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ELITES AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS:

A STUDY OF COMMUNITY POWER IN MANIZALES, COLOMBIA

by

George F. Drake*

*Associate Professor of Sociology at Western Washington State College, Bellingham, Washington.

All views, interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions are those of the author and not necessarily those of supporting or cooperating agencies.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Pluralism and Elitism

A voluntary association is the result of individuals with a common need or interest forming an organization with the limited end of securing a specific goal. Pluralists traditionally assume that the simple existence of such voluntary associations is prima facie evidence that a given society is pluralist. I will argue instead that it is necessary to look closely at voluntary associations, and at the rules surrounding them, to determine whether a society is pluralist or elitist.

Voluntary associations may be generally classified as expressive or instrumental. Only the latter can provide evidence as to the pluralist character of a society, and even here further subdivision is necessary. Instrumental associations can be oriented either towards service to others or towards mutual benefits. Service-oriented associations endeavor to help some members of the society without instituting any social change. Mutual-benefit-oriented associations can seek either small alterations in the social structure via cooperative action or major, significant social change. Organizations seeking such real change are the only true pressure groups. Membership in them may, in fact, tell us something about the character of a society.

Further evidence as to the character of a society may be gathered from an analysis of the membership of voluntary associations. A description of the rates of participation in these associations will show that it is highly correlated with most measures of socio-economic status. The correlation is not absolute, in that some persons of lower socio-economic status do participate in voluntary associations. What must be done is to ascertain the means for encouraging the participation of the poor, the uneducated, the worker, the unemployed. Societies which fail to encourage such participation can hardly be considered pluralist.

B. The Historical Basis of an Economic Elite

Manizales is located atop a ridge on the western slopes of the Central Range of the Andes in central Colombia. This is not a traditional hacienda area; rather it was settled by independent individual farmers. Nevertheless, from the very beginning of the history of Manizales there has been evidence of a class hierarchy. As early as 1852 (two years after the community was founded) the 3000 inhabitants were divided into six economic categories, on the basis of which their taxes were assessed.

Strategically located astride a number of trade routes, the city became the commercial hub of central Colombia. Its political importance grew also: it was made capital of the Provincia del Sur de Antioquia in 1876 and of the Departamento de Caldas in 1905. The city's commercial significance continued to expand until by 1959 it was estimated that more than 25 percent of all Colombian export trade was handled by Manizales merchants. There has grown up a powerful merchant class which is very active in national and even international politics.

C. History of Voluntary Associations in Manizales

The city's tradition of organized charity goes back to 1870, when a committee was formed to found a charity hospital. In that decade also was founded the Catholic Society, whose members paid dues to support the hospital and to finance schools, food, and clothing for poor children. Other charitable associations also appeared--the Charity Society (1890), the Saint Vincent de Paul Society (1890), the Red Cross (early 1900s), etc. It became a pattern for these groups to open a charitable institution, like the hospital, run it for a time and then turn it over to the government to maintain. The very existence of organizations like these--founded by the rich to aid the poor--gave evidence of the elitist character of the society.

Mutual-benefit organizations started up at about the same time. One of the most important of these was the Commercial League (1913), which consisted of merchants and served as a debt-collecting agency for them. That same year saw the founding of a Chamber of Commerce. There were also a number of mutual aid societies founded by workers and a few individual trade guilds with similar functions.

Labor unions were formed in the early 1900s, but their life expectancy was short. Most enrolled artisans and these had a higher survival rate than did industrial unions, but a large proportion of the labor force was never involved.

II. PARTICIPATION IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

A study was conducted through Manizales' high schools¹ to explore the relationship of the city's socio-economic elite with participation in voluntary associations. There are 32 high schools, technical schools, and commercial schools in the city. Only one-fourth of them are public schools. Of the private schools, 16 are high schools and 6 are commercial schools. Questionnaires were sent home with a 50 percent sample of the population of these 32 schools and the students were asked to fill out the form for their parents in the case that the parents were illiterate. (This is another reason that the high schools were used, the fact that in many cases the student would have to do the writing.) A total of 1,045 questionnaires were returned of the 4,870 that were distributed. The following figures are based on the analysis of these data.²

The questionnaire asked that the students name all the organizations to which their parents belonged, state whether they were an officer in the organization, and whether they considered themselves to be very active, active, or not too active in the organization. Using this information I constructed a participation scale ranging from 1 to 6 for any one organization (1 point for "not too active," 2 for "active," and 3 for "very active." This was multiplied by 2 if the person was an officer in the organization). I used only the scores of the father, or in the case where there was no father in the family, the score of the mother. The range is shown in Table 1.

Twenty-six percent of the respondents belong to more than one organization. Given the nature of the biases of the sample, I anticipate that less than 10 percent of the total population belongs to any organization.³ Table 2 shows how closely the rates of participation in voluntary associations are related to a major index of socio-economic status.

¹This was a highly biased sample--only 2 percent of the population of poor barrios ever get to high school--but limitation of funds prevented a random sample of the total population of 200,000. A biased sample seemed better than none.

²A fuller methodological discussion of the e data can be found in George F. Drake, "Elites and Voluntary Associations: A Study of Community Power in Manizales, Colombia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970), App. I.

³There are three relevant biases: only 1.5 percent of the population of the four poorest barrios had gone to high school; lower class respondents were unable to report accurately on organizations to which they belong (e.g., more than 60 "dead" unions were cited); those poor people who do get their children into high school are atypical and may have a greater commitment to such middle class values as participation in organizations.

Table 1. Distribution of Respondents by Participation Score^a

Participation Score	Percent of Respondents	N =
0	74	771
1-6	16	166
7-12	6	65
13-18	3	27
19+	2	16
Total	100%	1,045

^aThe intervals used indicate minimally: 1 membership for the 1-6 range; 2 for the 7-12 range; 3 for the 13-18 range; 4 for the 19+ range.

Table 2. Percentage of Persons in Each Income Group Belonging to One or More Organizations

Income in Pesos/Month	Percent Belonging to 1+ Organizations	N =
Under 500	11	150
500-1,000	23	331
1,001-3,000	30	250
Over 3,000	54	103
		834
Income not reported		211
Total		1,045

Studies show that the percentage of the population which participates in no organizations is 43 in the United States⁴ and 90 in Mexico.⁵ Table 3 reveals that the participation rate in Manizales seems to be lower than that in the U.S. for primary and secondary educational levels while comparable with that of Mexico. For those who have had some university education, though, there is a significant difference in the trend. One explanation may be that this society is still highly ascriptive, i.e., many positions are filled by virtue of one's birth rather than one's education. Hence, one would not necessarily find the same relationship between education and participation in organizations that exists in a more achievement-oriented society.

⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 301.

⁵ Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 317.

Table 3. Percentage of Respondents Belonging to One or More Organizations by Education

Level of Schooling	U.S. ^a	Mexico ^a	Manizales
Primary or less	46	21	19
Some secondary	55	39	34
University	80	68	34

^aGabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 304.

Manizales has 73 barrios. These were ranked according to a prestige scale.⁶ Table 4 shows the relationship of this ranking to organizational participation. The figures are close to those in Table 2 because of all respondents who earned more than 3000 pesos (US\$200) per month, 66 percent lived in the high prestige barrios.

Table 4. Participation in Voluntary Organizations by Prestige of Barrio

Prestige of Barrio	N =	Percent of Respondents Belonging to 1+ Organizations	
			N =
High	15	53	116
Medium	36	24	512
Low	22	22	152

Another finding was that those who had the highest propensity to participate in voluntary associations also sent their children to the schools of highest prestige. Sending one's child to a school of high prestige is an indication of both wealth and status in that these schools are all private and are also the most expensive. (See Table 5.)

Table 5. Participation in Voluntary Organizations by Prestige of School of Child

Prestige of School	Percent of Respondents Belonging to 1+ Organizations	
		N =
High	82	39
Medium	31	396
Low	20	174
	Total	609

⁶See Drake, "Elites and Voluntary Associations," App. I.

One of the assumptions of pluralists is that persons have multiple memberships in organizations in a democratic society. Studies in the U.S. show that multiple membership is even more a function of socio-economic class than is belonging to even one organization. In Manizales I took into consideration the level of participation in the organization with a scale ranging from 0 to 6. In the tabulations I worked with a distribution of 0, 1-6, 7-12, 13-18, and 19 and above. Table 6 shows the percentage of total responses for each range in participation for the respondents living in the high prestige barrios, having an income of over 3,000 pesos per month, having a college education, and sending their child to a high prestige school.

Table 6. Percent of Total Responses for Each Participation Range by Highest Ranges in Barrio Prestige, Income, Education, and School Prestige

	Participation Level				
	0	1-6	7-12	13-18	19+
High prestige barrio	10	18	35	55	62
Income over 3,000/mo.	8	18	19	61	67
College education	13	14	17	30	38
High prestige school	2	10	22	24	55

The percent of all respondents represented in each of these highest categories is: High prestige barrio = 15%; Income over 3,000 pesos/mo. = 12%; College education = 14%; High prestige school = 6%.

Table 6 notes that those persons living in the high prestige barrios, while comprising only 15 percent of the population, have 62 percent of those individuals who had a participation score of 19 or more (representing minimally 4 organizational memberships), and 55 percent of those individuals who had a participation score of 13-18 (representing a minimum of 3 memberships). The same pattern holds true for the category of persons who earn over 3,000 pesos a month, for while it comprised 12 percent of the respondents it had 67 percent of those persons who had a participation score of 19+ and 61 percent of those with a score of 13-18.

Conclusion

Participation in voluntary associations is seen to be a function of socio-economic status with persons of the highest status having the highest level of participation. Persons of highest income, highest education, and the amenities of upper class status (better barrio of residence and better school for the children) are most likely to participate in the voluntary associations of the city. These same persons are those most likely to have multiple memberships. If, as pluralists claim, voluntary associations serve as a means of making known to the government the wishes of the people we can only conclude that the wishes of the community's socio-economic elite are those that are being communicated to the government.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

Pluralists assume that a voluntary association will be formed as soon as there is a felt need for such an organization on the part of a segment of the population. I find, however, that the interests of the rich and the powerful in the community are those that are best represented by the presence of voluntary associations. The pluralist claims that the only effective restraint on the power of this ruling class is the formation of voluntary associations by the subordinate population. The implications of this are twofold: first, that the lower classes are equally as capable of forming organizations; second, that the dominant class, accepting the rules of the game, would be neutral towards their formation. Historically, in Manizales, those groups formed for the dispensation of charity and to protect the interests of the rich were long-lived, while those formed to protect the interests of the poor were short-lived. This chapter will examine some of the variables of organizational dynamics, beginning with the age of given voluntary associations.

A. Age

Table 7, which is based on data gathered in interviews with the presidents of 234 organizations in Manizales, shows that fewer than one-fifth of the 219 organizations for which we have data were founded prior to 1950, one-fourth of them were founded in the 1950s, and an average of about 15 per year were founded in the 1960s. The majority of the organizations that were formed in the earlier part of this century and that were still functioning in 1967 were organizations made up of persons who had the time and the resources to participate in the dispensing of charity. Most of the rest were founded for the protection of the business interests of the rich or for the entertainment of the well-to-do.

Table 7. Age by Type of Organization

Type of Organization	Date of Founding			
	Prior to 1950	1950 to 1959	1960 to 1963	1964 to 1967
1. Professional	0	7	3	10
2. Labor Unions	15	13	16	12
3. Civic and Service	15	13	9	6
4. Business and Economic	2	2	1	2
5. Social and Recreational	4	5	4	6
6. Educational and Cultural	0	3	4	7
7. Coop/Comm. Development	3	11	22	21
8. Political	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total	40	54	60	65

B. Finances

Table 8 shows the sources of income for Manizales' voluntary associations. These data indicate that three types of organizations--Civic and Service, Social and Recreational, Coop./Comm. Development--derive most of their income from outside sources. The first two types of organization, composed largely of persons of the middle and upper classes, solicit funds from banks and businesses. Many of the business and financial institutions of the city maintain funds for "donations" or "public service." To a great extent they determine which organizations in the community will be supported and which will be allowed to die for want of funds. For this reason personal contacts with banks and major businesses are important.

Table 8. Percent of Organizational Income from Membership by Type of Organization

Type of Organization	Less than 70%	Over 70%	Total N =
1. Professional	3	17	20
2. Labor Unions	3	56	59
3. Civic and Service	25	20	45
4. Business and Economic	2	6	8
5. Social and Recreational	12	8	20
6. Educational and Cultural	6	9	15
7. Coop/Comm. Development	39	19	58
8. Political	0	4	4
Total	90	139	229

Cooperatives and community development organizations also derive the bulk of their income from outside sources. The former, which are principally mutual aid societies, pose no real threat to the elite. Community development groups, on the other hand, are of great concern to the elite. Their funds come from government grants; hence, they are dependent for their survival on the continuing good will of the group in political power. By law such agents of authority as police inspectors and parish priests take a major role in the organization of such groups. These, along with labor unions (which must rely on the limited incomes of their members for funds), are the principal voluntary associations representing the interests of the poorer members of the community.

C. Problems With the Authorities

Nineteen leaders of organizations admitted in interviews that their groups had had difficulties with the authorities. This is certainly an absolute minimum. Nine of the 19 organizations that reported problems with the local authorities were labor unions, many of them belonging to the local communist-affiliated labor federation as well

as the federation itself. Almost all the rest of the organizations reporting problems with the authorities were community development groups and cooperatives. Given this, it is no surprise that the level of association between "having problems with the authorities" and the percentage of the membership of the organization of the lowest income groups is +.51 (Gamma). The association with the percentage of the membership coming from the working class is +.404, while the relationship with the percentage of the membership coming from the management and professional occupational group is -.81.

The leaders of the organizations were also asked to respond to the following: "Do you feel that there exist pressures against your organization to limit its activities or to destroy it?" and "The group is under outside pressures." (The latter statement asked for a response of "very true, more or less true, neither true nor false, more or less false, and very false.") Sixty-eight organization presidents said there were pressures against their organizations to limit their activities or to destroy them. Sixteen organizations responded "very true" or "more or less true" to the second question. Along with this were the 19 which had problems with the authorities. A coercion scale was constructed ranging from 0-3 for which one point was given for an affirmative response for each of three items. Table 9 shows the distribution of coercion by type of organization. From it we can note that the labor unions, cooperatives, and the community development groups accrue a total of 71 percent of the coercion values while comprising only 51 percent of the organizations studied.

Table 9. Distribution of Coercion by Type of Organization

Type of Organization	Coercion				N =	Percent of Total
	0	1	2	3		
1. Professional	14	5	1	0	20	7
2. Labor Unions	31	20	7	2	60	40
3. Civic and Service	43	3	2	0	48	7
4. Business and Economic	6	1	1	0	8	3
5. Social and Recreational	14	5	1	0	20	7
6. Educational and Cultural	11	4	0	0	15	4
7. Coop/Comm. Development	32	23	4	0	59	31
8. Political	3	1	0	0	4	1
Total	154	62	16	2	234	100%

This information indicates the unreality of the assumptions of the pluralists that organizations of the poor and the workers will be given an equal chance for survival in a social system. Even if one assumes that the members of the organization of the lower classes, or their leaders, have skills in organizational management comparable to those of the upper classes, they are nevertheless confronted with an environment that is inimical to the survival of their organizations.

D. Pressure Group Activities of the Organizations

One of the major assumptions of the pluralists is that the voluntary organizations will function to permit the citizens to make their concerns known to the government. In Manizales we asked the presidents of the voluntary organizations in the study two questions relating to their lobbying or pressure group activities: 1) "Has your organization sent any resolutions or petitions to any government representative in the past year?" 2) "Has your organization sent a delegate or a commission to visit any representative of the government in the past year?" To question 1) the responses were Yes = 118; No = 115. To question 2) the responses were Yes = 107; No = 127. If an organization response was Yes to both 1) and 2), then the organization was given a score of 2. If the response was Yes to one question but No to the other it was scored 1. If the response was No to both questions then it was scored 0.

Table 10. Distribution of Pressure Group Score by Type of Organization

Type of Organization	Pressure Group Score			Percent of Possible ^a
	0	1	2	
1. Professional	9	3	8	47.5
2. Labor Unions	19	11	30	59.2
3. Civic and Service	32	4	12	29.1
4. Business and Economic	3	1	4	56.3
5. Social and Recreational	8	6	6	45.0
6. Educational and Cultural	9	3	3	30.0
7. Coop/Comm. Development	18	14	27	57.6
8. Political	3	0	1	25.0
Total	102	42	90	

^aComputed by figuring the total possible score for each category and then dividing this into the achieved score.

Table 10 indicates that 132 of the 234 organizations made contact with a government official at least once in the previous year. The table also shows that Labor Unions and Cooperatives and Community Development groups rated in the first and second categories with 59.2 and 57.6 percent of the possible score attainable for such activities. But close behind them are the Business and Economic groups with a pressure group score of 56.3 percent. There is a difference, though, between the various kinds of groups and their preference for one or another kind of activity. While fewer organizations in general sent committees to call on public officials there were three kinds of organizations that sent more committees than letters, these being Business and Economic, Social and Recreational, and Educational and Cultural groups, i.e., mainly the groups of the elite or the upper middle and

upper classes of the community. (Of the 39 organizations in these three categories on which we have information 32 of the presidents earn over 1,000 pesos per month or more and one-third of them [13] had an income of 5,000 pesos or more per month.)

We see from Table 10 that 19 labor unions sent no letter or committee to any government agency or official and that 31 unions had a coercion score of 0. These organizations obviously were not functioning as change agencies in the community social system. They may have been instrumental mutual benefit associations but were not conflict groups.¹ The pluralist would count them as agencies of a pluralist society. Without further analysis, I would be skeptical of such assumptions.

E. Conclusions

We have seen from the data presented in this chapter that the ongoing voluntary associations in Manizales effectively represent only the interests of the ruling class. Such associations have been operative longest and have the most secure financial bases.² Organizations which might represent the interests of the poorer members of the community are either financially unstable (e.g., labor unions) or dependent on and closely supervised by the government (e.g., community development groups). These types of organizations had a disproportionate share of troubles with the authorities and were not able to exert effective pressure on the government.

We can only conclude then that not only are the interests of the ruling class best represented by the organizational structure of the city but that the cards are stacked against the development and survival of organizations that could possibly serve as a force for expressing the interests of the "gente popular."

¹Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959). In my analysis of the 234 organizations I found that there is a coefficient of correlation between pressure group activities and coercion of +.37 (.001 level of significance).

²Supporting this is a finding that the coefficient of correlation between budget and age of an organization is +.30 (significant at the .001 level).

IV. LA OLIGARQUIA Y LA ROSCA

Manizales, in 1967, was a city of over 200,000 population, capital of the State of Caldas, seat of an Archbishop, and the location of three universities. It had several large industries employing over 800 persons each and was one of the major commercial centers of the country.

During several years of residence in the city I had heard reference to "la oligarquia" (the oligarchy) and "la rosca" (the clique). The first term was most often used to describe the rich and powerful ruling class of the city, while the second was more often used in discussing particular decisions that had been made in community affairs. The feeling was that there was a traditional ruling power structure made up of the old families of the city but that within this there were one or more cliques that dominated important decision-making areas. It was my intent to try to ascertain the nature of the relationship of the oligarchy and the cliques to the organizational life of the community.

A. Reputational Leaders

The method of analysis used to determine the power structure of Manizales is a modification of that developed by Charles M. Bonjean and first applied to a study of Burlington, North Carolina, in 1962. In that study Bonjean began by asking the general secretaries of community associations: "Who are the community leaders who really get things done around here?"¹ Using this list of names, up to 20 from each respondent, Bonjean then interviewed the persons named and asked them the same question, "until new lists yielded many more duplications than nominations."² After 45 interviews he had a list of 116 persons, with relatively high agreement on the top 16 names, which he then called "leaders." Of the 45 persons interviewed, only 38 supplied names, the others refusing to participate. Of the 16 leaders who were on the top of the list, Bonjean had already had interviews with 12, but 2 of the 12 had declined to give him a list of nominations.

Bonjean then compared the nominations from the 10 persons in the leader category with the nominations from the remaining 28 of the original 38 informants. In this comparison he found that the leaders offered a list of persons that was somewhat different from the non-leaders. When he found that both groups nominated the same person, he called that person a "visible leader." When only the leaders named a person, Bonjean called that person a "concealed leader"; when the non-leaders named a person that the leaders failed

¹ Charles M. Bonjean, "Community Leadership: A Case Study and Conceptual Refinement," AJS, 47 (May 1963): 673.

² Ibid., p. 674.

to name, he called the persons a "symbolic leader." Bonjean discusses the differences between the various categories of leaders.

In 1964 Delbert C. Miller and James L. Dirksen replicated the study in Indiana City.³ Burlington, at the time of Bonjean's study, had a population of 33,000 while the population of Indiana City was 32,000. The Miller and Dirksen study substantiates the study of Bonjean and suggests that the method is of value in the delineation of the reputational elites of a community and the differentiation between the various sorts of elites, i.e., visible, concealed, and symbolic.

In Manizales I modified the technique by using two entirely different lists of persons for the comparison. The first list was generated by asking the presidents of 275 voluntary associations in the city the question: "Suppose that an important problem existed that the community had to resolve, one that required a decision by a group of leaders who would be accepted by almost everyone. Which persons would you choose to form this group, whether you know them personally or not?"⁴ The person being interviewed could nominate as many or as few persons as he wished. There were six spaces provided in the interview schedule and most persons being interviewed offered this many or fewer names. They were not encouraged to give any specific number or to put the names in any order of preference. All these nominations were tallied by entering them on cards for each individual named. They are given in Table 11 in rank order by number of nominations received, along with the various formal positions that they currently or formerly held in the institutional sector of the city, state, and/or nation.

A second list of reputational leaders was generated. To obtain this second list, I first prepared a list of "informants" who were to be interviewed and asked the question that was asked of the presidents of the voluntary associations. The list of informants included everyone who received five or more nominations from the presidents of the voluntary associations, all the persons who occupied the positions given in the positional structure of the city,⁵ all persons who showed up in a review of ten important decisions in the city in the past five years, and the secretaries general of three major organizations in the

³ Delbert C. Miller and James L. Dirksen, "The Identification of Visible, Concealed, and Symbolic Leaders in a Small Indiana City: A Replication of the Bonjean-Noland Study of Burlington, North Carolina," Social Forces, 43 (May 1965): 548-555.

⁴ Robert Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 443.

⁵ See George F. Drake, "Elites and Voluntary Associations: A Study of Community Power in Manizales, Colombia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1970), App. I.

Table 11. List of Reputational Leaders of Manizales Obtained from Presidents of 275 Voluntary Associations

Name	No. of Nominations	Current Position	Former Positions
A	63	Ambassador	Minister, Governor, Mayor
B	25	President City Council	
C	24	University President	
D	23	Economic Leader	
E	20	Economic Leader	Mayor
F	18	---	Mayor
G	16	Church Welfare Director	
H	15	Head of Liberal party in the state	
I	13	Cura of the Cathedral	
J	13	State Assemblyman	
K	13	Director of community development for the city	
L	12	Mayor	
M	11	State Assemblyman	
N	10	State Senator	
O	10	Archbishop	
P	9	Secretary General of Labor Federation	
Q	9	Head of Tourism Board	
R	9	State Senator	
S	8	Governor	

community. This produced a list of 120 potential informants. Interviews were attempted with all of them and successfully completed with 111. All the persons who were named five or more times by the 111 informants are given in Table 12.

Working on the assumption that the persons named five or more times are more knowledgeable about the power structure of the community than were the total group of 111, I recounted the nominations of those Top Influentials from whom we had nominations and prepared a new listing of those persons they thought were the most influential in the community. This new list, called the Key Influentials, is given in Table 13. All persons on the Key Influential list received two or more votes from the Top Influentials. Actually only 18 of the Top Influentials participated in the naming of individuals for the Key positions since we had no interviews with four of them and another four declined to nominate anyone during the interview.

When one compares Table 11 with Table 13, there is a difference to be noted. If the two lists were identical we would, in fact, have a single list of reputational leaders who were recognized as such by the presidents of the voluntary associations as well as by the

Table 12. Top Influentials Nominated by 111 Community Informants

Rank	Name	Nominations	Rank	Name	Nominations
1	B	53	14	F	7
2	D	38	15	L	7
3	A	28	16	X	7
4	T	20	17	Y	6
5	H	19	18	Z	6
6	M	19	19	I	6
7	C	18	20	AA	6
8	U	16	21	BB	5
9	E	15	22	CC	5
10	V	12	23	DD	5
11	W	10	24	EE	5
12	J	7	25	FF	5
13	N	7	26	GG	5

Table 13. Key Influentials

Rank	Name	Nominations	Rank	Name	Nominations
1	B	12	12-23	Y	2
2	D	8	12-23	HH	2
3-4	T	7	12-23	C	2
3-4	E	7	12-23	I	2
5	A	6	12-23	Q	2
6-7	H	5	12-23	CC	2
6-7	V	5	12-23	R	2
8-9	W	4	12-23	EE	2
8-9	M	4	12-23	X	2
10-11	AA	3	12-23	II	2
10-11	FF	3	12-23	JJ	2

Top Influentials. Since there is a difference between the two lists we have, in effect, not two but three categories of reputational leaders, as was found by Bonjean and Miller in the works already cited.

B. Visible Leaders

A comparison of the two lists in Tables 11 and 13 shows that there are some persons named as community leaders by both the presidents of the voluntary associations and the Top Influentials. Using the terminology that has been established for this methodology, I designate these persons "Visible Leaders" (see Table 14). Their careers are described in some detail below.

"A" was appointed to serve as the Colombian Ambassador to Brazil during the time of this study. He was formerly Ambassador to France

Table 14. Visible Leaders

Name	Ranking by Presidents of Voluntary Organizations	Ranking by the Top Influentials
A	1	5
B	2	1
D	4	2
E	5	3-4
H	8	6-7
C	3	12-23
I	9	12-23
M	13	8-9
Q	17	12-23
R	18	12-23

and to the United Nations. He served as Mayor of Manizales on two occasions and also as governor. On the national level he has served as Minister of Government and as Foreign Minister. He is a person of national prominence. But "A" is also a person who epitomizes the elitest position vis à vis the formation of interest groups of the poor and the workers. He was Minister of Government at the time that the national program of community development (Acción Comunal) was established but has remarked during an interview with the author that "it is a dangerous program that is being taken over by the communists." He referred to it as "minifundismo civico," claiming that each of the separate barrio groups are always fighting for the limited amount of public resources available for distribution. "If I gave the money to one barrio for the construction of a school the next barrio would take me to task for not giving them an equal amount," he said. Another group that "A" considers to be antithetical to the well-being of the nation is the labor unions. "They are an elite," he commented, "who are concerned only with their own self interest. They do not take into consideration the impact of their demands on the economy of the nation." Rural labor unions were anathema to "A" (he is the largest single coffee grower in the nation). On being asked if there were no voluntary organizations that were working for the good of the nation, he replied, "Of course there are; for instance, there is ANDI (The National Association of Manufacturers), the Coffee Federation, the Cattle Growers, the Chambers of Commerce, etc." (On July 20, 1970, the New York Times reported that "A" was kidnapped by communist guerrillas and ransomed for \$100,000.)

"B" is a member of 22 organizations in the city of Manizales. He is the owner (with his brothers) of the largest local chocolate industry, an industry that was significant in the growth of the city. "B" is a member of the city council, president of the Chamber of Commerce, member of the board of several banks and financial institutions, member of the board of directors of the Coffee Growers Committee for the state (one of the most powerful in the nation), member of the board of the Cattle Fund. Besides this he is the president of a

voluntary association known locally by the name of Corporación de la Sagrada Familia and called the Mano Negra (Black Hand) by many who see it as an instrument for the subjugation of the masses. "B" is adamantly opposed to the formation of labor unions and was responsible for firing some of his oldest employees who dared to discuss the possibility of organizing a branch of the national union in the local plant of his company.

"C" is a member of some 30 organizations, most of which are the boards of directors of financial and industrial firms connected with the Corporación Financiera de Caldas, of which he is president. He is a cousin of "B" and a member of a family that has played an important role in the development of the city as merchants and industrialists. "C," as putative leader of the informal clique to be discussed later, is also against the formation of labor unions; none survive in organizations on whose board he sits.

"E" is the Grand Old Man of Coffee and is perhaps the most powerful single individual in Colombia when it comes to the field of coffee politics. He is the president of the coffee growers committee for the State of Caldas (which at one time produced 40 percent of the nation's coffee), president of the board of directors of the Banco Cafetero (Coffee Bank). Other memberships include the coffee growers cooperative, the Manuel Mejia Foundation, National Red Cross, Financial Corporation of Caldas, and the Cattleman's Fund. He is on the board of directors of the Tourism Office for the city and has served as mayor on three different occasions. "E" and his sons were instrumental in providing the aid to the Cruzada Social in their work in Barrio Pio XII (see below) as an attempt to reduce the influence of "communism" in that sector of the city.

"H" is the president of the Liberal party in the State of Caldas. He has been Mayor of Manizales and has been a member of the city council for seven different terms. He is an economic leader of the community and founding member of several of the most important financial institutions in the city. He is a member of the board of directors of the city lottery, which is the income-producing agency for the welfare activities of the city.

"C" is the President of the University of Caldas, president of the National Association of University Presidents, and member of numerous associations. He is one of the economic leaders of the city and is reputed to be one of the wealthiest individuals in the community. He is a member of the board of directors of the Coffee Bank and owner of extensive farms as well as commercial enterprises. While he has no active membership in any of the local action groups, his wife is one of the leading ladies in the Cruzada Social and in the activities of the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia.

"I" is the only member of the church hierarchy who appears on the list as a visible leader. He is the cura of the cathedral, and active in the administration of the largest parish in the city. He is one of the leading members of the Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas

and has served as President of that organization. He is quite conservative in his view of the rights and prerogatives of the church in the community.

"M" is a member of 22 organizations in the city, most of which are boards of directors of industrial corporations. He is the manager of the largest industry in the city and a member of the State Assembly. "M" is a cousin to "C" and a member of the clique (rosca) that is reputed to have the most power in the community. He is "vehemently and adamantly against the formation of industrial labor unions in the city," says one of the socially conscious priests in Manizales who tried to work in the field of labor relations.

"Q" is director of the Tourism Office for the city and is vice-president of the wealthiest voluntary organization in the city, the Sociedad de San Vicente de Paul. He is a member of the board of directors of a bank and is active in a number of agricultural enterprises. He is the youngest of the community leaders.

"R" is the head of the conservatives in the National Senate and is the State Senator from Caldas, formerly Mayor of Manizales, and Governor of the state. He is owner of the influential daily newspaper in the city, La Patria, as well as owner of several commercial enterprises in the city. He is cousin to "B."

Table 15. Visible Leadership in Manizales

Name	Born in Manizales	Age	Highest Government Office Held	Education	Travel
A	Yes	66	Minister	Univ.	Europe, Americas
B	Yes	45	City Council	Univ.	U.S.
D	Yes	42	Assembly	3rd yr. H.S.	Worldwide
E	Yes	79	Mayor	6th yr. H.S.	Europe, Americas
H	Yes	50	Mayor	Univ.	Europe, Americas
C	Yes	50	None	M.D.	World
I	Yes	73	None	Seminary	U.S.
M	Yes	43	State Assembly	Univ.	Europe, Americas
Q	Yes	36	None	5th yr. H.S.	Americas
R	Yes	?	Governor	Univ.	World

Other characteristics of these 10 Visible Leaders are given in Table 15. Several factors emerge from an analysis of that table. The first is that all of the Visible Leaders are currently positional leaders in the city, and seven of the 10 have held or currently hold

high political office. Another factor is that of the level of education shown in the group: in a nation where less than 1 percent of the population have finished high school, we find that most of the Visible Leaders have finished the six years of high school and that a number have a university degree. Most of them are extensive travelers. All except the priest are members of the main social club, Club Manizales, which charges an initiation fee equal to \$1,000 for its limited membership.

C. Symbolic Leaders

A further comparison of the two lists in Tables 11 and 13 shows that a number of names appear only on the list provided by the presidents of the voluntary organizations. This group of individuals is considered to be Symbolic Leaders (see Table 16); i.e., presidents of the city's voluntary associations consider these individuals to be influential in the community but the Top Influentials do not include them among those they would place on a committee to solve a serious local problem. They are discussed in detail below to give us a better idea of why the general public considers them as influential while they are ignored by the Top Influentials.

Table 16. Symbolic Leaders

Name	Rank from Organization Presidents	Name	Rank from Organization Presidents
F	6	N	14
G	7	O	15
J	10	P	16
K	11	S	19
L	12		

"F" was born in 1921 in Manizales and has a university degree from the School of Mines in Medellin. He has served in the city government on several occasions, twice as Mayor and twice as Secretary of Public Works. He has also been a member of the City Council, head of the City Assessment Board, and for one term served in the National Assembly as a representative from Manizales. He is very active in the Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas, most especially in its campaign to bring the Pan-American Highway past Manizales. He is a dynamic administrator and was constantly away from his desk, visiting the poor barrios of the city. He is a political protegé of "A" and followed "A" in office as Mayor. (The President of the nation appoints the Governor and he, in turn, appoints the Mayor.) Because of his dynamism and frequent contacts with the masses of the community, "F" was remembered by the organization leaders and named as a community influential even though at the time of the interviews he held no formal position in the government and, in fact, met none of the criteria established for inclusion in the positional community leader list. He is not an economic elite.

"G" is a priest who has a dynamic oratorical manner and a weekly radio program, "The Catholic Hour," that is now in its 31st year of broadcasting. "G" has been active in most of the social activities of the archdiocese. He claims to be one of the founders of the national Catholic Labor Union, "Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia." In Caldas he has long been associated with the labor union movement. For many years he has been the representative of the Archbishop to all of the social welfare organizations in the archdiocese. He is the representative of the archbishop on the state Community Development Council. When landslides caused extensive loss of life and property in several of the slum areas of the city, "G" was named as leader of a committee to raise money for the sufferers. The appearance of "G" as a Symbolic Leader was at first a surprise to the investigator, but on learning that at least three criminal or civil investigations were being conducted on the activities of the priest, and that the Archbishop had literally confined him to quarters, it was understood why this person would be on the symbolic list. The fact that the members of the oligarchy were privy to much of the information on the status of "G" while the organization leaders knew nothing of this would cause the elite of the city to ignore "G" while the ordinary citizen would still think "G" had power.

"J" is the only woman who appears on either of the lists. She is a staunch conservative and a woman who often exercises her influence with government officials. She is a representative in the State Legislature and represented Colombia to the International Conference on Women held in Washington in 1959. She is a member of the national board of directors of the Red Cross and vice-president of the state chapter. She is vice-president of the Conservative party for the state.

"K" is the director of the city program of community development. In this capacity he is constantly working with the various citizens' committees in the slums of the city. He is 37 years old and personable and is rarely found in his office but rather is in the field meeting with the barrio leaders.

"L" was the Mayor in office at the beginning of the study. He is a Liberal and while having resided in Manizales for over 20 years is thought of by members of the oligarchy as an outsider. He is a civil engineer and it was a matter of conflict of interests that caused his resignation from the office of Mayor. He was an energetic and popular Mayor.

"N" is one of the current Senators of the Republic from Caldas. He has formerly held office as Governor, as Minister of the Government, and other city and state offices. He, too, is a liberal and is thought of as a serious and capable professional politician. For the past seven years he has held the position of Senator, Governor, or Minister, removing him from the immediacy of local decision-making.

"O" is the archbishop of Manizales. He was born in the neighboring state and has held his office for eight years. He is a

conservative in his concept of the relationship of the church to secular affairs. The archbishop is a Symbolic Leader in that the leaders of the voluntary organizations feel that he is instrumental in effecting decisions in the city. As it turns out, the key community leaders disagree. But the archbishop does have power, mainly in his ability to stop something he does not like. Since the newspaper is owned by a conservative he has quite a bit of influence there and can have the news censored to his taste when he feels it necessary to protect the reputation of the church. He is a large landholder and is adamantly opposed to the formation of rural labor unions.

"P" is the secretary-general of the Catholic labor federation. Some of the leaders of the labor movement in the city see him as a capable leader. The elites of the community feel "P" is irrelevant to the decision-making process of solving real community problems. With the division of the state into two states the labor federation was also cut in size, leaving the current federation financially extremely weak.

"S" is the Governor of Caldas and has held almost every major political position except Minister. He was most recently Secretary General for the President of the Republic. On leaving this position President Valencia obtained for him the nomination as Governor of Caldas, his home state. He still acts somewhat of a stranger in the city where he has not lived for many years.

One wonders why the current State Senator, Mayor, Archbishop, Governor, and State Assemblywoman are all listed as Symbolic Leaders. The answer might lie in the nature of the question used to elicit from the persons being interviewed the names for the formation of the group. By limiting the phrasing to "the resolution of a serious local problem" we might have cut off from consideration those persons from the community who were acting out roles that transcended the local arena of action. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the organizational leaders thought that these persons were those who should be called on while the Top Influentials did not so consider them.

Table 17 provides additional data on Symbolic Leaders. Not a single one is an economic leader. Two of the persons on the list obviously owe their nominations to the positions they hold in various institutional structures that include numerous voluntary organizations, e.g., the director of the office of community development (we included interviews with 28 community development groups in our 275 voluntary organizations) and the Secretary General of a labor union federation (we had several score of labor unions of the various federations in our organizational interviews). The educational level of the symbolic leaders is also very high and they are, as a group, well traveled.

Among the symbolic leaders we find fewer members of the Club Manizales. The priest and the archbishop do not hold memberships. The heads of the labor federation and community development office do not have memberships (the initiation fee would equal more than two years' income for both). In terms of the place of birth of the

Table 17. Symbolic Leadership in Manizales

Name	Born in Manizales	Age	Highest Government Office Held	Education	Travel
F	Yes	46	National Assembly	Univ.	Americas
G	Yes	55	Sec. of Ed. State	Seminary	Americas
J	Yes	39	State Assembly	H.S.	Europe, Americas
K	No	38	Comm. Dev. Dir.	Univ.	None
L	No	40+	Mayor	Univ.	?
N	Yes	52	Minister	Univ.	World
O	No	68	None	Seminary	World
P	No	45	None	3rd yr. H.S.	U.S.
S	No	57	Governor	Univ.	Europe

Symbolic Leaders, four of them were born in Manizales, four of them born in other parts of the state, and one, the archbishop, born in a neighboring state. This is in contrast to the Visible Leaders, all of whom are from Manizales by birth. None of the Symbolic Leaders are closely related to the Visible or Concealed Leaders.

D. Concealed Leaders

A third category of persons emerges in comparing the two lists of rankings in Tables 11 and 13. This is the list of persons nominated for the group by the Top Influentials who did not receive sufficient nominations from the organizational presidents to be included in their list. They are designated Concealed Leaders (see Table 18).

Personal background information on the Concealed Leaders indicates that they are quite different as a group from the Symbolic Leaders.

Table 18. Concealed Leaders

Name	Rank from Top Influentials	Name	Rank from Top Influentials
T	3-4	HH	12-23
V	6-7	CC	12-23
W	8-9	EE	12-23
AA	10-11	JJ	12-23
FF	10-11	X	12-23
Y	12-23	II	12-23

"T" is President of the Conservative party for the state and recently served a term as state senator. He is an active industrialist, an economic leader in the community. Member of a prominent family

of Manizales, he is considered one of the strongest leaders in the community (ties for third place in the Key Influential ranking).

"V" is the manager and part owner of a large wholesale and retail dry good store that sells everything from household appliances to building materials. He is president of one of the most prestigious of the charity organizations in the city. Other memberships include board memberships of two of the major state monopolies, a bank, and a major insurance company.

"W" is the brother of "T" and is the manager of the largest match factory in the state (property of an important family of Manizales now moved to Bogotá). He is the vice-president of the new bank in the city and member of many boards of directors of industrial and commercial companies. He has served as Secretary General of the Ministry of Hacienda, as Mayor of Manizales, City Councilman, State Assemblyman, and as First Secretary of the Colombian Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

"AA" is a large landowner in the state, member of one of the founding families of Manizales, and one of the founders of the Financial Development Corporation. He has served as Ambassador and as Minister and on the boards of several local financial institutions. He makes his home in Bogotá but comes to Manizales quite often.

"FF" is cousin to "B" and "R" (Visible Leaders), and an active member in the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia (see below), of which "B" is the President. He is board member or part owner of several major industries in the city, and member of the board of one of the banks.

"Y" is the owner of a public relations and advertising firm that has a national clientele. He is on the board of directors of several industrial firms in the city and president of one of them. He readily assists most of the welfare organizations in the city that seek his help for advertising or promotional campaigns. He is a member of one of the oldest families in the city and can recount who is related to whom for several generations back. He has held no formal governmental post.

"HH" has lived in Manizales since 1905 (born in 1903). He has one degree in engineering and another in architecture. He has served in the City Council and the State Assembly and has held many appointive positions in various city and state offices. For the past three years he has been the Dean of the School of Engineering of the National University in the city.

"CC" is brother to "B." With his brother he is owner of the large family chocolate industry. He also serves on the board of directors of some of the major industries in the city and also on two of the major state monopolies. He has held no government posts.

"EE" is the son of "E" (Visible Leader) and is the director of the major Inter-American Development Bank project for the development

and diversification of agriculture in the coffee growing regions of Colombia. He has an M.S. degree from North Carolina State and has traveled the world studying the coffee market and growing regions. He is a member of the board of the Cattlemen's Bank and a member of the trustees (Consejo Superior) of the State University. He served one term on the City Council.

"JJ" is brother to "EE" and is manager of the cement plant on the edge of the city. He is a member of seven other boards of directors and was a founding member of the Financial Development Corporation of the state. He has held only one appointive position in the government and that was on completion of his university training (law) when he was appointed as judge in a nearby town. Since then he has dedicated himself to industry.

"X" is the manager of the state office of the National Association of Industrialists. He is brother-in-law to "T" and "W." He belongs to 15 boards of directors, several of them being industrial organizations but most of them being civic or welfare organizations. He is president of the Regional Committee of Scouting, president of the board of directors of the National Apprenticeship Schools for the state, a president of the Tourism and Development Board of the city, vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce, etc. He has served as secretary of the budget (Hacienda) for the state, as Mayor, as acting president of the State University, and on several occasions as Dean of the Law School of the University where he currently teaches several courses each year.

"II" is the father of "V," who has more or less retired from active participation in the development of new corporations and industries in the city. He is the president of several welfare (charity) organizations and is a highly respected member of the community.

Table 19 gives further data on this group. Eight of the 12 persons considered to be Concealed Leaders in Manizales are currently economic leaders and two of these are also positional leaders. Only one of the persons on whom we have data is not currently or was not formerly a positional leader.

Family ties are close within the Concealed Leaders. "T" and "W" are brothers, brothers-in-law to "X," and cousins to "C" (Visible Leader). "II" is father of "V," who is brother-in-law to "EE" and "JJ," who, in turn, are cousins of "Y" and sons of "E" (Visible Leader). "AA" is cousin to "D" and "M" (both Visible Leaders). "FF" is cousin to "CC" and to "CC's" brother "B" (Visible Leader). Only one of the 12 Concealed Leaders does not have family ties with other members of the power structure of Manizales ("HH").

When we look at the family relationships between the various elite of the community we note that of the ten Visible Leaders, four are related to other Visible Leaders. Seven of the ten Visible Leaders are related to one or more of nine of the 14 Concealed Leaders. Six of the Concealed Leaders are related to one or more of the other

Table 19. Concealed Leadership in Manizales

Name	Age	Born in Manizales	Education	Highest Government Office Held	Travel
T	43	No ^a	4th yr. H.S.	Senator	World
V	43	Yes	6th yr. H.S.	None	U.S., Europe
W	49	Yes	Univ.	Mayor	World
Y	58	No ^a	H.S.	None	U.S., Latin Am.
HH	65	No	Univ.	State Assembly	Europe
CC	51	Yes	H.S.	None	U.S., Latin Am.
EE	44	Yes	Univ.	City Councilman	World
JJ	38	Yes	Univ.	None	U.S., Latin Am.
X	53	No	Univ.	Mayor	U.S., Latin Am.
AA ^b			Univ.	Minister ^c	World
FF ^b					
II ^b					

^aBorn outside the city but parents were Manizalenos.

^bNo interview data.

^cOnly person currently holding public office on the list.

Concealed Leaders. Altogether, there are 27 family relationships between the 24 persons on the two lists. Not one of the Visible or Concealed Leaders was related to a Symbolic Leader. Only one of the persons who was related in the above network was not born of Manizaleno parents. In fact, if we look at the place of birth of the Visible, Symbolic, and Concealed Leaders, we find that of the 33 names on the three lists only seven were not Manizalenos by birth or born of Manizaleno parents who were out of the city for a period of time. Of these seven, five are Symbolic Leaders.

E. Los Azucenos

We have seen how the power structure of Manizales is viewed by the presidents of 275 voluntary organizations and by the reputational leaders of the community. These observations were based on the question in the interviews that sought to elicit a list of persons the interviewee thought should be on a committee to resolve a serious community problem. A variation of this technique was utilized in an attempt to ascertain if there was a single organization or clique of individuals who participated in most of the important decisions of the community. The community informant questionnaire included the question: "In some communities one finds [that] a small group of organizations or persons have a great influence in important community

decisions. In others it is not so. Do you think that this is so in Manizales?"⁶ If the respondent gave a "yes" answer he was asked: "What is the name or nickname of this group?"

Of the 111 persons interviewed, 30 answered the question by responding "Los Azucenos." Eighteen of the respondents named the Society for Public Improvement, 12 named the Industrial Development Corporation, ten named "a group of industrialists." The total list is given in Table 20; organizations listed there are all those named five or more times by the 111 informants.

Table 20. Group With Most Influence in Community Decisions


Name	Votes	Rank	Adjusted Votes	Adjusted Rank
Azucenos	30	1	52	1
Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas	18	2	18	2
Industrial Development Corporation	12	3		
Group of Industrialists	10	4		
Chamber of Commerce	8	5	8	3
Coffee Committee	6	6	6	4
National Association of Industrialists	5	7	5	5-6
Political Groups	5	8	5	5-6

Sixteen of the persons who said Los Azucenos were willing to provide a listing of those persons they thought comprised the clique. A comparison of this list with the persons most closely identified with the Industrial Development Corporation showed a very close fit. The "group of industrialists" named by ten of the 111 interviewed also seems to describe the same clique so we joined these responses. If we can accept these assumptions we then have almost half of the informants (52 of the 111) naming the same small group of individuals as comprising the major decision-making clique in the community.

A list of the names of the supposed members of the Azuceno clique was obtained by comparing the lists of those receiving the most nominations from persons who were themselves members of the clique and were willing to discuss the matter, and from some of their close associates. This revised list, obtained from eight interviews, is given in Table 21. It is interesting to note that the name of "LL" only appeared when the Azucenos themselves were asked who they considered to be a member of the clique. "LL," it seems, is a part of the group but

⁶Presthus, Men at the Top, p. 458.

NETWORK OF PERSONS JOINED BY NUMBERS OF MUTUAL MEMBERSHIPS IN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN MANIZALES



- A ○ AZUCENO
- a ● NON-AZUCENO
- 6 OR MORE JOINT MEMBERS
- - - - 5 JOINT MEMBERS

Table 21. Los Azucenos

Name	Nominations	Leader Category
D	8	Visible
GG	8	None
V	7	Concealed
M	6	Visible
KK	6	None
T	5	Concealed
B	5	Visible
W	4	Concealed
LL	4	None

his membership is known only to the insiders and a few of their friends. He was one of the few persons who refused to grant an interview to the research team; he felt that he was not a person of sufficient prominence in the community to be included in the study. It was noted by one of the members of the clique that "LL" had gone bankrupt in business and that the others in the clique had helped to set him up in his current store.

Besides using the reputational approach to the delineation of this clique we also tried to see if it was possible to ascertain its membership in another manner. Taking the data from the Chamber of Commerce that indicated the board memberships of all of the commercial and industrial establishments in the city, we fed these into a computer and programmed for a listing that indicated the strength of relationship between persons by virtue of the number of joint memberships in the same organizations. We found that of all the names appearing as members of the various boards of directors, only 17 persons were connected by five or more joint memberships. The full relationship between persons with five or more joint memberships in business and industrial organizations in Manizales is given in Diagram I.⁷ Only Azucenos have six or more joint memberships, except in one case where "D" and "E" are joined by six to each other and to "A," an Azuceno, by five each. While six of the Azucenos have six or more joint memberships a seventh is joined to the network by five joint memberships with two other Azucenos.

In Table 22 we give the age of the members of the clique and it is here that we can see graphically the fact that the group is a "new generation" of leaders in the community. They are all in their forties, five of the nine being 42 or 43 years of age. A number of them were classmates in the same private schools. In fact, this is given as the basis for the formation of the clique . . . classmates, sons

⁷The letters on the Diagram do not correspond with the letters designating the community Leadership as used herein.

Table 22. Azuceno Characteristics

Name	Age	Economic Elite	Computer Clique	Leader Category	Education
D	42	a-b-c-d-e	Yes	Visible	3rd yr. H.S.
GG	42	a-b-c-d	Yes	None	6th yr. H.S.
V	43	a-c	Yes	Concealed	6th yr. H.S.
M	43	a-b-c-d	Yes	Visible	Univ.
KK	46	c	No	None	6th yr. H.S.
T	43	c	Yes	Concealed	4th yr. H.S.
B	45	a-b-c-d-e	Yes	Visible	Univ.
W	49	a-b-c-d	Yes	Concealed	Univ.
LL	?	None	?	None	?

of rich families who became known as "cococolos" [sic]. The name "Azucenos" was given to the group by the father of one of the boys and it has stuck with them for over 25 years. In English the term means "Easter Lilies," but by connotation it means something pure and unspoiled, as the Easter Lily was traditionally carried by the "innocent" youths at their first communion. Since this group of wealthy kids was anything but "innocent" the term carries with it a pejorative connotation so that to this day the term is used behind the backs of the Azucenos, when speaking of them, and not when speaking to them.

In terms of formal education it can be noted that two of the nine members were high school dropouts (even private schools will not automatically graduate everyone in Colombia), and three of them have only high school educations. Another three of them have a university education. We have no data on "LL." All but one of the members of the clique were born in the city of Manizales and that one was born of Manizaleno parents who were only temporarily out of the city. Only two of the nine do not appear on the chart showing joint memberships in organizations. It is this pattern that justifies our joining with "the Azucenos" all those persons who responded to the earlier question with "a small group of industrialists." A look at the Top Influential list (Table 12) shows that the Azucenos are ranked by the community informants in positions 1,2,4,6,10,11, and 26. Seven of the nine Azucenos were selected to be among the 26 persons in whom the 111 community informants had most confidence in solving local problems.

A study of the organizational memberships of the eight Azucenos (not including "LL" on whom we have no data) showed that they held numerous positions in the industrial and commercial world of Manizales. In the 50 largest companies in Manizales these eight persons had 90 positions.

This rosca also has had or currently has many positions of power in the voluntary associations of the community. One of them served as President of the Cruzada Social (see below), another is the current

President of the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia, while a third is President of the prestigious service organization dedicated to the building of houses for the poor. Their extensive participation in other activities of the city is given in the personal vignettes above. As a group they averaged 16 organizational memberships each.

On inspection of the remaining community organizations, we find that the Azucenos are also active in them, except for the Sociedad de Mejoras Públicas, a civic improvement group. They are represented in the Chamber of Commerce (one of their group is the President and the vice-president is brother-in-law to three of them); the coffee committee (Comité de Cafeteros) where one of the Azucenos serves on the board of directors; the National Association of Manufacturers (ANDI), since they are all managers of industries in the city; in the political groups, we find that one is the head of the Conservative party for the state, another is a state assemblyman, another in the city council. Accordingly, we can say that this one small clique, or rosca, in the city of Manizales is truly a power clique.

F. Pluralism or Elitism

Lest anyone think that there is no opposition to the Azucenos in the city we should point out that there is another small group of industrialists which does not agree with the policies of the Azucenos and the rest of the rosca that seemingly control most of the decisions of importance in the city. This second group is composed of five or six persons whose resources are not so great as those of the Azucenos. Two persons in this group have extensive agricultural investments. Of more importance, however, is the fact that they seem to be most closely related to industry which is owned by foreign firms or national companies. In other words, this group is not subject to the financial controls of the local rosca. Thus far the influence of this group has been small but they are developing new projects. Its members are no more interested in permitting the development of industrial unions in the city (or in the rural areas, for that matter) than are the Azucenos. While one might see herein the seeds of a counter-elite in opposition to the Azucenos we feel that it is merely a competition among the "in-group," as one member of the second group is the son of "A" and another is the son of "FF."

It is to be noted that the leaders of both the Liberal and the Conservative parties of the state show up among the power elite of the city. Both are economically elite. One finds that several of the Azucenos are Liberals and several are Conservatives. This does not mean that the Liberals and Conservatives agree on everything in the city. In one instance there was a split even in the economic realm. In 1967 a person was elected to the national presidency of ANDI who was unacceptable to the Liberals. They responded to his election by withdrawing from ANDI all the industries they controlled. Those that remained with ANDI were controlled by the Conservatives and the new group mentioned above.

A pluralist might say that these facts are enough to claim that the society is pluralist but we would maintain that they merely demonstrate that there is developing, in an embryonic form, another subgroup of the elite of the city and that with regard to the control of the rest of the population they are all of a kind, that the needs for the preservation of the class of business and social elites will override any differences between them when it comes to their relationship with the masses.

Even the new group is composed of persons who are Manizalenos by birth. To illustrate the extent to which decision-making in the city of Manizales is in the hands of the native sons we cite a case where a prominent woman of the city was removed from a position of honor merely because she was not born there. Dona G. is the daughter of one of the most famous governors of a neighboring state. Her husband is a prominent professional person in the city, an intellectual, and a land owner. Dona G. was called by the leadership of the Conservative party in Bogotá and asked if she would serve as chairman of a local group of women to be organized to obtain support for the Frente Nacional candidate in the forthcoming election. She agreed to the request but when the local ladies heard of this they called Bogotá and protested that the chairman should be "one of them," that they did not need "foreigners" to head up their committees. The local conservative leadership named another person to head up the committee and Dona G. was not even asked to cooperate with the new committee. "This is a closed group," commented the new leader, "no outsider gets in unless specifically invited."

G. Conclusions

It seems that the Bonjean method of differentiating a reputational power structure in a community, as modified for this study, is of value in that it provides us with three categories of persons who are different from each other in several ways. The Visible and the Concealed Leaders tended to be economic elites. They were mostly born in the city of Manizales. They tend to be highly interrelated while members of neither group are related to the Symbolic Leaders. The Symbolic Leaders tend to be persons who have a high public position that is without real power. A number of persons appeared on the Symbolic Leader list who were associated with such organizational networks in the city as the community development groups and the labor unions. In other words, many of the persons appearing as Symbolic Leaders hold positions that have little or no real power in the local decision-making structure, or power that is based on the good will of persons more powerful in the city or nation.

The heads of both political parties showed up as part of the reputational power structure but the Liberal party head was a Visible Leader while the Conservative party head was a Concealed Leader. Both party leaders are members of the traditional families of the city and both are economic elites.

The use of a question to seek out a specific rosca turned up a small group of individuals who truly represented a power group. The first method used was a reputational one but it had an almost perfect fit with a sociogram relating persons by virtue of joint memberships in economic organizations in the city. This was the rosca in Manizales. Labor union leaders were right when they said "it's one big family that runs Manizales." Another small group was identified through comments on the part of several of the informants. The members of the group were still part of the traditional oligarchy but they did have two independent bases of power: 1) large agricultural enterprises, and 2) positions as managers of absentee-owned corporations. This group is no more amenable to the presence of labor unions than are the rest of the economic elite in the community.

In terms of relationship to the voluntary organizations of the city we find that the heads of the major organizational networks are present in the reputational lists. Members of the Azucenos were closely related to three of our case studies of domination (below) in that two of them serve (or have served) as presidents of organizations committed to the infiltration and destruction of popular movements and all are committed to the destruction of trade unions.

V. CASE STUDIES OF DOMINATION

A. The Cruzada Social

A classic example of the control of voluntary organizations by the oligarchy was the work of the organization called the Cruzada Social (the Social Crusade) in its activities in the poorer barrios of the city of Manizales in the years 1958 to 1964. The Cruzada Social was founded by a Jesuit, Padre Francisco Javier Mejia, in 1951 in Bogotá. In 1956 it was reorganized and registered with the government of Colombia as a non-profit organization. Shortly thereafter a chapter was founded in Manizales.¹

The Cruzada Social was founded to spread the social teachings of the Catholic Church and to influence the oligarchy in their actions affecting the masses. The organization claimed to be a "national organization of social action, composed of the lay leadership classes, with legal recognition and approval and guidance of the church hierarchy, for the promotion of the study, promulgation and implantation of the Catholic social doctrine as an efficient instrument to realize the supreme ideal of social justice and charity."²

Some of the basic principles underlying the activities of the Cruzada Social were the following:

- a) Man was created in the image and likeness of his Creator and elevated to the level of the supernatural. Because of this his rights and liberties must be respected.
- b) The family is the fundamental basis for the society.
- c) The community is the fundamental civil nucleus for the realization of the common good.
- d) Each person has the inviolable right to the ownership of private property.

¹Most of the information used here in the study of the Cruzada Social is from documents in the files of the organization. Some are in manuscript form with little or no identification as to the author or the exact date. They all relate to the period between 1958 and 1962. Extensive conversations were held with a number of the members of the Cruzada Social, including the nun who ran the organization during the years in which it was the most active. Conversations were also held with the person who was in charge of the infiltration activities of the organization and with others who participated therein.

²This statement is from a mimeographed circular distributed by the national office of the organization.

- e) Private property implies social rights and responsibilities.
- f) Work is a human activity for the perfection of the spirit and for sustenance, wellbeing, and material progress.
- g) The worker has the right to a salary for support of his family.
- h) Capital is necessary for the economy and includes obligations regarding the rights of the workers.
- i) The rich, mere administrators of his wealth, must use it in accordance with the public good.
- j) The natural right of association is indispensable to the economic order; because of which one must promote:
 - 1) the organization of cooperatives,
 - 2) the unionizing of the workers, especially the rural worker,
 - 3) the formation of associations of employers,
 - 4) the integration of the above units into regional structures.
- k) The above cited social structures, along with the family and the municipio, must be represented and intervene in their own right in the parliament and the rest of the entities of the state.
 - 1) The solution of the social problems demands a leadership class that is responsible for their debts to the community and, for this reason, they must be trained in the knowledge of the social doctrine of the Catholic Church through instruction in the high schools and the colleges.
- m) Colombia needs a fundamental agrarian reform.
- n) We urge also a reform of the businesses with the gradual application of the principles of co-ownership of the property, co-management, and co-participation in the income (with the worker).³

The local organization was an aggregate of numerous "cells" [sic] of various types. The cells were composed of "homogeneous groupings of individuals who were brought together by common interests, such as place of residence, place of work, profession, occupation, etc."⁴ Each of these cells was to be headed by a person selected

³"Conclusiones aprobadas por la directiva nacional segun estudio de las actas de la reunión de irectivas de centro efectuada en la Casa de Emaus, en Bogotá, en los días 10, 11, y 12 de febrero de 1961," p. 1.

⁴Ibid., pp. 2-3.

by the directors of the organization so that a "responsible" person would be in charge of the religious and social activities of the members of the cells. Members of each cell met together weekly and then jointly with all the other cells once a month.

The goals of the cells were: a) religious and social development of the members; b) diffusion of the social principles of the church within their sphere of influence; c) proselytizing; and d) realization of social action programs. Everything relating to the organization and activities of the cells had to be approved by the "Committee on Cells," named by the leaders of the local organization of the Cruzada Social. The members of the local board of directors were all socially prominent individuals from the upper middle and upper classes. The executive director was a nun who had worked in social action programs for many years, Sister Maria Teresa.⁵

It is to be understood that the Cruzada Social was established and later joined by persons who were concerned with the social conditions of the nation. They felt that it was possible for social justice to be obtained within the teachings of the Catholic Church and especially in keeping with the Papal Encyclical "Mater et Magistra." But they were also supporters of a belief in the sanctity of private property and the capitalist method of economic development; they felt, however, that owners of capital and property had social obligations to fulfill. They saw communism as a threat to the attainment of this Catholic social state. At their national meetings action against communism was as much a concern as was the method whereby the attainment of the social goals of the Cruzada would be achieved.

One of the methods of reaching the masses with the ideology of the organization was to form social welfare centers in the poor sectors of the city. These centers were called "Residencias Sociales" (Social Residences) and were defined as, "Centers which are established in a determined geographic area, for example in a poor workers' barrio, to elevate the moral, cultural, material and social level of the community by means of works of social action The residence seeks to further the relationship among neighbors, to give opportunity to the people to develop in a practical form the sense of interest and responsibility for the community. It can also serve as a center of demonstration for the families of how it is possible to live better with the same income by means of programs developed therein."⁶

In order to see the extent to which the program was for but not of or by the poor citizens of the barrios where the Cruzada was to work one only needs to look at the structure of the board of directors of the Residencias. Each barrio board was to be made up of: a) the

⁵All names herein are fictitious except that of the founder of the national organization.

⁶"Conclusiones," p. 3.

parish priest; b) a representative of the civic organization which founded that barrio center, for example, the alumni association of a rich girls' school; c) a representative of the Cruzada Social; d) a social worker; e) a "responsible" citizen of the city, meaning a member of the upper class; and finally f) a member of the barrio named by the other members of the board of directors.⁷ The programs developed in these barrio centers were to be in the fields of religious training, basic education for adults, and literacy. Participants in the programs were to pay dues regularly, 10 percent of which was to go to the national office of the Cruzada Social in Bogotá.

By October of 1958 there were seven of these centers formed in various parts of Manizales. Most of the sponsoring institutions were alumni associations of the various Catholic high schools in the city. Their activities were generally of the personal aid type, as indicated by the following list of activities in Barrio Buenos Aires.⁸

Table 23. Activities Developed in Barrio Buenos Aires by the Cruzada Social of Manizales

-
- a. Medical consultations three times weekly
 - b. School daily for 70 children
 - c. Store for inexpensive food and clothing
 - d. Catechism twice weekly
 - e. Visits to the home by the alumni of the high schools
 - f. Lectures on Christian morality for men and women
 - g. First Communion once a year
 - h. Baptisms, confirmations
 - i. Sewing garments for the newborn
 - j. Christmas gifts for the children
-

Besides these barrio centers the Cruzada Social maintained a major center in the heart of the city. It was there that the cells would often have their meetings and where the main office of the Cruzada was maintained. The building was large and housed many clinics and offices where, in the first ten months of 1958, the following services were rendered.⁹ Activities tended to be in areas which can easily be counted and recorded as an index of "social action."

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ In the last part of 1958 the Cruzada Social of Manizales prepared a six-page mimeographed document telling about the service activities of the organization, seeking financial assistance from the public. They list the activities in six barrios, including this one of Buenos Aires.

⁹ Ibid.

Table 24. Service Rendered in the Office of the Cruzada Social in Manizales, January to October, 1958

a. Family visits	1,500
b. Interviews	2,500
c. Jobs found for	728
d. Job forms filled out for	105
e. Legal problems handled	420
f. Legal problems "under consideration"	104
g. Families receiving milk distribution	120
h. Attendance at Sunday conferences	500
i. Weekly catechism classes (attendance)	170
j. Vocational school classes (attendance)	150
k. Night classes in literacy	30
l. New medical histories written	1,091
m. Medical prescriptions filled	5,898
n. Dental extractions	2,128
o. Dental fillings	3,000
p. Injections	9,196
q. First aid treatments	13,216
r. Home visits by a physician	908

At the local as well as at the national level the Cruzada Social was concerned not only with positive programs of diffusing the social doctrine of the Church but also with engaging in direct action against the communist threat. The Cruzada Social promulgated the following as part of its national program:

1. Prepare Catholic leaders in all the social classes by means of intense courses on social doctrine of the Church and the Marxist doctrine.

2. Infiltration of student organizations, labor unions, neighborhood committees, civic centers and especially the university students.

3. Diffusion of the social principles of the Church, by means of publications.

4. Organize a permanent secretariat of communist information with sections of instruction in Marxist doctrine, social investigation and publications.¹⁰

Attempts to increase the membership of the organization in Manizales included the distribution of information bulletins on the threat

¹⁰ Cruzada Social, Boletín Informativo, Número 22 (November 1959), p. 3.

of communism in the nation as well as in the city of Manizales.¹¹ They were able to cite the exact number of known militant communists in Colombia, the number in the universities, in government offices, etc. These figures were never supported as to source or any other form of verification.

The University Student Crusades - In October of 1958 a group of university students from Bogotá went to Manizales to found a cell of the Cruzada Social at the University of Caldas. Initially, the group consisted of some 30 members but soon dwindled to a consistent membership of about 15 students. The major problem that the student group addressed itself to was the threat they saw coming from the communist influence in the community.

The first activity of the newly formed cell was to call a meeting of the leaders of all the major charity and welfare organizations in the city. At this general meeting the president of the Cruzada Social of Manizales spoke of the "great communist danger falling over Manizales, the frightening labor [activity] developed by them and the necessity of forming an organized Catholic youth, resolved and daring, capable of defending the faith of the community and willing to engage in an open confrontation against communism."¹² The outcome of the meeting was the formation of a coordinating committee made up of representatives of all active organizations responding to the initial invitation to meet together. But this group quickly dissolved because of the opposition of several member priests who were not convinced of the threat of a strong communist movement in the city.

Shortly after the formation of the University Crusader's cell at the University of Caldas, a committee prepared a report on the nature and extent of the communist network in the city.¹³ They reported that in a number of the poor barrios of Manizales there existed committees called "Comité Pro-defensa Barrio . . ." (Committee in Defense of Barrio . . .). A communist organizer and one or two friends would visit the people in the barrio and encourage them to come to the initial meeting of the new committee to discuss the barrio's problems. The meeting would be open to all comers, so the organizer would see to it that many of his cohorts from other barrios attended and the original one or two persons always emerged as president and vice-president of the association. Some of these committees were called "comité pro desocupados" (committee for the unemployed) or "comité

¹¹ Cruzada Social of Manizales, mimeographed document dtd. May 1961.

¹² "Informe de las labores desarrolladas por el grupo universitario de Cruzada Social de Manizales desde su fundación hasta el mes de mayo inclusivo" (n.d. [1959?]). Typewritten manuscript in the files of the Cruzada Social.

¹³ Handwritten manuscript report titled, "Organizaciones de Tipo Comunista en Manizales."

pro vivienda" (committee for housing). At times separate committees would be formed for the women; the leaders of these committees would often be the wives of the general committee officers. Barrios well organized in this way included San Xavier, Carmen, and San José (this last committee actually served three neighboring barrios as well).

Many of the residents of these barrios had migrated to Manizales in the 1950s in search of greater opportunities and to escape the violence then existing in the countryside. They built their own dwellings on the edges of the city (illegally), bamboo shacks perched on the hillsides which often housed two or three families in a space of ten feet square. Such barrio organizations as the Comité pro-defensa Barrio El Carmen planned invasions of public and private lands in the city to provide more space for housing. The first such invasion was planned for the land along the old road leading to the North. With the assistance of the communist student group at the University of Caldas, some 250 persons took part in this invasion.¹⁴

The second major land invasion was planned at the meetings held in Barrio El Carmen, which served as the focal point for the entire network of these barrio committees--Barrios Unidos. Each of the barrios sent a representative to the executive committee meetings held in Barrio El Carmen where the decisions were made that affected the whole group. Since many of the leaders of the individual barrio organizations were also the initial organizers of the network the meetings in El Carmen were of the "hard core" organizers plus a number of persons who had joined with them in their activities.

Barrio El Carmen is near the bull ring and at midnight on the night of November 10, 1958, over 350 persons met behind the bull ring at the edge of the city. Each family carried poles that were to mark off a piece of land for its use. Only the members of the central committee knew the chosen site. On a signal the group descended the steep hillside and planted their stakes in the land adjacent to the road leading to the national prison. When the local army commander threatened to move the invaders off by force, the mayor immediately designated several parcels of city land for the relocation of the squatters so as to prevent a bloody confrontation.

The transference of these people to the newly designated site, Barrio Pio XII, was a major undertaking, involving city trucks and

¹⁴ These people, unexpectedly, were allowed to remain on the invaded land. There may be two reasons for this. First, this was one of many such urban invasions (there were a great many in the countryside as well) and to dislodge all these people would have provoked violence greater than that already existing in the rural areas. Second, much of the land was publicly owned, hence the interests of the elite were not vitally concerned; the loss of some public land may have seemed a good means to provide a peaceful solution to a potentially violent problem.

the assistance of many of the young members of the Cruzada. Once established in the new barrio, the Cruzada began to funnel in supplies donated both by CARE and by the local business community. Throughout this period the Cruzada battled for control of the barrio with the original leaders of the land invasion and with the communist student organization from the university (FEJEC, Federación Juvenil de Estudiantes Caldenses). The struggle continued for quite some time with the Cruzada eventually emerging the winner, in large part because of the aid for the barrio it was able to raise from CARE and powerful local merchants. Eventually even the barrio committee meetings were held in the center-city office of the Cruzada.

In the period 1958-63 the Cruzada extended its control, first by infiltrating and eventually taking over the parent barrio organization, Barrios Unidas. The Cruzada influenced the people's attitude toward communists by means of training courses, lectures, films (with the aid of a USIA mobile film crew), etc.; they offered help in writing to public officials. New committees were formed in many of the city's barrios. The group even hired a former communist organizer to subvert the work of the communists in the barrios.

Notwithstanding the successes of the Cruzada Social it soon faded from the scene. At the height of the influence of the Cruzada Social, under the direction of the Sisters of the Cross, and most especially under the able leadership of Sister Maria Teresa, hundreds of persons were using buildings of the organization for medical, dental, economic, and legal aid each day. Many groups met there each evening since the organization was composed of four main sections: Professionals, University Students, Ladies Group, and the High School Groups. The main building was bustling with activity and some of the most prominent persons in the city aided the organization with donations of material for distribution to the poor or acted in the capacity of officers in the organization. One of the leading industrialists and an Azuceno (see the section on the oligarchy above) was president of the Cruzada Social and the wife of one of the most prominent persons in the cultural and educational circles of the city was most influential in the ladies section of the movement. The powerful leaders of the coffee growers association also helped the movement.

Several reasons have been offered for the decline in the activities of the Cruzada Social. One is that the costs of running such an organization were beyond the ability of the organization, as structured, to meet them. In an attempt to improve the financial basis for the organization a meeting was called to be held in the auditorium of the liquor monopoly building to which Dr. José Galat was invited from Bogotá to speak. As a result of his presentation there was engendered sufficient interest among the business world of the community to form a new organization called the Centro de Estudios y Acción Social (CEAS). The prime local mover of this organization was a person who was dedicated to attempting to bring the social concepts of the Catholic Church to the poor of the land.

But it seems that he and the sister disagreed on many fundamental principles. The Archbishop removed the Sisters of the Cross from the management of the organization and replaced them with another organization. Sister Maria Teresa said that this was done through the influence of the head of CEAS, as he was very influential with the Archbishop. "Now," says the sister, "the organization is but a shell. It is doing nothing of any importance. And the organization that has taken its place in the work in the barrios is doing everything for the residents and not with them. More importantly, it is not training local leadership to run their own activities."

The study of the activities of the Cruzada Social shows us the extent to which it was possible to organize the poorest of the citizens of the slum barrios to participate successfully in two illegal acts of land invasion. It also shows the extent to which such an organization was easily manipulated by outside forces. The infiltration of the communist barrio committees by the members of the Cruzada Social and their subsequent control thereof is support for the idea that organizations of the lower classes are not so stable as those of the better educated and the upper classes.

The study indicates more, though. It also shows what is possible with a fervor and dedication to an ideology and not merely a personal immediate gain. Both the communists and the Cruzadas were motivated by a belief in a system of social justice and the need to participate in social action programs to achieve that end. Both groups were seeking social change and both groups were a threat to the status quo of the power structure of the community and of the nation. When the nun who was the organizing force behind the Cruzada Social became too independent of the oligarchy she was removed from the organization. At the national level the founder of the Cruzada Social was also removed from control of the organization and sent from Bogotá to Cali. A national executive in a major Catholic organization reported that "Padre Francisco Javier Mejia was just getting too powerful."

B. The Black Hand and The Corporation of the Sacred Family

The formation in 1960 of the Centro de Estudios y Acción Social (CEAS) was another sort of reaction to the threat to the nation from international communism. The "Mano Negra" (Black Hand--its popular name) was founded by several of the most powerful oligarchs in the nation, including José Gomez Pinzon, German Tobar, Luis Robledo, Aurelio Correa Arango, Alberto Samper, and Hernan Echavarria.¹⁵ Chapters of CEAS were founded in Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, and Manizales.

¹⁵Norman A. Bailey, "The Colombian 'Black Hand': A Case Study of Neoliberalism in Latin America," The Review of Politics, 27 (October 1965): 455. See also his "Organization and Operation of Neoliberalism in Latin America," in Bailey, ed., Latin America: Politics, Economics and Hemispheric Security (New York: Praeger, 1965).

CEAS initially had four basic goals:

The first was to awaken among the 'gente decente' of Colombia the realization of the imminent danger from the Jacobin left. The second was to develop and undertake an extensive anticommunist and anti-Castro campaign, and a less extensive campaign in favor of free enterprise, through whatever means were deemed appropriate. The third was a program of direct anticommunist and anti-Modern Left activities, especially through infiltration in the labor unions, universities and corporations, through pressure, blacklisting and support of anticommunist elements and through the withdrawal of advertising in Modern Left organs. Finally, CEAS was to attempt to alter the mentality of the capitalists toward a greater realization of their social responsibilities.¹⁶

The organization was founded in Manizales through the initiative of Don Julio M., "hacendado, agricultor y periodista." Don Julio M. invited José Galat (later the adviser to President Carlos Lleras Restrepo for the program "Integración Popular") to Manizales to conduct a series of seminars for industrial and commercial leaders of the community at the ranch of one of the social and economic elite of the state. Out of these meetings grew the formation of the local branch of CEAS.

Since the local organization needed a charter (personeria jurídica) to maintain a bank account, enter into contracts, etc., Don Julio offered to the group the charter that he had already received from the government for a family foundation called "The Corporation of the Sacred Family" (Corporación de la Sagrada Familia). Minor changes in the wording of the charter were requested of the government and the Manizales branch of CEAS became a reality. When the organization was attacked by the extreme left and called the Mano Negra the name was picked up and used by many.

In Manizales CEAS followed two policies. One was that of direct action against communism by the distribution of anti-communist and pro-capitalist propaganda. Some of the material originated with an organization formed by United States industrialists, called the Latin American Information Committee. Other aid came from sources in New York City identified merely by a post office box number. Several major U.S. corporations gave financial aid to CEAS and for a time were represented on the national board of directors.¹⁷ The written

¹⁶ Bailey, "The Colombian 'Black Hand,'" p. 455. He does not clarify the difference between the terms Jacobin Left and Modern Left.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 456.

material received from these outside sources was reproduced by the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia and distributed to other organizations in the city. To help with the costs of the local operation the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia sought financial help from the Catholic church hierarchy in Germany and in Spain.

The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia in Manizales decided the best way to seek to support a viable Christian and capitalist student movement in the university of Caldas was to sponsor a fraternity house. The cost of the dwelling was underwritten by the Corporación and they selected the initial group of students to occupy the house. A Chaplain was appointed and the students were required to attend mass and various "seminars" planned for them by the Chaplain and the leaders of the Corporación. The fraternity lasted about one year and was then given up by the Corporación as a waste of funds. They found out that the house was being "taken over" by students from the coast (Costeños) and that those from Caldas were in the minority. Several of the former residents in the "fraternity" said that they left because of the strict rules and the constant ideological sales pitch in support of a modified free market economy, opposition to all forms of collectivism, and support of free enterprise capitalism. Major emphasis was on the evils of communism and especially Castroism.

In keeping with the national goals of CEAS, the local branch was also interested in the labor movement. The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia paid to officials of UTRACAL, the Catholic trade union federation in the state, the sum of 1,500 pesos monthly (about \$150 in 1962). This money was passed to the federation through the hands of Padre Pacho, its moral adviser. The money was used to pay the salary of one of the union organizers and to purchase office equipment. The secretary general of UTRACAL claimed that the money was supposed to go directly to them but that the Padre made them wait for it. The Padre, he said, tried to claim that the office furniture was really his and only on loan to the union federation. Finally, the secretary general of the labor federation had to fire the organizer who was paid out of the funds from the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia because "he was working more for the Mano Negra than he was working for us."¹⁸ After investing more than 25,000 pesos in UTRACAL, the leaders of the Corporación decided that they were not getting an adequate return on their investment (without specifying what an adequate return would consist of). "We were not too sure Padre Pacho had any influence on the union and we concluded that we had no control over Padre Pacho. It was wasted money," said one of the members of the board of directors of the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia.

By 1964 the Mano Negra was no longer so actively engaged in anti-communist activities, the distribution of propaganda in the barrios, etc., but rather in working with the poor in the slums of the city. In March of that year a week-long seminar was held for some 80 leaders

¹⁸ Conversation with the secretary general of UTRACAL.

of welfare activities in the city on "Community Development" to which various North American professors contributed. One of the outcomes of the seminar was the formation of yet another committee that was to attempt a coordination, or minimally a communication, between the many welfare entities in the city. The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia offered its office for the headquarters of the new committee and, before long, had absorbed it.

In time the Corporación became the focal point for most of the private welfare activities in the city of Manizales. It attempted to serve as coordinator of the many poorly organized and financed activities of the ladies of charity. Upwards of twenty local businessmen contributed from 500 to 1,000 pesos per month to the organization (\$50 - \$100). Few of the contributors ever attended the meetings of the Board of Directors.

Since the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia was the service organization with the most money to spend in anti-communist activities it was approached by the Board of Directors of the Centro Colombo-Americano (the USIA local cultural center and library) for financial aid.¹⁹ When the center was formed it was anticipated that the founding elite would aid with substantial cash donations. None of them ever donated more than a pittance. With the center going into debt and the threat hanging over the Board of Directors that the center would be moved to Pereira, they did not dip into their own pockets to offer aid but instead went to the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia. Most of the members of the Board of Directors of the Centro Colombo-Americano were of the oligarchy of Manizales, many of them represented in the chapter on La Oligarchia y la Rosca. The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia was willing to aid the Centro Colombo-Americano with several thousand dollars, spread over a year.

In return, the Corporación worked closely with the Director of the Centro Colombo-Americano in the distribution of tens of thousands of anti-communist pamphlets supplied by the United States Information Agency. The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia distributed them through their barrio centers. They also assisted in the planning of the barrio movie program wherein 15,000-30,000 persons monthly were exposed to USIA propaganda films in the poor barrios of the city. These films were on communism as well as on such topics as the "Life of the Jones Family in Centerville, New York." And, of course, there were cartoons, but each with a moral message, like "drink your milk, it's good for you" to an audience of perhaps the most malnourished persons in

¹⁹The USIA bi-national centers, which serve as "democratic-front" organizations in many parts of the world, must earn their operating expenses in the community in which they operate. The board of directors of these organizations usually represent the elite of the community, and Manizales was no exception. This writer was at that time the Director of the Centro Colombo-Americano (January 1962 to March 1964).

the state who never saw milk. The count on the persons in attendance was required by the Embassy and was estimated by those showing the films. They counted all but the children nursing at the breast of their mothers, and most of the audience was children. But USIA reporting techniques required counts: number in classes, number in library, number of books withdrawn, number of persons at film showings, etc.

Soon the reports of the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia read like those of the Cruzada Social of several years prior.²⁰ They listed the number of pesos spent in the various barrios of the city on their projects: 33,584.42 pesos in Barrio El Carmen for food for the children in the day care center, salaries of the employees, transportation, drugs, and general expenses; 26,809.40 pesos in Barrio Juan XXIII (the old Barrio Galan); 5,486.76 pesos in Barrio Fatima; 14,990.85 pesos in Barrio Pio XII; and another 8,511.80 in miscellaneous costs for a total of over 89,000 pesos (about \$16,000 in 1966 exchange rates).

The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia attempted to encourage other entities to cooperate with them in their work in the barrios. To the extent that an organization worked with the Corporación in any of their many projects the Corporación would then list that organization as being "coordinated" by the Corporación. The game of numbers (citing how many rolls were distributed, how many old clothes sold, etc.) continued to the point where one of the leaders of the CARITAS movement wrote an article for the local paper calling for an end to the misuse of numbers. Not having the ability to discuss the problem (nor any other way to measure goal attainment in solving it) the Corporación was limited to actuarial reporting.

The Corporación de la Sagrada Familia had the goal of forming a Social Center in each of the poor barrios of the city. In these centers neighbors would be encouraged to congregate and participate in such activities as courses in various formal subjects as well as in craft skills. Each group was encouraged to form a club with its own president and other officers. But the Corporación retained the right to remove from any club a member it considered an obstacle to the development of the work of the club. The social worker assigned to each center would, in most cases, conduct the meetings of the club; only when she was not there would the president of the club be permitted to run the meeting.

In all of this there is a bit of fantasy. The leaders of the Corporación have no real idea of the extent of the problems that they are attempting to resolve. Many of the oligarchy view these slum barrios as dangerous places to be and most of the oligarchy never set foot in one. In the beginning the Corporación was quite political

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The same person was now executive secretary of the Corporación who had worked as secretary of the Cruzada when it was most active.

in its action--anti-communist and pro-democratic and capitalist. This was during the first several years after Castro took over in Cuba. In time the organization directed its activities more in the field of social work. The Corporación remains very paternalistic. It is certainly not seeking social change. Its "clubs" were what we have referred to as "sponsored" groups, with so little autonomy that they cannot be considered independent of the parent organization.

C. Labor Unions

In the city of Manizales there are many labor unions and several labor federations serving the various unions in the State of Caldas. No one, however, is sure of the exact number of unions or members thereof at any given time since the statistics are most inadequate. When beginning our study of the organizations in the city, we had on our list over 110 labor unions and federations; we were able to find only 60 of these still in existence. Even the regional office of the Ministry of Labor had no idea as to the current state of affairs in the city with regard to the number and location of the unions.²¹

In 1962 the National Association of Manufacturers for the State of Caldas (ANDI) prepared a booklet about Manizales for prospective investors in industry in the area. They listed the labor unions in existence in the city as numbering only 19 which were registered with the government. The list is given in Table 25.

Table 25. Labor Unions That Existed in the City of Manizales in 1962

Name	Members
1. Centro de Educadores Caldenses	3,200
2. Sindicato de Trabajadores al Servicio del Departamento	600
3. Sindicato de Trabajadores del Municipio	650
4. Sindicato de la Universidad de Caldas	150
5. Sociedad de Choferes	200
6. Pequeños Comerciantes de la Galeria	250
7. Sociedad de Pirotécnicos	50
8. Sindicato de Trabajadores de Carreteras Nacionales	350
9. Sindicato de Bavaria, S.A.	150
10. Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Federación de Cafeteros	350
11. Asociación de Radio-técnicos	45
12. Sindicato de Trabajadores de Cementos Caldas	120
13. Sindicato de Empleados del Municipio	120
14. Sindicato de Empleados del Instituto de Crédito Territorial	50
15. Sindicato de Expendedores de Carnes	130
16. Sindicato de Empleados de Comunicaciones	80
17. Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Caja Agraria	100
18. Sociedad de Barberos	80
19. Sindicato de Empleados de la Controloria General de la República, Sec. de Mzles	40
Total	6,715

Source: ANDI, Manizales y su Economía (Manizales, 1962), p. 93
Includes only those with formal personarias jurídicas.

Table 25 shows that there were some 6,715 persons in the labor unions in the city of Manizales. But the figures are misleading; more than half of the unions listed were in government agencies.

Municipal Government

3. Sindicato de Trabajadores del Municipio	600
13. Sindicato de Empleados del Municipio	<u>120</u>
	720

State Government

1. Centro de Educadores Caldenses	3,200
2. Sindicato de Trabajadores al Servicio del Departamento	600
4. Sindicato de la Universidad de Caldas	<u>150</u>
	3,950

National Government

8. Sindicato de Trabajadores de Carreteras Nacionales	350
14. Sindicato de Empleados del ICT	50
16. Sindicato de Empleados de Comunicaciones	80
17. Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Caja Agraria	100
19. Sindicato de Empleados de la Controloria General	<u>40</u>
	620

Total 5,290

Moreover, these figures show the size of the unions which have offices in the city but whose members (except for those in municipal government) may actually be working in other parts of the state.

Another type of union on the ANDI list is one enrolling persons in the same type of occupation. These craft unions generally are not composed of employees organizing against employers. They are actually small shop keepers or independent operators who are organizing against the buyers of their goods or services. On the ANDI list they are the following unions:

²¹We were given access to the files of the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor and found them to be a complete mess.

5.	Sociedad de Choferes	200
6.	Pequeños Comerciantes de la Galeria	250
7.	Sociedad de Pirotécnicos	50
11.	Asociación de Radio-técnicos	45
15.	Sindicato de Expendedores de Carnes	130
18.	Sociedad de Barberos	80
	Total	<u>755</u>

There remain on the list three unions, all of which are major industrial unions. Two of them, though (Bavaria and Federación de Cafeteros, totalling 550 members,) are national unions in national industries. The only labor union on the list which is an industrial union in a local industry is that in Cementos Caldas, with 120 members.

A list of the largest employers in the city of Manizales was obtained that gave the number of employees in each organization. The organization was then classified as being governmental or private, and if governmental whether it was city, state, or national government. The private industries were classified as being local or national. The national ones were those that were not headquartered in the city and merely had a branch office or plant in the city. This list is given in Table 26.

As with the preceding list in the ANDI document, we find that most of the labor unions are in government organizations. In fact only one of the government organizations is not unionized--the health center. Of the four private firms of a national character with a branch in Manizales, two are unionized and two are not. Of the 13 private firms locally owned or controlled in the city of Manizales, only one currently has a labor union, that being Cementos Caldas. Of the 12 remaining we have information indicating that seven of them were at one time unionized but no longer have a union. The other five, reportedly, were never unionized.

These two lists seem to indicate that labor unions do exist in the city of Manizales, but only of special kinds. Most of the unions that we noted on the two lists are unions in governmental organizations or are unions of persons who are organizing against the unorganized. That is to say, the barbers, morticians, etc. In these cases the craft unions have no opposition structure that is willing to utilize its resources to destroy them. While unions are tolerated in the governmental agencies they are closely regulated. Strikes are forbidden to government workers, and disputes that cannot be settled through direct negotiations and conciliation must be submitted to compulsory arbitration.²²

Between 1947 and 1954 there was a great decline in the number of unions in the state, from 70 to 31. This was a period of great turmoil

²² U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in Colombia (BLS Report No. 217, 1962), p. 26.

Table 26. List of Employers in Manizales by Number of Employees
(By Type of Firm and Union Status, 1967)

Name	No. of Employees	Type	Union Status
1. Tejidas Unica	820	PL	-
2. Bavaria	800 (est)	PN	+
3. OOPP Nacional	646	GN	+
4. La Chec	573	GD	+
5. Empresas Pub. Municipal	535	GM	+
6. Universidad de Caldas	498	GD	+
7. OOPP Departmental	412	GD	+
8. Comité de Cafeteros	292	PN	+
9. Telecom	291	GN	+
10. Incolma	286	PL	0
11. Arrow	283	PL	-
12. Cia Nacional de Fosferos	280	PL	0
13. Incorsa (Kelvinator)	280	PL	-
14. Cementos Caldas	244	PL	+
15. La Licorera	202	GD	+
16. OO.PP. Municipal	141	GM	+
17. Acuacaldas	104	GD	+
18. Herragro	100 (est)	PL	-
19. Centro Piloto de Salud	100	GD	0
20. Iderna	90	PL	-
21. Fosferos Poker	86	PL	0
22. La Patria	85	PL	0
23. Luker	79	PL	0
24. Muebles Metalicos	75	PL	-
25. Ley	75	PN	0
26. Banco Cafetero	63	PN	0
27. Urival	63	PL	-

Symbols used: P = private; L = local; N = national; G = governmental; M = municipal; D = departmental (state); + = currently unionized; - = union defunct; 0 = not unionized; est = estimated.

in the nation. What is of further interest to us is the proportional decline in the four types of unions. The four types can be categorized as follows: Base, "enterprise unions formed by employees in various occupations in one and the same enterprise"; Industrial, "includes persons employed in various enterprises in the same industrial branch"; Gremiales, "craft unions consisting of employees belonging to the same occupation or trade"; Oficios Varios, "catchall unions composed of employees of any kind."²³ While the gremial and the base unions lost approximately half their number, the oficios varios lost three-fourths of their number, and the industrial unions were completely

²³Ibid., p. 22.

wiped out. Similarly, of nine unions founded between 1962 and 1965 only those in government agencies were still operative in 1967.

Discussions held with many of the leaders of the labor movement in the city of Manizales indicate that there was a concerted labor persecution in the local industries. Documents in the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor supported this. Some examples follow.

In a letter to the Director Regional del Trabajo in Manizales the Secretary General of the Unión de Trabajadores de Caldas wrote: "Several months ago Mr. Nestor Ocampo S., treasurer of UTRACAL, was conversing with various of the workers in the LUKER factory of this city with reference to the possible affiliation of these workers with the national union that this company has that is located in Bogotá. Since this is a right that the workers have, and besides since the unions already existed, we did not feel that the representatives of the company would react against these workers. But unfortunately, we were wrong in that when they became aware of the intentions of the workers they immediately initiated a reaction against them.

"Among the first victims is found: Nelly Arias Ramirez, with nine years of service to the company; Ester Julia Gil, with twelve years and José Daniel Ospina, with 20 years of service."²⁴

HERRAGRO had a labor union but, says a local labor leader, shortly after signing the first contract with the union the members were subjected to persecution and after the president of the union was fired for disciplinary reasons the rest of the union members quit the union. The manager of HERRAGRO is one of the small group in opposition to the Azucenos and is the son of one of the founders (and active members) of the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia.

The management at IDERNA gave a party for the workers and when they were well drunk brought out letters of resignation from the union for them to sign, which they did. Once the number of members of the union dropped below the 25 necessary for legal status, the remaining members of the union were not protected by "foro sindical," the law that protects union leaders from expulsion from their jobs. After the party many of the ex-union members were fired from the plant. The local labor federation won a formal suit against the company because of this attempt at union-busting but the workers were now too afraid to rejoin the union.²⁵

²⁴ Document on file at the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor. The owner of the LUKER chocolate company is the same person who figures highest on the list of Key Leaders in the city (Table 13) and is also an Azuceno and President of the Corporación de la Sagrada Familia.

²⁵ Ibid.

A worker was hired from MUEBLES METALICOS to work at IDERNA. The worker happened to be an active union leader and hence protected by law. On arriving at IDERNA he was asked to wait until the following week to begin work. He never began, however, since this was a plan to get the man to resign from MUEBLES METALICOS. The phone conversation between the respective parties in the two industries was overheard and reported to the officers of the Unión de Trabajadores de Caldas.²⁶

Another tactic used by the elites to wipe out a union was to sell the industry or enterprise to another firm or person. The plant would be shut down at the time of the sale and reopened as a new industry and only the non-union staff would be rehired. Of course, all the same stockholders would own this new plant.²⁷

Many of the governmental agencies are chronically short of funds to pay their staff and this is sometimes used as a method of removing the unionized personnel. In February 1964 the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor was informed of a situation where one state government official whose agency had insufficient funds to pay the staff over a period of many months agreed to co-sign bank loans to the non-union personnel but would not do so for labor union members. Further, it was reported that if a man were willing to resign from the union he would actually receive all the money due him from the agency.²⁸

One of the major problems confronting labor unions and federations in Manizales, as well as in other parts of Colombia, is their weak financial structure. The recent (1966) division of the State of Caldas into two states reduced by over half the financial base of the Catholic union federation, the major labor federation in the state. Strike funds are practically non-existent and only in 1966, by Presidential decree, was a law instituted whereby the union could call for compulsory arbitration to end a strike that could possibly be fatal for the union.

As we have noted in the above comments on unions in the industries in Manizales, the unions that survived were either in national industries or in governmental agencies. The small, local industrial union tended not to survive. This problem is endemic not only to Manizales, but to the nation and the entire structure of trade unionism in Colombia is gradually changing as a result of it. From regional or state federations of small industrial unions the trend is toward

²⁶ Conversations with the Secretary General of the labor federation.

²⁷ Document in the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor, dated 1 December 1964.

²⁸ Letter dated February 1964, *ibid.*

national industrial unions and federations. "This change is due to the increasing activities and influence of the International Trade Secretariats and to the realization on the part of the country's labor leaders that union power cannot be achieved so long as the labor movement is divided into hundreds of relatively small, single-enterprise unions which bargain separately even within the same industry. Functional organization already exists in the metal trades, transportation, hotels and restaurants, communications, textiles, petroleum, and public services."²⁹

Observations of the U.S. Labor Attaché in Colombia reinforce the idea that most management attitudes and relationships toward the worker are paternalistic and they resent the idea of the worker organizing to defend his interests.³⁰ "Opposition to unionism on grounds of principle is still widespread among employers who also generally object to such limitation of their present rights as are sought by unions."³¹

Perhaps the projected growth in the trade union movement and the structural changes that are being effected will change the nature of unionism in the city of Manizales. For the moment we can merely observe that it is quite weak.

D. The Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda

The Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda (CNPV) was without doubt the largest popular movement in Manizales during 1966 and 1967 that was not established under the aegis of either the government or the oligarchy. It was a truly grass-roots organization with leadership coming from the barrios and the labor unions. Its president, Antonio U., came to Manizales in 1965 at the invitation of the Federación de Trabajadores de Caldas (the communist labor federation) to help organize labor in the city. His experience with unions went back to the 1930s and in Manizales he worked principally with the union in Cementos Caldas.³²

The CNPV was organized in Manizales in December 1965 at a meeting called by the secretary of the Federación de Trabajadores de Caldas, presided over by its president, and attended by representatives of all its affiliated unions as well as by representatives of several

²⁹U.S. Labor Attaché, "Labor Report, Colombia," August 25, 1966 (Bogotá, Colombia, dittoed), p. 3.

³⁰Ibid., p. 12.

³¹U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in Colombia, p. 25.

³²Interview with Antonio U. (All names of characters are disguised and do not relate to any person with the name used.)

barrios. Antonio attended as the representative of the national office of the CNPV. Officers were elected and statements made about conditions in the barrios. Housing was one of the group's major concerns.

Meetings began to be held on a regular basis. An arrangement was made with the national office in Bogotá to send on 40 percent of all dues collected to cover the costs of running the organization. In these early formational months several petitions were presented to various local officials, especially those in the office of public works. Numerous deaths had been caused in the barrios by landslides which residents alleged were the result of city officials failing to take adequate drainage and safety measures. Various official attempts to raise money for the poor--which they never got--were denounced. No satisfaction was received from public officials, most of whom refused even to meet with the CNPV petitioners.

After considerable internal dissension, Antonio assumed control of the group in May 1966, following a trip to headquarters in Bogotá. He then began inviting various city officials to meetings to give them an opportunity to see the extent to which the CNPV was, in fact, a well-organized group. Work continued on solving the problems of the various barrios. Peace was made with the priest who had control over the largest source of funds for the relief of the poor (he had denounced the communist affiliations of CNPV). Fiestas were held to raise funds; by June 1966 the treasurer reported 543 pesos in the bank.

The organization was expanded to other parts of the city. It continued to send committees to call on the city officials to rectify more problems in the poor barrios. A memorial was sent to the new president of the nation calling on him to lift the state of seige under which various parts of the nation were ruled. Also, CNPV sought the release from jail of those persons detained following a confrontation with the national police during an earlier land invasion. Aside from this, the organization financed the burial of one of its members, interceded for others with the authorities, purchased drugs for others, and in many ways sought to render some service to the members of the organization, but always seeking the final goal of getting land for building a house.

Antonio was hired as a paid funcionario, his salary set at 40 pesos per week (less than US\$3) to be raised in the better-off barrios. On October 24, 1966, Antonio participated in the most important act of the organization to that date. He was given a chance to make a formal speech before the State Assembly. He spoke of the needs of the "popular classes" and spelled out the specific needs of some of the barrios of the city of Manizales, the state capitol. He used data obtained from some official source (probably a study done by students of the Department of Home Economics for the Instituto de Crédito Territorial) to support his contention that there were many unmet needs in the barrios and that the parliamentarians had to address themselves to these needs.

In November Antonio had the opportunity to address the members of the city council. The CNPV group sought to have several of the city councilwomen tour the poor barrios along with members of the association. These activities paid off when representatives to the city council presented a bill granting the CNPV of Manizales 20,000 pesos for use in their work (a companion bill for the sum of 50,000 pesos was rejected). Dona P., member of the State Assembly, is reported to have informed the CNPV that a bill introduced in the state assembly granting to that organization 60,000 pesos was approved and they awaited the release of the funds (as far as I know they never came). At the last meeting in November it was announced that the President of the Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda in Bogotá, Mario U., was released from jail, "thanks to the action of the organization."

Even though the organization was having some success with members of the city and state legislative bodies they still were having problems with the police. A member of one of the barrio organizations was jailed by DAS (the Colombian FBI) and an investigation was conducted on the nature of the organization in Barrio Pio XII. The CNPV sent a note of protest to the director of DAS for this action.

At the end of the first year of operation the assets of the organization were: in the Central, 841.05 pesos; in Barrio San Nicolas, 480.60; in Asis, 311.90; and in Marmato and Buenos Aires (a joint centro), 1,462.40. The year closed with a series of fiestas in various of the barrios serving the function of bringing the members of the association together in a social activity but also serving as a source of income for the organization since the food and the drink offered at the fiestas were sold at a profit for the organization.

The group continued to work throughout 1967, despite the arrest and temporary detention in March of Antonio U. He and other leaders of the Federación de Trabajadores de Caldas were jailed, along with many other leftists in the city and the nation. Antonio had been in the process of planning a fiesta to celebrate Día Internacional de la Mujer (International Woman's Day) which the CNPV never secured permission to hold. The organization worked more and more closely with both its national headquarters and with the Federación de Trabajadores de Caldas in 1967.

The CNPV differed from other organizations in Manizales in a number of ways. First, it was heavily influenced, if not actually led, by communists. Second, the people who ran the organization were from the poorer strata of the city. Third, and perhaps most important, CNPV demonstrated a thorough-going rejection of paternalism with its concomitant role of the humble petitioner in front of a great patron. The people who participated in the CNPV were working on the belief that they had certain rights as citizens in their society and that one of these was the right to speak up and to make just demands on their government. They rejected the elitist ideas of the traditional charity organization that dispensed aid to the poor but generally asked in return a humility and a subjugation to the oligarchy.


Further, in the CNPV there seemed to be a real desire to develop the abilities of participation and of leadership. People who had never before participated in organizations were given responsibilities on committees that called on public officials or as the representatives of one of the centros to another's meetings. There was a constant encouragement on the part of the leadership of the CNPV that the membership speak up and express their doubts and their complaints about the way in which the organization was run.

The structure of the organization of the CNPV was such that it enhanced a sense of participating in a social movement for it encouraged mutual aid and fraternalism. There were many fiestas, ostensibly to raise money for the organization, but which the members of the organization from other barrios in the city would attend, giving them a sense of belonging and comradeship and of working together in a mutual effort to solve those problems. The junta directiva of the CNPV moved its meetings to the various barrios so that they could meet with the people of that community from time to time, both to make them feel more a part of the organization and to keep an eye on the operation of the barrio movement. Besides this rotation of the location of the junta directiva, Antonio or other members of the junta directiva attended almost every meeting of the barrio groups. These groups, in turn, sent "fraternal representatives" to attend the meetings of other barrio committees. This structure is exactly that which was reported for the organization of the Barrios del Norte and later, Barrios Unidos. (See Fig. I.)

This method of building the organization was of great advantage for a number of reasons. The first was that it permitted a member to belong to a small, close-knit barrio group, all of whose members he knew well in that they were his immediate neighbors. This small group raised funds for their operations and for the operations of the city organization. With the cross-visitation of the committees in the barrios there was developed a horizontal integration that tied the barrios into one network. This, along with the constant attendance at the barrio meetings by the officers of the city-wide organization, precluded deviationism and enabled the entire movement to act as one when called upon to do so.

Whether the organization will be permitted to survive is questionable. Since parts of the nation are ruled periodically under a state of siege there is no need for the government to go through legal procedures for arresting those persons whom they feel are subversive to the stability of the government in power. The commander of the local army battalion told me that the army regularly would round up "subversives" and keep them in custody for various periods of time. "How long?" I asked. "For the fellow-traveler, one month; for the outspoken agitator, two months; for the real hard core activist, three months. After awhile maybe they will learn that the fight is not worth it," he said. Also agents of DAS attended all CNVP meetings and some even became members. Permission was required for all general CNVP meetings and armed guards attended.

ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF A COMMUNIST FRONT IN MANIZALES



- B.C. BARRIO COMMITTEE
- INTER-COMMITTEE REPRESENTATION
- CORE LEADERS ON BARRIO COMMITTEES
- INFILTRATION BY UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
- BARRIO REPRESENTATIVES TO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

But the CNPV, we find, is not the only organization under close scrutiny of the authorities. The commander of the national police in the state of Caldas told me in an interview that he assigns an agent of the police to join and attend every meeting of the juntas of barrio community development groups. Even PTA meetings held in the poor barrios of the city have police officers in attendance.

VI. REVOLUTION OR EVOLUTION

When the "Grey Ladies," volunteers at the University Hospital in Manizales, were asked to help in the preparation of genealogies of the elite families of the city in exchange for publication rights to this study, they were enthusiastically for the idea. Not only was it a potential source of income for their organization, but they, as members of the elite of the city, were proud of their heritage and were interested in seeing the study conducted. After a week's thought on the matter the group rejected it, commenting, "Such a study would give the communists a list of persons to assassinate when the revolution occurs." The implication was that there would be a revolution and that the oligarchy would be singled out for removal.

This view was not limited to the ladies aid society, for the fear of a communist-inspired revolution was and is a matter of concern to the national leaders of Colombia. With the success of Castro in Cuba and the establishment of the first communist nation in Latin America fairly close to Colombia, many of the national elite began to take concerted action against communism. Immediately after the Cuban success there was a lot of vigilante action by the non-communist leaders, many of them tied to Catholic social doctrine. In Manizales this was represented by the work of the Cruzada Social and the Mano Negra.

With time, the military succeeded in wiping out or severely limiting the activities of the communist "independent republics" and guerrilla bands operating in the mountains. The police took over from the vigilante groups in keeping their eyes on the activities of the communist-affiliated social movements in the slums of the city. The oligarchs now engaged in their more traditional form of charity and service organization.

While the pluralists may be right in stating that voluntary associations can serve as agents of social change, they are wrong when they assume that all environments are, ipso-facto, benign and will permit these groups to flourish and grow. As a matter of fact, a more viable assumption might be that the environment will tend to be antithetical to the formation of organizations whose goals are those of changing the structure of the social system that obtains.

I have pointed out that the level of participation in voluntary associations is very low and is highly correlated with measures of socio-economic status. I estimate that less than 10 percent of the population of Manizales participates in voluntary organizations. The characteristic of multiple memberships in organizations was even more highly correlated with the socio-economic status of the participant than was the act of joining one organization.

If one were to consider only instrumental voluntary organizations, which are supposedly those that are interested in effecting some change on the environment, the level of participation would be even less for all social classes, but not all instrumental organizations are change-oriented organizations and should not be so considered. Charity or

service groups are supportive of an elitist society rather than a pluralist society and they cannot be included in measures of participation as the pluralists are wont to do.

A study of the dynamics of 234 voluntary organizations in Manizales seems to indicate that most organizations are either directed by the elite or represent their interests. The age of an organization correlates with its budget and its budget correlates with the SES of the membership. While many organizations participate in pressure group activities, as herein defined, these most often merely reflect the seeking of funds to support the organizational activities. One-half of the organizations studied could be construed as being representative of the lower middle class or the lower class of the society (labor unions, cooperatives, and community development groups). This is a false assumption.

First of all, only a fraction of the labor force in Manizales is unionized. The movement represents an elite of the laboring force and is more willing to spend its scarce resources gaining more benefits for the entrenched working class elite than in expanding the movement. Confronting the weak labor movement is a highly organized elite that will not tolerate the presence of industrial unions in Manizales. The communist labor federation is watched closely by DAS as well as by the National Police. It is extremely doubtful that the labor union movement will become a significant avenue of social change in Manizales.

Cooperatives are usually thought of as middle class organizations. The rich do not need them and the poor do not have the skills to organize them. They are enterprises that have as a goal the attainment of a collective economic good through joint effort. They are not out to "shake up the system" and pose no threat to the community elites. The movement is small and irrelevant as an avenue of social change in Manizales.

Community Development groups are a sad example of a non-organization. They are so closely watched to make sure that they engage only in economic mobilization and never threaten any political action that they can hardly be considered interest groups capable of bringing about meaningful social change. Most of their resources for group action are derived from the government and as soon as they go beyond building outhouses or water systems, police stations or chapels, they lose the support of the community power structure and can even be dissolved as an organization.

The only organization in the city of Manizales in 1967 that had any of the characteristics of a truly popular movement was the Central Nacional Pro-Vivienda. It was a large organization (over 500 members) composed of lower class citizens. Its members lived in the worst slums and barely earned enough to survive let alone support an organization. The organization had an ideological orientation that was anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchy, and anti-government. It was founded by and was closely affiliated with the communist labor federation in Manizales.

To make sure that this organization would not disrupt the status quo it was infiltrated by the secret police and its meetings were watched over by heavily armed members of the mounted police. Regularly, the leadership was intimidated by the public authorities and finally rounded up by the DAS and jailed as being subversive. Earlier organizations of this nature were infiltrated and taken over by members of an elitist vigilante organization.

The various case studies point out the problems of survival of possible conflict groups where the "rules of the game" do not provide adequate safeguards to the right of association. Since 1931 the right to associate has been protected by law and, although the increasingly expanded labor code is offering more protection to the labor union movement, it seems that the growth and the strength of the unions are going to depend on the extra-local labor federations, national federations of oil workers, truck drivers, longshoremen, etc. This would have the effect of removing the conflict from the local social structure where an entrenched elite seem to dominate the industrial development of the area and to have been successful in limiting the development of the labor union movement.

At the same time it seems as though the cause of pluralism will be enhanced with the development of a counter-elite based on the presence of outside investment in the community. The Azucenos have pretty well coopted all new resources developed in the area in recent years but whether they can continue to do so is an empirical question. The two foreign-owned firms in which the Azucenos have no board memberships are managed by two of the group opposing the Azucenos. While this portends the development of a pluralistic structure within the industrial sector it is a pluralism of elites who subscribe, essentially, to the same social values for they are as anti-union as the rest of the industrial entrepreneurs in the city.

In the past the government tried to foment the development of voluntary organizations of the masses through programs of Integración Popular and Acción Comunal. The organizational activity among the poorest sector of the population, comprising over two-thirds of the nation, will probably remain mostly in the hands of the communists which might possibly cause an increase in government (police, DAS) supervision and intervention in these movements.

Returning full circle to our opening remarks on pluralist theory, a statement by another critic of modern pluralism cogently summarizes my conclusions. "Realism would seem to dictate that the most powerful or privileged groups in society 'limit' government, and that a 'pluralist' political system requires a conflict of values, not just conflicting groups The group theory of politics became the basis of a modern pluralism which is no longer concerned with efforts to change the system."¹

¹Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F. Bentley," in William E. Connally, The Bias of Pluralism (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 46.