

**MERELY A REFLECTION, OR MEDIA MANIPULATION:
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF MILWAUKEE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION,
1965-1976**

by

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In Nashville, Tenn., an unusually persistent Negro reporter questioned a Negro boy. When the reporter asked, "What would you like to do when you grow up?" the reply came promptly: "I'd like to punch you in the nose."

-- Robert F. Campbell, "Desegregation and the Press."

Vice Chairman Horn: Mr. Bingham, I noticed you visited with the publishers in Boston to get some advice, you prepared guidelines on how to cover desegregation. I wonder if another publisher from another city about to undergo a court order similar to what Louisville underwent came to you for advice, could you succinctly give me an idea of what you would tell him? How should he or she cover desegregation?

Mr. Bingham: Avoid it if possible.

-- US Commission on Civil Rights, *Hearing Held in Louisville, Ky.*

Introduction

In a 1958 article for *Nieman Reports*, Robert F. Campbell wrote that when covering school desegregation, newspapers should strive to meet two obligations: "(1) to report the news fully and (2) to avoid stimulating community passions and possible violence by what was published in the news and editorial pages."¹ Campbell's two-fold philosophy was easier articulated than accomplished. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, national and local newspapers covered an increasing number of racial disturbances, civil rights demonstrations, and school desegregation efforts. Simultaneously, gradual changes occurred in the ways in which newspapers attempted to cover these stories. Critics constantly accused reporters of providing crisis-oriented stories without context; a commission established by President Lyndon Johnson in 1968 characteristically accused the press of failing "to report adequately on race relations and ghetto problems."² As some newspapers struggled to provide additional context and perspective within their stories, the media came under increasing fire for contributing to the problem instead of reporting it.

Paralleling changes in the fields of civil rights and press coverage of them was Milwaukee's own laborious road to school desegregation, which eventually numbered fifteen years (1961-1976) from start to finish. This study analyzes coverage by the two major daily newspapers -- as well as two black weekly papers -- at two critical junctures in Milwaukee's school desegregation movement. First, it evaluates coverage during school boycotts in October of 1965; second, it studies coverage of the January 1976 court ruling which finally ordered school

¹ Robert F. Campbell, "Desegregation and the Press," *Nieman Reports* 12 (April 1958), 8.

² Kerner Commission, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: EP Dutton, 1968), 382.

desegregation in Milwaukee to begin. The study will answer two questions concerning to 1965 and 1976 coverage. First, did the two major daily newspapers in Milwaukee meet the standards Robert Campbell had set in 1958 -- to report news fully and avoid stimulating community passions? Second, how did changes in nationwide standards for newspaper coverage of race issues affect Milwaukee's coverage, if at all -- noting particularly conclusions reached by the Kerner Commission.

The answers to both questions, like Robert Campbell's questions themselves, are complicated. Both 1965 and 1976 coverage directed extensive attention to school desegregation efforts, and both papers supported the fight against racial imbalance in Milwaukee's schools. Additionally, the *Milwaukee Journal* and the *Milwaukee Sentinel* in 1976 did reflect greater awareness of context and perspective in their editorials and reporting. Nevertheless, a host of problems remained evident: by ignoring or dismissing key issues in school desegregation and sensationalizing others, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* may have harmed the very cause they claimed they supported. Ultimately, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* may have had the power to encourage and speed the desegregation of Milwaukee's schools -- a power they abdicated in both 1965 and 1976.

School Desegregation, 1954-1965

Although the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. the Board of Education* in 1954 decreed that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place"³ and *Brown II* in 1955 declared that southern schools must make a "prompt and reasonable start" toward desegregation,⁴ desegregation of America's southern schools did not follow promptly and

³ George Metcalf, *From Little Rock to Boston: The History of School Desegregation* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 48.

reasonably. From the date of the *Brown* decision to 1964, schools in the South advanced little toward desegregation. Even though the Supreme Court officially outlawed segregation, the doctrine of "all deliberate speed" espoused in *Brown II* left individual school districts room to maneuver. Some staggered toward integration slowly, but most avoided any implementation of the Supreme Court's ruling. The executive branch's lack of support for *Brown* and *Brown II* reinforced district evasion; a recalcitrant President Eisenhower "neglected to accept the *Brown* decision or call for its implementation."⁵

In some districts where administrators did push school integration ahead, policies met with massive resistance. The 1957 enrollment of nine black⁶ students at Little Rock Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, brought such resistance to national attention. Arkansas's Governor Orval Faubus refused to protect the black students' entry into the high school; President Eisenhower reluctantly discharged federal troops to Little Rock not as an endorsement of integration but as a fulfillment of his "constitutional duty."⁷ Little Rock's example prompted other southern school districts to avoid integration efforts at all costs.

Rather than face racial confrontation and national condemnation, many districts employed "freedom of choice" programs which *allowed* black students to enroll in white schools. Community pressures, of course, severely circumscribed such "choice."⁸ Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, "freedom of choice" programs and district evasion contributed to little progress in desegregation; by the 1962-1963 school year, 99 out of 100 southern black children

⁵ Ibid, 3.

⁶ Historical sources throughout my research employed a number of terms -- including Negro, colored, and African-American -- when describing black citizens. In an effort to maintain consistency, I will utilize the term "black." If another term is used within a quotation, I have preserved the integrity of the original source.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Gary Orfield, *Public School Desegregation in the United States, 1968-1980* (US: Joint Center for Political Studies, Inc., 1983), 1.

still attended all black schools.⁹ Civil rights leaders grew increasingly frustrated at the pace of change; in the early 1960s a wave of demonstrations swept the South,¹⁰ putting pressure on the federal government to act where state governments did nothing. The protesters and demonstrators frequently found that their efforts brought change: "as a direct result of these protests, more actual desegregation of public accommodations took place [from 1960-1962] than in the previous two decades."¹¹ Although ten years after the *Brown* decision little school desegregation had been accomplished, by 1964 the tide began to turn in the South.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, passed by Congress in 1964, "empowered the federal government to cut off federal funds to districts . . . guilty of racial discrimination." Coupled with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (which allocated federal funds to elementary and secondary schools), Title VI allowed the Health, Education and Welfare Department (HEW) to begin active punishment of school systems which had not yet begun to desegregate.¹² Although riddled with internal divisiveness and political pressures, HEW began in fits and starts to wield Title VI as a weapon and threaten southern schools with the loss of federal funding if they refused to desegregate.¹³ As southern schools began implementing measures to desegregate schools, however, they loudly protested the de facto segregation¹⁴ that they alleged

⁹ Gary Orfield, "Why it Worked in Dixie: Southern School Desegregation and Its Implications for the North," in *Race and Schooling in the City*, eds. Adam Yarmolinsky, Lance Liebman, and Corinne S. Schelling. (MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 25.

¹⁰ Sit-ins in southern cities began in 1957, and between 1957 and 1960 "southern towns experienced sixteen sit-ins." Freedom rides began in May of 1961, and demonstrations followed in Birmingham, Alabama, Jackson, Mississippi, and Montgomery, Alabama. On August 28, 1963, over 250,000 people joined the March on Washington. See Robert Weisbrot, *Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights Movement* (NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990).

¹¹ James H. Laue, *Direct Action and Desegregation, 1960-1962* (NY: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1989), 2.

¹² Diane Ravitch, "The Evolution of School Desegregation Policy, 1964-1979," in *Race and Schooling in the City*, eds. Adam Yarmolinsky, Lance Liebman, and Corinne S. Schelling, (MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 11.

¹³ Metcalf, 6. Ironically, the very funding most schools would lose included programs like Head Start, designed to aid minority populations.

¹⁴ The Supreme Court outlawed de jure segregation, or segregation by law, in its 1954 *Brown* decision. De

persisted in northern cities. In 1963, Turner Catledge of *The New York Times* argued that "'We've had open season on the South here now for some time, and it seems to me that, especially when you read the editorial pages in the North, some people are too concerned about what's going on somewhere else and too little concerned about what's going on right at their own door.'"¹⁵

Catledge's assertion proved prescient; in the mid 1960s, buoyed by the progress finally being made in southern schools, critics of school segregation -- especially the NAACP -- turned North.

As school desegregation marched North and West in the 1960s, however, it faced a radically different situation than it did in the South of the 1950s. Massive black migration to northern cities (including Detroit, Chicago, Boston and Milwaukee) triggered a white, middle-class exodus to the expanding suburbs. Most of the black population was concentrated in the "central core" of the cities, and closed housing choices in inner cities and growing suburbs made de facto segregation a rigid reality. Often such divisions were due to economic conditions: "blacks seeking lucrative jobs in the North soon discovered that migration did not change the basic facts of American race relations, even in the 'free market.'"¹⁶ While many southern neighborhoods were legally segregated within schools but sometimes integrated outside of them, housing patterns in the North often led to racial segregation in all areas.

Added to the demographic differences between North and South, splits in the civil rights movement and urban unrest made many northern whites *and* blacks wary of integration plans. By the mid-1960s, "the mass saintliness that had sustained the nonviolent revolution was at last giving way to more common if less admirable human responses -- frustration, blind rage and,

facto segregation, or segregation arising from other factors -- mainly housing patterns -- and not prescribed by law, was more nebulous and more prevalent in northern cities.

¹⁵ Quoted in Robert K. Baker and Sandra J. Ball, eds., *Mass Media and Violence (Volume IX): A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Preventions of Violence* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 52.

¹⁶ Weisbrot, 155.

perhaps inevitably, racial hate."¹⁷ This frustration culminated in the summer of 1965, when it took 14,000 national guardsmen and thousands of local police six days to quell the rioting in Watts.¹⁸ The violence caused \$45 million in damage and precipitated waves of rioting in urban areas across the country; many civil disorders took place in northern cities where de facto segregation was most prevalent. Frustration with many of the unmet goals of the civil rights movements also ushered in a rise of militant black separatists, including Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam, which posed a more radical threat to many school and political leaders. It was within this context in the early 1960s that Milwaukee took its first steps toward school desegregation.

The Press, Race, and School Desegregation, 1954-1965

The *Brown* decision and the events that followed in the 1950s didn't just bring a crisis to America's schools; they also brought a crisis to America's newsrooms. Reporters flocked to small southern towns, focusing national and international attention on local problems. Many northern reporters and papers lashed out at southern "defiance," with no reference to race problems in the North. A pious *Milwaukee Journal* claimed in 1957 "the mob scene outside Central on September 23 [was] a 'national disgrace,'" and defended the President's decision to send in federal troops.¹⁹ Northern reporters were often harassed by southerners, who "frequently complained that northerners simply could not understand southern life and customs, especially in race relations."²⁰ Many reporters from the North, safe in de facto segregation practices, underplayed northern race problems and focused extensively -- if not exclusively -- on crises in the South.²¹

¹⁷ Weisbrot, 186.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 160.

¹⁹ as quoted in Deborah Kades, "Covering the Second Fort Sumter: Newspapers and the Little Rock Crisis" (Master's Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1992), 49.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 56.

The *Jackson Daily News* astutely argued that "northerners were just as concerned with keeping their schools segregated, which they did by gerrymandering school boundaries."²²

For all of the frustration they directed at northern integrationists, southern newspapers -- somewhat surprisingly -- did not assert a universally segregationist stance. Studies of southern coverage found that although the Southern press was "inattentive" to the story, it was also almost "evenly divided" between pro-and anti-segregation sentiments and completed a "reasonably responsible job."²³ One study of Tennessee editorial reaction found that press response was diverse and even "urged honest efforts at compliance" with school desegregation efforts; in fact, "only two [newspapers] had forthrightly encouraged defiance."²⁴

Although southern newspapers advanced a more even-handed perspective regarding school desegregation than expected, they still incurred a variety of criticism. Perhaps most disturbing, some publishers and editors accused reporters of becoming part of the story they were covering -- or *creating* the story they were covering. In Nashville, "the superintendent of schools . . . blamed the *Nashville Banner* in part for the violence accompanying desegregation there . . . he said . . . [the reporters] aided and abetted in developing a spirit of rebellion."²⁵ Although radio and television crews bore the most criticism for "egging on" student and adult conflict, newspaper reporters also took the heat. Little Rock proved particularly controversial; there ". . . both Negro and white reporters were attacked by roughnecks who resented their presence," and after the

²² *Ibid.*, 57.

²³ Roy Carter, "Segregation and the News: A Regional Content Study," *Journalism Quarterly* 34 (Winter 1957): 3-18, and "Racial Identification Effects upon the News Story Writer," *Journalism Quarterly* 40 (Summer 1959): 284-290.

²⁴ Hugh Davis Graham, *Crisis in Print: Desegregation and the Press in Tennessee* (Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), 59.

²⁵ Robert F. Campbell, "Desegregation and the Press," *Nieman Reports* 12 (April 1958): 8.

controversy ended, "five reporters . . . agreed in a panel discussion . . . that the press broke journalistic rules and traditions in Little Rock."²⁶

Later evaluations of 1950s desegregation coverage also criticized newspapers for not providing a larger context for the desegregation crisis. Reporters generally covered events and outbreaks from day to day. Although most readers accepted and even expected event-oriented stories, coverage of desegregation as an individual event was not entirely accurate; "the school crisis was big news, while the underlying social struggle . . . was largely ignored."²⁷ While hundreds of reporters converged on southern towns, few gave readers the background of school desegregation which put the "crisis" in context. They directed little attention to the years of segregation in the schools, the effects such segregation had both on black and white children, or the failure of the Eisenhower administration to "pave the way for the sweeping social change the Court required."²⁸ Instead, writers presented the who, what, and when without the why. Such reporting performed a disservice to the public, critics argued, by failing to provide a bigger picture. Without the practice of "perspective and continuity"²⁹ in journalism, such "crises" would continue to recur.

With the advent of civil rights protests and urban rioting in the 1960s, the "crises" did just that -- and, of course, reporters continued to cover them. In some newspapers, coverage of black protest increased over 300% from the 1950s to the 1960s, but coverage of the underlying *causes* of protest increased only negligibly.³⁰ In fact, coverage of the protests on a day to day basis,

²⁶ Ibid, 9.

²⁷ Kades, 42.

²⁸ Harry Ashmore, "The Story Behind Little Rock: Was Its Meaning Lost In Reporting Its Drama?" *Nieman Reports* 12 (April 1958): 5.

²⁹ Ibid, 7.

³⁰ Carolyn Martindale, "Selected Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Black Protest," *Journalism Quarterly* 66 (Winter 1989): 920.

similar to that practiced in school desegregation coverage, "focused on facts and events and presented the civil rights movement as an unfolding drama to be chronicled, rather than a manifestation of a severe societal maladjustment."³¹ In addition to portraying such events as individual disturbances rather than as part of a larger pattern, such coverage often "frighten[ed] and alienat[ed] white readers, reinforcing the beliefs of those who believ[ed] the protesters [were] criminals."³² As protests against school segregation increased in Milwaukee, it remained to be seen if that city's local papers would contribute to such crisis-oriented coverage or provide sorely needed context to its readers.

School Desegregation in Milwaukee, 1954-1965

In many ways, Milwaukee in the early 1960s represented a typical northern city; strong ethnic and working class roots prevailed among local businessmen and politicians, and the city remained socially conservative.³³ The "comfortable complacency"³⁴ apparent on a surface glance at Milwaukee, however, masked a myriad of rapid demographic changes. After World War II, migration from southern cities and Chicago caused Milwaukee's black population to increase dramatically. In 1950, blacks accounted for 3% of Milwaukee's population; by 1960, that percentage almost tripled to 8.4%.³⁵ As the black population rose, the racial makeup of Milwaukee's schools also changed. The policy of assigning children to schools within their neighborhoods, long a Milwaukee tradition, increasingly resulted in racial segregation. Although small groups began to protest the growing segregation within schools, "the Milwaukee school

³¹ Ibid, 923.

³² Ibid, 924.

³³ Peter K. Eisinger, *Patterns of Interracial Politics: Conflict and Cooperation* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 41.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid, 42.

board and administration were essentially unprepared . . . slow in their recognition of the problem and slower still to mount effective responses."³⁶

While school officials lagged in acknowledging segregation as a problem, local politicians evidenced greater awareness -- if not a greater inclination to change. A 1960 report commissioned by outgoing Mayor Frank Zeidler, "pointed to segregation so rigid as to make Milwaukee one of the most racially divided cities in the US. It cited serious problems in the black community: above-average unemployment and underemployment, inadequate housing, high crime rates, substandard schools, lack of programs for youth and deterioration of police-community relations."³⁷ Mayor Henry Maier, elected to his first term in 1960, recognized the increasing problem of racial segregation; rather than take a progressive stance, however, Maier opposed open housing and blamed the "lily white suburbs" for "walling off" the inner city.³⁸ Together, Maier and the school board initiated little progress in civil rights in Milwaukee. The school board, overwhelmingly composed of members who "identified with the blue-collar and white-ethnic character of the city,"³⁹ was "disinclined to cooperate with black leaders and often interpreted civil rights demands as an attack on their power."⁴⁰ Within this inauspicious atmosphere Lloyd Barbee, a black attorney and President of the state NAACP conference, first raised the issue of school desegregation in Milwaukee in 1961.

³⁶ James G. Cibulka and Frederick I. Olson, "The Organization and Politics of the Milwaukee Public School System, 1920-1986," in *Seeds of Crisis: Public Schooling in Milwaukee Since 1920*, eds. John Rury and Frank A. Cassell (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 89.

³⁷ Genevieve Caspari, "Media at the Inflection Point: Coverage of Racial Conflict in Milwaukee in 1967" (Master's Thesis, Marquette University, 1982), 8.

³⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 14 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

³⁹ Cibulka, 91.

⁴⁰ Eisinger, 61. The school board was not the only group reluctant to tackle the issue of race relations in Milwaukee. The "business and civic elite," according to Cibulka and Olson, "was content to view urban progress in terms of a brick and mortar agenda." (Cibulka, 91) MUSIC's protests were designed to encourage action among these groups -- and increased pressure to act on the school board.

Twenty years after his initial efforts to prompt school desegregation, Lloyd Barbee remembered the initial stages: "I guess the effort started in terms of some objective activity in January of 1961 . . . it was my first year as President of the state NAACP conference . . . it seemed quite obvious that the Milwaukee school system had begun to shortchange blacks in a very . . . ingenious way in the beginning, and then it became more blatant, and I asked the President of the Milwaukee branch (of the NAACP) to study the situation. We made a study of the school system in Milwaukee and presented it to the school board in 1963."⁴¹ Although the school board created a Special Committee on the Equality of Educational Opportunity in the fall of 1963, the committee progressed little. The school board neglected to respond to Barbee " . . . and effectively denied Barbee's request by placing it in the file."⁴² In 1964, a number of civil rights groups in Milwaukee organized the Milwaukee United School Integration Committee (MUSIC) and elected Barbee chairman. Shortly thereafter, MUSIC began a series of demonstrations and protests to draw public attention to the school board's intransigence. Don Sykes, director of the Milwaukee Social Development Commission, recalled his perspective in the early 1960s: "I think when I look back on the period one of the things I see was a people struggling for a voice and an opportunity to be heard about their concerns and their lives."⁴³

On February 1, 1964, MUSIC facilitated a demonstration against de facto segregation at a meeting of the school board. In March of that same year, MUSIC organized and scheduled a public school boycott for May 18, with a number of smaller protests scheduled prior to the boycott. Responding to growing debate about the issue, Mayor Maier wrote to school board

⁴¹ Chuck Taylor, "Decade of Discontent, 1960-1970."

⁴² Michael Stolee, "The Milwaukee Desegregation Case, in *Seeds of Crisis: Public Schooling in Milwaukee Since 1920*, eds. John Rury and Frank A. Cassell (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 239.

⁴³ Taylor.

president John Foley and offered to mediate between MUSIC and the school board. On May 15, 1964, the school board rejected the mayor's offer by a vote of 9 to 6.⁴⁴ On May 18, 1964, over 10,000 students boycotted school to protest de facto segregation and the board's refusal to take action.⁴⁵

Throughout late 1964 and early 1965, MUSIC and the school board remained at a stalemate. In May of 1965, demonstrations began again and local police arrested Barbee for forcibly blocking buses involved in the intact busing program.⁴⁶ Many Milwaukeeans opposed the boycotts and throughout May and June of 1965, their reaction remained "anything but sympathetic."⁴⁷

Coupled with protests and demonstrations, Barbee and the NAACP worked on legal routes to desegregation. On June 18, 1965, Barbee filed a federal suit against the Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee on behalf of Craig Amos, a Milwaukee public school student, and Jeffrey Amos, his father. The suit alleged that the school board "was consciously maintaining all white . . . and all black schools, and in the process providing unequal educational opportunities for black students," and Barbee "sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the actions of the Board."⁴⁸ Barbee's suit focused on three main issues: the maintenance of a neighborhood school policy -- established in 1919 -- in the face of growing segregation in schools; the continuation of intact busing, which moved whole classes (usually black) from overcrowded

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ The school board and MUSIC disputed the actual number of students boycotting; MUSIC claimed 16,000, while the school board relied on a more conservative estimate of 11,000.

⁴⁶ Taylor.

⁴⁷ Stolee, 2442.

⁴⁸ Howard Fuller, "The Impact of the Milwaukee Public School System's Desegregation Plan on Black Students and the Black Community" (PhD Dissertation: Marquette University, 1985), 6.

schools to less crowded schools (usually white) without any integration of students; and the segregation of teachers -- with black teachers almost always working in majority-black schools.⁴⁹

Plans for a second school boycott in the fall of 1965 began shortly after Barbee filed the federal lawsuit in June. Barbee and MUSIC coordinated plans for students to boycott their regular schools and attend one of over thirty "freedom schools," many headquartered in local churches, which would focus on topics including black history and the quest for freedom. On September 18, 1965, MUSIC announced that the boycott would begin on October 18, 1965. A number of key groups pledged support for the boycott, including CORE, the NAACP, student groups at Marquette University, and the Milwaukee chapter of Americans for Democratic Action; by early October, "it appeared that the base of support for change in the schools was growing."⁵⁰ Some civic leaders, including Mayor Henry Maier, continued to oppose the boycott and expressed great relief when We-Milwaukeeans -- an interracial group composed of leading Milwaukee citizens -- proposed an extensive school study on October 8, 1968. Responding to Maier's requests to call off the boycott, MUSIC's leaders retorted that the boycott would proceed until the school board illustrated its preparation to take "immediate action" on school desegregation. Although Roman Atkielski, auxiliary bishop of the Milwaukee archdiocese, forbade participation by Catholic schools, priests, and nuns in boycott efforts -- thus reducing the outside help in freedom school efforts -- the boycott began, as planned, on Monday, October 18, 1965 and continued through Thursday, October 21, 1965.

⁴⁹ Stolee, 233-234.

⁵⁰ Stolee, 239.

Press Coverage of School Desegregation in Milwaukee, 1965

In charge of covering the ongoing battles regarding school desegregation were two main local newspapers. The *Milwaukee Journal*, an afternoon daily with a daily circulation of approximately 362,013 and a Sunday circulation of approximately 546,595 in 1965, was a locally owned and nationally respected newspaper. A 1960 poll of daily editors ranked the *Journal* third on their list of the ten best papers nationally; "in similar polls in 1961, 311 publishers voted the *Journal* fourth place among all dailies, and 125 deans and professors of journalism ranked it fifth."⁵¹ The other local daily, the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, was a Hearst-owned newspaper until 1962, when Hearst sold to the Journal Company. In 1965, the *Sentinel* had a daily circulation of approximately 163,783⁵² (the Journal Company discontinued the *Sentinel's* Sunday edition in 1962). While the Journal Company owned both papers, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* did not always share editorial perspectives. In fact, "the new *Sentinel's* editorial policy was often diametrically opposed to that of the *Journal*, with the morning paper taking a conservative stance . . . [editor-publisher Irwin] Maier [no relation to Mayor Henry Maier] insisted that the two papers should have independent editorial viewpoints."⁵³

While journalists, editors, and publishers lauded the *Journal* in the early 1960s for providing "continuity of purpose . . . in raising social, cultural and political standards in its community,"⁵⁴ the fight for school desegregation brought a new challenge to the *Journal's* and *Sentinel's* offices. Both newspapers "had predominantly white owners, readers, editors and reporters"⁵⁵; the first black reporter arrived at the *Journal's* city desk in 1964 (he had been hired

⁵¹ Will C. Conrad, Kathleen D. Wilson, and Dale Wilson, *The Milwaukee Journal: The First Eighty Years* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 193.

⁵² N. W. Ayers and Son's *Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals* (1965), 632.

⁵³ Robert K. Wells, *The Milwaukee Journal: An Informal Chronicle of its First 100 Years* (1981), 406.

⁵⁴ Conrad.

⁵⁵ Caspari, 2.

as a copy reader in 1963).⁵⁶ It remained to be seen how the *Journal* and *Sentinel* would cover the loaded and potentially divisive issues which arose in 1963 -- and if the two dailies would meet the standards set by Robert Campbell years earlier.

In their coverage of school desegregation efforts in October of 1965, both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* advanced beyond southern newspaper coverage of the 1950s. Critics accused some southern reporters of contributing to or even creating the stories they were covering; the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*, however, remained outside observers of the boycott and events surrounding it. While they did not become a part of the story, however, neither did they ignore it; each paper devoted considerable space and resources to the boycott and events preceding it. The *Sentinel*, in particular, provided extensive coverage of the boycott and surrounding protests; on October 19, the *Sentinel* ran a total of nine articles about the boycott (compared to the *Journal's* two articles on October 18 and three on October 19). By covering events thoroughly, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* ensured that those Milwaukeeans who read a daily newspaper were at least well informed about -- if not persuaded by -- MUSIC's protests.

Additionally, each paper made a concerted effort to provide a larger context for the boycott by tackling the issue of de facto segregation within its pages. Prior to the boycott, the *Journal* ran a ten part series on de facto segregation titled "Reading, Writing and Race." In the series, reporter Charles Friederich addressed many of the issues raised in Lloyd Barbee's suit against the school board. The articles included a lengthy discussion of the process of intact busing, teacher segregation, accusations against the intractable school board, and compensatory programs recently instituted by the board.⁵⁷ Similarly, the *Sentinel* in its coverage of the boycott

⁵⁶ Wells, 415.

⁵⁷ The compensatory programs, instituted by the board in the early 1960s, provided "special services" to those students -- mainly in the inner core -- who were "culturally deprived."

consistently included references to the de facto segregation present in Milwaukee's schools and the complaints which caused the boycott itself.

The *Journal* and the *Sentinel*, although newspapers mostly owned and read by white residents, did elicit some black perspective on the status of de facto segregation and the boycott. Both papers gave extensive attention to Lloyd Barbee, chairman of MUSIC, and his allegations against the school board. In his "Reading, Writing and Race" series, Friederich included commentary from Barbee, some teachers and principals in Milwaukee's majority black schools, and Cornelius Golightly (the only black member of the school board). During its boycott coverage, the *Sentinel* gave equal attention to scenes from the office of the superintendent and MUSIC headquarters, thus providing readers with perspectives from opposing factions. Additionally, the *Sentinel* sent reporters into "freedom schools" and reported on student reactions to de facto segregation and the boycott itself. The *Sentinel* frequently provided readers with scenes and perspectives that fell outside of -- and sometimes countered -- "official" sources and stories.

Finally, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* illustrated some support for school desegregation in their editorials and commentaries, although both geared that support toward the legal efforts proffered by MUSIC and Barbee. Both papers acknowledged that the school board was slowing necessary efforts; in an October 12 editorial, the *Sentinel* argued that "it is not unfair to point out that much of the responsibility for the present impasse over alleged de facto segregation must be laid at the step of the school board."⁵⁸ Similarly, the *Journal* commented in a September 18 editorial that the school board "continues to avoid the complex problem of racial imbalance in the

⁵⁸ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 25 October 1965, pt. 1, 10.

schools . . . [it] has all but abdicated its responsibility on the racial question."⁵⁹ Both dailies expressed relief when We-Milwaukeeans proposed an extensive study of Milwaukee schools. Neither paper ignored the reality of racial imbalance in Milwaukee's schools; they each supported "constructive action" to end the problem, whether originating in "federal courts . . . or the office of education in Washington . . . or perhaps the special education committee of We-Milwaukeeans."⁶⁰

While the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* clearly advanced coverage from that of southern newspapers in the 1950s, however, some problems remained. Each paper acknowledged the problems of racial imbalance in Milwaukee's schools, but the dailies -- especially the *Journal* -- often minimized the problems of de facto segregation by relying heavily on the perspective of the school board. Headlines in Charles Friederich's "Reading, Writing and Race" series reflected this reliance and seemed to imply that problems within majority-black schools were not as drastic as MUSIC and other groups contended: "Exteriors Reflect Age, but Many Negro Area Schools are Modern Inside"⁶¹; "New Negro Area Teachers Come and Go, Many Older Ones Remain"⁶²; "Failure to Take Dramatic Steps for Integration Here Stirs Protests"⁶³; "Transported Pupils Suffer Psychologically, Negroes Complain"⁶⁴; "School Board Members Branded Color Blind -- They Like That Label"⁶⁵; "Schools Give Special Help to Pupils Who Have Lacked Advantages"⁶⁶; "Some on School Board Feel They Reflect Community's View."⁶⁷

⁵⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 18 September 1965, pt. 1, 12.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 7 September 1965, pt. 1, 1.

⁶² *Milwaukee Journal*, 8 September 1965, pt. 1, 1.

⁶³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 10 September 1965, pt. 1, 8.

⁶⁴ *Milwaukee Journal*, 12 September 1965, pt. 1, 29.

⁶⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 13 September 1965, pt. 1, 16.

⁶⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 15 September 1965, pt. 3, 1.

⁶⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 16 September 1965, pt. 2, 6.

In addition to headlines, stories seemed to reinforce the board perspective on three key issues in the desegregation suit: intact busing, teacher segregation, and compensatory education. In an article on intact busing, Friederich granted extensive space and attention to the school board's rationale for the program, including a standard description of how busing worked and elaborate reasons for keeping classes self-contained. Civil rights leaders, characterized in the first paragraph of the article as "always eager for issues to dramatize Negro problems,"⁶⁸ received a few short paragraphs of attention. On the second page of the article, Friederich asserted that Lloyd Barbee -- representative of civil rights leaders -- "charged several months ago that Milwaukee was the only city that segregated transported classes. Subsequently, a *Milwaukee Journal* survey showed that Cincinnati did not integrate classes transported for less than one year."⁶⁹ The final segment of the article, subtitled "Classes Less Advanced," quoted a principal's aide at a black school as saying "probably the most important barrier to integrating transported Negro classes was that the Negro class was likely to be less advanced than the comparable class in the white host school."⁷⁰ Although Friederich then quoted Superintendent Harold S. Vincent as replying "that has not been a factor in our thinking,"⁷¹ the information presented suggested that race was a legitimate factor; integrating classes would force teachers to "concentrate on bringing up the lower level or to carry on with the advanced group and leave the others floundering."⁷² Additionally, this was a factor acknowledged by black members of the school system.

Similarly, articles on teacher segregation and compensatory education presented a perspective heavily weighted by school board opinion. In "New Negro Area Teachers Come and

⁶⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 12 September 1965, pt. 1, 29.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *Ibid.*

Go, Many Older Ones Remain," Friederich began the article by stating that "top school officials maintain that the quality of Milwaukee's teachers is excellent, and that teachers in the city's Negro areas are as good as those elsewhere."⁷³ The remainder of the article reinforced the lead; rather than questioning whether teacher segregation benefited students, those quoted seemed to agree that everyone was "more comfortable" with such a situation. A black teacher asserted that "inexperienced white teachers assigned to Negro area schools soon wanted out . . . most Negro teachers, however, did not object to remaining in a school with a large Negro enrollment, she said."⁷⁴ A white teacher interviewed for the article agreed that "the contact of the Negro teacher with the Negro student in most cases is far superior. I think it goes back to slavery and preslavery days, and the history since."⁷⁵ While at the end of the article Friederich argued that "there is evidence to support the observation of many inner core teachers that teacher turnover there is greater, and experience and training of teachers smaller,"⁷⁶ the rest of the article seemed designed to support the school board's assertion that teacher segregation, contrary to civil rights leaders' contentions, was not a problem in Milwaukee's schools.

Friederich described compensatory education, discussed in the ninth article of the series, as "a million dollar a year assortment of special courses and services."⁷⁷ The programs, which included orientation and after school reading centers, vocational and educational guidance service, and a pilot program called "Project Destiny," were discussed at length in the article as aiding those students who might otherwise fall behind. Although many civil rights groups, including MUSIC, believed that compensatory education was a temporary band-aid which masked the need

⁷³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 8 September 1965, pt. 1, 1.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 15 September 1965, pt. 3, 1.

for greater change in the schools, Friederich quoted no opponents to compensatory education in the article. Instead, the story consistently praised the services for rehabilitating students and lowering the pupil-teacher ratio in many local black schools.

Finally, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* minimized the problems of de facto segregation by focusing exclusively on Milwaukee's schools while ignoring advances made in other cities. While the Supreme Court didn't tackle de facto segregation until a 1973 decision,⁷⁸ other northern cities were rapidly becoming aware of the problem and some struggled to implement remedies. A 1965 NAACP report maintained that "13 school systems in the North and West took steps during [1964] to achieve greater desegregation in their schools."⁷⁹ Milwaukee, clearly, was not one of them. In many cities, school boards eliminated practices of intact busing and teacher segregation. The *Journal* acknowledged that "New York City has begun assigning Negroes to white schools, and vice versa . . . Massachusetts has declared racially imbalanced schools to be contrary to public policy."⁸⁰ Yet both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* largely ignored precedents set in other cities that would eventually trickle to Milwaukee. By indicating that de facto segregation was a problem which a majority of northern cities was working to alleviate, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* could have more effectively prepared readers for the upcoming battles over school desegregation in Milwaukee.

A useful contrast to the *Journal* and *Sentinel's* homogeneous perspective can be found in Milwaukee's black press. In 1965, two weekly newspapers with "predominantly black

⁷⁸ In *Keyes v. School District No. 1*, Denver, Colorado, the Supreme Court ruled that although the schools were not segregated by law, the school board had contributed to racial imbalance and "finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system . . . creates a presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious." *Keyes v. School District No. 1*, as quoted in Stolee, 231.

⁷⁹ *Milwaukee Star*, 11 September 1965, pt. 1, 1.

⁸⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 10 September 1965, pt. 1, 18.

ownership, readership, and personnel" existed in the Milwaukee area.⁸¹ The *Milwaukee Star*, founded in 1961, had an estimated 1965 circulation of 20,000. The *Milwaukee Courier*, founded in 1964, had an estimated 1965 circulation of approximately 12,000⁸² Although the black press had a long history, dating back to *Freedom's Journal* (est. 1827), by the 1960s black newspapers were losing subscriptions despite the growing black population. Ironically, that which made the black press necessary may have also caused its downfall; "as civil rights became news, mainstream dailies and television began covering stories that had once been the exclusive property of the black press, introducing an unprecedented element of competition."⁸³ Such competition had concrete effects; by the 1960s "the tabloid *Star* and the full-size *Courier* were less frequent, fewer in pages and far lower in circulation than the general media. The black papers' production was inferior and their editorial quality inconsistent."⁸⁴ Furthermore, the black press served a much more specialized role in Milwaukee than that of the general media; the black press tempered the failure of the mainstream papers to "provide sufficient news of blacks and the black perspective on news."⁸⁵ While the black press maintained no pretense of objectivity, the *Courier* and the *Star* both proved valuable comparisons to the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* in 1965.

Not surprisingly, the black press provided greater black perspective and context for the upcoming school boycott. The papers printed articles on sociological studies of de facto segregation which concluded that both black *and* white students suffered as a result of racial imbalance. Additionally, the black weeklies provided greater detail and perspective on the issues of intact busing, teacher segregation, and compensatory education. While the *Journal* asserted

⁸¹ Caspari, 2.

⁸² *Ibid*, 4.

⁸³ Phyl Garland, "The Black Press: Down But Not Out," *Columba Journalism Review* 21 (September/October 1982): 45.

⁸⁴ Caspari, 26.

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 45.

that the intact busing policy was "unchanged in 13 years" and was a reasonable way to solve temporary overcrowding, the *Star* painted a remarkably different picture. In "A Diller, A Dollar, a Second-Rate Scholar," a two part series written by *Courier* and *Star* editor Walter Jones in response to the *Journal's* series on de facto segregation, Jones referred to an Urban League report on Milwaukee schools which stated that "the transfer of pupils from inner core schools because of overcrowded conditions was not a temporary solution, but a continuing policy dating back to 1958."⁸⁶ Although the *Journal* quoted Barbee as representative of civil rights groups in opposition to the busing, the *Star* quoted a number of teachers who staunchly opposed the procedure as well: "the other parents stood by the bus and stared as if we were animals in a zoo' ... 'in the winter, the children wait outside in the cold 15 or 20 minutes for the bus."⁸⁷

Similarly, the *Star* and *Courier* questioned the *Journal's* presentation of the issues of teacher segregation and compensatory education. While the *Star* agreed with a white teacher's assertion that "many white teachers have difficulty communicating adequately with Negro students,"⁸⁸ editor Jones attempted to shed some additional light on the reason for such a situation. He argued, "the *Journal* failed to point out the most likely reason -- segregated, unequal schools. The teachers were probably products of segregated education and were not able to cope adequately with the complexities of a multiracial society."⁸⁹ Although *Journal* reporter Friederich pointed to compensatory education as an extensive and rewarding program -- and the *Journal*, in a September 18 editorial, asserted that the "worthwhile" programs in compensatory education "have been greatly overlooked"⁹⁰ -- Jones again questioned such acceptance and reinforcement of

⁸⁶ *Milwaukee Star*, 16 October 1965, pt. 1, 7.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 8 September 1965, pt.1, 1.

⁸⁹ *Milwaukee Star*, 9 October 1965, pt. 1, 20.

⁹⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 18 September 1965, pt. 1, 12.

board policies. He contended that Friederich attempted "to give the Negro the impression that he is the recipient . . . of myriad compensatory benefactions from a great humanitarian school system . . . the article . . . did not note that segregated education still means inferior education for Negro children."⁹¹

While the *Star* and *Courier* cannot be used to provide an objective point of comparison with the *Journal* and *Sentinel*, they did illustrate the homogenous way in which the two major dailies portrayed the "black community." Consistently, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* referred to Lloyd Barbee as *the* representative of Milwaukee's black residents. They often reduced stories about the NAACP's or MUSIC's decisions and actions to portrayals of Barbee as the ultimate force behind such action. As one of the only -- and sometimes *the* only -- black source for *Journal* and *Sentinel* articles, Barbee often vaulted beyond the status of organization spokesperson to become the entire organization itself. Rather than expanding readers' perspectives, such heavy reliance on Barbee as a source may have had the opposite effect; it reduced the battle over de facto segregation to one existing between Barbee and the mayor, Barbee and the school board, and Barbee and the press.

Conversely, black weeklies elicited a wide variety of perspectives from the black community. Each week, the *Star* ran a series entitled "Parents Tell Why they Support School Boycott." Although clearly designed to sway undecided members of the black community, the articles nonetheless provided a greater variety of views than the *Journal's* and *Sentinel's* monolithic portrayal of black Milwaukeeans. The *Star* also ran a weekly series which interviewed local youth -- black and white -- about the state of Milwaukee's schools. While the *Sentinel* notably provided some different perspectives, the *Star* and the *Courier* offered a much more

⁹¹ *Milwaukee Star*, 16 October 1965, pt. 2, 9.

thorough and nuanced account. Their articles consistently included thoughts from local leaders like Barbee, national spokespersons from the NAACP, and students and parents in Milwaukee. If the *Journal* and *Sentinel* supported efforts to alleviate racial imbalance and yet through the summer of 1965 many readers remained "unsympathetic," the inclusion of additional perspective may have provided readers with a more thorough understanding.

Finally, the portrayal of black students by both papers, particularly the *Journal*, may have reinforced some readers' perspectives that black students and families, not segregated schools, were to blame for Milwaukee's problems. In the first article of the "Reading, Writing and Race" series, Charles Friederich described a "typical" black family according to a 1960 Milwaukee census: "Families are larger . . . the rate of broken families . . . is four times that of whites . . . per capita illegitimacy is almost six times as frequent as among Negroes . . . median adult education of Negroes is 9.1 years . . . 1.3 years less than whites."⁹² While Friederich's statistics were certainly accurate, a reader might reasonably have inferred that the *schools* in Milwaukee's black areas were not inferior -- the *students* were. That same reader might reach that same conclusion after reading Friederich's ninth article, which discussed "culturally deprived" students and asserted that these students, mostly from the inner core, "lack traditional middle class values such as thrift, respect for hard work and concern for education. They live in the present and fail to plan for the future."⁹³ Friederich pointed out that "all Negroes are not culturally deprived; all of the deprived are not Negroes." But he then cited a sociologist who claimed that "75% to 80% of Milwaukee's Negroes lacked middle-class status" and, presumably, also lacked the middle class values which Friederich previously described.⁹⁴

⁹² *Milwaukee Journal*, 5 September 1965, pt. 1, 14.

⁹³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 15 September 1965, pt. 3, 1.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Again, the black press provided a useful comparison. While *Star* and *Courier* editor Walter Jones agreed that such statistics were correct, he argued that Friederich could have taken his analysis further: "the *Journal* failed to note that, for the most part, these characteristics are a result of inferior education -- a problem that civil rights groups are trying to get corrected."⁹⁵ While such a conclusion was easier made by Jones than Friederich, a series on de facto segregation could be expected to tackle the *why* behind the statement that "teachers, principals and others feel that the pupil in the largely Negro school does not do as well in his studies as his counterpart in a white school."⁹⁶ Instead, much of the *Journal's* and *Sentinel's* coverage of de facto segregation seemed to reinforce the school board's perspective and rationale without providing a critical context.

Perhaps most troublesome about the *Journal* and *Sentinel* coverage of the 1965 school boycott, however, was how both papers dismissed protest as a catalyst to change. The *Journal* and *Sentinel* coverage illustrated misconceptions about protest as a tactic, its ultimate goals, and the critical role of the media. Sociologists and political scientists argue that protest is *not* the equivalent of violence, nor does it normally escalate to violence; protest and violence are, instead, "two forms of political expression which may be distinguished conceptually and empirically."⁹⁷ As generally defined, then, protest is "a form of collective expression, disruptive in nature, designed to provide its users both with access to decision makers and with bargaining leverage in negotiations with them."⁹⁸ Protest, which could include mass meetings, picketing, boycotts, or

⁹⁵ *Milwaukee Star*, 9 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

⁹⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 9 September 1965, pt. 1, 16.

⁹⁷ Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *American Political Science Review* 67 (March 1973), 12-13.

⁹⁸ Peter K. Eisinger, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974), 593.

voting reprisals,⁹⁹ is often used by "relatively powerless groups"¹⁰⁰ to increase bargaining leverage. Although the individuals within these groups may not be powerless,¹⁰¹ as a collective the group (often minority or low income in background) may lack the power to affect change through standard political channels. Instead, such groups use negative inducements, including but not limited to an underlying threat of violence, which "rely, for their effect, on sanctions which require *mass* action or response."¹⁰²

While groups who have achieved political success may find protest irrelevant or offensive, for many "relatively powerless groups" protest has remained an essential element of political participation. In black communities, protest has a long history, one reflected in and reinforced by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. As urban and rural political structures traditionally excluded blacks from the polls and other methods of political participation, protest became one of the few ways to incite political change; "developed as one of the few tactics available to them as slaves, organized protest was artfully used as a political and economic stratagem."¹⁰³ School boycotts grew prevalent in northern communities in the early 1920s and 1930s to protest conditions in all black schools. Although generally not successful of their own accord, boycotts achieved greater success when paired with legal action. Eventually, a pattern emerged which utilized "litigation and protest . . . as complementary modes of black political

⁹⁹ James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest: Problems of Negro Civic Action," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5:3 (September 1961), 293.

¹⁰⁰ Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review* 62 (December 1968), 1144.

¹⁰¹ Peter Eisinger argues that, contrary to previous research, his research indicates that protestors -- particularly in the white community -- tend to actually be of a higher social and economic status than non-protestors. Black protestors are more representative of the group as a whole, but nevertheless *individuals* within protesting groups are not "powerless." See Eisinger, 1974, 598-604.

¹⁰² Wilson, 292.

¹⁰³ Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989), 220.

activity."¹⁰⁴ While some participants during the civil rights movement called for the abdication of protest activity in favor of an exclusive focus on political action and litigation,¹⁰⁵ protest remained popular among many black constituents; in large part, this was due to historical precedent. While "the legal approach [was] too slow and too cautious . . . [and] attempts at negotiating and bargaining . . . were simply stalling tactics on the part of the adversary,"¹⁰⁶ protest often drew immediate attention to a cause.

In Milwaukee, particularly, protest had a strong history and support network in the black community. Milwaukee's political structure, long dominated by whites with strong ethnic ties, led a majority of blacks in a 1970 survey to agree with the statement that "demonstrating is *better* than voting in Milwaukee as an instrumental device."¹⁰⁷ The same survey, however, illustrated a racial divide regarding approval of protest tactics. While a majority of blacks felt that protest was based on instrumental or positive reasons, more whites believed that protest arose largely from negative reasons.¹⁰⁸ Thus, although many whites found protest a negative and/or ineffective political tactic, protest "[enjoyed] major and widespread support as an acceptable device for political self-expression among blacks" in Milwaukee.¹⁰⁹

While protest may be a more accepted tactic among blacks than whites, most recent research agrees that a key factor in protest success is media treatment. Protest is not a direct action against a target; instead, it "is a highly indirect process in which communications media and

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement," *Commentary* 39 (February 1965): 25-31.

¹⁰⁶ Charles V. Hamilton, "Blacks and the Crisis in Political Participation," *Public Interest* 34 (Winter 1974), 192.

¹⁰⁷ Eisinger, 1974, 595.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 594.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 596.

the reference publics of protest targets play critical roles."¹¹⁰ Protesting groups generally have little or no leverage to force change in their desired target, and a protest will not change that fact. Thus the key audience in any successful protest is not the target, but "reference publics." These are groups who may be undecided on an issue but, once persuaded by a protest, may pressure the target group to take action. Traditionally powerful within the community, such groups may rely on media portrayal of protest when evaluating an issue and deciding whether action is needed.

While mere attention to a protest is crucial, "there is no protest unless protest is perceived *and* justified."¹¹¹ Thus the *type* of coverage allocated to protest is equally critical. Publicity given to protesters must be such as to activate support for protesters' goals among an influential segment of the audience.¹¹² Through their coverage, media can either legitimize or delegitimize protesters' actions *and* the underlying causes of such actions. Thus there is a critical difference between "publicity" and "persuasion," and for a protest to succeed in catalyzing action it must have both.

While the attribution of great influence to the media upon the viewing and reading public has been largely dismissed, it is still generally agreed that the media have *some* effect on public perceptions. Although the media may traditionally reinforce stereotypes,¹¹³ evidence indicates that they may be "extremely effective in creating opinions on matters about which the audience is unlikely to have preexisting opinions."¹¹⁴ Thus for the powerful and yet potentially undecided reference publics in Milwaukee's desegregation debate such as civic groups and local businesses,

¹¹⁰Lipsky, 1146.

¹¹¹*Ibid*, 1151.

¹¹²David Garrow, *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1978), 218.

¹¹³Baker, 251.

¹¹⁴*Ibid*.

the *Journal* and *Sentinel*, while claiming to support legal routes to desegregation, may have inadvertently slowed efforts by continually dismissing and condemning protest efforts.

In their coverage of the October 1965 school boycotts, both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* strongly opposed MUSIC's efforts and heavily criticized boycott participants on their editorial pages. In three editorials, entitled "Boycott Solves Nothing,"¹¹⁵ "Unfortunate Boycott,"¹¹⁶ and "Boycott Solved Nothing,"¹¹⁷ the *Journal* continually reiterated its full opposition to the boycott. The protest was characterized as "a hopeless and reckless mission,"¹¹⁸ and editors accused boycott leaders of using children as pawns in the desegregation debate. Although the *Journal* acknowledged that "the harshest reality is the practically immovable school board majority,"¹¹⁹ it continued to argue that the boycott was "illegal and pointless."¹²⁰ Less vitriolic in its sentiments, the *Sentinel* concurred in five separate editorials that "no civil rights leader genuinely interested in quality education and in ending the blight of racial segregation would be justified in proceeding with the scheduled boycott."¹²¹ As the boycott proceeded, the *Sentinel* grew increasingly hostile in its proclamations against boycott leaders. While an October 15 editorial expressed hope that boycott leaders would abandon their cause and forsake "turmoil, hatred, and misunderstanding for reason and truth,"¹²² an October 20 editorial argued that the boycott was "an exercise in dramatics, with no relevance -- and substantial harm,"¹²³ and an October 22 editorial asserted that Americans were "surely bored with, if not repelled by, the

¹¹⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 18 September 1965, pt. 1, 12.

¹¹⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 16 October 1965, pt. 1, 14.

¹¹⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 22 October 1965, pt. 1, 20.

¹¹⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 18 September 1965, pt. 1, 12.

¹¹⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 16 October 1965, pt. 1, 14.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 12 October 1965, pt. 1, 10.

¹²² *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 15 October 1965, pt. 1, 14.

¹²³ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 October 1965, pt. 1, 12.

antics"¹²⁴ of protesters. Although the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* expressed support for legal routes to school desegregation, their constant opposition to the school boycott effectively thwarted whatever power MUSIC may have had in affecting such change. Rather than legitimizing the protest or at least acknowledging its unattractive necessity the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* delegitimized both the protest and its cause.

In the *Journal's* case, at least, this opposition presented itself in articles as well as editorials. Some researchers have illustrated an unstated pressure reporters may feel in following editorial policy;¹²⁵ such pressure seemed evident in a number of aspects of the *Journal's* coverage. The *Journal* gave attention to the boycott itself, but certainly did not extend itself past the "crisis coverage" exemplified by southern newspapers in the 1950s. Although the *Journal* attempted to give greater context to the issue of de facto segregation prior to the boycott, during the boycott itself little attention was given to underlying causes. Articles focused on the numbers of students missing from schools and controversies regarding Catholic participation in the boycott; mention of reasons for the protest were relegated to the end paragraph of an article, if mentioned at all. Additionally, headlines in the *Journal* implied support for the school board and the paper's editorial stance by presenting protesters in a uniformly negative light: "'Won't Be Coerced,' School Leader Says"¹²⁶; "Defy School Boycott, Letter Asks Parents"¹²⁷; "Catholic Priests Told Not to Join in Boycott"¹²⁸; "Priests and Nuns Barred From Joining in Boycott"¹²⁹; "Boycott of Schools

¹²⁴ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 22 October 1965, pt. 1, 14.

¹²⁵ In a 1955 article for *Social Forces*, Warren Breed argued that "the publisher's policy, when established in a given subject area, is usually followed, and that a description of the dynamic socio-cultural situation of the newsroom will suggest explanations for this conformity." See Warren Breed, "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis," *Social Forces* 33 (May 1955): 326-335.

¹²⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 29 September 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹²⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 14 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹²⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 15 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹²⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 16 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

Begins; DA Pledges Prosecutions"¹³⁰; "Barbee Denounced By Mayor"¹³¹; "Boycott Ends, Pupils Sent Back to School At Once."¹³² By portraying the boycott as a deviant means of political expression on its front and editorial pages, the *Journal* left little chance that key "reference publics" would be swayed to support the protest or its causes.

Ironically, while the *Sentinel* was generally considered the more conservative of the two newspapers, its boycott coverage did not present as monolithic a perspective as the *Journal*. As mentioned earlier, the *Sentinel* devoted much more extensive coverage to the boycott and its causes, even during the boycott itself. The *Sentinel* provided some stories that illustrated a more balanced view of the boycott, including "Vigil of Prayer Under Way to Dramatize School Boycott,"¹³³ "200 Teachers Say Race Imbalance Hurts Status,"¹³⁴ and "35 Freedom Schools Ready."¹³⁵ Additionally, headlines of stories in the *Sentinel* marked a decided contrast to headlines in the *Journal*. While the *Journal* heralded "Boycott of Schools Begins; DA Pledges Prosecutions," the *Sentinel* added that "Both Sides Pleased With Day's Results."¹³⁶ Rather than "Barbee Denounced By Mayor," the *Sentinel* stated "Mayor, Barbee Exchange Retorts."¹³⁷ Ultimately, the *Sentinel* provided more neutral and extensive coverage of the boycott than the *Journal*.

While the *Sentinel* provided more neutral coverage, however, neither paper provided the persuasion of publicity that protesters needed. This essential fact becomes more apparent upon examination of black weekly newspapers. The black press clearly supported the boycott of public

¹³⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 18 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹³¹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 20 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹³² *Milwaukee Journal*, 21 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹³³ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 16 October 1965, pt. 2, 1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 18 October 1965, pt. 2, 1.

¹³⁶ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 19 October 1965, pt. 1, 2.

¹³⁷ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 21 October 1965, pt. 1, 7.

schools and made every effort to persuade its readers to do the same. In their pursuit of this goal, however, Milwaukee's black press provided greater context to the boycott than either the *Journal* or the *Sentinel*. In a number of articles prior to the boycott, reporters focused on precedents set around the country and the national perspective on school desegregation, thus providing readers with a picture outside of Milwaukee's local boundaries. In "Milwaukee Unlisted in Report of Gains in Northern School Drive," the *Star* presented a variety of facts regarding other northern school districts. The article described achievements in school systems across the country, including those in Cleveland, St. Louis, Kansas City, Baltimore, Denver and St. Paul. The *Star* asserted that "Milwaukee is simply out of step with the nation."¹³⁸ Additionally, while Milwaukee's dailies, particularly the *Journal*, reluctantly provided any context during the boycott itself, the *Star* and *Courier* continued to link the boycott to its underlying causes.¹³⁹ In articles about the boycott, even in those merely providing information about dates and times, the connection of the protest to de fact segregation was made explicit and appeared early in the articles. Such an approach provided a clear contrast to *Journal* and *Sentinel* articles, which often focused on numbers and events to the exclusion of underlying causes.

Not surprisingly, the *Star* and *Courier* supported the school boycott on their editorial pages as well. Neither paper, however, supported disobedience of the law -- or keeping children away from learning -- two factors the *Journal* and *Sentinel* focused on heavily. Rather, the *Star* and *Courier* pointed out that students boycotting should attend freedom schools which were designed "to show the Negro child that he, too, has a heritage . . . that the Negro is not an

¹³⁸ *Milwaukee Star*, 11 September 1965, pt. 1, 1.

¹³⁹ Clearly, it must be acknowledged that greater depth and context in coverage were easier to achieve for a weekly newspaper than a daily.

'invisible man.' He is no better, nor no worse, than the white man."¹⁴⁰ Additionally, *Star* and *Courier* editors argued that the boycott "should make the city take notice of just grievances of a deprived people."¹⁴¹ While the *Journal* and *Sentinel* contended that the boycott was a "pointless" exercise in "dramatics," the *Star* and *Courier* retorted that the boycott was not just a mindless protest. In a September 25 editorial, Walter Jones argued "to set the record straight, no one wants a boycott, not the civil rights leaders, the students, the parents, the *Star*, or anyone else. But, if boycotting is the only way to get the school board to act -- then boycott we must."¹⁴² While the *Sentinel*, in particular, called for an end to the boycott plans after We-Milwaukeeans proposed their study, the *Star* pointed out that the study did not meet MUSIC's conditions. Rather than illustrating a commitment to action on the part of the school board, We-Milwaukeeans "(1) [failed] to state that the study will be concerned with racial imbalance, (2) [set] no time limit on the study . . . and (3) [did] not include the Negro community."¹⁴³

Although the black press made a concerted effort to sway many undecided residents to support the boycott, its circulation ultimately limited its mission. In order for the school boycott to achieve success by convincing "reference publics" to pressure the school board and the Mayor to act, larger publications -- notably, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* -- would have had to lend their support. The lack thereof, illustrated on their front and editorial pages, may have helped to move the school desegregation movement backward instead of forward.

Public Reaction

¹⁴⁰ *Milwaukee Star*, 18 September 1965, pt. 1, 4.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Milwaukee Star*, 25 September 1965, pt. 1, 4.

¹⁴³ *Milwaukee Star*, 16 October 1965, pt. 1, 1.

In evaluating reaction to the *Milwaukee Journal* and the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, this study focuses on direct public response to each newspaper -- letters to the editor. Although such letters cannot be construed as representative of the general public, nor even of the newspapers' readers, they are still a valuable, if narrow, tool with which to evaluate the newspapers' impact. Throughout plans for the school boycott and the boycott itself, letters to the editor presented overwhelming opposition to the protest. Of twenty-six letters concerning racial imbalance in Milwaukee's schools, twelve expressed opposition to the protest, while three writers offered support (in the remaining letters, no reference to the boycott was made). Those in opposition to the boycott frequently referred to the "illegal and pointless" tactics utilized by MUSIC, and focused on breaking the law rather than the underlying issue of de facto segregation. Readers wrote that the boycott established a pattern of "contempt of law and order or a flaunting of legal authority"¹⁴⁴; it "encouraged [young people] to disobey the law"¹⁴⁵; that it taught citizens "the end justifies the means, whether lawful or not."¹⁴⁶ Many condemned Barbee as the single-handed organizer of the boycott; "Lloyd Barbee, pushing for a week's school boycott in Milwaukee . . . using innocent and bewildered children as puppets"¹⁴⁷; "we want our children to be in school and not in a boycott like Mr. Barbee wants . . . he just wants to be in the papers"¹⁴⁸; "Barbee, as an attorney . . . filed suit .. it is obvious that the children were used as pawns."¹⁴⁹

Other writers identified as the major problem not the protesters, but black students and families. One letter to the editor proclaimed "the colored are slower at learning. And because it is hard to teach a batch of slow pupils and easy learners all in one class, where do you think the

¹⁴⁴ *Milwaukee Journal*, 14 October 1965, pt. 1, 24.

¹⁴⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 15 October 1965, pt. 1, 20.

¹⁴⁶ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 27 October 1965, pt. 1, 10.

¹⁴⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 26 September 1965, pt. 5, 2.

¹⁴⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 27 September 1965, pt. 1, 18.

¹⁴⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 25 October 1965, pt. 1, 14.

teachers we do have will choose to teach?"¹⁵⁰ Other letters concurred; one former teacher wrote "every teacher knows what the school board likes to cover up, namely, some Milwaukee city schools have become 'blackboard jungles' with the shift in racial balance from white to Negro."¹⁵¹ Another author, congratulating the school board for holding firm, asserted with regard to teacher segregation that "... if teachers are able to teach white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestants but would be utterly baffled in a low IQ, nonwhite, workingman neighborhood where there is aggressive resistance to education, why not keep them where they can function?"¹⁵²

Although a few wrote to support boycott efforts and expressed hope that "the boycott should at least have aroused a small twinge of conscience among the board members,"¹⁵³ such support was minimal. It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern whether those writing reacted to *Journal* and *Sentinel* sentiment and editorial policy, or whether the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* simply mirrored the sentiments of the community they served. In either case, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* could have helped to raise "social, cultural and political standards" in their community. With additional focus on the issue of de facto segregation, an issue receiving increasing national attention, and acknowledging boycott efforts as warranted, if not desirable, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* might have expanded the dialogue regarding racial imbalance in Milwaukee's schools. Instead, by summarily dismissing protest efforts, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* set up another roadblock in Milwaukee's lengthy journey to school desegregation.

School Desegregation, 1965-1976

¹⁵⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 8 October 1965, pt. 1, 24.

¹⁵¹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 19 October 1965, pt. 1, 24.

¹⁵² *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 19 October 1965, pt. 1, 10.

¹⁵³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 25 October 1965, pt. 1, 20.

Throughout the 1960s, the Supreme Court expanded the jurisdiction and clarified the language of its *Brown* rulings. In *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County* of 1968, the Court struck down "freedom of choice" programs and ordered that "the time for 'deliberate speed' had run out;" desegregation, the Court said, must begin *now*.¹⁵⁴ In *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education* of 1971, the Court required local officials "to do whatever was necessary . . . in order to redistribute white and black pupils into the same schools," including busing of those pupils.¹⁵⁵ Slowly, results began to appear; even though many "integrated" schools in the South remained internally segregated and subsumed within a white power structure, by 1972 "the South was more desegregated than any other region."¹⁵⁶

By 1973, as school desegregation continued in the South, Supreme Court rulings made clear that such efforts eventually would move north of the Mason-Dixon line. In 1971, HEW collected data on school desegregation and found "a frightening disparity in racial isolation between North and South,"¹⁵⁷ in fact, by the mid-1970s "in the Midwest . . . blacks were more than three times as likely to be segregated"¹⁵⁸ as in the South. Some southern politicians in Congress aggressively asserted that the North should accept its burden in the desegregation efforts. For many, such a complaint was disingenuous; United States Senator John Stennis of Mississippi hoped that "the North would never submit to what Stennis called 'massive, immediate integration'"¹⁵⁹ and that the North's refusal would stem the tide of school desegregation in the South. Northern schools traditionally rebuked such pressure on the premise that school segregation in the South was *de jure*, while school segregation in the North was *de facto* and thus

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 11.

¹⁵⁵ Ravitch, 13.

¹⁵⁶ Ravitch, 12 and Metcalf, 92.

¹⁵⁷ Metcalf, 130.

¹⁵⁸ Orfield, 1981.

¹⁵⁹ Metcalf, 73.

was not affected by Supreme Court rulings. In 1973, however, the Supreme Court ruled in *Keyes v. School District Number One, Denver, Colorado* that instances of de jure segregation in the North did exist and, in fact, should be treated as "a southern system where segregation had been created by state statute."¹⁶⁰ Although stopping short of equating de facto segregation with de jure segregation, the Supreme Court nevertheless vaulted school desegregation from a regional arena into a national one.

The demographics of many northern cities, however, made the eradication of de facto or de jure segregation difficult, if not impossible. White exodus from inner cities in the northern states began in the 1950s, and whites were "joined by middle-class blacks in the 1970s."¹⁶¹ By the mid-1970s, when many desegregation plans called for blacks to enter white-majority schools, demographic trends made such plans impossible without the inclusion of the suburbs. Moreover, the 1974 Supreme Court decision in *Bradley v. Miliken* regarding school segregation in Detroit denied such inclusion into desegregation plans.¹⁶²

Northern school and political leaders, faced with the impending prospect of school desegregation, became increasingly worried. Racial tensions continued to increase; although many had denounced the turmoil in Little Rock, such violence now proliferated in some inner cities. To compound problems, although school desegregation plans emphasized white-majority schools, in some cities such a majority was rapidly becoming virtually impossible. Furthermore, the issue of busing students began to eclipse all other desegregation debates. Although in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg* the Supreme Court pointed out that "busing had been 'an integral part

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 285.

¹⁶¹ Ravitch, 16.

¹⁶² Metcalf, 188.

of the public school system for years,"¹⁶³ President Nixon quite vocally opposed the use of busing for desegregation purposes. Executive opposition to the ruling fanned the fire of busing opponents, and ultimately "White House opposition to busing encouraged the American people not to accept desegregation if it involved busing."¹⁶⁴ The clash over busing erupted prominently in the most public display of northern school desegregation gone awry, in Boston, Massachusetts.

In the summer of 1974, Federal Judge John Garrity, "finding the school committee guilty of maintaining a segregated school system, . . . ordered that the state plan go into effect in September."¹⁶⁵ The plan called for the cross-town busing of 17,000 to 18,000 students and paired diametrically opposed districts in busing efforts. The 1974-1975 school year exploded in violence; "wild, raging mobs of white men and women confronted armies of police, while youths in their teens and younger hurled rocks, bottles, and racial epithets at buses carrying terrified black youngsters to school."¹⁶⁶ It was one of the most violent reactions to school desegregation Americans witnessed, and to many it was even more terrifying because it seemed atypical in a "liberal, northern" city. It was on the heels of Boston's desegregation debacle that Milwaukee would venture into similar territory at the beginning of 1976.

The Press, Race, and School Desegregation, 1965-1976

Throughout the 1960s, critics accused the press of devoting minimal coverage to racial disturbances and exacerbating tension by focusing exclusively on "crises" instead of context.

After a wave of urban rioting in the summer of 1967, President Lyndon Johnson set up the Kerner Commission to investigate the causes of urban unrest. In 1968, that commission released a report

¹⁶³ Metcalf, 106.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 113.

¹⁶⁵ Ronald P. Formisano, *Boston Against Busing: Race, Class and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 64.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 1.

on civil disorders which acknowledged that the news media made a genuine effort to portray accurately the riots of 1967. On a number of fronts, however, the Kerner Commission alleged that the news media failed. The Commission concluded that the news media sensationalized many of the disturbances and "have thus far failed to report adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and the underlying problems of race relations."¹⁶⁷ In addition to not providing a larger picture to readers and viewers, the Commission argued that the news media also neglected to provide a black perspective in their reporting. By continually relying on "official" sources in government and law enforcement, most of whom were white, the news media "repeatedly . . . reflected . . . the indifference of white America"¹⁶⁸ to the black community. Furthermore, the news media rarely, if ever, portrayed black citizens "as a matter of routine in the context of the total society."¹⁶⁹ Such negligence, the Kerner Commission asserted, exacerbated racial tensions, contributed to black mistrust of the news media, and reinforced many misconceptions of black society among the white community.

Finally, the Commission advised the press to include more blacks not only in their stories but in their newsrooms. In a 1968 study of twenty cities, only 2.6% of news executives, desk people, reporters and photographers among the major dailies were black.¹⁷⁰ Inclusion of blacks into the newsroom, the Kerner Commission argued, would alter the "white power structure"¹⁷¹ of the media and incur greater trust of the press by black readers.

By the 1970s, some change in coverage and response to the Kerner Commission was seen in mainstream press coverage. Ten years after the Kerner Commission study, a reevaluation of

¹⁶⁷ Kerner Commission, 363.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 366.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 383.

¹⁷⁰ Edward Traves, "Black Journalists on US Metropolitan Daily Newspapers: A Follow-Up Study," *Journalism Quarterly* 56 (Winter 1979): 711.

¹⁷¹ Kerner Commission, 375.

black journalists in city newsrooms found a "marked increase"¹⁷² in the number of blacks working for major dailies. In fact, the number of blacks employed was "more than double the number reported ten years earlier."¹⁷³ However, out of the positions held by blacks, 70.9% were in reporting; only 18 of 676 news executives (2 %) were black.¹⁷⁴

Researchers noted similar advances in the coverage of causes of black protest and examination of underlying context. By the 1970s, more newspapers "devoted a much higher percentage of their protest coverage to explanation of the causes of the protests than they had in the 1960s coverage."¹⁷⁵ Likewise, the media integrated blacks more regularly into coverage in the 1970s. However, even though "there appeared to be increased integration of the black American into general coverage . . . coverage of black everyday life was markedly absent."¹⁷⁶

School desegregation coverage of the 1970s showed attempts to rectify the errors of coverage in the 1950s and 1960s, even if such attempts were not always successful. Rather than being accused of injecting themselves into the story, the Boston news media, particularly the *Boston Globe*, were accused of underplaying the violent incidents that accompanied school desegregation efforts.¹⁷⁷ Although newspapers generally called for calm compliance and "provided consistent support of the judge"¹⁷⁸ who decided the desegregation case, they allegedly misrepresented a number of events. Critics charged that "unquestionably, school conditions during 1974-1975 did worsen more than reported in newspapers."¹⁷⁹ *Louisville Courier-Journal*

¹⁷² Traves, 713.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 712.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 713.

¹⁷⁵ Martindale, 923.

¹⁷⁶ Mary Alice Sentman, "Black and White: Disparity in Coverage by *Life Magazine* from 1937 to 1972," *Journalism Quarterly* 60 (Fall 1989): 508.

¹⁷⁷ Formisano, 76.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, 83.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 76.

and *Louisville Times* publisher Barry Bingham, Jr., who met with *Boston Globe* staff members prior to Louisville's desegregation, later told the United States Commission on Civil Rights that "supposedly there was some agreement reached [between the *Boston Globe* and Boston Mayor White] on how they would cover the controversy, and perhaps, even whether they would play down violence and that sort of thing."¹⁸⁰

Many readers also argued that the news media proffered a liberal standpoint from a safe distance. To those opposing busing, "suburban liberals" were the largest enemy, including "the *Globe* editors, along with many *Globe* reporters."¹⁸¹ One antibusing mom, frustrated at coverage, said *Globe* reporters and editors were "pushing something they didn't know anything about. All of the people who work for the *Globe*, none of them live in Boston . . . if they felt so strongly about it, why didn't they move to Boston and put all their children in the Boston public schools?"¹⁸²

In Louisville, mainstream publishers and editors were widely lauded, even by members of the black press, for "an excellent job on the coverage"¹⁸³ of school desegregation. The *Louisville Times*, in an internal memo, urged its reporters to remember "we must perform our functions in a restrained and calm manner . . . we must not call attention to ourselves or, wittingly or unwittingly, become part of an event."¹⁸⁴ Even though Louisville may have been able to avoid some of Little Rock's pitfalls, they were still criticized by members of the community. Some alleged that the press sensationalized school desegregation; the chair of the Louisville-Jefferson County Human Relations Commission argued that "the news media produced a picture in this

¹⁸⁰ US Commission on Civil Rights: *Hearing Held in Louisville, KY, 14-16 June, 1976*, 122.

¹⁸¹ Formisano, 179.

¹⁸² *Ibid*, 95.

¹⁸³ US Commission on Civil Rights, 125.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 508.

community that the great majority of the people, 90% or more . . . were opposed to busing . . . it became the expectation for most of our citizens to oppose busing."¹⁸⁵ More prominent, however, was the accusation that the press failed "to tell white people about the problems that black people of this community face every day."¹⁸⁶ Thus, twenty years after the onset of school desegregation, ten years after the Kerner Commission report, and one year before Milwaukee's ruling on school desegregation, the news media still encountered criticism in the 1970s for issues which arose in the 1950s.

School Desegregation in Milwaukee, 1965-1976

After Lloyd Barbee filed his suit against the school board in June of 1965, the city endured an eleven year wait to hear the court's decision. In 1968, the plaintiffs in *Craig Amos and Jeffrey Amos, et. al., v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee* amended their original complaint to add more students allegedly "deprived of equal educational opportunities."¹⁸⁷ The trial, heard in the courtroom of Federal Judge John W. Reynolds, began in September of 1973 and lasted one month. Reynolds, however, took over three years to render his decision. On January 19, 1976, Reynolds declared that the Milwaukee school board did operate segregated schools. He found that "the segregation which exists in the Milwaukee system is directly attributable to acts of the defendants . . . [they] have knowingly carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting all of the city's students, teachers, and school facilities, and have intentionally brought about and maintained a dual school system."¹⁸⁸ Reynolds appointed a special master, Dr. John Gronouski, to oversee desegregation implementation.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 165.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 166.

¹⁸⁷ Fuller.

¹⁸⁸ Fuller, 7.

The length of Milwaukee's desegregation process held a number of implications for both the citizens of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee media. For Milwaukee's residents, waiting became a double-edged sword. The passing years allowed for increased preparation for the eventual ruling, and the school board in fact initiated movement toward a voluntary desegregation program by the mid-1970s. Furthermore, the ruling surprised few Milwaukee residents; precedents across the country implied school desegregation was virtually inevitable. Such precedents, however, were foreboding. Milwaukeeans watched violence erupt over school desegregation in metropolitan areas such as Boston and Louisville prior to Reynolds' decision. They witnessed riots in their own city and cities across the country in 1967. Although they may have anticipated Reynolds' ruling, many also anticipated violence. In 1976, Milwaukee was a city on edge.

The delay also granted Milwaukee's two major dailies, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*, a number of opportunities. Editors, publishers, and reporters could plan for the 1976 ruling, which both papers called for by late 1975. They had heard and even participated in criticism of past school desegregation efforts -- Little Rock, Boston, Louisville -- and coverage of those efforts by the press. With so much preparation time, Milwaukee's newspapers could answer the Kerner Commission's criticisms by providing in-depth coverage, a black perspective, and more black personnel. It remained to be seen if the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* would rise to the challenge.

Press Coverage of School Desegregation in Milwaukee, 1976

At the time of Reynolds' decision, the *Sentinel*, a morning daily, had a circulation of approximately 167,765; and the *Journal*, an afternoon daily, had a daily circulation of approximately 338,103 and a Sunday circulation of approximately 524,947.¹⁸⁹ Much of the 1976 coverage of Reynolds' ruling reflected an earnest effort to meet the Kerner Commission's

¹⁸⁹ Ayer, 1976, 548.

expectations and to improve upon earlier coverage in the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*. In both papers, attention given to the ruling was extensive. On January 19, the *Journal* ran three front page stories and twelve total stories on the ruling; the next morning, the *Sentinel* ran two front page stories and thirteen total stories (including an editorial) regarding Reynolds' decision. Both papers carried stories throughout the following week which focused on different aspects of the ruling's impact.

In addition to giving the school desegregation story extensive attention, both papers attempted to give the story a larger context. On the day of the decision, the *Journal* ran three articles, clearly prepared in advance, which provided additional perspective on school desegregation; such preparation illustrated a greater concern for context than that present in 1965 coverage. *Journal* reporter McNally recalled that prior to Reynolds' ruling, the staff set up a special "task force" to tackle issues specific to school desegregation.¹⁹⁰ The *Journal* offered a page seven pictorial of MUSIC marches and boycotts, entitled "Troubled Years on School Front," which illustrated some of the complaints regarding school segregation.¹⁹¹ The *Journal* also ran two stories on page one of the local section, "School Integration Rooted in '63 Marches" and "Highlights of 12 Year Effort,"¹⁹² which identified some key events leading up to Reynolds' ruling. Although the *Sentinel* ran less contextual coverage, it did run a page eight story entitled "Plaintiffs Recall Their Reasons for Filing Suit in '65," which featured an interview with Craig Amos and another student involved in the 1965 lawsuit against the School Board.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ McNally interview.

¹⁹¹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 19 January 1976, pt. 1, 7.

¹⁹² *Ibid*, 1.

¹⁹³ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 19 January 1976, pt. 1, 8.

From the day of the ruling onward, both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* urged compliance with Judge Reynolds' order on their editorial pages. On January 20, 1976, both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* ran editorials regarding the ruling. The *Journal* editorial stated "Milwaukee traditionally has prided itself on its reputation for sober, thoughtful government . . . this should suggest that Boston should not be repeated here."¹⁹⁴ The *Sentinel* echoed similar sentiments, affirming "there is a need now to guard against a defiant reaction to Reynolds' decision which would only place roadblocks in the way of a reasoned approach."¹⁹⁵ Even as some politicians vocally lambasted the ruling, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* attempted to maintain support for Reynolds and to advocate citizen participation in school desegregation. A front page editorial in the *Journal* on January 21 argued that "law, not emotion, must rule in integration" and asserted that "it is deeply disappointing that some elected officials have seen fit to try and stir up emotion and hostility toward the Federal Court's school desegregation order for Milwaukee. What is most needed is for community leaders to urge calm lawfulness."¹⁹⁶ Both papers encouraged and commended community participation; the *Journal* commented that "widespread public interest in helping plan for the desegregation of Milwaukee's schools is heartening,"¹⁹⁷ while the *Sentinel* agreed that Reynolds' ruling allowed "the political, educational, business and citizen elements of the community to come up with and to work together on a plan acceptable to the court."¹⁹⁸ Thus both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*, rather than "aiding and abetting a rebellion," seemed concurrently to reinforce community law, order, and compliance. *Journal* managing editor

¹⁹⁴ *Milwaukee Journal*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 10.

¹⁹⁵ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 10.

¹⁹⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 21 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

¹⁹⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 31 January 1976, pt. 1, 10.

¹⁹⁸ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 4 February 1976, pt. 1, 10.

Leonard remembered that "we had about six editorial writers and cartoonists, and we were all for desegregation."¹⁹⁹

Both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* elicited some black perspective on the ruling. Ironically, the *Sentinel*, generally considered to be a more conservative paper than the *Journal*, seemed more advanced in this regard. Of the two papers, only the *Sentinel* ran an interview with Lloyd Barbee, who claimed that "more rounds are to be fought in the legal battle to desegregate Milwaukee's schools."²⁰⁰ The *Sentinel* also ran a number of stories based on interviews with black and white Milwaukeeans; in addition to the story on plaintiff Craig Amos, the *Sentinel* offered black and white women's comments in "Reactions Vary Widely to Reynolds' Ruling."²⁰¹ Furthermore, the *Sentinel* was the only of the two dailies to offer black and white student perspectives, in "Student Opinions Vary on Order, Too."²⁰² Although the papers generally relegated most stories with black perspectives to inner pages or the local sections, and both relied heavily on "official" sources (including Wisconsin Governor Patrick Lucey, Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier, and School Superintendent Lee McMurrin), they made noted advances from the virtual dearth of black perspective found by researchers in most major dailies prior to the 1970s. Additionally, both papers expanded their inclusion of black perspective from 1965, when each paper generally relied on Lloyd Barbee as its only black source.

Finally, both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* included greater numbers of blacks in their newsrooms by the mid-1970s. By 1978, although there were no black news executives or desk people at either of the two dailies, eleven of 135 reporters and one of eighteen photographers

¹⁹⁹ Leonard interview.

²⁰⁰ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 8.

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, 6.

²⁰² *Ibid*, 14.

were black.²⁰³ Thus, even though the *Journal* and *Sentinel* had "predominantly white owners, readers, editors and reporters,"²⁰⁴ their newsrooms were becoming more representative of the Milwaukee community. According to Leonard, the 1968 Kerner Commission report was "right in line with our thinking." He asserted that the *Journal* made a concerted effort to meet the Commission's recommendations: "one, don't play it down and hope it's going to go away . . . two, make sure your staffs . . . contain minority members, and make positive efforts to cover the minority community."²⁰⁵

For all of the strides made toward increasing balance, perspective, and continuity in press coverage of school desegregation, however, a number of problems remained in the January 1976 coverage by the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*. First, "crisis" coverage evidenced in 1950s school desegregation and 1960s riot coverage remained prominent. Although both papers provided some context, they still gave little analysis of the de facto or de jure desegregation widely acknowledged in Milwaukee's schools, nor did they discuss the effects of such segregation. Both dailies primarily referenced Boston or Louisville -- where violence erupted -- when discussing metropolitan desegregation efforts, rather than instances or precedents of success. Additionally, much of the "perspective" presented, particularly by the *Journal*, involved little more than chronological ordering of events or pictorials accompanied by minimal text. Although such efforts might have aided Milwaukeeans in grasping a "bigger picture," more in-depth analysis of school segregation and its effects may have contributed to the community "calm and compliance" both papers urged.

²⁰³ Traves, 172.

²⁰⁴ Caspari, 2.

²⁰⁵ Leonard interview.

Furthermore, although the *Sentinel* in particular endeavored at times to add black perspectives to commentary, it did not always do so in a positive light. The *Sentinel*, known for its conservative sentiments, asserted in one article that "generally, blacks and liberals seemed to support the decision, while others questioned it."²⁰⁶ One black community leader was quoted as saying "I think the whole thing is going to be ignored' by most black people . . . he doubted that many black community groups are organized to participate in the integration plan."²⁰⁷ Such coverage may have reinforced some negative beliefs held in the white community; in addition, limited coverage of black perspective also forced the mainstream press to portray the black community monolithically. Rather than acknowledging heterogeneity within the black population, the *Journal's* and *Sentinel's* sparse coverage continued to contribute to the misperception that the school desegregation battle, tailored to its essential elements, was fundamentally a black versus white issue.

As in 1965, Milwaukee's black press provided a useful contrast to Milwaukee's dailies in 1976. The *Milwaukee Star-Times* (formerly the *Milwaukee Star*) had an estimated 1976 circulation of 11,000;²⁰⁸ the *Milwaukee Courier* had an estimated circulation of approximately 23,000.²⁰⁹ The black press continued to provide greater perspective and context for school desegregation than the mainstream media. The January 24, 1976, edition of the *Courier* included a front-page interview with Lloyd Barbee. Additionally, the *Courier* ran a front-page article entitled "Rights Fighters Laud Decision" which interviewed a variety of black and white Milwaukeeans on their reactions to Reynolds' ruling. Rather than concluding that "blacks and

²⁰⁶ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 6.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁰⁸ Walter Jones, interview with the author, 26 March 1997.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

liberals" generally supported the decision, as the *Sentinel* did, the *Courier* provided a number of perspectives from black Milwaukeeans. Although most supported the ruling and concurred with black attorney Terrence Pitts, who claimed "It's a long overdue judicial pronouncement on facts that we blacks already knew," not all did. African-American State Senator Monroe Swan argued that "desegregation would assign black kids to permanent underachievement."²¹⁰ Although the black press clearly had a vested interest in exploring a variety of black perspectives, such diversity in the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* might have advanced further understanding of the school desegregation efforts.

Even though a broader context and added black perspective would have been useful in the mainstream press, the largest problem with the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* coverage of January 1976 was inconsistency. While editorials compelled Milwaukeeans to remain calm and participate in desegregation, headlines and stories outside of the editorials often contained sensational and inflammatory information. In one respect, this division illustrated advancement from the coordination of editorial and story policy (especially in the *Milwaukee Journal*) evident in 1965 coverage. By 1976, Leonard agreed that "in editorials, of course, we were pitching for desegregation"; both he and McNally asserted, however, that editorial and story coverage remained completely independent of one another in 1976.²¹¹ While an admirable policy, some readers attempting to reconcile editorials with stories may have found the disparity confusing. Joel McNally and Richard Leonard asserted that readers would hopefully be persuaded to do the "moral and practical" thing through editorials and columns. However, statistics confirm that while 70% of readers will look at local news, only approximately 40% will read the editorial

²¹⁰ *Milwaukee Courier*, 24 January 1976, pt. 1, 18.

²¹¹ McNally and Leonard interviews.

pages. In local news stories and features, both the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* referred to issues that were fractious or occasionally, irrelevant. By the mid-1970s, busing was clearly a controversial issue in the school desegregation debate; for opponents, "the very word *busing* became a dirty word, a euphemism for the desegregation they hated."²¹² McNally agreed: in Milwaukee, he said, "busing was a code word which people substituted for race mixing."²¹³ Boston's violent struggle in 1974 and 1975 graphically illustrated the clamor over busing, and Judge Reynolds carefully avoided any mention of it in his over 800-page ruling. Even though Reynolds did not mention busing at all, the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* consistently referred to it in their stories and headlines. "Desegregation Order May Require Busing,"²¹⁴ the *Sentinel* boldly headlined on January 20. Other headlines in the *Journal* and *Sentinel* made busing equally prominent: "Citizens OK Integration, Strongly Oppose Busing,"²¹⁵ "Like it or Not, Busing May Be Necessary,"²¹⁶ "72% in Survey Oppose Busing."²¹⁷ Stories also focused on the unrealized *potential* of busing. A *Journal* interview with State Senator James Sensenbrenner discussed his voluntary exchange plan, which "certainly is preferable to forced busing, he said."²¹⁸ Four days later, the *Journal* asserted in a page one article that "based on comparable experiences . . . it would appear that at least some busing would be needed," and interviewed one desegregation planner who estimated Milwaukee could have to bus up to "57,000 of its 114,000 students . . . [which] would cost \$4.1 million to \$6.3 million"²¹⁹ All of this, of course, would come at taxpayer expense.

²¹² Orfield, 55.

²¹³ McNally interview.

²¹⁴ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, 8.

²¹⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²¹⁷ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 31 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²¹⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 21 January 1976, pt. 2, 1.

²¹⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 25 January 1976, pt.1, 1.

Even more than the *Journal*, the *Sentinel* directed extensive attention to busing in its stories. The day after Reynolds' ruling, a front-page article argued that "busing of pupils will probably be necessary to comply with Federal John W. Reynolds' order to desegregate city schools, several key figures in the case said Monday."²²⁰ A page eight story evaluating reactions asserted that "Milwaukeeans Monday offered lukewarm approval for the concept of integrating schools, but voiced scalding criticism for any plan that would involve busing."²²¹ A February 6 editorial in the *Journal* claimed "much confusion remains over Reynolds' order to desegregate Milwaukee's schools . . . For one thing, the issue is not busing. Reynolds said nothing about busing."²²² Such an assertion, however, rang hypocritical when the *Journal* and *Sentinel* clearly helped to foster the confusion the *Journal* described.

Busing was not the only issue on which the *Journal* and *Sentinel* focused extensive attention. "White flight" to the suburbs and including the suburbs in the desegregation plan also attracted their attention. Reynolds gave no indication of including the suburbs in his ruling (and the Supreme Court had ruled against this idea for Detroit in *Bradley v. Miliken*). Moreover, "white flight" had been occurring for years prior to the ruling,²²³ but articles appeared in both papers on these subjects. Headlines from the *Journal* and *Sentinel* in the week following Reynolds' decision included "White Becoming Minority in City Schools;"²²⁴ "Too Early to

²²⁰ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²²² *Milwaukee Journal*, 6 February 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²²³ A 1968 survey found that at the time the plaintiffs amended their complaint, Milwaukee had 130,445 total pupils in its school system; 95,161, or 73%, of the pupils were white, while 35,284 of the pupils were minority students. By 1976, there were 109,565 total pupils in the Milwaukee public school system; white pupils accounted for 61,738, or 56.3% of the total, while minority pupils made up 47,827, or 43.7% -- a total loss of 16%, and a white pupil loss of 35.1% (Source: Ravitch, 18). In fact, during the 1970s Milwaukee's "black [school] enrollment increased more than 20%," while white enrollment began a precipitous decline prior to Reynolds' ruling. (Orfield, 25).

²²⁴ *Milwaukee Journal*, 19 January 1976, pt. 1, 6.

Forecast White Flight, Maier Says;"²²⁵ "Suburban Officials Eye School Ruling;"²²⁶ and, finally, "Gronouski Says Task Limited to City."²²⁷ Within stories, interviews with a number of officials forecast the same plight. In a front page article in the January 20 edition of the *Journal*, one school board member argued that Reynolds' ruling "would cause massive white flight and 'destroy whatever racial balance we have in the city.'"²²⁸ Similarly, a January 21 article in the *Sentinel* claimed that "the court ordered desegregation of Milwaukee public schools has left suburban officials wondering if it may eventually affect their communities."²²⁹

Although discussion of the possibilities of school desegregation was natural, even necessary, black press coverage again provided a useful contrast. Both the general media and the black press agreed that forced busing was unwanted by most Milwaukeeans. The *Courier* and *Star-Times*, however, each ran an article by Barbee which maintained that "busing for basic school purposes has been a commonly accepted procedure for several decades. When used as a tool to eliminate racial imbalance in public schools, it then becomes a focal point for racial backlash and emotionalism." Barbee added that with regard to "white flight," most ignored "the fact that urban sprawl is being experienced by many cities, regardless of desegregation efforts." The article pointed out that busing already existed for 8,294 Milwaukee public school students "without opposition."²³⁰ Inclusion of such articles or information into the *Journal* or *Sentinel* busing or white flight coverage might have considerably enlarged the readers' perspectives. Walter Jones, *Courier* editor, commented in a February 7 editorial that the *Sentinel's* "second lead story in the

²²⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²²⁶ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 21 January 1976, pt. 1, 5.

²²⁷ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 23 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²²⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²²⁹ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 21 January 1976, pt. 1, 5.

²³⁰ *Milwaukee Courier*, 24 January 1976, pt. 1, 4.

January 20 issue warned 'Desegregation Order May Require Busing.' In fact, seven of the eleven school desegregation related articles in the issue had negative connotations."²³¹

Other headlines led Jones to argue in the same editorial that "if the *Journal* was as liberal as it purports to be, its news pages would practice what its editorial page so piously preaches . . . maybe the reporters and editorial and headline writers don't talk to each other."²³² Jones' allegations were, in some instances, well-founded. While the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* claimed on the editorial page that "the judge had no choice but to order desegregation,"²³³ those pages were surrounded by the following headlines: "Schools Defended as Victims, Not Criminal,"²³⁴ "Makes My Blood Boil: Zablocki,"²³⁵ "Parochial School Haven Ruled Out,"²³⁶ "Delay Feared on New Schools,"²³⁷ "Integration Issue Seen Affecting City Hall,"²³⁸ and "Seraphim Criticizes Decision."²³⁹

On January 11, 1976 -- eight days prior to Reynolds' ruling -- the *Milwaukee Journal* began an extensive series entitled "Inside Our Schools." To prepare for the series, "four *Milwaukee Journal* reporters [Patrick Reardon, Joel McNally, Gary Rummeler, and James Parks] spent six weeks each inside twelve city and suburban schools between October 6 and December 10."²⁴⁰ The series introduction said that "among other topics, the series will discuss student behavior, race relations and curriculum changes."²⁴¹ The first two articles in the series discussed a tough disciplinarian at West Allis Central, an overwhelmingly white high school, and drug and

²³¹ *Milwaukee Courier*, 6 February 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²³² *Ibid.*

²³³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 10.

²³⁴ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 20 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

²³⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 27 January 1976, pt. 1, 5.

²³⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 23 January 1976, pt. 1, 8.

²⁴⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 11 January 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

alcohol abuse among students.²⁴² On January 13, the third article in the series appeared. Entitled "Portrait of Frustration at Wells Jr. High" and written by Patrick Reardon, it portrayed an eighth-grade class at predominantly black Wells Jr. High School. Reardon acknowledged that the class he observed was "not typical of all classes at Wells But . . . the English class described in the story is typical of the classes of a new teacher."²⁴³ The two-page article detailed nine days of a classroom in chaos. According to Reardon, "disruption was a major problem. There was a lot of talking and horseplay, and some wandering around. The students baited the teacher and frequently talked back to her."²⁴⁴ When asked by the teacher what they wanted to be when they grew up, various students replied that they wished to be a pimp, "father of 34 kids," "a professional cutie pie." The article was accompanied by two illustrations: one depicted a class of black students shooting spitballs, listening to music and generally not paying attention while the teacher stood at the board. The second illustration, with no clear depiction of race, showed a classroom of students reading and raising their hands to answer a teacher's question.²⁴⁵

An article on January 14, "Restless 13 -- a Trying Age," by James Parks, described a "mischievous" group of white eighth graders at Walker Jr. High. It was followed on January 15 by a story entitled "Door Closes -- Contest Begins," by Joel McNally, which described discipline at various high schools in Milwaukee. Although a number of high schools were criticized for a variety of discipline problems, Riverside High School, with a 57% white and 35% black student population, was mentioned the most frequently. At Riverside, one teacher described discipline as a "very tenuous thing. You can't tell a kid to sit down and shut up or he very likely will tell you to

²⁴² *Milwaukee Journal*, 11 and 12 January, 1976.

²⁴³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 13 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 13 January 1976, pt. 1, 5.

sit down and shut up."²⁴⁶ McNally described one West Allis Central teacher (again, West Allis Central had an overwhelmingly white majority) who had an "easy rapport" with his class of occasional discipline problems, while the Riverside teacher quoted above conducted his class in absolute silence and was queried by one student "When we gonna stop readin' All you know how to do is pass out papers and walk. I'm gonna report you to the office. You ain't learnin' me how to talk properly."²⁴⁷

Although "Inside Our Schools" may have accurately described the facts witnessed by reporters, the timing of *when* it ran seemed, in retrospect, suspect. As *Courier* editor Walter Jones argued, referring specifically to the article about Wells Jr. High: "Wells students were depicted as a bunch of incorrigibles that no amount of teaching would or could help. This was just seven days before the desegregation order and the *Journal* knew a ruling was all but immediately forthcoming. Was the Wells story designed to prepare the Milwaukee community for the inevitable decision? Or was it designed to scare white folks? Was it designed to build resistance into integration? I think so. It appears to me that no editor would have let that story run the way it did and at the time that it did, unless there were other motives."²⁴⁸ McNally called Walter Jones' allegation "pretty incredible. I honestly don't know what he's talking about." McNally elaborated "I just categorically resist the idea that information and finding out what's really going on is a bad idea." McNally said that *Journal* staff discussed the Wells story extensively before running it, but ultimately decided that "there could be some negative reaction to this, but it's the truth."²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 15 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 10.

²⁴⁸ *Milwaukee Courier*, 7 February 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁴⁹ McNally interview.

With the January 19 ruling, the *Journal's* "Inside Our Schools" series temporarily disappeared. Upon its return, the series was retitled "Inside Our Schools: Blacks and Whites Apart" and included six articles on race relations in Milwaukee's schools. The articles' titles didn't proclaim a ringing endorsement of school integration: "Mixing Opens Few Doors,"²⁵⁰ "Two Lessons in Race Relations,"²⁵¹ "Schools Integrated, but Classes Aren't,"²⁵² "Wells Faces Up to Problems,"²⁵³ "King Tries to Improve Image."²⁵⁴ Although the articles again may simply have reflected the facts, their timing and content were difficult to correlate with the *Journal's* positive editorial stance regarding school integration. The four articles which concentrated specifically on integration revealed students who, even when "integrated" at school, remained racially divided. One administrator claimed that students were "more than happy to integrate in classrooms, but it all seems to end at 3:28."²⁵⁵ In "Two Lessons in Race Relations," McNally began, "those who oppose racial integration point to the self-segregation in a school like Riverside as proof that separation is preferred by both blacks and whites. However . . . the black class that had daily experience with integration was strongly in support of it. The white class that had limited contact with blacks was antagonistic to the point of racism."²⁵⁶ The rest of the article, however, did not lead to the conclusion that integration was eminently desirable. An all-white black history class at West Allis Central appeared virulently racist: "You wouldn't be friends with a Negro in the first place," asserted one student. Another added that blacks all "live in the slums and spend all their money on clothes and cars." One wonders: would a black parent reading this article want his or

²⁵⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 22 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁵¹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 25 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁵² *Milwaukee Journal*, 28 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁵³ *Milwaukee Journal*, 27 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁵⁴ *Milwaukee Journal*, 26 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁵⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 22 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁵⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 25 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

her child to attend a newly integrated school with a student who exclaimed "When slavery ended, they should have gone back to Africa. It's their own fault."²⁵⁷ Although the black history class at Riverside seemed more accepting and supportive of integration, some black students claimed that they were "steered" into black history and away from other electives. Most students agreed that integrated schools were preferable, but one acknowledged "I don't think whites would feel welcome in this class."²⁵⁸ Another described his former school -- Rufus King (97% black) -- as "a jailhouse. The only kind of education there is smoking that old dope."²⁵⁹ Again, one wonders: would a white parent reading this article want his or her student sent to King or Riverside under new integration plans? In "Schools Integrated, But Classes Aren't," McNally stated that "a visitor to the school [Riverside] quickly notices that the most challenging and difficult courses have only whites or mostly white and that the basic or remedial courses have only black students or mostly black."²⁶⁰

The two articles in the series describing predominantly black schools, while attempting to show improvement, also reinforced negative conceptions of both schools. While Gary Rummler asserted in the beginning of "King Tries to Improve Image" that "it became clear that most of the talk about King was based on reputation and rumor," he then listed a litany of problems: "King seemed to be plagued by more than its share of gambling, fighting, drug use . . . obvious pot smoking . . . many students who drift through the days . . . no opportunities for industrial education . . . parents are 'negative, negative, negative.'"²⁶¹ Likewise, "Wells Faces Up to Problems" argued that Wells was working to get better, but then quotes one teacher as saying

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 28 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁶¹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 26 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

" then there are the good kids. Lost in there. That's what makes you feel bad."²⁶² Again, for all of the urging by the *Journal* for sober thoughtfulness, time after time reporters portrayed black schools falling into disarray and disciplinary nightmares. Again, McNally defended the articles published. Regardless of the *Journal's* editorial policy, he said, "we weren't going to distort what we found."²⁶³

Although the *Milwaukee Sentinel* did not run a series on Milwaukee's schools prior to or following Judge Reynolds' ruling, it did run a five-part survey on integration beginning on January 31. Most prominently, the *Sentinel's* headlines often obscured the information contained within the article. On January 31, the *Sentinel* heralded "72% in Survey Oppose Busing;" buried in paragraph three, however, was the fact that the "survey also showed a generally favorable attitude toward integrated schools." In fact, 72% of those surveyed also supported integration, which was not mentioned in the headline.²⁶⁴ Likewise, the "56% Back Suburb Integration Role" headline of February 2 did not account for the acknowledgment in the middle of the article that the "survey [was] conducted during the week following Reynolds' ruling However, his ruling did not stipulate that busing be employed, and it did not encompass suburban schools."²⁶⁵ Again, one must wonder: why run the story if it is generally acknowledged to be irrelevant?

Walter Jones, *Courier* editor, alleged that the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* were placing their own "roadblocks" in the way of desegregation. He argued "If they have acted responsibly on the school desegregation issue, I'd hate for them to act irresponsibly. And the *Sentinel* talks about school desegregation as a 'vexing problem.' In my opinion, it's not a problem yet, it's still an issue.

²⁶² *Milwaukee Journal*, 27 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁶³ McNally interview.

²⁶⁴ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 31 January 1976, pt. 1, 1.

²⁶⁵ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 2 February 1976, pt. 1, 1.

But if the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* keep it up, school desegregation in Milwaukee will be one hell of a lot more than a problem.²⁶⁶ In reaction to Jones' statement, Leonard said "that's the risk you take Walter and other editors couldn't understand if we were for something, why would we run something negative I think they fear that we, even with our black reporters, never understood the black community."²⁶⁷

Public Reaction

Again, letters to the editor provide a narrow yet useful tool when evaluating the impact of the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* on Milwaukee's school desegregation. Letters sent to the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* regarding school desegregation generally fell into one of three categories. Some writers presented a misinformed opinion, utilizing inaccurate information apparently gleaned from the newspaper itself. A second group offered a negative response to school desegregation based in part on *Journal* or *Sentinel* articles, and a third group disagreed with the information presented in either newspaper.

Misinformed letters provide an interesting look at what effect the *Journal* and *Sentinel's* sensationalism (described in part IV) may have had on Milwaukee readers. Many referred to the busing and "white flight" so consistently discussed in *Journal* and *Sentinel* headlines and stories: "Federally forced busing of children is genocide Parents of all colors should see busing as an attack upon the family unit and join together;"²⁶⁸ "Busing the babies out of the neighborhood is not the answer for black or white schools;"²⁶⁹ "Reynolds' ruling . . . will accomplish two things: reduce the white population in the schools and in the city,"²⁷⁰ "forced

²⁶⁶ *Milwaukee Courier*, 7 February 1976, pt. 1, 16.

²⁶⁷ Leonard interview.

²⁶⁸ *Milwaukee Journal*, 29 January 1976, pt. 1, 10.

²⁶⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 30 January 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁷⁰ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 28 January 1976, pt. 1, 10.

busing for the sake of busing is asinine and costly;"²⁷¹ "Will the time ever arrive when someone has the courage to cry halt to the busing madness?"²⁷² One Milwaukee man, in a letter to the *Milwaukee Sentinel* entitled "Reverse Reynolds," erroneously claimed:

Judge John W. Reynolds is asking the already overburdened Milwaukee taxpayer to pay for a disastrous social program -- forced busing. If the order is enforced, these buses will require gas and oil, repairs, maintenance, replacement, drivers, etc. Another heavy economic burden for the taxpayer to shoulder.

To ask the people of Milwaukee to foot the bill for all this, and in the meantime to risk touching off a riot the like of which Boston hasn't seen yet, is sheer insanity. Reynolds' decision must be reversed by a higher court to keep the peace in this town.²⁷³

Although it cannot be concluded that the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* were the only organizations responsible for such misinformation, their focus -- particularly on busing, not even *mentioned* in Reynolds' ruling -- clearly had some effect.

The *Journal* and *Sentinel* consistently editorialized that Reynolds' decision was "an opportunity for peaceful change and perhaps even a better system in the long run."²⁷⁴ But some letters to the editor implied that the *Journal* and *Sentinel* contributed to quite a different public opinion. The *Journal's* "Inside Our Schools" series, which the *Journal* said would "address, in a general way, many of the issues that have been raised about public education locally and nationally in recent years,"²⁷⁵ seemed to have a more specific impact. Readers wrote that "It's discouraging for black and white taxpayers to realize their hard earned money is wasted trying to educate kids who won't learn . . . whose only interest evidently is to end up on welfare or in prison;"²⁷⁶ "the descriptions of classroom behavior in the 'Inside Our Schools' series resembled

²⁷¹ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 14 February 1976, pt. 1, 12.

²⁷² *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 19 February 1976, pt. 1, 10.

²⁷³ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 24 January 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁷⁴ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 5 February 1976, pt. 1, 20.

²⁷⁵ *Milwaukee Journal*, 13 January 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁷⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 22 January 1976, pt. 1, 16.

the description of a class in animal training rather than a class of human beings;²⁷⁷ "The courts and wishy-washy school administrators have decided that they cannot or will not interfere with the rights of disruptive students to ruin the educational atmosphere for all students Your recent articles on Milwaukee area schools reinforce my thinking;"²⁷⁸ "The article, 'Portrait of Frustration at Wells St. Jr. High,' in the January 13 *Journal* points out why a lot of parents object to integration and busing. They do not want to see their children wasting educational time in a negative situation."²⁷⁹ One reader, identified only as "Horrorified," sent the same letter to the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*:

The courts, legislators and civil rights leaders are loud in denunciation of all-black or all-white schools and are pressing hard for more integration to better the educational system, especially with minority groups.

However, after reading the *Journal* series on local schools, it is very apparent that integration is no answer to poor education. It is the sad inability of teachers to control students or poor school discipline and an utter disregard of pupils for law and order.

We are apparently rearing a generation of undisciplined, lawless, illiterate ruffians, and God help America in the years to come. I doubt if we will ever see the third century anniversary of our nation as a republic.²⁸⁰

Clearly, the *Journal*, whether intentionally or unintentionally, persuaded some readers to believe the exact opposite of its editorial policy. McNally and Leonard agreed that even if the "Inside Our Schools" series turned some people off to the prospect of integration, it was more important to present the information accurately. Leonard concluded "what you've got to hope is that through opinion pieces, columns, that you can instill in people the reason why it is important to correct inadequacies."²⁸¹

²⁷⁷ *Milwaukee Journal*, 2 February 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *Milwaukee Journal*, 23 January 1976, pt. 1, 16.

²⁸⁰ *Milwaukee Journal*, 29 January 1976, pt. 1, 14; *Milwaukee Sentinel*, 23 January 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁸¹ Leonard interview.

Some readers wrote to contest information presented in the *Journal* or the *Sentinel*. A number wrote to support integration efforts and to offer alternative perspectives: "We are seniors at St. John's Cathedral High School Cathedral is about as integrated a school as we've ever seen We're just glad to say that we were part of the integration that was not forced upon us but considered a natural event;"²⁸² "Integration, busing and quota systems not only can work in Milwaukee, but are working . . . blatant commitment to integration as a value by administration and teaching staff can make it work;"²⁸³ "As students of the Racine school system, we would like to give you the insight on our desegregation here We feel desegregation works because we're trying to make it work. We would like to see it work in Milwaukee, too"²⁸⁴ "The educational climate at this school [Wells] exceeds that of many so-called 'superior schools' in that there is mutual respect for all."²⁸⁵ One student, however, wrote both to contest information presented in the *Journal's* article and to chastise it for sensationalism:

I'm a student at Wells St. Jr. High. I'm a white student, and I have a *Milwaukee Journal* route. Most of my customers ask me what school I go to. I tell them Wells, and they give me a funny look. I tell them the truth that Wells isn't a bad school; just a few kids make it bad.

I know your article said that not all the classes are like that, but it sounded like all the classes are.²⁸⁶

Certainly, not all letters written to the editor had a negative perspective regarding school desegregation; additionally, such letters cannot be taken to represent Milwaukee's population at large. However, the number of letters opposing school desegregation overwhelmingly outweighed those supporting it, and many of the opposing letters referred to information discussed in the *Journal* and the *Sentinel*. Perhaps, as in Todd Gitlin's study of SDS discussed in

²⁸² *Milwaukee Journal*, 9 February 1976, pt. 1, 16.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁴ *Milwaukee Journal*, 17 February 1976, pt. 1, 14.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *Milwaukee Journal*, 24 January, 1976, pt. 1, 16.

the next section, the unbalanced coverage given to school desegregation by Milwaukee's print media did the cause more harm than good.

Media Influence and Public Opinion

Assessing the ultimate impact Milwaukee's newspapers may have had on school desegregation efforts warrants a closer look at research and theory regarding media effects. Multiple studies on media influence have concluded that generally, the more educated and wealthy use print media as sources of information more frequently than the less educated or less wealthy.²⁸⁷ The print media traditionally reflects this bias; "in part, the poor pay less attention to print media because these media cater to upper income groups rather than the needs and concerns of the poor."²⁸⁸ Race as well as class predicts print media usage. Whites use all forms of media more frequently than blacks, who "rely less on general mass media for political information."²⁸⁹ Younger members of the population also rely less on print media than older members.²⁹⁰

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, newspapers in Milwaukee and across the country encountered massive declines in readership. With the introduction and rapid proliferation of television as a source of information, newspapers occupied an even more precarious position. By the mid-1970s, "98% of all US homes owned one or more television sets. Almost half had more than one set."²⁹¹ Paralleling a rise in television viewing, daily newspaper reading declined dramatically. While 85% of Americans claimed they read the newspaper on a daily basis in 1946,

²⁸⁷ Graber, 190; Richard L. Allen and William T. Bielby, "Blacks' Relationship with the Print Media," *Journalism Quarterly* 56 (Autumn 1979), 494.

²⁸⁸ Doris Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), 196.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 195.

²⁹⁰ John P. Robinson, "The Changing Reading Habits of the American Public," *Journal of Communication* 30:1 (Winter 1980), 143.

²⁹¹ Ronald E. Frank and Marshall G. Greenberg, *The Public's Use of Television -- Who Watches and Why* (London: Sage Publications, 1980,) 21.

73% claimed the same in 1967, and only 63% claimed the same in 1977.²⁹² Television viewing also exacerbated race and class differences in use of print media. On average, "African-Americans . . . [watched] fifteen percent more television than [did] whites," and "low income audiences [preferred] television and radio programs."²⁹³ Additionally, television's influence was greatly increased by "its ability to reach millions of people simultaneously with the same images."²⁹⁴

Although newspaper readership flagged in the 1960s and 1970s, the print media maintained considerable influence. Contrary to television, "print media [excelled] in conveying factual ideas."²⁹⁵ Furthermore, even as television viewing rose, many still believed that newspapers provided a useful contrast to television by "uniquely among the media . . . [providing] an integrating force that [bound] a community together through commonly shared information."²⁹⁶ Accordingly, a majority of the population still read newspapers in the mid-1970s; Americans read a daily newspaper an average of four days a week in 1977, and 71% of the population claimed they read the Sunday newspaper.²⁹⁷ Although newspaper reading fell among younger people, of those old enough to have school-aged children or grandchildren, a large majority read the paper on a daily basis: 57% of those aged 30-39, 69% of those 40-49, 76% of those 50-59, and 80% of those 60-69.²⁹⁸ In addition, readers likely focused on stories regarding school desegregation. When choosing stories to read, 71% of readers claimed that they read local news, while 40% maintained that they read editorials.²⁹⁹ Furthermore, people traditionally cite "personal relevance"

²⁹² Robinson, 141.

²⁹³ Graber, 196.

²⁹⁴ Ibid, 190.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 189.

²⁹⁶ Leo Bogart, *Commercial Culture: The Media System and the Public Interest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 197.

²⁹⁷ Frank, 148.

²⁹⁸ Robinson, 143.

²⁹⁹ Frank, 152. This raises an interesting point, however: if 30% more of the population read the local news than the editorial pages, there is a much greater chance that Milwaukee readers were exposed to the inconsistency

as the most important reason for choosing to read a story. In both 1965 and 1976, parents of over 100,000 Milwaukee school children had a vested personal interest in school desegregation. Thus, even though print media influence waned in the 1960s and 1970s, it is likely that many of those affected by school desegregation read either the *Milwaukee Journal* or the *Milwaukee Sentinel*.

An issue of greater debate is what influence the print media have in forming public opinion on any given issue. Although some claim that the news media merely reflect society's reality and report it objectively,³⁰⁰ the truth is likely more complex. Members of the print media such as reporters, editors, and publishers bring to their work perspectives and ideologies which cannot be eradicated completely. Furthermore, those who are a *part* of the story generally do not enjoy the opportunity to report it; "people as producers of meaning have no voice in what the media make of what they say or do."³⁰¹ Overtly or inadvertently, the news media select issues and set parameters for public debate. Rather than passive observers and reflectors, "the mass media are . . . a significant social force in the forming and delimiting of public assumptions, attitudes and moods -- of ideology, in short."³⁰² The selection of certain issues for focus -- like the *Journal's* and *Sentinel's* repeated allegations to busing and white flight in 1976, or its attention to the "lawlessness" of the 1965 school boycott -- did not just reflect reality, "media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, or us who rely on their reports."³⁰³

of the *Journal's* and the *Sentinel's* story policy without being exposed to the more consistent editorial policy.

³⁰⁰ Graber, 23.

³⁰¹ Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (California: University of California Press, 1980), 3.

³⁰² *Ibid*, 9.

³⁰³ *Ibid*, 7.

Whether by explicit or implicit methods, mass media, and print media in particular, can have a profound impact on public opinion and action. Most young adults mention mass media "far more often" than any other sources when asked from where they receive their information.³⁰⁴ Heavy media exposure, from childhood into adulthood, "contributes to the lifelong process of political learning."³⁰⁵ Media can have positive or negative effects on public opinion regarding political and social events. Todd Gitlin's study of media coverage surrounding Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1965 alleged that "the media's decision to give wide publicity to SDS ultimately destroyed the movement."³⁰⁶ Although reporters were "sympathetic" and their coverage of SDS extensive, "the framing chosen by the media produced exciting news . . . but it misled media audiences and affected the self-perception of SDS members."³⁰⁷

Far from being passive receptacles of media information, people use media for a variety of reasons as well. Although many read stories to gain information or learn something new, old stereotypes and assumptions generally temper additional information. In fact, some readers may use stories or editorials to "gain a sense of security and social adequacy . . . people feel gratified if the media reinforce what they already know or believe."³⁰⁸ Some stories may reinforce positive images or stereotypes, but in some cases "mass media may actually become a negative reference point so that people condemn the lifestyle depicted by the media."³⁰⁹ Even though it is limited in scope, some evidence points to the fact that the *Journal* and the *Sentinel* may have done just that.

³⁰⁴ Graber, 192.

³⁰⁵ Ibid, 193.

³⁰⁶ Ibid, 175.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, 197.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, 216.

Conclusions

Predictions of violence for Milwaukee's school desegregation efforts ultimately proved false. By the mid 1980s, some lauded Milwaukee for managing "to achieve what bigger cities no longer even dream of. It has desegregated most of its schools through largely voluntary means, and avoided the white flight that usually follows on the heels of forced busing."³¹⁰ In fact, according to school desegregation architects, "preparation for desegregation was more volatile than the actual implementation Desegregation in two-thirds of the schools met no violent protest. Although not everyone liked the idea, desegregation during the first two years was accepted peacefully."³¹¹ By 1996, however, the newly merged *Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel* claimed that "metropolitan Milwaukee still is often labeled one of the most racially segregated areas in the country. The number of whites in Milwaukee public schools has fallen dramatically. From all sides, the whole subject of integration no longer seems to be a high priority."³¹²

Certainly the press should bear little criticism for school desegregation's failure, just as it should incur few plaudits in the face of success. But if Harry Ashmore's assertion in 1958 was correct, and "it remains . . . journalism's unfulfilled responsibility to somehow provide perspective and continuity,"³¹³ then those in the newsroom -- reporters, photographers, editors and publishers -- must be held accountable for their role in the community. In both 1965 and 1976 coverage of school desegregation efforts, the *Journal* and *Sentinel* may have contributed to community sentiment which opposed school desegregation efforts by either ignoring efforts or sensationalizing them. Although both papers repeatedly asserted their support for school

³¹⁰ *Newsweek*, 4 May 1981, 69.

³¹¹ David Bednarek, "Milwaukee," *Integrated Education* 15 (November/December 1977), 36.

³¹² *Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel*, 13 October 1996, pt. 1, 1.

³¹³ Ashmore, 7.

desegregation and acknowledged its inevitability, coverage of the 1965 boycott and 1976 ruling often contradicted those sentiments. It may be an exaggeration to state that the media potentially fostered "dangerous discord,"³¹⁴ but it is certainly questionable that they fostered community harmony. Ultimately, some readers were misinformed by the *Journal's* and *Sentinel's* inconsistent coverage. While that may just be "a risk you take,"³¹⁵ by failing to provide clear guidance in the school desegregation issue, the *Milwaukee Journal* and the *Milwaukee Sentinel* fell short of their potential.

³¹⁴ Caspari, 5.

³¹⁵ Leonard interview.

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