egypt.⁶³ The jealous Nelson wanted Russian and Turkish warships to operate as auxiliaries to his own squadrons rather than as a completely independent command.

The herculean task of maintaining harmonious relations between the Russians and the Turks under his command burdened the Russian admiral with still more anxiety. Ushakov was repeatedly forced to reprimand Turkish officers for not controlling their troops. The Turkish garrison at Cerigo caused disturbances with the inhabitants and had to be disciplined by Ushakov acting through Kadir Bey.⁶⁴ During the siege of Santa Maura, Seniavin had great difficulty in preventing the Turkish troops from molesting the

⁶¹ Adm. Nelson to Captain Ball, Jan. 21, 1799. Nelson, Dispatches, III, 236.

⁶² V. S. Tomara to Admiral Ushakov, Jan. 11, 1799, Feb. 9, 1799. Mordvinov, II, nos. 246, 265, pp. 282, 304.

⁶³ Adm. Nelson to Kadir Bey, Dec. 17, 1798, Feb. 15, 1799, Nelson, Dispatches, III, pp. 204, 265.

⁶⁴ Adm. Ushakov to Lieut. Diamanti, Dec. 6, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 197, p. 220.

inhabitants. After the Turks had plundered the house of a noble at Santa Maura, a delegation protested to Ushakov the disorders caused by the Turks. Ushakov could only call upon Kadir Bey to take preventive measures.⁶⁵ One of the reasons for the clamor of the islanders for annexation to Russia was the horror of the Ionians at the presence of Turks on the islands.⁶⁶

When Russians and Turks served together in batteries at Corfu, there were inevitable brawls. On one occasion some Turks refused to help the Russian cannoneers load the guns. In the resultant scuffle two Russians were killed, a Turk was wounded and two janissaries fled to the French lines for refuge. The islanders were more terrified of the Turks and Albanians than of the French. During the erection of siege works, the Turks, with complete disregard for the feelings of the inhabitants, placed a cannon in the Church of St. Athanasius, which was advantageously situated on the heights behind Corfu. French attempts to silence the cannon demolished the centuries-old church. Only the unimpeachable behavior of the

⁶⁵ Adm. Ushakov to Adm. Kadir Bey, Nov. 16, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 141, pp. 166-168.

⁶⁶ Adm. Ushakov to Count Kushelev, Vice-Pres. of the Admiralty-Kollegiia, Nov. 21, 1798. Ibid., II, no. 178, p. 195.

Russian troops prevented mass defections to the French. The devout islanders were impressed when the Russian troops before retirement every evening formed up into battalions for a communal prayer service.

Little could be done to improve the relations between Russian and Turkish soldiers, but Ushakov did his best on higher levels. Ushakov succeeded in establishing, at least outwardly, a cordial relationship with Kadir Bey.⁶⁷ Ushakov periodically distributed gifts to Turkish crews. But the Russian admiral's efforts were hindered by his instructions and by the ignorance and incompetence of the Turkish officers. A French prisoner aboard the fleet off Corfu reported that Kadir Bey harassed Ushakov with such proposals as sailing to Paris and bombarding the French capital.⁶⁸ Ushakov was contemptuous of the fighting ability of the Turks. During most of the blockade, the Turkish warships remained uselessly at anchor in spite of prodding by the Russian admiral.⁶⁹ After the end of the siege, Ushakov confided to Tomara that the Turks deserved no credit for the victory.⁷⁰

⁶⁷Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, March 16, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 303, p. 405.

⁶⁸Pouqueville, Voyage, II, 19.

⁶⁹Adm. Ushakov to Adm. Kadir Bey, March 27, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 325, p. 436.

⁷⁰Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, March 27, 1799. Miliutin, III, 107.

Tomara had instructed Ushakov always to keep control of captured towns and fortresses in Russian hands.⁷¹ Ushakov succeeded in that endeavor, but he could not always be tactful in doing so. According to the British ambassador at Constantinople, Kadir Bey returned from the Ionian campaign "with innumerable complaints against the Russians."⁷² The serious after effects of friction between the Russians and Turks during the campaign were revealed in a conversation which the Kapudan Pasha had with Captain Sir Sidney Smith more than a year after the fall of Corfu. The Kapudan Pasha was so enraged by what he considered Russia's arrogant and overbearing behavior at Corfu that he refused to salute Russian warships. When Sir Sidney Smith counseled him against such an unwise policy the Turkish admiral replied: "I will return your salute gun for gun even if you give me a hundred, not only because you are my old friend, but because the English are lords of the sea, but I never can be a friend of a Russian and the few seamen they have are actually my master's subjects."⁷³

⁷¹V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, Nov. 24, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 181, pp. 198-199.

⁷²Lord Elgin to Adm. Nelson, Jan. 15, 1800. The Spencer Papers, IV, 107.

⁷³Capt. Sir Sidney Smith to Lord Keith, Sept. 2, 1800. Christopher Lloyd, ed., The Keith Papers; Selected from the Papers of Admiral Viscount Keith (London: Navy Records Society, 1950), II, no. 26, p. 370.

The onset of a harsh winter, the acute shortage of supplies, and the lack of troops caused widespread despair among the Russian officers. Some proposed raising the ineffective siege, but Ushakov was not among them. After the fall of Corfu, Tomara reported that in the gloomy weeks of December and January the Turkish ministers had been convinced that Corfu would never be taken.⁷⁴ Ushakov, however, believed that if he could obtain a few thousand Albanian troops, he could reduce the fortress. Consequently, he clung to his position at Corfu awaiting whatever the future might bring.

While the fleet was suffering on a winter station, the besieged were feeling the harsh effects of a two-month blockade. Supplies of meat and vegetables within the city had been exhausted. By the end of December all horses, mules, donkeys and pets had disappeared from the city. Soldiers were detailed to trap rats. A pigeon sold for 12 francs and a rat for 3 francs. Houses were torn down for use as firewood. Sickness spread rapidly, enervating the garrison and driving the townspeople to desperation. French military hospitals always had at least 400 patients, forcing Chabot to ration his men as carefully as his bread. Medicines were unobtainable.

⁷⁴V. S. Tomara to Tsar Paul, Mar. 27, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 326. pp. 438-439.

With so many fortifications to man and sorties to make, the French garrison was dangerously overtaxed. Italian newspapers, sagaciously sent to Chabot by the Russian admiral, brought only depressing news of French defeats in northern Italy and on the Rhine. The atmosphere of depression which settled over the fortress was only partially dissipated by the reports of exchanged prisoners that the enemy was critically short of provisions and troops. To relax his weary soldiers and to divert the sullen townspeople, Chabot ordered a free carnival twice weekly.

As the siege wore on, more and more of the townspeople turned against the French, who were blamed for the hardships. A few hundred Corfiotes remained loyal to the French to the end and fought on the walls. The Jews never wavered in their loyalty to the French.⁷⁵ Jews under military age performed heroic acts of carrying munitions under fire and retrieving wounded from the glacis. However, the vast majority of the townspeople not only refused to help the French, but openly showed their pro-Russian feelings. The annual procession through the streets honoring St. Spiridion was an occasion for demonstrating solidarity with the coreligionists beyond the walls. At each new pro-Russian demonstration, the rage of the French

⁷⁵ Bellaire, p. 370.

increased. French officers vainly proclaimed that at the end of the siege the inhabitants would pay dearly for their treason to France.⁷⁶

The townspeople kept Ushakov well-informed of French activities, usually by means of signals from the higher houses. Twice the Cénéreux, attempting to slip past the blockading ships, had to return to port when blinking lights were observed in the city. On one occasion, as soon as a French unit had formed up on the esplanade for a ceremony, shot began raining down on the exact spot, giving clear evidence of Ushakov's good intelligence within the city. The French forbade the ringing of church bells through fear of their use as signals. Suspected persons were arrested and either expelled from the town or imprisoned. The death penalty was decreed for anyone caught signalling the enemy. The prisons of Corfu were engorged.⁷⁷ In the epidemic of denunciations inevitably many personal scores were settled. Count Antonio Capodistrias, who had been imprisoned for refusing to pay his quota to the French, was released on parole and caught while attempting flight. In consequence, Capodistrias, who was the "soul of the revolt" on Corfu,⁷⁸ was condemned to death, a measure which

⁷⁶ Rodocanachi, p. 141.

⁷⁷ Rodocanachi, p. 153.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 140.

caused increased agitation among the Corfiotes. The increasing hostility of the townspeople forced Chabot to divert precious troops to patrol the streets of the town.

The decisive factor in the siege would be the number of Albanian troops Ushakov could procure to invest the town. There was no hope of getting more troops from Russia because of Suvorov's campaign and because of Russia's acute and perennial shortage of troop transports. The Turks were fully occupied with the French in Egypt and the rebellious Pasvan-Oglu. Ushakov had raised a contingent of 250 Albanians from among Albanians who were residents, usually as fugitives, in the Ionian Islands. The 250 Albanians were integrated with the Russian troops and each Albanian received 10 piastres a month. Tomara had given his permission for the recruitment of soldiers, provided Ushakov did not recruit Souliotes or other habitual enemies of the pashas in Albania and Greece. It was not unusual for Albanians to serve in foreign armies. At that time the Albanians played a role in the Levant similar to that of the Swiss condottieri in Renaissance Italy. There were Albanian units in the armies of Britain, Naples, and of the Rumanian hospodars. However, recruiting Albanians could not possibly fulfill Ushakov's requirements. Ushakov's only recourse was to the semi-

private armies of Albanian pashas.

At the commencement of the campaign, the Sultan had sent firmans to the pashas of Yanina, Valona (Vlonë), Scutari (Shkodër), and Delvino (Delvinë), commanding them to supply to Ushakov up to 3,000 troops each if called upon.⁷⁹ The promised 12,000 men would have been more than sufficient for Ushakov's purposes, but the frustrated Russian admiral could not obtain them in spite of the firmans. Ibrahim Pasha of Scutari sent only 250 soldiers and then promptly lost interest in the siege. The other pashas procrastinated. In his correspondence with the pashas, Ushakov soon discovered that the Pasha of Yanina was the key. Ali Pasha, the most powerful of the pashas, was feared by the others, who would not commit troops on Corfu if Ali remained in Albania with a large army.⁸⁰ Ushakov's task was to prevail upon the erratic and virtually independent Pasha of Yanina to comply with the orders of Selim III.

Persuading Ali to help was an ambitious undertaking. Ali was still sulking from his setbacks at Parga and Santa Maura. Moreover, Ali had been negotiating with General Chabot even after the siege had begun. Ali proposed to

⁷⁹Miliutin, I, 108.

⁸⁰Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Dec. 29, 1798. Mordvinov, II, no. 230, p. 259.

the French that in return for sending the French garrison to Ancona, he would occupy Corfu fortress with a large army and present Ushakov with a fait accompli.⁸¹ Such a scheme would have been impossible to carry out as long as Ushakov was in control of Corfu Channel, but the scheme revealed the pasha's attitude toward both Selim III and Ushakov. During the siege, Ushakov had misgivings that Ali was corresponding with Chabot, and after the capitulation captured letters confirmed his suspicions.⁸²

Throughout December and January Ushakov wrote both pleading and threatening letters to the Pasha of Yanina.⁸³

The Russian admiral called upon Kadir Bey, Tomara, and the Grand Vizier to apply pressure upon the procrastinating pasha. Finally, Ushakov met Ali in person on board a Russian ship off the Albanian coast, a significant event in itself since Ali rarely left his dominions.

Eventually Ali succumbed to the multifarious pressures. His negotiations with the French had been barren. While Ushakov had sent supplicating and flattering letters to Ali, he had also dispatched a warship to the Albanian coast. The coastal towns which Ali had coveted and

⁸¹Bellaire, pp. 306-307.

⁸²When Tomara presented to the Porte the incriminating correspondence of Ali Pasha, the Turkish government evinced no surprise at all at Ali's activities (V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, March, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 347, pp. 467-468).

⁸³Mordvinov, II, nos. 198, 207, 213, 215, 272, 277.

conquered could be held only on the sufferance of the fleet. Moreover, the firman of the Sultan could not be ignored indefinitely without serious complications, particularly since at that time Ali needed the favor of the Sultan to acquire pashaliks for his sons to govern.

After Ali had decided to assist the fleet, he haggled with Ushakov over compensation, asking first for territory and subsequently only for captured French ships and guns. Ushakov avoided any commitments by postponing such matters until the end of the campaign. During the negotiations with Ushakov, Ali significantly expressed a fear that the independence of the Ionian Greeks might have repercussions among mainland Greeks. Ushakov assured Ali that neither the Russians nor the Ionian Greeks would interfere on the mainland.⁸⁴

In the latter part of January and early February, Albanian troops began arriving at Corfu. Ali sent 2,500 men and the other pashas sent 1,750 for a total of 4,250 men,⁸⁵ far short of the promised 12,000 but sufficient to invest the fortress in earnest. The conduct of the Albanian troops on Corfu was barbarous. Churches were plundered, French prisoners were decapitated, and the lives of the Corfiotes were constantly threatened by the unruly Albanian soldiery. The Albanians proved to be poor fighters

⁸⁴Metaxa, p. 194, quoted by Tarle, p. 153.

⁸⁵Adm. Ushakov to the Grand Vizier, Feb. 7, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 271, pp. 334, 335.

in siege warfare. Ushakov was frequently faced with cases of open insubordination. Moreover, the penurious Pasha of Yanina sent his troops to Corfu without provisions or money, with the resultant increased burden on Ushakov's meager resources. Nevertheless, by the beginning of February, Ushakov had the long-awaited troops and was able at last to take the initiative.

The recently arrived troops were employed to close the gaps between the Russian positions in the north and the Turkish batteries to the south. Two more batteries were erected on the heights of St. Pantaleone. Soon a continuous line of batteries and earthworks stretched from Potamo to Kastradhes, effectively cutting off the town of Corfu from the rest of the island. On February 4, Chabot noted in his journal that the fortress was now besieged in the classical manner.⁸⁶

As more and more siege guns pounded the thick walls of the fortress Chabot decided to make one last attempt to break the siege. On February 10, Chabot sent 600 men with 3 field pieces against St. Pantaleone and Kastradhes. The 3,000 Albanians defending those positions gave a better account of themselves than the island volunteers had in December. The French column was not only halted, it

⁸⁶Quoted in Rodocanchi, p. 157.

was driven back to the glacis of St. Salvatore. Between February 10 and 18, still more siege guns were mounted, with their fire adding to the thunder of nine batteries. The French, short of gunpowder and shot, could return only one shot in ten. Since Chabot's sorties cost over 100 casualties each time, the small garrison could no longer withstand such constant attrition. Consequently, the sleeping besiegers were no longer awakened during the night by the dreaded tapping of French drums. The initiative had passed decisively to Ushakov.

Ushakov's satisfaction with the progress of the siege was diminished by the escape of the Généreux and the Rivoli. Fearing that the fortress might eventually be forced to capitulate, Chabot ordered all the warships in the harbor which had full complements to slip past the blockade and escape to Italy. On the moonless night of February 5, two French vessels with sails painted black stealthily sailed out of the harbor. The Généreux had slipped past five Turkish warships before a belated alarm was sounded. Ushakov sent a squadron in pursuit, but with a strong south wind behind them, the French escaped to Ancona.

Ushakov was enraged by the escape of the French vessels. He berated the somnolent Turks for not sighting them and his own captains for not intercepting them. The Russian admiral had cause to be upset by the escape of two enemy vessels in the face of sixteen blockading ships, even

if half of the sixteen were Turkish. Tsar Paul showed his displeasure by refusing to decorate any officer except Ushakov after the fall of Corfu. Admiral Nelson predictably commented that the escape of the Généreux was "in a manner not much to their [Russians] credit."⁸⁷

Ushakov's fear that a relief expedition would be sent to Corfu was well founded. On December 7, a squadron left Ancona composed of three ex-Venetian ships-of-the-line and several transports carrying 3,000 troops and a large quantity of supplies.⁸⁸ Because the old ships were in a leaky state and constant bad weather prevailed, it took the squadron a month to sight the northern tip of Corfu. It had been prearranged that a French officer sent by Chabot would meet the squadron off the north coast, but the officer had been captured by peasants. Without information as to the state of the siege and fearing the appearance of a Russian squadron, the French returned to Ancona. Throughout January a Russian squadron patrolled the Strait of Otranto.⁸⁹ A second expedition was prepared at Ancona, but it sailed after Corfu had already capitulated.

⁸⁷ Adm. Nelson to Commodore Duckworth, Mar. 6, 1799. Nelson, Dispatches, III, 280.

⁸⁸ Bellaire, pp. 378-379.

⁸⁹ Journal of Rear-Admiral P. V. Pustoshkin; Mordvinov, II, no. 282, pp. 350-353.

Throughout February the siege guns pounded Corfu relentlessly. Each day the besiegers could see another gaping hole, another pile of masonry at the base of the walls, or another roofless house. By the end of the month Ushakov decided upon a general assault. The troops were now available, the weather was more predictable, and the fleet had already been at Corfu for an embarrassingly long time. Ushakov was prodded into accelerating his preparations when, on February 26, an English brig sent by Nelson arrived with an urgent request for assistance in the Italian theater. On February 28, Ushakov summoned his captains to the flagship and elaborated a plan of attack.⁹⁰ The plan was for the fleet to bombard the island of Vido and then land troops to take the island by storm. At the same time, attacks were to be made on all the outworks.

Vido was defended by five hastily constructed batteries. Owing to a deficiency of money and materials, Chabot had been unable to erect a fort or an enclosed redoubt on the small island, which had formerly been an olive grove. The five batteries, totaling 40 guns, were erected on the most salient points along the shore of the island. Unfortunately for the defenders, the parapets of the batteries were too low and the guns, taken off ships, could not be elevated sufficiently. Potential

⁹⁰ Order of Adm. Ushakov to the fleet, Feb. 28, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 285, pp. 372-380.

landing places were defended by only a trench or an abatis. A **French** bombship and several armed galleys formed a floating battery off the west coast of Vido. The island was garrisoned by 450 men under General Pivron. Just as St. Salvatore was the key to the outworks, Vido was the key to the harbor. If Vido should fall, the enemy could sail into the roadstead and bombard at will the vulnerable Old Citadel.

At dawn on March 1, guns fired from the Sv. Pavel signalled the commencement of operations.⁹¹ The entire fleet formed into two columns, with the Turks safely on the outside, and sailed to Vido. Arriving there, each warship took up an assigned station opposite the coastal batteries. Forewarned of an imminent attack, Chabot sent 200 reinforcements to Vido as soon as the fleet showed sail.

For three hours the 800 guns on the 22 Russian and Turkish warships bombarded Vido, plowing up the island in every direction. The sound of the thunderous broadsides was magnified by echoes from the Albanian cliffs. Whole trees were carried off; numberless splinters rained down on the defenders. By 11:00 most of the French cannon had been silenced; and Ushakov gave the signal for barges to land troops. Immediately 2,160 Russians, Turks, and

⁹¹Logbook of the Sv. Pavel, Feb. 27-March 3, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 284, pp. 362-363.

Albanians landed at various points on the island. The attackers were covered by the blinding gun smoke which blew back into the faces of the French. Hopelessly outnumbered and outflanked, the French abandoned their batteries and trenches and fled toward the center of the island.

The lack of a redoubt was disastrous for the French, who could not form an organized defense. The battle degenerated into a rout and a massacre. The Turks and Albanians pursued the fleeing French back and forth over the little island, decapitating most of those they caught. Many French soldiers threw themselves into the sea in an attempt to swim to Corfu. Only a score managed to save themselves in that way. When the Russians saw the Turks slaughtering the defenseless French without respect for rank or white flags, they worked frantically to save as many as they could. Russian units formed up into hollow squares and invited the French to flee to them for protection. Several hundred French soldiers found safety behind the Russian ranks. Many of the French, particularly officers, killed themselves to escape from the Moslems. Russian officers intervened wherever they could.⁹² A Russian major gave all the money and possessions he had

⁹² Bellaire, pp. 329-330.

on him to persuade a band of Turks to release a French prisoner. Individual Russian soldiers and sailors likewise threatened and bribed the Albanians in order to save the lives of Frenchmen who had been shooting at them a few minutes before.

By 2:00 Vido was securely in allied hands. Of the 650 defenders of Vido, 602 were either killed or taken prisoner.⁹³ The attackers suffered nearly 200 casualties. General Piveron, who was among the prisoners, was accorded gracious treatment by Ushakov. The serviceable guns on Vido were immediately turned against Corfu harbor, the most vulnerable side of the town.⁹⁴ The fall of Vido was a grave defeat for Chabot. In six hours Chabot lost one-fourth of his effectives.

While Vido was being attacked, a general assault was made upon all the outworks. Thousands of Russians, Turks, Albanians, and Corfiote volunteers repeatedly assaulted Ft. Abraham, Ft. St. Rocco, and Ft. Salvatore. After the fall of Vido, the fleet moved inshore and added its hundreds of guns to the bombardment of the fortress. For hours over 1,000 cannon rained shot upon the outworks. By 6:00 Ft.

⁹³Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, March 24, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 319, pp. 429-430.

⁹⁴Since the fortress was built when Venice had control of the sea, the seaward defenses of Corfu were neglected.

St. Rocco and Ft. Abraham had fallen and Russian troops had penetrated into St. Salvatore. While the allies were regrouping for a night assault over the top of the hundreds of dead on the glacis of Ft. St. Salvatore, Chabot reluctantly ordered the abandonment of the remaining outworks and a withdrawal to the town proper. The following morning, March 2, Chabot requested and received a 24 hour armistice.

On March 3 a council of war called by Chabot decided to open negotiations for surrender. Nearly four months of blockade and siege had decimated the overworked garrison and driven the starved and diseased townspeople to desperation. Chabot recognized that the Old Citadel, vulnerable after the fall of Vido, could be reduced to rubble in 48 hours.⁹⁵ Moreover, the enemy on Vido could prevent any relief expedition from entering the harbor. After the storming of the outworks, Chabot had only 800 effectives to oppose over 6,000 Russians, Turks, and Albanians.

Chabot sent commissioners to the Sv. Pavel to negotiate a surrender. Negotiations were delayed by the Turkish admiral, who wanted the glory of taking by storm the supposedly impregnable fortress of Corfu, and by Ushakov, who balked at transporting the French to Toulon at allied

⁹⁵ Rodocanachi, pp. 167-168.

expense. Ushakov finally conceded the point when he learned, much to his astonishment, just how few Frenchmen there were to transport. On March 3, Ushakov and Chabot signed the articles of capitulation. According to the convention,⁹⁶ the French were to receive honors of war and permission to return on parole to France at the expense of the allies. The French prisoners were to be treated well and French officers and officials were to be protected at all times by a Russian honor guard. The pro-French Corfiotes were to be protected and allowed a two-month period to leave the island with all their property if they so desired. Ushakov's terms were so liberal that they excited favorable comment in Great Britain:

In this capitulation there was nothing of that Asiatic barbarity which the friends of the French revolution affected to apprehend from the accession to the coalition of Turks and Russians. It is not possible that any convention could have been made on fairer terms, with greater regard to justice, humanity, and the nicest sense of honour. 97

After the capitulation, the Russian and French officers were on almost fraternal terms. When a French lieutenant died from wounds, he was given full military honors by a detachment of Russian grenadiers who marched to patriotic French tunes played by the French military band.

⁹⁶Corfu Capitulation Convention, March 3, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 288, pp. 382-385.

⁹⁷Annual Register, XXXXI (1799), p. 81.

Chabot and Piveron expressed their gratitude for Ushakov's humane treatment of the French.⁹⁸ At the end of March, the French garrison left for Toulon aboard eleven chartered merchantmen escorted by a Russian corvette.

For the successful completion of the Ionian campaign, the Tsar promoted Ushakov to full admiral and awarded V. S. Tomara an estate in Poland with 1,500 serfs. Selim III sent gifts to Ushakov and presented sums of money to the Russian crews. Kadir Bey received from Tsar Paul a jewel-studded snuff box. Tomara heartily congratulated Ushakov for his conquest of the Ionian Islands "without an army, without artillery, and, whatsmore, without bread."⁹⁹ Suvorov wrote to Ushakov regretting that he had not been at Corfu "if only as a midshipman."¹⁰⁰ Even Nelson grudgingly sent his congratulations.¹⁰¹ Celebrations were held on the other islands celebrating the long-awaited final expulsion of the French. Upon Ushakov's request, the Tsar sent awards and gifts to Ionians, including crosses to the Orthodox priests.

⁹⁸Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, March 24, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 322, pp. 433-434.

⁹⁹V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, March, 1799. *Ibid.*, II, no. 347, p. 465.

¹⁰⁰*Istoriia russkoi armii i flota*. Vol. IX (Moscow: 1913), p. 51, quoted by Tarle, p. 163.

¹⁰¹Adm. Nelson to Adm. Ushakov, March 23, 1799. Nelson, *Dispatches*, III, 304.

On March 4, the allies occupied Corfu. Following explicit instructions from the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, Ushakov kept control of the city in Russian hands. Russian garrisons were assigned to both of the citadels and all the other fortifications of the town proper. Turkish troops garrisoned the outworks. To the disgust of the inhabitants, Ushakov sagaciously placed the administration of the town at least nominally in the hands of Kadir Bey, who appointed Rear-Admiral Patrona Bey as governor. The real governor of Corfu was the Russian commander of the citadels, Lieutenant-Colonel Skipor. Of the French warships included in the capitulation, the Leander 54 was taken by the Russians and the Brune 32 by the Turks. As a mark of friendship for Britain, the Tsar subsequently presented the Leander, originally a British frigate, to George III.¹⁰²

Ushakov had difficulty preventing the Albanian troops from plundering the town. He flatly refused the request of the Albanians for the traditional sack of a captured city. The Russian admiral sternly forbade the Albanians even to enter the city. Ushakov wasted no time in getting them off the island. Within a few days after the capitulation, all the Albanian troops had returned plunderless to Albania. Ali Pasha had been cheated again by

¹⁰²"The Leander," Naval Chronicle, II (1799), p.377.

Ushakov. The Pasha of Yanina received no territory, no captured equipment, and no plunder. He had to be content with only the thanks of the Russian admiral.

Ushakov entered the town as a long-awaited liberator rather than as a feared conqueror. On March 4, the Russian admiral and his staff went ashore for a thanksgiving service in the Church of St. Spiridion.¹⁰³ The houses of the city were gaily decorated with Russian flags. The church bells, so long silent, pealed out a clangorous welcome. To salvoes from the warships and cries of "Long Live Paul I!" by the townspeople, Ushakov proceeded through the streets accompanied by the Protopappas of Corfu and the cream of the Corfiote aristocracy. The enthusiastic welcome extended to the common soldiers and sailors as well. To the clamorous acclamations of the townspeople, the Russian soldiers, not knowing Greek, amiably responded with "Greetings, Orthodox!"

With the fall of Corfu, the Ionian campaign came to a victorious conclusion. A five-month campaign had expelled the unwelcome French from all of the Ionian Islands. In terms of numbers involved, the Ionian campaign was insignificant compared to the bloody battles in northern Italy and Egypt. In terms of the effect on future events, the

¹⁰³Journal of Capt. I. A. Selivachev, March 4, 1799. Mordvinov II, pp. 460-461. Ogorodnikov, XVI, pp. 441-442.

Ionian campaign was more important than its minor engagements would suggest. The rulers of Russia were not to appreciate the value of the Ionian Islands, always perceived by Napoleon, until several years had elapsed. In 1799, the conquest of the Ionian Islands was only one phase in the war of the Second Coalition against France, but the successes of Ushakov in the Ionian Sea proved to be more enduring than the more spectacular achievements of Suvorov in northern Italy.

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SEPTINSULAR REPUBLIC

The establishment of a stable government in the Ionian Islands proved to be more difficult than the conquest of the islands. Ushakov, who had never been other than a career naval officer, was confronted with the task of governing 200,000 foreigners whose languages he could not speak. No functionary of the Russian government had sailed with Ushakov. During the campaign, Tomara's letters of counsel concerning the administration of the islands were rare and usually couched in the vaguest of terms. Ushakov's lack of explicit instructions was not because of negligence on the part of Tomara, but because the campaign had ended before Russia and the Porte had reached a definite agreement concerning the fate of the conquered islands.

In establishing local administrations as the islands were occupied, Ushakov had operated upon the basis of the vague proclamations of Tsar Paul and the Patriarch of Constantinople which had promised the Ionian Islands extensive autonomy if not outright independence. The administration of the islands until the conclusion of a treaty was left entirely in the hands of Ushakov. Ushakov could administer the islands directly through Russian officers, or he could step aside and give the Ionians virtual independence. The Russian admiral chose the latter course.

Ushakov sincerely wanted to see the Ionian people contented and prosperous under their own benign government. Moreover, Ushakov would soon be sailing for Italy and he wanted to be spared the burden of governing the islands.

Immediately after the fall of Corfu, Ushakov established a civil government on the island comparable to those functioning on the other occupied islands.¹ The Council of Signori, an institution from the Venetian period, was convoked and its membership increased by representatives from the middle class. Ushakov ordered the formation of at least one regiment of Corfiote troops to support the authority of the Corfu provisional government.

With the establishment of a provisional government on Corfu, all of the seven islands had roughly identical civil administrations. In all the governments the nobles enjoyed preeminence. The presidents of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante and Santa Maura were either counts or barons, many of whom were prominent during Venetian rule. However, a complete return to the society which had existed under Venice was avoided by the inclusion in the government of representatives of the middle class. On the less socially stratified islands of Ithaca and Cerigo, the middle class played an equal, if not greater, role than the nobility.

¹Adm. Ushakov to the Grand Vizier, April 10, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 338, p. 448.

During the siege of Corfu, Ushakov had closely observed the operations of the various provisional governments. On each island Ushakov had left a Russian officer with the dual function of advising the island government and acting as an informant for the Russian admiral. Ushakov's actions with respect to Cerigo revealed to what degree the Russian admiral intervened in civil affairs and to what extent he was liberal and flexible in setting up the local administrations.

When Ushakov received word, in December 1798, that several Cerigotes in responsible positions were disobeying the new government, he declared that the guilty persons should be removed from positions of trust and judged by fellow Cerigotes. Only if the guilty persons were French agents should Russian officers intervene.² Ushakov clearly intended to keep civil and military affairs separate. In May 1799, the Russian commander at Cerigo, Lieutenant Diamanti, reported having difficulty in procuring sufficient provisions for his garrison from the inhabitants. Ushakov told the commander, somewhat irrationally, that whatever he was getting from the people was sufficient and that under no circumstances was he to demand more. Ushakov closed the letter with a stern injunction against any intervention in civil affairs.³

²Adm. Ushakov and Adm. Kadir Bey to the Inhabitants of Cerigo, Jan. 13, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 252, pp. 289-290.

³Adm. Ushakov to Lieut. Diamanti, May 21, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 372, p. 506.

To conciliate the peasantry on Cerigo, Ushakov decreed that the peasants were to be allowed to settle their own affairs. Minor questions involving property or small sums of money were to be resolved in peasant courts, leaving only major questions to the regular courts which were controlled by the upper classes.⁴ Ushakov's action with respect to the peasant courts revealed that the Russian admiral did not intend to permit a return to the abuses of Venetian rule.

While the campaign was still in progress, Ushakov had to cope with the anarchic tendencies of the Ionian people, tendencies which in the future would undermine successive Septinsular governments. The gaping social cleavages left by Venetian rule, the heady effects of three different governments within two years, and the traditional lawlessness and brigandage which prevailed in the interior of the larger islands all combined to render difficult the tasks of any government. Since the nobles were reluctant to share their economic and political power with the middle class, Ushakov had to prod the island governments continually.

In February, Ushakov threatened the members of the Cephalonian government with arrest and imprisonment if his orders regarding the establishment of the government were

⁴Ibid., p. 507.

not immediately and fully carried out.⁵ Again in April Ushakov expressed his displeasure in the strongest terms at the length of time it was taking the Cephalonian government to establish order.⁶ The Russian admiral had to intervene on Zante to end a quarrel of almost vendetta proportions between two nobles factions in the government.⁷ Ushakov was harassed by periodic reports from Zante that the court system decreed by Ushakov was not yet functioning.⁸

Ushakov had particular difficulty establishing governments which represented both the nobility and the middle class. A balance between the two classes was the key to Ushakov's whole scheme of government. Unfortunately, in 1799 his concepts were too advanced for the Ionian people. His compromise of giving the government essentially to the nobles while protecting the middle class pleased no one entirely. It was to take three years of civil strife before the Ionian people themselves would recognize the wisdom of Ushakov's plan.

⁵Adm. Ushakov to the Deputies of Cephalonia, Mar. 6, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 292, p. 388.

⁶Adm. Ushakov to the Deputies of Cephalonia, May 1, 1799, Ibid., II, no. 363, pp. 492-493.

⁷Adm. Ushakov to the Deputies of Zante, Feb. 5, 1799. Ibid., no. 266, p. 307.

⁸Adm. Ushakov to the Zantiote Assembly, Apr. 4, 1799, Ibid., no. 331, p. 442.

Once governments had been established on all the islands, the next logical step would have been to establish a federal government for the Ionian Islands. However, Ushakov did not dare proceed with the drafting of a constitution without explicit instructions from St. Petersburg and Constantinople. If Ushakov should proceed on his own responsibility, not only would he risk his work being undone, but his actions might also adversely affect the delicate negotiations in progress between Russia and the Porte.

In October 1798, the Porte had opened negotiations with Russia over the fate of the Ionian Islands. In a note handed to Tomara,⁹ the Porte stated that since the Ionian Islands bordered on Ottoman dominions and since their inhabitants, being Greeks, were of the same nation as subjects of the Sultan, the Porte understandably was greatly concerned over the type of government that would be established in the islands. In the note the Porte proposed three solutions: give the Ionian Islands to a second-rate power, which could only be Naples, establish an aristocratic republic modelled on Ragusa¹⁰ and subject to the

⁹"Pièces diplomatiques inédites," no. 1; Jean P. G. Pauthier, Les Iles Ioniennes pendant l'occupation française et le protectorat anglais; d'après des documents authentiques la plupart inédits (Paris: Benjamin Duprat, 1863), pp. 5-6.

¹⁰The Republic of Ragusa, which became subject to the Porte in 1526, paid 100,000 ducats to the Sultan annually, but enjoyed virtual independence, having the right to maintain a diplomatic corps and negotiate treaties.

Porte, or erect the islands into a principality comparable to the Danubian Principalities and with the same relationship to the Porte.

The Porte expressed clear preference for the last solution. The Porte's note was drafted with great skill. Presumably the Tsar would be averse to placing the Orthodox Ionians under the Catholic King of Naples. Moreover, a republic would logically be anathema to the Autocrat of All the Russias. Thus the Porte expected the Tsar to accept the solution which it favored.

The Tsar did not accommodate the Porte. Paul did not want to give the Ionian Islands to the King of Naples, although King Ferdinand was a friend and ally, but neither did Paul want to contend with a potentially undependable prince ensconced at Corfu. Of the three solutions proposed by the Porte, a republican form of government in the Ionian Islands would allow Orthodox Russia to exert the greatest degree of influence. Paul had been kept well informed by Ushakov of the reservoir of good will toward Russia among the Ionian people.

Although Russia was several months in answering the Porte's note, on November 10 the Tsar confided to the Russian ambassador at Vienna that it was his intention to honor the promises of the Patriarch to the Ionian people and that the Ionian Islands should be formed into a republic

similar to Ragusa.¹¹ As a concession to the Turks, Tsar Paul temporarily considered permitting the Porte to annex Cerigo outright since it was at the mouth of the Aegean and was not properly a part of the Ionian Islands.¹² Happily for the Cerigotes, Tomara did not have to use the concession during the negotiations.

In February 1799, Russia officially responded to the Porte's note of October. In a lengthy note,¹³ Tomara stated that of the three solutions proposed by the Porte the establishment of an Ionian republic was the most agreeable to the Tsar. The Russian ambassador pointed out that the Patriarch of Constantinople had promised the Ionian Islands self-determination. "Moreover," Tomara added, "the inhabitants of the [Ionian] Islands, having before their eyes the example of the Republic of Ragusa, happy and tranquil for so many centuries, would undoubtedly prefer a form of government whose advantages are already well known."

Undismayed the Porte pressed for the establishment of a vassal principality. On March 8, 1799, the Porte

¹¹Tsar Paul to Count A. Razumovskii, Nov. 10, 1798. Miljutin, III, 102-103.

¹²Tsar Paul to Adm. Ushakov, Dec. 27, 1798; Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 29, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 386, p. 518.

¹³"Pièces diplomatiques inédites," no. 3, Pauthier, p. 7.

presented Tomara with another note.¹⁴ "It is certain," the Porte argued, "that during the time the people of those islands were under the domination of the French, they were, if not completely, at least partially infected with the poison of [French] principles; they have already demonstrated a propensity for discord and disorder." The Porte's skillful attempt to take advantage of the Tsar's aversion for radicals was completely unsuccessful. The Russian note in reply is of considerable interest aside from the Ionian question.

The well known sincerity of His Imperial Majesty does not permit him to conceal the fact that such a principality [as Wallachia or Moldavia] would not conform either to the fiery and unruly character of the inhabitants or to the true interests of the Sublime Porte. Independent of the pronounced and long-standing aversion of the islanders to being subject to the Sublime Porte, [The Ionians] could never become accustomed either to the form or even to the name of a government such as that of Wallachia or Moldavia. No people in Europe could respect as a prince a man who is subject to disposition and to corporeal punishment as are the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia.¹⁵

Throughout the summer a flurry of notes was exchanged between the Ottoman capital and St. Petersburg without a definite agreement being reached. The Porte gradually conceded the point that the Ionian Islands should become a republic, but continued to haggle over the precise nature

¹⁴"Pièces diplomatiques inédites," no. 4, Pauthier, p.8.
¹⁵"Pièces diplomatiques inédites," no. 5, Pauthier, p.8.

of the relationship between the islands and the Sultan.

Tomara did not wait for a final agreement. At the beginning of April, Tomara instructed Ushakov to proceed with the establishment of a federal government in the Ionian Islands.¹⁶ Ushakov was to establish, subject to subsequent ratification, a republican government modelled on that of Ragusa and with the same relationship to the Porte. The Russian ambassador admitted that there might be difficulties with the Turks, who preferred another form of government, but he directed Ushakov to proceed with his task with all haste and leave dealing with the Turks to the Russian embassy. Tomara was maneuvering to present the Turks with a fait accompli.

Ushakov approached his task with grave apprehensions. The Russian admiral feared that because of centuries of corrupt and venal rule by Venice, it would be inordinately difficult, if not impossible, to instill in the anarchic Ionian people a sense of justice, respect for constituted authority, and civic responsibility.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Ushakov complied with Tomara's instructions to proceed with haste. On April 23, Ushakov issued a proclamation

¹⁶V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, April 2, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 347, pp. 465-468.

¹⁷Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Mar. 16, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 304, p. 407.

to the various island governments ordering the convocation of a senate at Corfu to establish a federal government. The number of delegates from each island varied according to size: Corfu 3, Cephalonia 3, Zante 2, Santa Maura 2, Ithaca 1, Cerigo 1, Paxo 1.¹⁸

The federal Senate, presided over by Count Angelo Orio, deliberated for over a month. One of the main obstacles in the deliberations was the strong separatist tendencies of Zante and Cephalonia. Ushakov had to prod those two islands into even sending delegates.¹⁹ Drafting a constitution degenerated into a test of strength between the pro-Russian and the pro-Turkish parties. By admitting the middle class into the government, Ushakov had alienated the jealous aristocrats. Since the Turkish government wanted an authoritarian regime in the Ionian Islands, the Ionian nobility and the Porte became allies through a community of interests. Tomara warned Ushakov that Ionian nobles were surreptitiously corresponding with the Porte.²⁰ Ushakov's support of the middle class only served to reinforce the Porte's inclination to support the nobility.

¹⁸ Proclamation of Ushakov to the Deputies and Elders of the Ionian Islands, April 23, 1799. *Ibid.*, II, no. 360, p. 490.

¹⁹ Proclamation to the Deputies of Cephalonia and Zante, May 27, 1799. *Ibid.*, II, no. 378, p. 513.

²⁰ V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, May 4, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 364, p. 495.

The majority of the people, still fearful of falling under the crescent, clung to ties with Russia and pleaded with Ushakov not to desert them.²¹ Moreover, the lower classes regarded Ushakov as their protector against the nobility. On April 4, 259 Zantiotes sent Ushakov a petition requesting that commoners be included in the projected government. Otherwise, the Zantiotes warned, civil strife would result.²²

The loyalty of the people to Russia, the great personal prestige of Ushakov, and the votes of the commoners in the provisional governments compelled the nobility to comply with Ushakov's suggestions regarding the constitution. As Ushakov soon learned, however, it was not a permanent compliance; the nobles were only choosing their own battleground.

On May 27, the Senate presented Ushakov with a draft constitution consisting of thirty brief articles.²³ According to the Constitution, the government was to be elected by two classes. (Art. I) The "first class" included all the nobility. The "second class" was to be composed of

²¹Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, June 2, 1799. Ibid., No. 394, p. 533.

²²Address of 259 Zantiotes to Adm. Ushakov, Apr. 4, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 332, pp. 442-443.

²³"Proekt organizatsii upravleniia respublika ionicheskikh ostrovov," May 27, 1799. Ibid., no. 388, pp. 520-526.

commoners who could meet stringent qualifications. For a commoner to enjoy the franchise, he must be a Christian, a paterfamilias, could not be engaged in a manual trade, and had to have a specified annual income. The income varied among the islands, reflecting the relative wealth of each island: Corfu - 100 chervontsy, Cephalonia and Santa Maura - 60, Cerigo and Paxo - 40, Ithaca - 30.

A commission composed of representatives of both classes would decide cases of eligibility. (II) Senators, magistrates and other officials were to be drawn from both classes. (III) Members of the second class were to have the same privileges as were enjoyed by the nobles, but such privileges were not hereditary. (IV) The number of representatives of the two classes in government positions would vary in proportion to the relative size of each class on the various islands. (VI)

The Senate was to sit at Corfu and decide questions by a simple majority vote. All questions of foreign policy, defense, and economic policy were within the province of the federal Senate. The administration of justice and lesser matters were to be left to the government of each island. (VIII) Each island was to be represented in the Senate according to population and each island delegation was to be representative of both classes in the following manner: Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante - three senators each with one of the three from the second class; Santa Maura -

two senators with one from the second class; Ithaca, Cerigo, and Paxo - one each irrespective of class. (VIII) Half of the Senate was to be elected each year. (IX) Each of the seven islands was to have its own government modelled on the federal government, but all the laws of the island governments were subject to review by the federal government. The official language of the courts was to be Greek, not Italian as previously, "in order that everyone may understand." (XXIX) Further articles specified the amount of revenue each island was to send to Corfu, the size and nature of the appellate courts, and the size of the army.

Ushakov's Constitution was considerably advanced for its time. The system of admitting commoners into the government through separate electoral colleges was later adopted by the Republic of Italy in 1805.²⁴ Ushakov expressed to the Senate his belief that the Constitution was in conformance with the Patriarch's proclamation and with the wishes of the Tsar and Sultan.²⁵ In a letter to Tomara, Ushakov expressed his personal approval of the document.²⁶

²⁴Decree of Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, June 7, 1805. Eugène de Beauharnais, Mémoires et Correspondance, I, 109.

²⁵Adm. Ushakov to the Ionian Senate, May 29, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 384, p. 516.

²⁶Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 29, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 383, pp. 515-516.

Ushakov had good cause for personal satisfaction. The Constitution provided for a government which was substantially a replica of the provisional governments set up on each island by the Russian admiral. The nobles had a clear majority in the Senate and the qualifications for the second class were stringent. Moreover, such provisions as judges serving without pay further acted to exclude commoners from the government. However, at least four of the fourteen senators would always be from the second class. The senators from the second class would never have control of the government, but they would be in a position to act as a check on the nobles and thus give the protection to the middle class which Ushakov wanted.

No mention was made in the Constitution of the four coastal towns. The fate of Parga, Butrinto, Preveza, and Vonitsa had not yet been decided in Constantinople. Parga, the only coastal town not occupied by Ali Pasha, tried desperately to participate in the formation of the Ionian government. Parga deluged Ushakov with supplicating petitions and sent deputations to Constantinople.²⁷ Ushakov, always sympathetic to the plight of the Pargiotes, repeatedly sent letters to Tomara lobbying for their cause,²⁸

²⁷ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 8, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 365, pp. 497-498.

²⁸ Mordvinov, II, nos. 365, 370, 374, 386.

but Tomara ignored Ushakov's entreaties. The Russian ambassador was having enough difficulty obtaining a favorable settlement for the islands.

The last article of the Constitution provided for sending deputies to Constantinople and St. Petersburg to secure approval of the Constitution. At the end of June, the Senate dispatched two delegations, one to the Porte and one to the Tsar. The chief delegate was Count Orio, President of the Senate. Among the delegates was Count Antonio Capodistrias,²⁹ who had been saved from a French firing squad only by the capitulation of Corfu. After a leisurely journey the delegates reached the Ottoman capital in October. Because of the age and the poor health of many of the delegates, only Count Orio and Count Clidano proceeded on to Russia, arriving there on November 28.³⁰ With Ushakov's unsuspecting acquiescence, the Senate had sent as delegates the leaders of the aristocratic party. When Ushakov realized the implications of what had been done, it was too late.

²⁹A number of sources confuse Count Antonio Capodistrias with his son, Count John Capodistrias, the future foreign minister of Russia. Count John Capodistrias played no role in Ionian politics until the illness of his father at the end of 1800.

³⁰Report of the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, Nov. 28, 1799. Mordvinov, III, no. 166, p. 204.

Ushakov remained in the Ionian Islands for two months after the establishment of the federal government. He supervised the formation of the three corps of troops provided for in the Constitution. The income of the federal government was so meager that the islands could support little more than a token army.³¹ However, it was immediately apparent that more than a token army would be required to keep the islands tranquil. The promulgation of a constitution had not returned the islands to peace and order. Nobles fought among themselves and the peasants balked at any authority. When Captain-Lieutenant Telesnitskii, the Russian advisor on Zante, sent a detachment of 24 men into the interior of the island to apprehend a peasant for disobedience, the detachment was met by armed peasants and forced to turn back. Telesnitskii blamed pro-French Zantiotes for causing disturbances in the countryside,³² but the causes were more fundamental than that.

During the campaign against the French the Ionian people had been armed and encouraged by Ushakov to defy established authority. Economically the lower classes were as yet no better off than they had been under the

³¹ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 29, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 386, p. 519.

³² Capt.-Lieut. S. M. Telesnitskii to Adm. Ushakov, June 2, 1799. *Ibid.*, II, no. 395, p. 535.

French. In the insurrections against the French the peasants had lost their political virginity. It could not be expected that they would meekly return to their former state of passivity. Ushakov's policy in dealing with local disturbances was to show clemency. When several persons were arrested on Cephalonia for causing unrest, Ushakov ordered their pardon and release.³³

The struggle for influence between the pro-Turkish and the pro-Russian parties added to the disorders. On one occasion Ushakov was compelled to refute publicly rumors that there was a rupture between Russia and the Porte.³⁴ Incidents were frequent between the Ionian people and the Turkish troops garrisoning Corfu. In June, ten Turks were killed by Corfiotes who thought the Turks were carrying off a boy. On another occasion, an Ionian assaulted a Turk for showing disrespect for his wife. Tomara, who feared an entente between the Porte and the Ionian nobility, callously wrote to Ushakov that such incidents "could be useful" to Russia.³⁵

Establishing a stable government in the Ionian Islands was made doubly difficult by the interference of

³³Adm. Ushakov to Capt.-Lieut. S. M. Telesnitskii, June 4, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 399, p. 540.

³⁴Proclamation of Adm. Ushakov to the Inhabitants of Corfu, May 29, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 387, pp. 519-520.

³⁵V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, Sept. 6, 1799. Mordvinov, III, no. 93, p. 115.

other powers. The Austrians had never given up hope of acquiring all of the former territories of the Venetian Republic. A letter from General Brady, Austrian commander at Cáttaro (Kotor), to the Austrian consul at Zante fell into Ushakov's hands. From that letter and other evidence, Ushakov concluded that the Austrians were attempting to organize an "Austrian party" in the islands.³⁶ Ushakov wrote to General Brady demanding that such activity cease,³⁷ but the intrigues continued.

Great Britain was always interested in Ionian affairs, mainly because of the strategic importance of Corfu, but also because of the importance of the currant trade at that time. Britain's extremely able consul at Corfu, Spiridion Foresti, cultivated the good will of the Ionian aristocrats. The Ionian nobles, seeking a counterweight to Russia, turned to Britain as well as to the Porte. The aristocrats of Zante, which had a long separatist tradition and a powerful nobility, maintained close contact with Admiral Nelson through Foresti. In October 1799, the Zante Senate voted Nelson a gold sword and cane as a token

³⁶ Adm. Ushakov to Count G. G. Kushelev, July 23, 1799. *Ibid.*, III, no. 42, pp. 55-56.

³⁷ Adm. Ushakov to General Brady, July 23, 1799. *Ibid.*, III, no. 43, pp. 56-57.

of their esteem. In a letter to Nelson the President of Zante gave the impression that Nelson, not Ushakov, had been responsible for the expulsion of the French because of his victories in the Levant.³⁸ With the possibility of foreign support, the Ionian nobles could act more independently of Ushakov and the federal Senate with the resultant undermining of the prestige of the government.

A more direct threat to the tranquility of the Ionian Islands was posed by Ali Pasha. With an army conspicuously encamped at Preveza, Ali tried to extort tribute from Santa Maura in the name of the Porte. In May, Ali ominously began building fortifications on the coast opposite Santa Maura. In Ushakov's opinion, the fortifications could have no possible justification unless Ali Pasha had designs against Santa Maura.³⁹ In July a delegation from Cephalonia complained to the Senate that Ali's ships were preying upon Ionian commerce. Ushakov demanded that Ali Pasha cease such piracy and return captured ships and crews at once.⁴⁰ Ali's menacing activity caused Ushakov great anxiety because the imminent departure of the fleet for Italy would leave the islands defenseless. As

³⁸President of Zante to Admiral Nelson, Oct. 25, 1799. Nelson, Dispatches, IV, 151.

³⁹Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, June 8, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 406, p. 548.

⁴⁰Adm. Ushakov to Ali Pasha, July 20, 1799. Mordvinov, III, no. 41, pp. 54-55.

temporary measures, Ushakov dispatched ships to patrol the Albanian coast and sent reinforcements to Santa Maura. Ushakov also had to detach warships to protect the islands from Barbary corsairs which had begun preying upon Ionian commerce.⁴¹ Ushakov protested to the Bey of Tunis,⁴² but without effect.

In spite of the internal unrest in the islands, the threats of Ali Pasha and Barbary pirates, and the intrigues of Britain and Austria, Ushakov could no longer tarry at Corfu. Although the war had ended in the Ionian Islands, it was still raging in Italy. Ushakov had reluctantly become involved in the affairs of Italy while the siege of Corfu was still in progress. Apulia, where Cardinal Ruffo was inciting the people against the French, was within sight of Corfu on a clear day. During the French occupation of Naples, many eminent Italians, including Cardinal Braschi, Cardinal Pignatelli and Prince Borghese, sought refuge with Ushakov at Corfu.⁴³ Count Razumovskii suggested that if Palermo should fall, King Ferdinand himself should go to Corfu.⁴⁴

⁴¹Adm. Ushakov to Adm. Kadir Bey, Aug. 2, 1799. Mordvinov, III, no. 59, pp. 74-75.

⁴²Adm. Ushakov to the Bey of Tunis, Nov. 1, 1799. Ibid., no. 45, p.170.

⁴³Botta, IV, 66.

⁴⁴Count A. Razumovskii to Tsar Paul, Mar. 21, 1799. Vasil'chikov, II, part I, p. 306.

In response to an appeal from King Ferdinand, Russia's ally, Ushakov prepared to sail with the main body of his fleet to help Nelson drive the French out of southern Italy. In April Field Marshal Suvorov had requested that Ushakov blockade Ancona and protect his supply lines from French privateers.⁴⁵ Consequently, Ushakov also had to send a squadron to the northern Adriatic. In addition, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg had finally succeeded in procuring orders for Ushakov to detach frigates to assist the British in the Levant.⁴⁶

As diplomatic and military preparations were in progress for the campaign in southern Italy, Ushakov could devote less attention to Ionian affairs. On August 12 Ushakov sailed from Corfu, leaving the resolution of Ionian questions to the diplomats in Constantinople. The question of the size and type of garrison for the Ionian Islands had resulted in delicate and protracted negotiations between Tomara and the Porte. After the fall of Corfu, Ushakov had maintained that at least 3,000 troops were required for the defense of the islands.⁴⁷ In subsequent

⁴⁵Field Marshall A. V. Suvorov to Adm. Ushakov, April 3, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 329, p. 441.

⁴⁶Count F. V. Rostopchin to Count S. R. Vorontsov, June 1, 1799. F. V. Rostopchin, "Vesti iz Rossii v. Angliuu v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Pavla Petrovicha," Russkii Arkhiv, 1875, no. 3, p. 74.

⁴⁷Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, March 16, 1799. Mordvinov, II, no. 309, pp. 417-418.

negotiations between Tomara and the Porte it was decided that the garrison would be 1,500 Turks and 1,500 Russians, all maintained at the expense of the Ionian government.⁴⁸ The Ionian government immediately protested that it could not possibly support so many troops, although the government would welcome their presence in the islands.⁴⁹ As a result, the size of the garrison was reduced to 300 Russians and 300 Turks. Tomara cautioned Ushakov not to let the Turks in the fortress of Corfu unless it was already held by an equal number of Russian troops. Otherwise, Tomara warned, the sight of Turks in the fortress would cause a reaction among the people not only against the Turks, but against the Ionian government.⁵⁰ When Ushakov left Corfu for Palermo, he left in addition to the garrison two Russian ships-of-the-line and three Turkish frigates under the command of Captain A. P. Alexiano.

Negotiations had been in progress during the summer between Russia and the Porte regarding the status of the Ionian Islands. The Porte had agreed that the Ionian

⁴⁸V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, May 4, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 364, p. 494.

⁴⁹Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, June 3, 1799. Ibid., II, no. 398, p. 539.

⁵⁰V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, Sept. 20, 1799. Ibid., III, p. 124.

Islands should be a republic modelled on Ragusa, but was striving for a greater degree of control over the islands than was the case with the Dalmatian city-state. In August 1799, the Porte delivered a note⁵¹ to Tomara in which it argued that in order to protect his rights as suzerain, the Sultan must have a voice in the internal administration of the islands. Moreover, the Porte contended that the radicalism of the Ionian people required close observation by the Porte.

In September, the Russian ambassador, straining for an argument against any increase in Turkish influence in the islands, presented another note to the Porte. In the note⁵² Tomara stated that the Porte's arguments had been forwarded to the Tsar, but that he must observe that the attitude taken by the Ottoman ministry "was incompatible with the advancement of the negotiations." Tomara contended that any right of interference on the part of the Porte in Ionian internal affairs would constitute a return to Medieval feudal practices. "The Russian Court," Tomara declared, "would never tarnish its political transactions by reestablishing the odious practices of that barbarous period." In countering the contention that the Ionian

⁵¹"Pièces diplomatiques inédites," no. 10, Pauthier, p. 9.

⁵²"Pièces diplomatiques inédites," no. 11, Pauthier, p. 10.

people were radical, Tomara observed that it was not the fault of the Ionians and added that when the islands had been occupied by France, "it was a period when that victorious nation dictated to its enemies and imposed silence on the Sublime Porte itself."

At the same time that the status of the Ionian Islands was being determined, negotiations were proceeding at Constantinople with respect to the ratification of Ushakov's Constitution. The ratification of the Constitution in the face of the opposition of the Porte and the Ionian nobility would depend upon how zealously the Russian ambassador championed the Constitution. Unfortunately for Ushakov's work, Tomara did not share the Russian admiral's faith in the middle class. Tomara had accepted without comment Ushakov's arrangements with respect to the provisional governments and had not initially opposed the Constitution. However, when disorders continued on the islands, he became dubious. On July 14 Tomara wrote to Ushakov that he had been receiving reports and rumors from the Ionian Islands that the government was unacceptable to the people and that the continuing disorders seemingly substantiated the reports.⁵³

Tomara's irresolution made the task of the Ionian

⁵³V. S. Tomara to Adm. Ushakov, July 14, 1799. Mordvinov, III, no. 40, pp. 53-54.

delegates infinitely easier. The Porte selected two of the delegates, Capodistrias and Dissylas, to confer on the Constitution.⁵⁴ Since those two delegates were fervent supporters of government by only the nobility, the results of the deliberations were a foregone conclusion. The delegates presented for the Porte's ratification, not Ushakov's Constitution, but one they had drafted in secret and which they represented as reflecting the real will of the people.

Ushakov was at sea off the Italian coast for several months and did not return to Corfu until January 1800. When he discovered what was afoot at Constantinople, he used all his persuasive powers in an attempt to prevent the adoption of a different constitution. The Senate, caught between Ushakov and the Porte, could only evince surprise at the actions of the delegates at Constantinople. Although some of the senators may have genuinely been surprised, it is unlikely that most of the senators were completely unaware of the intentions of Count Orio, the President of the Senate. Ushakov assumed that the consternation of the Senate was genuine and wrote to Tomara stating that the Senate wanted to recall the delegates and make them answer for disobeying their instructions.

⁵⁴Stamati T. Lascaris, Capodistrias avant la révolution grecque; sa carrière politique jusqu'en 1822 (Lausanne: Imprimerie Centrale, 1918), p. 10.

Ushakov also warned Tomara that rumors of the actions of the delegates had already reached the Ionian people, who were on the verge of rebelling against the nobility.⁵⁵

In another letter less than a week later,⁵⁶ Ushakov assured Tomara that if the delegates were at Corfu instead of Constantinople they would be tried and punished for disobeying the Senate. Ushakov cautioned Tomara that the delegates at Constantinople were serving only their own interests and pointed out that one of the delegates had lost an election because of the votes of the second class. As for the people, presumably nobles or their partisans, who had been writing to Tomara protesting against the Constitution, Ushakov had a simple solution--hand over their names to the Senate which would punish the conspirators for treason. Ushakov ended his plaintive letter with a warning that the people had faith in the second class and if it were disfranchised the people would never again trust the nobility.

In another letter on March 3,⁵⁷ Ushakov told Tomara that he was aghast at rumors that the delegates in the Ottoman capital were planning to deprive Santa Maura, Ithaca,

⁵⁵ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Feb. 20, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 197, pp. 258-259.

⁵⁶ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Feb. 25, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 204, pp. 267-269.

⁵⁷ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Mar. 3, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 211, pp. 281-282.

and Paxo of their separate governments and unite them to larger islands. If that were done, Ushakov prophesied, the separatist tendencies of the aggrieved islanders would combine with the widespread indignation against the nobles and result in an explosive situation. In a melancholy postscript to his letter of March 3, Ushakov wrote plaintively: "You may be sure that I am not distressed because my own work is being undone; I am distressed because of the civil strife which I foresee."

Ushakov was not exaggerating the possible consequences of changing the Constitution. As rumors from Constantinople filtered back to the islands, agitation broke out anew. Cephalonia predictably took the lead. Tiesenhausen, the Russian advisor at Cephalonia, reported that the increased agitation was directed not only against the treacherous delegates, but also against the Senate which had not prevented a change in the Constitution.⁵⁸ In May a mob of 5,000 Corfiotes attacked the house of Count Antonio Capodistrias. The disorders which Ushakov had foreseen had already begun and there was no end in sight. Ushakov bitterly threw the whole blame for the change of the Constitution on Tomara. Ushakov was convinced that the Russian ambassador could have stopped the treasonable activity

⁵⁸ Lieut. N. A. Tiesenhausen to Adm. Ushakov, May 5, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 233, p. 306.

of the delegates "with one word."⁵⁹

Ushakov's arguments in support of the May Constitution had not convinced Tomara, who was an aristocrat loyal to his class. When Tomara was removed from his post two years later, the Russian foreign minister at that time, Count Kochubey, charged that Tomara had often been "led by the nose" by the Turks.⁶⁰ Events during the Ionian campaign, however, demonstrated that the Russian ambassador could effectively pressure the Porte when he chose. The personal views of Tomara prevented him from heeding Ushakov in his role as Cassandra. However, even if Tomara had zealously championed the Constitution, its ratification still would have been difficult. Both the Ionian delegation and the Porte were determined to change the Constitution. Moreover, the delegates which went to St. Petersburg encountered the same success as their colleagues at Constantinople. In the last years of Paul's reign, Count N. P. Panin and Count F. V. Rostopchin competed at the foreign ministry for Paul's favor, with the latter clearly in the ascendent by 1800.⁶¹ Count Orio succeeded in convincing Count Rostopchin and also the influential military governor of

⁵⁹ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 13, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 244, p. 320.

⁶⁰ Arkhiv Vorontsova, XIV, 9; quoted by Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Graf Pavel Stroganov, II, 206n.

⁶¹ Sergei M. Solov'ev, "Imperator Aleksandr I; politika--diplomatiia," Sobranie Sochinenii (St. Petersburg: 'Obshchestvennaia Pol'za', n.d.), p. 265.

St. Petersburg, Count P. Pahlen, that only a purely aristocratic government could assure the Ionian Islands a stable government. Ushakov was frustratingly alone in his support of the May Constitution.

The second constitution, known as the Byzantine Constitution because of its place of origin, was appended to the final treaty between Russia and the Porte on the Ionian Islands. The Byzantine Constitution suffered, partly by design, from the vagueness of its provisions. The seventeen articles of the Byzantine Constitution⁶² reversed the two basic principles of Ushakov's Constitution. The commoners were entirely excluded from the government and the power of the federal government was fatally weakened. Each of the seven islands was to be governed by a Grand Council composed of all nobles over the age of 25. The Grand Council in turn elected three executives, known as syndics, from among its membership. Only nobles could hold important offices. The Senate was composed of representatives from each island, but the representation of the smaller islands was reduced. Ithaca and Paxo could elect only one delegate in alternate years. The federal government was left with control of foreign affairs and the token army, but the all-important administrative, economic, and police powers were myopically granted to the various island governments. Although each island was supposed to

⁶²L'Augusta Convenzione delli XXI Marzo MDCCC, e Pezzi autentici ad essa relativi (Corfu: Nella pubblica stamperia di Corfu, 1801), 24 pp.; partially quoted in Pauthier, pp. 10-13.

send three-quarters of its revenue to the federal government, the island government, by virtue of its extensive powers, was the most important unit of government in the Ionian Islands. The vagueness of the article on the separation of powers only added to the residual powers of the island governments.

Instead of the strong federation envisaged by Ushakov, the Ionian Islands dissolved into a weak confederation. Separatist tendencies, instead of being appeased, were stimulated by the Byzantine Constitution. The Ionian Islands would be ruled, not by the cream of the nobility assembled at Corfu, but by the petty nobility of each island, free to oppress the lower classes now rendered defenseless. Only a return of the French could have undone Ushakov's work more completely.

The status of the Ionian Islands was determined by a treaty between Russia and the Porte signed on March 21, 1800.⁶³ According to Article I, the Ionian Islands were to be governed "by the notables of the country" and were to be subject to the Sublime Porte "in the same manner as the Republic of Ragusa." The treaty emphasized the suzerainty of the Sultan:

His Majesty the Ottoman Emperor and his successors, being Suzerains of the said Republic, that is to say, Lords, Princes, and

⁶³Noradounghian, II, 36-41; G. F. Martens, VII, 41-47.

Protectors, and the said Republic being the vassal of the Sublime Porte, that is to say dependent, subject, and protected, the duties of such protection shall be scrupulously observed by the Sublime Porte in favor of the said Republic.

The Tsar in his turn guaranteed the integrity of the republic and undertook to maintain the Byzantine Constitution.

The Ionian Islands, to be known as the Republic of the United Seven Islands,⁶⁴ were "to enjoy in their political affairs, in their internal constitution, and in their commerce, all the privileges enjoyed by the Republic of Ragusa" (Art. II) By virtue of Article III, the subjects of the Septinsular Republic who should trade in the Ottoman Empire would be under the "direct control" of the Ionian consuls. The Porte undertook to protect the commerce of the Ionian Islands against the corsairs of the Barbary states. The Septinsular Republic, as a sign of vassalage to the Porte, was to pay the Sultan the relatively small sum of 75,000 piasters⁶⁵ every three years, presented to the Porte by a "solemn embassy". The sum could never be augmented or diminished. The Ionian people were exempt from the capitation and all other taxes of the Porte. (IV)

⁶⁴ Generally known in English as the Septinsular Republic.

⁶⁵ In 1800, 75,000 piasters equalled approximately 5,000 pounds sterling or 18,750 francs.

For the duration of the war against France, Russia and the Porte would have the right to station troops on the islands for their protection. After the termination of the war, however, no foreign troops were to be permitted in the Ionian Islands. (V) The ships of the Septinsular Republic were to be permitted to navigate in the Black Sea under their own flag. (VI) Turkish warships were not to be allowed within the maritime limits of the Septinsular Republic except in case of urgent necessity and then only with the express permission of the Ionian government. (VII)

The four coastal towns, Parga, Preveza, Butrinto, and Vonitsa, were annexed outright by the Porte, but the inhabitants were granted extensive concessions (VIII) Customs and laws relating to the possession of property and to civil and criminal procedure would remain unchanged. As in the past, Moslems would be prohibited from residing in the four towns. The towns were to be administered by a Turkish governor appointed by the Sultan, but "since a great number of subjects of the Republic of the United Seven Islands have possessions in the four towns," the Porte undertook to consult with the Septinsular government regarding the rank of the governor, his revenue, his place of residence, and the nature of his functions. The Christians of the coastal towns were to enjoy all the rights, such as building churches and ringing church bells,

which they had enjoyed previously. Furthermore, because of the material losses suffered during the expulsion of the French, the towns were to be exempt from all taxes for a period of two years. (IX, X)

The March treaty was ratified by Selim III in May, by the Tsar in August 1800 and the King of Great Britain in January 1801. Although the treaty did not establish the Russo-Turkish condominium that Ushakov and the majority of the Ionian people wanted, a close examination of the treaty reveals that Russia acquired more advantages than did the Porte. The Porte's suzerainty over the Septinsular Republic was only illusory. The only sign of vassalage was the tribute every three years, a sum less than Venice extorted from the islands through taxes and imposts. On the other hand, Ionian consuls in the Ottoman Empire, by having complete jurisdiction over Ionian subjects, were in the same position vis-à-vis the Porte as the consuls of foreign powers. Moreover, although the Sultan was titularly suzerain of the islands, his warships could not enter the maritime limits of the Septinsular Republic. Furthermore, the Porte's obligation to consult the Ionian government in matters concerning the administration of the coastal towns made the Septinsular Republic, in effect, an equal of the Porte. The Septinsular Republic had its own consuls at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg and a commissioner at Constantinople. The

payment of tribute was the only mark of vassalage, but because the amount of tribute could never be unilaterally changed by the Porte, the significance of even the tribute was greatly reduced.

The most important article of the treaty was Article V, which provided for Russian and Turkish garrisons at Corfu for the duration of the war. Since by virtue of her superior fleet Russia was assured military superiority at Corfu, it was Russia, not the Porte, which could materially influence the actions of the Septinsular government. To be sure, the occupation was to last only until the end of the war, but given the ever changing complexion of the international situation, Russia could expect little difficulty in finding an excuse to tarry.

The March treaty inaugurated the first Greek state since the fall of the Peloponnesus to the Turks in 1460. The flag of the fledgling republic, seven arrows bound together on a plain field, was solemnly blessed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Three empires guaranteed the territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Ionian Republic. In spite of the favorable omens, however, the Septinsular Republic was destined to remain a state only in name for half of its existence. From its inception the Septinsular Republic as based on the Byzantine Constitution was not a viable state. The Ionian nobles yearned to return to their halcyon days of privilege

under Venice, but there would be no Venetian soldiers to protect their privileges. The commoners of the Ionian Islands had not liked the French, but they had learned from them. The vast majority of Ionians viewed the Byzantine Constitution with unconcealed revulsion.

Ushakov remained at Corfu from January to July, 1800. The March treaty was not ratified by the Tsar until August 1800, and the smug delegates did not return from Constantinople until November 1800. As a result, the months between March and November were a period of uneasiness but relative quiet, the lull before the storm. Although Ushakov disliked the new constitution as much as did most of the Ionian people, he took upon himself the thankless task of keeping the islands tranquil until the new government could begin functioning.

During the spring and summer of 1800 Ushakov played a conspicuous role in Septinsular affairs, but always through the Ionian Senate. At the request of the Senate, Ushakov inspected the Septinsular army and found that it had too many officers. Ushakov proposed to the Senate the unpopular measure of drastically reducing the officer corps.⁶⁶ Ever vigilant for potential causes of unrest, Ushakov suggested to the Senate that it was its "Christian

⁶⁶ Adm. Ushakov to the Ionian Senate, May 1, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 228, p. 302.

duty" to lower the price of bread.⁶⁷ In the trying months of the interim period it was mainly Ushakov's prestige and military strength which kept the federal government functioning. It was Ushakov, through his officers on each island, which prevailed upon the recalcitrant island governments to pay their share of federal expenditures. When the federal government would meet with a rebuff from the island governments in some administrative matter, the Senate would appeal to Ushakov, who usually succeeded in enforcing the edicts of the Senate.

Agitation against the Byzantine Constitution and the nobility in general persisted. Ushakov continued to follow a policy of amnesty and pardon with respect to agitators. He believed that the best policy was to arrest disturbers of the peace and then pardon them, thereby maintaining the forms of justice while causing less ill will on all sides.⁶⁸ Ushakov's conciliatory policy was partially the result of his sympathy with the populace and partially the result of his own weak position. His detachments on the islands were far too small to cope with major outbreaks,⁶⁹ and with the

⁶⁷ Adm. Ushakov to the Ionian Senate, June 8, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 256, p. 335.

⁶⁸ Adm. Ushakov to Lt. N. A. Tiesenhausen, May 13, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 245, pp. 320-321.

⁶⁹ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 13, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 244, p. 318.

military situation in the Mediterranean in a state of flux, he did not want to commit additional troops for garrison duty.

While trying to conciliate the dissident elements, Ushakov also urged the Ionian government to endeavor to remove causes of discontent. In a lengthy letter to the Senate, Ushakov discussed the increasing agitation and disobedience. The only way to establish a lasting order, Ushakov counseled the Senate, was to offer the people accessible and just courts.⁷⁰ The Russian admiral reasoned that if the people could obtain justice, perhaps the effect of their exclusion from government would be mitigated. Ushakov was endeavoring to make the best of a deplorable situation. To suggestions that another Ionian delegation be dispatched to St. Petersburg to plead the case against the Byzantine Constitution, Ushakov returned a firm refusal. The Russian admiral believed that what had occurred at Constantinople must be fatalistically accepted and any attempt to change it would only cause further harm.⁷¹

Simply protecting the Ionian Islands in the period of transition from the May Constitution to the Byzantine Constitution was an arduous task in itself. Ali Pasha was as menacing as ever. The Porte's annexation of the four

⁷⁰Adm. Ushakov to the Ionian Senate, June 3, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 254, pp. 333-334.

⁷¹Adm. Ushakov to Capt.-Lt. S. M. Telesnitskii, July 9, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 281, pp. 409-410.

coastal towns had displeased the Ionian government, but it had enraged Ali Pasha. The coastal towns were important to the Ionian Islands, aside from ties of religion, blood, and history, because the islands were not self-sufficient agriculturally. The coastal towns collected grain from the interior of Albania and Epirus and sold it to the islands. Without entrepôts on the coast, the Ionian Islands would be more dependent upon the rulers of Albania and northern Greece.⁷² Ali coveted the coastal towns in order to isolate Souli and outflank Delvino. Moreover, with the good ports and the flourishing fishing industry of the coastal towns, Ali could play a role in international commerce heretofore denied him. Thus the March treaty satisfied neither the Ionian government nor the Pasha of Yanina.

When the Porte sent a governor, Abdullan Effendi, a member of the ulema, to administer the four towns, Ali reluctantly surrendered Preveza and Vonitsa, but clung defiantly to Butrinto. Farga stubbornly refused to admit the Turkish governor within its walls. As soon as Farga had learned of the provisions of the March treaty, the town sent a delegation to Ushakov. The Fargiotes tearfully protested that they had been connected with the Ionian Islands for 400 years and that they had loyally expelled the French on their own accord as Ushakov had

⁷²Vaudoncourt, pp. 85-86.

stipulated.⁷³

Ushakov was convinced that it was too late to do anything about the status of the town, but he permitted the Pargiotes to appeal to St. Petersburg.⁷⁴ The Russian admiral, always vulnerable to the tears of coreligionists, tried to help the pathetic Pargiotes. He wrote supplicating letters to Count F. V. Rostopchin, Vice-Chancellor of Foreign Affairs, appealing for Russian protection for Farga.⁷⁵ However, Tomara impatiently ordered Ushakov to execute the provisions of the treaty. By convincing the Pargiotes that they would have almost complete freedom since Abdullah Effendi would be the only Turk allowed in the city and his powers would be strictly limited, Ushakov succeeded in overcoming Farga's recalcitrance. Farga finally acquiesced and allowed the Turk to enter the city, but in succeeding years the town stubbornly maintained its freedom of action.

Ali Pasha's hatred of Russians in general and Ushakov in particular was increased by Ushakov's interference in the affairs of Albania. Ushakov commendably but presumptuously took upon himself the protection of Christians in Albania and northern Greece. The Russian admiral threatened Ali with vague coercive measures if Ali did not cease

⁷³ Address of Pargiote Deputies to Adm. Ushakov, May 2, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 230, pp. 304-305.

⁷⁴ Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, May 5, 1800. *Ibid.*, III, no. 235, p. 308.

⁷⁵ Adm. Ushakov to Count F. V. Rostopchin, May 5, 1800. *Ibid.*, III, no. 234, pp. 307-308.

mistreating his Orthodox subjects.⁷⁶ The inhabitants of Souli and Cheimarra⁷⁷ petitioned Ushakov for Russian protection.⁷⁸ As with Farga, Ushakov lobbied for the cause of Souli and Cheimarra, sending letters to Tomara and officials in St. Petersburg. In his efforts to assist the Christians of the mainland, Ushakov received no support from St. Petersburg or Constantinople and only succeeded in further antagonizing the Pasha of Yanina. Ushakov's actions seemed to confirm Ali's fears that an Ionian state would cause unrest in his dominions.

In addition to attempting to maintain internal peace and to restrain Ali Pasha, Ushakov constantly had to contend with the depredations of pirates, the obstructionism of the Turks in the islands, and the intrigues of the Austrian and British consuls. The Porte had agreed in the March treaty to restrain the Barbary beys, but piratical activity steadily increased. Ionian commerce was almost paralyzed; even Ushakov's dispatch boats were captured. The Turks annoyed Ushakov in every petty way they could, refusing to return salutes properly and squabbling over quarters and prizes. The

⁷⁶ Adm. Ushakov to Ali Pasha, June 23, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 267, pp. 389-390.

⁷⁷ The canton of Cheimarra included nine Christian villages located in the foothills along the coast south of Valona. Cheimarra paid tribute to the Pasha of Yanina, but frequently revolted.

⁷⁸ Adm. Ushakov to Count F. V. Rostopchin, May 5, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 236, pp. 309-310.

Turkish commanders in the islands frequently infuriated Ushakov by making dispositions without informing him beforehand.⁷⁹ Ushakov protested to Tomara that the barbarous practices of Patrona Bey, the Turkish commander, were causing widespread unrest at Corfu.⁸⁰

The consuls of Austria and Britain had formed the partisans of the two countries into effective political organizations which steadily undermined Ushakov's prestige and authority.⁸¹ The mutual suspicion between Ushakov and the British at Corfu was approaching the status of a diplomatic incident. In the spring of 1800 the British were raising a corps of 2,000 Albanian mercenaries in the islands for use in the Italian theater. Ushakov was apprehensive at the presence in the islands of a force which outnumbered his own troops; consequently, he placed impediments in the way of recruitment. Ushakov's tactics evoked sour comment from the British ambassadors to the Porte and to Naples.⁸²

The multiplying problems of the Septinsular Republic were removed from Ushakov's weary shoulders by an order

⁷⁹Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Feb. 13, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 193, pp. 251-253.

⁸⁰Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Feb. 13, 1800. *Ibid.*, III, no. 191, p. 245.

⁸¹Adm. Ushakov to Count A. Ia. Italinskii, Russian Minister to Naples, Mar. 30, 1800. *Ibid.*, III, no. 216, p. 289.

⁸²Lord Elgin to Lord Paget, Mar. 8, 1800; Lord Paget to Lord Keith, Apr. 24, 1800. *Paget Papers*, I, 187, 199.

from Tsar Paul directing the immediate return of the fleet to the Black Sea. After the fall of Corfu, the fleet had ranged far and wide over the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. With an ideal base at Corfu, Russian ships and troop transports enjoyed a freedom of movement equalled only by the British squadrons based at Palermo. In May 1799, Captain Sorokin had occupied Apulia. In June a Russian detachment had united with a ragged army of peasants under Cardinal Ruffo and marched overland from Brindisi to Naples, capturing King Ferdinand's capital from the French. A Russian squadron had moved up the Adriatic coast of Italy occupying town after town, finally besieging and taking the major port of Ancona. In September 1799, a Russian contingent marching overland from Naples occupied the Eternal City. The long arm of Ushakov's fleet reached even to Genoa, where in the autumn months of 1799 Rear-Admiral P. V. Pustoshkin blockaded the coast of the Ligurian Republic.⁸³

On several occasions in the winter of 1799-1800 Ushakov's fleet united with Nelson's at Palermo and Messina to counter the expected appearance of a Franco-Spanish fleet. To conduct his extensive operations, Ushakov received substantial reinforcements. In August Rear-Admiral

⁸³ A. Viskovatov, "Deistviia eskadry Kontr-Admirala Pustoshkina v Genuezskom zaliv pri gorod Onel'e i Port Mavritsii 1799 g.," Slavianin, VII (1828), 9-14.

Kartsov arrived from the Baltic with 3 liners and a frigate. In succeeding months 2,000 grenadiers under Prince Volkonskii arrived from Suvorov and 2 battalions under Major-General Borozdin arrived from the Black Sea. The new troops were designated by the Tsar as the garrison of Malta when that island fell to the British.

In spite of the successes of Russian arms, the erratic Tsar became convinced that Austria and Britain were only using Russia for their own devious ends. On January 2, 1800, while still at Messina, Ushakov received an order from Paul dated November 3, 1799. Ushakov was directed to withdraw all ships and troops from the Mediterranean except for small garrisons at Corfu and at Malta if it had fallen.⁸⁴ Ushakov immediately instructed the commanders of his far-flung squadrons to return to Corfu in preparation for a return to the Black Sea.⁸⁵ Ushakov arrived at Corfu on January 19 only to receive a few days later an order countermanding his instructions of November 3. Although Ushakov was to discontinue joint activity with the Austrians, he was to protect Naples and take Malta if possible.⁸⁶ However, in April the unpredictable Tsar again changed his mind and Ushakov resumed preparations for a return to Russia. By protesting the lack of provisions

⁸⁴Tsar Paul to Adm. Ushakov, Nov. 3, 1799. Mordvinov, III, no. 148, p. 74.

⁸⁵Adm. Ushakov to Capt. Sorokin; Adm. Ushakov to Rear-Admiral Pustoshkin, Jan. 22, 1800. *Ibid.*, III, nos. 188, 189, pp. 241-244.

⁸⁶Tsar Paul to Adm. Ushakov, Jan. 31, 1799. *Ibid.* III, no. 215, p. 287.

and the poor state of his ships, Ushakov managed to linger at Corfu for several months, awaiting another change in orders. The decisive French victory at Marengo on June 14, which liquidated at one stroke the work of Suworov, persuaded Ushakov to make preparations in earnest.

On July 13 Ushakov held a military council to debate the Tsar's contradictory and vague orders. Ushakov's dilemma was compounded by the fact that Malta had not fallen and by the desperate pleas of the King of Naples and the Ionian Senate for at least some Russian troops to remain in the area. The council decided that Captain Sorokin with three frigates and the two battalions of General Borozdin should remain at Naples. With the remainder of the fleet and Prince Volkonskii's grenadiers, Ushakov would return to the Black Sea.⁸⁷

Ushakov was in a quandary with regard to the garrison to be left at Corfu. He justifiably feared that without a substantial Russian force in the islands order could not be maintained.⁸⁸ However, the Tsar wanted only a token force in the islands and so Ushakov left Lieutenant-Colonel Gastfer with 150 men. Gastfer was instructed by Ushakov to maintain harmonious relations with the Turks and only

⁸⁷Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, July 13, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 283, pp.410-413.

⁸⁸Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, June 19, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 262, p. 378.

⁸⁹Adm. Ushakov to Lt.-Col. Gastfer, July 14, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 284, pp. 413-415.

in the most extreme cases was he to intervene in internal Ionian affairs and then only upon the express request of the Ionian Senate.⁸⁹

On July 16 Ushakov sailed from Corfu with 10 ships-of-the-line and a frigate. As the fleet sailed down the coast the Russian detachments on each island joined the fleet. Three frigates under Captain Voinovich at Ancona could not reach Corfu in time to sail with the fleet, but Voinovich was under orders to follow Ushakov to the Black Sea as soon as possible. Before his departure, Ushakov presented to the Septinsular Republic, with the permission of the Tsar, an armed galley captured from the French. The Ionian Senate met in a special session and presented Ushakov with a diamond-studded sword with the inscription "Corfu to Ushakov, its liberator". When Ushakov had first made preparations for leaving the island in April, the Senate had sent him a letter expressing its gratitude for his benevolent government and referring to him as "the father of the Septinsular Republic."⁹⁰

As Ushakov touched at each of the islands on his return to Russia, he received further marks of esteem. Cephalonia presented to the "Archinavarchos" a gold medal. Ithaca also presented a medal, with the inscription "To

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Adm. Ushakov to Lt.-Col. Gastfer, July 14, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 284, pp. 413-415.

⁹⁰ Ionian Senate to Adm. Ushakov, April 26, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 224, p. 298.

the Valiant Liberator of Ithaca". Zante gave Ushakov a gold sword and a shield with the Ionian Islands in bas-relief.⁹¹ Even though his work had been repudiated by his own government, the Ionian people knew Ushakov had tried.

While in the Aegean, Ushakov regretfully received Paul's order of June 2 whereby Ushakov was instructed not to leave a single soldier in the Ionian Islands and Sorokin was ordered back to the Black Sea.⁹² Paul petulantly wanted no reminders of the Mediterranean campaign. Ushakov protested to Tomara that even a token force could exert a stabilizing influence on the shaky Septinsular government,⁹³ but unlike some of the Tsar's earlier commands, the decree of June 2 was not subject to interpretation. Accordingly, Ushakov ordered Captain Voinovich, who was still in the Adriatic, to stop at Corfu on his return to Russia and take aboard Gastfer and his men.⁹⁴

Even after the Ionian Islands were astern of the fleet, Ushakov still tried to use his prestige to pacify the islands. Having received reports of more disturbances on the islands and fearing the effect of the departure of all Russian troops, Ushakov made one last appeal to the Ionian Senate and the

⁹¹Adm. Ushakov to Tsar Paul, Sept. 16, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 306, p. 443.

⁹²Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Sept. 10, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 303, p. 436.

⁹³Adm. Ushakov to V. S. Tomara, Sept. 15, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 305, p. 439.

⁹⁴Adm. Ushakov to Captain N. D. Voinovich, Sept. 16, 1800. Ibid., no. 309, p. 448.

Ionian people. As a friend of the republic, as the liberator of the islands, and as an admiral of one of the guaranteeing powers, Ushakov beseeched the Ionian Senate and the Ionian people to overcome petty differences and work together to build a stable society.⁹⁵ As an added measure, Ushakov wrote to his friend, the influential Count N. Bulgari, asking him to use his influence to settle the differences between the dissident factions.⁹⁶ As a strong and steady wind carried Ushakov further and further away from Corfu, writing a couple of plaintive letters was all Ushakov could do to ease his forebodings.

On September 11 Ushakov's fleet dropped anchor at Constantinople. The fleet remained there for a month engaged in a heady round of festivities. The Sultan presented to Ushakov six bronze cannon which had been used in the siege of Corfu.⁹⁷ On November 6 Ushakov arrived at Sevastopol after an absence of twenty-seven months. The Mediterranean expedition was Ushakov's last fleet command. Ushakov was unjustly blamed by Paul for not taking Malta and was out of favor at court. Since Ushakov was

⁹⁵Adm. Ushakov to the Ionian Senate and the Ionian People, Sept. 29, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 323, pp. 460-461.

⁹⁶Adm. Ushakov to Count N. Bulgari, Oct. 6, 1800. Ibid., III, no. 325, p. 463.

⁹⁷Tsar Paul permitted Ushakov to keep the cannon. In December, 1806, Ushakov gave the cannon to the Russian army for use against the French.

never a courtier and, moreover, since he was a member of the "Russian party" as opposed to the "European party", he never won the favor of Tsar Alexander. In 1807 Ushakov retired with honor and died in 1817.

With the departure of Ushakov's fleet, the Russian Empire was represented in the Mediterranean only by the frigate squadrons of Sorokin and Voinovich. However, both Sorokin and Voinovich had been ordered to return to the Black Sea as soon as possible. According to Paul's express orders the only Russian in the Ionian Islands in an official capacity was to be L. P. Benaki, the ineffectual Russian consul at Corfu. The Septinsular Republic could not have been deserted at a more critical time. Abandoned by one guaranteeing power, detesting the other, threatened by Ali Pasha, and prey to internecine civil strife, the Ionian people faced a most uncertain future.

CHAPTER V

THE ASSUMPTION OF A PROTECTORATE OVER THE SEPTINSULAR REPUBLIC

Within a few months after Ushakov's departure from Corfu, the Ionian Islands, after tottering on the brink for so long, finally slid into the abyss of anarchy. At the end of November 1800, the delegates at Constantinople who had written and secured approval for the Byzantine Constitution returned to Corfu to put the Constitution into effect. However, the Ionian people refused to recognize the authority of the new government. Without a substantial number of Russian troops to call upon, and not daring to use Turkish troops, the new government could not enforce its edicts. The comic-opera Septinsular army, which included more noble officers than soldiers, was completely ineffective everywhere except at Corfu.

The individual islands ignored the federal government, factions of nobles fought each other vindictively, rival towns fought to be the seat of government, the middle class maneuvered for political rights, and the peasants looked out for their own interests since no one else ever did. Such volatile political and economic cross currents and undercurrents would have resulted in chaos in any state,

but in the Septinsular Republic there was an additional factor militating against a return to order. The kaleidoscopic political situation allowed the release of the anarchic strain in Ionian character noted by so many consuls and visitors to the islands.¹ Political contests degenerated into self-perpetuating blood feuds rivaling the vendettas of Corsica in their intensity. By the beginning of 1801, there was no social or political fulcrum in the Ionian Islands on which a stable government could be based.

The Ionian government exercised a modicum of power only on the island of Corfu. This was the direct result of the presence of Turkish and Russian detachments. Colonel Gastfer had not yet departed. While the Senate's writ still ran on Corfu, the other islands were treated to a preview of what they could expect from a government based on the Byzantine Constitution. All who opposed the new government on Corfu were denounced as French agents and imprisoned or exiled. The nobles, who had faced impoverishment under the French, recouped their fortunes by

¹A. V. Arnault to Napoleon, July 5, 1797, Arnault, III, 379. Bellaire, pp. 85-86. Rapport consulaire, Les Iles Ioniennes, Vol. XXII, Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, quoted in Lévy, pp. 7-8. Bronevskii, II, 96. Vaudoncourt, pp. 63-64. William Turner, Journal of a Tour in the Levant (London: John Murray, 1820), I, 179.

corrupt use of the courts and by exploiting the lower classes.²

Attempts by the Senate to extend its authority to the other islands met with dismal failure. In April 1801, the Senate sent Count Dissylas and Count John Capodistrias, the future foreign minister of Russia, to Cephalonia to establish a government in accordance with the Byzantine Constitution. When the two commissioners arrived at Argostoli, they found an island racked by civil war. Most of the populace was armed and the houses in all the villages were fortified.³ As soon as the commissioners would pacify or placate one village or faction, fighting would break out at another village. The most powerful noble on the island, Count Eustathios Metaxa, refused to recognize the authority of the central government. Argostoli and Lixouri jealously fought to be the capital of the island. After weeks of vainly striving to establish some kind of order out of the chaos, Capodistrias departed from the island, leaving it in a worse state of anarchy than he found it.⁴

At Ithaca Capodistrias and Dissylas had no more

²"Les Iles Ioniennes redevenues indépendantes," Les Iles Ioniennes 1796 à 1801, Vol. I, p. 17, Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères; quoted in full in Rodocanachi, Appendix A, pp. 237-247.

³Lascaris, pp. 12-13.

⁴Ibid., p. 15.

success than at Cephalonia. The people of Ithaca not only refused to recognize the Corfu government, but threatened to raise the British flag.⁵ Zante did what Ithaca threatened to do. On February 19, 1801, a rebellious mob raised a British flag over the town of Zante. The Zantiotes encountered no opposition from the few government troops on the island. In fact, militiamen in government pay protected the British flag after it had been raised. The Corfu government could muster only 150 soldiers to send to Zante, but since that was not sufficient, no action was taken.⁶

On Corfu itself the populace was restive, resorting to arms at the slightest provocation. In April 1801, a visiting British classical scholar witnessed a battle in which a Corfiote mob drove the detested Turks out of the town and into the fortress, killing 17 Turkish soldiers in the process. Only the arrival of a Russian detachment ended the bloodletting.⁷ Clearly Corfu would follow the lead of the other islands once the Russian troops had departed. With Corfu smoldering, Cephalonia and Ithaca in open rebellion, and Zante flying the British flag, the Septinsular Republic, so painstakingly nurtured by Ushakov, was a state only in name.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Spiridion Foresti, British consul at Corfu, to Lord Elgin, British ambassador to the Porte, Feb. 26, 1801. Keith Papers, II, no. 42, pp. 189-190.

⁷ Dodwell, I, pp. 29-30.

After the withdrawal of the Russian fleet from the Mediterranean, Tsar Paul had lost interest in the fledgling republic. In the hectic last months of Paul's reign, the Ionian Islands came to his attention only once, and then only as a part of a broader scheme. In October 1800 the Tsar instructed his chancellor and foreign minister, Count F. V. Rostopchin, to prepare a memorandum on Russia's international position. Rostopchin, who was hostile toward Britain, proposed that Russia cease being a "timid infant" and take an active role in international politics. The first step in such a course, the foreign minister proposed, would be a partition of the Ottoman Empire jointly with France and Austria. Austria would receive Bosnia, Serbia and Wallachia, France would receive Egypt, and Russia would obtain Bessarabia, Moldavia and Bulgaria. Greece, including both the mainland and the islands, would be erected into a state modelled on the Septinsular Republic and guaranteed by all the partitioning powers. In the margin of the memorandum, Tsar Paul wrote: "I approve of your plan in its entirety and desire that you put it into execution."³ Nothing came of Rostopchin's ephemeral scheme and Paul was assassinated five months later. However, it is significant that in one of his ever-changing moods Paul had envisioned the Septin-

³Count F. V. Rostopchin, "Zapiska Grafa F. V. Rostopchina o politicheskikh otnosheniakh Rossii v poslednie mesiatsy pavlovskago tsarstvovaniia," Russkii Arkhiv, 1878, no. 1, pp. 103-110.

sular Republic as the nucleus of a large Greek state.

In spite of Paul's orders, a Russian squadron had remained at Corfu. Count Voinovich had arrived at Corfu from Ancona on October 2, but repeatedly postponed his departure on the grounds that his vessels needed repairs before proceeding to Sevastopol.⁹ Voinovich and Colonel Gastfer remained at Corfu during the entire winter of 1800-1801. In March, Voinovich's fear of the British caused him to flee from Corfu to Brindisi, where he remained from March 14 to April 11.¹⁰ On the grounds that Russia had been betrayed by her allies, Tsar Paul had withdrawn from the Second Coalition on October 22, 1799, and placed an embargo on British ships and merchandise. Because of the Tsar's hostility toward Britain, Russian warships in the Mediterranean had changed from hunters to the hunted.

For his disobedience in delaying his return to the Black Sea, Voinovich was court-martialed and Captain Konstantinov was sent to Corfu to assume command of the squadron. The presence of the Russian force at Corfu was debated at a meeting of the State Council on July 15, 1801. In spite of the Porte's request that the Russians

⁹Captain Voinovich to Adm. Ushakov, Oct. 11, 1800. Mordvinov, III, no. 326, p. 464.

¹⁰Count G. G. Kushelev, Vice-President of the Admiralty-Kollegiia, to Tsar Alexander, May 10, 1801. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 42, p. 21.

remain at Corfu until the end of the war, the Council decided that such a small force could not defend the islands or assist the Porte and might lead to war with France.¹¹

Upon receiving Tsar Alexander's orders to return to the Black Sea, Captain Konstantinov left Corfu on August 25, taking Gastfer and his men with him.¹²

The departure of Captain Konstantinov left the Ionian Islands completely denuded of Russian soldiers and warships. The only remaining Russian military force in the Mediterranean was Sorokin's frigate squadron at Naples. The new tsar, Alexander, desired a general European peace settlement. In the event of a general peace, a naval base at Corfu would not be as valuable. Moreover, because of the provisions of the March treaty, keeping troops at Corfu after the termination of the war would be illegal. Furthermore, the hostility between Russia and Britain at the end of Paul's reign had not yet been completely dissipated. The Russian admiralty as late as June 1801 feared that British warships in the Mediterranean might attack Russian warships.¹³ Unless a fleet as large as Ushakov had commanded were sent into the Mediterranean, any Russian naval activity in the Ionian Sea would be only

¹¹ Miliutin, III, no. 63, pp. 656-657.

¹² Commander of the Black Sea Fleet to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, Oct. 10, 1801. Ogorodnikov, XVII, no. 107, p. 54.

¹³ "Journal of the Admiralty-Kollegiia," June 21, 1801. Ogorodnikov, XVII, no. 141, p. 103.

on British sufferance.

Another reason for the relative disinterest of Russia in Ionian affairs was the attitude of Count Kochubey, Alexander's foreign minister. During his tenure in the foreign ministry, Kochubey was indifferent to the events occurring in the Ionian Islands. Moreover, any action taken with respect to the Septinsular Republic would have to be in conjunction with the Porte, but Kochubey distrusted the Turks. At a meeting of the State Council in August 1801, Kochubey declared that the Ottoman Empire was Russia's "natural enemy" in spite of the treaty of alliance of 1798.¹⁴

While Russia, both by choice and necessity, was temporarily indifferent to the plight of the Septinsular Republic, other powers decidedly were not. In February 1801, French troops occupied the Otranto peninsula, which was separated from Corfu only by the Strait of Otranto.¹⁵ In May, Napoleon sent a mission to reestablish contact with Ali Pasha.¹⁶ There was still a French party in the Ionian Islands and the chaos in the Septinsular Republic presented an ideal opportunity for a return of the French to Corfu.

¹⁴Conference of August 24, 1801. Stroganov, II, no. 121, pp. 94-95.

¹⁵Napoleon to Talleyrand, Feb. 25, 1801. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 5413, VII, 46-47.

¹⁶Ibid., May 23, 1801, no. 5588, p. 159.

The nascent French threat provoked a predictable response on the part of the ever vigilant British. The British ambassador to Naples, Lord Paget, feared that the French would send an expedition to reconquer the defenseless islands.¹⁷ British apprehensions, which were shared by the Porte, resulted in the dispatch of a squadron to cruise in the Adriatic to guard against a French descent on Corfu.¹⁸ In July 1801, the British government considered a preventive occupation of the Ionian Islands, although in conjunction with the Porte. The Russian reaction to such a move was indicative of to what extent the Tsar was indifferent to the fate of the Septinsular Republic. When the British ambassador to Russia informed the Russian government that Britain would refrain from occupying the islands if Russia would send troops there, he reported:

I mentioned these circumstances to the Minister of His Imperial Majesty, who informed me that the Emperor had no intention of stationing any force at Corfu, and that I might be assured that our occupying that island with any military force that might be judged necessary, either for its immediate defence or in order to defeat the designs of the enemy in that

¹⁷Lord Paget to Lord Grenville, Oct. 23, 1800. Paget Papers, I, 277.

¹⁸Lord Elgin to Admiral Keith, Apr. 3, 1801; Lord Keith to Lord Elgin, May 17, 1801. Keith Papers, II, nos. 43, 46, pp. 191, 192.

quarter, would not occasion here the slightest degree of umbrage or dissatisfaction. ¹⁹

Clearly Tsar Alexander was not interested in jealously maintaining Russia's erstwhile predominant position in the Septinsular Republic.

When the anticipated French thrust toward Corfu did not materialize, Britain refrained from occupying the islands. Moreover, the British flag which had been flying over Zante since February had become a source of embarrassment for the British, although Russia had not protested. On August 25 Lord Elgin ordered that the "indecent display of English colours" be ended since the British government did not intend to take the next logical step and occupy the islands.²⁰ Accordingly, on September 12, Captain Ricketts of the sloop El Corso proceeded to Zante to remove the flag. Thousands of peasants flocked into the town determined to prevent the lowering of the flag, but Captain Ricketts bluffed the populace into surrendering the British standard.²¹ Britain had respected the integrity of the Septinsular Republic, but by choice, not through any pressure from Russia.

¹⁹ Lord St. Helens, British ambassador to Russia, to General Hutchins, Aug. 9, 1801. Keith Papers, II, no. 49 p. 194.

²⁰ Lord Elgin to Admiral Lord Warren, Aug. 25, 1801. Keith Papers, II, no. 50, p. 194.

²¹ Captain Ricketts of the El Corso to Captain Rogers of the Mercury, Sept. 14, 1801. Keith Papers, II, no. 52, 196-198.

At the conference tables during the peace settlement of 1801-1802, Russia evinced little desire to consolidate her initial advantage with respect to the Septinsular Republic. In the last month of his reign, Tsar Paul had sent Kolychev as ambassador to France. Among the arrangements agreed upon in forming a Franco-Russian alliance against Britain, France was to recognize and guarantee the Septinsular Republic.²² The wily Talleyrand agreed not only to recognize the republic, but to guarantee its territorial integrity as well, thereby acquiring a voice in future matters relating to the Ionian Islands.

The death of Tsar Paul in March ended the Kolychev negotiations, but Franco-Russian negotiations were resumed with General Duroc's mission to St. Petersburg in May. Although Duroc's ostensible object was to congratulate the Tsar upon his accession, negotiations for a peace settlement were initiated. During the negotiations, Alexander agreed to the arrangements made by Kolychev and Talleyrand regarding the Septinsular Republic.²³

²²Peace project of Talleyrand, Mar. 18, 1801. Aleksandr S. Trachevskii, ed., "Diplomaticheskiiia snosheniia Rossii s Frantsiei v epokhu Napoleona," Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva, LXX (1890), no. 30, p. 64.

²³Talleyrand to General Duroc, June 6, 1801. Sbornik, LXX, no. 86, p. 183.

The direct result of Duroc's mission to Russia was the appointment of a Russian ambassador to France, Count Morkov. Count Morkov negotiated a peace convention between Russia and France signed October 8, 1801. During the negotiations for the treaty, Talleyrand made a feeble attempt to have the four coastal towns ceded to France, but Morkov refused to consider the proposal.²⁴ In a separate convention signed October 10, 1801, France joined Russia in guaranteeing not only the independence, but the constitution of the Septinsular Republic. Furthermore, it was agreed that no foreign troops of any kind would be stationed at Corfu.²⁵

France relinquished her pretensions to the Ionian Islands, but the cost was higher than Russia need have paid. The fact that France was allowed to become a guarantor of the constitution and thereby given a voice in the internal government clearly demonstrated that at that date Alexander was not yet interested in a Russian protectorate over the islands. Corfu would be of value to Russia only in time of war or threat of war; in 1801 it appeared that peace was finally settling over the continent. In a preliminary peace treaty between France and the Porte, mediated by Russia and signed on October 9,

²⁴Count Morkov to Tsar Alexander, Oct. 13, 1801.
Ibid., LXX, no. 111, p. 272.

²⁵De Clercq, I, 475.

1801, the Ottoman government accepted a French guarantee of the Septinsular constitution.²⁶ Thus by the two treaties of October, France became an equal of Russia and the Porte in Septinsular affairs.

Russia's policy at that juncture was to relinquish any pretensions for predominance at Corfu, but at the same time prevent any other of the guaranteeing powers from gaining paramount influence. In that context Russia pressured the French to evacuate the Otranto peninsula, a position from which the French could easily occupy Corfu. Ambassador Morkov was instructed to inform the French that Russia had evacuated all troops from Corfu and expected France to withdraw its troops from Otranto.²⁷ Talleyrand mendaciously stated in response that the order had already been given. A few days later, Morkov learned that only 2,000 of the 10,000 French troops had evacuated Otranto.²⁸ Actually Napoleon was determined not to evacuate Otranto unless the British evacuated Malta.²⁹ The proximity of the French at Otranto to Corfu would be a constant point of friction between Russia and France throughout the brief history of the Septinsular Republic.

²⁶ Noradounghian, II, 47-48.

²⁷ Tsar Alexander to Count Morkov, Nov. 16, 1801. Sbornik, LXX, no. 117, p. 288.

²⁸ Count Morkov to Tsar Alexander, Nov. 26, 1801. Ibid., LXX, p. 319.

²⁹ Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, Mar. 12, 1802. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 5938, VII, 408.

The international position of the Septinsular Republic was finally securely established by the Peace of Amiens, signed March 27, 1802. According to Article IX, Great Britain, France, Spain, and Batavia recognized the Septinsular Republic.³⁰ The winter of 1801-1802 marked the nadir of Russia's interest and influence in the Ionian Islands. The Russian Empire was only one of four nations guaranteeing the constitution of the Septinsular Republic. Moreover, because of the Porte's control of the Straits, the presence of French troops at Otranto, and the ubiquitous British fleet in the Mediterranean, Russia of all the guaranteeing powers could least influence directly the affairs of the Septinsular Republic. Little more than a year before, Russia's influence had been paramount. A Russian admiral had been viceroy of the islands in all but name. But a combination of Russian disinterest and the dictates of geography had resulted in a swift erosion of Russia's position at Corfu.

The departure of the last Russian detachment from Corfu in August 1801 presaged the end of the Byzantine Constitution. When the Russians left, all Turks except for the Turkish commander of the fortress and his retinue also left upon orders from Constantinople.³¹ With the last

³⁰ De Clercq, I, 486.

³¹ Spiridion Foresti, British consul at Corfu, to Admiral Keith, Sept. 1, 1801. Keith Papers, II, no. 51, p. 195.

stabilizing influence gone, the republic disintegrated. Cephalonia and Ithaca declared themselves completely independent and the countryside of Corfu rose in revolt. The powerless Senate at Corfu decided to negotiate with the rebels, whose strength was increasing daily. This sign of weakness only encouraged the rebels, who boldly took over the government. The rebel assembly, which styled itself the Onoranda deputazione delle città, borghi e ville, annulled the Byzantine Constitution and drafted another constitution, which was adopted on October 25, 1801. The Onoranda Constitution was the third constitution in less than three years.

According to the constitution of October,³² which only applied to Corfu, the privileges of the nobility were abolished. The nobles were accorded only 48 representatives in the governing assembly of 240. The assembly was to be elected indirectly by universal male suffrage. As a concession to the nobility, membership on the executive council, elected by the assembly, was limited to the noble or wealthy elements of the population who had reached the age of 30. The French influence on the authors of the Onoranda Constitution was shown by such radical measures as the confiscation of all church property. The October constitution

³² M. Manessi, ed., Le tre costituzioni (Corfu: 1849), pp. 22-26, quoted partially in Lascaris, pp. 16-18.

was far more radical than Ushakov's constitution. In spite of minor concessions to the aristocracy, the middle class of Corfu had firm control of the government.

The nobles predictably refused to accept their defeat. Although powerless themselves, they invited the Porte to send a fleet. Ali Pasha massed troops at Butrinto, intending to take advantage of the turmoil on the islands. A Turkish squadron arrived at Corfu, but the Turkish admiral was reluctant to attack the Onoranda government, which enjoyed the support of the majority of Corfiotes. The issue was decided by a British squadron which, opportunely for the Ionian nobles, arrived off Corfu. The British commander landed 300 sailors at Corfu and imposed a truce upon the feuding Corfiote factions.³³ In a conference between representatives of the Onoranda and the nobility, a compromise was reached whereby the Onoranda would retain its functions of government, but delegates would be sent to St. Petersburg, Constantinople, and Paris to seek the approbation of the three guaranteeing powers for the Onoranda government.³⁴

As soon as the delegates had left Corfu, the nobles,

³³ Annual Register, VII (1802), p. 200.

³⁴ Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Les Iles Ioniennes, Vol. I, p. 17; quoted in Rodocanachi, Appendix A, p. 244.

emboldened by the presence of the English and Turks in the fortress, overthrew the Onoranda and reestablished the Byzantine Constitution. As soon as the British and Turks had left, another revolt erupted. In the ensuing weeks of civil war, it was the newly arrived French consul, Romieu, who led the way in trying to reestablish order, not the British consul, who overtly favored the nobles, or the ineffectual Russian consul.³⁵

The civil strife in the Ionian Islands had reached such proportions that the Tsar could no longer remain indifferent to his responsibility as guarantor of the Septinsular constitution. The reports of consul Benaki were not Alexander's only source of information. Napoleon periodically sent Alexander letters calling his attention to the anarchy in the Septinsular Republic. In a letter to Alexander dated October 10, 1801, Napoleon deplored the anarchy in the islands and appealed to Alexander's sympathy for his coreligionists in the islands. Napoleon proposed that since the Turks were unable and unfit to govern the islands, Russia and France should concert their actions and pacify the islands.³⁶ In an interview

³⁵ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 17; quoted in Rodocanachi, p. 245.

³⁶ Napoleon to Tsar Alexander, Oct. 10, 1801. Sbornik, LXX, no. 110, p. 260.

with Morkov three days later, Napoleon returned to the theme that the barbarous Turks were unfit to govern the Orthodox Ionians.³⁷ The First Consul was cleverly trying to disrupt the Russo-Turkish alliance and establish a Franco-Russian condominium over the Septinsular Republic.

Tsar Alexander was still unsure of what measures to take even after the establishment of the Onoranda government. In a letter to Napoleon in December 1801, Alexander stated that he was "deeply moved" by the disorders on the Ionian Islands, but that he was awaiting more precise information before judging what measures to take.³⁸ Alexander's indecision was ended when a delegate, Naranzi, arrived in St. Petersburg with a pathetic request from the Corfu Senate for Russian intervention.³⁹

Russia was the only guaranteeing power which could intervene at Corfu without serious international repercussions. France and Britain would jealously prevent each other from gaining the strategic fortress of Corfu. The Ionian people would never submit for long to dictation from the Porte. In his role as European peacemaker,

³⁷ Count Morkov to Tsar Alexander, Oct. 13, 1801. Ibid., LXX, no. 111, p. 263.

³⁸ Tsar Alexander to Napoleon, Dec. 15, 1801. Sbornik, LXX, no. 122, p. 299.

³⁹ Ioannes A. Kapodistrias, "Zapiska Grafa Ioanna Kapodistrias o ego sluzhebnoi deiatel'nosti," Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva, III (1868), p. 165.

Alexander was ideally suited to intervene at Corfu. Moreover, the Tsar perspicaciously perceived the fundamental causes of the turmoil in the Septinsular Republic. In a letter to Morkov, Alexander diagnosed the disorders as being the result of "the lack of restraint of the Ionian people, the dissatisfaction of the Ionians with the constitution which was given them, and the awarding of suzerainty over the islands to the Porte."⁴⁰

The Tsar instructed Captain Sorokin at Naples to make preparations to go to Corfu.⁴¹ Sorokin had been at Naples with three frigates and the two battalions of General Borozdin since Ushakov left the Mediterranean. Although Sorokin had been ordered by Paul to return to the Black Sea, insufficient provisions, fear of the British, and the pleas of King Ferdinand I had kept him at Naples. His actions were vindicated when, on March 29, 1801, the Tsar countermanded Sorokin's previous orders and instructed him to remain at Naples.⁴² Two of Sorokin's three frigates were in poor condition. In preparation for his departure from Naples, Sorokin had the Sy. Nikolai broken up and sold

⁴⁰Tsar Alexander to Count Morkov, Feb. 20, 1802. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, no. 142, p. 349.

⁴¹Tsar Alexander to Captain Sorokin, Apr. 22, 1802. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 150, p. 151.

⁴²"Journal of the Admiralty-Kollegiia," Sept. 1801; Ogorodnikov, XVII, no. 108, pp. 54-55.

and the Grigorii Velikiia Armenii, taking advantage of good weather, was sent back to Russia. Sorokin was left with the frigate Sv. Mikhail and two transports to execute the Tsar's orders.⁴³

Before occupying the islands, Alexander went to great lengths to assure the other guaranteeing powers that he had no ulterior motives. Alexander instructed Morkov to inform the French government that the only motive for Russian intervention at Corfu was to pacify the islands and that no change would be made in the international status of the Septinsular Republic.⁴⁴ The other guaranteeing powers did not protest Russia's actions. Napoleon, hoping to appease Alexander while at the same time increasing French influence at Corfu, instructed the French consul, Romieu, to assist the Russians when they arrived.⁴⁵ Alexander's energetic measures after such a long period of pusillanimity brought Russia in a few short months from fourth to first rank among the protectors of the Septinsular Republic.

On August 31, 1802, Captain Sorokin arrived at Corfu

⁴³Capt. Sorokin to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, June 8, 1802. Ogorodnikov, XVII, no. 161, pp. 155-156.

⁴⁴Tsar Alexander to Count Morkov, Feb. 20, 1802. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, no. 442, p. 350.

⁴⁵Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 26, 1802. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 6140, VII, pp. 495-496.

with a frigate and transports carrying 1,600 men.⁴⁶ Sorokin was accompanied by Count George Mocenigo, who was charged with administering the islands. Mocenigo was a scion of a prominent Venetian family which had given four doges to Venice.⁴⁷ A branch of the family had settled at Zante and adopted the Orthodox religion. Count George Mocenigo's father, Demitrio, had assisted Admiral Orlov in 1770, for which he was exiled by Venice. Count George Mocenigo had been Russian consul at Florence until he fell into disfavor with Paul. Upon the accession of Alexander, Count Mocenigo was appointed to the Neapolitan embassy. When appointed minister plenipotentiary to the Septinsular Republic in March, 1802, Count Mocenigo had risen to the rank of councillor of state, the fourth rank in the Russian hierarchy. It was to this Zantiote noble in Russian service that Alexander entrusted the formidable task of pacifying the Ionian Islands.

Mocenigo and Sorokin encountered no resistance in occupying Corfu. On September 22, the Cephalonians also joyously welcomed a Russian detachment. At the end of October, another frigate, the Nazaret, arrived from Sevastopol and was sent to Cerigo to occupy that island.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Capt. Sorokin to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, Sept. 23, 1802. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 190, p. 166.

⁴⁷ Simonde-Sismondi, "Mocenigo," Biographie Universelle, XXIX, 189-191.

⁴⁸ Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 199, pp. 173-174.

By November all the Ionian Islands were tranquil and awaiting directives from Corfu. It was a peace of exhaustion and of hope. The nobles viewed the Russians as protectors against the rabble, whereas the lower classes fondly remembered the liberal regime of Ushakov. Mocenigo's origin was both an advantage and a handicap. He spoke the language of the Ionians and understood their customs, but he was a Zantiote aristocrat himself.

Immediately after his arrival, Count Mocenigo issued a manifesto summoning former senators and other prominent Ionian figures to Corfu to form a senate as the provisional government. Mocenigo surrounded himself with the most prominent personages on the islands. His principal advisers were Count Spiridion Theotoki and the young Count John Capodistrias, both leaders of the moderate faction of the nobility.⁴⁹ Governors for each island were appointed by the provisional government under the guidance of Mocenigo. The authority of the governors was enforced by Russian detachments on each island. With the Ionian people timidly obedient and with Russian troops in complete control, Mocenigo was able to rule the Ionian Islands as a de facto viceroy from his residence in the palace of the last Venetian proveditore-generale.

⁴⁹ Lascaris, p. 18.

Once the Ionian Islands had been restored to tranquility, the Russian government was perplexed at what to do with the ill-fated Septinsular Republic. Russian troops were at Corfu in contravention of Russia's treaty obligations with both the Porte and France and could not remain there for a prolonged period without diplomatic repercussions. However, there were no grounds for hoping that the Ionian people would live together in peace if the Russians should leave. Tsar Alexander did not yet envisage Corfu as a bulwark against French expansion in the Levant, as had Paul and Tomara in 1798-1799. Sending troops to the Ionian Islands had been no more than a temporary expedient to end the chaos in the islands.⁵⁰

While Sorokin was sailing toward Corfu, Foreign Minister Kochubey proposed that Russia end its burdensome responsibility with respect to the Septinsular Republic by giving the islands to the King of Naples. Kochubey argued that Russia could avoid the anger of the Porte at its loss of suzerainty by having Napoleon take the initiative in the cession.⁵¹ The First Consul had been thinking along the same lines. In May Napoleon had proposed that

⁵⁰ A. L. Shapiro, "Sredizemnomorskie problemy vneshnei politiki Rossii v nachale XIX v.," Istoricheskie Zapiski, IV (1956), pp. 267-268.

⁵¹ Count Kochubey, "Ob Anarkhii," Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, no. 177, p. 758.

the Ionian Islands be given to the King of Sardinia.⁵² The warnings of Ambassador Morkov that Napoleon had ulterior motives and the obvious fact that France could pressure the King of Naples at will persuaded the Tsar to reject Kochubey's proposal.

The dilemma of what to do with the islands remained. For months after their arrival at Corfu, Sorokin and Mocenigo were without instructions from St. Petersburg. On April 15, 1803, Sorokin protested the lack of instructions to Admiral Chichagov, Minister of the Navy,⁵³ but received no response. Instead of increasing her forces on the Ionian Islands, Russia decreased her strength there. In the spring of 1803, the Sv. Mikhail was ordered, over the protests of Mocenigo, to return to Russia, leaving only one Russian frigate in the Ionian Sea.⁵⁴

The Russian occupation of the islands brought in its train the diplomatic headaches which Kochubey had feared. Count Mocenigo issued proclamations and made dispositions in the name of Alexander alone. Talleyrand protested to Morkov that since France was also a guaranteeing power, actions should be undertaken in the name of the French

⁵²Tsar Alexander to Count Morkov, May 28, 1802. Ibid., LXX, no. 165, p. 410.

⁵³Capt. Sorokin to Admiral Chichagov, April 15, 1803; quoted in K. Goloviznin, "Kapitan-Komandor Sorokin v Ionicheskoi Respublike," Morskoi Sbornik, CVIIIIC, no. 9 (Sept. 1882), pp. 38-39.

⁵⁴Commander of the Black Sea Fleet to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, April 9, 1803. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 242, pp. 281-282.

Republic also. Moreover, Consul Romieu should be consulted by Mocenigo. The French Foreign Minister did not criticize Mocenigo's actions, but simply wanted France to have a voice in the progress of events at Corfu.⁵⁵ Ambassador Morkov's response to Talleyrand's protest is of great significance because it marked the beginning of Russia's change of policy toward the Septinsular Republic. Morkov stated:

. . . England also has undertaken the same commitment [as France], but it does not follow, however, that she or any other power which likewise recognizes the political existence of that small republic should interfere in its internal affairs. The case of Russia is entirely different and quite special. It was under her auspices that the republic was established and it is under her protection that it exists. It is for Russia alone, in concert with the Porte, to organize and consolidate the republic. 56

Morkov also protested the prolonged stay in France of the delegation sent to Paris by the Onoranda government.

The Russian chancellor, supporting the position of Count Morkov, wrote to Alexander that the French had no more voice in the affairs of the Septinsular Republic than Russia had in the internal affairs of Switzerland, Holland or Italy.⁵⁷ The French ambassador to Russia, General Hédouville, reported to his government that

⁵⁵Count Morkov to Chancellor A. A. Vorontsov, Oct. 20, 1802. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, no. 176, p. 758.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Chancellor Vorontsov to Tsar Alexander, Oct. 28, 1802. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, no. 182, p. 762.

Russia was adamant on excluding the French from the arrangements being made at Corfu.⁵⁸

France was on strong grounds in its protest. By the treaty of peace between France and Russia, France guaranteed the Septinsular constitution. After the end of the war, Russia had no legal right to station troops at Corfu. Russia's actions at the end of 1802 reflected a growing proprietary interest in the Septinsular Republic, an interest which had been absent a year before and which was a direct result of the growing French threat. The Russian position at Corfu was beginning to assume more importance. Napoleon's tentative suggestions for a partition of the Ottoman Empire had alarmed the Russian Court. Chancellor Vorontsov instructed Morkov to watch closely French actions with respect to the Porte.⁵⁹

Having been rebuffed in an attempt to gain influence through his consul at Corfu, Napoleon tried another angle. The First Consul had been concerned for several months about the depredations of Algerian corsairs.⁶⁰ In December

⁵⁸ General Hédouville to Talleyrand, Nov. 28, 1802. *Ibid.*, LXX, no. 223, p. 750.

⁵⁹ Chancellor Vorontsov to Count Morkov, Jan. 5, 1803. Trachevskii, *Sbornik*, LXX, no. 244, pp. 619-620.

⁶⁰ Napoleon, *Correspondance*, nos. 6187, 6210, 6211, 6216.

1802, Napoleon proposed that Russia send three or four frigates to Corfu and France would do likewise. The joint Russo-French squadron, using Corfu as a base, would operate against Algiers.⁶¹ If the French proposal had been accepted, the French would have had a squadron in the roadstead of Corfu. Moreover, Algiers was nominally a vassal of the Porte and any action against that beylik would have caused Russia embarrassment at Constantinople. Morkov divined Napoleon's real motives and warned Vorontsov that France was sufficiently powerful to deal with Algiers by herself if she so chose.⁶² Once again Napoleon's attempt to gain a foothold at Corfu was rebuffed by Russia.

Russia's growing suspicions of French interest in the Ionian Islands were reinforced by a diplomatic blunder by Napoleon. On August 29, 1802, Napoleon sent General Sébastiani on a mission to the Levant, ostensibly for commercial reasons but actually to report on the political and military situation.⁶³ Sébastiani visited Tripoli, Egypt, Syria, and, on December 5, 1802, he arrived at Zante on his return to France. At Zante, Sébastiani had the affrontery to inspect the fortifications and to tell

⁶¹ Talleyrand to Hédouville, Dec. 29, 1801; Count Morkov to Chancellor Vorontsov, Jan. 3, 1802. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, nos. 239, 241, pp. 603, 607.

⁶² Count Morkov to Chancellor Vorontsov, Jan. 3, 1803. Ibid., no. 241, p. 607.

⁶³ Napoleon to Talleyrand, Aug. 29, 1802. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 6276, VIII, p. 9.

the notables of the island that their true interests were tied to France.⁶⁴ Sébastiani's mission elicited strong protests from England⁶⁵ and caused the French ambassador to the Porte acute embarrassment.⁶⁶ Chancellor Vorontsov "could not hide his astonishment" at Sébastiani's actions from the French ambassador.⁶⁷

A continuing source of friction between France and Russia was the disconcerting activity of Romieu, the French consul at Corfu. Mocenigo protested to Vorontsov that Romieu was intriguing with Ali Pasha and others on the continent.⁶⁸ Vorontsov instructed Count Morkov to protest to the French government that Romieu was consorting with and encouraging all the "anarchistic and muddle-headed people" in the Ionian Islands. Morkov was to demand that Romieu be sent instructions to assist, not hinder, Count Mocenigo.⁶⁹ Ambassador Morkov suspected that Romieu was endeavoring to establish a French protectorate over the Catholics in the Septinsular Republic.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ Martin Phillipson, "La Paix d'Amiens et la politique générale de Napoléon I^{er}," Revue historique, LXXVI (May-Aug. 1901), p. 51.

⁶⁵ Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, British Ambassador to France, Feb. 9, 1803. Baron Charles Whitworth, England and Napoleon in 1803 (London: Longmans, Green, 1887), p. 67.

⁶⁶ P. Coquelle, "L'Ambassade du Maréchal Brune à Constantinople (1803-1805)," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVIII (1904), p. 61.

⁶⁷ Chancellor Vorontsov to Count Morkov, Mar. 5, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 23, p. 50.

⁶⁸ Chancellor Vorontsov to Count Morkov, Jan. 5, 1803. Ibid., LXX, no. 244, pp. 619-620.

⁶⁹ Ibid., no. 243, pp. 613-614.

⁷⁰ Count Morkov to Chancellor Vorontsov, Mar. 17, 1803. Ibid., LXXVII, no. 30, pp. 70-71.

At the beginning of 1803, Russia feared that France had designs against the Ottoman Empire. In October 1802, the British warned the Russian government that Napoleon intended to attack the Morea and suggested a defensive alliance.⁷¹ Although Russia would not yet commit herself, she shared the apprehensions of Britain. In February, Vorontsov wrote to Morkov that Russia would not permit a partition or an attack on the Ottoman Empire.⁷² Russia's misgivings were increased when, in February, Napoleon sent a French brig, L'Arabe, to Greece with arms and munitions for the Suliotes and the Maniotes. Evidence was accumulating that France planned decisive action against the Porte. Sébastiani's mission had raised the alarm. Shortly afterwards Napoleon began concentrating artillery in Italian ports and a corps of 8,000 soldiers was formed at Corsica. Napoleon had preserved intact the name and the organization of the l'armée d'Egypte.⁷³ As a direct result of the French threat to the Balkans, the Ionian Islands assumed greater importance. Corfu could be either a bulwark against a French advance or the western terminus of a new Via Egnatia.

⁷¹ Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Warren, Oct. 27, 1802, Britain, Foreign Office 65/51. Cited by Piers Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810 (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), pp. 33-34.

⁷²Chancellor Vorontsov to Count Morkov, Feb. 1, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 23.

⁷³Phillipson, pp. 52-53.

The international situation reinforced Russia's already growing inclination to maintain Russian troops at Corfu for an indefinite period. In the event of a prolonged occupation of the islands, a provisional government was no longer expedient. At the end of October 1802, Mocenigo had warned Ambassador Morkov that the Ionian Islands would relapse into chaos as soon as the Russian troops departed.⁷⁴ The warnings of Mocenigo and the burgeoning French threat in the Levant combined to persuade Alexander to think in terms of another constitution for the Septinsular Republic. When the subject of a constitution was broached with the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Alexander was gratified to learn that the French government would not protest the promulgation of a new constitution.⁷⁵ Chancellor Vorontsov disclosed to Morkov what kind of government Alexander envisaged for the Septinsular Republic:

[The Emperor] does not want to favor the privileged class in a manner which would be detrimental to the other classes. He desires only to establish a government which would assure the happiness of all the classes equally and would be capable of maintaining itself.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Count Morkov to Chancellor Vorontsov, Jan. 3, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXX, no. 241, p. 606.

⁷⁵Tsar Alexander to Count Morkov, Feb. 1, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 8, p. 13.

⁷⁶Chancellor Vorontsov to Count Morkov, Jan. 5, 1803. Ibid., LXX, no. 243, pp. 614-615.

Once the decision to introduce another constitution had been made at St. Petersburg, it required months to carry it out at Corfu. It was October 1803 before Mocenigo had received his instructions and was able to convoke an elected constituent assembly.

The outbreak of hostilities between France and Britain in May 1803 brought Corfu again to the attention of European chancelleries. The British admiralty instructed Admiral Nelson to keep Corfu under close surveillance in expectation of a French attempt to reconquer the Ionian Islands.⁷⁷ In June, 13,000 French troops reoccupied the Stranto peninsula, which they had evacuated after Amiens. Russia's alarm was shown in a letter of Vorontsov to Prince Czartoryski:

It is possible that the French will take hostile measures against the Ionian Islands and particularly against our troops there, which are in rather small numbers. We ought, therefore, to ask England for her naval forces in the Mediterranean to guard against any French enterprise against those islands.⁷⁸

It was five months, however, before Russia made overtures for British cooperation. In the interval Alexander tried to make his influence felt at the conference table.

In the light of the changed international situation,

⁷⁷ British Admiralty to Lord Nelson, May 18, 1803. Nelson, Dispatches, V, 69.

⁷⁸ Chancellor Vorontsov to Prince Czartoryski, June 10, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 73, p. 195.

⁷⁹ Martens, VIII, pp. 102-104.

the Tsar took two measures with respect to the Septinsular Republic. Alexander tried to secure recognition of the neutrality of the Septinsular Republic and maneuvered to gain greater control over the Ionian Islands. In June 1803, at the instigation of Count Mocenigo, the Ionian Senate formally declared the neutrality of the Septinsular Republic and forbade Septinsular subjects to take part in the war "either directly or indirectly."⁷⁹ Upon orders from London, Admiral Nelson promised the Septinsular government that British warships would respect the neutrality of the small republic.⁸⁰ However, the British admiral was in doubt whether the impotent republic would be able to maintain its neutrality.⁸¹ Friction developed between Nelson and Mocenigo when British warships took into Malta French vessels flying the Septinsular flag,⁸² but on the whole Britain faithfully respected the neutrality of the Septinsular Republic.

Alexander tried to secure French acceptance of Septinsular neutrality during his attempted mediation between France and England. In response to Napoleon's request that Alexander mediate a peace, the Tsar produced, on

⁷⁹Martens, VIII, pp. 102-104.

⁸⁰Adm. Nelson to the Government of the Septinsular Republic, June 16, 1803. Nelson, Dispatches, V, 88.

⁸¹Adm. Nelson to Spiridion Foresti, Aug. 13, 1803. Ibid., V, 166.

⁸²Adm. Nelson to Count Vorontsov, Oct. 19, 1803; Adm. Nelson to Count Mocenigo, Oct. 22, 1803. Nelson, Dispatches, V, pp. 255, 261.

July 19, 1803, a project of a convention of peace between France and Britain. The convention⁸³ called for a general peace conference, a guarantee of the borders of Naples, Sardinia, and the Ottoman Empire, and the restoration of Malta to the Maltese Order. According to Article IV, France and Britain would recognize and guarantee the neutrality of the Septinsular Republic as well as of Batavia and Switzerland. Both France and England rejected the project, leaving the Septinsular Republic with its former nebulous status.

In addition to attempting to secure recognition of the neutrality of the Septinsular Republic, Alexander also sought to draw the republic closer under Russia's protective wing. In June 1803, the Russian government decided to take over the commercial functions of Septinsular consuls. The Septinsular consuls in London, Marseilles, and other ports were to surrender their offices to Russian ministers and consuls. A corollary was that all Septinsular subjects and merchant vessels would be protected by Russia. On July 14, Count Morkov notified Talleyrand that the Russian consul at Marseilles would represent the Septinsular government in that port.⁸⁴

⁸³Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 115, pp. 282-285.

⁸⁴Count Morkov to Talleyrand, July 14, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 106, p. 264.

The explanation given to the suspicious French government was that the Septinsular government had requested Russia to take over the consular functions because of a lack of sufficient funds and too few consuls in European ports.⁸⁵

The motives of the Russian government were transparent. With Mocenigo a virtual dictator of the Ionian Islands, the Septinsular government would request only what it was told to request. The booming merchant marine of the Septinsular Republic, rather than being a burden on the government, was a large source of revenue. The Ionian Islands, like Greece in general, gained tremendously from the perennial wars which swept the merchantmen of so many nations off the seas. Cephalonia alone had over 250 merchantmen and little Ithaca had 50.⁸⁶ Between 1800 and 1807, more than 400 ships were built in the Ionian Islands.⁸⁷ In 1802, 41 Septinsular vessels called at Russia's Black Sea ports⁸⁸ and by 1805 the number had risen to 51, compared with 35 English and 59 Ragusan vessels.⁸⁹ By the treaties of 1801-1802 most of the states

⁸⁵Count Morkov to Talleyrand, Aug. 1, 1803. Ibid., LXXVII, no. 124, pp. 300-301.

⁸⁶Vaudoncourt, p. 434. Leake, III, 26-27.

⁸⁷Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Lex Iles Ioniennes, Vol. XXII, 1814 a 1823; quoted in Rodocanachi, Appendix B, p. 301.

⁸⁸Oddy, European Commerce, I, 198.

⁸⁹Shapiro, "Sredizemnomorskie problemy," p. 260.

of Europe honored the Septinsular flag. By Russia taking over its consular service, the Septinsular Republic gained nothing and in the event of a war in which Russia participated, the Ionians would suffer. Russia's action could only be interpreted as a move to tighten her control over the Septinsular Republic in the face of the threatening international situation.

England and the Porte, needing Russian support against the French, accepted Russia's absorption of the Ionian consular service. The commercial republic of Ragusa, foreseeing keener competition from the Ionian Greeks, balked at the Russian action, but threats from Chancellor Vorontsov ended Ragusa's recalcitrance.⁹⁰ France, seeing the portentous significance of Russia's unilateral assumption of protection over Ionian commerce, proved to be less amenable. Napoleon not only refused to permit the Russian consul at Marseilles to represent the Septinsular government, he appointed an agent of his own choice to be Septinsular consul and demanded that the Corfu government ratify his action.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Vikentii Makushev, "Materialy dlia istorii diplomaticheskikh snoshenii Rossii s raguzskoi respublikoi," Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri moskovskom universitete, 1865, no. 3, pp. 168-171.

⁹¹ General Hédouville to Talleyrand, Nov. 2, 1803; Count Morkov to Chancellor Vorontsov, Oct. 10, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, nos. 156, 157, pp. 393-394, 374.

The dispute dragged out for months. On December 4, 1803, Talleyrand declared that France "could not permit Russian agents to be charged with the affairs of that republic without implicitly recognizing that it was under Russian domination."⁹² In response to Talleyrand's contention that France by treaty had equal rights in the Ionian Islands, the Russian government stated its position unequivocally:

The right of protection which Russia exercises over the Septinsular Republic is not at all based upon her treaties with France, but rests upon the convention between Russia and the Porte which determined the existence and the organization of the Septinsular Republic, and which placed the Septinsular Republic under the special protection of Russia while at the same time awarding suzerainty to the Porte.⁹³

Thus at the end of 1803, by a liberal interpretation of one treaty and disregard for another, Russia was claiming to be the sole protector of the Septinsular Republic.

The activity of the French consul at Corfu had become increasingly vexatious to the Russian government. In July 1803, Morkov protested to Talleyrand that Romieu's intrigues, which had been the subject of protests several months before, were still continuing. Morkov protested on three specific points: the attempt of Romieu to establish

⁹² Talleyrand to General Hédouville, Dec. 4, 1803.
Ibid., LXXVII, no. 172, pp. 428-429.

⁹³ Aide-mémoire to General Hédouville, Jan. 13, 1804.
Ibid., LXXVII, no. 190, p. 464.

a French protectorate over the Ionian Catholics, the claim of Romieu that his diplomatic status was the result of treaties between France and the Porte rather than a concession of the Septinsular government, and finally, Romieu's interference in the internal affairs of the republic by championing elements opposed to the government and thereby undermining it.⁹⁴ Again in September Morkov strongly protested Romieu's attempts to cause "discord and anarchy."⁹⁵ Although Napoleon was willing to concede to Russia paramount influence at Corfu, he was not yet willing to relinquish all French interests in the area.

The dispute over the Septinsular consuls and Romieu's conduct was lost in more momentous developments. The Tsar's failure to mediate a peace had ended Napoleon's hope of using Russia for his own ends. In July 1803, Napoleon asked for the recall of Ambassador Morkov, whom he personally disliked.⁹⁶ Alexander recalled Morkov, but ostentatiously decorated the ambassador. Morkov's departure from Paris in December was the beginning of a definite

⁹⁴Count Morkov to Talleyrand, July 22, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 119, pp. 288-289.

⁹⁵Count Morkov to Talleyrand, Sept. 30, 1803. Ibid., no. 147, p. 356.

⁹⁶Napoleon to Alexander, July 29, 1803. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 6957, VIII, p. 426.

coolness in Russo-French relations. The entry of French troops into Hanover further disquieted the Russian government.

In the autumn of 1803, Russian fears of a French thrust toward the Balkans grew proportionately. In a report to the Tsar on November 24, 1803, Vorontsov expressed a fear that the French, based in Apulia, would make a descent on the Balkan coast, probably at Antivari, Paštrovići, or Preveza. In consequence, the chancellor recommended that Russian forces in the Levant be increased.⁹⁷ Since Britain also feared a French descent on the Morea, Vorontsov saw the advantages in concerting Russian and British defenses in that area. He instructed the Russian ambassador in London to suggest to the British that Nelson coordinate his activities with Count Mocenigo.⁹⁸

In the face of the French threat and in her self-appointed role as protector of the Septinsular Republic, Russia began to strengthen her forces at Corfu. On December 21, 1803, Tsar Alexander ordered a squadron and a regiment of troops sent to Corfu.⁹⁹ On March 25, the Trekii (54), Ioann Zlatoust (54) and Pospeshnyi (44)

⁹⁷Chancellor Vorontsov to Alexander, Nov. 24, 1803. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 165, p. 411.

⁹⁸Chancellor A. Vorontsov to Count S. Vorontsov, Nov. 20, 1804; cited by Mackesy, p. 36.

⁹⁹Tsar Alexander to Adm. de Travers, Dec. 21, 1803. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 300, pp. 345-346.

together with 1,095 men under Colonel Papandopoulo¹⁰⁰ arrived at Corfu. On March 24, 1804, Alexander ordered additional warships and four more regiments sent to the Ionian Islands.¹⁰¹ In conformance with that order, five additional squadrons, each carrying troops, were sent out to Corfu. The arrivals of the ships at Corfu read like a roll-call of the Russian Black Sea fleet: on June 24 arrived the Sv. Paraskeva (74) and the Simeon i Anna (74), on July 14 - the Aziia (74) and the Sv. Troitsa (66), on August 1 - the Varakhail (68) and the Pobeda (66), on August 4 - the Mariia Magdalina (74) and the Sv. Mikhail (50), on September 1 - the Grigorii Velikiia Armenii (50).¹⁰²

Prince Czartoryski, fearing that the Porte would be alarmed at so many warships passing the Straits, instructed the squadron commanders to pass the Straits with only a few ships at a time and not to tarry.¹⁰³ Actually, the Porte was intimidated rather than angered. At the end of 1803 and in early 1804, the French ambassador at Constantinople steadily lost influence.¹⁰⁴ However, for Russia the

¹⁰⁰ Emmanuel Grigorevich Papandopoulo was born in Greece and educated in a Russian military school. He distinguished himself in the war of 1787-91.

¹⁰¹ Tsar Alexander to Adm. de Travers, Mar. 24, 1804. Ogorodnikov, KVII, no. 316, pp. 446-447.

¹⁰² Excerpts from logbooks, 1804; Ogorodnikov, KVII, no. 418, pp. 541-553.

¹⁰³ Prince Czartoryski to Minister of Marine Chichagov, May 15, 1804. Ibid., KVII, no. 334, pp. 468-469.

¹⁰⁴ Coquelle, "Brune," p. 68.

most important question was not whether her warships could pass the Straits, but whether they would be allowed to return to the Black Sea.

Although some of the warships were rotated back to Russia, by the autumn of 1804 a formidable Russian squadron was stationed at Corfu and nearly 8,000 Russian troops were encamped in the Ionian Islands. The steady build-up of Russian strength at Corfu in 1804 proclaimed more incisively than any aide-mémoire that Russia intended to be paramount in the Ionian Islands. In July 1804, Sir John Warren, British ambassador to Russia, reported that there was a distinct possibility that the Ionian Islands would soon be annexed to Russia "in full sovereignty."¹⁰⁵

While measures were being taken to protect the Septinsular Republic externally, Mocenigo succeeded in establishing a stable government in the islands. In preparation for drafting a new constitution, the provisional government established qualifications for eligibility for membership in the electoral college, whose members were called synclitae. To be eligible, one had to be of noble birth or fulfill the following qualifications: be a citizen of the republic, a Christian, be of irreproachable conduct, possess a certain

¹⁰⁵Adm. Sir John Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, July 30, 1804. Paget Papers, II, 152.

annual income, and not be engaged in a manual trade.¹⁰⁶

The synclitae then elected a constituent assembly, which met at Corfu on October 26, 1803, to draft and adopt a constitution. The qualifications for holding the franchise, which were actually determined by Mocenigo and his advisers, foreshadowed the kind of government which would be established.

The first session of the constituent assembly was opened by a speech by Mocenigo. The tone as much as the content of the speech was of significance. It was more like an address from the throne than a speech by a foreign envoy.

The establishment of a provisional government, supported by the invincible troops of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, has had as its object to put you in a state worthy of the blessings of this free and durable constitution, which you are now called upon to accept.

Thus, in the name of my august sovereign, I urge you to comply

I intend to support with firmness and all necessary force the installation of this government in order that a strong administration, just but stern--such as you have not yet enjoyed--will bring you to appreciate the precious advantages of a peaceful and civil existence.

You should, people of the Ionian Islands, gather the first fruits of the affectionate pains which my august master has paternally and presciently taken on your behalf.

¹⁰⁶Lascaris, p. 19.

Those who do not respond with the most peaceful conduct know that they will be considered as enemies¹⁰⁷

The 212 articles of the constitution submitted to the assembly were discussed individually, but there was little controversy. The provisions of the constitution were eloquently defended by Count John Capodistrias, one of the authors. Capodistrias pointed to the years of anarchy behind the Ionian people and to the "road of honor" which, thanks to God, the Emperor of Russia, and Count Mocenigo, lay ahead of them under the proposed constitution.¹⁰⁸

The constituent assembly adopted the constitution by a unanimous vote on December 5, 1803. The Constitution of 1803, with its 212 articles, suffered from complexity as much as the Byzantine Constitution had suffered from vagueness. According to the Constitution of 1803,¹⁰⁹ the Septinsular Republic was to be governed by a "constitutional nobility" rather than by the hereditary nobility. The nobles were automatically accorded membership in the "constitutional nobility". The commoners had to

¹⁰⁷Proclamation of Count George Mocenigo (enclosure, Lord Adair, British ambassador to Vienna, to Adm. Lord Collingwood, Nov. 23, 1807). Sir Robert Adair, Historical Memoir of a Mission to the Court of Vienna in 1806 (London: Longman, Brown, Green, 1844), p. 431.

¹⁰⁸Quoted in Lascaris, p. 20.

¹⁰⁹Costituzione della Repubblica Settinsulare (Corfu: 1803), 71 pp. Quoted partially in Pauthier, pp. 12-16.

meet the following qualifications: Septinsular subject by birth, legitimate child of Christian parents, possess an annual revenue varying from 1,300 ducats¹¹⁰ on Corfu to 225 ducats on Cerigo, ability to read and write in the languages employed by the government, and be out of debt to the public treasury. (Art. VI) However, if one were a graduate of "one of the first academies of Europe," all other qualifications were waived. (VII)

The "constitutional nobility" formed an electoral college which elected a legislature, a Senate, and three censors. The legislature, composed of forty members, was to convene at Corfu every two years for a two-month session. It was charged with making laws and electing judges and the seven prytanos who acted as governors of the islands. The Senate, composed of seventeen members, was to have executive functions and was divided into three chambers: foreign affairs, internal affairs, and finance. Each chamber had a secretary of state. The presiding officer of the Senate was to be the head of state, known as the prince-president. The three censors elected by the synclitae had as their function the surveillance of the other organs of government. Federalism was specifically condemned in the constitution; the authority of the Corfu government was supreme.

¹¹⁰7,500 francs.

The constitution declared the Orthodox religion to be the dominant religion in the Septinsular Republic, but the Catholics were protected and all other rites were tolerated. (I) Extensive individual rights were stipulated in the constitution. The inviolability of property and domicile was specifically recognized. (CVIC) All persons arrested had to be interrogated within 24 hours. (CLXII) The last article contained an escape clause for Tsar Alexander. It provided that the legislature of 1806 could revise the Constitution of 1803 if the need for any revisions were evident by that date.

The provisions for individual rights, the balance of power between the government branches, and the admission of commoners into the electoral college marked the Constitution of 1803 as a liberal document for its period. The acceptance of education alone as a qualification for the franchise antedated by decades a similar development in western Europe. The government would still be dominated by a small oligarchy, but the oligarchy would be based, not just on birth, but also upon property and education. With the exception of the centralist structure of the government, the Constitution of 1803 greatly resembled Ushakov's constitution of May 1799. The Constitution of 1803 was a compromise born of experience. The Byzantine Constitution had given the government to the nobility, but the commoners had risen in

revolt. The Onoranda constitution of October 1802 had given the government to the middle class, but the nobility had refused to accept it. Under the new constitution, the nobles retained their privileges and most of their power while at the same time the upper middle class was allowed to participate in the government.

Mocenigo had done his work well. After four years of disorder and uncertainty, the Ionian people settled down and enjoyed four years of peace and relative prosperity. Tsar Alexander took pride of authorship in the constitution,¹¹¹ although he had only suggested its broad outlines. The omission of any mention of Russia in the constitution caused Alexander to postpone ratification and eventually to make use of the escape clause, but that was years in the future. Although Russia's rights were not specifically recognized in the Constitution of 1803, Mocenigo's influence over the government was unchallenged. Most of the Ionian people preferred the blessings of stability to the burdens of unfettered independence. Moreover, by 1806 there was one Russian soldier in the Ionian Islands for every seventeen inhabitants.

The small body of electors was easily appeased or coerced by Mocenigo and, as the years passed, Mocenigo

¹¹¹ Tsar Alexander to Count Morkov, Feb. 1, 1803; Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 8, p. 18. Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, Sept. 6, 1807; Joseph Bonaparte, Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire 2nd ed. (Paris: Parrotin, 1853-1854), III, 438.

used his power more and more nakedly. A perspicacious British visitor to the islands, who observed an election on Santa Maura in September 1806, noted in his journal:

The assembly [synclitae] meets in the church of St. Minas on the out-skirts of the town with a Russian guard at the door. The Prytano opens the assembly with a long speech in Greek pointing out the importance of the business on which they are met He had the character of being one of the most learned men in these islands, and the speech is much commended, though I hear one of the country nobles whispering to another, 'fine words without meaning'. In fact, not one of those present is ignorant that the meeting is all a farce, and that the legislators have been named a fortnight ago by the emissary of the Russian plenipotentiary It is a common joke to call the Syncliti, the Synklefti. ¹¹²

By the beginning of 1804, Russian control over the internal affairs of the Septinsular Republic was secure. This in turn freed the Russian troops in the islands for possible use against the French. The first half of the history of the Septinsular Republic had been dominated by internal strife. The second half of the republic's brief history would be dominated by attempts to achieve external security. Since by 1804 the Ionian Islands were a de facto protectorate of Russia, the Septinsular Republic had no foreign policy distinct from that of Russia.

¹¹²Leake, III, 21-22. "Synklefti" is an allusion to the Greek word "klepht" meaning outlaw.

CHAPTER VI

THE SEPTINSULAR REPUBLIC IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1804-1807

At the beginning of 1804, Prince Adam Czartoryski became minister of foreign affairs. Of all the Russian foreign ministers during the Napoleonic period, Czartoryski proved to be the most ardent champion of the Russian position at Corfu. Soon after his assumption of office, Czartoryski described Corfu as "the boulevard of Greece" and urged Alexander to maintain strong forces on the islands.¹ Czartoryski saw Corfu not only as a bulwark to shield the Balkan coast of the Ottoman Empire, but also as a base for possible operations against the French in Italy, as it had been in 1799-1800. Prince Czartoryski, as had Chancellor Vorontsov, favored concerting Russia's actions in the Ionian Sea with Great Britain. The Russians at Corfu and the British at Malta could effectively prevent General Gouvion-Saint-Cyr at Otranto from making a descent on the Morea.

Prince Czartoryski's position was upheld at a meeting of the State Council on April 17, 1804.² The council

¹Czartoryski to Tsar Alexander, Feb. 29, 1804. Trachevskii, *Sbornik*, LXXVII, no. 200, p. 495.

²Conference of April 17, 1804. *Ibid.*, LXXVII, no. 223, pp. 553-554.

concluded that Russia could not "remain passive" in the face of French actions in north Germany and the duc d'Enghien affair. Anticipating an imminent rupture of relations between France and Russia, the council recommended that steps be taken in concert with Britain to defend Corfu and the Kingdom of Naples. Since Russia could assist Naples only from Corfu, Russia's position in the Ionian Islands was assuming the offensive nature which Czartoryski had envisaged.

The steady build-up of Russian forces at Corfu in the spring and summer of 1804 brought cries of protest from the French government. Napoleon instructed Ambassador Brune at Constantinople to protest to the Porte the use of the Straits by Russian warships and the presence of so many foreign troops in a state which was under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Brune was to hint that the Russian troops were really destined to occupy the Morea while France was devoting all her attention to England.³ France's attempt to frighten the Porte failed for the present, but France kept pressuring Russia.

On July 28 Talleyrand officially protested to the Russian chargé Cubril. Talleyrand maintained that the presence of Russian troops at Corfu was in direct contravention of Article IX of the Franco-Russian treaty of

³ Napoleon to Maréchal Brune, July 27, 1804. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7874, IX, pp. 432-433.

October 1801. Talleyrand also reversed his position on the change in the Septinsular government. The French foreign minister now claimed that Russia had no right to change the government without prior consultations with the French government.⁴ Napoleon was arrogantly contemptuous of the military significance of a few thousand Russian troops at Corfu, but he was angered by the attitude of the Russian government which had sent them there.⁵ Although Napoleon presumed to be disdainful of the forces at Corfu, he reinforced his troops in Italy⁶ and, in the last month before a final rupture between France and Russia, Napoleon proposed as one of the conditions for a relaxation of tensions that "the Septinsular Republic be independent and under the protection of all the powers."⁷

To all French protests in the summer and autumn of 1804, Cubril responded that the troops were at Corfu at the request of the Septinsular government and with the permission of the Porte. Moreover, Cubril never failed to point out that France had previously agreed to the

⁴Talleyrand to Cubril, July 28, 1804. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, no. 274, pp. 681-683.

⁵Napoleon to Talleyrand, Aug. 2, 1804. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 7895, IX, pp. 444-445.

⁶Napoleon to Maréchal Berthier, Sept. 3, 1804. Ibid., no. 7981, IX, pp. 497-498.

⁷Napoleon to Talleyrand, Aug. 10, 1804. Ibid., no. 7917, IX, p. 462.

Russian occupation of the islands.⁸ Just before the French chargé quit St. Petersburg, severing relations, Czartoryski told him frankly that Russian troops were at Corfu because French troops were on the Italian coast.⁹

The amount of attention devoted by the French government to the Russian troops at Corfu was out of proportion to their military significance. However, of all the diplomatic incidents in the drama of the formation of the Third Coalition, it was only on the Corfu and Malta questions that France had clear grounds for righteous indignation and thus Napoleon understandably took advantage of it. Furthermore, with the Russians at Corfu and the French in Apulia, it was only at the Strait of Otranto that there was a direct confrontation of the two empires.

After Russia had established a virtual protectorate over the Ionian Islands in the face of vehement French protests, Russia sought ways of defending her new advanced, but exposed, position. To protect the Ionian Islands by sea, an alliance with Britain was adequate. To protect the Ionian Islands in the rear, the alliance with the Porte had to be maintained. However, the Turkish

⁸Oubril to Talleyrand, Aug. 28, 1804. Oubril to Czartoryski, Sept. 5, 1804. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, nos. 290, 298, pp. 705, 729.

⁹Chargé Rayneval to Talleyrand, Sept. 20, 1804. Ibid., LXXVII, no. 305, p. 741.

alliance was not enough in view of the independent position of Ali Pasha and the industry of French agents in the Morea. The success of a French descent on the Morea or Albania would be largely dependent upon the reception accorded the French by the inhabitants. To establish a counterweight to the French and Ali Pasha in the Balkans, the Russian government decided upon a dangerous and potentially far-reaching policy of wooing the Orthodox inhabitants of Greece and Albania.

On February 26, 1804, Czartoryski informed Count S. Vorontsov, Russian ambassador in London, of the Tsar's intention "to revive the old ties which have existed between the Russian Court and the Ottoman subjects of the Greek communion." Russia, Czartoryski added, could not undertake the defense of the Ottoman Empire without promising to the Greeks and Slavs an amelioration of the conditions under which they lived.¹⁰ Czartoryski declared to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg that Russia's object was to preserve as much as possible the Ottoman Empire in its present state, but "it is with that object that we have thought it necessary to reactivate our influence over the Greeks and Slavs of that empire."¹¹

¹⁰Prince Czartoryski to Count S. Vorontsov, Feb. 26, 1804. John Holland Rose, ed., Select Despatches From the British Foreign Office Archives Relating to the Third Coalition Against France (London: Royal Historical Society, 1904), p. viii. Britain, Foreign Office 65/54, quoted in Mackesy, p. 46.

¹¹Czartoryski to Tsar Alexander, Feb. 29, 1804. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXVII, no. 200, p. 495.

Russia's objective was to outbid the French agents and persuade the Orthodox inhabitants of Greece and Albania that only Russia could improve the position of the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

In carrying out such a policy, Russia labored under several handicaps. Russia's desertion of the Greeks in 1790 was still a living memory. Moreover, in making any promises to the Greeks, Russia would be embarrassed by her alliance with the Porte. In the decade before 1804, the Russian government had shown no interest in wooing the Orthodox. Ushakov's pleas for assistance to the Souliotes, Cheimarriotes and other Orthodox rebels had gone unheeded in St. Petersburg. The sudden change in Russian policy suggested only opportunism and insincerity.

Czartoryski's policy toward the Orthodox subjects of the Porte could be implemented in two ways: by applying diplomatic pressure at Constantinople to gain concessions for the Orthodox or by actively aiding the subjects of Ali Pasha. The Russian government embarked on both courses. To support the Orthodox inhabitants of Greece in a direct manner, the Septinsular Republic was an ideal base. Natural allies of Russia against Ali Pasha were the Christian rebels, particularly the Souliotes and the Cheimarriotes, and the Moslem enemies of Ali Pasha, notably the rulers of Delvino, Paramithia, and Margariti.

The warrior republic of Souli had been waging war with the Pasha of Yanina since 1790. Both Benaki and Mocenigo had aided the Souliotes by sending arms and by offering hospitality to refugees and wounded.¹² At the end of 1803, Souli was overwhelmed by Ali's superior forces. On December 12, 1803, the Souliotes signed a treaty surrendering all their territory to the Pasha of Yanina.¹³ By the terms of the capitulation, the Souliotes were given permission to emigrate to the Ionian Islands. During the exodus over the mountains to Farga and Preveza, thousands of Souliotes were treacherously massacred by the pursuing troops of Ali's son, but 1,700 managed to reach Corfu. Mocenigo generously granted the Souliotes land to settle down and form a colony; but the warriors were ill-suited for a pastoral existence.

In addition to the Souliotes, other refugees flocked to the islands. Santa Maura, in particular, was a place of refuge for Albanian and Greek exiles. Bands of klephts used Santa Maura as a winter asylum and in the summer raided the coast of Albania, Epirus and Acarnania. If effectively organized and given direction by Russia, the refugees in

¹² E. Yemeniz, "Les Héros de la Grèce moderne; Photos Tsavellas," Revue des Deux Mondes, XX, no. 2 (Apr. 15, 1859), pp. 333-348.

¹³ Treaty is given in full in Pouqueville, Histoire de la Grèce, I, 200-202.

the islands could be a potent weapon against Ali Pasha.

On May 19, 1804, the newly appointed Russian commander in the Ionian Islands, General Roman Karlovich Anrep,¹⁴ received detailed instructions from Tsar Alexander with respect to Russian aims toward the Orthodox of the mainland.¹⁵ After a review of the causes for hostility between France and Russia, Anrep was warned to expect a French descent on Greece or Albania momentarily. General Anrep, Count Mocenigo, and Captain Sorokin were to form a military council to concert measures for opposing a French landing. Shore batteries and other fortifications were to be strengthened and liaison established with the British fleet. Anrep was to oppose with force any attempt by Ali Pasha to gain control of the four coastal towns. To augment his forces, Anrep was to form the Greek and Albanian exiles in the islands into a corps with Russian officers and strict discipline. Furthermore, Anrep was instructed to establish contact with the Orthodox leaders on the mainland. While not subverting the authority of the Sultan, the Russian general was to convince the Orthodox inhabi-

¹⁴The Anrep family, Baltic Germans of Westphalian origin, had given officers to the Russian army for a century ("Anrepy," Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, II, 821.

¹⁵Secret Instructions to General Anrep, May 19, 1804. Quoted in full in Goloviznin, pp. 40-51.

tants of the mainland, particularly the doughty Maniotes, that their interests were tied to Russia. In the event of a French attack, General Anrep was to rouse the countryside against the French in the name of both the Tsar and the Sultan.

When Anrep, armed with his instructions, arrived at Corfu in August 1804, he and Count Mocenigo began aiding in earnest the Moslem agas who opposed Ali Pasha's authority. Moreover, Russian consuls on the mainland were directed to afford the Greek inhabitants protection against the harsh rule of Ali Pasha.¹⁶ In July 1804, Mocenigo sent a band of 400 Souliotes from Corfu to the mainland. The Souliotes joined with the troops of the Bey of Tsamuria and withstood a six-weeks siege by the troops of Ali Pasha.¹⁷ Although the Souliotes were finally driven back to the coast by an army of 6,000 men mustered by the Pasha of Yanina, the ability of Russia to strike at Ali in his own dominions had been clearly demonstrated.

After the return of the Souliotes to Corfu, General Anrep formed a light infantry regiment from the refugees in the islands. Ten companies were organized, including 624 Souliotes and 416 Cheimarriotes under the command of

¹⁶Spiridion Foresti to Lord Harrowby, July 20, Aug. 21, Sept. 6, 1804, Britain, Foreign Office, 65/54. Quoted in Mackesy, pp. 48-49.

¹⁷Leake, I, 246-521-522.

Colonel Benckendorff and subsequently of Colonel Papan-
dopoulos. The last warrior chief of Souli, Photo Tsavellas
and his mother, Mosco, were both given commissions in
the new regiment. One of the majors was a former monk.
The Greek regiment organized by Anrep continued in exist-
ence under the French after 1807 and was a military school
for many of the subsequent leaders in the Greek war for
independence. Theodore Kolokotronis and Markos Botzaris,
the defender of Missolonghi in 1822,¹⁸ both served in the
regiment.

Russia's support of the Orthodox of Greece and Albania
caused friction with Great Britain. While Russia sought
security against the French by wooing the Orthodox sub-
jects of the Sultan, Britain followed a policy of support-
ing the Balkan pashas, thereby hoping to win them over
and keep the area stable. The British ambassador to
Russia and Admiral Nelson suspected that Russia's ulti-
mate aim in supporting the Greek klephts might be the
independence of Greece.¹⁹ Relations between Mocenigo
and Spiridion Foresti, the British consul at Corfu,

¹⁸E. Yemeniz, "Les Héros de la Grèce moderne; Marc
Botzaris," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXI, no. 3 (June 15,
1859), p. 834.

¹⁹Lord Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, June 21, Feb. 3,
Feb. 24, Mar. 26, 1804, Britain, Foreign Office 65/54.
Cited by Mackesy, pp. 46-47. Nelson, V, 115, 136, 462,
VI, 99.

were embittered by Foresti's continued support of Ali Pasha. Czartoryski protested the activities of the British consuls in Greece and Albania,²⁰ but without effect.

The British foreign minister, Lord Harrowby, was convinced that Mocenigo's actions would alarm the Porte and drive the most powerful pasha in the Balkans into the arms of the French while at the same time the Orthodox inhabitants would render little assistance to Russia in her hour of need.²¹ Russia overestimated the attachment of the Orthodox Greeks and Albanians to Russia. Captain Leake, who traveled extensively in Greece and Albania at the end of 1804, recorded in his journal:

The sentiments of the Greeks, as well in this Delving as in other parts of Greece which I have visited, show that the conduct of the Russians in the Greek expeditions of Catherine, as well as the administration of the Septinsular Republic, has left a very unfavourable impression: so far from desiring the presence of these brethren of their church, as might have been supposed, they much more commonly bestow upon them the appellation of Klephts.²²

Russia persisted in her policy of wooing the Orthodox,

²⁰Czartoryski to Count S. Vorontsov, Aug. 18, 1804, Arkhiv Vorontsova, XV, 241-243. Quoted in Shaprio, "Sredizemnomorskie problemy," p. 279.

²¹Lord Harrowby to Lord Gower, Oct. 10, 1804, Britain, Foreign Office, 65/55. Quoted in Mackesy, pp. 49-50.

²²Leake, I, 21.

although not as overtly, and two years later Lord Harrowby's dire prophecies were fulfilled.

After the final rupture of relations with France in September 1804, Tsar Alexander ordered further reinforcements sent to Corfu. Fearing to weaken any further the Black Sea fleet, the ships and troops were sent from the Baltic. On September 19, Alexander ordered the ships-of-the-line Elena and Retvizan and the frigates Venus and Avtriat to prepare to sail.²³ Three weeks later, Commodore Alexis S. Greig, the son of one of the founders of the Russian navy, Sir Samuel Greig, was appointed commander.²⁴ Commodore Greig arrived at Corfu on January 23, 1805 and replaced Borokin as naval commander in the area.

At the beginning of 1805, the Septinsular Republic was no longer the defenseless islands of a year before. Instead of a single frigate at Corfu, there were now six ships-of-the-line, five frigates, and thirty lesser warships. Instead of 1,600 troops, there were now over 14,000, including the 2,000 men of the Greek Legion. The walls of Corfu fortress had been repaired and strengthened. On Vido, the Achilles' heel of the French in 1799, four permanent batteries had been erected. Russian warships patrolled the Ionian Sea

²³Tsar Alexander to the Admiralty-Kollegiia, Sept. 19, 1804. Ogorodnikov, Materialy, XVII, no. 378, p. 503.

²⁴Minister of the Navy Chichagov to Adm. V. P. Fondezin, Oct. 13, 1804. Ibid., XVII, no. 385, p. 517.

and the Adriatic as far as Ragusa and Ancona.²⁵ Corfu seconded Malta in barring the French from the Levant. Until 1804, the objective of the Russian forces had been simply to defend the Septinsular Republic, but with a substantial fleet based at Corfu, the troops could play a more active role in the looming continental war.

In spite of his earlier disparagement of the significance of the Russian forces at Corfu, Napoleon was increasingly concerned about the Russian build-up. The French Emperor angrily wrote to the King of Naples that if the Russians had not reinforced Corfu, he would have reduced his forces at Otranto, but now he had no choice but to augment them.²⁶ Napoleon endeavored to get the Russian troops evacuated from Corfu by indirect pressure through Austria. Austria had been alarmed by Napoleon's assumption of the crown of Italy. Taking advantage of Austria's attitude, Napoleon wrote to Emperor Francis that the crowns of France and Italy would be united as long as the Russians remained at Corfu and the British at Malta. If the Russians should leave, Napoleon declared, there would be no necessity for the union of the two crowns.²⁷

²⁵ Goloviznia, pp. 37-38.

²⁶ Napoleon to King Ferdinand of Naples, Jan. 2, 1805. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 8254, X, 102.

²⁷ Napoleon to Emperor Francis, Mar. 17, 1805. Ibid., no. 8445, X, 231-232.

Trying still another tack, Napoleon suggested that amicable relations could be restored between Russia and France if the Ionian Islands and Malta were given to the King of Sardinia. Alexander received the proposal "with merited contempt."²⁸

The Russian base at Corfu was a thorn in the flank of the French Empire. France could not strike directly at Russia, whereas the Russians, based at Corfu, could easily attack Italy and even make a descent on Provence. The troops and warships at Corfu had the effect of lengthening the French perimeter of defense by hundreds of miles at little cost to the Russians, who enjoyed the mobility of sea power.

After the failure of both Britain and Russia to ratify the Russo-British convention of April 11, 1804, Alexander again considered a rapprochement with France. In June Novosiltsev was sent by the Tsar to Paris to open negotiations for a general peace settlement. In the event that Napoleon demanded the evacuation of Russian troops from Corfu, Alexander was willing to withdraw the "major part" of his forces, but would not consider withdrawing all of the troops. Under any circumstances, the 1,600 men which were originally sent to the Ionian Islands must remain.²⁹

²⁸Lord Gower, British ambassador to Russia, to Lord Mulgrave, Mar. 22, 1805. Rose, p. 125.

²⁹Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, p. 67. Modest I. Bogdanovich, Istoriia tsarstvovanii Imperatora Aleksandra I i Rossii v ego vremena (St. Petersburg: F. Sushchinskii, 1869), I, 370.

Previously in order to secure a general European peace, Alexander had been willing to settle for only guarantees of the independence and neutrality of the Septinsular Republic. By the summer of 1805, however, Alexander was determined to keep Russian troops at Corfu even in time of peace. Novosiltsev got only as far as Berlin before he was recalled to Russia. The French annexation of Genoa and Lucca had ended Alexander's hope for a peaceful settlement.

During the summer of 1805, other negotiations, equally momentous for the Septinsular Republic, were being conducted by Russia. The Russo-Turkish treaty of 1798 was to expire in 1805, subject to renewal. Since the umbilical cord of the Russian forces at Corfu ran through the Straits, the attitude of the Porte was crucial. Many causes of friction had developed between Russia and the Porte during the years of the alliance. Russia had eased the Turks out of all influence in the Septinsular Republic. Russian warships passed and repassed the Straits with disturbing regularity. Beginning in 1804, Russian forces in Georgia had been steadily augmented.

The Porte would tolerate Russian dictation only as long as the French threat was clear. By the end of 1804, Napoleon had stopped sending munitions to the Maniotes and to Ali Pasha. The threat to the Morea was seeming more and more like the grand feint it was. On October

14, 1804, the Russian ambassador to the Porte, Andrei Italinskii, reported that the influence of the pro-French party in the Divan was steadily increasing.³⁰ However, Italinskii's position was still strong enough that he could, by means of a virtual ultimatum, prevent the Porte's recognition of Napoleon's imperial title, forcing French Ambassador Brune to leave Constantinople in December 1804.³¹

In January 1805, Napoleon sent Selim III a carefully drafted letter designed both to infuriate the Sultan and to turn him against Russia. The Emperor of the French wrote:

You, descendent of the great Ottomans, emperor of one of the greatest empires in the world, have you ceased to reign? How can you tolerate the dictation of Russia? . . . Are you blind to your own interests? If Russia has 15,000 men at Corfu, do you think they are directed against me? ³²

The negotiations for a renewal of the Russo-Turkish alliance revealed a deep gulf of mutual suspicion and distrust which was bridged only by the effective mediation of the British ambassador, Lord Arbuthnot. As a result of his experience during the protracted negoti-

³⁰ A. Italinskii to Count S. Vorontsov, Oct. 26, 1804, Arkhiiv Vorontsova, XX, 299. Cited by Shapiro, "Sredizemnomorskii problemy," p. 276.

³¹ Coquelle, "Brune," pp. 71-73.

³² Napoleon to Selim III, Jan. 30, 1805. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 3298, X, p.130.

ations, Lord Arbuthnot became convinced that Russia's dominance at the Ottoman capital was a thing of the past.³³

A treaty of alliance was signed on September 24, 1805.³⁴ The provisions for reciprocal assistance in the event of an attack by a third power were substantially the same as in the treaty of 1798. The March 1800 treaty, which had established the Septinsular Republic, was re-affirmed. As a warning to Ali Pasha, the status and the privileges of the four coastal towns were specifically confirmed. In the secret articles appended to the treaty, the Porte agreed to the presence of Russian troops in the Septinsular Republic, but only for as long as the military situation in Italy remained unchanged.

There was a discrepancy between the Turkish and the Russian versions of the clause relating to Russia's use of the Straits. The Russian version³⁵ stated that passage of the Straits by Russian warships would be permitted as long as Russian troops were on the territory of the Septinsular Republic. The Turkish version³⁶ omitted

³³ Lord Arbuthnot to Lord Mulgrave, Aug. 4, Sept. 10, 18, 1805, Jan. 20, 1806, Britain, Foreign Office, Turkey, 45, 46. Cited by Paul F. Shupp, The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question 1806-1807 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), p. 46.

³⁴ Noradounghian, II, 70-78.

³⁵ Quoted in Sergei Coriainov, Le Eosphore and les Dardanelles (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1910), p. 7. The Russian version does not appear in any of the treaty series.

³⁶ Noradounghian, II, 70-78. Noradounghian is a French translation of the Turkish original.

any reference to the length of time that passage would be allowed, but when connected with the preceding clause on the military situation in Italy, meant that when the military situation in Italy changed, Russia could no longer use the Straits since Russian troops should not remain in the islands. The discrepancy, seemingly meaningless, was of significance in 1806.

The treaty of 1805 did not grant Russia a protectorate over the Ionian Islands. With a continental war imminent, Russia prudently did not want to antagonize the Porte by demanding that the Sultan relinquish his suzerainty over the islands. The treaty allowed the situation to continue as it had for the preceding three years, with Russia having a de facto protectorate and the Sultan de jure suzerainty. However, the anomalous arrangement was threatened in spite of the signing of the treaty.

Before the treaty was signed, but after the provisions were known, the French chargé, Ruffin, discussed the provisions with a Turkish minister. In the course of the conversation, the Turkish minister candidly stated that the purpose of the treaty was to lull the Russians and that the Porte would not hesitate to disavow any of the provisions of the treaty in the event that it should become

expedient to do so.³⁷ Although Italinskii had succeeded in obtaining the provisions he wanted in the treaty, he had grave doubts whether the Porte intended to fulfill its obligations.³⁸ A decisive victory by the French emperor could promptly turn the Porte against Russia, with the resultant perilous isolation of the Septinsular Republic.

The French annexation of Genoa had spurred Austria, Britain and Russia into overcoming their differences. On August 9, 1805, Austria acceded to the Russo-British alliance of April 11, 1805, which had finally been ratified in July. Prevailing upon cautious Prussia to join the coalition was more difficult. However, when French forces marched into Anspach, a Prussian dependency, Friedrich Wilhelm met with Alexander and signed the Treaty of Potsdam on November 3, 1805.

The Treaty of Potsdam, signed two weeks after the Austrian disaster at Ulm, reflected the Tsar's desire either to get Prussia into the war or use Prussia to force a peace upon the French. According to the

³⁷Chargé Ruffin to Talleyrand, July 23, 1805. Quoted in full in Eudoxiu de Murmuzaki, ed., Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor Supplement I, Volume II (Bucharest: 1885), p. 317.

³⁸A. Italinskii to Count S. Vorontsov, Nov. 16, 1805, Arkhiv Vorontsova, XX, 305-306. Cited by Shaprio, "Sredizemnomorskie Problemy," p. 277.

treaty,³⁹ Prussia was to act as mediator between France and the allied powers and was pledged to enter the war if France did not agree to the conditions of peace stipulated in the treaty. Among the terms, France was to evacuate Naples, Holland, the Holy Roman Empire, and Switzerland. In return, Russia would recognize Napoleon's two crowns and, if Napoleon made it a sine qua non, would evacuate Corfu. However, Prussia was to use all her influence to obtain French agreement for 1,500 Russian troops to remain in the Ionian Islands. In any event, the Russian troops would not be withdrawn unless the independence of the Septinsular Republic was guaranteed. Austerlitz ended Prussia's attempt at mediation, but the Treaty of Potsdam indicated that, although Alexander would grudgingly throw his military position at Corfu on the conference table, he was determined to exact a high price in return.

The Ionian Islands were not directly involved in the war of the Third Coalition. Instead, Corfu was a base for operations against the French in southern Italy. Ever since February 1804, the British had been trying to get Russia to join in an expedition against the French in

³⁹ Quoted in full in Prince Karl August von Hardenberg, Denkwürdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fürsten von Hardenberg. Edited by Leopold von Ranke. (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1877), II, pp. 325-332.

Otranto. Alexander's prudent policy in 1804 had been not to become involved in a limited war in southern Italy before the other continental powers joined in a coalition against France.⁴⁰ At the end of 1804, after two months of haggling over the extent of British support, Russia consented to join Britain in an expedition to protect the King of Naples.⁴¹ On January 14, 1805, Alexander appointed as commander of future allied forces in Naples General of Infantry Lacy, a septuagenarian Irishman who had been in Russian service since the Seven Years' War. General Lacy arrived incognito at Naples in May to prepare for the campaign. In February 1805 Alexander sent orders to General Anrep at Corfu to make preparations for an expedition to Naples.⁴² However, British refusal to evacuate Malta and Alexander's reluctance to be drawn into a war in alliance with Britain alone caused the Naples expedition to be postponed.

When the Third Coalition was finally formed in July-August 1805, a military council at Vienna, composed of

⁴⁰Czartoryski to Count S. Vorontsov, May 11, 1804, *Arkhiv Vorontsova*, XV, 254; cited by Shapiro, "Sredizemnomorskie problemy," p. 282.

⁴¹Lord Gower to Lord Harrowby, Dec. 2, 1804. Rose, pp. 77-79.

⁴²Tsar Alexander to General Anrep, February, 1805. Shapiro, "Sredizemnomorskie problemy," p. 285.

Generals Mack, Winzingerode, and Schwartzenberg, revived the plan for an expedition to Naples. Russian and British troops under Lacy were to land at Naples, sweep up the peninsula, and link up with the Austrians in the Po Valley. Lacy was expected to tie down at least 20,000 French troops.

On October 23, Commodore Greig's squadron sailed from Corfu with 13,000 troops aboard, including the Greco-Albanian Legion. The Russian force united with 7,000 British troops at Syracuse and landed at Naples on November 20, 1805.⁴³ However, the allies had not anticipated the rapidity of French movements. By forced marches, General Gouvion-Saint-Cyr withdrew to the north, linked up with General Masséna, and drove Archduke Charles across the Alps. The French victory at Austerlitz on December 3 put Austria out of the war, allowing Masséna to move against Lacy at Naples. Four days after Austerlitz, Alexander ordered General Lacy to evacuate Naples and return with most of his troops to Russia after leaving a strong garrison in the Ionian Islands.⁴⁴ Lacy received his instructions on January 7, 1806, and embarked at

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Sir Henry Bunbury, Narratives of Some Passages in the Great War with France, from 1799-1810 (London: Richard Bentley, 1854), p. 262. Joseph Bonaparte, Correspondance, I, 338-339.

⁴⁴ Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 106. Gen. Sir James Craig to Lord Castlereagh, Feb. 11, 1806; quoted in Bunbury, Appendix C, pp. 425-26.

Naples nine days later. The Russian troops, always short of funds, had to borrow money from the British for provisions to get back to Corfu.⁴⁵

At the time of the Naples campaign and for a long time after, the Naples expedition was widely but erroneously regarded as a complete fiasco.⁴⁶ Apparently 20,000 allied troops were idle during the campaign. However, the strategy was sound, but the timing was wrong. If the allied landing had occurred a month earlier, Saint-Cyr's corps could not have withdrawn to the north. The Austrians realized too late that since Lacy was getting a late start, he should have landed at Venice, not Naples.⁴⁷ Austerlitz prevented the allied expedition from making its weight felt. In spite of the failure of the expedition, the value of Corfu as a base for a mobile expedition had again been demonstrated, as it had in 1799-1800.

General Lacy's demoralized troops had just returned to Corfu when, on January 30, 1806, the guns of Corfu fortress announced the arrival of a Russian squadron from the Baltic. On September 22, 1805, Vice-Admiral D. N. Seniavin, who had besieged Santa Maura in 1798, left Kronstadt with five ships-of-the-line and one frigate,

⁴⁵Eunbury, p. 218.

⁴⁶Mackesy, pp. 89-91.

⁴⁷Count A. Razumovskii to Czartoryski, Sept. 1, 1805, Oct. 19, 1805. Vasil'chikov, II, part 2, pp. 225, 260.

under orders to defend the Septinsular Republic and support General Lacy in Italy. Seniavin, who replaced both Commodore Greig and General Anrep as commander in the Mediterranean, had under his command at the end of January 10 ships-of-the-line, 5 frigates, 11 lesser warships, and 10,181 Russian troops plus the 1,964 men of the Greco-Albanian Legion.⁴⁸

In spite of Russia's impressive strength at Corfu, on December 26, 1805, Alexander ordered all Russian warships and transports to return to Russia.⁴⁹ After Austria had signed the Treaty of Pressburg with France, Alexander was more concerned with the security of his empire than the safety of the remote Septinsular Republic. The major part of Lacy's troops and all of Seniavin's ships were ordered to return to Russia at the very moment when the victorious troops of Masséna were sweeping down the Italian peninsula in the direction of Corfu.

At the end of 1805, Alexander was resigned to only a holding action at Corfu. Only a complete evacuation of the islands could have pleased the French government

⁴⁸Russia, Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv voennomorskogo flota (TsGAVMF), sbornyi fond, d. 134, pp. 71-72. Table quoted in Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 346, note no. 12.

⁴⁹Tsar Alexander to Adm. Seniavin, Dec. 26, 1805; Russia, TsGAVMF, sbornyi fond, d. 134, p. 73. Cited by Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 106.

more. Immediately after Pressburg, a French Foreign Ministry mémoire discussed future French policy in the light of Austria's defeat. One of the specific objectives of French policy was to procure Corfu as soon as possible. "The independence and security of Italy will be consolidated still more when the Seven Islands are again united to Venice. . . ." ⁵⁰

After the panic following Austerlitz and Pressburg had subsided, the Russian State Council met at the beginning of 1806 to evaluate the implications of the recent events. The decisions of the State Council, together with the mémoires of Czartoryski on January 23, ⁵¹ determined Russian foreign policy for 1806. Czartoryski and the State Council viewed the French acquisition of Dalmatia as a particularly ominous development. Possession of Dalmatia allowed France to attack or pressure the Porte directly. The Russian government feared that any Russian attempts to thwart French moves in the Balkans might have an unfavorable effect on Russo-Turkish relations. Russia's policy was to maintain the alliance with England, enter into closer relations with the Greeks and Slavs of the Ottoman

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France, Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Autriche, no. 3 (1737-1805), fo. 315. Quoted in Edouard Driault, Austerlitz; la fin du Saint-Empire (1804-1806) (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1912), p. 281.

⁵¹Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, pp. 231-273.

Empire, keep Prussia out of an alliance with France, and strengthen Russia's military forces while at the same time keeping the door open for negotiations with France.

The Ionian Islands were viewed in a more favorable light than on the gloomy morrow of Austerlitz. Instead of seeing Corfu as an exposed position inviting the French to engage Russian troops directly, Corfu was seen as a bulwark which could effectively check French penetration of the Balkans. With that function in mind, Czartoryski recommended leaving all of Lacy's troops in the Ionian Islands. Based at Corfu, the troops could operate along the entire western coast of the Balkans and render particular assistance to the Montenegrins.⁵²

Czartoryski also conceived forming buffer states in the western Balkans. He argued that in normal times a weak Ottoman Empire was in the best interests of Russia, but in view of the French threat after Pressburg, the Porte's weakness was a definite liability. By forming buffer states, strengthened by the loyalty of the inhabitants and the protection of Russia, a shield could be raised on the western periphery of the Ottoman Empire.⁵³

Czartoryski envisaged two buffer states, One would include Hercegovina, Montenegro and Cattaro (Kotor) and

⁵² Mémoire of Czartoryski, Jan. 23, 1806. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, pp. 246-269.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 252-255.

would have a government similar to that of Ragusa or the Septinsular Republic. Its function would be to protect the Ottoman Empire by land. A second state would have as its nucleus the Septinsular Republic and would include in addition "adequate territory on the mainland." The function of the Greek state would be to shield the Porte by sea. The Russian Foreign Minister admitted that it would be difficult to persuade the Porte to acquiesce in the scheme, but he hoped that the Porte would see the advantages in not having a common frontier with the French Empire.⁵⁴ Thus after a lapse of over five years, the Russian government again considered erecting the Septinsular Republic into a sizable Greek state.

In the instructions to the ambassador to Great Britain, Count Stroganov, Czartoryski expounded further on the concept of buffer states. Stroganov was ordered to sound out the British government on the scheme. In explaining the project to Stroganov, Czartoryski thought of the future Greek state in grander terms than earlier.

Another state could be formed out of all the Greek people united to the Ionian Republic. Both states [Slav and Greek] would receive an independent government modelled on Ragusa or the Septinsular Republic and they would have as their first obligation to employ all their resources to prevent the French from penetrating into Turkey.⁵⁵

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Ibid., p. 273.

⁵⁵Czartoryski to Count Stroganov, Feb. 18, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 201, pp. 9-11.

Czartoryski argued that even if the hardy Slavs and Greeks proved unable to stop the French, at least they would have no incentive to join the invaders since they would already have their own states. Stroganov was warned not to frighten the sensitive British with the imaginative scheme, but to be tactful and cautious when presenting it to the British government.

In spite of Count Stroganov's efforts, the British government proved to be unresponsive, if not hostile, to Czartoryski's scheme.⁵⁶ Moreover, the Austrian government was opposed to the establishment of buffer states.⁵⁷ Consequently, the plan was lost in the procession of events.

On February 15, Alexander sent instructions to Lacy countermanding his orders of December 7 and directing him to leave all Russian troops at Corfu.⁵⁸ However, before the receipt of the new instructions, General Lacy and General Anrep together with one regiment had already left Corfu for Sevastopol. Only Seniavin's entreaties had prevented Lacy from taking more than one regiment. Alexander's new orders had not countermanded Seniavin's

⁵⁶Count S. Vorontsov to Tsar Alexander, Mar. 31, 1806. Baron Nikolai to Count Stroganov, Apr. 27, 1806. Fédor F. Martens, Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie (St. Petersburg: 1874-1905), XI, 121, 126.

⁵⁷Sir Robert Adair to Charles J. Fox, July 3, 1806. Adair, Historical Memoir, pp. 102-109.

⁵⁸Tsar Alexander to General Lacy, Feb. 15, 1806. Russia, TsCAVMF, sbornyi fond, d. 134, pp. 74-75. Quoted in Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 106.

instructions to return to Russia, but Seniavin, realizing how ineffective the troops alone would be at Corfu, decided to disobey his orders and remain at Corfu.

Soon after his arrival at Corfu, Seniavin had dispatched warships to cruise in the Adriatic. On April 27, 1806, Admiral Seniavin left Corfu with the main body of the fleet for Cattaro. In succeeding months Seniavin operated against the French along the Dalmatian coast. Russian assistance to the Montenegrins and the operations against the French were possible only because of the secure base at Corfu. Once again the far-reaching strategic significance of Corfu was demonstrated.

The actions of the Russian warships in the Adriatic finally impelled Napoleon to take a step he had long hesitated to take. In spite of the commencement of the war with Russia in 1805 France had continued to respect the neutrality of the Septinsular flag. Napoleon had wanted to maintain his pretensions of being one of the protectors of the Septinsular Republic. To regard the Septinsular Republic as a belligerent when France was at war with Russia and at peace with the Porte would have constituted de facto recognition of Russia's protectorate over the Ionian Islands. However, in view of the Russian blockade of the Adriatic coast, Napoleon could no longer tolerate the anomalous situation of Russia enjoying the advantages of a base at Corfu while the Septinsular Republic enjoyed the advantages of neutrality.

A month after a Russian squadron had entered the Adriatic, Napoleon ordered the seizure of all Septinsular vessels.⁵⁹ The Ionian Senate protested France's violation of Ionian neutrality and in reprisal issued letters of marque to Septinsular vessels. Since Ionian commerce suffered greatly as a result of Napoleon's action, Capodistrias, Ionian Secretary of State, requested permission from the Russian government for the free entry of Ionian goods through Russia's Black Sea ports. In spite of Mocenigo's assurances, the Russian government ignored the request.⁶⁰

In the spring of 1806 the conference table again took precedence over the battlefield. In January the state Council had decided to keep the door to negotiations open. When Napoleon opened negotiations with Britain through Lord Yarmouth, Alexander decided to send Cubril to Paris on the pretext of negotiating for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war. In discussing possible conditions for peace, Czartoryski stated that it was "an indispensable necessity" that Russia maintain her garrison at Corfu, that French troops evacuate Naples, and that an intermediary state be established

⁵⁹ Napoleon to Vice-Adm. Decrès, Apr. 10, 1806. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10076, XII, p. 271. Napoleon to Prince Eugene, Apr. 11, 1806. Prince Eugene, Correspondance, II, 224-225. Napoleon to King Joseph of Naples, Apr. 11, 1806. Joseph Bonaparte, Correspondance, II, 177.

⁶⁰ Lascaris, p. 24.

between the Ottoman Empire and Italy.⁶¹

Czartoryski went to great lengths to impress upon Alexander the importance of Corfu. If Corfu should fall to the French either by the fortunes of war or through negotiations, Czartoryski argued, "the damage would be irremediable." The French could then concentrate on Sicily and with both Sicily and Corfu in French hands, France would have preponderance in the Mediterranean. In that event, Czartoryski warned:

. . . nothing would stop the execution of their projects in the Morea and Turkey in general. They would have only to wish and Constantinople would be theirs within three months. The Greeks, Montenegrins, and all the other Christian peoples of that area, without excepting even the Serbs, would eagerly follow the banner of the French, whom they would envisage thenceforth as their liberators while the hopes which they had placed in Russia would disappear forever. ⁶²

Czartoryski concluded by recommending that up to 20,000 additional troops be sent from the Black Sea to Corfu. If the Porte should close the Straits to such a large force, the troops could march across Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia to the Adriatic.⁶³ In discussing Cubril's instructions with ambassador Stroganov, Czartoryski stated

⁶¹ Czartoryski to Alexander, Apr. 17, 1806. Trachevskii, *Sbornik*, LXXVII, pp. 342-343.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 336.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 338.

that if the King of Naples could not regain his mainland possessions, Russia would demand concessions such as an addition of territory on the mainland to the Septinsular Republic, including possibly all of the Morea.⁶⁴

Oubril arrived in Paris on July 6 and Talleyrand immediately opened negotiations for a treaty between France and Russia. The French avidly wanted a change in the status of Corfu. The French commander in Dalmatia had reported to his government that without French possession of Corfu "it will be as difficult to hold Cattaro as to occupy it."⁶⁵ Although Napoleon wanted all of the Russians out of the Ionian Islands, he realistically recognized that Russia would not agree. Consequently, the French emperor was content with attempting to reduce the number of troops at Corfu and to close the Straits to Russian warships.⁶⁶

Talleyrand and his aide, General Clarke, put heavy pressure on Oubril, threatening a resumption of hostilities and a march into the hereditary provinces of Austria.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Czartoryski to Count Stroganov, May 26, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 206, p. 25.

⁶⁵ Gen. Molitor to Prince Eugene, June 25, 1806. Prince Eugene, Correspondance, II, 342.

⁶⁶ Napoleon to Talleyrand, July 4, 1806. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10448, XII, p. 513.

⁶⁷ Oubril to Count Stroganov, July 20, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 231, p. 83.

As a bargaining point, the French initially demanded the complete evacuation of Corfu. Oubril was firm on Corfu, but he succumbed to the pressure and agreed on other points. In the treaty signed on July 20, 1806,⁶⁸ Russia recognized Napoleon's two crowns, ceded Cattaro to the French, and acknowledged French possession of Dalmatia. France promised to evacuate Germany within three months after the evacuation of Cattaro. According to Article V, France and Russia recognized the independence of the Septinsular Republic. Russia could station troops on the territory of the republic, but not in excess of 4,000 men. Oubril had agreed to reduce Russian forces at Corfu by two-thirds.

The Oubril treaty caused an outcry in St. Petersburg and London. The new foreign minister, Baron Budberg, emphatically opposed the treaty. On July 14, Budberg had written to Stroganov: "The position which we have at Corfu is and will always be too important [to surrender]. His Imperial Majesty is firmly resolved to reject any proposal which would lead to a withdrawal of his troops from that station."⁶⁹ Alexander declared that he would not sign the treaty as it was contrary to Oubril's

⁶⁸ De Clercq, II, 181.

⁶⁹ Baron Budberg to Count Stroganov, July 14, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 228, p. 76.

instructions. When the treaty was submitted to the State Council for discussion, the State Council flatly rejected it.⁷⁰ As a mark of the Tsar's displeasure, Dubril was exiled to his country estate.

As if in reply to the French effort to reduce the Russian forces at Corfu, a Russian squadron left Kronstadt on September 1 destined for the Ionian Islands. The squadron, commanded by Commodore Ignat'ev, was composed of five ships-of-the-line, one frigate and one corvette.⁷¹ Ignat'ev reached Corfu on January 2, 1807, a time when his arrival was most welcome. After the failure of the Dubril negotiations, the Russian government continued to view Corfu as a strong link in the chain of containment against France, a chain which included Malta, Sicily, Cattaro, Belgrade, and the Principalities.

The stone walls of Corfu and Malta and the wooden walls of warships could withstand French attacks, but not French diplomacy. Skillful French diplomacy jumped the barrier and struck at the vulnerable rear of the Russo-British defenses. In 1806, Russia's relations with Ali Pasha of Yanina and with the Porte grew progressively worse. For five years Ali had fed his hatred of the Russians

⁷⁰F. F. Martens, XIII, p. 295.

⁷¹Russia, TsGAVMF, f. dep. mor. min. d. 555, pp. 87, 149, 210, 211. Cited by Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 178.

who had deprived him of the coastal towns and Santa Maura. In spite of repeated orders from the Sultan, instigated by the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, Ali had clung to Butrinto, claiming that the town was his since he had not been compensated for his services against the French in 1798-99.⁷² Preveza and Vonitsa were under the light rule of Abdullah Bey. There were only 36 Turkish soldiers in Preveza and 6 in Vonitsa. The Russian consul at Preveza vigilantly prevented any encroachments upon the rights of the three coastal towns. Farga was still nominally under the rule of Abdullah Bey, although General Anrep had sent a small detachment of Russian soldiers there as a warning to Ali Pasha.

The desire for the coastal towns was not the only cause for Ali's hatred of Russia. The Ionian Islands had become a refuge for Ali's enemies. Katzantoni, a prominent klepht and inveterate enemy of Ali, used Santa Maura as a base for operations against the mainland. In 1805, Metropolitan Ignatius of Arta, who was subsequently connected with the Philike Hetairia,⁷³ fled to Corfu. The exile colony in the Ionian Islands was a festering ulcer in Ali's flank.

⁷² Leake, I, p. 185.

⁷³ George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1861), I, 177.

In conjunction with Russia's new policy of wooing the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople had attempted to prevail upon Selim III to check Ali's excesses. Even more infuriating for the Pasha of Yanina, the Russian ambassador intervened, although unsuccessfully, to try to prevent the Sultan from giving the pashalik of Trikkala to one of Ali's sons.⁷⁴ For a person as sensitive as Ali, any one of Russia's hostile actions would have been sufficient to win Ali's bitter enmity.

While Russia's prestige was paramount at Constantinople, Ali could do little but sulk. However, after the French victory at Austerlitz and the resultant increase in influence of the French party in the Divan, Ali had an opportunity to strike back at Italinskii, Anrep and Mocenigo. Immediately after Austerlitz, Ali displayed increased boldness in provoking the Russians in the Ionian Islands. In January 1806, Seniavin reported that he was having problems obtaining sufficient provisions because Ali was obstructing the normal flow of foodstuffs from his dominions to the Ionian Islands.⁷⁵ In February, Mocenigo was forced to call upon Seniavin to take measures against French privateers which, abetted by Ali, lurked in the coves along the Epirote coast. When called to account,

⁷⁴Pouqueville, Histoire de la Grèce, I, 229-230.

⁷⁵Adm. Seniavin to Minister of the Navy Chichagov, January 1806. Quoted in Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 100.

Ali cagily sent gifts to Seniavin.⁷⁶ In April, Seniavin solemnly warned Ali Pasha to maintain correct relations with the Septinsular Republic.⁷⁷

Because of his standing army of 16,000 and his ability to field over 30,000, Ali Pasha was assiduously courted by the French. François Pouqueville, an able French diplomat, was appointed French consul at Yanina, arriving there in February 1806. The French had convincing arguments with which to win over the Pasha of Yanina. Until the Treaty of Pressburg, the British fleet had been in a position to prevent any direct French assistance to Ali Pasha, but with the French now in Dalmatia, an overland route could be established. Napoleon dangled tantalizing bait before the ambitious pasha. Pouqueville was instructed to inform Ali that if ever Corfu should fall into French hands, Napoleon "could not entrust it to better guardianship than that of Ali Pasha."⁷⁸ In April, the British consul at Yanina warned that Ali was threatening to make an alliance with France.⁷⁹ British attempts to placate Ali Pasha only brought protests from Baron Budberg, who saw no possibility of appeasing the pasha without sacrificing the vital

⁷⁶ Bronevskii, II, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁷ Ibid., II, p. 9.

⁷⁸ Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 19, 1806. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 10378, XII, pp. 472-473.

⁷⁹ J. P. Morier to Charles J. Fox, Apr. 25, 1806, Britain, Foreign Office, Turkey 53. Cited by Shupp, p.280.

interests of the Septinsular Republic.⁸⁰

The battle of Austerlitz and the ignominious recall of the Russian troops from Naples were grave blows to Russian prestige at Constantinople. In January 1806, Czartoryski had weighed the distinct possibility that the Porte would change alliances. Czartoryski believed that if the Porte should succumb to French persuasions and demand "with a certain degree of insistence" that Russia evacuate Corfu, Russia would have no choice but to send the Dniester army in the Principalities.⁸¹

In January, Talleyrand sent his secretary, Le Roux, to the Ottoman capital to procure recognition by the Porte of Napoleon's title and to undermine Italinskii's position. Le Roux's arguments, backed by Austerlitz, sounded convincing to the Turks. On February 5 Le Roux declared to the Reis Effendi:

what have the Russians done in the past fifty years? They have taken the Crimea, Little Tartary, the territory of Ochakov, the Kuban, a part of Georgia If they do not use force, they try to conquer by means of intrigues and treaties. The proof of this is in the treaties on Moldavia and Wallachia The proof is also in their treaty on Corfu. They have obtained by it the right to send troops there for use in Albania. ⁸²

⁸⁰ Baron Budberg to Count Stroganov, July 16, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 229, p. 79.

⁸¹ Mémoire of Czartoryski, Jan. 23, 1806. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVII, p. 250.

⁸² Le Roux to the Reis Effendi, Feb. 5, 1806. Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, Vol. II, p. 325.

By the end of February, Russian and British prestige had fallen so precipitately at Constantinople that both Italinskii and Arbuthnot urged the dispatch of a substantial squadron to the eastern Mediterranean.⁸³

Russia's precautionary concentration of troops on the Dniester frontier and Seniavin's occupation of Cattaro stirred the Porte into action. On April 24, the Porte closed the Straits to Russian warships and troops, claiming that Russia's use of the Straits was an infraction of the Porte's neutrality and would lead to war with France.⁸⁴ Moreover, the Porte declared that Russia no longer had a right to send troops to Corfu since Russia could no longer claim to be defending the islands, but rather was using Corfu as a base for offensive action in the Adriatic. Italinskii replied that Russia had the right to use the Straits by virtue of her treaties with the Porte. The Russian ambassador argued, on dubious grounds, that the treaties did not specify what kind of war would be valid grounds for maintaining Russian troops at Corfu.⁸⁵ Czartoryski agreed entirely with Italinskii

⁸³Count Stroganov to Czartoryski, Apr. 28, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 203, p. 15. Lord Arbuthnot to Lord Mulgrave, Feb. 25, 1806, Britain, Foreign Office, Turkey 49. Cited by Shupp, p. 53.

⁸⁴Italinskii to S. Vorontsov, Apr. 24, 1806, Arkhiv Vorontsova, XX. Lord Arbuthnot to Fox, Apr. 25, 1806, Britain, Foreign Office, Turkey, 49; Cited by Shupp, p. 55.

⁸⁵Italinskii to S. Vorontsov, Apr. 24, 1806, Arkhiv Vorontsova, XX; Cited by Shupp, p. 55.

that Russia could only follow a policy of firmness toward the Porte.⁸⁶

In June, Napoleon sent General Horace Sébastiani as ambassador to the Porte. The astute Sébastiani proved to be an able adversary of Italinskii and Arbuthnot. Sébastiani was instructed by Napoleon to work for a triple alliance between France, the Porte, and Persia. Napoleon declared to Talleyrand that the "object of all the negotiations [of Sébastiani] must be the closing of the straits to Russia."⁸⁷ As an added measure to turn the Porte against Russia, Napoleon instructed Talleyrand to convince the Turks that the Serbs were being supported by Russia. Baron Budberg presciently feared that the arrival of Sébastiani would result in the ascendancy of France at Constantinople.⁸⁸

On June 24 the Porte closed the Straits to a Russian brig-of-war carrying 190,000 ducats to Mocenigo. When Joseph Fonton, the dragoman of the Russian embassy, informed the Reis Effendi that the vessel had the right to pass the Straits and would use force if necessary, the

⁸⁶ Czartoryski to Stroganov, May 25, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 184, pp. 384-385.

⁸⁷ Napoleon to Talleyrand, June 9, 1806. Napoleon, Correspondance, nos. 10339, 10346, XII, pp. 450, 454-455.

⁸⁸ Budberg to Stroganov, July 14, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 229, p. 78.

Porte backed down.⁸⁹ On July 23, when the Russian frigate Kildun, destined for Corfu, arrived in the Straits, the Porte protested. When Italinskii remained firm, the Reis Effendi again backed down, stating that he was only making an amicable request through fear of French reprisals.⁹⁰ when the news of the Porte's actions reached St. Petersburg, Budberg asked the British to reinforce their Mediterranean fleet and concert actions with the Russian forces at Corfu.⁹¹ On August 23, the Russian cabinet instructed Italinskii to demand that the Porte reaffirm her treaties with Russia. In the event of a refusal, Italinskii was to demand his passport.⁹²

The Porte was caught in a dilemma between France and Russia. On September 15, Sébastiani threatened the Porte with war if the Porte continued to allow Russia to violate her neutrality.⁹³ To the dispute over the Straits was added an equally explosive dispute over the Porte's removal of the hospodars of the Principalities in September without consulting Russia. In answer to vehement Russian protests, the Porte replied that Russia was in no position to protest

⁸⁹ Goriainov, pp. 9-10.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

⁹¹ Budberg to Stroganov, Aug. 26, 1806. Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, Stroganov, III, no. 257, p. 135.

⁹² Goriainov, p. 10.

⁹³ Sébastiani to the Reis Effendi, Sept. 16, 1806; Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Turquie, p. 212. Cited by Shupp, p. 154.

since she had not observed her treaties concerning the Ionian Islands. The Porte declared that "the suzerainty of the Porte over the Seven Islands had not been observed" and that "the Russian functionaries there comported themselves as if sole masters."⁹⁴ However, when Russia grew more threatening and the British ambassador made it clear that war with Russia also meant war with Britain, the Porte again backed down on all issues. On October 17, the Reis Effendi agreed to the reinstatement of the deposed hospodars and secretly reaffirmed Russia's right to use the Straits in order to provision the troops on Corfu.⁹⁵

The Russo-British victory proved to be of short duration. Napoleon's triumphs over Prussia enhanced French prestige still more. Napoleon urged Selim III to send an army to the Dniester since the Russians would be fully occupied with the French army of 300,000 men in Poland.⁹⁶ A rash act by Russia saved the French further exertions at Constantinople. On October 28, General Michelson marched into Moldavia with a Russian army in order to intimidate the Porte. The Russian army would be withdrawn only when the Porte gave firm guarantees to Russia

⁹⁴The Porte to Italinskii, Oct. 1, 1806. Hurmuzaki, Suppl. I, Vol. II, p. 353.

⁹⁵Lord Arbutnot to Charles J. Fox, Oct. 17, 1806; Britain, Foreign Office, Turkey, 51; cited by Snapp, pp. 168-169.

⁹⁶Napoleon to Selim III, Nov. 9, 1806. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11232, XIII, p. 519.

concerning the straits and the Principalities and agreed to renew the triple alliance of 1799 between Russia, the Porte, and Great Britain.⁹⁷

With assurances of support from the French and visions of regaining the Crimea, Selim III declared war on Russia on January 3. In the declaration of war, the Porte cited the usurpations of Russia in the Ionian Islands as one of the causes of the war.⁹⁸ The Septinsular Republic was confronted with a war between its protector and its suzerain. Russia had been able to conquer the islands only with the direct assistance of the Porte and had been able to maintain her position at Corfu with the indirect support of the Sultan. With the Porte's declaration of war, Corfu's vulnerable umbilical cord would run through Copenhagen, Portsmouth, and Lisbon. Napoleon was exultant, writing at the end of January: "Now the Bosphorus is closed. By that alone the squadron at Corfu has ceased to be formidable."⁹⁹

When the future of the Septinsular Republic was most uncertain, still another constitution was adopted. The Constitution of 1803, which had brought tranquillity and

⁹⁷ Budberg to A. Italinskii, Nov. 14, 1806. Quoted in P. Coquelle, "Sébastieni Ambassadeur à Constantinople 1806-1808," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVIII (1904), p.584.

⁹⁸ Noradounghian, II, 79.

⁹⁹ Napoleon to General Marmont, Jan. 29, 1807. Napoleon, Correspondance, no. 11734, XIV, p. 261.

prosperity to the Septinsular Republic, had never been ratified by Tsar Alexander. At the end of 1806, Count Capodistrias, the spokesman of Mocenigo in the government, candidly explained to the legislature the reason why ratification had been withheld. The Ionian Secretary of State declared that a revision of the constitution was necessary

to put the two protecting powers on an equal footing. The Porte, because of its nearness to the Ionian Islands, can easily impose its will on the government of the republic because of the dependence of the Ionian people upon the mainland for food. Russia, lacking natural ties, has need of legal ties in order to be on equal footing with the Ottoman government. 100

In short, Russia wanted statutory recognition of her position at Corfu, recognition which was omitted in the Constitution of 1803. With both the Porte and France now challenging Russia's position at Corfu, Russia needed a more substantial basis for her occupation.

Count Mocenigo and the coterie of nobles surrounding him used the opportunity of revising the constitution to make the government less democratic. Mocenigo had little faith in the ability of the Ionian people to govern themselves. In 1816, Count Mocenigo advised the new masters of the islands, the British, that "if General Maitland expects to keep them [Ionians] in good humour for any

¹⁰⁰Quoted in Lascaris, p.25.

length of time, he will be greatly disappointed."¹⁰¹
Count John Capodistrias, one of the authors of the new constitution, believed that abstract principles of liberty were incongruous for an uneducated people.¹⁰²

In 1804 Mocenigo had appointed a commission of ten men, all sufficiently deferential, to study proposed revisions of the constitution. In 1805 Mocenigo had indirectly, but effectively, influenced the elections in order to obtain an even more docile legislature than that of 1803. When the legislature convened at the end of 1806, a new constitution was submitted to the legislature and adopted on December 10 without opposition. According to the Constitution of 1806,¹⁰³ the franchise still remained with the "constitutional nobility", but the governmental structure was changed. The legislature was abolished. A Senate, composed of seventeen members elected for four years, became the chief organ of government. It was divided into two chambers, one with executive and one with legislative powers. The flowery declarations in the Constitution of 1803 on individual liberties, trial by jury, and police methods were conspicuously absent in the new constitution.

The most significant article in the Constitution of

¹⁰¹Sir William à Court to Sir Thomas Maitland, Dec. 10, 1816; Britain, Colonial Office, 136/382. Quoted in Dixon, p. 180.

¹⁰²Lascaris, p. 25.

¹⁰³Quoted partially in Pauthier, pp. 16-20.

1806 and the reason for the constitution's existence was Article LXXVI which stipulated that the Emperor of Russia, through his minister plenipotentiary at Corfu, had to ratify the election of the prince-president and all the senators elected by the "constitutional nobility." By the use of his veto power, Count Mocenigo could directly determine the complexion of the Septinsular government. Only outright annexation could have given Russia more power in the internal affairs of the republic. The Russian government was not satisfied with the right of review over acts of the Septinsular government; Russia wanted and obtained statutory authority to determine the composition of the government itself, including not just the executive as was the case subsequently in the Principalities, but also all the members of the legislature.

The Constitution of 1806 was adopted just three weeks before the outbreak of war between Russia and the Porte. The Turkish war and the subsequent negotiations with France delayed Alexander's ratification of the Constitution of 1806. In consequence, when France acquired the Ionian Islands at Tilsit, the Constitution of 1803 was still operative. Although the Constitution of 1806 was fated to remain no more than a project of a constitution, it demonstrated the intentions of Russia if she remained at Corfu. By the end of 1806, Russia was determined to end the anomalous situation at Corfu which had existed

since 1802. If Russia remained at Corfu, she would remain as master in name as well as in fact. The suzerainty of the Porte was not repudiated in the Constitution of 1806, but the statutory rights accorded Russia in the new constitution far outweighed those of the Porte.

By 1806 Russia had firm political, military and economic control over the Septinsular Republic. A Russian officer at Corfu in 1806 was struck by the extent of Russian influence in the Ionian Islands:

Corfu was justly considered the capital of our acquisitions in the Mediterranean. It resembled more a Russian colony than a Greek city. Everywhere one encountered Russians. The inhabitants had grown accustomed to our ways. Many of them had learned to speak Russian and the children even sang Russian songs. 104

The thousands of Russian troops and sailors in the Ionian Islands pumped 12,000,000 rubles annually into the Ionian economy.¹⁰⁵ Ionian commerce was absolutely dependent upon Russian protection. Mocenigo wielded as much power as the Venetian proeditore-generale had ever possessed and his power was to be institutionalized by the Constitution of 1806.

Thus it came as no surprise when the Septinsular government chose to align with Russia in the face of the

¹⁰⁴Bronevskii, II, p. 255.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., II, p. 97.

Porte, France and Ali Pasha. In January 1807, the Septinsular government presented a gold sword to Seniavin and on February 16 Prince-President Anino requested continued Russian protection.¹⁰⁶ Great Britain's alliance with Russia was an added incentive for the vulnerable island republic to reject the overtures of its suzerain.¹⁰⁷

In Russia's general strategy for conducting the war against the Porte Seniavin's fleet and the troops at Corfu were to play a vital role. The Russian government envisaged a front against the Turks running from the Black Sea along the north bank of the Danube to Orşova, from Orşova to Belgrade, and then west to the Adriatic. The Balkan line would be anchored on the west by the fleet at Corfu and Cattaro.¹⁰⁸ In September 1806 Seniavin had requested reinforcements, but none were sent after Ignat'ev's squadron. In a war with the Porte, the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean would be more handicapped than in a war with France. With the straits closed, troops and provisions would be months in arriving at Corfu. Moreover, the corsairs of Tunis and Algiers were free to prey upon Russian shipping after the Sultan's declaration of war.

¹⁰⁶Svin'in, I, 268-269. Bronevskii, II, 257.

¹⁰⁷Spiridion Foresti to Lord Howick, Mar. 7, 1807; Britain, Foreign Office, Ionian Islands, 9. Cited by Shupp, p. 469.

¹⁰⁸Budberg to Alexander, Jan. 4, 16, 1807. Quoted in Stancu Bradisteanu, Die Beziehungen Russlands und Frankreichs zur Türkei in den Jahren 1806 und 1807 (Berlin: E. Ebering, 1912), pp. 192-193.

While still in the Adriatic, Seniavin was summoned by Mocenigo to defend the Ionian Islands before the Porte's declaration of war. On December 9 Mocenigo sent a brig to warn Seniavin that Ali Pasha had occupied Preveza.¹⁰⁹ Ali Pasha had moved against the coastal towns immediately after learning of Michelson's advance into Moldavia. The Russian consuls in Albania were imprisoned, ships carrying food to Corfu were detained, and Ali's son Veli easily occupied defenseless Preveza and Vonitsa, unceremoniously expelling the Porte's governor. Ali vindictively razed two-thirds of Preveza and drove the Christian families into the interior, replacing them with Moslems. Only the Russian garrison at Parga saved that town from the same fate. After gaining three of the four towns which he had coveted for so long, Ali ambitiously planned to gain an island or two in addition. To obtain his objective the Pasha of Yanina requested aid from the French. Napoleon eagerly agreed and ordered fifty artillerymen together with cannon and military stores sent to Ali Pasha under the command of Colonel Vaudoncourt.¹¹⁰ while awaiting their arrival, Ali fortified Preveza.

In response to Mocenigo's urgent pleas, Seniavin

¹⁰⁹Seniavin, I, 207.

¹¹⁰Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, Jan. 24, Feb. 2, 1807. Joseph Bonaparte, Correspondance, III, 296, 303. Vaudoncourt, p. 251.

arrived at Corfu on January 30. At Corfu Seniavin learned only of the entrance of Michelson into the Principalities, an event which Budberg had assured him would not lead to war. As a result, Seniavin was in doubt as to what steps he should take. Admiral Collingwood had asked the Russian admiral for four ships-of-the-line, but Seniavin had refused on the grounds that all his forces were needed to defend the Septinsular Republic.¹¹¹

It was not until February 11 that Seniavin finally learned of the Porte's declaration of war. In preparation for leaving the islands for a campaign in the Archipelago, Seniavin entrusted the defense of the Ionian Islands to a military council composed of Count Mocenigo, Major-General Nazimov, and Captain Lelli. The council had at its disposal a ship-of-the-line, a frigate, and 11,300 troops.¹¹² Mocenigo tried to raise more troops by appealing to mainland Greeks for volunteers,¹¹³ but he met with limited success. With the main body of the fleet and 1,700 troops Seniavin sailed for the Aegean on February 22. Before his departure, Seniavin negotiated with Ali Pasha in an attempt to protect his supply lines. The wily pasha promised to remain neutral in the war

¹¹¹Adm. Collingwood to Adm. Seniavin, Dec. 14, 1806. Adm. Seniavin to Adm. Collingwood, Jan. 10, 1807. Baron Cuthbert Collingwood, A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood (London: James Ridgway, 1837), II, 26, 26-27.

¹¹²Adm. Seniavin to Adm. Chichagov, Feb. 18, 1807. TsGAVMF, f. dep. mor. min., d. 571, pp. 22-26. Cited by Shapiro, Seniavin, p. 189.

¹¹³Bronevskii, II, 259.

between the Porte and Russia,¹¹⁴ but Ali only wanted to hasten the departure of the Russian fleet from the Ionian Sea.

As soon as Seniavin had left, Ali Pasha gathered an army of over 20,000 men on the coast between Parga and Santa Maura. Captain Lelli dispatched two corvettes to strengthen Parga's defenses and with the Azilia (74) and a frigate he patrolled the waters around Zante and Cephalonia.¹¹⁵ In the face of a superior naval force, Ali could not cross to Zante or Corfu, but one island, Santa Maura, could be bombarded from the mainland. In March Ali moved his army opposite Santa Maura and began constructing flat-boats. Colonel Vaudoncourt arrived with cannon and engineers to direct the siege operations.¹¹⁶ At the same time, Ali sent his secretary, Mehemet Guerini, an Italian renegade, to Napoleon in Poland to obtain the cession of Parga and Santa Maura to the Pasha of Yanina.¹¹⁷

The backbone of Santa Maura's defenses was 2,000 Russian troops under Major-General I. I. Stetter. Count John Capodistrias, who had been appointed military governor of the island, appealed to all Ionians for volunteers

¹¹⁴Ibid., II, 256-257.

¹¹⁵Ibid., II, 258-259.

¹¹⁶Vaudoncourt, pp. 251-252.

¹¹⁷Auguste de Marmont, Mémoires du Maréchal Marmont Duc de Raguse de 1792 à 1841 (Paris: Perrotin, 1857), III, 55.

and money.¹¹⁸ The garrison of the island was supplemented by over 250 armatoloi and klephts from the mainland who had answered Mocenigo's call to arms against the Moslems. During the siege of Santa Maura, Capodistrias came in contact with Kolokotronis, Botzaris, Tsavellas, Nikitos, Khristakis and scores of other future leaders in the Greek war for independence. At Santa Maura in the spring of 1807 Capodistrias first began to think in terms of the future of the Greek people as a whole.¹¹⁹

Ali's first probing attacks against Santa Maura were repulsed. Santa Maura was strongly garrisoned and in the months since the declaration of war extensive fortifications had been erected. Moreover, the Russians caused diversions in Ali's rear by inciting the chronically rebellious Tsamuriotes and Paramithians. In May and June Ali steadily built up his forces in preparation for a general assault on Santa Maura. However, the elusive prize again escaped Ali because of Tilsit.

Almost from the moment of the declaration of war by the Porte negotiations had begun to end a war which neither Britain nor Russia wanted. In March, Britain sounded out the Russian government on possible conditions for peace.

¹¹⁸Lascaris, p. 27.

¹¹⁹Capodistrias, "Zapiska," Sbornik, III, pp. 165-166.

British Ambassador Douglas was informed by Baron Budberg that Russia only desired a peace based upon the existing treaties of Russia with the Porte and that Russia sought no change in the status of the Septinsular Republic.¹²⁰ Pozzo di Borgo arrived at Tenedos in the Aegean on May 24, 1807, to join with Lord Paget in seeking peace with the Porte. In the subsequent negotiations the allies discovered that the Porte wanted changes made at Corfu. One of the Porte's conditions for peace was the immediate evacuation of all Russian troops from the Ionian Islands.¹²¹ The fact that Russia wanted only the status quo and the Porte wanted changes in its favor only reflected the critical situation which faced Russia as a result of Napoleon's formidable army in Poland.

The fate of the Septinsular Republic was not to be decided at Tenedos, at Santa Maura, or even on the Danube, but rather on the distant Nieman. The battle of Friedland on June 15 persuaded the Tsar to open negotiations with Napoleon. Ten days after the battle Alexander and Napoleon met on a raft in the middle of the Nieman to

¹²⁰Douglas to Howick, Mar. 10, 19, 1807; Britain, Foreign Office, Russia, 68. Cited by Shupp, p. 442.

¹²¹Sébastien to Talleyrand, June 28, 1807; France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Turquie. Cited by Édouard Briault, La Politique orientale de Napoléon, Sébastiani, et Gardane, 1806-1808 (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1904), p. 222.

decide the fate of continental Europe. The Septinsular Republic was relatively a small item on the Olympian agenda of the two emperors.

The first suggestion that Russia should relinquish her position in the Ionian Islands came from Prussia. On June 23 Prussian Foreign Minister Prince von Hardenberg, in an attempt to save Prussia, proposed a partition of the Ottoman Empire whereby Russia would receive the eastern Balkans, Austria the western Balkans, and France would obtain Greece and all the islands.¹²² Alexander accepted Hardenberg's plan as a basis for negotiations; but Napoleon disliked Hardenberg and had him dismissed.

Alexander's favorable reception of Hardenberg's proposal was the first suggestion that he would consider giving up Corfu. In the light of the changed international situation Alexander's attitude was sensible. If Alexander and Napoleon should grandiosely redraw the map of Europe, Corfu would not be worth quibbling over. The ardent supporters of Russia's position at Corfu were no longer influential. Czartoryski was no longer foreign minister, Count Morkov had been out of affairs since 1804, Count Tomara was in disgrace and Admiral Ushakov was in retirement. Thus Alexander was receptive to Napoleon's sapient arguments for the cession of the Ionian Islands.

¹²²Hardenberg, III, pp. 461-462.

Napoleon's judicious arguments reflected his personal eagerness to reacquire the Ionian Islands. Ever since 1797 Napoleon had followed Ionian affairs with almost paternal interest. It was Napoleon who had been responsible for France's acquisition of the islands in 1797 and it was Napoleon who had given the islands their first modern government. Moreover, Seniavin's activities in the Adriatic had demonstrated once again how a fleet based at Corfu could operate effectively in the French rear.

On July 3 the Emperor of the French presented to Alexander a long memorandum on Corfu.¹²³ Napoleon declared that he shared Alexander's concern for the security and prosperity of the Ionian people and that if Corfu were his he would not change the government so wisely established by the Tsar. Napoleon conceded that ideally a joint Russo-French protectorate over the Ionian Islands would result in the greatest degree of security for the Septinsular Republic, but he argued that since France was closer to Corfu, France could best and most rapidly assist the Septinsular Republic.

Moreover, Russia has no interest in retaining her position at Corfu. Corfu, which Russia has never considered as a point d'appui for her projects against Turkey or for her contacts with the Greeks of Albania and

¹²³Napoleon to Alexander, July 3, 1807. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXXVIII, no. 24, pp. 58-61.

neighboring coasts, is separated from all of Russia's other possessions. Corfu is located in another sea and is expensive and difficult to provision and defend. Corfu could be used in conjunction with Russia's old policy of trying to surround European Turkey with her forces, but the interests of Russia and France are no longer separate. Since France and Russia are now working in concert with respect to Turkey, Russia's previous motives for retaining that distant possession no longer exist. It is not Albania, Montenegro, and all of western Turkey which should attract the attention of Russia. The provinces contiguous to her dominions will always be of more direct interest to her. The Black Sea is bordered by Russian possessions, the Adriatic by French possessions. This difference of position permits acting in concert; the two powers should never have a conflict of interest between them.

Napoleon's request for the outright cession of the Ionian Islands to France was received favorably by Alexander. The initial purpose of the Russians at Corfu had been to act as a bulwark against the French. An alliance with France and the delimitation of spheres of interest removed the need for a defensive system against France in the Mediterranean. Far from being of further value to Russia, the Ionian Islands would become an unnecessary cause of friction between the two powers if Russia insisted on maintaining her position at Corfu. The wisdom of Alexander's alliance with Napoleon may be open to question, but once the alliance had been decided upon, it was logical for Alexander to relinquish his position in the Ionian

Islands.¹²⁴

On July 6 Alexander had a conversation with Napoleon on the subject of Corfu. The Tsar was agreeable to the cession of the Ionian Islands, but he exacted a concession from Napoleon. In return for the evacuation of the Ionian Islands, Cáttaro, and the Principalities, Alexander requested and received the restitution to the King of Prussia of 200,000 Germans on the left bank of the Elbe.¹²⁵ The Emperor of Russia lost as many subjects in the Ionian Islands as the King of Prussia gained in Germany. The Ionian people had been loyal to Alexander; Friedrich Wilhelm proved to be otherwise.

In a secret article of the treaty signed on July 7, the Ionian Islands were ceded to France "in full ownership."¹²⁶ The legality of the cession was questionable at best. Alexander ceded to France "in full ownership" a territory which he did not possess by treaty. The Treaty of March 1800 had indisputably awarded suzerainty to the Sultan. The October 1801 treaty between Russia and

¹²⁴Historians, particularly Russians, who have criticized the cession of Corfu have done so on the basis that the Franco-Russian alliance was not durable. However, the cession of Corfu should be judged in the light of the alliance rather than with the alliance.

¹²⁵Mémoire of Alexander, July 6, 1807. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXVIII, no. 31, pp. 71-72.

¹²⁶De Clercq, II, 213.

France and the Treaty of Amiens had increased the number of guarantors of the independence of the Septinsular Republic, but the Porte's rights remained intact. The Russo-Turkish treaty of 1805 had likewise left suzerainty to the Sultan. Moreover, with the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war, neither Russia nor the Septinsular Republic had repudiated the Porte's suzerainty over the islands.

The French defended the cession on the grounds of the Russo-Turkish war and also because the Byzantine Constitution, upon which the Septinsular Republic had been based, was void. The French argued that because the Byzantine Constitution was no longer operative, the Ionian Islands had reverted to their status of 1799--conquered territory at the disposal of the conqueror.¹²⁷ In short, the French contended that the Septinsular Republic had never actually been independent since 1801. The French attempt to justify the cession was obviously contrived. For years Napoleon and Talleyrand had insisted in their relations with Russia that the Septinsular Republic was independent. However, the legality of the cession was a purely academic question.

A convention signed two days after Tilsit provided

¹²⁷France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Iles Ioniennes, XVII, Mémoire. Quoted in Levy, pp. 28-29.

for the evacuation of Russian troops from the islands. The Russians were allowed ample time to leave Corfu and could return to Russia by way of Venice, crossing French territory.¹²⁸ Napoleon placed the port facilities of Toulon, Cadiz and Brest at the disposal of Seniavin for his return to the Baltic.¹²⁹ On July 10, Sudberg sent two couriers galloping south to the Adriatic to inform Count Mocenigo and Admiral Seniavin of the treaty.

Napoleon had insisted that the cession remain a secret. He feared the reaction of the Porte and also that a British squadron might occupy Corfu before the French could arrive. Napoleon ordered the utmost haste in preparing and sending a French force to Corfu.¹³⁰ Sébastiani at Constantinople was instructed to keep the cession secret as long as possible.¹³¹ Napoleon's fears about Britain were only partially justified. Britain had the desire but not the means to occupy Corfu. Although Canning did not know of the secret articles, he was suspicious because Corfu was not mentioned in the treaty.¹³²

¹²⁸De Clercq, II, 215-217.

¹²⁹Napoleon to Alexander, July 6, 1807. Tracnevskii, sbornik, LXXXVIII, no. 32, p. 73.

¹³⁰Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, July 4, 9, Aug. 3, 5, 17, 1807. Joseph Bonaparte, Correspondance, III, 401, 404, 417, 423.

¹³¹Coquelle, "Sébastieni," p. 601.

¹³²George Canning to Lord Paget, Aug. 15, 1807. Paget Papers, II, 323.

The British ambassador to Vienna proposed conquering at least the lesser islands by a coup de main; but the British commander in Sicily, far from being able to spare a squadron, feared for the safety of Sicily.¹³³

On August 19 General César Berthier arrived at Corfu from Otranto with French troops and took possession of the islands. Berthier immediately issued a decree reducing the Senate to five members and abolishing most of the posts in the septinsular government, including secretary of state for foreign affairs.¹³⁴ The French comported themselves as imperiously as they had in 1797-1798. Count Mocenigo, astounded by the Tsar's orders, sought excuses to procrastinate while hoping in vain for countermanding orders to arrive. The Corfiotes viewed the arrival of the French with sullen distaste.¹³⁵ The British consul at Corfu wrote that "the appearance of the slightest effectual support might rouse [the Corfiotes] to the most successful resistance."¹³⁶

Admiral Seniavin learned of Tilsit on August 24 while off the Dardanelles. On September 4 he received

¹³³Sir Robert Adair to George Canning, Sept. 19, 1807; Adair, pp. 270-271. Sir John Moore to Lord Paget, Sept. 3, 1807; Paget Papers, II, 338-339.

¹³⁴Decree by General Berthier, Aug. 14, 1807. Quoted in Pauthier, p. 20.

¹³⁵Svin'in, II, 230. Bronevskii, III, 177.

¹³⁶Spiridion Foresti to Commodore Campbell, Aug. 12, 1807. Adair, pp. 404-405.

orders from Alexander to evacuate all Russian forces from the Mediterranean. Immediately Seniavin returned to Corfu, picking up the Russian garrisons on the lesser islands on the way. When Seniavin sailed into Corfu harbor on September 16, he refused to salute the French flag flying over the fortress. In the period that Seniavin remained at Corfu relations between him and Berthier were acrimonious. The Russian admiral's conduct was so hostile that Napoleon protested Seniavin's "rudeness" to St. Petersburg.¹³⁷

Seniavin's surly behavior was partly the result of his personal dislike of the French. Shortly before, Seniavin had frankly told Admiral Collingwood that he "hated" the French.¹³⁸ However, the reason for Seniavin's actions was not entirely personal. Seniavin shared the indignation of the Russians at Corfu at being forced out of the Mediterranean without having been defeated. Almost daily there were scuffles on the streets of Corfu between Russian and French soldiers.¹³⁹

In the two weeks that Seniavin remained at Corfu the Corfiotes did not conceal their preference for the Russians

¹³⁷Napoleon to General Savary, Oct. 9, 1807. Trachevskii, Sbornik, LXXXVIII, no. 84, p. 226.

¹³⁸Adm. Collingwood to J. E. Blakett, Oct. 24, 1807. Collingwood, II, 77.

¹³⁹Svin'in, II, 230.

over the French. Government officials and townspeople implored Seniavin to stay and protect them. Corfiotes defiantly acclaimed Alexander when French soldiers would shout "Vive Napoléon!"¹⁴⁰ A Russian diplomat attached to the squadron recorded: "Whenever we appeared on the esplanade, thousands of the inhabitants would surround us and deafen us with their acclamations."¹⁴¹ When the last Russians marched down to the shore to embark, a huge crowd and all the Orthodox clergy of the city accompanied them to the shore. Flowers were thrown down from the houses on the soldiers. Priests blessed the troops as they boarded ships. The Protopappas of Corfu gave bread and salt to General Nazimov and started to make a speech but was stopped by his tears.¹⁴² On October 1 Seniavin disconsolately sailed from Corfu, bringing to a close Imperial Russia's first and last venture as a Mediterranean power.

¹⁴⁰ Bronevskii, III, 183-184.

¹⁴¹ Svin'in, II, 233.

¹⁴² Bronevskii, III, 186.

CONCLUSION

When viewed in terms of the span of history, the Russian protectorate over the Ionian Islands was almost ephemeral. However, the decade that the destinies of the Ionian people were linked with Russia was a period of vast political and social metastasis in Europe. Because of the kaleidoscopic international situation prevailing during that period, it is difficult to summarize succinctly Russia's policy with respect to the Ionian Islands. Moreover, in less than a decade two tsars and five foreign ministers grappled with the problem of Corfu, each adding epicycles to Russia's foreign policy. The attitude of the Russian government toward the Ionian Islands changed radically several times. At one time Count Kochubey was willing to discard the islands as an unwanted burden; Prince Czartoryski exaggerated the importance of Corfu for Russia. However, in all of Russia's policies on the Ionian Islands there was one constant element--Russia's relations with France. None of Russia's actions with respect to the Ionian Islands, whether Ionian internal affairs or foreign policy, were completely divorced from Russo-French relations.

The Ionian Islands first attracted the attention of the Russian government because of the threat to the Ottoman

Empire posed by the new masters of Corfu, the French. By means of an unprecedented alliance with the Porte, Russia acted to extirpate the French threat in the Levant. Ushakov's conquest of the Ionian Islands was not an isolated Balkan venture, it was a part of the war of the Second Coalition.

After the French had been expelled from the Ionian Islands, Russia realized that the island steppingstones led not only to the Levant, but to Italy as well. The Russian soldiers who left Sevastopol in 1798 destined for Corfu ended up in Rome in 1799. Hence the position at Corfu assumed an offensive nature which doubled its value to Russia. No longer did Russia want the Ionian Islands just because France coveted them too much; Russia wanted them because she could use them. Thus in the treaty establishing the Septinsular Republic Russia acquired what amounted to a condominium with the Porte over the Ionian Islands. Russia obtained the form of government she wanted for the islands and the right to station troops in the islands in time of war.

Since the value of Corfu to Russia was dependent upon the continued hostility of France, when the French threat receded in the face of Suvorov's bayonets and subsequently ended altogether as a result of Paul's impulsive change of

alliances, the Ionian Islands reverted to their former status of out-of-the-way Levantine islands which were of more interest to London currant merchants than to the Russian government. However, Russia could not abdicate all her responsibilities and influence in the Septinsular Republic. Russia had incurred treaty obligations and, more importantly, there was always the possibility that Corfu could again serve Russia in time of war. Consequently, in 1800-1801 Russia did not assert herself at Corfu, but at the same time she jealously did not want any other power to gain ascendancy in the Ionian Islands, although she was not averse to Great Britain taking defensive measures in the area.

The series of treaties in 1801-1802 indicated Russia's determination to retain a legal foothold at Corfu, but the treaties also demonstrated Russia's relative disinterest in the Ionian Islands. By allowing so many other powers to become guarantors, not just of the territorial integrity of the Septinsular Republic, but also of the Septinsular constitution, Russia was diluting her own tenuous position. Through a combination of Russia's disinterest and distance from the Ionian Islands, the winter of 1801-1802 was the nadir of Russia's influence over the destinies of the Septinsular Republic.

In the summer of 1802 Russia again came to the fore at Corfu, but her action in sending troops to the islands was more dramatic in appearance than in intent. Tsar Alexander undertook the pacification of the islands, which had been plunged into anarchy for more than a year, because of a sense of responsibility, the prodding of Napoleon, who hoped to gain some future advantage, and the entreaties of the Ionians, who were unable to resolve their differences by themselves. But even though the re-occupation of the islands by Russia was ostensibly divorced from international politics, Alexander's actions were severely circumscribed by his desire to avoid offending the other guaranteeing powers. Alexander the peacemaker was not interested as much in the welfare of the Ionian people as he was in extinguishing the seven Ionian embers which, given the strained relations between France and Britain, could kindle a general conflagration. The Ionian people received the blessings of stability and order not as much for their own sake as in the interest of European peace.

For a year after the return of Russian troops to the Ionian Islands, Russia regarded the islands as a burdensome ward. The Ionians only narrowly escaped falling under the sceptre of the King of Naples. Russian officials and commanders in the islands were left for months at a time without instructions from St. Petersburg. In view

of the state of communications of that period, the lack of instructions would not have been particularly unusual had it not been for the fact that the Russians lacked specific instructions when they arrived in the islands. Instead of increasing her naval forces in the Ionian Sea, Russia reduced her strength there.

The Ionian Islands had little intrinsic worth to Russia in time of peace. The cost of maintaining a substantial force at Corfu outweighed the advantages derived from it. Moreover, since neither the Porte nor Russia was at war, maintaining troops in the islands was illegal. In its first years of existence, the Septinsular Republic was little more than flotsam left in the wake of the war of the Second Coalition. The Septinsular Republic, which was born of war and met its demise by war, flourished under the gloomy haze of war clouds rather than in the illumination of peace.

Toward the end of 1803 the attitude of the Russian government toward the Ionian Islands underwent a decisive change. The re nascent French threat in the Levant inevitably brought Corfu to the attention of European chancelleries. Corfu was again viewed as a bulwark shielding Russia's protégé, the Porte. Russia's proprietary interest in the Ionian Islands increased proportionately with the French threat.

Alexander's first measures were defensive in nature. Internal peace in the Septinsular Republic was consolidated by a constitution which withstood the severest of tests, the test of time. In order to tie the Septinsular Republic more protectively to Russia, the Russian government absorbed the Septinsular consular service. Alexander endeavored at the conference table to secure recognition of the territorial integrity and neutrality of the Septinsular Republic in the midst of the war between France and Britain. Warships, troop transports, cannon, and munitions flowed in a steady stream to Corfu throughout 1804, underscoring Russia's determination to defend the islands and her position therein.

By the end of 1804, the Septinsular Republic was a de facto Russian protectorate. Russia's dominance in Ionian internal affairs was unchallenged. Vessels of the Black Sea fleet were as familiar with Corfu harbor as with Sevastopol. However, Russia's position in the Ionian Islands was not the result of a policy of aggrandizement in the Balkans. Russia was only reacting to the French threat. The man most responsible for Russia's position at Corfu was not Tsar Alexander or Chancellor Vorontsov, but Napoleon.

In the years 1804 to 1806 the Russian government was increasingly determined to maintain its position in the Septinsular Republic, partly because of growing hostility

toward France, partly because of the tenure of Prince Czartoryski at the foreign ministry. Prince Czartoryski was the most ardent champion of Russia's position in the Ionian Islands. In the conferences which punctuated the years before and after Austerlitz, Russia steadily increased her demands with respect to Corfu. Demands for simple guarantees of the independence and neutrality of the Septinsular Republic were replaced by demands that a token Russian force remain in the islands at least temporarily. This position in turn was replaced by a policy of insistence that a substantial Russian force be stationed at Corfu even in time of peace. Russia's consolidation of her position within the Septinsular Republic proceeded concurrently. The Constitution of 1806 was designed to reduce the legislature of the Septinsular Republic to the status of a provincial assembly.

The intimate relationship between the Ionian protectorate and Russia's fear of France was demonstrated dramatically by Tilsit. With France as an ally rather than an enemy, the Tsar was no longer interested in the Ionian protectorate. Alexander did not cede the islands in the face of dictation by the victor of Friedland, he succumbed to Napoleon's shrewd arguments. A bulwark against the French was no longer needed and a bulwark was all the protectorate had ever been in the view of the

Russian government. Diplomatic notes, mémoires, and correspondence seldom referred to the Septinsular Republic or to the Ionian Islands, but nearly always to Corfu--not Corfu the island, not Corfu the city, but Corfu the fortress with 600 cannon. In time of war Corfu was a base; in time of peace Corfu was a barometer on gathering war clouds and a pawn which could be used to restore equilibrium. The quarter of a million inhabitants of the Ionian Islands were just so many caretakers of the fortress of Corfu.

Contrary to the apprehensions of Britain, France, and Austria, the Russian government did not regard its position in the Ionian Islands as a point d'appui for undermining or pressuring the Ottoman Empire. To be sure, during all but the last months of the protectorate Russia was allied with the Porte and had every reason to support the authority of the sultan. However, it must be noted that the successive Russian foreign ministers during the period of the protectorate, not excluding even the Turcophobe Count Kochubey, did not argue that Russia should retain her position at Corfu in order to obtain a measure of security against a change of alliance by the Porte. The grandson of Catherine II did not establish the Ionian protectorate with the intention of outflanking European Turkey and he did not jealously maintain Russia's position

at Corfu for several years with that end in view. The policy of wooing the Orthodox inhabitants of Greece and Albania and the attempts to establish buffer states in the western Balkans were not designed to weaken the Porte, but to strengthen it. Admiral Nelson, Lord Elgin or Talleyrand could never have been convinced that Russia's protectorate over the Ionian Islands did not fit into a broader design directed against the Ottoman Empire at some future date, but apparently that was indeed the case.

Since Russia was not interested in the Ionian Islands per se, but rather in their value on the international market, the form of government in the islands was a secondary concern, subordinate to the demands of Russia's foreign policy. In the five constitutions of the Septinsular Republic the Russian government was not interested in form or content, but in results. In the early years Russia wanted a government which would assure the islands peace and stability. Toward the end of the protectorate, Russia insisted upon statutory recognition of her position in the islands. After the requirements of Russia's foreign policy had been met, the Ionians enjoyed great latitude of choice, particularly with regard to the Constitution of 1803.

Of all the constitutions of the Septinsular Republic, the first is the most interesting because of the role of Admiral Ushakov. Ushakov, an unsophisticated naval officer, gave to the Ionian people a government which was remarkably advanced for its time, certainly for its area. He was not guided by a liberal ideology; he was not acquainted with the currents of political thought in western Europe. Ushakov's administration was a pragmatic groping for a practical solution to the difficult problem of establishing stability in an area where for most of the inhabitants stability was synonymous with misrule. For his wise administration of the Ionian Islands, Admiral Ushakov deserves to be classed with General Kiselev, who governed Rumania in 1829-1834, and Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, who administered Bulgaria in 1879. All three were representatives of a remarkable breed of nineteenth-century Russian aristocrats. Ushakov's constitution was vindicated when, after the failure of two subsequent constitutions, the fourth constitution marked a return to the most fundamental principle of Ushakov's constitution--the participation of the middle class in the government.

During the years of the protectorate, Russia exerted a moderating influence in the normally stormy internal affairs of the Septinsular Republic. Neither the nobility nor the lower classes were unduly favored. As a

result, Russia was rewarded with the loyalty of the majority of Ionians of all classes. Of the successive governors of the islands--General Chabot, Count Mocenigo, General Berthier, Sir Thomas Maitland--Count Mocenigo's rule was by far the most benevolent, although one must take into consideration that Russia's position in the Ionian Islands was never as secure as that of Britain and France.

The course which the protectorate would have taken if Russia had retained her position in the islands can only be a subject of conjecture. If the Russian protectorate had survived Tilsit, one might assume that it would have survived the Congress of Vienna. By the end of 1806, Russia's actions reflected a definite tendency to tighten the reins on the Septinsular government. Whether the actions were a prelude to eventual annexation will always be an unanswerable question. In the history of the Septinsular Republic the years 1802-1807 may have corresponded to the years 1778-1783 in the evolution of the Crimea from an independent state to a Russian province. However, such a course was improbable, mainly because the Ionian Islands were not contiguous to Russian territory.

In the nineteenth century the Russian government evinced a marked propensity for what amounted to a condominium. In the case of Rumania after 1829 and Bulgaria

after 1878, Russia retained the substance of power while leaving the appearance to the Porte. That was precisely the case with the Septinsular Republic. It must be noted that with both Rumania and Bulgaria, Russia's policy was the road, not to annexation, but to independence, although independence was not the direct result of Russia's actions alone.

If Russia had remained at Corfu, there might have been far-reaching effects beyond the limits of the Ionian Sea. If Admiral Ushakov rather than General Maitland had been governor of the Ionian Islands during the Greek war for independence, the course of Greek history might have taken a different turn. If the "Gendarme of Europe" had possessed a Mediterranean precinct at Corfu, Russia's influence would have been much greater at Naples and Madrid.

In spite of the brief duration of the protectorate, however, the Russian protectorate over the Ionian Islands was not a sterile ephemera. For the history of Greece, the Septinsular Republic was of substantial importance. The Ionian state was "a political and social school full of experience; a school of immense value for all of Greece."¹

¹Édouard Driault, "Les Iles Ioniennes et la domination anglaise," in Édouard Driault and Michel Lheritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours. Vol. I. (Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1925), p. 63.

John Capodistrias, the first president of Greece, began his career in the Septinsular Republic under Russian patronage and arrived in Greece by way of St. Petersburg. However, the ties of Russia with the Ionian Islands left no indelible vestiges. Within a few short years after Tilsit, memory of the protectorate lingered on only in the nostalgia of Ionians old enough to remember the eventful and prosperous years of the Septinsular Republic, in a few graves with markers in a foreign tongue, in a few Ionians with the incongruous names of Olga or Vladimir.

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Noradounghian, Gabriel effendi (ed.). Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman. Vol. II: 1789-1856. Paris: Cotillon, 1900.

As opposed to the G. F. Martens collection which is based on the French copy of the Porte's treaties, Noradounghian is a French translation of the Turkish copy. As a result there are often minor discrepancies between the two collections.

Ogorodnikov, Stepan F. (ed.). Materialy dlia istorii russkago flota. Vol. XVI: 1796-1800. Vol. XVII: 1801-1804. St. Petersburg: Tip. Morskago Ministerstva, 1902-1904.

An exhaustive collection of documents from the Russian naval archives. A valuable feature is the inclusion in full of the annual journal of the Admiralty-Kollegiia.

Paget, Sir Arthur. The Paget Papers; Diplomatic and other Correspondence 1794-1807. Edited by Sir Augustus B. Paget. London: William Heinemann, 1896. 2 vols.

Lord Paget was British ambassador to Naples in 1800-1801, to Austria in 1801-1806, and to the Porte in 1807. In addition to his own correspondence, his papers include documents connected with the posts he held and are particularly fertile for the Aegean negotiations in the summer of 1807.

Pauthier, Jean P. G. Les îles Ioniennes pendant l'occupation française et le protectorat anglais; d'après des documents authentiques la plupart inédits. Paris: Benjamin Duprat, 1863. 153 pp.

In an attempt to prove that the Ionian people owed what liberties they enjoyed to the French and Russians, not the British, Pauthier gives in full documents relating to the Ionian Islands and includes translations wholly or partially of the septinsular constitutions. The book suffers from incomplete documentation.

Poskochin, Ivan S. "Zhurnal kapitana 2-go ranga Poskochina, komandovavshago otriadom rossiiskikh i turetskikh voennykh sudov, vedennyi pri zaniatii ostrova Chefalonii, s 14-go po 23-e oktiabria 1798 goda," Slavianin, VIII (1825), 245-258.

Fouqueville, François C. H. L. Histoire de la régénération de la Grèce, comprenant le précis des événements depuis 1740 jusqu'en 1824. Vol. I. Paris: F. Didot, 1824.

The author was French consul at Yanina in 1806-1807. Many of the chapters of this work are more in the nature of a memoir than a history. It is of particular value with reference Souli, Parga and Ali's relations with Russia.

_____. Voyage en Morée à Constantinople, en Albanie, et dans plusieurs autres parties de l'Empire othoman, pendant les années 1798, 1799, 1800 et 1801. Paris: Gabon, 1805. 3 vols.

Dr. Fouqueville, who sailed to Egypt with Napoleon, was captured by a Barbary corsair and held prisoner by the Turks in 1798-1801, spending part of his detainment aboard the Russo-Turkish fleet blockading Corfu.

Rose, John Holland (ed.). Select Despatches from the British Foreign Office Archives Relating to the Third Coalition Against France 1804-1805. London: Royal Historical Society, 1904. 289 pp.

Rostopchin, Fëdor V., count. "Zapiska Grafa F. V. Rostopchina o politicheskikh otnosheniakh Rossii v poslednie mesiatsy pavlovskago tsarstvovaniia," Russkii Arkhiv, 1876, no. 1, 103-110.
Rostopchin was Russian foreign minister 1799-1800.

_____. "Vesti iz Rossii v Angliiu v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Pavla Petrovicha; pis'ma grafa F. V. Rostopchina k grafa S. R. Vorontsovu," Russkii Arkhiv, 1875, no. 3, 65-103, 414-436.

Letters of F. V. Rostopchin to the Russian ambassador to Great Britain covering the years 1799 to 1801.

St. Vincent, John, earl. Letters of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of St. Vincent whilst First Lord of the Admiralty 1801-1804. London: Navy Records Society, 1922-1927. 2 vols.

Because of Britain's interest in strategically important Corfu, British naval archives are a fruitful source of information on the Ionian Islands.

Spencer, George, 2nd earl. Private Papers of George, Second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty 1794-1801. Edited by H. W. Richmond. Vol. IV. London: Navy Records Society, 1924.

Svin'in Pavel P. Vospominaniia na flote. St. Petersburg: V. Flavil'shchikov, 1818. 3 vols.

Svin'in sailed with Commodore Ignat'ev's squadron as a diplomatic functionary and was in the Ionian Islands from January to October, 1807. His observations supplement those of Bronveskii.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de, prince de Bénévant. Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon 1800-1808. Edited by Pierre Bertrand. Paris: Ferrin, 1889. 491 pp.

Thompson, Sir Thomas. "Biographical Memoir of Sir Thomas Boulden Thompson," The Naval Chronicle, XIV (1805), 1-15.
Thompson was captain of a British frigate which was captured by the French in 1798 and taken to Corfu where it remained during Ushakov's campaign.

The Times (London). 1798-1807.

Trachevskii, Aleksandr S. (ed.). "Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia Rossii s Frantsiei v epokhu Napoleona," sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshestva, LXX (1890): 1800-1802; LXXVII (1891): 1803-1804; LXXXII (1892): 1805-1806; LXXXVIII (1893): 1807-1808.

An invaluable collection of treaties, correspondence and memoranda relating to Franco-Russian relations 1800-1808.

Turner, William. Journal of a Tour in the Levant. London: John Murray, 1820. 3 vols.

The author, who was attached to the British embassy in Constantinople, visited the Ionian Islands in 1813-1814. He recorded in his journal statistical information on the islands and historical sketches of personalities he encountered who had been prominent in the Septinsular Republic.

Vasil'chikov, Aleksandr A. (ed.) Le Comte André Razoumovski. Volume II in four parts of Les Razoumovskii. Halle: Tausch und Grosse, 1893-94.

A collection of the papers of the Russian ambassador to Vienna during the entire period of Russia's protectorate over the Ionian Islands.

Vaudoncourt, Guillaume, baron de. Memoirs on the Ionian Islands, Considered in a Commercial, Political, and Military Point of View. London: Baldwin, Cradock and Joy, 1816. 502 pp.

In January 1807, Vaudoncourt, a colonel of artillery, was charged by Joseph Bonaparte with a mission to Ali Pasha. This book is both a memoir of his mission and a detailed survey on the Ionian Islands.

Vincent, D. "Les Français à Corfou," Revue des Études Napoléoniennes, XXX (Jan.-June, 1930), 276-287; XXXI (July-Dec., 1930), 213-223.

The diary of a French army doctor who arrived at Corfu with General Berthier in 1807.

Whitworth, Charles, baron. England and Napoleon in 1803; being the Despatches of Lord Whitworth and Others. Edited by Oscar Browning. London: Longmans, Green, 1887. 305 pp.

Lord Whitworth was British ambassador to Russia 1788-1800 and to France 1802-1803. In addition to his correspondence, the book contains papers of Count Morkov and Count Vorontsov.

Wilson, Robert M. "Remarks on Board His Majesty's Ship Unité of 40 guns," in Thursfield, H. G. (ed.), Five Naval Journals 1739-1817. London: Navy Records Society, 1951. pp. 128-276.

Wilson was a signalman on a British frigate which called at Corfu frequently in 1805-1806.

"Zapiski o raznykh predmetakh odnosiasnchikhsia k Turtsii v 1797 i 1798 g.," Slavianin, VII (1828), 355-363.

Contains letters of merchant captains and Russian naval officers relating to the political and military situation at Constantinople immediately before Ushakov's campaign.

Secondary

Afanas'ev, Dmitrii M. "K Istorii Chernomorskogo flota (1768-1816)," Russkii Arkhiv, 1902, no. 2, 193-263.

Includes a few documents on Ushakov's campaign.

Anderson, Roger C. Naval Wars in the Levant 1559-1853. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952. 619 pp.

Includes two chapters on the Napoleonic period. The author used Russian sources, but his account is limited to ship movements and engagements without interpretive remarks.

"Anrepy-El'mity, grafy," Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, II (St. Petersburg: 1890), p. 821.

Barsov, N. "Nikifor Feotoki," Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, XLI (St. Petersburg: 1897), 85-86.

Bartenev, Petr. "Graf Motsenigo; episod iz pervoi turetskoi voiny pri Ekaterine II-i," Russkii Arkhiv, 1878, no. 12. 413-425.

Bogdanovich, Modest I. Istoriia tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Aleksandra I i Rossii v ego vremia. Vol. I. St. Petersburg: F. Sushchinskii, 1869.

An official history of Alexander's reign, it contains two chapters on Russian foreign policy and one on the Russian navy, based on archival material. The appendices contain records of the sessions of the Council of State.

Boretskii-Bergfeld, N. "Imperator Pavel I i politicheskaia sud'by Italii," Russkaia Starina, CIXL (March, 1912), 509-522.

Based on the papers of the Neapolitan ambassador to Russia.

- Botta, Charles. Histoire d'Italie de 1789 à 1814. Paris: P. Dufart, 1824. 5 vols.
Includes an account of events in the Ionian Islands from 1797 to 1800. The author visited the islands in 1798 and knew many of the personalities in the first French government at Corfu.
- Browning, Oscar. "Hugh Elliot at Naples, 1803-1806," English Historical Review, IV, no. 14 (April, 1889), 209-228.
Elliot was British ambassador to Naples.
- Chevalier, Louis E. Histoire de la marine française sous la Première République. Paris: Hachette, 1886. 424 pp.
Covers the period 1793-1799 and includes an account of French naval activities at Corfu.
- Coquelle, P. "L'Ambassade du Maréchal Brune à Constantinople (1803-1805)," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVIII (1904), 53-73.
_____. "La Mission de Sébastiani à Constantinople en 1801," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVII (1903), 438-455.
_____. "Sébastieniani Ambassadeur à Constantinople 1806-1808, d'après des documents inédits," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, XVIII (1904), 574-611.
- Daru, Pierre Antoine, count. Histoire de la République de Venise. Vol. XXIV. Stuttgart: Charles Hoffmann, 1828.
Includes chapters on the Venetian administration of the Ionian Islands and the transition from Venetian to French rule.
- Deutsch, Harold C. The Genesis of Napoleonic Imperialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938. 460 pp.
Covers the period 1801-1805 and is an attempt by the author to rectify the undue reliance of Sorel and Driault on French sources.
- Dixon, C. Willis. The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland. London: Longmans, Green, 1939. 274 pp.
Contains statistics on the Ionian Islands in 1815 and some letters of Count Mocenigo.
- Dora d'Istria, Countess. "Les îles Ioniennes sous la domination de Venise et sous le protectorat britannique," Revue des Deux Mondes, XVI (July 15, 1858), 381-422.
Relying on French and Italian sources, the author cursorily surveys the modern history of the Ionian Islands with emphasis on British rule.

- _____. "La Poésie grecque dans les Iles-Ioniennes," Revue des Deux Mondes, XIV (March 1, 1858), 57-88.
Ionian poetry during the Septinsular Republic provides an interesting insight into the activities of prominent klephts of the period.
- Driault, Édouard. Austerlitz; la fin du Saint-Empire (1804-1806). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1912. 492 pp.
- Driault, Édouard. "Les Iles Ioniennes et la domination anglaise," in Driault, Édouard and Iheritier, Michel, Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours. Vol. I. Paris: Les presses Universitaires de France, 1925. pp. 56-71.
- _____. Napoléon en Italie (1800-1812). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1906. 367 pp.
- _____. La Politique extérieure du Premier Consul 1800-1803. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910. 481 pp.
- _____. La Politique orientale de Napoléon, Sébastiani et Gardane, 1806-1808. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1904. 410 pp.
- _____. "La Question d'Orient en 1807," Revue d'histoire Diplomatique, XIV (1900), 410-451.
- _____. Tilsit; France et Russie sous le Premier Empire (1806-1809). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1917. 491 pp.
- Engelhardt, Édouard P. Les Protectorats anciens et modernes; étude historique et juridique. Paris: A. Pedone, 1896. 231 pp.
Chapter XX is an interpretive study of the international status of the Ionian Islands from Angevin to British rule.
- Gaffarel, Paul. La Politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908. 487 pp.
Contains a summary of both French occupations of the Ionian Islands, 1797-98 and 1807-14, with emphasis on administration.
- Gobineau, Arthur de. "Capodistrias," Revue des Deux Mondes, (April 15, 1841), 234-271.
- Golovizain, Konstantin. "Očerki iz istorii russkago flota; kapitan-komandor Sorokin v Ionicheskoj Respublike," Morskoi Sbornik, CLXXXII, no. 9 (Sept., 1882), 33-54.
Most of the article is the correspondence of General Anrep, Commodore Sorokin, and Minister of the Navy Chichagov.

Goncharov, Viktor A. Admiral Seniavin. Moscow: Voenno-morskoe izd. SSSR, 1945. 142 pp.

A reprint of an article in *Morskoi Sbornik* (1913, no. 7) which commemorated the 150th anniversary of Seniavin's birth plus the memoirs of Seniavin until 1788.

Goodisson, William. A Historical and Topographical Essay Upon the Islands of Corfu, Leucadia, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Zante; with Remarks Upon the Character, Manners, and Customs of the Ionian Greeks. London: Thomas and George Underwood, 1822. 265 pp.

The author was a British doctor on Corfu 1815-1820. Contains only incidental references to the Septinsular Republic.

Coriainov, Sergei M. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles: Etude historique sur la question des détroits. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1910. 392 pp.

Based exclusively on Russian archival material.

Jervis, Henry Jervis-White. History of the Island of Corfu and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands. London: Colburn, 1852. 323 pp.

The title is misleading. The book is mainly on ancient and medieval Corfu with only a few pages on the period after 1797. For Ushakov's campaign, the author plagiarized J. P. Bellaire.

Jourdain. "Eugenios Bulgaris," Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne, XIII (Paris: Michaud, 1815), 491-493.

Kaldis, William P. "John Capodistrias and the Modern Greek State." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1959.

Emphasis is on the later career of Capodistrias.

Lascaris, Stamati T. Capodistrias avant la révolution grecque; sa carrière politique jusqu'en 1822. Lausanne: Imprimerie Centrale, 1918. 127 pp.

Based on Greek, Italian, French and German sources, this monograph is more than a biography of Capodistrias until 1822, it is a history of the Septinsular Republic, liberally sprinkled with documents and extracts from the speeches and correspondence of Capodistrias.

"The Leander," The Naval Chronicle, II (1799), p. 377.

The Leander was a captured British frigate in the harbor of Corfu throughout the siege in 1798-1799.

Lefebvre, Armand E. Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe pendant le consulat et l'empire 1800-1815. 2nd ed. Paris: Amyot, 1866. Vols. I-III.

Lekić, Dušan. La Politique extérieure de Pierre I^{er} Petrovitch, Métropolitte du Monténégro (1784-1830). Paris: L. Rodstein, 1940. 255 pp.
Based mainly on French archives.

Lenormant, François. "La Grèce depuis la Révolution de 1802; L'Annexion des Iles-Ioniennes," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXXIX (Jan. 1, 1864), 99-136.

Includes statistics on the Ionian Islands, particularly on commerce, during the period of the Septinsular Republic.

Lévy, Gaston. La Condition internationale des Iles Ioniennes depuis le Congrès de Vienne jusqu'à nos jours. Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1901. 154 pp.

As an introduction, Lévy surveys the international position of the Ionian Islands from 1797 to 1815.

Lewis, Bernard. "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey," Journal of World History, I, no. 1 (July, 1953), 105-125.

Using Turkish sources, Lewis relates the impact of Revolutionary France on the Ottoman Empire both in terms of ideology and diplomacy. It is of particular value for the period 1797-1799.

Mackesy, Piers. The war in the Mediterranean 1803-1810. London: Longmans, Green, 1957. 430 pp.

Much more than a military account, it is a detailed and well documented history of the diplomacy of France, Britain and Russia in the Mediterranean, although the emphasis is on the role of Great Britain.

Mesmay, Jean Tiburce de. Norace Sébastiani; soldat, diplomate, homme d'état, maréchal de France. Paris: H. Champion, 1948. 321 pp.

The emphasis is on Sébastiani's life after 1803.

Miliutin, Dmitrii A., and Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, Aleksandr I. Istoriia voiny 1799 goda mezhdurusskoi i Frantsiiskoi voiskovykh sil v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Pavla I. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg: Tip. Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1857. 3 vols.

Although devoted mainly to Suvorov's campaigns, it includes cursory chapters on Ushakov's expedition. The entire third volume is documents and correspondence. The correspondence between Tsar Paul and Count Razumovskii is of particular value for a study of the Ionian Islands.

Miller, William. "The Ionian Islands Under Venetian Rule," English Historical Review, XVIII, no. 70 (April, 1903), 205-235.

"Mochinego, Graf Dimitrii," Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, XX (St. Petersburg: 1857), p. 81.

Mouravieff, Boris. L'Alliance russo-turque au milieu des guerres napoléoniennes. Neuchâtel: Baconnière, 1954. 223 pp.

A study of Russia's Near Eastern policy 1799-1815. Based only on French and Russian published archival material, the book suffers from a nationalistic bias, facile interpretations, and careless dating and documentation. Mouravieff was an officer in the Imperial Russian navy.

Mowat, Robert B. The Diplomacy of Napoleon. London: Edward Arnold, 1924. 315 pp.

Oddy, John Jepson. European Commerce, Shewing New and Secure Channels of Trade with the Continent of Europe; Detailing the Produce, Manufactures, and Commerce of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Philadelphia: James Humphreys, 1807. 2 vols. in 1.

The volumes contain three chapters on Russian trade from the middle of the eighteenth century to 1805, with detailed tables and statistics. The author, a British merchant, was a member of the Russian and Levant Companies.

Pappas, Spyridion. "La Mission des Stéphanopoli en Grèce," L'Hellenisme Contemporain, X, no. 2 (1950), 148-158.

Based on the memoirs of the Stephanopoli brothers, who were Corsicans of Greek descent charged by Napoleon with a mission to the Morea in 1797-1798.

Phillipson, Martin. "La Paix d'Amiens et la politique générale de Napoléon I^{er}," Revue Historique, LXXV (Jan.-Apr., 1901), 286-318; LXXVI (May-Aug., 1901), 48-78.

Pisani, P. "L'Expédition russo-turque aux Iles Ioniennes en 1798-1799," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, II, (1888), 190-222.

A brief account of Ushakov's campaign based almost entirely on French memoir accounts.

Plomer, William C. F. Ali the Lion; Ali of Tebeleni Pasha of Jannina 1741-1822. London: Jonathan Cape, 1936. 288 pp.

Although a highly popularized biography, it is based on extensive primary sources. Considerable attention is devoted to Ali's wars with the Souliotes.

Potrel, Jacques. "La Russie et la rupture de la Paix d'Amiens (mai-septembre 1803)," Annales de l'École libre des sciences politiques, XII (1897), 70-101.

Based on archival sources, principally the papers of Admiral Warren, British ambassador to Russia.

Furyear, Vernon J. Napoleon and the Dardanelles. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. 437 pp.

Rodocanachi, Emmanuel P. Bonaparte et les Iles Ioniennes; un épisode des conquêtes de la République et du Premier Empire (1797-1810). Paris: Félix Alcan, 1899. 316 pp.

Although the emphasis is on the French occupations, the author devotes a chapter to the Septinsular Republic. Relying only on non-Russian sources, his account is seriously out of balance, particularly with respect to Ushakov's campaign. The chief value of the work is the lengthy appendices containing extracts from French archives.

Rubinstein, N. L. "Vneshniaia torgovlia Rossii i russkoe kupechestvo vo vtoroi polovine XVIII v.," Istoricheskie Zapiski, LIV (1955), 343-361.

Includes an account of the development of Russia's Mediterranean trade.

Savant, Jean. "Napoléon et la libération de la Grèce," L'Hellenisme Contemporain, IV (July-Oct., 1950), 321-341; (Nov.-Dec., 1950), 474-485.

Relies on archival material of the French Foreign Ministry and of the French embassy in Constantinople.

Shapiro, Aleksandr. Admiral G. N. Seniavin. Moscow: Voennoe izd. Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1955. 371 pp.

A detailed, well documented study based on unpublished archival material. Shapiro's book is by far the best biography of Seniavin yet published.

_____. "Sredizemnomorskie problemy vneshnei politiki Rossii v nachale XIX v.," Istoricheskie Zapiski, LV (1956), 253-288.

An account and an interpretation of the role of Naples, Malta, Sardinia, Cattaro, the Ionian Islands, and the Straits in Russian foreign policy in the period 1800-1805, based on unpublished archival material.

Shtorm, Georgii F. F. F. Ushakov. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1947. 363 pp.

This biography, together with those of Snegirev and Zonin cited below, was a reflection of the post-war chauvinistic revival of interest in Russia's naval history. cursory, highly popularized, biased and frequently incorrect, the three biographies are of little value.

Shupp, Paul F. The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question 1806-1807. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931. 576 pp.

Although this is the best monograph in English on the subject, the emphasis is on Britain's attitudes and actions. For Russia's role only published archival material was used.

Simonde-Sismondi. "Mocenigo," Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne, XXIX (Paris: Michaud, 1821), 185-191.

Six, Georges. Dictionnaire biographique des généraux et amiraux français de la Révolution et de l'Empire (1792-1814). Paris: Georges Saffroy, 1934. 2 vols.

Snegirev, Vladimir L. Admiral Ushakov. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1945. 74 pp.

solov'ev, Sergei M. "Imperator Aleksandr I; politika--diplomatiia," in Sobranie Sochinenii. St. Petersburg: 'Obshchestvennaia Pol'za', n.d. pp. 248-753.

Includes extracts from diplomatic correspondence, but the monograph is undocumented. It is of particular value because of its discussions of the personalities and relative influence of the men in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Sorel, Albert. "Comment la Paix d'Amiens fut appliquée," séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques, CLIX (March 15 and 22, 1902), 670-696.

_____. L'Europe et la Révolution française. Vols. IV-VI. Paris: Plon, Nourrit, 1892-1903.
Draws on the wealth of information in the Arkhiv Vorontsova.

Sturdza, Alexandre. "Notice biographique sur le Comte J. Capodistrias," in Kapodistrias, Iōannēs A., count, Correspondance du Comte J. Capodistrias, Président de la Grèce. Vol. I. Geneva: A. Cherbuliez, 1839. pp. 1-119.

Tarle, Evgenii V. "Admiral Ushakov na Sredizemnom More (1798-1800)," in Sochineniia, Vol. X. Moscow: Izd. Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959. pp. 95-229.

Principally a military rather than a diplomatic account, the monograph reflects a chauvinistic bias, relies almost exclusively on Russian sources, and contains inaccuracies. Its principal value is the lengthy quotations from the rare memoirs of Lieutenant Egor P. Metaxa.

Tatishchev, Sergei S. Alexandre I^{er} et Napoléon d'après leur correspondance inédite 1801-1812. Paris: Ferrin, 1891. 640 pp.

Vandal, Albert. Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}; L'Alliance russe sous le Premier Empire. Vol. I: De Tilsit à Erfurt. Paris: Plon, Nourrit, 1898. 527 pp.
The first two chapters are on Tilsit.

Viskovatov, A. "Deistviia eskadry Kontr-Admirala Pustoshkina v Genuezskom Zaliv pri gorod Onel'e i Port Mavritsii 1799 g.," Slavianin, VII (1828), 9-14.

_____. "Vziatie ostrova Sviatyiia Mavry kapitanom 1-go ranga Seniavinym v 1798 godu," Slavianin, VII (1828), 311-325.

Based on Seniavin's journal.

"Vzgliad na voennyiia deistviia Rossian na Chernom More i Dunae, s 1787 po 1791 god," Slavianin, VIII (1829), 289-301, 329-341, 373-383, 405-418, 437-450, 469-486.

Provides insights into Ushakov's early military career, particularly on his tactics at Cape Kaliakra.

Yemeniz, E. "Les héros de la Grèce moderne; Marc Botzaris," Revue des Deux Mondes, XXI, no. 3 (June 15, 1859), 833-866.

Botzaris was a Greek exile in the Septinsular Republic.

Yemeniz, E. "Les héros de la Grèce moderne; Photos Tsavellas," Revue des Deux Mondes, XX, no. 2 (April 15, 1859), 824-855.

Tsavellas, the last ruler of Louli, was an officer in a regiment raised in the Ionian Islands by Russia.

Zonin, Aleksandr. Fëdor Fëdorovich Ushakov. Moscow: 'Molodaia Gvardiia', 1944. 88 pp.

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