

NASSER OF EGYPT
A CASE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
(Political Science)
at the
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1965

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Two of the most important factors in the study of international relations are nationalism and economic underdevelopment. Their importance lies in their apparent influence on the thinking, and therefore the actions, of the political elites of many nations. This is particularly true when both factors operate simultaneously in the same nation, as is the case in much of the so-called "underdeveloped world." But the more precise relationship of these factors to the thinking of elites in many individual countries still needs to be specified. The purpose of this paper is to examine these interrelationships in a case study of one nation. It will ask the question: What are the interrelationships of the factors of nationalism and underdevelopment with thought on international politics in an underdeveloped country? The country selected is Egypt. An authoritarian country was selected because it will provide a better opportunity for the examination of the ideas of the authoritative policy-maker, in this case Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose views are more likely to be available and definable.

More precisely, I plan to examine the development of Nasser's thought with regard to international affairs as it was formulated in the period from 1954, when his power in Egypt became solidified, to the present. This will be done within the framework of a model of nationalism, based partly on the work of Karl W. Deutsch and partly on the historical model of Carlton Hayes. Using this combined model I shall examine the writings and speeches of Nasser to try to determine

the extent to which his thought is characterized by nationalism as it is presented in the model and what effect this is likely to have on his actions in international affairs. In the area of economic development the more specific model (in that it is related solely to the Middle East) of Morroe Berger will be used as the basis for a discussion of this factor's possible role in the formation of Nasser's thought on international affairs independent of nationalist influences. This part of the study will include an examination of these forces as they have actually been operating in Egypt over the past decade.

A major premise underlying the use of Egypt for this case study is the assumption that Nasser speaks for Egypt in foreign affairs. This is, in fact, the reason for using an authoritarian country rather than a country with some other sort of political system. When we discuss Nasser's ideas we are referring to the major factor in the formation of Egyptian foreign policy.¹ In a country where decision-making has a wide base a study of this type would be virtually impossible because there would be no one who spoke for the country in the way Nasser does.

A second reason for using Nasser in this study is that he occupies a relatively important position in the Middle East and in the

¹"Arab Nationalism and Nasserism," World Today, XIV (December, 1958), p. 540.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Foreign Policy of Egypt," Foreign Policy in a World of Change, ed. Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 319-348.

"Nasser's One-Man Show," The Economist, CLXXXVI (March 22, 1958), p. 1050.

"Pyramid in the Fog," The Economist, CCI (November 11, 1961), pp. 268 & 270.

underdeveloped world in general.² Two things are important here. The first is that this position has tended to spotlight his activities, therefore making both Nasser's actions and words more accessible for purposes of this study. The second is that because of his position, particularly in the Middle East, Nasser has come to exemplify many of the theoretical traits of nationalism to be discussed below. He has tended to become a personification of the goals and aspirations associated with these factors and therefore provides an excellent example for the study of their role.

Even without Nasser Egypt would be useful for several reasons in a study of this type. First, she is a prime example of an underdeveloped country, possessing one of the lowest per capita incomes and one of the highest population densities on usable land in the world. Second, she has a history of nationalist activity that precedes that of many of the newly formed nations.

On the other hand, the use of Egypt and Nasser for this study does present some methodological difficulties. The first is the language barrier, with much material available only in Arabic. Although there are many translations available, many of these tend to be unreliable. Even those put out by the Egyptian government are known to contain errors and deliberate changes in text. For this reason extreme

²Geoffrey Barraclough and Rachel F. Wells, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1955-56 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 91.

Leonard Binder, "Egypt's Positive Neutrality," The Revolution in World Politics, Morton Kaplan, ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 178.

Carl Leiden, "Egypt: The Drift to the Left," Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (December, 1962), p. 294.

caution must be used in interpreting them. The main source of Nasser's ideas for purposes of writing this paper is a set of collected speeches, press releases, and press interviews put out by the Egyptian Information Agency, which began this task only in 1958 and has yet to issue a volume for 1964. Thus material is limited for the period prior to 1958 and during the year just past. These limitations do not make the study impossible, but they do present obstacles that must be recognized and accounted for.

CHAPTER II

MODEL OF NATIONALISM

It is the purpose of this section to present a general model of nationalism. The emphasis of this model will be historical description rather than causitive analysis, although the latter will not be completely ignored. The object here is to find the type of nationalism that generally serves best to describe what is going on in the underdeveloped world (excluding Latin America) with regard to international relations, and then to show how its features relate to Nasser's ideas.

To accomplish this parts of the models of two writers will be used. They are Karl Deutsch and Carlton Hayes. Hayes' model, though formulated in the 1920's, still seems to provide the best historical descriptive analysis of the development of modern nationalism. But the fact that it is dated results in the omission of certain factors that are necessary for a proper analysis of nationalism in a contemporary underdeveloped nation. For this purpose it is necessary to bring part of Deutsch's model into the picture. Deutsch's definition of nationalism also fits the contemporary situation better and it will therefore be used.

Deutsch's definition states that nationalism is a "preference for the competitive interest of this nation and its members over those of all outsiders in a world of social mobility and economic competition, dominated by values of wealth, power, and prestige, so that the goals of personal security and group identification appear bound up with the

attainment of these values."³ For purposes of this paper this definition provides a good general description of goals that seem to be common to modern nationalism, while at the same time giving an indication of what some of the underlying factors for this type of movement are. It also avoids such ambiguous terms as nationality, culture, and common language and in their place substitutes what the author feels is a describeable pattern of social interaction in a communications framework as a measurement apparatus.⁴ In other words, Deutsch attempts to describe basically the same phenomena as Hayes, but from a more technical and psychological point of view.

Basic to Deutsch's model is the role of communication as a means both of delimiting nationalism and creating it.⁵ Thus nationalism is partly a function of an increased communications grid pattern in a certain geographic area. By the same token, it can be increased by a deliberate stepping up of this communication activity and channeling at least part of it in the direction of stronger national identification. This increases the power of giving direction to the people who control this communications network.⁶ The "forming of a tradition" or "political will" becomes at least a partial function of the ability to exercise such power.⁷ Both of these ideas are important to the development of nationalism in Deutsch's model.

³Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," World Politics, V (1952-53), pp. 170-71.

⁴Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1953), pp. 161-64.

⁵Ibid., p. 164.

⁶Ibid., pp. 48-49.

⁷Ibid.

The geographic area mentioned in the preceding paragraph has been in modern times the nation-state. Loyalty to it, based on some idea of self-interest and identity with it, has been the object of many of the modernizing groups attempting to wrest power from the more traditional ruling groups, whether they are of local or foreign origin. Once the modernizing group is in power it will promote a concept of self-interest and self-awareness of the total society in order better to compete and gain security in a world where its values are dominant.⁸ The feeling by this group is that these are indeed the best way in which they may improve their own standards vis-à-vis their neighbors.⁹ Security comes in the creation of a new object with which the individual may identify, the nation-state, thus replacing the decaying traditional objects of identification, such as religion.¹⁰ The nation-state then becomes tied up with the individual and its successes and failures become the same as his.

The idea of "political will" may also play a further role. This concept, which amounts basically to a great pressure to fulfill the goals of the nationalist movement, may become an obstacle to practical policy making.¹¹ Success in the achievement of stated goals may become a built-in prerequisite to the stability of the regime. Such a process amounts basically to feedback. A regime may teach a lesson so well that any attempt to alter it later will result in violent reaction on the part of the newly educated. A mild example may be seen in U.S. policy toward the recognition of Red China.

⁸Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations...", p. 183.

⁹Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 185.

¹¹Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, pp. 155-160.

The above partial model serves to identify certain common factors of nationalism, but it does not attempt to demonstrate differences within the broad model. Nor does it provide a basis for the direct study of actions and thought in the international sphere. Finally, it excludes the role of ideology as a basis for action. That is, according to Deutsch's model there is no nationalism for sake of nationalism. There is no struggle for independence merely for the sake of an ideal.

In a sense Hayes' descriptive model of the types of nationalism takes up where Deutsch leaves off, though, of course, it was developed decades before Deutsch began to work. Deutsch's definition of nationalism is not incompatible with any of Hayes' types of nationalism. Both display essentially the characteristics described in the definition. Therefore despite radically different methods of arriving at their models the two writers seem to be describing the same phenomena and coming to conclusions that are remarkably similar on a general level.

Hayes' concept of nationalism is presented as a historically recent phenomena that combines the old ideas of patriotism and nationality.¹² Its development parallels that of the modern nation-state, and it is originally an offshoot of humanism.¹³ Its primary characteristic at that point was the demand that each nationality have its own national government.¹⁴ This general feeling then broke into

¹²Carlton J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 6-7.

¹³Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1931), Chapter 2.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 34 and 37.

three distinctive groups, called Jacobin, Traditional, and Liberal nationalism.¹⁵ Later came a product of the twentieth century called Integral nationalism.

The fact that Hayes' model is essentially a picture of the historical development of nationalism does not mean that the typologies formed cannot be used to describe contemporary nationalism in its various forms. This is not to say that these models are complete and must not be added to in any way. On the contrary, just as Deutsch's model was missing certain important factors, so too is Hayes'. This is particularly true in the area of contemporary developments, where his model becomes noticeably dated. It is here that Deutsch's model fills an important gap.

Our major concern in describing the types of nationalism as posed by Hayes will be the answering of the question stated at the beginning of the paper. Therefore factors that seem to relate to the international sector will be stressed. It is also our contention that the models of Jacobin and Integral nationalism come closest to describing nationalism as it is practiced in the present day underdeveloped world. Accordingly emphasis will be placed on relating these types in the following model.

Jacobin nationalism has its historical beginnings in the French Revolution. It is not a monolithic philosophy but a conglomeration of beliefs of several groups active during that period.¹⁶ The general character of Jacobin nationalist thought is said to have four

¹⁵Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 42-46.

characteristics: 1. a professed belief in the "common people;" 2. a belief in popular sovereignty; 3. some sort of an idea of natural law; 4. the idea of liberty played up verbally.¹⁷

A second set of characteristics described by Hayes are those Jacobin nationalism exhibited in practice. The first of these is intolerance of internal dissent.¹⁸ This included the rooting out of any faction that did not give complete loyalty to the cause as the leaders saw it. The second was the reliance of force against "domestic dissenters and the foes of the military machine."¹⁹ The "machine" was a kind of universal army, where everyone, women and children included, had a role to fulfill. Third was a religiousness in the movement that was expressed in the form of symbols (national flag, song, shrines, etc.) and ceremonies (parades, national holidays, republican funerals, etc.).²⁰ The religious nature of the movement was basically a substitute for the old religion that was being broken down.

Fourthly, Jacobin nationalism was characterized by a missionary zeal.²¹ This zeal was manifested both at home and abroad. In the former area every means possible was used to secure popular conformity. A large propaganda system became an important feature of Jacobin action in this sphere and is particularly useful in distinguishing it

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 51-52.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 53.

²⁰Ibid., p. 54.

²¹Ibid., pp. 56-62.

from its antecedent, Humanitarian nationalism. The missionary characteristics of the movement are tied closely with its religious nature, with the latter giving the former credibility. They were carried via the propaganda apparatus and allowed for such maneuvers as attempts to identify civil with military patriotism (i.e., to justify conscription). The use of a popular educational system was also important in efforts to do such things as stamp out foreign dialects.

In the international sphere this missionary zeal led to wars. The influence of war was an important one. It produced its own form of extremism, where not only tyrannical monarchs and reactionary governments were hated, but also people who failed to rise against their rulers and make common cause with the French Revolution.²² This led to a vindictiveness against foreigners and to pride in and ambition for their own nation, to conquest, and eventually to a new imperialism. Napoleon was, of course, a promoter of this spirit.

Finally, Jacobin nationalism is revolutionary in nature. It had the aim of overthrowing the old order and establishing a new one. New groups were gaining in strength, but were not allowed to assert themselves. The only way they could do so was through revolution. The democratic ideals of these new groups were also stifled and provided the ideological vehicle for the revolution.

The implications of these characteristics as they might bear on international affairs are manifold. They include: 1. a tendency

²² Ibid., pp. 80-81.

toward national aggrandizement in various forms; 2. attempts to proselytize abroad; 3. xenophobia; 4. an idea of natural law that produces a feeling of "rightness" in the ideas and actions of the leaders of the movement; 5. a religious quality that ties in with numbers 2 and 3, and also gives a fervor that might not otherwise exist; 6. lip service to the idea of democracy in practice; 7. a concept of "the people" which generally aims at the elimination of class as the basis for rule; 8. a revolutionary spirit. These factors are not separate, but are often tied closely together in both thought and action.

Two other types of nationalism in Hayes' model are Traditional and Liberal. The former has an aristocratic orientation,²³ and the latter forms a compromise between Jacobin and Traditional nationalism.²⁴ Neither is particularly relevant to our case study.

The final type of nationalism described by Hayes is called Integral nationalism. Within the framework of this term he attempts to include the contemporary developments of nationalism that do not fit into his earlier types.²⁵ Integral nationalism is defined in the words of the originator of the term, early twentieth century French political activist and founder of the Action Francaise movement, Charles Maurras, as "the exclusive pursuit of nationalist policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady increase in national power--for a nation declines when it loses military might."²⁶ Integral

²³Ibid., pp. 109-111.

²⁴Ibid., p. 121.

²⁵Ibid., p. 165.

²⁶Ibid.

nationalism focuses on nations that have already obtained their independence. It makes nationalism an end in itself, not a means to some broader end. It puts national interests above those of humanity, something that none of the other types do. It lacks a feeling of internationalism, therefore it refuses cooperation except in its own interest. It is jingoist, militaristic, and tends to be imperialist.

Domestically it is illiberal and tyrannical, and would oblige all of its citizens to conform to common standards of morals, etc. It would subordinate all individual liberty to its own ends.²⁷ The admitted cardinal principle of this movement is the reliance on brute force.²⁸ Hayes' models for his description of Integral nationalism are Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Bolshevik Russia. But an element of integral nationalism is also mixed in with some of the other types, as in Liberal nationalistic America where Hayes points to the U.S. refusal to join the League of Nations.

Certain characteristics of Hayes' Integral nationalism fit into the contemporary pattern of nationalism in the underdeveloped world. The most important of these are the placing of absolute importance on the interests of the nation, the maintenance of its absolute integrity, and its advancement in the world by any means practical at a particular time.

It is our contention that Nasser's brand of nationalism fits generally into Hayes' model of Jacobin nationalism. Demonstrating this

²⁷Ibid., p. 166.

²⁸Ibid., p. 223.

will be the objective of Chapters IV and V of this paper. But before this can be done it is necessary to examine the economic and social pressures within Egypt to try to determine what kinds of pressures they might exert on Nasser outside our model of nationalism. This is the objective of Chapter III of the paper.

CHAPTER III

EGYPT, A DEVELOPING NATION

Egypt is an underdeveloped country; that is, she is a country trying to "catch up" with the West in her standard of living and move closer in her social patterns. In this respect she follows a pattern that typifies other Arab²⁹ and Afro-Asian countries, in that she both resents the West for past "wrongs" and wants to immitate her style of life. But these goals are only generalities and are certainly not shared with equal vigor or unequivocalness of meaning by all of the various groups and individuals in Egypt. In this section I shall examine some of the manifestations of these general goals and their possible relationship to Nasser's thought on international politics.

A leading factor in the establishment of these goals is the advancement in the development of technical communication.³⁰ This development has allowed the widespread dissemination of information about conditions in other nations and has helped to create some of the desire to immitate these nations. The technical improvement in communication has also helped in the internal growth of "basic communications grids" within Egypt that is a basic factor in the growth of nationalism.³¹ These two ideas complement and reinforce each other, thus adding to the growth of this phase of Egyptian nationalism.

²⁹ Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1962), p. 324.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 449.

³¹ Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations," p. 175.

Another demand stemming from the goals mentioned above is industrialization. It has become the mechanical route through which all of the other goals may be reached. It has also been called the route to survival for Egypt.³² But it poses many problems for a country like Egypt that is lacking in resources, capital, and basic technical skills. All of these factors, particularly the need for capital, create demands for action in the international sphere. In order to achieve industrialization Egypt must get large quantities of outside financial aid. Aid in the quantities needed has thus far been available from only two sources in the world, the U.S. and the USSR. This leaves to Egypt the alternatives of going to one or the other exclusively, or trying to get aid from both simultaneously. The matter is complicated by the rivalry between the two super-powers and by the nationalist feelings in Egypt.

The advance in technology also allows for a greater degree of internal control. Nasser's control of new weapons and of all of the mass communications facilities enables him to carry on more easily the authoritarian tradition of Egypt.³³ Here we have a paradox in the role of communication. It simultaneously allows for greater control, and creates new demands in some segments of the population which the regime is forced to take into consideration. This contradiction is modified somewhat in that the demands created are often the same as the goals desired by the regime itself. This is due not only to the

³² Gilbert Burck, "Nasser's Imperial Economics," Fortune, LVII (October, 1958), p. 109.

³³ Berger, p. 403.

control of the regime over the communications network, but also to the common outlook that exists between the regime and the groups in Egyptian society that are most likely to be making such demands. That is, there is similarity in values of the new middle class, the military regime, and to some extent even the masses. The nature of the outlook of each of these groups and their potential bearing on international affairs will be examined in the following pages.

It is the so-called middle class that is the vehicle for modernization in Egypt.³⁴ This middle class consists, in Morroe Berger's model, of middle and low level civil servants, Westernized technicians, and professionals who have never been in the West.³⁵ It is small but is becoming increasingly larger. It is also becoming better educated and more vociferous. Under the "old regime" it had little voice in what was going on in government and little chance to improve its lot. In this way it resembles the middle class of the Jacobin model presented above.

As a major force in Egypt's revolution the middle class is caught up in the same cross pressures, a desire for a Western way of life coupled with a bitter hatred of the West itself.³⁶ This, of course, stems from the period of British rule that was the first and foremost objective of the revolution. It has spread to the identification of all the West as the imperialists, a handicap under which the Soviet Union need not labor.³⁷ Egyptian xenophobia stretches to other

³⁴Ibid., p. 277.

³⁵Ibid., p. 328.

³⁶Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 135.

³⁷Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).

foreign minority groups such as Turks and Greeks, who comprised the merchant and business class and are also resented. But much of this feeling is the result of governmental pressure and propaganda. Economic pressures, and subsequent failures, have caused the leaders to look for scapegoats. For this purpose foreigners have made ideal targets in the past.³⁸ The first businesses to be nationalized were those belonging to foreigners.

The success of the new middle class is closely tied to the success of Egypt in overcoming her economic problems. If Egypt fails, they will fail with her. This was not the case with the old land-owning class that held power in Egypt before the revolution. For them a change in regime or a foreign policy dominated by a foreign nation meant little for their economic situations. The 1952 revolution changed this and swept this group from power. Behind the revolutionary regime stood the military and the modernizing middle class, and with the success of the new regime rode the success of these two groups. This situation is described almost exactly in Deutach's discussion of nationalism.³⁹ The new groups identify their success with that of the nation, thus producing unusually strong feelings for seeing that the nation advanced toward its goals.

This is particularly true of the fast growing bureaucracy. Egypt's system of higher education turned out far more bureaucrats

³⁸ Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 57.

³⁹ See above, pp. 5-6.

(as opposed to technocrats, who were in heavy demand) than could be used under the "old regime."⁴⁰ With the coming of the revolution there also came a large expansion in the activity of the government. This created a larger niche for the liberally educated. It also helped to create an ever expanding opening for the technically educated. This group also has a vested interest in seeing the success of the present regime and its goals. Together these two groups make up the bulk of the new middle class that supplies most of the pressure for modernization and industrialization because this is the only way that they will also reach their goals.

In this light a feeling of the absolute integrity of Egypt as a sovereign nation-state is a not too distant step. The insecurity felt by the middle class in the light of general economic conditions in Egypt is not hard to see. There are also the feelings of distrust and hatred of those who the Egyptians feel have kept them down in the past. Any invasion of the sovereignty of Egypt is taken as a blow struck at their goals. This type of nationalism is set apart from Jacobin nationalism in that it places the interests of the state above those of the individual. The success of the state becomes the focal point and the individual is relegated to secondary status even though his interests may have been the basis for the origin of the whole process. It is here that we see the characteristics of Integral nationalism.

Here we may return to the subject of industrialization and foreign aid mentioned briefly at the beginning of this section. This subject is

⁴⁰ Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 237-38.

closely tied to that of the new middle class and its brand of nationalism, as well as to Egypt's international relations. In the above discussion we have seen industrialization pushed from two different, though interrelated directions. The first is given in the goals of the modernizing elites. The second is in the form of internal pressure felt by the military regime to fulfill this goal both as one of its own goals and because of the pressure that is being applied from below. These pressures may result in two different kinds of reactions on the part of the regime. The first is an all out attempt to attempt to accomplish an extremely difficult if not impossible task, the industrialization of Egypt. In so doing, it must obtain foreign aid by whatever means possible. The result here has been a kind of blackmail, playing the East off against the West to obtain the necessary capital. This game is complicated by distrust and dislike for the West that far outweighs any animosity felt toward the East.

The second reaction to pressure for industrialization is an apparent attempt to cover up failures in the industrial sphere at home with violent and disruptive actions in the international sphere.⁴¹ Keith Wheelock, for example, sees the seizure of the Suez Canal in these terms. At best it is only a partial explanation and would be a difficult proposition to prove. Another explanation might be that of Nasser playing to the people's dislike of the West in general in order to improve his own stature.

⁴¹ Wheelock, p. 57.
Malcolm H. Kerr, Egypt Under Nasser (New York: The Foreign Policy Assoc., 1963).

The second major moving force behind Egypt's socio-economic revolution is the army. For purposes of this paper we will follow Morroe Berger's model and keep the military separate from the middle class in our analysis.⁴² In Egypt the military has played a dual role of being a vanguard in the socio-economic revolution, while at the same time looking out for its more traditional interest of increasing military power.⁴³ This aspect of the Egyptian revolution lies outside Hayes' model of nationalism. As described by Berger it is a role that is almost peculiar to the Middle East, and it is attributable to a number of factors.

First, there was a need on the part of those groups that wished to take power to have the support of the army.⁴⁴ This had two effects. One, the army became a great political school, and two, various political movements and sects have attracted elements of the army at various times, giving it a heterogeneous rather than predominantly conservative outlook.⁴⁵ Second, with the decline of the power of Britain within Egypt there arose the opportunity for the new middle class of Egypt to gain status in the army. This brought into the army officers who did not have a vested interest in the then current ruling elite. The new group of officers brought with them the values of the middle class of social progress, economic advancement, and most of all a nationalistic fervor and hatred of the British and traditional ruling

⁴²Manfred Halpern, in The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), combines both into one large middle class concept that is too broad for the purposes of this paper.

⁴³Berger, p. 391.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 392.

⁴⁵Ibid.

class who had long kept them down.⁴⁶ Third, other elites in Egypt were just not strong enough to carry out a revolution. Only the army was able to seize power and hold it stable enough to carry out some of its goals.⁴⁷

Finally, in a more immediate sense, the army was interested in improving its own position both socially and militarily.⁴⁸ Prior to the revolution the army generally occupied a very low position in the minds of most Egyptians. With the coming of the revolution and the subsequent rule of the military regime the position of the army has gone up considerably in Egyptian society. Militarily the Egyptian army has long stood in the shadow of the foreign rulers. The humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel in 1948 brought this dissatisfaction to a peak. This more traditional role of military aggrandizement fits easily into the nationalist contest. The idea of building up the army became identified with the building of Egypt and, indeed, in order to accomplish the former, control over Egypt had to be obtained. Combined with the generally modernizing middle class outlook of important segments of the military, this provided the perfect take-off point for the launching of the revolution.

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 393-397.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 386.

Dankwart Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," The Military in the Middle East, ed. Sydney N. Fisher (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963), p. 12.

⁴⁸ Jean Lacouture, "Nasserism in Uniform," New Outlook, IV (March-April, 1961), p. 9.

The task of building the power of the army is further tied to the idea of economic modernization in that modernizing, i.e., industrialization, is the only way in which the army can materially improve its power. This serves to firm the tie between the military as a builder of its own power and as a modernizing and reforming influence in the Egyptian society. It also presents some of the same problems with regard to how this objective is going to be obtained, at least in reference to the economic improvement.

For the task of building a stronger army there are further implications. Waiting for Egypt to become strong enough industrially to provide herself with as strong a national army as the regime desires would be far too slow a process. In lieu of waiting for such a tenuous process the regime must seek other ways of filling this gap, both to satisfy its own desires and to stabilize its power position within Egypt. Thus we may observe in Egypt an emphasis on international affairs that seems out of proportion when considered in the light of the immense internal problems.⁴⁹ At least part of this is due to the quest for power and need for industrialization discussed above.

Within the sphere of external affairs it is possible to see actions that seem directly related to pressure by the military, such as the Czech arms deal which brought Nasser arms that the West was unwilling to supply free of "strings." One immediate trigger for this action was probably the Israeli border raid of February 28, 1955,

⁴⁹ Wheelock, p. 51.

that cost Egypt more than forty lives. Military preparedness with regard to Israel was and is a major objective both within the army and with Nasser himself, and such a defeat as that one could easily cause important repercussions within Egypt. Leonard Binder sees a similar pattern in Egypt's reaction to the Bagdad Pact.⁵⁰

A problem arises in trying to separate the military from the nationalist reaction. Our model makes no real provision for this situation. This is due to the aggressive nature of international actions attributed to Jacobin nationalism, but it is also due, in part, to the nationalist character of the Egyptian military regime.

Egypt's economic plight is most strikingly revealed when one looks at the condition of her masses, both urban workers and rural peasants. But, at the same time, this is not the source of greatest pressure on the regime. The argument about pressure from the masses, says Berger, is "overrated" in the Middle East.⁵¹ The urban worker makes up the group in Egyptian society that cares least about nationalism.⁵² The social reforms established by the regime were not the result of a clamoring from below, but more an expression of the regime's own values.⁵³ This is the same pattern seen in Jacobin nationalism with middle class values governing the movement while it is popularly attributed to the masses.

⁵⁰ Binder, p. 178.

⁵¹ Berger, p. 389.

⁵² Ibid., p. 277.

⁵³ Barbara Castle, "Revelution From Above," New Statesman, LXV (February 8, 1963), p. 182.

It has been the task of the regime to educate rather than respond to the demands of "the people."⁵⁴ The new military regime that installed itself in 1952 seemed, to the peasant, much like the old authoritarian regimes that it had replaced.⁵⁵ It became the job of the regime to win over the respect of the masses through economic improvement, social reform, and a vast educational campaign. As in Jacobin France the last of these tasks was undertaken with great vigor.⁵⁶ Reforms moved slowly during the early years of the regime. The land reform was aimed mostly at breaking the power of the old ruling class and was not undertaken with real vigor until 1961. Economic reforms, nationalizations, and socialization did not effect the masses or did so only very indirectly.⁵⁷

The important task for the regime was to bring the masses into the political community.⁵⁸ Communications, again, plays a large role in this area. Through the use of radio Nasser can reach large numbers of urban and rural peasants who were previously isolated. With this weapon Nasser attempts to instill in them his own values. His task is a difficult one. The peasant does not hold the kind of internationalist outlook that is an important feature of Egypt's nationalism.⁵⁹ Any

⁵⁴Berger, p. 329.

⁵⁵Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958), p. 29.

⁵⁶Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, pp. 61-63.

⁵⁷Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt," Middle East Journal, XVI (Spring, 1962), p. 142.

⁵⁸Berger, p. 329.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 477.

internationalist outlook that any of the masses might have is not of the secular nature that typifies the regime. Rather it is connected with Islam.⁶⁰ The later appeals to Arab nationalism made by Nasser are usually connected in some way with the religious community of Islam.

As the educational process continues a new problem is created in the new demands that it fosters. As the masses become enlightened they will make the demands that are fed to them during the educational process. This will in turn put more pressure on the regime to fulfill what it has promised. The qualifying factor is the tight control that the regime is able to maintain over the communications system and its monopoly on modern weapons. With these factors in the hands of the leaders control is considerably easier to maintain. Demands are more easily channeled into some area that the regime can take care of, if not in the actual solving of the problem, then in placing the blame for it somewhere else. An example of this is, of course, the constant harangueing of the "imperialists" carried on in Nasser's speeches and over Cairo radio. They may be blamed for everything from the general backward condition of the country to the failure of last year's cotton crop.

Islam exhibits a rather ambiguous role in this whole process. It would seem that it would be constantly at odds with the secular modernizing process of nationalism as it is exhibited in Egypt. This is partially true. But it also serves as a touchstone to which the idea of unity is attached and by which Egyptian nationalism receives a righteous quality.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 337.

To a certain extent Islam and nationalism are in competition with each other and it appears that in Egypt secular nationalism is winning out.⁶¹ It is not only winning out, but it is to some extent replacing Islam as the religion of Egypt. Traditional Islam is giving way to the material demands of the people. Nationalism not only feeds on such secular demands, but promotes them. Egypt's nationalism also has the quality of "rightness" and of providing the answer that gives it a religious cast. This religious quality makes the spread of nationalism to other nations a more likely result.⁶² If you are right, you want others to be right with you. This concept may provide a partial explanation for the great stress placed by Nasser on Arab nationalism once he had stabilized his position in Egypt.

While in some respects providing an antithesis for Egyptian nationalism, Islam provides a synthesis in others. It provides a bridge by which the masses may be reached. Egyptian nationalism as expressed by Nasser acknowledges no contradiction between itself and Islam, though the appeal of Islam is stronger for Arab nationalism than it is for the more secular and political Egyptian variety.⁶³ In this way Islam does provide a slightly more international outlook than would otherwise be the case. Islam also provides a fertile area for the sowing of anti-Western seeds. The "great debate" between Islam and Christianity that has been going on for centuries was accentuated by the past century and a half of Western domination.⁶⁴ Such a relationship allows for the easy spread of anti-Western propaganda.

⁶¹Zafar Ishaq Ansari, "Egyptian Nationalism vis-a-vis Islam," Pakistan Horizon, XIII, 1 (First quarter, 1960), p. 43.

⁶²Hayes, Historical Evolution, p. 56.

⁶³Berger, pp. 337, 339, and 343.

⁶⁴Lewis, p. 135.

One final area to be discussed before turning to Nasser's own thought is Egypt's internal political situation. Several observers of Nasser's actions over the past years advance the theory that the best way to understand his international actions is to study his position within Egypt.⁶⁵ Such a theory would, for instance, see Nasser's attacks on the West as a result of his trying to win support at home, based on the idea that the people he is trying to win support from are anti-Western.⁶⁶ The basis of this theory is fundamentally sound, especially for the first few years of the regime. Estimates as to the time of Nasser's gaining full power in Egypt vary from early in 1954⁶⁷ to as late as 1955-56 when he gained stature for his international exploits and finally eliminated the Revolutionary Command Council.⁶⁸ Whatever the exact date of his final ascendancy or the precise relationship between his power position and his external actions, it is obvious that Nasser has had to step lightly in many areas in the international sphere because of strong pressures at home. Finding the exact nature of this relationship is beyond the scope of this paper.

Certainly the first two years of the military regime's rule were its most tenuous. For Nasser, too, this was an uneasy period of consolidation of power and it was not until the elimination of General Naguib, the popular figure head leader of the regime, in March, 1954, that Nasser's power began to firm into the dictatorial status that it

⁶⁵ Wheelock, p. 51.
Georgiana G. Stevens, "Arab Neutralism and Bandung," Middle East Journal, XI (Spring, 1957), pp. 143 and 150.

⁶⁶ Wheelock, p. 51.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁶⁸ Kerr, Egypt Under Nasser, p. 10.
Lacouture, Egypt in Transition, p. 193.

now occupys. There followed, in the fall of 1954, the evacuation agreement with the British. This agreement was attacked by both the left and right wing extremes within the country. During this period Nasser had a severe test of his ability to stay in power.⁶⁹ Later in the year an attempt on his life was made by the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result of this attempt he was able to eliminate them as an effective rival for his power. This completed the task of the suppressing of the major political groups that might endanger his position, the Wafd, the Communists (who were being jailed), and the Brotherhood.

Nasser's main source of power was, of course, the army.⁷⁰ It is this group that he has to worry most about keeping satisfied. But again it is difficult to differentiate between what is pressure by the army and what is Nasser's own feeling. His background seems to indicate they would be quite close. The Czech arms purchase in September, 1955, for instance, might be interpreted as army pressure to build up or as a result of Nasser's own feeling of humiliation at early army defeats and recent embarrassing raids at the hands of the Israelis.

The second group to whom Nasser must direct his appeal is the modernizing middle class. It is in this group that he is trying to build his strength with such political party replacements as the National Union and Arab Socialist Union. These organizations are

⁶⁹ Leonard Binder, "Nasserism: The Protest Movement in the Middle East," The Revolution in World Politics, ed. Morton Kaplan (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 161.

⁷⁰ Wheelock, p. 38.

designed to at least pay lip service to the idea of democracy. Their real function might better be described as determiners of public opinion, rather than reflectors of it.⁷¹ Al Ahram, the semiofficial Cairo daily, described the function of the National Union in this way: "it must echo the leadership at various levels and implant a spirit of services rather than a desire for gain."⁷²

The economic interests of this group seem to be more important. Nasser's shift toward socialism may well be explained by a too long neglect of the internal sphere at the beginning of the regime and a later realization that something more radical would have to be tried if the demands of this group were to be met. The fact that the nationalization decrees of July, 1961, were one of the factors in the breakup of the UAR would seem to indicate that internal demands for economic development weighed quite heavily even in the face of Arab Nationalism. Again, we have the problem of differentiating between what amounts to pressure and what is merely a reflection of Nasser's own thought on the subject. It is this problem that will be at least part of our concern in the next two sections of the paper.

⁷¹ Kerr, Middle East Journal, XVI, p. 141.

⁷² Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE REVOLUTION

In the second section of this paper we presented a general model of nationalism in the contemporary world. In the third section we examined in greater detail some of the seemingly relevant social, economic, and political factors in Egypt, and where possible attempted to relate these to our model of nationalism. In the next two sections we shall attempt to show the interrelationship between these two areas and the development of the thought of Egypt's President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The emphasis will, of course, be placed on the international sphere.

It will be our hypothesis that Nasser represents the epitome of these forces as they operate in Egypt. In the public utterances and in many of the actions of Nasser we will find personified those ideas of nationalistic, social, and economic revolution that were described in earlier sections of this paper. Much of Nasser's power and influence comes from his ability to symbolize the feelings of the people whom he leads.⁷³ The problem which arises is whether this is a conscious act, designed to gain power and prestige for his own personal ambitions, or a real expression of feelings and desires that stem from the same factors that cause them in a great many other middle class Egyptians and Arabs. It is not within the scope of this paper to attempt to solve this problem, but, at the same time, it is not a problem that can be ignored when attempting an analysis of Nasser's thought.

⁷³Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 24.

The analysis of Nasser's thought will be done in two parts. The first will center on his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution,⁷⁴ an article entitled "The Egyptian Revolution," appearing in Foreign Affairs in January, 1955,⁷⁵ and such other material as is available for the period prior to 1955. These will constitute a kind of initial position. The second part will cover the subsequent development of his thought.

The Philosophy of the Revolution appeared first in Cairo sometime in 1953, although not much notice was taken of it until the events of 1955 put Nasser on the center of the world stage. It is more like a collection of random thoughts than a carefully planned and organized philosophy, but it does express some of Nasser's ideals both in terms of the revolution itself and what was to come after it. These early thoughts show Nasser as a devoted and seemingly sincere young nationalist, typifying the frustration and idealism of his generation.⁷⁶ In analyzing his own objectivity in writing about the revolution Nasser himself sees his own involvement in the process. "I myself was inside the maelstrom of the revolution, and from those who find themselves in a maelstrom, some of its more distant details are hided."⁷⁷

⁷⁴Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington: The Public Affairs Press, 1955).

⁷⁵Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign Affairs, XXXIII (January, 1955).

⁷⁶John S. Badeau, in the Introduction to Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo, New York: Smith, Keynes, & Marshall, Publishers, 1959), p. 19.

⁷⁷Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 28. (All citings of the text will be from the Public Affairs Press edition.)

Certainly the strongest feeling Nasser expresses in his book is that of nationalism. Even Palestine takes a back seat to his thoughts of Egypt.

When I now try to recall the details of our experience in Palestine, I find a curious thing: we were fighting in Palestine, but our dreams were centered in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy in his trenches before us, but our hearts hovered over our distant country, which we had left to the care of the wolves.⁷⁸

During the early stages Nasser's concern was with the internal problems of getting rid of the despots and foreigners, rather than with foreign matters. But the external always had a role. The "dream of an Egypt free and strong" means more than just removing foreign oppressors.⁷⁹ It was a "dream of the glory of our nation; it is necessary to build that glory."⁸⁰ It is the filling of "that wandering mission in search of a hero to play it. We alone, by virtue of our place, can perform the role."⁸¹ Here we can easily see the Jacobin tendency toward national aggrandizement.

Other characteristics of Jacobin nationalism found expression in Nasser's early writing. Among the more prominent of these was the revolutionary spirit. Nasser saw revolution as the only way out of the dilemma that Egypt was in.⁸² In addition he believed in the inherent rightness of the nationalist revolution. He admonished the United States to adopt the only "morally correct" position and support his regime.⁸³

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 21.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 49.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 56.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 114.

⁸²Nasser, Foreign Affairs, XXXIII, p. 203.

⁸³Ibid., p. 211.

Elsewhere he speaks of the "natural forces" which called the people to the revolution.⁸⁴ The force of the revolution takes on an almost deterministic cast in the following:

The situation demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive framework, far removed from the conflict between individuals and classes, and drawn from the heart of the people.⁸⁵

Such an outlook entails some of the religious quality characteristic of Jacobin nationalism. It assumes for the nationalist revolution some of the character of Islam in attempting to find the answer to the problems of the Egyptians. But it also bypasses Islam, at least at the national level, in that its problems are not the same. It is revolutionary in that it wants to replace the traditional religious problems with modern secular ones, while at the same time retaining some of the religious nature and spirit, the "sacred advance toward the great objective."⁸⁶

Nasser also pays the appropriate lip service to democracy. He says, "Our ultimate aim is to provide Egypt with a truly democratic and representative government."⁸⁷ But this statement is qualified shortly after with the warning that in order to accomplish this aim the old subversives, reactionaries, Communists, the Brotherhood, and the old politicians must be checked and that the military regime will have to keep authority until "the people" are safe from these groups.⁸⁸

⁸⁴Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 42.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 33.

⁸⁷Nasser, Foreign Affairs, XXXIII, p. 208.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 209.

This does not mean that he had planned from the very beginning to keep authoritarian control over Egypt. In The Philosophy of the Revolution, which was written about a year before the article in which the above quotation appeared, he is not nearly as severe in his qualifications. Although he was disappointed when "the serried ranks" did not "come up in their sacred advance toward the great objective," and admonished them duely for their "indolence and sloth," he does not hold the threat of semipermanent dictatorship over their heads as he seems to in the preceding quotation.⁸⁹

Nasser has relatively little to say about the social and economic pressures discussed in Chapter III of this paper. His ideas on this subject are expressed in broad and virtually meaningless generalities. He dichotomizes Egypt's revolution into two revolutions, the political and the social.⁹⁰ In the former he is out to remove Farouk and the British, and install a democracy. In the latter his aim is to improve the general social and economic conditions within Egypt and "catch up with the caravan of human progress."⁹¹ By the time of the writing of "The Egyptian Revolution" he has developed a "definite program for reconstruction."⁹² This "program" included the high dam, various reclamation projects, and expansion of trade on a broader basis to get out of the financial control of Britain. Methods for accomplishing these objectives were not mentioned.

These economic and social goals are tied in with nationalism. The old regime and the British were obstacles that had to be removed

⁸⁹Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, pp. 33-34.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 39-40.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 68.

⁹²Nasser, Foreign Affairs, XXXIII, p. 208.

to allow for progress.⁹³ They were also tied with the idea of imperialism, although this concept does not get nearly the play that it will in Nasser's later work. In this earlier work it connected mostly with Israel and the common cause of the Arabs, national liberation.

Nasser divides those things of concern to Egypt on the international level into three "circles", the Arab, the African, and the Islamic.⁹⁴ It is, of course, the Arab which is of most concern to him and on which he spends the most time. He sees the other Arab countries as being in the same position as Egypt with regard to throwing off the old chains and modernizing. He also sees Egypt as the center of the Arab world and the most likely nation to assume the role of "responsibility" to "spark this tremendous power latent in the area surrounding us."⁹⁵ He is careful not to say leadership.

The defense of Egypt is also tied with the defense of the other Arab nations, "our own security (vis-à-vis Israel) required the defense of the boundaries of the sister Arab states among whom we were placed by Fate."⁹⁶ Here we see the beginning of what was to develop into a great outward expression of Arab nationalism, although at this point it does not submerge Egypt into a great Arab unity. It is still Egypt's defense that is of primary concern and Egypt's feeling of insecurity that must be relieved. One of the primary factors in seeing that this is accomplished is to make sure that those countries

⁹³Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 76.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 85-86.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 88.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 94.

with which she had closest contact are kept friendly, or at least in check.

We also see another Jacobin trait at least taking form during this period, that of proselytization in a very direct form. Here we have Nasser looking about him at the other Arab states, seeing their condition as the same as Egypt's prerevolution situation, and trying to pass on the good word of what things might be like if they only followed Egypt's lead. Thus we have the following passage:

They all, armies and governments, seemed to be pawns, devoid of power and self-motivation, moved only by the hands of players. And behind the lines, all our peoples seemed to be the victims of a well-knit conspiracy which deliberately suppressed the realities of what was happening, the facts of the actual situation.⁹⁷

This was followed a few pages later by the following:

When all these truths had impressed themselves upon me, I began to realize the need for a common struggle. I said to myself that so long as the region is one region, sharing the same conditions and problems, and the same future (and, however he tries to change his disguise, the same enemy)-so long as this is true, why do we scatter our efforts?⁹⁸

One may almost see his thought processes as he makes the next jump in his argument:

I also began to see the great obstacles which block the path to the common struggle, but I began to believe that these obstacles, being the creation of the common enemy, had to be removed.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 96-97.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 103.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 104.

This is followed by political contacts to try to do something about the condition. But then comes the conclusion that the greatest obstacle is "doubt," which was planted by the old common enemy.¹⁰⁰

The same type of argument is used to defend an Egyptian interest in Africa. Egypt is not only the key for the Arab world, but it performs the same function for Africa.

The people of Africa will continue to look to us, who guard their northern gate, and who constitute their link with the outside world. We will never in any circumstances be able to relinquish our responsibility to support, with all our might, the spread of enlightenment and civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle.¹⁰¹

And so Nasser's imagination soars to new heights and with it the position of Egypt in the world. For even if the Arab circle "had become a single entity" in his eyes, Nasser was still the leader of only one Arab country. He was talking of reality only when he spoke in terms of Egypt, if then.

For the third circle, the Muslim world, he had even vaguer notions. Here he sees cooperation, but only so long as it does not go "beyond the bound of their natural loyalty to their own countries."¹⁰² The old religion cannot make a stronger bond than the new.

Nasser is not much concerned with a broader world than the one discussed above. The East-West conflict does not enter into discussion

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 113.

in his book. A year later, though, we see the results of Western pressure to get Egypt into a defense pact in his Foreign Affairs article. Here he asserts that "the best defense against Communism must rest with the inhabitants of the area."¹⁰³ We see the beginnings of a policy of neutralism that is to play a much greater role later. Its basis, at that time, seemed to be Egypt's recently won national integrity which she did not want to jeopardize in any way. The new neutralism also took aim at the colonial policy of some of the Western states, identifying this easily with her own recent position. Again, one can easily see in this policy the feeling of insecurity that Deutsch finds characteristic of modern nationalism. A search to protect her own position by trying to gain comrades in arms, of which there were very few at that time.

One final reference should be made to Nasser's idea of the role of the military in the revolution. Not surprisingly his analysis parallels that of Morroe Berger as it was discussed in Chapter III. Nasser sees the army as the vanguard of the revolution. He also sees it as the only possible group in Egypt at the time that could carry out the revolution, "If the Army does not do this job, who will?"¹⁰⁴ But, Nasser says, this was not just a palace coup. The army was part of the modernizing and nationalistic segment of the population, not just the bitter survivors of the Palestine War.¹⁰⁵ The role of the army after the initial revolution is somewhat unclear. First, it is the

¹⁰³ Nasser, Foreign Affairs, XXXIII, p. 210.

¹⁰⁴ Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 31.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 19.

role "of a guardian, no more and not less."¹⁰⁶ The guardianship is to last only a "specified and limited time."¹⁰⁷ Yet the guardianship does not seem to be one that is pointed toward imminent democracy, as is illustrated in this passage: "Our revolution must be sustained by our having the courage to embark on whatever is deemed necessary, no matter what loss of popularity and applause and cheers such action may cost us."¹⁰⁸ The revolution and the strong desire to push Egypt ahead as fast as possible are goals that are not sacrificed no matter what the circumstances.

Despite reference to many goals and aspirations, The Philosophy of the Revolution presents no definite program of action. It talks only in generalities and its primary concerns seem to be to keep Egypt free and independent of foreign influences, and to advance her power and prestige as far as possible. These goals call for the rapid and great improvement of internal economic conditions, but there is no program of action here either. The rather small-scale land reform initiated by the military regime in 1952, and later one step at a time economic and social policies followed by the regime, at least for the first nine years, are indicative of this. The same thing is true in the international field, where, for the first few years, Nasser takes on only one problem at a time, not venturing to problems outside Egypt until he has cleared the most important internal one, Britain. Even Palestine takes a back seat until the British are moved

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 74.

out. But some of the ideas and concerns expressed in his book change over the years. New emphasis is placed on formerly neglected areas and a different kind of emphasis is placed on others. The nature of these changes will be the concern of the next section of the paper.

CHAPTER V

NASSER AND NATIONALISM

The years following the writing of The Philosophy of the Revolution were marked by a rapid growth in the fame and prestige of Gamal Abdel Nasser. They are also marked by a substantial change in method by which he pursued his goals, both domestic and foreign. In this section we shall examine Nasser's thought, as expressed in his speeches and press interviews, in relation to our model of nationalism and the categories used for the discussion of international affairs in section four.

This task is somewhat complicated by the fact that most of Nasser's ideas are cloaked in a slogan-like and repetitious terminology that makes finding coherent sets of ideas very difficult, assuming that they do exist. But certain somewhat clear blocks of thought do appear in his speeches and these provide enough of his ideas for the completion of this analysis.

One of the most important of these comes in a speech delivered in December, 1963. In it we get a view of Nasser's picture of the world that helps provide a key to all of his other utterances. With peace representing the first point:

The second point is that the countries looking forward to peace and hoping for life and progress cannot exercise this role and achieve its result except with a start on its national territory. They must realize their sovereignty and rid themselves of exploitation whatever the sacrifices and obstacles.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Gamal Abdel Nasser, Speeches and Press Interviews, 1963, (Cairo, UAR Information Department, n.d.), p. 286. (Hereafter cited as Speeches, 19__).

Here we have expressed the point on national sovereignty that must be kept in mind at all times while dealing with any of Nasser's other public remarks.

Egyptian nationalism is still the dominant force behind Nasser's thought, though we find a shift in emphasis in his speeches from the period just after the publishing of The Philosophy of the Revolution to 1957. At the time of the Czech arms purchase in 1955, this statement is typical: "Egypt--independent Egypt, revolutionary Egypt, strong Egypt--will never permit foreign influence."¹¹⁰ According to one source Nasser's first speech to lay greater stress on Arab rather than Egyptian nationalism came in August, 1956.¹¹¹ This closely follows the nationalizing of the Suez canal and had an obvious advantage for someone trying to rally support for his action. By early 1958, the ideas were similar but the object had changed:

We felt that our enemies always worked with the aim of separating--and dividing the Arab nation into smaller nations which they would dominate and control. We felt the fate of each Arab country influenced that of the others and that there was an imperative need for us to stand staunchly by each other, to unite, cooperate and strengthen our brotherly ties so as to ward off the greed of ambitious powers and to guarantee our security, to prevent the recurrence of the Palestine tragedy and to protect our Arab homeland through our unity and co-operation.

Today we feel that Arab Nationalism is becoming a reality. Today we look to the future and feel that, God willing, it will be filled with dignity and integrity.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Gamal Abdel Nasser, quoted in The Arab States and the Arab League; a documentary record, Muhammad Khalil (Beirut: Khayats, 1962), p. 905.

¹¹¹ Binder, "Nasserism: The Protest Movement in the Middle East," p. 162.

¹¹² Speeches, 1958, pp. 13-14.

After the split of the U.A.R., Arab nationalism is spoken of in these terms:

Yet, we must understand that our Arabism and the Arabism of Egypt is not a matter that changes according to circumstances. Our Arabism is genuine and lasting...We have therefore to understand that Arab unity will remain as our objective, for the unity of the Arab people is an inevitable process of nature.¹¹³

It is important in a discussion of Nasser's ideas to establish the relationship between Egyptian and Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism becomes the primary context in which Nasser conveys his ideas after 1957, although the ideas themselves are not very different. The key, I think, is provided in The Charter of the U.A.R. published in May, 1962. This document, which may reasonably be taken as expressing Nasser's views, provides a compendium of his positions and thoughts for a period of about three to four years, roughly 1960-1963. It also serves to put Arab nationalism in its Egyptian perspective. The Charter is written to and for Egypt. It places Egypt clearly at the center of all of Nasser's international activity: "The experiment of the Egyptian people had far-reaching repercussions on the struggle of the Arab Nation."¹¹⁴ It was Egypt that was the pacesetter and carrier of the Revolution.¹¹⁵ Egypt's economic and social problems are going to be solved.¹¹⁶ Arab nationalism is something to be strived for, but it must be remembered that Egypt is still the center of loyalty. It

¹¹³Speeches, 1962, p. 23.

¹¹⁴The Charter of the U.A.R., (Cairo: UAR Information Department, 1962, p. 9. (Hereafter cited as The Charter).

¹¹⁵Ibid., pp. 17-21 and 28-29.

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 49, 61, 63, and 68.

is the United Arab Republic that is the vanguard in the struggle for Arab unity.¹¹⁷ It is U.A.R. foreign policy not Arab foreign,¹¹⁸ although the Arab states are given a somewhat special position in this area and are considered to be in a different class from the rest of the world. But, as will be seen below, they are still external to Egypt (with the brief exception of Syria) and they are still nations with whom Egypt interacts in the international sphere.

The importance of the above discussion is that it allows speeches filled with references only to Arab, rather than Egyptian, nationalism to be put in their proper perspective. That perspective is as a manifestation of a contemporary version of Jacobin nationalism as it is practiced by Nasser. The references to the goals of Arab nationalism, in so far as they do not apply to some kind of recommendation for unity of whatever type, may be seen as applying first to Egypt, then to the rest of the Arabs. The more precise nature of Arab nationalism in Nasser's context will be discussed below.

Nasser's primary aims are the integrity and security of Egypt. These, of course, are the most important considerations for any nationalist movement. In 1955, these sentiments are expressed in this way: "Egypt's policy...will go forward with her independent policy; will go forward after having rid herself of imperialism; after having rid herself of domination; and after having rid herself of foreign influence."¹¹⁹ In 1959, the same idea was expressed this way:

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 95.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 97.

¹¹⁹ Nasser, quoted in Khalil, p. 904.

When the United Arab Republic declared its independent position, adopting the free, independent policy, emanating from its own consciousness, she was faced by enemies from everywhere. Those enemies were represented in imperialism, the imperialist lackeys and agents; those who wanted to subjugate us to the foreigner; those traitorous people of our own citizens who worked for the foreigner in order to subjugate our country for a cheap price for pure personal interests.¹²⁰

The extent to which these aims may be carried is expressed in this statement about the role of the armed forces:

The role of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces is to defend the process of social construction against external dangers. The Armed Forces must be ready to crush any imperialist reactionary attempt at preventing the people from realizing their great aspirations.¹²¹

The above statements and many others made by Nasser over the past ten years reflect the extent to which he has displayed at least one factor of integral nationalism, absolute national integrity. This idea was not as evident in 1954, at the time of the signing of the British evacuation agreement, which allowed the British to return in case of war. The Suez War in 1956 settled the issue. From that time on, no foreign influence was consciously allowed in Egypt. Even the Soviets are castigated if Nasser feels they are getting too forward in relations with Egypt or any of the Arab states. This was aptly demonstrated in the 1959 feud between Nasser and Khrushchev.

One of the Jacobin characteristics to appear most decidedly in Nasser's thought is that of national aggrandizement. This takes many forms, beginning with the building of Egypt's role in history.

¹²⁰ Speeches, 1959, p. 144.

¹²¹ The Charter, p. 78.

The Egyptian people had borne the material and military responsibility of stemming the first wave of European colonialism....

The Egyptian people had assumed as well the material and military responsibility of repelling the attacks of the Tartars who swept over the plains of the East and crossed its mountains bringing destruction and ruin.

The Egyptian people had also borne the literary responsibility of preserving the heritage and wealth of Arab civilization.¹²²

The role of the military is very important in increasing Egypt's position in the world also. On the basis of our discussion in section three of this paper, the military can be seen to play a dual role here, both as representative of the increased strength of Egypt and as a pressure for increasing that strength.

The Armed Forces of the United Arab Republic should enjoy a decisive superiority on land, sea and air. They should be capable of quick movement within the Arab area, the security of which is primarily the responsibility of the United Arab Republic Armed Forces.¹²³

Basically Egypt is felt to be the center of the Arab world and this is brought out in no uncertain terms.

The United Arab Republic which is, in particular, the vanguard, base and fighting fortress of the Arab progressive struggle, is the natural target of all the enemies of the Arab nation and of its progress.¹²⁴

At present the United Arab Republic is, both historically and actually the only Arab Nation which can assume the responsibility of building a national army, capable of deterring imperialist, Zionist aggressive plans.¹²⁵

¹²² Ibid., p. 17.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 78.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 79.

Nor does Nasser fail to point out how these responsibilities were carried out in action.

Our people, who were determined to protect their independence, to reject all the imperialist tricks designed to drag them into spheres of influence, led a stupendous resistance in the whole of the Middle East against the Bagdad Pact until it collapsed, and did not hesitate to oppose the armed tripartite aggression in which two of the world's great powers took part.¹²⁶

The sum of this attempt to build the role of Egypt in the world seems to be a rather premature assertion of a position which cannot be backed up with inherent power, combined with an overestimation of the power that she actually has.¹²⁷ Although such tendencies may be seen in The Philosophy of the Revolution, they do not really come to the forefront until after the Bandung Conference and particularly until after the moral victory of the Suez War. These two incidents provided Nasser himself with an increased sense of self-importance which was easily carried over to Egypt as a whole.

Another of the Jacobin characteristics found in Nasser's thoughts is the feeling of "right" that gives his nationalism part of its religious quality. The "right" which is spoken of is that which allows all revolutionary movements to succeed, once approved by Nasser. Thus: "Today, after the elapse of one year, right comes out victorious. The revolution in Yemen has triumphed and will soon triumph everywhere against the reactionary elements."¹²⁸ The reason for "right" being

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 99.

¹²⁷ Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 150.

¹²⁸ Speeches, 1962, p. 270.

what it is, is revealed in this passage: "when reactionism conspires or attacks, it is only revealing its desperate desire to live, because its end is inevitable. It is obstructing the inevitable evolution of history."¹²⁹ These two thoughts are repeated in numerous places throughout Nasser's works. They represent a kind of universal defense for all that he approves and a proof of wrong for all that he disapproves.

Such an attitude of "right" would also seem to preclude a "live and let live" philosophy on the part of its holder.¹³⁰ It is difficult for anyone who thinks he is "right" in some absolute sense of the term to allow "wrong" to go on where he can prevent it. This idea corresponds, in part, with still another characteristic of Jacobin nationalism from our model, proselytization. The sense of "right" is combined with a sense of mission on the part of Nasser that leads him to attempt to spread his ideas of nationalism and neutralism to every nation that he feels comes within his sphere of interest.¹³¹ The most important sphere is, of course, the Arab world. Nasser's feeling about this area is well demonstrated in the following two passages:

Such are social experiences. They are capable of passing from one place to another but not of being blindly copied, they are capable of useful study and examination, but not of being learnt heartily parrot-fashion by mere repetition.

This is **then** the first duty of the popular revolutionary leadership in the Arab Nation. It means that the great part of the responsibility

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 167.

¹³⁰ Laqueur, 1961, p. 355.

¹³¹ Lyon, p. 141.

for this pioneer revolutionary action devolves upon the popular revolutionary leadership in the United Arab Republic, since natural and historical factors have laid upon the United Arab Republic the responsibility of being the nucleus state in this endeavour to secure liberty, socialism and unity for the Arab nation.¹³²

The United Arab Republic, firmly convinced that she is an integral part of the Arab Nation must propagate her call for unity and the principles it embodies, so that it would be at the disposal of every Arab citizen, without hesitating for one minute before the outworn argument that this would be considered an interference in the affairs of others.¹³³

These efforts are also directed toward Africa, though they take the form of liberation from colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Another one of the important aspects of Egyptian and Jacobin nationalism is revolutionary spirit. In the international sphere Nasser exhibits this trait almost to the Nth degree, while at home it is less prevalent in action, though it is paid extensive lip service. This revolutionary spirit is expressed in various forms of which the following are only illustrative:

Through their sincerity to the Revolution and their unshakable revolutionary will the people succeed in bringing a basic and deep change...¹³⁴

Experience has shown, and ever confirms the fact that revolution is the only course which the Arab struggle can take to head for a better future.

Revolution is the only way to overcome underdevelopment forced on the Arab Nation through suppression and exploitation.

¹³² The Charter, p. 16.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 94.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

It is therefore imperative to deal radically with matters and ensure the mobilization of all the nation's material and spiritual potentialities to undertake this responsibility.¹³⁵

As a result of the interaction between world changes and the will of the national revolution, it was no longer believed that freedom could be attained by placating the imperialists or bargaining with them.¹³⁶

Within Egypt Nasser seems concerned with keeping up the impression that there is a continual revolution: "they have been ten years of continuing revolution and continuous change"¹³⁷ and "From the first day up to the present time revolution is going on."¹³⁸

In the international sphere this spirit of revolution is often accompanied by such helpful actions as internal subversion of Arab regimes that Nasser does not agree with.¹³⁹ The idea behind this type of activity seems to tie in with national integrity and security. The object seems to be to get all reactionary (therefore imperialist controlled) governments out of power and replace them with governments friendly to Egypt, completing a process that is historically inevitable anyway. At the same time this process makes life more secure for Egypt, at least in the mind of Nasser, because it eliminates from the area the influence of the imperialists, primarily the British, who are seen as the greatest threat to Egypt's security. This same line of

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

¹³⁷ Speeches, 1962, p. 89.

¹³⁸ Speeches, 1963, p. 163.

¹³⁹ Wheelock, pp. 231-232.

argument could be applied to Israel, although it would lose some of its explanatory power. In neither case does it provide a complete explanation.

Spreading nationalism and eliminating the old enemies are only part of the story. They are mostly negative goals that help to remove obstacles standing in the way of the other part of Nasser's ideals, economic advancement. But they are not mutually exclusive objectives; in fact, as can be seen in the following passage, they are inextricably tied together:

Production is the true criterion of the dynamic Arab force. By production we can end our underdevelopment, rush toward progress, face and overcome difficulties and intrigues, finally achieve victory over our enemy.¹⁴⁰

This naturally leads to:

We are now required, at the dawn of the atomic age, to join those who have embarked on this age....Atomic energy for prosperity is able to perform miracles in the struggle of national development.¹⁴¹

There is a warning that does with the call to industrialization, which again provides reason for Egypt's activity in the international sphere and her attempts to protect herself from outside influence:

There is no doubt that self-development is the best way of defense against lurking dangers. But we must realize that we live in an area exposed to aggressive ambitions. The prime aim of our enemies is to prevent us from reaching the stage of strength which achieves development, that we may always remain at the mercy of threats.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ The Charter, p. 61.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 78.

The problem that arises from this discussion of the economic factor is separating true nationalist sentiment from Nasser attempting to rationalize internal economic failures. As discussed in section three a great deal of pressure is put on Nasser for economic development. The situation in Egypt is particularly difficult if one is looking for economic miracles. In the opinion of many Western observers this leads to an aggressive foreign policy on the part of Nasser in an attempt to offset his internal failures. Such an analysis may be partially true, although it is difficult to substantiate either way. Certainly his military and middle class background has created in him some of the same goals and aspirations as his constituents. This is, in fact, our contention. One of these goals is Egypt's absolute sovereignty. If this is the case, it would seem just as plausible to explain his bold international actions as a reaction based on a set of ideals and demonstrating a personal feeling not unlike that of many other Arabs from the same background. Both explanations seem likely to have some merit, since it is undoubtedly true that Nasser is interested in retaining his power and maintaining stability in Egypt also. Given these last two goals a certain amount of activity designed especially to meet their requirements would not be unlikely.

The foregoing discussion has attempted to isolate the nationalistic elements of Nasser's later thought as it pertains to international affairs and examine it in terms of our model of nationalism. In the remaining pages of this section the discussion will be carried on in terms of the categories discussed in section four; that is, the three circles, the East-West conflict, and Israel.

The first circle is, of course, the Arab states. In the brief discussion at the beginning of this section we attempted to establish at least part of the relationship between Nasser and the Arab states. It remains to examine more fully the role of Egyptian nationalism in the Arab area and the full role of Arab nationalism itself.

The Arab states provide the prime area into which Nasser can spread the gospel of revolutionary nationalism. Since the writing of The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser has changed from basically accepting the political status quo in the area to demanding a change that would make every regime like his own; that is, espousing the same goals and objectives. This would allow the most important of his objectives, to keep Egypt's sovereignty and security intact, to be more easily filled. This idea is expressed in a rather round about way in this statement:

Brethren,...we, in the United Arab Republic, have taken upon ourselves to stand with you shoulder to shoulder in order to consolidate our purposes, to strengthen our hopes, so that our firm land may help us to realize all our aims.¹⁴³

In another speech a few years earlier Nasser gives a fuller description of Arab nationalism:

We mean by Arab Nationalism that we be independent, and that this independence emanates from our consciences. We must never be subservient to any country or to imperialism, neither must we be part of any sphere of influence. That is Arab nationalism: Arab nationalism is union, unity, solidarity, but all that must be built on right, and on

¹⁴³Speeches, 1963, p. 44.

the interests of the Arabs, not the interests of imperialism or the spheres of influence.¹⁴⁴

In this passage we have expressed many of the goals of Egyptian nationalism, only in terms of something called Arab nationalism. This idea does not get any firmer than "union, unity, solidarity." Beyond a hint at a common foreign policy we are never told what, exactly, these words entail.

Nasser's other actions and lack of them give further indication that it is not meant to be a realized goal, but rather one that is permeated by "the inevitability of history," but not by the inevitability of action on the part of the Arab states.¹⁴⁵ There is no indication, for instance, that Nasser would be willing to make the kind of sacrifices necessary to bring about union.¹⁴⁶ That is, he is not willing to give up any of his own power. Another problem is that even the broad concept of unity presented by Nasser changes over time, so that in 1959 it is a very loose idea:

Each country has the right to design its own bounds in connection with Arab unity. If certain countries wish to be unified with others, it is left entirely up to such countries....And if a country wishes to join a federal union with other countries it is also left to them to decide on this. And if a country wishes to keep its own borders defined and clear and not merged into any other Arab countries, it is still left to it to decide.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Speeches, 1958, p. 272.

¹⁴⁵ "Exchange of Letters Between King Husain of Jordan and President Gamal Ald An-Nasir of the U.A.R.," Middle Eastern Affairs, XII (May, 1961), p. 146.

¹⁴⁶ P. J. Vatikiotis, "Dilemmas of Leadership in the Arab Middle East: The Case of the U.A.R.," American Political Science Review, LV (March, 1961), p. 110.

¹⁴⁷ Speeches, 1959, p. 595.

Arab unity here is an IF question rather than the "inevitable" one it is in other places.

Nasser's actions in the Syrian union are another instance where he did little to further the cause of Arab unity. Egypt's exercising of too much control over the Northern Region and the stifling of the Syrian military were topped off by the July 1961, nationalizations. Such policies were scarcely likely to promote unity among the Arab nations, given the political make-up of most of them at that time.

It was not until that 1965 that Nasser finally admitted what seemed to be the real reason for the lack of unity among the Arab states: "Today each Arab state is afraid of the others. We are beset by suspicions, contradictions and distrust."¹⁴⁸ This came after over a decade of blaming the "imperialists" and "reactionaries" for keeping the Arabs apart. That it will solve the problems is another matter.

On the other hand, there is much in the way of positive attraction for Egypt in the idea of Arab nationalism. First of all, it is the only sphere in which Egypt can really flex her muscles, as in the case of Yemen.

Why does imperialism use all its forces to prevent the realization of the goals of Arab nationalism? It is because it feels that the triumph of Arab Nationalism means the rise of a Big Power in the area which refuses to owe allegiance to any sphere of influence or participation in any pacts; a power that will not follow a policy of alignment, that will be determined to follow an independent policy that springs from its conscience and conforms with its interests.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸"Heresy in Cairo, Time, LXXXV (June 11, 1965), p. 41.

¹⁴⁹Speeches, 1958, p. 273.

Secondly, paying at least lip service to the idea of Arab unity seems to pay off in the support of large segments of the Arab population. This factor cannot always be overlooked by governments who might be at odds with him.

Finally, it provides a position of leadership from which Nasser might speak, both within and outside of the Arab community. Nasser's first recognition of this fact came at the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955. He was the only Arab ruler present and was generally recognized as the spokesman for the rest of the Arab countries. Partially through this role he also gained recognition in other parts of the world, particularly Africa. Such attention is not unpleasant, particularly to a man of Nasser's ambitious character. Under such circumstances it is to his benefit to maintain the role of leader of Arab nationalism, no matter how ambiguous it might be in actuality.

With the second circle, Africa, Egypt has much less in common. The economic ties with African nations are even more tenuous than those that Egypt has with the Arab countries. Geographically they are separated by large deserts. But there is none the less a common colonial background and underdevelopment. Nasser's references to Africa are based mostly on these two general connections. The character of his remarks about Africa and the Africans is remarkably close to what he says to the Arabs. It is couched in all of the same nationalistic terms that he has been applying to Egyptian and then Arab nationalism. In this case though, Nasser's view of Egypt's role has decreased, rather than increased since The Philosophy of the Revolution.

Whereas in 1954, this role was as a leader of the African colonialization and modernization process, in 1963, it was more as a big brother and havginger of outlawed rebels.¹⁵⁰ Nasser's one big fling into Africa was at the time of the Congo crisis. His ticket was a pro-Lumumba and anti-neocolonialism position.¹⁵¹ His position resulted in the creation of the so-called Casablanca Group which formed a treaty based on their common stand on the Congo crisis. The effort and the group waned as the issue ran out.¹⁵²

Another reason for Nasser's interest in Africa is the increasingly large role that Israel is playing there.¹⁵³ In this area he seems to be losing ground. During the eighteenth session of the UN, for instance, the Central African Republic, supported by 18 other African nations introduced a resolution calling for direct negotiation between the Arabs and Israel.¹⁵⁴ This could hardly be said to demonstrate Nasser's great influence in Africa.

The third circle, the world of Islam, gains as little attention as a geographic unit as it did in The Philosophy of the Revolution. Islam's main importance seems to be as a string that further increases Nasser's ties to the Arabs. It seems to add to the religious quality of Egypt's nationalism.¹⁵⁵ Certainly it is not allowed to conflict with nationalism.

¹⁵⁰ Wheelock, p. 254.

¹⁵¹ "Among Africans," The Economist, CIC (April 15, 1961), p. 241.

¹⁵² Charles A. Gallagher, "The Death of a Group," American Universities Field Staff Reports, North Africa Series, IX, No. 4.

¹⁵³ Speeches, 1958, p. 307.

¹⁵⁴ Muhammad Mehdi, "The Arab Summit," Middle East Forum, XV (May, 1964), p. 27.

¹⁵⁵ Vatikiotis, American Political Science Review, p. 107.

One area that received almost no mention in Nasser's earlier book was the East-West conflict and Egypt's position in it. Later it occupies almost as much space as the Arab circle. It is out of Nasser's relationship to this problem that "positive neutralism" arises. The connection between neutralism and nationalism seems to be very strong. Positive neutralism was best defined not by Nasser, but by one of his aides, as a policy which basically refuses cooperation "in any way with anyone who stands against our dignity and our freedom, and that we cooperate with and support anyone who helps and supports us."¹⁵⁶ The policy generally states that Egypt will remain neutral in the struggle between the two big blocks, but it maintains the right to take whatever position it feels is in its own interest on a particular issue. It is this attitude that gives Nasser the left leaning appearance on many issues. The issues themselves seem to center around the same nationalistic objectives discussed in this paper, national integrity and security, the building of Egyptian power in the Middle East, and Egypt's drive toward economic development.

The positive aspect of Nasser's "positive neutrality" centers around an aggressive policy with regard to obtaining Egypt's goals. This means doing whatever is necessary to maintain her national integrity and build her power and economy. The outcome of this is that the West suffers, because it is the enemy of the underdeveloped country, colonialism and imperialism.

The primary objective is again sovereignty:

The real obstacles are moral. We do not approve of the policy of pressure and intimidation and

¹⁵⁶ Salem, Misr Egyptian News Agency, February 13, 1954, quoted in Wheelock, p. 216.

shall never submit to such a policy. We do not want to be hostile to the United States. Our planned policy is to be friendly towards all and to have good relations with all. But we do not want to, and cannot, forego our sovereignty or our national dignity.¹⁵⁷

The same kind of warning is given to the Communists when Nasser feels that they are getting too ambitious in their actions.¹⁵⁸ The policy is flexible enough to allow Egypt to protect herself under its aegis whenever she feels threatened. In this respect it fits nicely into our model of nationalism, particularly integral nationalism when it is applied with severity common to Nasser in this area. What gives this policy its force, however, is the fact that one or the other Great Power is usually willing to stand behind it, at least verbally.

Neutralism also provides Nasser with a measure of power in his international dealings that he would not have normally had. Egypt is able to make itself felt, even by the great powers, in situations that a nation aligned with one of the blocks could not. Such a situation was Nasser's first bold venture into the world of neutralism, the Czech arms purchase of 1955. In this instance Nasser made a conscious effort to play one side off the other and eventually win the game. The bone of contention was, of course, the "strings" which the West attached to their arms versus the free barter deal, guns for cotton, worked out with the Czechs.

Neutralism has led to greater power in another way also. This is in regard to influence among the rest of the underdeveloped world and in the Arab world. In the former case Nasser has assumed the position

¹⁵⁷ Speeches, 1958, p. 383.

¹⁵⁸ Speeches, 1959, p. 146.

of one of the important leaders, a role that he could not possibly play if he had remained aligned with the West. In the Arab world his neutralist policy is an aid in much the same way as his Arab Nationalism. By avoiding connection with either of the major blocs he is able to appear as a true nationalist, that is not connected or controlled from the outside. In a world where the greatest wish of many is to obtain just such a portion for their nation, Nasser's stature grows immensely by assuming this posture. It also provides him with a lever to prod reluctant Arab leaders. To be sure, this is more a side effect than a major reason for adopting such a policy, but it does exist and is played to the hilt by Nasser and his extensive propaganda machine. Such prestige also helps Nasser in getting backing for his own goals from the Afro-Asian bloc.¹⁵⁹

Economic development provides the other major rationale for the neutralist policy. Not only can Nasser play a blackmail game to increase his power and insure Egypt's national integrity, but he can also aid his difficult task of making Egypt's economy healthy. At first this game took the shape of blackmail, in which Nasser would say to one side, the West, that he was getting aid from the other. Such a game has its drawbacks, as Nasser found out with the three year delay in getting aid for the Aswan dam project. Here, again, the policy fits into nationalist goals. By keeping both ends of the candle lit, Nasser theoretically keeps out from under the control of either of the Great Power blocs. That this is a conscious policy seems illustrated in the events of 1958, at which time Nasser made the first move toward

¹⁵⁹ Binder, "Egypt's Positive Neutrality," p. 180.

getting relations back to normal with the British and the Americans, whose aid had been stopped at the time of the Suez crisis, partly because of the necessity of becoming too heavily dependent on Soviet help.

One hot issue that has plagued Nasser since the revolution and even before, is Israel. Nasser's general feelings toward this problem are expressed in the following passage: "The existence of Israel in itself is an act of aggression."¹⁶⁰ That Nasser frames this problem in terms of national security is not surprising when one examines the two sound beatings Egypt received at the hands of the Israeli army during the past seventeen years, even though one of these defeats is not admitted.

Of course, I could not discuss Arab Nationalism without speaking of Israel, for Israel's very existence was since its inception a source of menace to Arab nationalism, ever trying to stamp it out. It would continue to be a source of danger, for every time, conditions became too calm, Israel would create some kind of trouble to disturb the peace and isolate Arab countries and Afro-Asian countries.¹⁶¹

But despite strong feelings Nasser does not let this game get out of hand. Israel may be a "destructive imperialist cancer"¹⁶² that will be eliminated, but it will not be eliminated until Nasser's forces are "completely ready"¹⁶³ and the "Arab defense" is provided for.¹⁶⁴ He

¹⁶⁰ Speeches, 1958, p. 389.

¹⁶¹ Speeches, 1959, p. 275-86.

¹⁶² The Charter, p. 100.

¹⁶³ Speeches, 1963, p. 56.

¹⁶⁴ "Heresy in Cairo," Time, p. 41.

is not ready to meet defeat for the third time and even constant pressure from one or the other of the Arab countries, mainly Syria and Iraq, will not make him jump off the deep end without being well prepared. Besides, Israel as a going concern provides an excuse for a buildup of Egypt's military that might otherwise be difficult to explain. As mentioned above, Israel is also challenging Nasser in another one of his areas of interest, Africa. The Israelis are causing him to tread lightly in this area and it is quite clear that he does not like it.¹⁶⁵ It seems that this is more an injury to his pride than to his nationalism. It is, none the less, a goal put in terms of the nationalist idea, liberate Palestine from the imperialists, and remains an open sore for which a cure may be impossible given the highly emotional character of the feelings on both sides.

¹⁶⁵The Charter, p. 100.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In terms of the historical model presented at the beginning of the paper conclusions are fairly straight forward. Nasser, indeed, seems to be a personification of nationalism in Egypt. This nationalism, as expressed by Nasser, gives a close approximation of Carlton Hayes' Jacobin nationalism as it is described in our model. Each of the eight general characteristics listed on pages 11 and 12 of this paper is exhibited to a greater or lesser degree in Nasser's nationalism, or at least in his verbalization of it.

The characteristic of national aggrandizement is demonstrated in a variety of forms throughout all of Nasser's speeches. References vary from building a powerful national army and a strong economy to leading an Arab nation that sits at the crossroads of the world toward Great Power status. He attempts to play up and verbally build up Egypt's role in all of her international dealings. In so doing Nasser often vastly overestimates her actual role as in the claim that Egypt was the cause of the fall of the Baghdad Pact.

Proselytization is another Jacobin characteristic that is amply represented in Nasser's public utterances. Basically what Nasser seems to be doing here is attempting to export his revolution. He is trying to spread the word to all newly emergent or emerging nations that his way is the right way to solve their problems. Such attempts at proselytization seem to stem from a variety of sources. The first is a feeling of "right" that demonstrates another characteristic of

Jacobin nationalism. The feeling that you have the answer to a particular problem would seem to lead naturally to a belief that it should be shared. A second source for the desire to proselytize seems to be the desire for national aggrandizement discussed above. Still a third source might be the wish for security for Egypt. Having other nations in the proximity of Egypt who believe in the same principles has obvious advantages over neighbors who are hostile to one's international goals, and Nasser makes it clear that he realizes this in several speeches.

Related to the righteous quality of Nasser's nationalism and to the attempts at proselytization is the Jacobin characteristic of a religious quality in his nationalism. This is demonstrated in the natural law concept that appears in Nasser's speeches and in the more exterior symbols, such as national holidays, monuments, martyrs, etc.

A revolutionary spirit also pervades much of Nasser's thought. The spirit is expressed in terms of a supposed continuous revolution going on inside Egypt and a constant calling for revolution in the Arab states and in the rest of the underdeveloped world.

These five Jacobin characteristics of Nasser's Egyptian nationalism combine to give his verbally expressed ideas an aggressive quality. One would assume that a foreign policy based on these ideas would be aggressive, even belligerent.

A sixth Jacobin characteristic demonstrated in Nasser's speeches is xenophobia. This is a somewhat selective feeling though, directed at those whom he feels are making unwanted intrusions on Egypt's

national integrity. The brunt of these attacks is borne by the "imperialists" who may generally be identified as the West, particularly England, France, and the United States. The rationale behind these attacks seems to be a feeling of insecurity that is common to many of the recently decolonized nations.

The final two Jacobin characteristics manifested in Nasser's writings are lip service to democracy and a concept of the "common people." Both of these are themes that reappear constantly in Nasser's speeches. Both also are much less common in practice than they are in verbalization.

Nasser's speeches also exhibit some of the qualities of Integral nationalism as described by Hayes, but these are more difficult to find examples for. The absolute nature of the characteristics of Integral nationalism makes them exist more as tendencies in Nasser's speeches than firm features of his nationalistic thought. Thus we see a tendency toward placing the interests of the state above those of the individual, although there is no direct expression of this idea. Absolute national integrity is an idea that gets more direct attention in Nasser's speeches, but here we run into the problem of differentiating in practice Integral national integrity from Jacobin national integrity. If it is only a matter of degree the dividing line is fine.

That Nasser adheres to the values and exhibits tendencies described in Deutsch's definition of nationalism is evident from even the most casual reading of his speeches. Wealth, power, and prestige are goals constantly being reiterated in Nasser's speeches and public proclamations. That his actions are based on a personal identification of

his own success with the success of Egypt is demonstrated both in what he says and in his actions in international affairs.¹⁶⁶ Egypt's successes and failures become Nasser's in a very personalized manner so that an adverse reference to Egypt is likely to cause Nasser to feel personally insulted and react accordingly.¹⁶⁷ This reaction usually takes the form of a vicious verbal attack against the offender. Nasser's temper is often given as an explanation for his fiery speeches and impulsive actions in international affairs. His temper is often given as an important reason for the apparently unplanned seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956. It may also be seen in Nasser's more recent verbal blast against U.S. foreign aid policies.

The results of the study, then, seem to indicate that at the verbal level, at least, Nasser's brand of nationalism is close to that described in our model. The model itself has provided a useful analytic framework for a discussion of Nasser's ideas as they are expressed in his speeches and other public pronouncements. It has provided a general setting into which Nasser's nationalism may be placed. It has also helped to explain some of the positions Nasser has verbally expressed over the past eleven years. It certainly does not explain all that Nasser has said or done during that period with the role of the military and Nasser's personality being important factors that are not accounted for in the model.

¹⁶⁶ Binder, "Egypt's Positive Neutrality," p. 180.

¹⁶⁷ Robert St. John, The Boss (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1960).

Connecting the verbally expressed ideas to action is beyond the scope of this paper. Although some references have been made, it has not been the purpose of the paper to establish any kind of causative relationship between Nasser's actual foreign policy and the set of beliefs he seems to exhibit. It is generally agreed that Nasser's is a pragmatic foreign policy based more on reaction than action.¹⁶⁸ Such a foreign policy is difficult to follow or put into a coherent pattern, but in so far as I have been able to explore it, it has been closely linked with the verbal expression. The major disparity has been in the area of Arab policy where Nasser's actions do not seem to meet the standards for unity etc. set up in his public pronouncements.

Yet both the action and the speeches seem to reflect a strong feeling of nationalism. Certainly this feeling is a factor in what he does, even if it is not consciously so. They serve to give a kind of pattern to his actions in a nationalistic framework just as in his verbally expressed ideas.

Finally, Nasser and Egypt may be put into the perspective of the contemporary international system. Egypt falls generally into a category of important underdeveloped nations which are attempting to become modern while at the same time maintaining their national integrity. Nasser is somewhat of an innovator in this group. He is a leader in the development of a kind of neutrality that seems to allow for an aggressive foreign policy without the loss of the national

¹⁶⁸ Wheelock, p. 223.

integrity and security that is so important to most of these nations. He is looked upon as a leader in the struggle against all of the Imperialists and will fight hard to maintain that image even if it is to the detriment of the immediate welfare of his own country. Such actions seem to be partly the result of a desire for personal prestige and partly the result of an overextended sense of the justness of his cause.

On the basis of our case study of Egyptian nationalism as manifested by the words of Nasser it may be possible to formulate hypotheses about similar situations in other underdeveloped countries. Account must be taken, of course, of factors that are peculiar to Egypt, which include Nasser's personality, her particular economic situation, and her history, and factors which are peculiar to Egypt's immediate geographic location, such as her Arabness and the role of the military in her revolution.

The kind of nationalism demonstrated in Nasser's public proclamations seems to be fairly widespread among Afro-Asian underdeveloped countries, though only if they have recently obtained or are about to obtain their independence. There may be some question as to the degree to which these ideas are expressed. The authoritarian nature of Nasser's regime seems also to play a role, with other authoritarian regimes displaying a similar tendency toward more fervent nationalism and neutralism. Less authoritarian regimes seem more likely to be willing to cooperate with their old colonial oppressors.

Nasser's attempts at proselytization of the ideas of national liberation and neutralism also seem to be widespread among newly emergent nations. Nothing seems to disturb the African nations more than to see some other African nation under the domination (in their opinion) of an outside country. As in Egypt, an important factor here may be the fear for their own security.

The righteous quality of Egyptian nationalism is another characteristic that is exhibited by most of the new nations with regard to the nature of their goals and the way they go about obtaining them. This, of course, ties in with the religious quality of contemporary nationalism in the underdeveloped world. As in Egypt, this religious quality seems to be tied to the breaking down of old values and beliefs, and replacing them with new ones. A major part of the new beliefs is nationalism as a saving force.

The above are not the only hypotheses that might be made about the underdeveloped world, but they do seem to relate to the situation in Egypt more than some others might. In any case they form part of a syndrome of nationalism and desire for improvement that is a powerful force in world politics.

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