AN INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITIVE AND NON-COMPETITIVE FRAMING EFFECTS: INTERPRETING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELITE RHETORIC AND SUPPORT FOR PREVENTIVE WAR

by

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines how competitive and non-competitive framing environments influence public opinion towards the use of preventive force. I attempt to develop a theory that helps to explain which factors are responsible for influencing public opinion for those who possess strong predispositions towards or against the use of force in contrast to those who possess weak predispositions towards or against the use of force. I test predictions based on my theory in two empirical chapters: a media content analysis and a laboratory experiment. The media content analysis allows me to test whether there is a significant difference between those who are exposed to non-competitive and competitive framing environments from those who are not exposed to them. The experimental chapter will allow me to test how framing effects work, in particular whether or not those who possess strong predispositions are likely to be influenced by frames that correspond to preconceived values and whether those who possess weak predispositions are likely to be influence by frames based on the credibility of the source. In addition, this chapter will examine how these factors hold in both competitive and non-competitive framing environments.

I dedicate my dissertation work to my parents, Gerald and Jean Guse for their encouragement and support.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Framing Preventive War

President George W. Bush, when attempting to build popular support for the war against Iraq and more broadly for his administration's preventive self-defense doctrine, suggested that it was in the public's best interests for the US to accept the risks associated with going to war in the present in order to avoid fighting a more painful, costly war against Iraq in the future. In an address to the country on Iraq, Bush stated: "in 1 year, or 5 years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over… we choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities" (2003: 340). The Bush administration's "First Strike Doctrine" is outlined in the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*.

As President Bush and others before him discovered, there are built-in electoral constraints against the use of preventive force, which suggest that costs be minimized when initiating conflict. Preventive war is not designed to preempt specific imminent threats, but to prevent subjective, generalized threats from materializing. The threat posed by the adversary may take several years to develop. The consequence of non-action is not an attack by the adversary, but the risk of a more costly war in the future conducted in a position of relative inferiority compared to the present circumstances. In short, the motives for fighting a preventive war are to fight what is perceived as a winnable war now rather than fight a war under less favorable circumstances later (Jervis 2003). Since the threat presented by the adversary may not be visible or apparent in the present, the war might be extremely unpopular. Elites may face a difficult time in achieving reelection if they have to market an unpopular war.

It is important, therefore, to examine how elites can minimize such costs since democratic elites are accountable to their public constituents. And at the same time, elites face foreign policy crises created by adversaries that demand their attention and response.

Even though there have been previous studies examining the relationship between public opinion and the uses of force (Berinsky 2006; Eichenberg 2005; Jentleson 1992; Mueller 1973), few extensive or systematic studies have been examined extensively focusing on the relationship between the use of preventive force and public opinion. This is a problem because empirically speaking, preventive wars do take place (e.g., Iraq, Arab-Israeli War 1967) and therefore they demand our systematic scholarly and empirical attention. Most previous work on preventive war has debated the appropriateness of utilizing preventive strikes against adversarial targets, the role of preemption and prevention in US foreign policy, historical cases to understand conditions under which states are likely to adopt preventive based tactics, the correlation between power shifts and conflict initiation, and the application of self-defense in dynamic political environments (Doyle 2008; Gilpin 1975, 1981; Kim and Morrow 1992; Levy 1987; Niou and Ordeshook 1987; Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Shue and Rodin 2007).

Furthermore, empirical research has largely assumed that democracies do not engage in preventive war (Schweller 1992; Silverstone 2007). In democracies, leaders will have a hard time mobilizing forces necessary to engage in preventive conflicts. Preventive conflicts are associated with windows of opportunity which are conducted for national glory, economic gain, and territorial acquisition when clear and present dangers may not be present. As a result, the public might be averse to the costs associated with preventive war. Scholars have suggested that preventive war should only be an attractive

option for declining leaders in non-democratic states (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Schweller 1992). And if they do engage in preventive uses of force, these uses of force are usually short-lived with a clear-cut victory in mind. If we buy into this assumption that democracies do not engage in preventive war due to the costs associated with such conflict, then we have to rely on another untested assumption that elites are unable to mitigate or lower the costs associated with such conflict by the way they present information. And because preventive war is conducted in circumstances in which threats may not be visibly apparent on the horizon, the topic presents a hard test case concerning the plausibility that elites might be able to engage in framing effects to increase support. It is also important to note that due to a failure to study such phenomena empirically, we do not know which dynamics are therefore responsible for driving public opinion in association with such conflicts.

Since the public depends on elites for information, this creates an incentive for elites to manipulate information for public consumption. Dependence on elite information sources is important because the average person may not have the ability to monitor closely the events around the world. It is this ignorance that makes individuals reliant on elites such as government officials, journalists, and foreign policy experts for valuable information. Elites, therefore, attempt to control and spin information in such a way that they gain an information advantage or propaganda advantage by maximizing support for their position and minimize support for their opponent's position. Elites may feel the need to respond to foreign policy crises that involve heavy costs in terms of public support and opinion. It is therefore important to know whether or not elites are able to shape such opinion based on the way they present information to their constituents. Sometimes elites engage in competition with other elites when they engage

in framing (Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and Druckman 2007a; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). At other times, elites might dominate the terms of debate when they engage in framing (Brewer 2001; Iyengar 1991; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997; Price and Tewksbury 1997). These elites, furthermore, have different levels of credibility. In addition, elites themselves must take into consideration that they are presenting information to their constituents who vary in terms of their sophistication towards the issue and values they may possess. Some elites might have high levels of credibility while others have low levels of credibility. Individual constituents, on the other hand, vary in terms of the firmness of the opinion they hold towards the use of force and how they are exposed to such information from elites.

Purpose

The general question that this dissertation wishes to address concerns how frames work to influence public opinion for or against preventive war. Subsidiary questions in association with this main question are listed below.

a) Do non-competitive frames influence public opinion? Do competitive frames moderate public opinion?

b) How do non-competitive and competitive frames influence public opinion for those who initially possess strong opinions towards the use of force in comparison to those who initially possess weak opinions towards the use of force?

My purpose is to understand how elites are able to successfully frame preventive war in competitive in comparison to non-competitive contexts. To do this, the dissertation will first center on the conditional limitations and psychological mechanisms associated with framing effects utilizing preventive war as a subtext. The conditional limitations of framing effects simply refer to the circumstances under which framing

effects are successful or not. The psychological mechanisms center around whether the individual buys into the frame based on central or peripheral mechanisms. If a person buys into a frame based on central cues, according to Petty and Cacioppo (1984), this results from a person's diligent consideration of information that she or he feels is central to the merits of the attitudinal position. On the other hand, if a person buys into a frame based on peripheral cues, then the person makes simple inferences about the merits of a position based on simple cues. A framing effect occurs in political discourse when a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially viable considerations in the process of describing events encourages individuals to focus on these particular considerations in the process of constructing their overall opinion (Druckman 2001b).

Conceptual Framework

The main effect associated with influencing public opinion is the framing environment in which the elites present information. Some individuals have well formed opinions about the efficacy of the use of force whereas others may not be sure. If we are to determine the degree to which an individual opposes or supports the use of force, however, it is important to take into account the environment in which the information is presented. Is only one side presenting information or are two competing sides presenting information? We should see differences in the degree to which public opinion is influenced taking into account the framing environment in which information is provided. Non-competitive frames should polarize public opinion; competitive frames should moderate opinion.

Taking into account concepts such as elites, frames, framing environment, source credibility, the following are my independent and dependent variables. The framing environment, individual frames, and frame source all constitute independent variables in

my model. The dependent variables constitute change in overall opinion, in particular change in the direction as well as the degree of overall opinion and vote choice. Moreover, I take into account the domestic and international context in my model. I examine overall opinion in light of vote choice and opinion towards the use of preventive force. Lastly, my model also takes into account changes in the underlying considerations of public opinion.

Organization of Dissertation

Chapter I provides an introduction to the issues I will be examining in the dissertation. In chapter II, I review the mass communication and political science literature (agenda setting, priming, and framing) as well as the preventive and preemptive war literatures. My major purpose in the literature review is to discuss the conceptual distinctions undergirding agenda setting, priming, and framing as they have been applied to the international conflict literature. I then discuss the work that has been conducted on preventive and preemptive war. I conclude by pointing out ways in which this dissertation will make a contribution to mass communication and political science as well as preventive and preemptive war literatures.

In Chapter III, I explain the theoretical approach I will use to examine the psychological mechanisms and conditional limitations associated with framing effects. The theoretical approach I will use will generate predictions concerning these psychological mechanisms and conditional limitations in the context of both non-competitive and competitive framing environments.

In chapter IV, I present work associated with my first empirical chapter. In this chapter, my objective is to simply uncover how framing effects work in competitive and

non-competitive framing environments. In short, my main purpose is two-fold. First, I want to see whether or not frames are likely to influence public opinion based on exposure. I want to see whether or not individuals who are exposed to frames are more likely to be influenced by frames in determining their overall opinion than individuals who are not exposed to such frames. Second, I want to examine if the degree of the framing effect should be more pronounced in non-competitive framing environments in comparison to competitive framing environments. To do this, I will explore the relationship between framing and the 2004 US presidential election pitting George W. Bush against John Kerry. I will conduct content analysis on one major newspaper, the *New York Times*, from the first day after the end of the Republican Convention (September 8, 2004) to the day of the presidential election, November 2, 2004. My independent variables derived from the 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) data set consist of gender, ethnicity, ideology, race, age, education, political knowledge, non-competitive and competitive frames. The dependent variable is vote choice, for either Kerry or Bush. In this model, I want to determine whether individuals that are exposed to political information from the newspaper determine their vote choice based on the frames the newspaper focuses on the most.

In chapter V, I present results and analysis from my experimental study. In this chapter, I examine the conditional limitations and psychological mechanisms behind framing effects. In particular, I examine the influence of frames on those who have initially strong opinions as well as initially weak opinions towards the use of force. The independent variables include the frame (costs of delay/costs of escalation), the framing environment (non-competitive/competitive), and frame source (credible/non-credible).

The dependent variables concern change in overall opinion and changes to underlying considerations associated with opinion. I want to see if individuals who possess initially strong opinions are influenced by frames based on central cues such as informational substance and individuals who possess initially weak opinions are influenced by frames based on peripheral cues such as source. In addition, I want to see if the degree of the framing effect is related to initial strength of opinion and framing environment.

Chapter VI concludes the study by reviewing the major findings of the research. Implications of the findings and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Chapter II

Literature Review

Introduction

There have been three generations of work devoted to examining the influence of mass communication on public opinion. The first generation of work asserts that elites utilize mass communication to manipulate citizens' opinion. These models progressed from those that posited a simple and direct relationship between mass communication and citizen opinion in the 1920s and '30s (e.g., first generation) to more complex models in the second generation that took into account the possibility that people's informational networks might reinforce pre-existing beliefs thus mitigating the effects of mass communication (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Those in the third generation rejected the earlier sentiments of second generation scholars arguing that mass communication has a more robust impact on public opinion. Mass media has strong long-term effects on popular opinion based on the stream of messages presented to audiences. Elite communication has a sizeable influence on citizen opinion because citizens rely on elite advice to help them make better decisions (Downs 1957; Kinder 1998; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Page and Shapiro 1992; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). This particular generation gave birth to three models of mass communication: agenda setting in the 1970s and framing and priming in the 1980s.

The focus of this dissertation will be on the process of frame setting and individual level framing effects. The idea of frame setting has been compared to agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw 1972). According to this perspective, agenda setting deals

with the accessibility of issues whereas frame setting deals with the accessibility of issue attributes. Accessibility refers to the ease in which particular instances or associations can be brought to mind (Kahneman and Tversky 1973). Issues themselves can consist of attributes which can be employed to think about the issue. Agenda setting deals with the importance of issues, whereas attribute agenda setting is concerned with issue attributes and has been categorized as "second level agenda setting" (Weaver et al. 1981). However, empirical work conducted by Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) and Nelson and Kinder (1996) contradicted theoretical approaches adopted by McCombs and Shaw (1993) and McCombs (1997). Nelson and his colleagues did not reject the role of accessibility in the framing process, but rather argued that the perceived importance of frames rather than their accessibility is the key variable (Chong 1996; Druckman 2001b; Jones 1994; Nelson and Kinder 1991, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Nelson, Willey, and Oxley 1998). Frames influence opinions because they stress specific values, facts, and other considerations "endowing them with greater relevance to the issue than they might appear to have under an alternative frame" (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997:569).

Much work needs to be done in addressing the individual level of framing effects. The interaction between elite frames and audience frames (e.g., individual schemas) has been hypothesized to motivate behavioral and attitude changes of the constituents (e.g., individual level framing effects). These individual level variables, in turn, constitute the raw ingredients that elites use when constructing their media frames. Most work does not take into account the mediating effects of audience frames on individual level outcomes. In the context of information processing, do constituencies adopt elite frames or frames

similar to these in processing information? In order to understand the effects of elite frames on individual level outcomes (e.g., behavioral, attitudinal, cognitive responses), we have to understand how audience frames mediate such effects. This dissertation will address how audience frames might mediate such effects. Addressing the issues of frame setting and individual level framing effects are important because both are inextricably linked with citizen attitude formation. And if the frame-setting process reorders considerations relevant to opinion, then we need to examine the individual level effects of framing by addressing whether the public adopts elite frames or the degree to which they use frames similar to these elite frames in their own information processing.

This literature review will discuss works associated with the agenda setting, priming, and framing literatures. In addition, since preventive war will be utilized as a template to examine these questions related to framing, I will also discuss the preventive and preemptive war literatures as well.

Agenda Setting

It is important to make some conceptual distinctions between agenda setting and other related topics. Agenda-setting can be contrasted with agenda building. Agenda building is a concept adopted by Cobb and Elder (1972) and refers to the process involved in the creation of issues (e.g., policy agenda-setting) (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Funkhouser 1973; Lang and Lang 1981). In contrast to agenda building, public agenda setting deals with the salience of public issues. There seems to be a dual focus on elite content and audience participation. The amount of time or space given to certain issues is measured and this measurement is related to the amount of time that individuals pay to issues or to their innate importance (Kosicki 1993). It is not necessarily information

about the issue or issues which has the effect. As Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) note, at stake is the relative attention given to a certain issue by policymakers, the media, and the public and not to others. The issue has received a certain amount of processing time and attention which carries the effect. Issues can be rank ordered and rise or fall on the agenda and compete with one another for attention over a long period of time. Or main issues on an elite agenda can be investigated at a single point in time. Based on these perspectives, the public agenda is a zero sum game. There is competition associated with the agenda amongst a very small number of issue proponents. At most, there are usually only four to five issues on the public agenda at any given time (Brosius and Kepplinger 1992). Kim, Scheufele, and Shanahan (2002) also note that agenda setting needs to be distinguished from attribute agenda setting.

According to Dearing and Rogers (1996) there are three major sub-areas associated with agenda setting: policy agenda, public agenda, and media agenda. There is considerable overlap associated with these sub-areas. The first policy sub-area relates to *policy agenda-setting* issues. In this context, the dependent variables of interest are the issue agendas of public bodies or elected officials. The important items of interest concern what issues reach the elite agenda. As Dearing and Rogers (1996) point out, a number of deductive typologies have been proposed concerning issues which might be placed on the agenda. Lowi (1964) distinguishes between distributive issues which do not involve an excess of expenditures associated with public funds and thus not much interest from public groups; regulatory issues which focus on the allocation of contested public funds and result in interest from combative interest groups; and redistributive issues, which motivate political leaders to siphon public funding in diverse ways to pacify

attentive public groups. Rosenau (1971) proposed a division of issues based on the status of each particular issue, the extent to which human and nonhuman resources are required on each issue, the territory affected, and the extent to which the means and ends of issue resolution are tangible. Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969), on the other hand, considered issues to be military-security, economic, or cultural in nature while Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) propose a model of how and why issues are placed on the global policy agenda by focusing on issue proponents, issue salience, what is at stake, the nature of the stake, and the values that are associated with the stakes at hand.

Despite the issue typologies that have been developed for international relations studies (Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein 1969; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981) that can be applied to agenda setting research, Wood and Peake (1998) suggest theoretical and empirical works in the policy agenda setting literature have largely ignored foreign policy related matters and instead have focused on understanding how domestic issues reach the systemic or institutional agenda of the United States (Anderson 1978; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Bosso 1987; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Cobb and Elder 1972; Cohen 1995; Downs 1972; Flemming, Wood and Bohte 1995; Glick 1992; Jones 1977, 1994; Kingdon 1984; Light 1991; Peters and Hogwood 1985). These empirical studies were largely inspired by March and Olsen (1976) who argue that the core dynamic of policy agenda setting is attention. Fluctuations in attention are deemed to alter policymaking routines by destabilizing policy systems. According to March and Olsen (1976), shifts in attention towards issues are able to disrupt policy subsystems because they are able to make the public more aware and concerned about particular problems and thus lead to a

broader participation in the policy process through the expansion of the scope of conflict (Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1995; Schattsneider 1960).

Wood and Peake (1998) would suggest that the neglect of foreign policy is derived from practical academic concerns related to shifts in attention towards issues and the nature of the domestic policy agenda. Theories related to subsystems cannot be easily applied to foreign policy concerns because foreign policy issues rarely, if ever, generate the material benefits necessary to encourage interest group participation (Ripley and Franklin 1991). Pluralism and interest group formation, as a result, are considered to be of low importance in foreign policy matters (Wood and Peake 1998). In addition, the domestic policy agenda is developed in gradual, piecemeal fashion with the process aided by the abilities of domestic interest groups (Anderson 1978; Cobb and Elder 1972; Kingdon 1984). Thus destabilization of policymaking subsystems is a slow process. Foreign policy issues, however, evolve as Wood and Peake (1998) suggest based on crisis developments which may be sporadic and episodic in nature.

Since foreign policy issues sometimes evolve based on external or trigger events inherited from previous administrations, the president's ability to set the agenda has been described as endogenous in nature (Cobb and Elder 1972). The president's ability to focus on particular foreign policy crises is constrained by the responsibilities he is believed to possess. Despite the growth of institutions which exist, the president is boundedly rational (Simon 1947). It is impossible for presidents to either forecast the rise of foreign policy issues or attend to all the issues that develop. The economy of attention associated with the president's position is influenced by the priority that the president gives to some issues in comparison to others (Cobb and Elder 1972). The

president's agenda determines which issues are deemed worthy of attention and which issues are not. The most important foreign policy issues take time and energy to resolve and require that the president cater to his domestic constituents in the process.

The second sub-area traces its seminal origins to McCombs and Shaw (1972) and the focus of this work is on *public agenda setting.* This particular area of research is related to the literature on bandwagon effects (O'Gorman 1975) which focuses on the relationship between elite knowledge of public opinion and subsequent influence that other individuals have towards that opinion. The public agenda setting literature is also related to the social movement literature (Blumer 1971; Gamson 1992) which focuses on the collective actions of people to solutions involving the emergence of social problems. The public agenda setting literature, mostly conducted by mass communication scholars, suggests that there has to be a relationship between the agenda that elites set and the agenda which the audience is believed to adopt (Dearing and Rogers 1996). Elites engage in agenda setting when they shape public opinion by telling citizens *what issues are important* and *what issues to think about* (Cohen 1963; Edelstein 1993; Kingdon 1984). Elite emphasis, for example, on national security threats may lead citizens to view security threats as an important issue in comparison to health care issues. In order to prove such a relationship, Kosicki (1993) notes that researchers should present evidence that the media content is the purported cause of the effects being considered. Second, it is important that the audience is exposed to such content. Third, other extraneous factors should be controlled for in order to ensure that the agenda-setting stimulus is robust and finally, researchers should specify the mechanisms underlying such effects.

Dearing and Rogers (1996) note that public agenda-setting studies can be divided based on the methodological approaches they have used. Two types have been incorporated. The first kind perceives the public agenda as a hierarchy (McCombs and Shaw 1972). In this context, all of the main issues on the public agenda at a given point in time are examined. The second kind perceives the public agenda in longitudinal fashion in which the rise and fall of one or a few issues at a time is examined (Blumer 1971). One of the key working assumptions of the hierarchical approach is that elite emphasis on issues helps to determine which issues the members of the public think are important. The approach suggests that the public is relatively passive in nature (Weaver 1977). However, other research violates these tenets by emphasizing that the public is relatively engaged in public issues (Downs 1972; Gamson 1992; Kingdon 1984).

Hierarchy studies, however, do not adequately capture this relationship since longitudinal based designs are better able to capture how public opinion exerts influence on policymakers or how issues rise or fall at the expense of other issues on the public agenda (Zhu 1992). Downs (1972) suggests that a longitudinal approach is most appropriate for an agenda-setting approach because the issue-attention cycle proceeds through clearly identifiable stages. An undesirable situation exists but may not capture public attention. Then a dramatic event suddenly erupts on the scene and creates public alarm concerning the issue. The cost of solving the social problem might be seen as too expensive and thus might begin to slip down the public agenda as interest fades in the issue. There might be a high cost associated with solving the social problem and the media or elite coverage of the issue might create boredom associated with the issue. Afterwards the issue drops off the public agenda. Or perhaps, as Dearing and Rogers

(1996) point out, the media's focus on a particular issue might have the opposite effect. The media or elite agenda might influence the public agenda for an issue based on a gradual and incremental process. As the cumulative number of messages builds up and increases over time, the public may become persuaded that the issue is important. Hence, the public agenda for an issue might actually be emboldened in longitudinal fashion.

Based on research conducted of the public agenda from a hierarchical and longitudinal perspective, foreign affairs issues have generally dominated the public agenda of the US public since World War II, between 40% to 50% of the MIP (e.g., most important problem) responses by the public from 1946 to 1976 (Smith 1980). One of the primary questions raised by public agenda-setting studies pertains to whether the executive is a proactive or reactive office (Andrade and Young 1996; Peake 2001). In the context of foreign policy crises, the executive is viewed by some as the dominant player because such an institution has advantages in key areas such as secrecy, efficiency, and unity that the legislative branch does not possess (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cohen 1995; Edwards and Barrett 2000; Kingdon 1984; Jones 1994; Neustadt 1960; Peterson 1994). Sinclair (1993) argues that even though congressional leaders have become more active in foreign and defense policy since the Vietnam War, their influence is still limited (see however Carter 1998; Carter, Scott, and Rowling 2004; Lindsay 1994; Scott and Carter 2002).

Despite such limited influence, Congress is comprised of individual players who differ in terms of policy interests. Labeled policy entrepreneurs by Carter, Scott, and Rowling (2004), certain individuals may wish to affect policy, whether in support or opposition. These individuals seek to initiate action on foreign policy actions they deeply

care about rather than simply wait for administration action. As Carter, Scott, and Rowling note, members of Congress have an incentive to act as foreign policy entrepreneurs if members of the administration do not initiate policies on foreign policy interests of deep concern. The second cause, the authors note, is to initiate a change in administration policy that is of particular dislike to a member of Congress. Such interests may be a byproduct of formative experiences or exogenously driven by constituency needs. However, arguably as the dominant player in the foreign policy process, the president has a number of tools at his disposal that are believed to assist him in the public agenda setting process. Presidents routinely hold news conferences (Eshbaugh-Soha 2003; Hager and Sullivan 1994), travel abroad and domestically (Brace and Hinckley 1992), and make policy statements to affect the coverage they receive.

In addition to holding news conferences and formulating policy statements, the president is uniquely situated to influence the public agenda because of his position and control over the U.S. military. Because the president has authority to order military actions, he has the ability to shift public and governmental attention to issues he considers to be extremely important, which can provide public and congressional political support for his actions especially if the focus is narrow (Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha 2007; Edwards and Wood 1999; Peake 2001; Schattsneider 1960). Besides possessing the power to initiate military actions, public support can be further cemented through the president's State of the Union addresses (Gruscynski 2004). Cohen (1995) and Hill (1998) found that presidential agenda setting is most pronounced after the State of the Union address (see however Young and Perkins 2005). In comparison to the State of the Union speech, the president's ability to set the agenda declines with other presidential

speeches not given in front of a national audience (Edwards and Wood 1999; Wood and Peake 1998).

Some studies, therefore, assert that the executive is a reactive rather than a proactive office (Baum and Kernell 1999; Edwards and Wood 1999; Edwards 2003; Wood and Peake 1998). As Gruscyznski (2007) notes, the nature of the constraints associated with the presidency suggest that we should study the powers that the president has in the context of the entire system that surrounds each presidency. It is important, therefore, as Gruscyznski (2007) points out, that there are a number of factors outside of the president's direct control (e.g., constitutional limitations, formal and informal arrangements amongst institutions, and changing conditions in the policymaking environment). Factors which might help the president to set his agenda such as his approval ratings, his influence in Congress, and international events are only partially influenced by the president. Furthermore, the executive is highly responsive to media coverage (Peake 2001). Those studies that see the president's office as reactive in nature generally view the president's ability to set the agenda as a dependent variable developed through external factors such as attention paid to it by Congress and public opinion. Approval ratings are dependent on prior economic conditions that are associated with the presidency at a given point in time (Brace and Hinckley 1992). In addition, as Bond and Fleisher (1990) assert, the president's influence in Congress which might help to set his agenda is determined by and large through the parties that are composing the members of both houses (e.g., whether the government is divided or not). Moreover, he has to compete for air-time with entertainment choices on TV (Edwards and Eshbaugh-Soha 2001).

The influence of the media gives credence to the president's position as largely that of a reactive rather than proactive office. The *media-agenda setting literature* largely assumes that the agenda-setting process begins with the issue climbing on the media agenda (Dearing and Rogers 1996). The media in essence determines the public agenda of elites. Of course such determination is based on the credibility of the source. The *New York Times* is a more credible source than the *National Enquirer* and therefore would have more agenda setting power. In addition, the media has agenda-setting power based on the amount of interpersonal conversation which takes place amongst the public that may reinforce media talking points (Wanta and Wu 1992).

The media also may play a significant role based on a need for orientation on behalf of the constituents. Individuals with high uncertainty will have a high need to become oriented towards an issue. These individuals will seek out information from media outlets to reduce their uncertainty thus leading to greater agenda-setting effects (Weaver, McCombs, and Spellman 1975). As a result of this need to reduce uncertainty, it should not be surprising that an individual's close familiarity with a particular issue may override the influence of the mass media in helping to determine what is important for the person. For example, as Dearing and Rogers (1996) suggest, depending on how individuals hear about information concerning events like the U.S. military presence in Somalia (e.g., mass media, interpersonal conversations with others) will help to determine the agenda-setting power of the media. Individuals, because they are more likely to be uninformed about international issues than domestic, will rely more on the mass media to help establish what is important from what is not important (Manheim 1986). However, scholars such as Iyengar and Kinder (1987) found that personal

experience with an issue might sensitize an individual to that issue, so that further information is then sought in the media concerning that issue. Hence, there is a positive correlation between personal experience with an issue and the enhancement of the media agenda's influence.

The media can increase or decrease the accessibility of an issue based on the type or amount of coverage provided (Mullins 1977; Shaw and Clemmer 1977; Wanta and Hu 1994). As Linsky (1986) notes, the media is important because government officials and politicians take the amount of media attention present on an issue as an indirect expression of public interest on that particular issue. Wittkopf (1990) asserts that many Americans do not pay a great deal of attention to an issue until events covered by the media motivate them to do so. Oftentimes, however, the attention is slight and has a tendency to lessen in intensity rather quickly. Of course the president wishes to manipulate the press by informing the media of matters that are of high importance to his administration through presidential trips, summits and speeches (Brace and Hinckley 1992). Many politicians and bureaucrats learn of each other's activities through the efforts of the mass media. Policymakers, according to Linsky (1986), attempt to acquire positive coverage for their issues while tipping off reporters about the negative aspects of competing issues. So, as a result, policymakers and elites will naturally try to further their own policy goals.

Taking into consideration that there have been different findings associated with examining the executive office as either proactive or reactive in nature, it is important to examine the circumstances in which the executive is constituted as either proactive or reactive in nature. Scholars have tackled the divide in the reactive/proactive debate by

considering prior issue importance. Prior issue importance, as Edwards and Wood (1999), Flemming, Wood, and Bohte (1995) suggest, may be vital in determining the agenda-setting power of the president. Depending on the policy issue presented, the president may either be a strong agenda setter or a weak agenda setter. The policy issue itself resembles that of a conditional variable. If the policy issue is new or weak, the president faces relatively few constraints in determining how that issue might fit into his agenda since competing actors have very little interest in such an issue when it is weak or may not have an established position on it if the issue is new. However, if the issue is old or strong, the president has to compete with other actors in establishing his agenda. Wood and Peake (1998), for example, have found evidence suggesting that the president is a weak agenda setter in comparison to the media when salient topics such as the Arab-Israeli conflict were the subject matter than when non-salient topics such as health care (Edwards and Wood 1999) or foreign aid are the topics of concern (Peake 2001).

Priming

The literature suggests that priming takes place when elites tell citizens *how to think about* politicians and issues (Dearing and Rodgers 1996). Citizens are primed, for example, when they evaluate political leaders on the basis of their national security policies. Priming occurs when elite emphasis on an issue induces citizens to base their political judgments on that particular issue (Ghanem 1997; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Specific issues should be used as benchmarks to evaluate the performance of leaders and government. Priming is believed to be related to agenda-setting. The elite agenda is said to influence the public's agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). By encouraging the formation of public opinion through telling individuals what to think about,

considerations can be shaped that are taken into account when making judgments about candidates or issues (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

Priming influences constituent attention by calling attention to some specific issues and ignoring other issues. Priming thus helps to activate remembered associations and influence the considerations that individuals might use in forming their political opinions (Jones 1994). As Fiske and Taylor (1991) note, priming works by helping individuals take into account context in the interpretation of new information which differentiates priming from other phenomena such as framing. When people are primed by television news stories about national defense, people judge elites such as the president by how well they provide national defense. Recently and frequently activated ideas come to mind more readily than ideas that are not in the process of being activated. Accessibility, as is the case for agenda setting, is viewed as the key mediator of priming effects (Higgins and King 1981; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Miller and Krosnick 1996; Price and Tewksbury 1997; Wyer and Srull 1986, 1989). The concept's accessibility is determined in part by the frequency (Higgins, Bargh, and Lombardi 1985) and recency (Herr, Sherman, and Fazio 1983; Higgins, Rholes, and Jones 1977; Srull and Wyer 1980) in which it has been used in the past, and how readily such a concept can be retrieved from memory. Thus chronic accessibility of a concept such as the president's foreign policy will be much greater for individuals who have been exposed to news stories like this in the past. Stimuli motivate priming by influencing the individual's ability to judge and evaluate.

How does priming operate based on accessibility? Priming has been known to operate through mass media effects because most individuals are dependent on the mass

media concerning international affairs (Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat 2003). Exposure to news coverage increases knowledge and therefore accessibility in association with such events (Albritton and Manheim 1983; Manheim and Albritton 1984; Perry 1985, 1987). These events may involve issues such as the nature of personal interactions amongst people of different nations to mass attitudes about foreign policy and the practice of diplomacy (Bartels 1995; Brewer, Graf and Wilnat 2003; Manheim 1991, 1994; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992).

Studies conducted by Iyengar et al. (1984) along with Iyengar and Kinder (1987) illustrate the importance of accessibility in relationship to news stories. The studies conducted by Iyengar and his colleagues are influential because they break ground methodologically in examining the agenda-setting and priming process. Most research examining these effects utilizes survey-content analysis based methods. However, Iyengar and his colleagues disaggregated agenda-setting research probing the psychology of the agenda-setting process by examining these issues from a micro-level perspective.

Iyengar et al. (1984) randomly assigned subjects to watch either a news broadcast containing several stories on defense or a broadcast which contained no stories on defense related issues. After viewing one of the two broadcasts, subjects were then asked to rate the president's overall performance in a number of specific areas, in particular energy, economic, and defense policy. Subjects who viewed broadcasts emphasizing defense policy placed a greater salience concerning the president's performance on defense policy than did subjects who saw absolutely no stories focusing on defense. Hence, news stories served to prime opinions towards the president's performance on defense policy. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) further demonstrated that news coverage of a

particular issue is able not only to increase salience, but also to prime viewers to give that particular issue more weight in their overall evaluation of public officials and political candidates. Exposure to media coverage of national problems such as energy, defense, and inflation increased the salience that Americans assigned to Jimmy Carter's performance on these particular issues in regards to forming an opinion concerning his performance. Field studies have also studied this phenomenon as well. Krosnick and Kinder (1990) examined the effects of media coverage on the Iran-Contra scandal on perceptions of President Reagan in 1986. The disclosure of the Iran-Contra scandal took place in the midst of the National Election Study (NES) survey and the authors thus compared two groups of people, one that was interviewed before the disclosure and one that was interviewed after the disclosure. Respondents in the post-disclosure group lent more weight to foreign policy in their evaluation of President Reagan's decision than did the pre-disclosure group. However, what priming cannot tell us is whether people lent more weight to foreign policy based on the type of news coverage associated with the Iran-Contra scandal. We could argue that people lent weight to foreign policy because of the negative publicity associated with the scandal, which might be independent of the quantity of news coverage associated with the issue.

Two models have been developed to address priming as it relates to these particular works. First, it is possible to think of priming in terms of an associative network model. Individual memory consists of organized nodes that are linked together through various associative pathways (Anderson and Bowers 1973; Collins and Loftus 1975). Once one node is activated, this activation then spreads to other nodes that are present in the mental network. Domke, Shah, and Wackman (1998) suggest that

activation may spread from one political concept to another which can thus activate indirectly associated concepts. This associative network model of information processing is based on the idea of accessibility because judgments and attitude formation have been found to be correlated based on the ease with which these associations come to mind (Collins and Loftus 1975; Kahneman and Tversky 1973). According to this approach, individuals make judgments about other people or issues based on information that can be easily retrieved through memory. The longer the time that it takes for respondents to answer a question, for example, the less accessible is the association. Priming works through accessibility (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Chong 1993; Domke, Shah, and Wackman 1998; Fazio 1995; Gamson and Modigliani 1987, 1989; Hothchild 1983; Iyengar 1991; Nabi 2003). As Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat (2003) suggest, a story about domestic terrorism may prime the issue of terrorism which can thus influence the attitudes towards foreign nations previously associated with terrorism. However, what is important to note is that the issues that are the most accessible in a person's memory are most likely to strongly influence the individual.

The second model that has been developed to compete with the associative network model is called the "online" processing model. Wilnat (1997) labels this model a "storage bin model." Attitudes are formed as incoming information is processed (Hastie and Park 1986). Attitudes are stored in memory in what has been called summary or judgment tallies (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). New impressions are processed and integrated into a running tally that then shapes one's attitude (Torgenthau and Rasinski 1988). Attitudes may change, but the argument which motivated the change in attitude is forgotten.

In both models, there is a potential for ambiguity in the linkages between the issue and target of judgment. It is possible for citizens to draw multiple connections between one concept and another concept. News stories might activate contradictory associations and as a result, fail to guide the judgment of citizens in a particular direction. For example, as Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat (2003) note, Americans might be able to draw a negative association between the "war on drugs" and Mexico and Columbia with the thought that these particular nations are prominent sources of illegal drugs that might reach the US. However, the individual may also develop a positive association between the "war on drugs" and Mexico and Columbia because these countries are perceived to be key US allies in that war also.

Framing

The framing process is believed to involve both frame-building and frame-setting processes (Kanner 2004). The frame-building process is a rather under-theorized research topic. Frame building refers to processes associated with how elite frames are formed or types of frames created. Based on research conducted by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) and Tuchman (1978), five factors have been identified as playing a role in the frame-building process: social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists. Entman (2004) proposed a media effects framing model which argues that on foreign policy issues, frames that originate from the administration shape the frames used by other elites (e.g., members of Congress), media outlets and the public. Entman's model suggests that ideas cascade downward from the administration's first expressions concerning an event. These expressions lead to discussions between elites

who comprise Congressional members and staffers as well as important foreign policy leaders. The ideas circulated amongst the president's administration and elites cascades downward to the media. These individuals communicate regularly with individuals from the president's administration as well as elites. The interaction between the media, elites, and members of the president's administration helps to generate media frames which are then disseminated to the public. The public's reaction to the media frames feeds back to the media and other elites who then influence the administration's views. This process is believed to determine the debate on a particular issue, for example, whether one frame dominates in the debate or if there is parity amongst a multitude of frames.

In the prospect theory literature, there is an effort to distinguish between two phases in the choice process. The first phase constitutes the frame-building phase. The first phase, the editing phase, incorporates a very simple preliminary analysis of the choice problem. As Levy (1997) notes, the editing and production of frames plays a much greater role in choice situations in international relations than does the evaluating process. The process is important because the process transforms the representation of outcomes and probabilities. However, according to Levy (1994), the editing processes associated with prospect theory remain underdeveloped. Such an analysis, however, is believed to include an identification of options available to the actors, the possible outcomes associated with each of the choices, and the values and probabilities associated with each of the various outcomes. Involved in this process are several mental operations involving coding, simplification, the elimination of dominated alternatives and probabilities associated with outcomes (Levy 1994). Coding involves the identification of a reference point and framing of outcomes as deviations from this reference point.

This process can affect individual orientations towards risk. Simplification incorporates the rounding off of probabilities or outcomes which includes the discarding of unlikely outcomes. In addition, dominated alternatives are eliminated and probabilities associated with identical outcomes are combined.

Most of the literature, however, in international relations focuses on the frame-setting process. Framing, in this context, refers simply to the phenomenon that subtle changes in the wording or description of a situation might affect how audience members interpret a given situation. For those who want to conceptually distinguish framing from priming, framing takes into account that the subtle selection of certain aspects of a given issue by the media or elites makes these aspects more important than other aspects. Framing is utilized, therefore, to simplify complex issues. How an issue is characterized relates to how well it is understood. Framing traces its roots to sociology (Goffman 1974; Pan and Kosicki 1993) and psychology (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Priming, on the other hand, takes place when elite emphasis on an issue encourages individuals to think of that issue in a certain way. Priming effects also rely on context as they interact with the interpretation and retrieval of information. Context helps to establish issue salience and therefore accessibility. Framing effects do not necessarily have to take into account context. In addition, framing has been distinguished from agenda setting based on the locus of effect. An agenda-setting effect takes place based on the processing time associated with the particular issue. In contrast, a framing effect takes place based on how the issue is described (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).

Elite frames have been referred to in two ways. First, framing has referred to the words, images, phrases, presentation styles that a speaker may use when relaying

information to another individual in order to manipulate or influence opinion (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Entman 1993). Nelson and Kinder (1996) and Entman (1993) stipulate that frames are simply more than positions or arguments about an issue. Frames illustrate the essence of the problem and, by doing so suggest how the problem should be thought about as well as in what manner the problem should be solved. Moreover, the chosen frame reveals what the speaker sees as relevant to the topic at hand. For example, President Bush issued a "frame" by suggesting that there was a need to go to war with Iraq due to the threat Iraq posed to US national interests. In issuing this frame, the president suggested how the crisis should be thought about and in addition, made recommendations concerning what should be done to solve the crisis. An emphasis framing effect is said to take place. An emphasis or issue framing effect is said to occur in political discourse when in the process of describing an event, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially viable considerations encourages individuals to focus on these particular considerations in the process of constructing overall opinion (Druckman 2001b).

In this context, political elites choose to frame events strategically. Riker (1993) argues that political elites choose frames that emphasize issues in which they have an advantage relative to other elites and avoid issues in which either the other side or no particular side has a particular advantage (Austen-Smith 1993; Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). As Entman (2004) notes, frames chosen by the executive have a tendency to shape opinion developed by congressional leaders and members of the media elite. Public feedback influences how the media re-frames the issue for members of the executive. Thus, when political elites choose frames, they have to take into account that there are

many actors who might attempt to frame and re-frame these issues. The production side of the framing equation helps to determine if there is one frame amongst an issue or whether competing frames of equal or unequal salience dominate the issue. In addition, members of a decision unit have to be careful concerning which words, images, phrases, or presentation styles come to mind when framing policy options for an elite decision-maker (Geva, DeRouen, and Mintz 1993; Geva, Mayhar, and Skorick 2000; Geva, Mintz, and Redd 2000; Maoz 1990; Mintz 1993; Mintz and Geva 1997; Redd and Geva 2001; Redd 2002).

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), Boettcher (2004), and Krosnick (1988) note that packets of incoming information pass through cognitive, affective, and/or social filters that help to create perceptions of the outside world. The external environment is both ambiguous and expansive. Individuals possess limited cognitive capacities and therefore must restrict their inputs to the few most salient dimensions in order to reach some form of closure. Because individuals have limited cognitive capacity, it is possible they might have vague notions on many political topics and thus may not have fully developed attitudes. At best, individuals might be able to express few considerations that come to mind in response to questions but not be able to identify their importance. Thus the set of dimensions along which a person's evaluations are based might be limited. Hence politicians, when they attempt to select themes have to keep in mind the considerations that their constituents possess. So when we consider the words, image, styles, etc., that an individual may use in the context of framing, we should also examine literature which has focused on works emphasizing *thematic*, *productive*, *initiator v. target*, and *revolving versus sequential* types of framing.

When we think of *thematic* framing, we think of attempts by leaders and actors to insert themes into the policy debate. Themes refer to information presented by leaders emphasizing different attributes of an issue (Druckman 2004a; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Hence, thematic frames rely on content-based communication to get their message across. The frame contains content which acts as a focal point in which citizens can be sensitized to specific elements of the political environment (Geva, Courtois, and Mintz 1996). Thematic frames help to prioritize the content that is being considered during policy debates (Geva, Courtois and Mintz 1996). In this context, as Berinsky and Kinder (2006) note, elites introduce frames in such a way that the public is able to comprehend and understand them. Riker (1986, 1993) also notes that political elites often choose frames that emphasize issues on which they have an advantage relative to other opponents and also avoid issues in which the other side or even no side is believed to have an advantage. If elites are able to define the boundaries of an issue along which it is discussed, specifically in terms of what the public considers to be domestically acceptable, then it would be easier for members of the public to lend their support (Astorino-Courtois 1996; Geva, Courtois and Mintz 1996; Paine 1989; Riker 1986; Schattsneider 1960).

The purpose of choosing proper words, images, phrases, and presentation styles is to engage ultimately in productive framing. Productive framing, quite simply is any framing attempt that tends to bring about the desired outcome. If a leader, for example, decides to portray a potential adversary in a negative light and the intended audience of the frame is a domestic public, then if the public does view the potential adversary in negative fashion, it can be argued that the frame was productive. If the frame produces

something other than the intended consequences, then the frame itself is said to be counterproductive or a failed frame (Mintz and Redd 2003).

Important factors that might condition frame success are moderator variables. Individuals, as Gross (2000) points out, are less receptive to frames that might contradict their values. Strong predispositions to certain frames have been shown to increase resistance to disconfirming information. Druckman and Nelson (2003) have shown that knowledge enhances framing effects since it increases the likelihood that considerations emphasized in a particular frame might be available or understood by the individual. Moderators have been shown to influence framing effects based on their influence on the strength of the frame. Frames delivered by credible sources are likely to influence framing effects whereas frames delivered by non-credible sources are not (Druckman 2001c). Frames that invoke cultural values are also likely to influence framing effects (Chong 2000; Gamson and Modigliani 1987).

A frame can be successful also depending on the strategies or tactics used in the framing attempt. Productive framing attempts may be derived from who is doing the framing and/or who is being framed. In turn, these chosen strategies and tactics may also depend on the issue at stake and the target of the frame, for example whether a target state is democratic or authoritarian. Presidents of democratic states are more likely to succeed in negatively framing the actions and leaders of non-democratic states and thus obtain public approval for the use of force against such entities than if they were to engage in similar activities towards democratic actors (Mintz and Geva 1993). As Geva, Mintz and True (1994) demonstrated, subjects were less supportive of the use of force

when the adversary was framed as democratic in nature than if the adversary was framed as non-democratic in nature.

Whether a frame is deemed to be successful might be dependent on whether the frame is presented in *revolving* or *sequential* fashion. A revolving frame encompasses a series of different frames sequentially implemented over time. A sequential frame utilizes the same frame with the notion that various aspects of it are implemented over time. As Maoz (1990) notes, sequential framing is related to the salami tactic. Individual leaders are posited to break a course of action into a series of gradual policy options. Each subsequent change in policy options deviates marginally from the previous stage and also helps to set the stage for future frames to be implemented as well. Frames might be implemented either before or after the decision is made to engage in a use of force. In the case of the Persian Gulf Crisis, framing occurred before the use of force was implemented and in the cases of Grenada, Libya, and Panama, framing took place after the use of force was implemented (Geva, Mintz and True 1994).

In addition to the timing of the frame, individuals can frame aggregate effects or multiple options (Levy 1996). Levy notes that framing oftentimes focuses on only single, one-shot outcomes or events and thus overlooks the cases in which crucial choices are made involving compound outcomes. How leaders aggregate or disaggregate these outcomes may influence the reference point used in establishing what is a loss or gain.

The second kind of framing, classified as evaluative in nature, refers to the speaker's frame of a situation which can alter another's understanding of that particular situation (Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat 2003; Hoyt and Garrison 1997; Maoz 1990; Taylor-Robinson and Redd 2003). The frame manipulates the reference point to which the

external environment is compared with (Mintz and Redd 2003). The frame serves to operate as an evaluative anchor in the assessment of the environment, and is therefore able to shift the meaning of the policy debate (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Quattrone and Tversky 1988). An evaluative frame, for example, might skew perceptions of a peace operation as either more favorable or less favorable than the objective situation deserves (Geva, Courtois, and Mintz 1996).

The preeminent framing theory in International Relations which takes into account the nature of evaluative frames is prospect theory (Levy 1992). Prospect theory relies heavily on what are called valence-based framing effects. An equivalency, or valence based framing effect is said to occur when two logically equivalent statements of a problem that are not necessarily transparent in equivalency lead individual decision makers to select different options (Boettcher 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986). Scholars have used prospect theory to call into question the basic economic premise that individuals are believed to have stable, asymmetric and transitive preferences. Prospect theory thus attempts to incorporate observed violations of expected utility theory and derive from these a theory of risky choice that is based on experimental findings in conjunction with mathematical formulas which provide the necessary explanatory and predictive frameworks.

In prospect theory, edited prospects are evaluated and the preferred prospect is selected. People tend to think in terms of gains and losses in the context of a reference point rather than in terms of their net assets. They encode the choices they make in terms of deviations from a reference point. The reference point is usually deemed to be the

status quo. People have a tendency to remain at the status quo and hence it is the most common reference point for states as well as for individuals when they frame a decision problem (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). The bias towards the status quo is believed to lead to the loss-aversion effect. However, the status quo does not have to serve as a reference point. A future aspiration level can be a reference point as well.

Due to the encoding process related to the reference point and the differential treatment of gains and losses, the identification of the reference point, or framing of the choice problems is a matter of critical importance (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). People tend to treat gains differently from losses in relationship to the reference point. The value function associated with prospect theory is deemed to be concave for gains and convex for losses. Thus, individuals are deemed to be risk averse in the domain of gain and risk seeking in the domain of loss (Dawes 1988). These observations have been substantiated by past work conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1984) and Tversky and Kahneman (1981) who have found that when individuals are faced with a choice between risky prospects (a sure gain of $100 in comparison to a 50% chance of receiving $200 or 50% chance of receiving nothing), they are more likely to use risk-averse strategies when the outcomes are framed as gains and risk-seeking strategies when the equivalent outcomes are framed in terms of losses. Individual preferences change as a result of the alternative frames even though the objective outcomes are deemed to be identical. These findings have been demonstrated in a variety of settings in the international arena (Astorino-Courois 1996; Boettcher 1995; Farnham 1992; Geva, Astorino-Courtois, and Mintz 1996; Huth, Bennett, and Gelpi 1992; Jervis 1992;

Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Levy 1987, 1992, 1996; McDermott 1992, 1998; Stein 1993).

In addition, negative items are weighted more heavily psychologically than positive items. Losses hurt more than equal gains. An event that is framed as averting a loss or securing a gain may have substantial repercussions in arms control negotiations as well as in escalating commitments. The weapons one side may give up will be experienced as more of a loss than those that could be gained through the dismantling of the other side. The concessions that one makes count more psychologically than the concessions the other side might make. Concessions and acceptable agreements can be difficult, since the principle of loss aversion indicates that both sides want the other side to give up more weapons than they themselves are willing to give up. Loss aversion helps to explain sunk costs. People appear to be willing to pay additional costs in order to recover sunk costs. As Schaubroeck and Davis (1994) and Straw (1976) showed, individuals who are not responsible for an original policy that failed might be more willing to stop the policy as opposed to putting further resources into continuing that policy. Applied to international relations, when a situation is framed as involving the potential battle deaths to be incurred, it is politically difficult for leaders to cut and run from the situation. Because of this, risks are taken in bad situations (e.g., Vietnam) in the hopes that in doing so, losses may be recovered, the tide of the battle may be turned, or sunk costs might be recouped (Arkes and Blumer 1985).

In addition to arms control agreements and escalation-based endeavors, McDermott (2004) suggests that arguments over territory can become particularly contentious in the context of loss aversion. For example, in the Middle East today, the

Israelis assert that they own land in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians, on the other hand, want to possess such territory and make it their own sovereign and independent nation. In this context, when land is taken away, it is framed as a loss that must be overturned and made right. However, when land is gained, it is framed as a rightful gain. When each side perceives that the same territory is stolen, the possibility for peace fades into the background. Each side will fight long and hard for the land they feel was lost or stolen instead of fighting for new land it seeks to control for the very first time. It is more difficult to achieve a peaceful solution if individuals believe that the land they claim as their own is possessed by an adversary.

Given these set of circumstances, what is the relationship between framing and preventive war? Can we frame preventive war in such a way that we can systematically understand how leaders can gain or lose support for the use of force?

Preventive War

Before we address these questions, it is important to address the differences associated with preventive wars from warfare in general. In particular, preventive wars can be distinguished from non-preventive wars by the presence or absence of a power shift. A power shift, very simply, is defined as a change in relative power capabilities between two states based on changes in national growth. In order for a war to be classified as preventive in nature, an actual or perceived power shift has to be a necessary and/or sufficient condition. It is this power shift that is believed to create perceptions of a resource deficit thus fueling the preventive motivation. In contrast to preventive wars, in non-preventive wars, the power shift may be one of many factors we should consider as a causal variable explaining the outbreak of conflict (Lemke 2003; Levy 1987).

Normative works address the conditions or circumstances under which it is permissible to launch preventive war. Thus, works in the normative genre have largely focused on legal and moral standards associated with the proper use of preventive force within a just-war context (Crawford 2003; Dombrowski and Payne 2006; Raymond 2007; Record 2004). As discussed by Buchanan and Keohane (2004), there are four different perspectives in the normative literature in regards to preventive war. The first, labeled the just-war blanket prohibition, suggests that preventive war is strictly forbidden (Kaufman 2005; Walzer 1977). Force might be justified in cases where an attack is imminent and the enemy is mobilizing forces with clear aggressive intent and/or missiles or warplanes have been launched but have not reached their intended target. Thus, such a perspective forbids preventive conflict, though not preemptive conflict. The second perspective, the legal status-quo, suggests that the preventive use of force is regarded as prohibited by contemporary international law unless the state has received collective authorization from the UN Security Council to conduct such war. Since the UN Charter clearly stipulates that the use of force should be used to defend against armed attack, the preventive use of force is strictly curtailed. The legal-status quo perspective suggests that these high constraints should be maintained. The third and fourth perspectives are quite similar. The third perspective, the national interest perspective, suggests that states may do whatever their leaders believe necessary to serve the best interests of the state. Leaders of states may disregard universal moral principles when they conflict with the national interest. Leaders have the right to use force preventively if they deem it to be necessary to pursue state interests. And the fourth perspective, adopted as a primary component of the Bush Doctrine, suggests that preventive war should be used proactively

as a tool to defend against future losses. If preventive war is used as a proactive tool as critics fear, then there is the possibility of imperial expansion and overreach as well as the sensitivity on the part of target nations to such imperial expansion and overreach (Snyder 2003).

The empirical literature focusing on preventive war has largely addressed concerns associated with the international system. Some scholars have pointed out that preventive war has been initiated to preserve the balance of power in the international system (Gulick 1955). However, as Niou and Ordeshook (1987) suggest, leaders not only calculate the balance of power based on present resources in the international system, but also the potential for future imbalances as well. These future imbalances might be derived from resource deficits caused by a declining world power (Gilpin 1975, 1981; Levy 1987). If the balance of power in the system might become "unbalanced" in the future, then a preventive war might be launched in the present to perhaps rectify the situation (Brodie 1973; Fay 1966; Maoz 1983). However, as Niou and Ordeshook (1987) note, if preventive wars can be launched simply to rectify a future balance of power problem, then there is a possibility that preventive war may involve more than two adversaries (e.g., a hegemon and challenger nation) and may not be only launched by a single hegemonic country, but by any country who wants to recalibrate the balance of power. Preventive war, for example, might be launched by a coalition of countries to prevent one country from becoming too dominant. Certain coalitions might be more prone to launching preventive war than others. And even if all countries grow at the same rate, depending on how this rate of growth influences the future balance of power between these nations of interest, this might influence whether or not preventive war

breaks out. Others such as Organski and Kugler (1980) assert that dissatisfied challengers have waged wars against great powers long before a balance of power was substantively achieved (see also Doran and Parsons 1980; Goldstein 1988; Organski 1968).

The empirical literature also suggests that we need to take into consideration the domestic constraints associated with launching preventive war. Structural theories cannot explain why some power shifts lead to preventive war while others do not (Schweller 1992). Regime type plays a significant intervening factor in determining the nature of domestic constraints associated with launching preventive war (Dolan 2004; Holsti 2004; Hymans 2004; Tucker 2004). In democracies there are many players who are more than able and willing to counterframe bellicose frames by rehashing the costs associated with going to war (Fischer 2004; Hymans 2004; Tucker 2004). Intra-departmental squabbles between hawks and doves may also complicate matters as well. So taking into account all these constraints, Schweller (1992) asserts that preventive war should only be an attractive option for declining leaders in non-democratic states (see also Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). In democracies, leaders will have a hard time mobilizing forces necessary to engage in preventive conflicts. The separation of civilian and military power characteristic of democracy discourages preventive warfare (Posen 1984; Schweller 1992).

The politics of a society must comply with the norms of that society as Brodie (1965) suggests and because of this, preventive war is an attractive response for leaders facing future resource deficits only in the case of non-democratic regimes. The public is averse to the costs associated with war. The arguments adapted by Schweller (1992) are

derived from democratic peace theory which suggests that democracies are by nature more pacific and less bellicose, all things being equal, than non-democracies (Chan 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Maoz 1998; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Weart 1998). This does not necessarily mean that democracies are less prone to go to war than non-democracies. This simply means that there are built-in electoral constraints which suggest that costs be minimized when initiating conflict. Furthermore, the assumptions adopted by Schweller (1992) and Posen (1984) fail to take into account the possibility that presidents might be able to frame such policies in ways that may seem favorable to their constituents and thus minimize the electoral constraints and costs associated with launching preventive war.

Preemptive War

As Reiter (1995) points out, preemptive war is not motivated by greed as in preventive war, but by fear. A preemptive war breaks out if an attacker believes that it will be the target of a military attack in the short term. A preventive war, on the other hand, breaks out if the attacker believes that it will be victimized in the long-term. A preventive war is said to take place if the use of force is used to stem an attack that might take place a few years from now or if the declining power will be in a position of strategic inferiority in the long-term if it does not launch an attack in the present. Therefore, most scholars suggest that we can distinguish preventive wars from preemptive wars based on the time dimension in play (Jervis 1978; Levy 1987; Vagts 1956). Preventive wars take into account a time dimension whereas preemptive wars do not. For example, Van Evera (1999) defines a war as preemptive if a state is motivated to attack if there is an advantage to making the first move regardless if the war happens now or later. Preventive wars, on the other hand, occur if the attacker prefers war now to war

later regardless of who made the first move. A war is thus preventive according to Van Evera (1999) if the attacker prefers to attack now rather than face the risk of an attack in the future if the additional time affords the adversary a relative advantage. Thus, according to Van Evera, preventive wars emerge from concerns focused primarily on long-term shifts in power from wars that emerge from crisis dynamics.

Reiter (1995) notes that there are two models which predict preemption as a central path to war: a) spiral model, and b) offense-defense balance. Relations between states according to the spiral model are characterized by spirals of hostility and fear. Preemptive war is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear of being a target encourages a state to lash out and strike. As the dynamics of an international crisis unfold, the end result is preemptive war. Tensions between the two states might rise to the point where one state believes that the other state is about to attack. In order to forestall such an attack, a preemptive assault is launched. As Jervis (1976), Glaser (1992), Glaser and Hopf (1992), and Fearon (1990) note, preemptive wars are more likely when other states are perceived to be hostile and pose imminent threats.

According to Reiter (1995), we can examine the frequency of preemptive wars by deriving hypotheses inspired by the spiral model. If preemptive wars are estimated to break out frequently, then the spiral model suggests that states would be constantly worried about threats to security. If preemptive wars would break out occasionally, then the spiral model would predict that states might be sometimes worried about future threats to security and cognitive miscalculations would sometimes result in war. If beliefs about the offense-defense balance reflect the objective state of affairs and the balance occasionally favors the offense, preemptive wars should break out occasionally.

Preemptive wars would also be less frequent if the military believed that the offense is dominant and the military exerted a high degree of control over foreign policy.

The second model, derived from Van Evera's work (1999), emphasizes the offense-defense balance. Preemptive wars, like preventive, are more likely when the offense is posited or perceived to have the advantage on the battlefield. Advantages may be derived from military technology, strategy, and terrain. As Reiter (1995) notes, when offense is perceived to be dominant, wars fought for expansionist intent increase because aggression becomes cheaper. In addition, when the offense has the advantage, future shifts are likely to have more dire consequences. Moreover, preemptive wars may increase in propensity because if states believe that an adversary's attack is more likely, the motivation to preempt increases. There is an advantage to striking first (however, see Jervis 1984; Schelling 1984; Quester 1984). The offense-defense theory is useful in helping to explain why states with essentially defensive policy aims might end up going to war with each other.

In short, there are many reasons why states might end up going to war with each other. It is important for scholars to find out not only why states engage in war, but also whether elites are able to persuade their constituents that war is the best option out of the other options that might be available.

Conclusion

In order to determine whether framing effects theoretical models are significantly different from agenda setting/priming models, we need to understand how frames work and in particular the conditions under which frames are likely not to be effective. In short,

we need to go beyond simply understanding framing based on subtle changes in the wording of situations which might influence audience interpretation.

Past research conducted by Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggests that the applicability of any given frame increases with perceptions of its relevance or strength. What factors might be related to a frame's relevance or strength? Frames might be acceptable only if they are viewed as being strong in nature (e.g., they come from a credible source for example) or if personality dispositions or values influence acceptance. If this is the case, then speakers who want to successfully use frames must build credibility with their constituents and can only influence certain constituents who have certain predispositions towards the issues being framed (see Pornpitakpan 2004 for an extensive review of the source credibility literature).

In understanding which factors encourage frames to be relevant, we must begin to understand better the nuances which exist between different types of framing environments (Brewer and Gross 2005; Chong and Druckman 2007a; Sniderman and Theriault 1999, 2004). Leaders have to be very careful to take into account the nature of their opposition because in democracies, frames engender counterframes. The media, for example, may deliberately or involuntarily frame or contribute to attempts by others to frame or counterframe given foreign policy situations, individual states, or the environment. Hence, the success or failure of framing attempts by national leaders may depend on whether the media or other third party elites such as political parties, advisers to national leaders, political rivals or challengers, may agree or disagree with the proposed frame being discussed. Previous work which has focused on counter-framing has focused on direction of opinion (Sniderman and Theriault 1999, 2004), the nature and

number of people's thoughts about the issues being raised by competing frames (Brewer and Gross 2005), and how competitive framing environments might differ based on number of frames and varying strength levels associated with such frames (Chong and Druckman 2007b).

It is important to examine framing effects from both a non-competitive and competitive perspective because the capacity of individuals to engage in framing effects and thus positively influence public opinion may be different depending on the framing environment they find themselves in. Typical framing effects studies associated with international relations employ one-sided designs in which subjects are assigned to receive one of two different alternative representations of a given issue. These studies have shown that if one side can establish the relevant terms of debate in conjunction with an issue, then that side can persuade others to adopt its position. However, debates over contentious issues such as foreign policy crises and specifically preventive war involve competition between parties and different ideological factions. These factions present issues to the public in opposing terms involving multiple frames of varying intensity.

In the next chapter, I will discuss my theoretical contribution which attempts to address a novel approach to examine the conditions under which frames might be relevant in garnering support or opposition for preventive war and vote choice.

Chapter III

A Theory of Competitive and Non-Competitive Framing Effects

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I concentrated on the differences between agenda setting, framing, and priming. In short, the major point I wanted to make was that framing constitutes a distinct phenomenon from agenda-setting and priming. There is still extensive debate in the literature concerning exactly how framing effects work. This is problematic because the primary means by which we distinguish framing as distinct from agenda setting and priming is based on how framing effects actually work. It is also important to understand when framing effects are likely to work as well.

As the war in Iraq demonstrated, understanding how and when framing effects work has imminent "policy" ramifications that have implications which extend outside of academia. To encourage and discourage support for the war in Iraq, frames were put forward by various elites. For example, supporters of the war like President Bush presented frames suggesting that it was in the public's best interests for the nation to accept the risks associated with going to war in the present in order to avoid a more painful, costly war against Iraq in the future. Since Iraq did not fit the mold of a "status-quo, risk averse" adversary, the costs associated with delay outweighed the costs associated with escalation according to this perspective.

As Bush made his case concerning the reasons why the US needed to go to war, various pundits, scholars, and media personalities offered frames concerning why going to war was not a good idea. Elites such as the former national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, asserted that a unilateral invasion of Iraq might destabilize the Middle East

and undermine efforts to deal with anti-American militant groups. Among the many issues brought up by opponents of the war, critics such as Scowcroft claimed that the invasion would lead to the deaths of thousands of coalition soldiers, Iraqi soldiers and civilians. Moreover, the war would damage peace and stability throughout the region.

In order for individuals like Bush and Scowcroft to best market their cases to the American people, both should have a good idea how and when their frames might be received by the public. From a theoretical and "academic" standpoint, answering these questions is vital because we do not know empirically whether leaders move public opinion based on constituent delegation to peripheral cues such as frame source or whether public opinion is dictated by individuals consciously deliberating over the frames set forth by leaders.

There are two types of psychological mechanisms under which framing effects are hypothesized to work. In the first case, framing effects work through a passive process. Framing effects work because individuals are influenced by frames based on peripheral cues such as frame source. For example, frames that are sponsored by a credible source such as Colin Powell may elicit more support than frames that are sponsored by a non-credible source such as Jerry Springer or Chris Rock. Credibility in this context is based on the knowledge and access to information associated with the foreign policy crises that the individual source may have. In the second case, framing effects work because individuals buy into frames based on their strength, relevance and applicability to the issue being discussed. Individuals, therefore, when presented with a frame emphasizing the costs of delay associated with conflict would buy into the frame.

only if such a frame corresponds to preconceived values or beliefs. Framing effects may not be successful if they do not correspond to certain values possessed by individuals.

In addition to understanding how framing effects work, it is important to develop a coherent theory to help us make predictions in regards to the potential successes or failures of framing effects as they pertain to IR that take into account variables which might condition such effects (Berinsky and Druckman 2007).[1] Most research in IR has presented framing effects in the context of non-competitive framing environments while ignoring competition as a variable. Hence, we lack a theory of framing effects that is arguably externally valid. The purpose of this dissertation is therefore two-fold: a) to devise a theory that takes into account when constituents are likely to buy into frames based on central or peripheral cues and b) that captures the conditional limitations associated with the framing process as it applies to both competitive and non-competitive framing environments. I examine the nature of framing effects in two specific contexts. The first context is a domestic context involving vote choice. I examine the use of framing effects in light of the 2004 election, an election that specifically highlighted themes related to the 2003 US led War in Iraq and thus preventive war. In this case, my interest concerns the nature of framing effects on vote choice. Is there any difference

[1] Other theories that have been developed to explain framing success or failure have involved bargaining situations between two different actors (Kanner 2004). Kanner develops a model that takes into account the bargaining situation between a stronger actor and a weaker actor. The weaker actor wishes to change the risk attitudes of the stronger actor thus changing the negotiating outcomes in its favor. However, Kanner's model does not take into account that the stronger actor might be constrained not only by the risk attitudes it possesses, but also by the framing environment the actor may be in and the individual values of their constituents. The theory that I am trying to develop, on the other hand, is a theory of framing taking into account the inter-relationship that exists between elites and their constituents in multiple framing environments.

between competitive and non-competitive frames on the likelihood that individuals may cast their ballot for Kerry or Bush? My major interest is to determine if there is any systematic difference between the impact of non-competitive from competitive frames on vote choice. Are there conditional limitations associated with framing effects based on the issue considered, the framing environment in which the issue was presented in, and candidates who frame such issues? The second context is an international context. Here I want to determine the impact of non-competitive and competitive frames on public opinion towards the preventive use of force. I am interested specifically in understanding whether individuals are likely to buy into frames based on central or peripheral cues provided by the frames. In addition, are individuals likely to buy into frames based on central or peripheral cues due to individual predispositions?

Thus framing effects may operate differently depending on the type of framing environment (e.g., non-competitive, competitive) and variance in individual predispositions. The major assumptions associated with the theory that I wish to present suggest that by understanding *how* framing effects work, we might begin to understand *when* framing effects work. For example, if people buy into frames because of the central cues they offer or if people buy into frames because they are motivated to justify a conclusion, then frames are likely to be successful when they emphasize information that is favorable to the public because it reinforces opinions they might adhere to. However, if framing effects work through peripheral cues or people do not feel pressure or motivated to justify their conclusions, then frames might work because they are sponsored by a credible source in comparison to a non-credible source. If this is the case,

then framing effects might work in an environment that requires individuals to exercise less cognitive skill and strain in making their decisions. It might matter less whether the frame itself emphasizes the costs of delay or escalation associated with conflict and matter more whether or not Colin Powell or Jerry Springer is the sponsor of the frame. Frame success might be highly dependent on the credibility of the individual sponsoring the frame.

Hence, the major question that I wish to address is "How do framing effects work and under what conditions are they likely to take place?" When I mention the term framing effect, I am referring to emphasis framing effects and not equivalency framing effects.[2] A framing effect takes place when individuals reorient their thinking towards a given issue based on information contained in a given frame. The important question here is how and when a framing effect takes place.

Before discussing what the literature has to say concerning psychological mechanisms and conditional limitations associated with the framing effects process, I will discuss the literature associated with frames and framing effects.

[2] An emphasis framing effect takes place when an individual by focusing on a subset of information associated with an issue encourages other individuals to reorient their thinking in line with the information being addressed. In contrast, an equivalency framing effect is said to occur when two logically equivalent statements of a problem that are not necessarily transparent in equivalency lead individual decision makers to select different options (Boettcher 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). An equivalency framing effect takes place when frames that cast information in a positive or negative light lead individuals to develop different preferences. Such preference reversals are asserted to violate the invariance axiom which underlies the rational choice approach.

Frames

Communication Frames

When we refer to the term frame, we often mean a *communication frame*.[3] The purpose of a communication frame very simply refers to issues emphasized in elite discourse. Its purpose is to organize reality and provide meaning to events (Chong and Druckman 2007b). Communication frames promote particular definitions and specific interpretations of political issues (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Tuchman 1978). They are defined in relationship to a specific issue, event, or political actor. Communication frames are usually organized by individuals communicating information (Scheufele 1999). Communicators make both conscious and unconscious judgments in deciding what to say and what not to say. Communication frames, as Brewer (2003) notes, exist within communicating texts and can be found in oral statements, newspaper articles, and news broadcasts. These frames are most likely introduced by political entrepreneurs in hopes that the media will disseminate them and citizens discover them, accept them, and make judgments in association with them. Furthermore, these frames might present information dealing with policy or strategy (Cappella and Jamieson 1997) or attribute responsibility to a specific person or group of people based on the logical conclusions derived from the frame (Iyengar 1991).

Since the purpose of communication frames is to organize everyday reality, the main function of communication frames is to provide theories as to what exists, what should happen, and what matters. Communication frames that relate to issues such as preventive war accomplish this through influencing the attitudes possessed by individual

[3] The term communication frame has been referred to as "frames embedded in political discourse" (Kinder and Sanders 1990:74) and media frames (Entman 1993).

constituents. In order to influence such attitudes, Gitlin (1980) notes that communication frames rely on principles associated with selection, emphasis, and presentation. This means that the type of information that is selected in the frame is as important as the information that is not chosen to be part of the frame (see Kahneman and Tversky 1984). As work by Kahneman and Tversky suggests, frames select and call attention to what they are describing. The frame, for example, may emphasize the importance of saving lives or the frame may emphasize the importance of losing lives. These frames are characterized by what they omit as well as what they include. Therefore, the omission of certain evaluations, problem definitions, and recommendations is as important to the recipient as is what is included in the frame.

Focusing on certain considerations to the exclusion of others may influence the direction of public opinion. A preventive war frame emphasizing the cost of delay but not the costs of escalation may encourage individuals to favor preventive conflict. A preventive war frame, on the other hand, emphasizing the costs of escalation but not the costs of delay may encourage individual attitudes to favor a more diplomatic approach (Edelman 1993; Entman 1993). Some frames might focus on the public's overall attitudes towards preventive war. By focusing on such information, these frames might exclude information concerning the normative implications of a preventive strike. In short, what is suggested in the frame is as important as what is not suggested in the frame. By focusing on certain information and excluding other information, elites hope to move public opinion in a certain direction by encouraging the public to focus on information contained in the frame.

Frames might also suggest that for actions undertaken, there is a cause and

consequence. Entman (1993) asserts that frames help to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies to problems. In defining problems, frames help to determine what a causal agent might be doing and what the costs and benefits of a certain action might be. In diagnosing causes, frames help to identify the forces responsible for creating the problem. In making moral judgments, people use frames to evaluate whether the action undertaken has positive or negative ramifications. And in suggesting remedies to problems, frames might offer and justify treatments for problems thus predicting their likely effects. For example, the Cold War frame highlighted certain foreign events such as civil wars as problems. Such a frame may also highlight the source of the problem which might be communist rebels. People then could make moral judgments as to the source of aggression and advocate particular solutions based on the moral judgments advocated. In the context of a Cold War frame, an elite figure might advocate that the best possible solution is that the US supports the side opposite of the communist rebels (Entman 1993). In defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments, and applying appropriate panaceas, frames help to make sense of the complex phenomena around us. Frames may present certain issues as correct and other propositions as incorrect. For example, proponents of preventive war might frame such an event as possibly "reversing a decline in the relative balance of power" with an adversary. Opponents of preventive war might frame preventive war as unnecessary and or foolish because such war might "lead to defeat" since victory is not a certain outcome. The words, images, and presentation styles used in communication frames are important (Druckman 2001b).

Besides their focus on privileging certain information more than others,

communication frames may focus on the perceptions of the decision maker in the decision-making process and/or focus on cultural based information associated with a topic (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). A decision frame itself, therefore, might be a type of communication frame. A decision frame incorporates a decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice as it relates to what exists, what should happen, and what matters. Cultural frames, according to Gamson and Modigliani (1987), might serve as a central organizing idea or a story which is able to provide cultural meaning to a subsequent unfolding strip of events. A frame which focuses on cultural or constructionist-based accounts in general suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue, and as Goffman (1974) notes, a structured understanding of the way that the world functions. As part of the constructionist framework, the frame serves to tell a story. In this context, the frame may present information that is either episodic in nature relying on anecdotes to convey information or thematic in nature relying on abstract analysis to tell a story. If a frame becomes embedded within a cultural genre, as Entman (1993) notes, the communicator must be careful with the way he or she uses information associated with the frame. For example, Gamson (1992) suggests that a term such as "affirmative action" is a very controversial issue with individuals taking opposing sides to an issue. If individual communicators demonstrate that they do not know the debate associated with affirmative action or are unfamiliar with the term affirmative action, the individual communicator can be either misunderstood or, worse, perceived as lacking credibility.

Frames in Thought

In addition to considering communication frames, it is also important to take into

account *frames in thought*.[4] An individual's frame in thought is simply the set of evaluative beliefs which influences how individuals perceive the external environment. It is what an individual believes to be relevant to understanding a situation. There are two perspectives associated with the concept frames in thought according to Brewer (2001). One perspective suggests that individuals act as passive receivers of information. Labeled the passive receiver hypothesis, citizens are lazy organisms who spend as little energy as possible processing political messages. The passive receiver hypothesis is based on the premise that framing constitutes nothing more than an extension of agenda setting. According to scholars such as Weaver (2007), McCombs (2005), and Ghanem (1997), there are two levels associated with the agenda-setting process. "First level" agenda setting is focused on the relative accessibility of issue attributes. "Second-level" agenda setting, meanwhile, is focused on the relative accessibility of issue attributes. These attributes might simply be the issues and traits of political candidates. Scholars such as McCombs (2005) and Ghanem (1997) suggest that these attributes are indeed frames. McCombs (1997:37) notes that frames constitute a "selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed." Frames are merely descriptive elements. Frames, in this context, are not seen as reasoning devices or as appeals to causes, principles, or moral claims.

Instead, individuals are influenced mostly by whichever political message presented by the frame is easiest to access within memory. There are two versions

[4] The term "frames in thought" is related to the schema concept. According to Entman (1993:53), the term schema refers to "mentally stored clusters of ideas that guides individual processing of information." The term "frames in thought" has been referred to as "an internal structure of the mind" (Kinder and Sanders 1996:164) and individual frames (Scheufele 1999).

associated with the "passive receiver" thesis. The strong view associated with this thesis is advocated by Zaller (1992). Citizens in this context do not think or reason at all about politics. They are likely to uncritically accept whichever arguments are presented. Despite uncritical acceptance, people can reject arguments from sources that seem to lack credibility as long as they possess the contextual knowledge necessary to judge what is credible from what is not credible based on their values. The second version of this thesis presented by Iyengar (1991), Iyengar and Kinder (1987), and Miller and Krosnick (1996) suggests that the media indirectly makes some issues more accessible than others. Exposure to frames "primes" the information invoked by the frame, thus heightening the frame's accessibility.

The second perspective associated with frames in thought has been labeled the "thoughtful receiver hypothesis" (Brewer 2003). Frames in this context are seen as causal reasoning devices appealing to individuals to consider the strength or logic inherent in the information provided. According to this perspective, frames work because people consciously weigh the frames presented to them and only accept those frames that are relevant in nature. Frames work because they encourage individuals to reconsider the importance of considerations associated with given issues, not because they help individuals access easy to recall information. The frame that is strongest is not necessarily the frame that is repeated the most or is the most recent frame to be presented. Individuals are said to engage in a critical thinking process to determine which frames are most applicable on a given issue.

The thoughtful receiver hypothesis is derived from research conducted by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). These scholars describe what is called a conventional expectancy

model that is designed to help explain how frames in thought work in the framing effects process (see also Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). In this model, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) place a significant amount of importance on attitudes. According to Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), an attitude towards an object is the weighted sum or a series of evaluative beliefs about that particular object.

In this context, one's overall attitudes towards preventive war might be a combination of negative and positive evaluations associated with each belief. An individual might assert that the initiation of preventive war could in the long-term prevent an adversary from gaining too much power by weakening its infrastructure. This might constitute one belief. However, at the same time, the initiation of war might create the uncertainty of third party intervention on behalf of the adversary which may worsen the crisis. This position might constitute another belief. If this individual places a positive value on the costs of delay and a positive value associated with the uncertainty of third party intervention, the attitude of individuals will depend on how they weigh and evaluate each belief (Nelson and Oxley 1999). Of course, as Chong and Druckman (2007b) note, such a model assumes that individuals possess beliefs towards the subject matter that are relevant in nature.

Thus the expectancy value model takes into consideration that beliefs vary in terms of their importance (Enelow and Hinich 1984).[5] The beliefs associated with the costs of delay might be more important than the beliefs which emphasize the importance of third-party intervention. If only a belief such as costs of delay or third-party intervention matters, then the individual is more likely to place all weight on that

[5] The term belief has been used interchangeably with consideration (Zaller 1992), value (Sniderman 1993), and attribute (Azjen and Fishbein 1980).

particular attribute in the attitude-formation process. It is these sets of beliefs that comprise an individual's frame in thought. If the costs of delay dominate all other considerations in deciding whether the state should go to war, then that individual's particular frame in thought concerns the costs of delay associated with conflict. If, however, the individual considers not only the costs of delay, but also the probability of victory and likelihood of third-party intervention, then his or her frame in thought is a mixture of beliefs. One's frame in thought influences whether or not one responds favorably to the use of force. A "costs of delay" frame in thought might incline one to support the use of force. A "costs of escalation" frame in thought might incline one to not support the use of force. Zaller (1992) notes politicians try to mobilize voters behind their specific policies by encouraging these individuals to think about these policies along specific lines or dimensions associated with communication frames.

Framing Effect

Psychological Mechanisms

It has become fashionable in the framing literature to understand the psychological processes that help to explain framing effects (Brewer 2001; Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Gross 2000; Iyengar 1991; Price and Tewksbury 1997). In order to understand what a framing effect is, we need to grasp what their psychological mechanisms are. It is also important to determine the exact psychological mechanisms associated with such effects in order to determine whether or not framing constitutes a unique phenomenon separate from priming as discussed in the previous chapter.

In order for a framing effect to occur, a given belief or consideration has to be available within a person's memory to be retrieved and used. So if the frame supporting

the use of force is likely to have an effect, the "costs of delay" should be stored in the person's memory and be available to be retrieved and used. If an individual cannot understand concepts associated with costs of delay, then the costs of delay is not an available consideration and thus individuals are likely not to be influenced by frames which emphasize the importance of taking into consideration "better now than later" logic.

Second, a consideration must be accessible. In other words, the consideration must be present in either the short-term or long-term memory to be recalled. Accessibility is believed to increase through consistent exposure to communication frames which are responsible for emphasizing the consideration (Iyengar 1991; Price and Tewksbury 1997). There is a significant chance that the recipients of the highlighted information will perceive such information, discern the meaning of the information, process the information, and store it in memory. In this context, if individuals are presented with frames that emphasize the costs of delay more frequently than the costs of escalation, the consideration that is likely to be weighted heavily and perhaps applicable in the individual's mind in forming opinion concerns the costs of delay associated with the use of force. Hence, it is possible that frames can influence public opinion as Higgins (1996) and Chong and Druckman (2007b) note, through a passive and unconscious process. In this context, framing is quite similar to priming. Citizens, according to Miller and Krosnick (1996:96), are no better than "passive recipients of hypodermic injections" with the information providing the "injection." If this is the case, framing is very much a by-product of elite manipulation as the social psychology literature would indicate (Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Iyengar 1990, 1991; Zaller 1992). If accessibility

is the primary mediating factor explaining the framing effect process, individuals react to stimuli in a hasty manner (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Zaller 1992).

However, in order for a framing effect to be considered a distinct phenomenon from priming, framing effects should operate based on the frame strength or ability of the frame to persuade.[6] The considerations associated with the frame must be accessible within the person's memory in order for the person to comprehend whether or not the frame presents information that is influential or not. However, not all information that is considered accessible is relevant. Individuals weigh frames and implications associated with such frames. Thus information associated with the frame must not only be made accessible through regular or recent exposure, but the frame has to be seen as strong or relevant (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Frames that are heard the most frequently may not necessarily be the strongest. Accessibility may still be very important, because as Brewer, Graf, and Wilnat (2003) point out, exposure might positively influence how individuals perceive the strength of frames and thus their applicability. However, because applicability is based largely on processes related to conscious deliberation, Druckman (2004a) notes that individual personal motivation plays an important role in helping to determine the potential for applicability to take place. Individuals who are more motivated are likely to want to exert effort necessary to examine whether or not frames are applicable in influencing their overall opinions. However, strong frames may not necessarily possess sound logic or even be factually correct. It is important to note, as Chong and Druckman (2007a) assert, that strong frames are not synonymous with

[6] The primary focus of this dissertation is on frame strength.

intellectually superior or morally superior arguments. Strong frames might be based on outright lies, arbitrary symbols, etc.

Psychological mechanisms associated with strong frames operate through the following three processes according to the thoughtful receiver hypothesis. First, beliefs have to be available and stored in memory in order for a framing effect to work. Second, considerations have to be accessible for use. However, if people bought into the frames that reinforce information that is most easily accessible, framing effects would be indistinguishable from priming effects. Whichever considerations that were emphasized most recently or most frequently would influence public opinion the most. Third, regardless of the recency or frequency associated with such considerations, only those most applicable or strongest have the largest effect on overall public opinion (Nelson and Oxley 1999). The consideration must still be accessible for it to be applicable. However, if framing effects primarily work through applicability then certain accessible considerations or beliefs within a person's memory may not necessarily be important in influencing public opinion.

It is important to keep in mind exactly what a framing effect is and how it is defined. Regardless of whether or not a framing effect primarily works in similar fashion to priming or is a unique phenomenon, a framing effect takes place when an elite figure influences individual frames in thought in such a way that they reflect underlying premises associated with communication frames. Then what is the primary psychological mechanism associated with such a process? Do frames work through a passive process? Or do frames influence public opinion because they contain information that is considered applicable, persuasive, or relevant?

Conditional Limitations

Studies examining framing effects have examined variables which condition such effects. Scholars, as Druckman (2001b) noted, have examined four major moderators of framing effects including: a) values; b) framing environment; c) source; and d) group discussion setting.

Values

Predispositions, values, and need to engage in deliberation are characteristics possessed by the receivers of the communication frames. Elites frame issues in terms of values that are widely believed to be cherished or embraced by the public. The reason why elites frame issues in terms of the values that are widely embraced is that citizens, according to Brewer and Gross (2005), have a tendency to understand political issues based on the relationship between them and their core beliefs (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). These values are used to forge common bonds of acceptance between members of the public and elites who frame important issues. Strong predispositions, Gross (2000) and Brewer (2003) note, reduce the propensity for framing effects to take place by increasing the resistance to information that is contradictory to such predispositions. As Gross (2000) discovered, in the course of deliberating about an elite frame, people have a tendency to compare the information that is presented in the frame itself with their own predispositions or values. In her study, Gross (2000) employed two types of frames on the Los Angeles race riots. She labeled one a dispositional frame and the other, a situational frame. The dispositional frame placed blame on the individuals for the riots. The situational frame placed blame on social conditions for the riots. Gross discovered that individuals who are defined as unprejudiced generate counterarguments in the face of

the dispositional frame becoming more liberal in their race and welfare opinions in the process (see also Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Price and Na 2000). People generate counterarguments in the face of frames they disagree with (Shah, Domke, and Wackman 1996). This research on values provides an indication that individuals do not just base their opinions on recently and frequently heard frames as the "priming as framing" hypothesis would predict. Rather, individuals are selective concerning the frames they are likely to buy into based on prior predispositions and values. The values possessed by individuals serve as conditioning limitations associated with framing effects.

Research, however, is mixed in terms of the relationship between prior knowledge and framing effects. Price and Na (2000), Kinder and Sanders (1990), Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) and Sniderman and Theriault (1999) for example, find that individuals who possess more knowledge are less susceptible to being framed. Kinder and Sanders (1990) note that individuals who possess extensive knowledge are likely to have strong predispositions and therefore are less likely to be influenced by external frames. However Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) find that the framing effect is much stronger for those who possess greater familiarity with the arguments themselves. If framing is likely to have an impact, it is likely to influence individual beliefs. This argument stems from the assumption that individuals who are likely to have their beliefs reordered are those who possess knowledge associated with the issue under consideration. Moreover, as Druckman and Nelson (2003) suggest, the reason why frames might influence knowledgeable citizens more than those who are less knowledgeable is that frames allow knowledgeable citizens to connect the framed information to their prior opinions. In short, as Druckman (2001b) points out, it is

important to understand the relationship between knowledge and framing effects. If those who possess less knowledge are more susceptible to framing effects then framing effects are likely to resemble priming effects. Individuals are likely to be framed based on manipulation. If however, framing effects are liable to take place for individuals who possess more extensive knowledge, then individuals are more than likely consciously engaging in deliberation in the process of buying into frames.

Framing Environment

In addition to predispositions and knowledge, the framing environment itself may influence the conditional limitations or boundaries associated with framing effects. A non-competitive framing environment would only present one frame. On the other hand, a competitive framing environment would present two competing frames that are opposites of each other. A competitive framing environment, for example, would incorporate the presentation of a frame emphasizing the costs of delay simultaneously with a frame emphasizing the costs of escalation. Scholars such as Sniderman and Theriault (2004) suggest that the real world impact of a given frame is neutralized by a counterframe which emphasizes opposing considerations. There have, however, been few empirical studies examining the relationship between variance in framing environment and conditional limitations associated with framing effects. Most classic studies associated with framing effects have examined framing effects in the context of two conditions. In one condition, the subject is presented with one frame and in the other condition the subject is exposed to a different counterframe. The empirical studies that have examined framing in both noncompetitive and competitive framing environments usually examine issues that are of high importance, longstanding in nature, and of course

competitively contested. It is unfortunate that there have been so few empirical studies examining the relationships between different versions of framing environments because as Sniderman and Theriault (2004) assert, people are exposed to more than one frame of an issue usually at any given time. People are not simply exposed to preventive war in the context of frames emphasizing the costs of delay or costs of escalation. Rather, they are exposed in general to these different frames at the same time.

One of the earliest studies examining the nature of competition on the framing effects process was a study conducted by Sniderman and Theriault (1999). The authors implemented two experiments where individuals were exposed to one of two frames or both frames simultaneously. They found that individuals exposed to only one frame at a time were more likely to buy into the frame that was presented. However, when presented with two frames simultaneously individuals were less likely to experience a framing effect. Individuals are more likely to revert back to their original beliefs and disregard the information presented in the frames.

Chong and Druckman's (2007b) study comprises arguably the most extensive examination involving the dynamics of framing effects in competitive contexts. In the context of multiple framing environments, Chong and Druckman (2007b) ask whether the number of frames in the framing environment influences public opinion more or less than the strength of individual frames. To answer this question, participants were asked to evaluate a local proposal in regulating development and conserving open space through the creation of urban growth boundaries. In addition, in a second experiment, individuals were asked to examine the rights of an extremist group to hold a rally. Subjects were presented with competing arguments of various strengths on both sides of the issue.

According to their findings, people's values were a significant factor in the policy preferences across framing conditions. The competitive context influenced both how individuals received as well as processed information. In noncompetitive environments, unmotivated individuals are inclined to use the considerations made accessible by the single frame. Competitive framing environments, on the other hand, stimulated individuals to examine the merits of alternative interpretations. As personal motivation increased, individuals were more inclined to evaluate the applicability of frames and therefore, only strong frames received support. Individuals who were likely to be persuaded by weak frames in non-competitive contexts were likely not to be persuaded by weak frames in competitive contexts. At the same time, the authors found that competition actually stimulated individuals to express opinions reflective of their true preferences or values. Individuals were more likely to give weight to competing considerations on both sides of the issue when presented with competing frames. As a result, individuals took a more moderate position than when presented with single isolated frames.

Source

Variables such as the source of the frame, like the framing environment, operate independently of the information associated with the frame. The persuasiveness of the frame itself depends on the sponsor of the frame.[7] Studies associated with the source credibility hypothesis fall into two camps (see Pornpitakpan 2004 for a critical review of the source credibility literature). There have been studies which examine the main effects of credibility and studies which largely examine the interaction between source

[7] Similarly along these lines, as Gamson and Modigliani (1987) point out, the persuasiveness of the frame is dependent on whether the frame reflects real-world cultural themes.

credibility and other variables. Such interaction variables have included but not been limited to: a) the physical attractiveness of the source; b) the timing of the source information; c) the modality of the media; d) individual disposition of the source; and e) passage of time after exposure to communication from the source. Most of these studies have been conducted in the mass communication and marketing literatures. Frames delivered by credible sources are believed to more likely shift opinions than frames that do not derive from credible sources (Druckman 2001a; Horai, Naccari, and Fatuollah 1974; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Lirtzman and Shuv-Ami 1986). Frames work because people turn to elites for guidance (Druckman 2001a; Grewal, Gotlieb and Mamorstein 1994; Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo 1983). In prior works, source credibility has referred to two phenomena: a) the speaker's audience must believe that the speaker possesses knowledge concerning the information associated with the frames he/she wishes to present (e.g., the speaker must be an expert) and b) the target audience must believe that the speaker is able to reveal what he or she may know (Druckman 2001a; Hovland, Janis, and Kelley 1953; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lupia 2000). In other words, the source must be competent and trustworthy in nature.[8]

I will now present the theoretical argument which will form the basis for the ensuing empirical chapters.

Non-Competitive and Competitive Framing Effects: The Theoretical Argument

As discussed previously, the framework attempts to analyze how and when framing effects operate. The theory makes an assumption that the framing process takes

[8] Other studies have suggested that the credibility of the source depends on other foundations outside of competence and trustworthiness. Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz (1969) identified competence, trustworthiness, and dynamism dimensions. Whitehead (1968) identified four dimensions: trustworthiness, competence, dynamism, and objectivity. McCroskey (1966) identified two dimensions: authoritativeness and character.

into account the interaction between elites and their constituents. Elites, when they attempt to influence public opinion, do so by engaging in framing. In addition, I make the assumption that there are conditions under which framing can and cannot work. Elites engage in framing because the public is reliant upon elites for information (Page and Shapiro 1992; Western 2005). Because the public is reliant upon elites for information, this creates an incentive for elites to manipulate information for public consumption. Dependence on information sources such as the media is important because the average person may not have the ability to closely monitor events around the world. It is this ignorance that makes individuals beholden to elites such as government officials, journalists, and foreign policy experts for valuable information. Elites, therefore, attempt to gain control and spin information in such a way that they gain "an information advantage" or "propaganda advantage" by maximizing support for their position and minimizing support for their opponent's position (Western 2005). Elites may feel the need to respond to foreign policy crises that might involve heavy costs in terms of public support and opinion. It is, therefore, important to know whether or not elites are able to shape such opinion based on the way they present information to their constituents. Sometimes these elites engage in competition with other elites when they engage in framing while at other times, elites may dominate the terms of debate when they engage in framing. Furthermore, elites that engage in framing have different levels of credibility. Individual constituents, on the other hand, vary in terms of the firmness of opinion held towards the use of force. They vary in terms of how they are exposed to such information.

Based on these assumptions, the theory I wish to develop takes into account that we can best make predictions concerning how framing effects operate and when framing effects operate through integrating concepts such as elites, discussion groups, frames/framing, non-competitive/competitive framing environments, firmness of constituent opinion, and exposure to information. Frames, quite simply, work through exposure. Individual constituents who are exposed to such frames are more likely to be influenced by such frames than individuals who are not exposed to them.

This explication leads to my first proposition and fundamental hypothesis:

- P1: Frames influence public opinion based on exposure. Individuals who are more exposed to such frames are more likely to be influenced by such frames than individuals who are not as exposed to such frames.

In addition to frame exposure, it is important to address the role of the framing environment: non-competitive in comparison to competitive. The type of framing environment is important in determining the expected degree of the framing effect. We can expect individual constituents to moderate their opinions when faced with competing frames presenting both sides of an issue, whereas in non-competitive framing environments, individuals should have little impetus to moderate their positions. This leads to my second proposition:

- P2: The degree of framing effect should be more pronounced in non-competitive framing environments in comparison to competitive framing environments.

Besides examining the main effect of the framing environment on individual opinion, we also have to examine interaction effects that might exist as well. Frames have two key components to them. The first is the substance of information associated with them. For example, a frame might support the use of force by encouraging the president's constituents to consider the costs of delay if the state fails to take action against the adversary. On the other hand, the frame might discourage the use of force by

encouraging the president's constituents to consider the costs of escalation of conflict if the state takes action against the adversary. The second component to a frame is the individual source sponsoring the frame. The frame's sponsor might be the president, a journalist, a talk show host, or even a comedian. Hence, I am assuming that the source that is sponsoring the frame might be a source that is considered an expert in the subject or a novice in the subject (Druckman 2001a).

One of the most important interaction effects is the firmness of opinion held towards the use of force. Individuals might have strong, well-developed opinions towards or against the use of force or might have weak, less-developed opinions. Of particular relevance here is the relationship between the degree and direction of the framing effect, the framing environment, and firmness of opinion held. In analyzing these interaction effects, I borrow from Kunda's (1990) work on motivated reasoning and Petty and Cacioppo's (1984) work on peripheral and central routes to attitude change in examining how framing effects might work.[9] According to Kunda (1990), when individuals want to draw particular conclusions, they feel obligated to construct justifications that can be considered to be reasonable in nature. An individual's motivation provides an initial trigger for the operation of cognitive processes which lead to the desired conclusions. As a result, only a biased subset of relevant rules and beliefs can be accessed at any given point in time. Prior knowledge imposes constraints on motivational biases. If this is the case, then individual motivation may bias the individual constituent who has a firm opinion towards the use of force to accept those frames that are reflective of preconceived values or beliefs more so than those frames that are not

[9] I would like to thank Paul Brewer for bringing my attention to this link.

reflective of preconceived values or beliefs. However, individuals who have weak opinions towards the use of force may not be as motivated as those who have strong opinions to justify their conclusions. These individuals are more likely to be influenced by frames based on who sponsors the information rather than the information provided by the frame.

Likewise, we can draw similar conclusions based on applying Petty and Cacioppo's (1984) work on peripheral and central routes to attitude change. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) note that there are two distinct routes to attitude change. The first route they label the central route. In this particular route, a person diligently considers information that he or she might believe to be central to the merits of a particular attitudinal position. The second route they label the peripheral route. The attitude issue or object is associated with positive or negative cues. As Petty and Cacioppo (1984) point out, a person might make a simple inference about the merits of a particular position based on various simple cues in the persuasion context. If a particular expert in a given field suggests the information is true, this might be enough to persuade individuals that it indeed is true. There is very little extensive thought concerning issue arguments. So those who possess strong opinions towards the use of force might be influenced by frames via the central route. These individuals might be influenced by frames based on a diligent consideration of information that they might feel is central to the merits of a particular position. On the other hand, those who possess weak opinions towards the use of force might be influenced by frames via the peripheral route. The person might be influenced by the frame that the expert advocates. Kunda's (1990) discussion on

motivated reasoning and Petty and Cacioppo's (1984) work on central and peripheral routes lead to my third and fourth propositions:

- P3: In non-competitive and competitive framing environments, individuals with strong opinions towards or against the use of force are likely to be influenced by the frame based on the substance of information provided by the frame rather than frame sponsor. In other words, those with strong opinions will use the frames with which they agree.

- P4: In non-competitive and competitive framing environments, individuals with weak opinions towards or against the use of force are likely to be influenced by the frame source associated with the frame rather than the substance of information associated with the frame. In other words, those with weak opinions will use the frames championed by the party they see as the most expert in the area.

When we consider the relationship between firmness of opinion and framing effect, it is also important to note the degree of framing effect as well. How much does the frame influence public opinion? It is important to consider this question in light of the framing environment. In a non-competitive framing environment, individuals who possess strong opinions are more likely to experience weaker framing effects since the individual frame should not have an inordinate influence on public opinion. In the same framing environment, individuals who possess weak beliefs, on the other hand, are likely to experience stronger framing effects because they are more dependent on the frame for information. The frame should have an inordinate influence on public opinion. However, the relationship between firmness of opinion, degree of framing effect, and framing environment should be different in competitive framing environments. As Chong and Druckman (2007b), Peffley and Hurwitz (2007), and Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) suggest, when two competing frames come together, the weaker frame does not have a tendency to fall on deaf ears. Rather, ineffective or weak arguments create a contrast or boomerang effect. Individuals, when faced with competing frames,

not only weigh each frame on its individual merits, but weigh each frame based on the merits raised by the other frame. In this context, a comparatively weaker argument might enhance the strength of a comparatively stronger argument. Therefore, for those who possess strong beliefs, the framing effect might be stronger in the competitive framing environment due to the presence of the weaker frame than it might be in a non-competitive framing environment with only one frame presented. We should also see a boomerang effect take place for those who possess weaker beliefs as well in competitive framing environments. However, in this case, the boomerang effect should be created by the non-credible source as determined by the constituent. However, the addition of a competing frame should motivate a need to deliberate on behalf of those who possess weak beliefs. This factor could mitigate against a boomerang effect for those who possess weak beliefs. The following propositions follow from this analysis:

- P5: The degree of the framing effect should be weaker for individuals who possess strong opinions towards the use of force than for individuals who possess weak opinions towards the use of force in non-competitive framing environments.

- P6: The degree of the framing effect should be stronger for individuals who possess strong opinions towards the use of force for individuals than for those who possess weak opinions towards the use of force in competitive framing environment due to the "boomerang effect."

Conclusion

In order to examine how framing effects occur as well as when they occur, I have devised an original theory that takes into consideration both processes within the context of non-competitive and competitive framing environments. Theoretically, the relationship between the circumstances under which framing effects function depends on the psychological mechanisms associated with framing effects. I explored how such

psychological mechanisms operate in non-competitive and competitive framing environments as well as how individuals with varying strength of opinion utilize such psychological mechanisms (e.g., central, peripheral cues) in buying into frames. These psychological mechanisms, in turn, help to determine whether or not individuals buy into frames based on the sponsor of the frame or frame position. Knowing this information will help us to make predictions associated with the degree and direction of framing effects in both competitive and non-competitive framing environments.

In the next portion of the dissertation, I will present my empirical tests associated with these propositions. My first empirical chapter will examine the relationship between frame exposure and impact on vote choice utilizing a non-experimental, quantitative approach controlling for various domestic level variables. The second empirical chapter will examine the impact of non-competitive and competitive frames on public opinion towards the use of preventive force.

Chapter IV

Non-Competitive Versus Competitive Framing Effects

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between non-competitive and competitive framing effects on public opinion. In particular, I want to examine whether non-competitive frames influence public opinion differently from competitive frames using the template of the 2004 election. This election was significant because it occurred shortly after the introduction of the US led war in Iraq, which has been described as a preventive war. Scholars have come to different conclusions concerning this question. The prevailing view associated with this question is that the campaign has a minimal influence on voting behavior besides reminding constituents of the opinions they hold (Finkel 1993; Patterson 1980). In this context, the War in Iraq might have minimal influence on voting behavior. As a result, scholars have explored the role of non-campaign factors in examining what factors may influence voting behavior. Such factors have included personal and economic conditions (Erickson 1989; Finkel 1993; Markus 1992), presidential popularity and consumer sentiment (Holbrook 1994), and track record of the incumbent presidency or party (Fiorina 1981). For our intents and purposes, issues related to preventive war discussed frequently throughout the course of the campaign might help to determine vote choice. Non-competitive frames (e.g., issues) might enhance vote choice for one particular candidate over another and competitive frames (issues) might moderate vote choice for the particular candidates.

What is the evidence? Scholars such as Shaw (1999) have examined aggregate differences in voting behavior based on campaign behavior whereas others have focused

on the nature of elite rhetoric and voter evaluations (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Although this research is ground-breaking and important, it does not address how the nature of the communication environment might influence voting behavior in an election where preventive war is considered a salient issue. This is problematic to this study because individual candidates reinforce attitudes in ways that affect voter turn-out and vote choices through engaging in framing related activities (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2001; Brosius and Kepplinger 1992; Chong and Druckman 2010; Dearing and Rogers 1996; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar and Simon 2000; Johnston et al.1992; Sheafer and Weimann 2005; Zaller 1992, 1996).

In this chapter, I utilize a content analysis of media campaign coverage in the *New York Times* of the 2004 US presidential election. In particular, I focus on how media frames, both competitive and non-competitive, determine vote choice for each candidate. Frames operate as proxies for issue ownership and tone of media coverage. Non-competitive frames present one side of an issue and suggest that one candidate is able to dominate that issue based on the tone of media coverage. Competitive frames present two sides of an issue and suggest that that particular issue is contested in the context of media coverage. Examination of how frames work has taken place in the artificial setting of the lab as well as through the use of hypothetical questionnaire scenarios. As a result, many of these findings do not take into account the contextual factors associated with the political decision making process. Examining framing effects in the context of a real-world election campaign should help us to understand how frames interact with contextual factors better. After examining framing effects in this real-world context, I find evidence to suggest that frames had minimal effect in influencing voting behavior.

Important issues influenced the voting behavior of non-attentive constituents in similar fashion to attentive constituents. In addition, non-competitive frames did not significantly influence vote choice and competitive frames did not moderate vote choice as the theory would predict. Hence, we cannot make the argument that it was exposure to frames which helped to determine vote choice. In addition, only a select number of non-competitive and competitive frames influenced opinion in a significant direction. Moreover, the most salient frames did not affect vote choice as hypothesized. This study, as a result, argues that frames may have minimal effect in determining individual vote choice.

Campaign Effects

If we are to make the assumption that elites engage in framing related behavior in a number of framing related environments, how should we actually measure such effects as it pertains to the campaign. As Druckman (2004b) notes, there are problems with using experimental research to examine the nature of a campaign on voting behavior. Media effects associated with experiments tend to be short-lived (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2001; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Kuklinski et al. 2000). If an experimental approach were to be employed in examining the influence of a campaign on voting behavior, at best we would garner a basic understanding concerning how individuals might respond to campaign events or short-term stimuli, not necessarily understanding how individuals might respond to the totality of a campaign over time. In general, outside of certain exceptions, experiments have not considered time as an important variable (see however Chong and Druckman 2007b). Taking into account the artificiality of the laboratory, the limited number of test subjects associated with experimentation

(most are derived from convenience samples of college undergraduates), and the fact that the time element is difficult to manipulate in an experimental setting (e.g., experimental fatigue, loss of participants, etc.), it would be very difficult to acquire externally valid results in the context of examining the influence of a campaign on voting behavior. Ideally, the best approach is to measure the influence of frames on voting behavior over a specific period of time utilizing a randomly selected sample of the population in the process.

Hence, when I am measuring the influence of the campaign on voting behavior, I am measuring the extent to which frames (non-competitive and competitive in nature) influence voting behavior. If the campaign influences voting behavior, then the frames put forth in the campaign should influence the choice of either voting for Kerry or Bush. And if the frames themselves are to influence voting behavior, they should do more than simply influence specific campaign events which are stochastic in nature.

The last important issue that I should discuss in terms of measuring campaign influence focuses on the impact of the frames on voting behavior. In particular, we need to examine if it is the framing environment that is responsible for leading to a change in voting behavior. Hence, the research design should be constructed in such a way that we can prove or show that those exposed to the media frame/s reacted differently than those that did not react to or were exposed to the media frames. In order for this to take place, the research design for such a venture must address the following three items. First, the voters must be actually exposed to the information associated with the campaign. Second, we should be able to measure or identify issues that are competitive from issues that are non-competitive. Lastly, we have to provide evidence

that it was indeed the campaign (e.g., the frames) that led to changes in vote choice for either Kerry or Bush and not alternative explanations such as party identification, income, gender, education levels, or prior knowledge.

Research Strategy

The main reason why experiments have been incorporated to measure framing effects is that it is easy to establish control. Holding all control variables constant, we can establish whether or not the frames themselves influenced the dependent variables of importance. However, as has been stated before, experimental approaches are not the most optimum method for measuring the effects of a campaign on voting behavior. The strategy that I wish to employ takes into account that frames are initiated in a campaign repeatedly over time, not in a brief thirty minute setting in an artificially induced environment and only once in such a sitting.

Specifically, this paper focuses on the 2004 US presidential election. I examine campaign content through an intensive content analysis of the *New York Times*. This is a major newspaper that features a wide audience of subscribers. Most importantly, however, researchers focus on the *New York Times* because it tends to lead to other news coverage and thus provides a good indicator for the nature of US news coverage. It is possible, therefore, to make the argument that the political topics discussed in the *New York Times* is representative of mainstream news coverage.

I will examine the impact of the campaign by taking a look at questions associated with the 2004 NES data set. These questions allow me to probe the role of the most important aspects of the 2004 campaign that might serve as underlying frames to influence vote choice. Using NES data, I incorporate measures associated with vote choice,

demographic related issues that affect vote choice, as well as the impact of competitive and non-competitive media frames. However, because the NES data are not collected in the context of an exit poll, this data may not adequately assess people's reasoning as it pertain to vote choice directly but to short term stimuli independent of vote choice.

Despite the inherent weaknesses associated with a cross-sectional design, the design itself is able to provide insight in examining the variance associated with framing environments and voters' decisions. Relatively speaking, those who have been exposed to the media frames are more likely to be influenced by them. As it pertains to this study, non-competitive frames should influence vote choice and competitive frames should moderate vote choice more for those who are exposed to these frames than those who are not exposed to such frames.

In this chapter, I test the following hypotheses:

- H1 (P1): Individuals who are more exposed to such frames are more likely to be influenced by such frames than individuals who are not as exposed.
- H2 (P2): The degree of framing effect should be more pronounced in non-competitive framing environments in comparison to competitive framing environments.

The 2004 US Presidential Campaign

The 2004 presidential election pitted George W. Bush, the Republican incumbent against John Kerry, the Democratic challenger. In an extremely close and controversial election, Bush was elected to the presidency in 2000. He won the electoral vote despite losing the popular vote. His first term was marked by the tragedy of the terrorist attacks, which occurred on September 11th, 2001, only eight months after his election. Shortly after these attacks, Bush announced a global war on terrorism, which featured an invasion

of Afghanistan that same year and an invasion of Iraq in 2003. In addition, Bush made significant inroads pertaining to domestic policy, signing into law broad tax cuts, the No Child Left Behind Act which reformed educational accountability standards, and Medicare prescription drug benefits for seniors. Moreover, the president emphasized the importance of creating private investment accounts as part of a social security reform package and opposed mandatory carbon emissions controls.

John Kerry, his opponent, was a Senator from Massachusetts. Kerry and other Democrats attacked Bush on the Iraq War, and accused him of failing to do enough to stimulate the economy. At the same time, Kerry claimed that the Bush administration presided over skyrocketing health care costs, a lack of regulatory attention to the environment, and poor job growth. The Bush campaign countered that Kerry was a "flip flopper," making contradictory statements concerning the war in Iraq and lacked the decisiveness and vision necessary to successfully propagate the war on terrorism. In the 2004 election, Bush carried 31 of 50 states, and received a total of 286 electoral votes. In addition to winning the majority of electoral votes, Bush also won the popular vote, with 50.7% in comparison to Kerry who received 48.3%.

Method

To capture campaign content, I performed a content analysis of the *New York Times* from September 3, 2004 (the day after Bush's acceptance speech at the RNC) until November 2, 2004. There were two coders on this particular project.[10] Since there was coverage associated with the election every day, this resulted in 61 days of coverage. I analyzed every newspaper article on the presidential campaign that had the words "Bush"

[10] Jean K. Guse was the other coder on this project.

or “Kerry” written. I then coded each article for a number of specific characteristics, including position (lead, non-lead) and type (editorial, non-editorial). Altogether, I considered a total of 14 different frames (3 competitive, 11 non-competitive). The goal of the content analysis was simply to capture the most important frames of the election and categorize them as either non-competitive or competitive in nature. I simply counted the number of paragraphs associated with the issue. If the number of paragraphs associated with each issue favored a particular candidate by a 2:1 margin in a particular article that featured either Bush or Kerry, I coded the issue as being non-competitive in nature. If the issue discussed in the article was a non-competitive frame, it specifically advocated on behalf of a particular candidate’s position on the issue in comparison to another or debunked a particular candidate’s position on an issue without giving equal time to the opposing side of the issue. Furthermore, a candidate sponsoring a non-competitive frame might put a positive “spin” on an issue he or she feels is important to electoral chances. The individual candidate who was on the winning end of the particular issue in that article would receive one point, indicating a non-competitive frame in association with that issue. However, if the article considered both viewpoints on the issue or if both candidates echoed competing interpretations of that particular issue in the same article, each candidate would receive a half a point on the issue indicating that issue was competitively framed. I determined an issue as being framed in a competitive fashion if the number of paragraphs for each particular candidate on a particular issue was less than a 2:1 ratio.

After coding each article in this way, to determine a competitive frame from a non-competitive frame, I simply counted the number of points associated with each

particular issue in each article in relationship to each of the candidates. I then divided the point totals accrued by each candidate by the total number of points calculated on the issue. If the candidate that was awarded the majority of points received 66.7% or more of the points on that particular issue, I categorized the issue in the election as being non-competitive in nature. If the lead candidate received less than 66.6% of the points on the issue in the election, then I categorized the issue as being competitively framed. In addition, if the article mentioned a particular issue and took a particular position on that issue or focused on particular positions on this issue, this was counted as one frame. Regardless of how many times the article mentioned the issue; each issue was counted as constituting one frame. Hence at most each article could contain one frame on a particular issue.

Table 1 focuses on summary statistics from the analyses, in particular data from the *New York Times.* Each day, the *New York Times* discussed the campaign with an average of 13.8 stories per day. In addition, the table indicates that the paper utilized non-competitive frames 63.3% of the time and competitive frames 36.7% of the time. Of the non-competitive frames, 76.8% of these frames supported John Kerry and 23.2% adopted positions supporting George W. Bush.[11]

[11] Of the issues that were competitively framed, 45% of these frames supported Bush and 55% of these supported Kerry.

Table 1

***New York Times* News Coverage of the 2004 US Presidential Campaign**

	New York Times
Average percentage of days of presidential campaign coverage	100% (n=61)
Average number of campaign stories on a given day	13.8 (n=61)
Average percentage of stories with competitive frame	36.7% (n=61)
Average percentage of stories with non-competitive frame	63.3% (n=61)
Average percentage of pro-Kerry non-competitive frames	76.8% (n=61)
Average percentage of pro-Bush non-competitive frames	23.2% (n=61)
Average percentage of pro-Kerry competitive frames	45.5% (n=61)
Average percentage of pro-Bush competitive frames	55.5% (n=61)

Figures 1 and 2 show the proportion of space devoted to the top non-competitive and competitive frames adopted (in proportion to the total number of frames examined). In contrast to the other issues, which received scant attention, non-competitive frames involving Iraq, health care, and job growth received the most attention. Of the 11 non-competitive issues that were coded, these three issues alone accounted for 76.3% of the non-competitive frames. Compared to Iraq, however, health care is significantly less important, ($z = 15.325$; $p < .01$ for a two-tailed difference of proportions test). In this particular study, the Iraq War was strongly considered the strength of John Kerry.[12]

[12] Of the 488 frames associated with Iraq, Kerry received 79% favorable frames in comparison to 21% for George W. Bush. Of the 168 frames associated with health care related issues, Kerry received 74% of the favorable frames; Bush 26%. Lastly, of the 122 frames associated with job growth, Kerry received 83% of the favorable frames and Bush 17%. Intercoder reliability tests were performed on each of the issues related to the noncompetitive frames. Intercoder reliability indexes are in parenthesis. Of the 43 frames recoded focusing on Iraq, Kerry received 73.2% favorable frames in comparison to 26.8% for George W. Bush (92.7%). Of the 20 frames associated with health care, Kerry received 87.5% of the favorable frames and Bush, 12.5% of the favorable frames (84.6%). Of the 18 frames associated with job growth, Kerry received 80.6% of the favorable frames and Bush, 19.4% favorable frames (97.1%).

Of the three issues that were categorized as competitive frames, government spending/services did not significantly receive more attention than anti-terrorism related issues. Other competitive frames received scant attention. Of the 269 frames analyzing government spending/services, Kerry received 64.7% of the favorable frames in comparison to 35.3% for Bush. Of the 267 frames analyzing national security related issues discussing the war on terrorism, Bush received 54% of the favorable frames in comparison to 46% for Kerry.[13] In sum, the election revolved around three major frames, Iraq, anti-terrorism, and government spending/social services. I thus anticipate that those who are exposed to the campaign will be influenced by these three frames the most. In particular, the war in Iraq should increase voter choice for Kerry. Meanwhile, the anti-terrorism issue, since it is a competitive frame, should moderate support for either candidate. And even though government spending/social services is classified as a competitive frame based on the coding procedures, the percentages are heavily skewed in Kerry's direction. So it should not be a surprise if this particular frame increases voter choice for Kerry.

Assessment of Campaign

To assess the impact of the campaign, I utilize NES data from the 2004 presidential elections. To evaluate the criteria underlying vote choice for Bush or Kerry, I incorporate measures associated with non-competitive frames (Iraq War, health care,

[13] Intercoder reliability tests were performed on each of the issues related to the competitive frames. Intercoder reliability indexes are in parenthesis. Of the 23 frames recoded associated with the anti-terrorism issue, Kerry received 52.7% favorable frames in comparison to 47.3% for George W. Bush (87.6%). Of the 24 frames associated with government spending/services, Kerry received 69.5% of the favorable frames and Bush, 31.5% of the favorable frames (93.1%).

job growth), competitive frames (anti-terrorism, government spending/services), and demographic variables.[14]

In particular, to gauge respondents' views towards terrorism, I examined their beliefs on the importance of combating international terrorism. In short, as the issue becomes more important for the respondent, we should see anti-terrorism moderate voter choice for attentive voters more so than for those who are non-attentive since anti-terrorism is a competitive frame. In addition, I examined the importance of government spending/services.

I then gauged non-competitive frames by examining issues associated with the Iraq War, health care, and job growth. I wanted to examine the level of importance each individual placed on the issue. In particular, to assess the importance of the Iraq War, I examined responses towards intervention and diplomacy. To assess the importance of the job growth issue, I examined responses towards guaranteed job self-placement. Finally, to assess the importance of the health care issue, I examined responses towards the government health insurance issue. In short, because these frames are all non-competitive in nature, as the issue becomes more important for the respondent, we should see these issues intensify voter choice for Kerry for attentive voters more than those who are non-attentive. As indicated in Table 2, I also include standard control variables such as ideology, party identification, class, religion, gender, age, racial/ethnic group, and education. I incorporated political knowledge as a control variable taking into account that even if individuals are classified as non-attentive voters, they still might be exposed to frames based on high levels of knowledge in association with the issues. I measured

[14] When examining the frame government spending/services, I examined issues related to the budget, fiscal policy, social security, housing, and education.

political knowledge based on two questions: one asking respondents to identify the political office that House Speaker Dennis Hastert holds and the other one asking respondents what office William Rehnquist holds. I coded this variable as an index. If the constituent did not correctly identify Rehnquist or Hastert, I coded this as a 0. If the constituent correctly identified Rehnquist or Hastert, I coded this as a .5. Lastly, if the constituent correctly identified both Rehnquist and Hastert, I coded this as a 1.

Table 2
Description of NES Respondents

Variable	Sample Data
Presidential Vote Choice	Voted for Kerry, 48.5%; Voted for Bush, 50.1%; Voted for Nader, .5%
Ideology	Conservative, 55.3%; Moderate, 7.5%; Liberal, 36.7%
Party ID	Favor Democratic Party, 44.8%; Favor Republican Party, 48%
Religion	Religion provides a great deal of guidance, 35.5%; Religion provides quite a bit of guidance, 23.9%; Religion provides some guidance, 18%; Religion is not important, 22.6%
Gender	Male, 47%; female, 53%
Ethnicity	White, 71.5%; African American, 14.5%; Asian American, 2.4%; Hispanic, 6.2%; other/no answer, 4.2%
Class	Upper Class, .9%; Middle Class, 43.8%; Working Class, 50.3%; Lower Class, 3.7%
Education	High school or less, 38%; some college, 22%; college degree, 28%; advanced degree, 12%
Age	18-24, 11%; 25-34, 17%; 35-44, 18%; 45-54, 20%; 55-64, 18%; 65-74, 10%; 75+, 6%
Political Knowledge	0 Correct, 67%; 1 correct, 21%; 2 correct, 12%
Attention (TV)	A great deal or quite a bit, 42%; Some and very little, 34%; None, 1%
Attention (Newspaper)	A great deal or quite a bit, 24%; Some and very little, 29%; None, 1%

I tested for framing effects by comparing the responses of those attentive to the campaign (denoted “attentive voter”) to those respondents who were not attentive to the campaign (denoted “non-attentive voter”). The dependent variable was vote choice (0 =

Bush, 1 = Kerry). My assumption is that attentive voters should pay closer attention to the issues related to the election. As a result, if frames work, those issues framed in non-competitive fashion should suppress vote choice for Bush and increase vote choice for Kerry in comparison to non-attentive voters. And those issues that are framed in competitive fashion should moderate vote choice for either of the candidates in comparison to non-attentive voters.

To measure campaign exposure and attention, I examined how much attention the subjects paid to the campaign discussed in the newspaper and on the television. Since the NES data does not specify whether the subject read or had access to the *New York Times* specifically, I could not directly measure respondent access to the specific frames put forth by this particular newspaper. This is a significant inference problem given the fact that it is not certain individuals polled in the NES data had access specifically to frames presented in the *New York Times*. In addition, individuals also receive access to information from alternative media outlets such as the blogosphere. Despite this weakness in the research design, people do receive substantial campaign information from the local newspaper and television (Druckman 2004b: Mondak 1995). In addition, the *New York Times* helps to set the tone for local media news coverage given the fact that local newspapers much like the *New York Times* similarly receive their information from Reuters and the AP press outlet.

Those individuals who read the local newspaper and paid attention to it on the television should in general have greater access to frames presented by the media than those who have not paid attention to a local newspaper. Even though my measure is a far from ideal measure since local newspapers and TV news outlets may decide to frame

issues different from the *New York Times* and attention may not be synonymous with processing, the measure I adopt is superior to subjective measures such as "general personal interest" in a campaign. As Druckman (2004b) points out and Southwell et. al. (2002) allude to, individuals may not remember how much personal interest they have in a campaign but have a better time of recalling how closely they pay attention to what is written in the newspaper. Those voters who paid a "great deal of attention" or "quite a bit" of attention to newspaper articles and/or the TV news are coded as being "attentive voters." Those voters who paid "some," "very little," or "no" attention to newspaper articles and TV news focusing on the campaign I coded as being "non-attentive" voters. Finally, to test for framing effects, I regressed vote choice on both the issues associated with non-competitive and competitive frames as well as all control variables for all respondents. Then I regressed these aforementioned variables on just attentive voters and then on non-attentive voters. All variables in the logit model are standardized into a 0 or 1 format and the methodological approach is a binary logit approach. Higher values on all issues indicate movement towards Kerry since I coded a vote for Kerry as 1 and vote for Bush as 0.

Table 3
Framing Presidential Voting

	Attentive	Non-Attentive	Everyone
Anti-Terrorism	-3.82*** (1.37)	-2.47* (1.32)	-22.8** (9.32)
Iraq	-.259 (.755)	-.876 (.874)	-3.95 (4.79)
Government Spending	-.226 (.795)	-.920 (.958)	.462 (4.37)
Health Care	-.365 (.873)	1.10 (1.18)	16.6** (6.9)
Job Growth	.121 (.735)	-.260 (.883)	-2.77 (4.81)
Ideology	1.34*** (.473)	.969 (.669)	1.91*** (.629)
Gender	.491 (.411)	-.381 (.561)	1.07** (.567)
Race	-1.14** (.484)	-.910 (.672)	-1.11* (.655)
Age	1.23* (.649)	-.149 (.921)	2.29** (.912)
Education	.198 (.510)	-.955 (.659)	-.510 (.632)
Knowledge	.326 (.611)	-.785 (1.17)	688 (.876)
Religion	-.635 (.528)	-.001 (.710)	-.429 (.734)
Class	.895 (.587)	-.134 (.834)	-.429 (.721)
Party	5.06*** (.522)	5.28*** (.754)	6.10*** (.722)
News			2.81 (5.28)
TV			-6.63 (10.16)
News*Anti-Terrorism			18.1* (15.8)
News*Iraq			6.54 (8.94)
News*Government Spending			-1.13 (7.24)
News*Health Care			-28.4** (11.7)
News*Job Growth			6.30 (8.58)
TV*Anti-Terrorism			22.7** (10.8)
TV*Iraq			2.23 (6.18)
TV*Government Spending			-2.30 (6.60)
TV*Health Care			-17.1** (8.8)
TV*Job Growth			3.00 (6.35)
TV*News*Anti-Terrorism			-24.9** (16.8)
TV*News*Iraq			-3.80 (10.2)
TV*News*Government Spending			2.99 (9.80)
TV*News*Health Care			28.4** (13.6)
TV*News*Job Growth			-5.84 (10.4)
N	433	223	373

Results

The third column of Table 3 shows that all voters, taken together, based their vote on party identification, race, ideology, gender, and the anti-terrorism issue. However, none of the other issues influenced vote choice. Individuals who believed that the anti-terrorism issue was extremely important were more likely to vote for George W. Bush and less likely to vote for John Kerry. Those who were affiliated with the Democratic Party were more likely to vote for John Kerry. In addition, minority groups and individuals who possess a liberal ideology were more likely to vote for John Kerry and less likely to vote for George Bush.

The first and second columns of Table 3 separate out the attentive from the non-attentive voters. As the first column indicates, attentive voters base their vote on the anti-terrorism issue. Non-attentive voters also based their decision to cast their ballot on the anti-terrorism issue. As the anti-terrorism issue became more important, non-attentive voters were more likely to cast their vote for George Bush. As a result, they are less likely to perceive the anti-terrorism issue as a competitive issue. This might perhaps account for the strong support for George Bush. However, this does not take into account that the terrorism issue failed to moderate vote choice for attentive voters as well. Party identification mattered for both types of voters in the anticipated direction. Race and ideology influenced vote choice for attentive voters. In neither case was the war in Iraq significantly related to vote choice. However, given the way this variable is operationalized in the NES data set (e.g., importance of diplomacy/intervention), this variable might not fully capture the extent to which individuals support or oppose the war in Iraq.

To establish the impact of the anti-terrorism issue on attentive and non-attentive voters, I examined the predictive probabilities of voting for Kerry as indicated in Figure 1a , holding all variables at their median values but then varying attentive and non-attentive voters' values for the anti-terrorism issues. For example, if the median non-attentive voter believes that the anti-terrorism issue (0) is not important, the probability of voting for Kerry is 84%. If the anti-terrorism issue is extremely important, the probability of voting for Kerry is 30%. For the attentive voter the predicted probability changes in similar fashion from 98% to 45%. Attentive voters based their votes on the second most salient competitive image. However, access to the anti-terrorism frame did not moderate vote choice for attentive voters. Attentive voters, as a result, were not significantly different from non-attentive voters as identified in Figure 1b.

Figure 1a. Effect of Anti-Terrorism Self-Placement on Voting for Kerry (Attentive Voters)



Figure 3a. Effect of Anti-Terrorism variable on the probability of voting for Kerry

Figure 1b. Effect of Anti-Terrorism Self-Placement on Voting for Kerry (Non-Attentive Voters)



To further examine the nature of the framing effect, I reran the model and included a dummy variable for individuals who paid attention to the campaign on TV and newspaper in the fourth column. In addition, I include interaction effects for newspaper and issue independent variables and interaction effects for TV and issue independent variables. These measures specifically address whether it was attention to the TV or newspaper which helped to determine the importance of issues on vote choice. In addition, I included three way interaction effects for TV, news, and issue important variables.

The results are shown in the final column of the table. There are significant two-way interaction effects between news and health care, TV and health care, and TV and anti-terrorism. Hence, not surprisingly, we can make the argument that TV viewership, not newspaper coverage seems to be influencing vote choice in regards to the terrorism issue. Moreover, there are three-way interaction effects among TV, news, and health care. In this context, framing effects manifested themselves among constituents who attended to the campaign on TV and in the newspaper.

Given the inconsistent evidence presented by these findings, it is important to qualify the impact that campaigns have on shaping the criteria on which voters base their votes. Two implications follow from this assertion. First, if attentive and non-attentive voters support candidates based on similar issues given their importance, candidates have fewer incentives to try getting issues most favorable to them on their agenda. The motivation to sway attentive voters is less significant if these voters behave in similar ways to non-attentive voters. Second, issues might be so important that individuals have deep seeded beliefs regardless of access to frames. As a result, issues that might be

framed in a competitive fashion might create a boomerang effect. Hence, rather than moderating support for a particular political candidate, opposing views might solidify opinion solidly in one direction. Hence, this might explain why those who viewed anti-terrorism as important and had access to the frame might strongly support George W. Bush in comparison to John Kerry.

Conclusion

This research presents a novel approach to helping scholars understand the influence that campaigns might have on the voting behavior process. Scholars in recent years have attempted to incorporate framing type approaches to help us understand how communication might influence such campaigns (Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw 2001). Work on framing, in particular, has been relegated to that of the laboratory. If we take this approach to examining the influence of campaigns, we will end up knowing more about specific responses to campaign events than responses to the campaign as a whole. The study here indicates that at best, frames are extremely limited in their influence on vote choice. Voters are more likely to determine their vote choice based on demographic variables (e.g., race, party identification). However, given the fact that the *New York Times* has a decidedly liberal bent, determining what is truly a competitive and non-competitive issue should be qualified. Since regional variation exists in the newspaper coverage of the 2004 elections, the findings associated with this study should be qualified. Following Trumbore (2009), future work should take into consideration regional variation in newspaper coverage. Local newspapers in certain geographical regions might frame the anti-terrorism issue differently. Hence future research must take into account a more representative sample of local newspapers and TV news outlets in

order to truly convey which issues were non-competitive and which issues were competitive.

Second, future work should also emphasize other important variables that might influence voter attentiveness. In particular, future work should examine the length of time before an election that a vote choice is made. Individuals who make up their mind early on in the campaign as to who they will cast their vote for might be more likely to pay less attention to the campaign. In contrast, individuals who decide late in the campaign season who to vote for might be more attentive to the issues addressed in the campaign. These issues should serve as a cue to help an undecided or independent voter cast his or her ballot. Intriguing questions might address the circumstances in which framing effects are contingent on circumstances involving length of time needed in order to cast a vote. In contrast, it is possible that those who make up their mind early in the campaign season do so because they are attentive to the issues and the way they are addressed during the campaign season.

Third, future work should further address the relationship between issue ownership and framing. As Goble and Werner (2005) along with Goble and Holm (2009) point out, voters typically respond to appeals from the parties that own the issue. For example, the Republican Party is generally acknowledged to possess an ownership over national security issues whereas the Democratic Party is generally perceived to possess an ownership over health care issues. Hence, in order to truly understand if frames operate in a real world setting such as a campaign, we have to know if the ability of a leader to use frames is dependent on the ideological advantage the leader might have in regards to the issues the frame sponsors. It is possible to do this by examining a more

representative, regional variety of newspapers. In doing so, we can begin to take steps to hold issue ownership constant and attribute differences which do occur in vote choice to the influence of frames.

Fourth, future work should address the relationship between issue ownership and Congress. In particular, are members of Congress more willing to decouple the party's reputation from that of the president by distancing themselves from his policies based on the competitiveness of the issues the policies were based on? As Goble and Holm (2009) point out, members of the Republican Congress were hesitant to vote against President Bush's policies on Iraq despite heavy criticism. National security issues, in general, have traditionally been an uncontested Republican issue. Would members of Congress have been just as hesitant to vote against the president if the issue itself was historically one that neither party owned?

Appendix A Codebook

Content Analysis Procedure

Pro Bush Anti-Terrorism Frame – Suggests President Bush has the right strategy and ideology to combat international terrorism. President Bush has the resolve to combat international terrorism as Commander-in-Chief; we need a leader who is strong and decisive in combating international terrorism. One can trust President Bush as Commander-in-Chief in combating international terrorism. President Bush will destroy/defeat international terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance to prevent a future terrorist attack; will devote the necessary resources to combat international terrorism; has the vision necessary to combat international terrorism; has a competent administration necessary to combat international terrorism; and will keep the proper perspective necessary to combat international terrorism to win and keep the public trust. Kerry lacks the resolve, commitment, decisiveness, and perspective necessary to successfully combat international terrorism as Commander-in-Chief; lacks the right strategy, ideology, vision, and perspective to combat international terrorism; does not deserve the public trust to combat international terrorism; will not be strong and decisive in combating international terrorism; will not destroy international terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; and will not have the proper administration in place necessary to grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance to prevent a future terrorist attack.

Pro Kerry Anti-Terrorism Frame – Consists of an explicit rejection or rebuttal of the Pro-Bush national security frame. President Bush's perception in combating international terrorism is uni-dimensional; we cannot combat terrorism by military means alone. President Bush's strategy in combating terrorism creates more enemies than friends. President Bush is unable or unwilling to gain the support of our allies necessary in combating international terrorism. The public cannot trust President in combating international terrorism; President Bush will not destroy/defeat international terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; will not grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance to prevent a future terrorist attack; will not devote the necessary resources to combat international terrorism; does not have the vision necessary to combat international terrorism; does not have a competent administration necessary to combat international terrorism; and will not keep the proper perspective necessary to combat international terrorism to win and keep the public trust. Kerry has the resolve, commitment, and nuanced perspective necessary to successfully combat international terrorism as Commander-in-Chief; has the right strategy, ideology, vision, and perspective to combat international terrorism; deserves the public trust to combat international terrorism; will be strong and decisive in combating international terrorism; will destroy international terrorists and those that aid and harbor them; and will have the proper administration in place necessary to grant peace, safety, protection, and guidance to prevent a future terrorist attack.

Pro Bush Iraq Frame – Suggests that President Bush is committed to fighting and winning the war in Iraq; he has the right strategy, people and resources in place to fight and win the war in Iraq. Under the leadership of President Bush and his administration the US and its allies are making impressive gains in Iraq and achieving political, military, humanitarian, social, cultural, and economic progress. President Bush made the right decision to militarily intervene in Iraq. The world, Middle East, and US, a much safer place without Saddam Hussein in power, the use of force in Iraq is sponsored by multilateral rather than unilateral forces, uses of force are not meant to extend US empire or hegemonic interests or concerns in Iraq or in the surrounding region. John Kerry is not committed to fighting and winning the war in Iraq, would not have the right strategy, people, and resources in place to fight and win the war in Iraq, is wrong to oppose the war in Iraq, is wrong to suggest that the war is conducted for hegemonic interests or is being conducted unilaterally, and is wrong to assume that the US is not making impressive gains in politically, military, socially, culturally, and economically in Iraq. Kerry's policies in Iraq would leave the world, Middle East, and US vulnerable to its adversaries.

Pro Kerry Iraq Frame –Consists of an explicit rejection and rebuttal of the Pro-Bush Iraq frame. Bush's strategy in Iraq is disastrous, incompetent, steeped in cronyism, has the wrong strategy, people and resources in place to fight and win the war in Iraq. Under the leadership of President Bush and his administration the US and its allies are harming Iraq politically, militarily, and economically. President Bush made the wrong decision to militarily intervene in Iraq. The world, Middle East, and US, a much dangerous place based on the decision to intervene in Iraq, the use of force in Iraq is unilateral rather than multilateral, uses of force are meant to extend US empire or hegemonic interests or concerns in Iraq or in the surrounding region. John Kerry is committed to fighting, winning and/or ending the war in Iraq, would have the right strategy, people, and resources in place to fight, make progress militarily, culturally, economically, and win the war in Iraq. John Kerry will fight the war in Iraq from a multilateral rather than from a unilateral position.

Pro Bush Government Spending/Services Frame – Consists of explicit support for Bush's policies concerning the budget, fiscal policy such as taxes and the budget deficit, housing, education, and social security and explicit rejection of Kerry's positions on these issues. Bush engages in prudent spending; his tax plans have succeeded; policies will decrease the tax burden; fiscal policies will decrease national debt and/or deficit; policies have restored investor and consumer confidence in the economy; economy has grown because of tax policy. Bush's fiscal policies will increase domestic prosperity. Bush's spending policies will increase educational opportunities; have led to excellence in educational progress, standards, expectations, and/or reform, will provide more opportunities for individuals to pursue an education. Bush's social security policies will strengthen, harbor, maintain, modernize, fix, and/or reduce risks towards and safeguard social security. Bush's policies have helped to lead to record growth in home sales; opportunities to purchase and/or stay in homes. Kerry will increase tax burden; fiscal policies will lessen investor and consumer confidence in the economy; fiscal policies will increase national

debt and/or deficit; fiscal policies will be a disaster for the economy, country, and its people; fiscal policy will make the cost of living unaffordable. Kerry's fiscal policies will decrease domestic prosperity. Kerry's policies will hurt, harm, damage, increase the risks of, and/or bankrupt social security. Kerry's policies will decrease educational opportunities, lead to a decline in educational progress, expectations, standards, and or/reforms, will provide less opportunities for individuals to pursue an education. Kerry's policies will lead to a decline in home ownership; opportunities to purchase and/or stay in homes.

Pro Kerry Government Spending/Services Frame – Consists of explicit support for Kerry's policies concerning the budget, fiscal policy such as taxes and the budget deficit, housing, education, and social security and explicit rejection of Bush's position on these issues. President Bush engages in wasteful spending; his tax plan has failed; policies have increased the tax burden; fiscal policies have led to an increase in economic inequality; fiscal policy will increase the national debt and/or deficit; fiscal policy will lessen investor and consumer confidence in the economy; fiscal policies will be a disaster for the economy, country, and it people. Bush's fiscal policies will decrease domestic prosperity. Bush underfunds education; his policies will provide less opportunity for individuals to pursue and education, lead to a decline in educational progress, expectations, standards, and/or reforms, will provide less opportunities for individuals to pursue an education. Bush's policies will lead to disastrous outcomes for social security; will bankrupt, increase risks towards, harm, hurt, damage social security. Bush's policies will lead to a decline in home ownership; opportunities to purchase and/or stay in homes. Kerry will engage in fiscal discipline and restore fiscal responsibility. Kerry will decrease the tax burden; fiscal policies will increase investor and consumer confidence in the economy; fiscal policies will decrease the national debt and deficit; fiscal policies will make the cost of living affordable. Kerry's fiscal policies will increase domestic prosperity. Kerry's spending policies will increase educational opportunities; have led to excellence in educational progress, standards, expectations, and/or reform, will provide more opportunities for individuals to pursue an education. Kerry's policies will protect, safeguard, harbor, maintain, fix, decrease risk towards, and/or modernize social security. Kerry's policies will lead to an increase in home ownership; opportunities to purchase and/or stay in homes.

Pro Bush Health Care Frame – Consists of explicit support for Bush's policies concerning health care and explicit rejection of Kerry's positions on these issues. Kerry opposes innovation in health care that will help cut down on consumer costs; might impose health care policies that increase the national debt. Kerry's health plan is too ambitious; does not take into account tort reforms which might not effectively control lawsuits; does not accurately add up costs associated with health care policies; will have poor relationship with members of Congress on health care related issues. President Bush supports expanded opportunity in health care policy, offers a dramatic, better choice to health care reform in comparison to Kerry, and has dramatically different and better options to health care from Kerry; offers more options in insurance coverage based on policies adopted or will adopt in comparison to Kerry. Bush has lived up to his campaign

promises to deliver affordable health care to all segments of the population; has expanded health care to underinsured sectors of the population; Bush's health care plans will raise costs to health care less than will Kerry's; will adopt tort reforms necessary to control lawsuits which will curb health care costs.

Pro Kerry Health Care Frame – Consists of explicit support for Kerry's policies concerning health care and explicit rejection of Bush's positions on these issues. Kerry offers innovative reforms for health care, offers a better choice to health care in comparison to Bush. Kerry will expand health care coverage to focus on underinsured segments of population. Kerry will help to keep health care costs low, affordable; for all segments, underinsured segments of the population. Bush has offered no concrete proposals for health care reform, has failed to provide good, quality, substantive health care for Americans or a subset of the population that is presently underinsured; health care polices not working for the American family; the number of uninsured has increased; has failed to accurately calculate the costs associated with previous health care proposals adopted. Bush has made little to no progress on health care related issues, will not make progress on such issues if reelected; health care proposals are not innovative or ambitious enough. Has poor working relationship with Congress on health care related issues. Bush's policies cater to high income Americans at the expense of low-income Americans; will do a below average to poor job in cutting health care costs.

Pro Bush Job Growth Frame – Consists of explicit support for Bush's policies concerning job growth and explicit rejection of Kerry's position on these issues. Frame highlights positive job growth during Bush's tenure in office shortly before 2004 presidential election, falling unemployment levels prior to 2004 election.

Pro Kerry Job Growth Frame - Consists of explicit support for Bush's policies concerning job growth and explicit rejection of Kerry's position on these issues. Bush's record on the economy is highlighted by his net loss of jobs since attaining the presidency in 2000 which cannot be compensated by recent net gain in job creation.

Measurement of Variables
The wordings for the 2004 ANES post-election and pre-election survey values are presented below.

Anti-Terrorism
V45107 US Foreign Policy Goal: Combat International Terrorism

Very Important Goal (1)
Somewhat Important Goal (.5)
Not an Important Goal (0)

Iraq
V045125 Interventionism by diplomacy/military: importance

Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not Too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)

Government Spending/Services
VO43137 Importance of Spending/Social Services to R

Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)

Health Care
VO43151 Importance of Government Health Insurance to R

Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)

Job Growth
VO43153 Importance of Guaranteed Job and Standard of Living Issue

Extremely Important (1)
Very Important (1)
Somewhat Important (.5)
Not too Important (0)
Not at all Important (0)

Ideology
VO43086 R self-placement liberal-conservative

Liberal (1)
Moderate (.5)
Conservative (0)

Party Identification
VO45257 Like/dislike scale Democratic Party
VO45258 Like/dislike scale Republican Party

If score associated with Democratic Party is higher than Republican Party (1)
If score of Democratic Party is same as Republican Party (.5)
If score associated with Republican Party is higher than Democratic Party (0)

Religion
VO43220 Religion provides some guidance in day to day living

A great deal of guidance (1)
Quite a bit of guidance (1)
Some guidance (.5)
Religion is not important (0)

Class
VO43298 Summary: Subjective Social Class

Upper class (1)
Upper middle class (1)
Middle class (.5)
Average middle class (0)
Working class (0)
Average working class (0)
Lower class (0)

Gender
VO43411 R: Gender

Male (1)
Female (0)

Race
VO43299A Race of Respondent

White (no mention of other race) (1)
Black (0)
Asian (0)
Native American (0)
Hispanic (0)
Other (0)

Age
VO 43250 Summary: Respondent Age

68-above (1)
43-67 (.5)
18-42 (0)

Education
VO43254 Summary: Respondent Education Level
Advanced degree (1)
BA level degrees, no advanced degree (1)
Junior or community college level degrees (1)
More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree (.5)
High school diploma or equivalency 3 (0)
9-11 grades and no further schooling (including 12 years without diploma or equivalency) (0)
8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency (0)

Political Knowledge
VO 45162: Political Office Recognition: Dennis Hastert
VO 45165 Political Office Recognition: William Rehnquist

Correctly identifies Hastert as Speaker of the House of Representatives and Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1)

Correctly identifies either Hastert as Speaker of the House of Representatives or Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, but not both (.5)
Does not either correctly identify Hastert as either the Speaker of the House or Rehnquist as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In addition, does not attempt to guess. (0)

Newspaper
VO 43022 Attention to Newspaper Articles

A great deal (1)
Quite a bit (1)
Some (.5)
Very Little (0)
None (0)

TV News
VO 43015 Attention to National (Network) News

A great deal (1)
Quite a bit (1)
Some (.5)
Very Little (0)
None (0)

Attentive

Attentive: If Newspaper and/or TV News is 1 (1)

Non-Attentive: If both Newspaper and TV News is less than 1. If Newspaper is less than 1 and there is no observation for TV News or if TV News is less than 1 and there is no observation for Newspaper.

Vote Choice
VO 45026 Voter: R's Vote for President

John Kerry (1)
George Bush (0)

Examples of Pro-Bush Frame

Anti-Terrorism Frame

"'This is not an enemy that can be negotiated with or reasoned with or appeased.', Mr. Cheney said, 'This is, to put it simply, an enemy that must be destroyed, and with George Bush as our commander in chief, that is exactly what we're going to do.'" (Lyman, Rick. 2004. "Cheney Says Kerry Suffers 'Fundamental Misunderstanding.'" New York Times, September 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/04/politics/campaign/04cheney.html (accessed on October, 15, 2009).

Iraq War Frame

"We are committed to winning this war on all fronts, and we are making impressive gains." (Franks, Tommy. 2004. "War of Words." New York Times, October 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/opinion/19franks.html (accessed on September 18, 2009).

"Iraq is led by a free government made up of its own citizens. By the end of this year, NATO and American forces will have trained 125,000 Iraqis to enforce the law, fight insurgents, and secure borders. This is in addition to the great humanitarian progress already achieved in Iraq." (Franks, Tommy. 2004. "War of Words." New York Times, October 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/opinion/19franks.html (accessed on October 26, 2009).

Government Spending/Services Frame

"No wait a minute, wait a minute – to be fair, there are some things my opponent is for. He's proposed more than $2 trillion on federal spending so far, and that's a lot, even for a senator from Massachusetts. And to pay for that spending, he is running on a platform of increasing taxes, and that's the kind of promise a politician usually keeps. His taxes – his policies of tax and spend, of expanding government rather than expanding opportunity, are the politics of the past." (President George W. Bush. 2004. "Full Text of President Bush's Remarks." New York Times, September 2, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/politics/campaign/03TEXT-BUSH.html?pagewanted=print&position (accessed on October 28, 2009).

Health Care Frame

"These changing times can be exciting times of expanded opportunity. And here, you face a choice. My opponent's policies are dramatically different from ours. Senator Kerry opposed medicare reform and health savings accounts." (President George W. Bush. 2004. "Full Text of President Bush's Remarks." New York Times, September 2,

2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/politics/campaign/03TEXT-BUSH.html?pagewanted=print&position (accessed on October 28, 2009).

Job Growth Frame

"In his remarks on the economy, Mr. Bush cast his economic record in a bright light: The nation, he said, has enjoyed 12 straight months of job gains, adding 1.7 million jobs in the past year, and seen the unemployment rate fall to 5.4 percent." (Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2004. "Bush Attacks His Opponent Over His Record on Taxes." New York Times, September 10, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/10/politics/campaign/10bush.html (accessed on October 8, 2009).

Examples of Pro-Kerry Frame

Anti-Terrorism

"Less than a week before the first presidential debate, Mr. Kerry took aim at what has long been considered Mr. Bush's greatest political strength since 9/11 - the perception that he would do a better job keeping the country safe from future attacks. In two fiery speeches here, with widows from 9/11 and mothers of soldiers at his side, Mr. Kerry dismissed that notion and argued that Mr. Bush's real record on fighting terrorism was a catalogue of mistakes." (Toner, Robin. 2004. "Kerry Promises to Refocus U.S. War on Terror." New York Times, September 25, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/25/politics/campaign/25kerry.html (accessed on October 22, 2009).

Iraq War

"It's hard to find a nonpartisan national security analyst with a good word for the Bush administration's foreign policy. Iraq, in particular, is a slow-motion disaster brought on by wishful thinking, cronyism, and epic incompetence." (Krugman, Paul. 2004. "A Mythic Reality." New York Times, September 7, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/opinion/07krugman.html (accessed on October 23, 2009).

Government Spending/Services

"'Four years ago, we had a historic opportunity to shore up Social Security for years to come, and George Bush squandered that opportunity.'" (Toner, Robin, and David Rosenbaum. 2004. "Social Security Poses Hurdle for President." New York Times, September 18, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/18/politics/campaign/18social.html (accessed on October 28, 2009).

Health Care

"'Four years later, have we had a big fight with Congress that you can remember over how we're going to provide health care to all Americans? Can the president come to you and say how much progress we've made, and that we've covered all the children in America?'" (Halbfinger, David, and Richard W. Stevenson. 2004. "With Polls on the Move, Bush and Kerry Take Their Economic Message to Ohio." New York Times, September 5, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/05/politics/campaign/05trail.html (accessed on October 10, 2009).

Job Growth

"'My friends at the rate this administration is creating jobs, you're not going to have a net plus of one job in the state of Ohio till the year 2011. I don't think this is something to celebrate, I think this is something to get to work on.'" (Halbfinger, David. 2004. "Kerry Urges Voters to Look Past Bush's 'Last Minute Promises.'" New York Times, September 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/04/politics/campaign/04kerry.html (accessed on October 12, 2009).

Chapter V

Conditional Limitations Associated with Framing Effects: Experimental Analysis

Introduction

It is important to understand the interaction effects that might take place which might confound the relationship between non-competitive and competitive frames on individual public opinion. As I hypothesized in the last chapter, non-competitive frames should polarize public opinion and competitive frames moderate public opinion. However if we are to understand which factors influence public opinion more fully, we should also examine factors which influence the direction of public opinion along with factors which influence its intensity. By understanding how frames influence the direction as well as the intensity of public opinion, we might have a better idea which factors under which circumstances can be best described as conditional limitations of framing effects.[15]

Framing Environment, Source, and Individual Predispositions

In short, I argue that in order to make predictions associated with the conditional limitations of framing effects, it is important to examine the variance in framing environment, source, and individual predisposition. In this chapter, I will examine two factors associated with framing effects and their influence on personal opinion towards

[15] Research on the conditional limitations of framing effects is extremely important given the nature of the literatures which focus on the volatile nature of citizen opinion to subtle changes in the news media or political speech (Zaller 1992). Druckman has repeatedly questioned these claims and has presented considerable research illustrating the limitations of framing, most notably the impact of source credibility on the nature of effect (Druckman 2001a, 2004b; Druckman and Nelson 2003).

preventive war. First, I will examine factors which influence the direction of personal opinion. Second, I will examine factors which influence the intensity of opinion.

What factors influence the direction of public opinion? All else being equal, credible sources are more likely to gain support for a position they sponsor than non-credible sources. Therefore, we should expect that the State Department official is more likely to be successful garnering support for or against preventive war than a comedian might be. Second, individual predispositions or beliefs might influence the direction of public opinion. By taking into account individual beliefs, predictions become more complex and less straightforward. I posit that individuals who possess strong predispositions for or against the use of force will be influenced by frames based on the substance of information. Individuals who possess weak beliefs towards or against the use of force are more likely to be influenced by frames based on who sponsors the frame.

What factors should influence the intensity of public opinion? The type of framing environment should influence the intensity of public opinion. If information is framed in a non-competitive in comparison to a competitive framing environment, individuals will not be presented with both sides of the issue. Competitive framing environments, therefore, have a tendency to moderate public opinion in contrast to non-competitive framing environments.[16] Non-competitive framing environments in contrast to competitive framing environments have a tendency to polarize public opinion.

[16] Framing studies often take a rather narrow view of the influence of frames on how citizens make sense of politics and hence have measured the effects of only one frame at a time (Nelson et. al. 1997). However, in day-to-day political discourse, citizens are likely to be exposed to competitive news messages. Hence it is important to examine frames in both non-competitive and competitive contexts.

In addition, the interaction between framing environment and individual predisposition should influence the intensity of public opinion. In non-competitive framing environments, those who possess weak initial opinions towards the use of force are more likely to be dependent on the frame for shaping their views. This factor should produce a strong framing effect. In contrast, those who possess strong initial opinions are not likely to be highly dependent on the frame for shaping their views. This factor should produce a weaker or moderate effect. This relationship might be different as it pertains to competitive framing environments. For those who possess strong initial predispositions in these circumstances, the degree of framing effect should be determined by the counter-effects produced by the weaker frame. The degree of framing effect, therefore, might be strong.[17]

In short, by taking into account individual predispositions, the relationship between formation of public opinion, framing environment, and source is made more complex. In addition, by taking into account framing environment, values, and individual predispositions, we can make predictions not only involving the *direction*, but also the *intensity* of the framing effect as well.[18] Hence, the approach I adopt not only allows us

[17] Research on competitive framing largely suggests that exposure to two opposing frames that invoke different values dampens framing effects (Brewer 2002; Chong and Druckman 2007a; Wise and Brewer 2010). However, Sniderman and Theriault (2004) argue that competitive framing increases the influence of personal beliefs in the process and thus decreases the effects of news framing. The increasing influence of personal beliefs in the process suggests that we should further examine the nature of competitive frames on the nature of the counter-effect.

[18] In general, we know very little concerning the factors which determine the strength of the frame and thus which factors might influence the intensity of the framing effect. Chong and Druckman (2007b) would argue that frame strength depends on source credibility. In general, source credibility works based on the theory of issue ownership. Credible sources establish their reputations based on the accumulated historical evidence of their activities related to the issues in questions.

to examine whether or not elites can gain support for preventive war, but how much support they can gain for such an enterprise as well. Hypotheses three and four suggest that framing effects are conditional. In other words, frames should significantly influence public opinion in non-competitive framing environments for those who possess weak initial opinions. In addition, frames should significantly influence public opinion in competitive framing environments for those who possess strong initial opinions towards the use of force.

In this chapter, I test the following hypotheses:

- H1 (P3): In both non-competitive and competitive framing environments, those who possess strong initial opinions towards the use of force are more likely to be influenced in the direction of the frame that reflects individual beliefs and less likely to be influenced by the frame that does not reflect individual beliefs.

- H2 (P4): In non-competitive framing environments, those who possess weak initial opinions towards the use of force are more likely to be influenced by the frame being presented by the more credible source.

- H3 (P5): In non-competitive framing environments, frames should influence individuals who have strong initial opinions less than individuals who possess weak initial opinions.

- H4 (P6): In competitive framing environments, frames should influence individuals who have strong initial opinions more than individuals who possess weak initial opinions.

Experimental Overview

To enhance the external validity of the experiment, the scenario is based on a real-life foreign policy crisis. The experiment is based on the current US-Iranian crisis with liberties taken to distinguish the fictional crisis from the actual real world event. There are pros and cons to using fictional crises in experimental research. Even though we sacrifice empirical validity by utilizing fictional crises in our scenarios, we avoid priming

the subject to think in a certain way which can confound the manipulation of the experiment. The goal of this experiment is to gauge the effects of framing on public opinion in the context of preventive war in general, not simply to examine the effects of framing in the context of specific preventive war scenarios such as Iran. In this case, by utilizing a fictional scenario we increase the generalizeability of our findings to a plethora of cases that can be grouped under threats to core national interests.

In the Iranian crisis, the cost of delay from a policy standpoint might embolden an enemy that is not rational in nature. If Iran does acquire nuclear capabilities, it could be emboldened to become a regional hegemon. If Iran becomes a regional hegemon, this might lead to an arms race as other countries in the region might seek nuclear deterrents of their own. At the same time, there could be substantial costs due to escalation if the use of force against Iran is used. Iran has hardened and buried many of its nuclear facilities in a way that may be difficult to destroy. Therefore, if the US were to go to war with Iran, the military force needed to destroy these nuclear facilities may cause Iran to retaliate thus forcing the US to escalate to push for full-blown regime change. The end result may be unintended consequences inside and outside of Iran.

Method

Subjects

I recruited a total of 344 undergraduate students from political science courses at a major Midwestern university. The participants were randomly selected to receive one of six different experimental conditions. In four of these conditions, subjects received a single frame (non-competitive situation) with either the US State Department official as the credible source and a comedian as the non-credible source. In two of these

conditions, a different set of subjects received competing frames with the US State Department as the source of one frame and a comedian as the source of the other frame. All participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine elite rhetoric and its subsequent influence on foreign policy crises.

Design

In this study, a 3x2 between groups factorial design is employed. The two factors are frame (costs of delay, costs of escalation, both) and source credibility (credible versus noncredible). The conditions are as follows: a) delay-credible; b) escalate-credible; c) both-credible; d) delay-noncredible; e) escalate-noncredible; and f) both-noncredible.

The Independent and Dependent Variables

The independent variables are the frame and source issuing each frame. These constitute the makeup of the research instrument. The dependent variables of interest are changes in overall opinion and underlying beliefs associated with conflict after the presentation of the frame/frames. Before examining changes in overall opinion and issues associated with belief importance, I ask questions establishing a baseline for overall opinion. These questions are measured on a 10 point scale. If overall opinion is strongly in favor of the use of force, scores should be closer to 10. If overall opinion is strongly against the use of force, scores should be closer to 1. Individuals who possess strong opinions towards the use of force will have scores ranging from 8 to 10 and individuals who possess strong opinions against the use of force will have scores ranging from 1 to 3. Scores ranging from 4 to 7 I define as weak opinion. Individuals who possess weak opinions towards the use of force have scores ranging from 6 to 7 and

individuals who possess weak opinions against the use of force have scores ranging from 4 to 5.

Changes in overall opinion and *belief importance items* are utilized to examine the extent and nature of framing effects. Each of these questions measured on a 10-point scale are given after the presentation of the frame. These questions are designed to find out if the frame had any influence in terms of changes to overall opinion and belief importance of respondents. I test for changes in overall opinion by simply inquiring how strongly the subject is likely to support the use of force after the frame or set of frames have been presented. In this regard, I measure changes in overall opinion based on comparing responses before and after the presentation of the frame or set of frames.

Second, participants will be asked after the frame or frames are presented questions related to *belief importance.* The subjects will be asked how important the considerations brought up by the frame were in response to the question related to overall opinion after the presentation of the frame. Scores closer to 10 indicate that the considerations brought up by the frame were highly significant and closer to 1 if they were not highly significant in influencing public opinion. The considerations associated with measures of *belief importance* include "the costs of escalation," "probability of the crisis worsening," "probability of US military victory," "costs of delay," "likelihood and costs associated with a future war if diplomacy does not work" and "feasibility of diplomatic alternatives." Higher scores indicate a more positive response to the belief importance measure.[19]

[19] In the sample, mean scores and standard deviations associated with belief importance are as follows: a) costs of delay 6.81 (2.06), b) costs of escalation 7.60 (1.83), c) feasibility of diplomacy 7.40 (2.23), d)

Framing Effect

I measure a framing effect by taking into account the difference in overall opinion before and after the frames have been presented. Hence, the framing effect takes into account opinion movement. In non-competitive framing environments, we should see less movement for individuals who possess strong initial opinions towards the use of force than for individuals who possess weak initial opinions. In contrast, in competitive framing environments we should see greater movement for individuals who possess strong initial opinions towards the use of force than for individuals who possess weak initial opinions. In addition, we should see significant movement based on source for those who possess weak opinions towards the use of force.

The Research Instrument

Frames

The frames mention multiple considerations for the subjects to consider (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).[20] However, the primary consideration of interest is the potential costs associated with delay and the potential costs associated with crisis

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probability of crisis worsening 5.75 (2.49), e) likelihood and costs of future war 6.63 (2.17), and f) probability of military victory 7.06 (1.43).

[20] In some framing experiments, the frame focuses exclusively on one consideration (Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Sniderman and Theriault 1999) while other frames mention multiple considerations, but emphasize one as of primary importance (Druckman 2001a). My experiment focuses on the latter approach and not the former. In addition, Entman (2004) would argue that the most inherently powerful frames are those congruent with schemas habitually used by most members of society. Hence, frames should emphasize considerations that members of society are generally familiar with. Levy (1987) would argue that preventive wars can be distinguished from non-preventive wars by the presence or absence of a power shift. If this is the case, then pro-war frames in this context might be those that emphasize the costs of delay. At the same time, scholars such as Van Evera (1999) have highlighted the nature of spiraling effects as a result of conflict. Hence, a competing anti-war frame that might be inherently just as powerful might emphasize the costs of escalation.

escalation. In addition, the sources take an explicit position concerning whether they support the use of force or not. People who use frames also emphasize what the proper response to the crisis should take into account. The information associated with each of these frames is based on work by Levy (1987). In the scenario, those who receive the costs of delay frame will be told essentially that the costs of delay involve the possibility that one's position might continue to deteriorate as the enemy develops the technology necessary to produce dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. In addition, they will be told that it is unknown what the feasibility is of securing diplomatic support to contain the enemy nor the likelihood and costs of future war if diplomacy fails to work. Those who receive the costs of escalation frame will be told that victory is uncertain and there is a possibility that escalation could take place from intervening third party states if they choose to use force. This might make the present crisis worse rather than better.

In each of the frames, the credible source, the US State Department official, will be described as having extensive knowledge in association with national security affairs while maintaining access to classified military documents concerning the crisis. The comedian, on the other hand, will be characterized as not having extensive knowledge in regards to national security affairs or possess extensive access to classified military documents concerning the crisis.

Framing Environment

Individuals are presented with one frame or two frames simultaneously.

Source of the Frame

The frame is presented either by a credible source, the US State Department official or non-credible source, a comedian in the non-competitive framing environment.

In the competitive framing environment, the US State Department official and comedian present both sides of the debate simultaneously.

Procedure

After reading through the fictional scenario and told that their responses are anonymous, participants are presented with a set of baseline questions asking them for their *overall opinion* towards the use of force. Higher scores indicate more positive responses to each of these measures.

After being presented with the baseline question, I presented each subject with either a single frame (e.g. non-competitive framing situation emphasizing one major set of considerations) or dual competing frames (competitive framing situation where competing considerations are emphasized by the same source). The participants randomly received one of the six statements – a statement put forth by a member of the US Department of State focusing on the costs of escalation (n=60); a statement put forth by a member of the US Department of State focusing on the costs of delay (n=54); a statement put forth by a comedian focusing on the costs of escalation (n=57); a statement put forth by a comedian focusing on the costs of delay (n= 57); a statement put forth by a member of the US Department of State focusing on the costs of escalation and on the costs of delay (n=58); and a statement put forth by a comedian focusing on the costs of escalation and on the costs of delay (n=58).[21] Afterwards, I then ask two sets of questions related to changes in *overall opinion* and *belief importance*.

[21] I conducted manipulation checks using ANOVA on each of the six experimental conditions. In each of the non-competitive conditions, I calculated credibility based on questions involving a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 constituting that the source was not at all credible and 10 that the source was extremely credible: State Department Escalation Frame 6.67; State Department Delay Frame 6.83; Comedian Escalation Frame 6.59; and Comedian Delay Frame 5.79, $F(3,217) = 2.28$ $p<.08$. In the competitive conditions, I calculated the

The last set of questions deal with idiosyncratic background orientation items. The first set of variables here (individual risk propensity, need for cognitive closure, isolationism/internationalism, and militant internationalism) serve as control variables associated with framing effects. I measure risk propensity through a series of four questions asking individuals to select either a risk averse or risky alternative pertaining to various topics (e.g., recreational activities, mountain climbing, travelling, etc.). I categorize individuals as risk acceptant if they select option A three out of four times and risk averse if they select option B three out of four times. Individuals who select option A twice and option B twice I categorize as neutral to risk.[22] I measure individual need for cognitive closure based on questions establishing individual need for order and structure in the environment, comfortableness with ambiguity and open-ended judgments, and possession of secure and stable knowledge. Each of these questions is measured on a 10-point scale. Scores closer to 1 indicate a lower need for cognitive closure and scores closer to 10 indicate a higher need for cognitive closure.

I measure isolationism/internationalism through a series of three questions asking individuals for their views concerning US level of political and economic involvement in world affairs, whether or not the US has a special role to play in world affairs, and whether the US should have an active role in world affairs. Scores ranging from 1 to 5 will be classified as isolationist responses and 6 to 10 internationalist. I measure militant internationalism by asking individuals whether they believe a strong military should be a

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manipulation check using the same scale: State Department Competitive Frame 6.61; Comedian Competitive Frame 5.72, F (1,115) = 4.65 $p<.03$.

[22] In the sample, 42.2% can be defined as risk acceptant, 40.2% as risk averse, and 17.5% as risk neutral.

high priority, what the role of the CIA in undermining hostile governments should be, and whether or not the Iraq war was justified. [23]

Finally, the second set of variables (e.g., voting behavior, political party behavior, ideological predispositions, age, gender, race, educational level, and party ID) establishes the demographic context for the study.[24]

Results

The data analysis focused specifically on determining if individuals such as the US State Department official or comedian can engender support or opposition towards the use of force based on the frames that are presented for public consumption.

Framing Effects on Support for Preventive War

Using the ANOVA statistical method, I tested for statistically significant main and interaction effects on overall opinion towards the use of force. In presenting these results, I run tests on the entire sample (n=344). In addition, I run tests on subsets of respondents based on their initial support for the use of force; strongly support the use of force (n=95), strongly oppose the use of force (n=48), weakly support the use of force (n=130), and weakly oppose the use of force (n=71).

As reported in Table 4, I found a strong statistically significant main effect for frame on those who weakly oppose the use of force, $F(2,71) = 5.26$, $p<.008$, costs of

[23] In the sample, mean scores and standard deviations associated with cognitive closure, internationalism, and militant internationalism are as follows: cognitive closure 4.62(2.94), internationalism 5.31(2.63), and militant internationalism 5.37(2.73) Scores for individual questions related to each of these variables are available upon request from the author.

[24] In the sample, 45% were under the age of 20, 48% between the ages of 20-25, 4% between the ages of 26-30, 1% between the ages of 31-35, 1% between the ages of 41-45, and 1% over the age of 45. 57% of the participants were male. 87% of the participants were white and 13% were non-white. Average participant ideology was 5.0 (1=extremely liberal and 10 = extremely conservative). Lastly, 23% of the participants identified themselves as Republicans, 38% Democrat, and 39% Independent.

delay frame (M=4.78), costs of escalation frame (M=3.76), and competitive framing environment (M=3.92). I found that respondent support for the decision to initiate conflict was considerably less when individuals were presented with a frame emphasizing the costs of escalation in comparison to either a costs of delay frame or a competitive environment featuring both frames.

Table 4. Main Effect of Frame

Sample	Cost of Delay Frame	Competitive Frame	Costs of Escalation Frame
Weak Opposition	4.78	3.92	3.76

In addition, as reported in Table 5, I found a marginally statistically significant main effect for source on those who weakly support the use of force, $F(1,130) = 3.74$, $p<.06$, US State department official (M=5.71) and comedian (M=6.10). Support for the use of force increased when the comedian was the source of information in comparison to the US State Department official. In this case, the findings contradict the second hypothesis which suggests that the US State Department official should have more influence encouraging support for the use of force than the comedian for those who weakly support conflict.

Table 5. Main Effect of Source

Sample	Comedian	US State Department
Weak Support	6.10	5.71

Afterwards, I ran ANOVA tests examining interaction effects. In Table 6, I examine interaction effects for non-competitive framing environments. I present results regarding the entire sample size. In addition, I also present statistically significant

interaction effects for those who strongly support and weakly oppose the use of force. First, I found a marginally statistically significant interaction effect for non-competitive framing environment and source, F (3,228) =2.38, p<.07, State Department Escalation Frame F (M=4.98), State Department Delay Frame (M=5.96), Comedian Escalation Frame (M=5.71), Comedian Delay Frame (M=5.52). These findings indicate that differences in overall opinion are dependent on the source sponsoring the frame. There is a wider variation in overall opinion for frames issued by the credible source than for those issued by the non-credible source. It is important to note, that overall opinion was higher for State Department delay frames than for State Department escalation frames. However, opinion towards the use of force is higher for the comedian escalation frame than it is for the comedian delay frame.

Second, I also discovered statistically significant effects in regards to non-competitive framing environments and source for those who strongly support the use of force, F (3,63) = 3.21, p<.03, State Department Escalation Frame (M=6.26), State Department Delay Frame (M=7.42), Comedian Escalation Frame (M=7.85), Comedian Delay Frame (M=7.53).

Third, we see very strong statistically significant effects for individuals who weakly oppose the use of force, F (3,48) = 5.45, p<.003, State Department escalation frame (M = 3.25), State Department delay frame (M=4.85), comedian escalation frame (M=4.36), and comedian delay frame (M=4.56).

Table 6. Interaction Effects of Source and Frame (Non-Competitive)

Sample	US State Department Escalation Frame	US State Department Delay Frame	Comedian Escalation Frame	Comedian Delay Frame
Everyone	4.98	5.96	5.71	5.52
Strong Support	6.26	7.42	7.85	7.53
Weak Opposition	3.25	4.85	4.36	4.56

I also examine interaction effects for competitive framing environments. For individuals who strongly supported the use of force, I found marginally statistically significant interaction effects as reported in Table 7 in regards to competitive framing environments and source, $F(1,32) = 2.89$, $p<.10$, comedian competitive framing environment ($M=7.21$) and State Department official competitive framing environment ($M=8.07$).

In addition to those who possess strong opinions, we see statistically significant effects for individuals who weakly support the use of force in competitive environments, $F(1,43) = 4.50$, $p<.04$, State Department competitive framing environment ($M=5.95$) and comedian competitive framing environment ($M=5.26$).

In this case, it was the US State Department official which increased support for the use of force and comedian who discouraged such support. In support for the second hypothesis, those who weakly supported the use of force were more likely to buy into the reasoning put forth by the state department official than comedian. However, those who strongly supported the use of force were also more likely to buy into the use of force based on information presented by the US State Department official than the comedian.

Table 7. Interaction Effects of Source and Frame (Competitive)

Sample	US State Department	Comedian
Strong Support	8.07	7.21
Weak Support	5.95	5.26

However, in order to adequately test the hypotheses, it is important to compare the difference in overall opinion towards the use of force before and after the framing environments are presented. To do this, I run ANOVA tests examining opinion towards the use of force before and after the non-competitive and competitive framing environments are presented. In addition to examining all respondents, I also examine subsets of respondents, specifically those who strongly support, strongly oppose, weakly support, and weakly oppose the use of force. I present findings for the entire sample first before presenting results associated with subsets of respondents.

As reported in Table 8, I found a marginally statistically significant effect for respondents presented with the US State Department competitive frame, $F(1, 58) = 3.37$, $p<.07$. Overall, opinion was higher before the competitive frame was presented by the US State Department official (M=5.84) in comparison to after the competitive frame was presented (M=5.03).

In addition, I also found a marginally statistically significant effect for respondents presented with the comedian competitive frame, $F(1, 58) = 3.54$, $p <.07$. Overall opinion was higher before the competitive frame was presented by the comedian (M=6.36) in comparison to after the competitive frame was presented (M=5.66). In neither case did the competitive framing environment serve as a moderating factor.

Lastly, I found a strong statistically significant effect for individuals presented with the US State Department escalation frame, F (1,60) = 9.57, p <.003. Overall opinion was higher before the frame (M=6.12) in comparison to after the frame was presented (M=4.98).

Table 8. Everyone

Framing Environment	Before	After
US State Department Competitive Frame	5.84	5.03
Comedian Competitive Frame	6.36	5.66
US State Department Escalation Frame	6.12	4.98

Afterwards, I examine the relationship for those who possess strong and weak opinions towards and against the use of force. For those who strongly support the use of force, I hypothesize that opinion towards the use of force should be higher after the presentation of the non-competitive frame featuring the costs of delay. There should be no effect when presented with the non-competitive costs of escalation frame. For those who strongly oppose the use of force, I anticipate that opinion should be influenced favorably by the costs of escalation frame. In particular, opinion towards the use of force should be lower after this particular framing environment is presented rather than before. In addition, I anticipate that there should be no effect when presented with the costs of delay non-competitive frame. Furthermore, I anticipate that competitive frames should have more influence on opinion than non-competitive frames for those who both strongly support and oppose the use of force due to counter-effects produced by the perceived

weaker frame. Competitive framing environments should encourage support towards the use of force for those who have strong initial opinions and discourage support for the use of force for those who have strong initial opinions against such activity.

For those who weakly support and oppose the use of force, I anticipate that framing environments should only be influential if sponsored by a credible source. In this context, the costs of escalation should discourage support for the use of force and costs of delay encourage support only if sponsored by a credible source. Furthermore, non-competitive framing environments should have more impact on overall opinion than competitive framing environments.

In Table 9, I present results for individuals who strongly support the use of force. First, I found a statistically significant effect for individuals who strongly support the use of force regarding competitive frames presented by the state department official, $F(1,13) = 5.23$, $p < .04$. Overall opinion was higher before the competitive frame featuring the state department official (M=9.15) in comparison to after (M=8.08). In addition, I found a strong statistically significant effect for individuals who are presented with the comedian competitive frame, $F(1, 19) = 12.36$, $p < .002$. Overall opinion was higher before the competitive frame featuring the comedian (M=8.52) than after (M=7.21). Once again support for the use of force considerably decreased after being presented with the competitive frame.

Moreover, I found a marginally significant effect for individuals who were presented with the comedian delay frame, $F(1,17) = 4.09$, $p < .06$. Overall opinion was higher before the non-competitive frame sponsored by the comedian was presented (M=8.52) than after (7.52). Furthermore, I found a strong significant effect for

individuals presented with the state department costs of delay frame, F (1,15) = 8.51, *p* <.007. In this case, the overall opinion of respondents decreased significantly after being presented with a non-competitive frame sponsored by the state department official focusing on the costs of delay. Overall opinion before the frame was presented was much higher (M=8.27) than after (7.40). Lastly, I found a strong statistically significant effect for individuals presented with the costs of escalation frame sponsored by the state department official, F (1,18) = 26.48, *p* <.001. In this case, overall opinion was higher before the non-competitive frame sponsored by the state department official emphasizing the costs of escalation (M=8.20) than after (M=6.20).

In short, these cumulative results indicate that because an opinion is strongly held does not necessarily mean that it is firmly held and thus unable to change. However, it should be noted in most cases that opinion still strongly supported the use of force after the frame was presented. Still, opinion towards the use of force decreased in all cases regardless of source and frame. These results do not lend support to the first hypothesis, which suggests that opinion towards the use of force should increase after being presented with noncompetitive and competitive frames.

Table 9. Strongly Support

Framing Environment	Before	After
US State Department Competitive Frame	9.15	8.08
Comedian Competitive Frame	8.52	7.21
Comedian Delay Frame	8.52	7.52
US State Department Delay Frame	8.27	7.40
US State Department Escalation Frame	8.20	6.20

In addition, I find statistically significant results for those who weakly support and oppose the use of force. In short, I hypothesize that statistically significant effects should be based on source. In addition, I hypothesize that non-competitive framing environments should have more of an impact on overall opinion than competitive frames.

However, as was the case for those who strongly supported the use of force, competitive frames influenced opinion towards the use of force. In Table 10, I found a strong statistically significant effect for individuals who were presented with the US State Department competitive frame, $F(1,19) = 16.81$, $p<.0003$. In the first case, support for the use of force was higher before the competitive frame sponsored by the state department official (M=6.63) than after (M=5.26). Similarly, I found a statistically significant effect for individuals presented with the comedian competitive frame, $F(1,24) = 6.17$, $p<.02$. In the second case, support for the use of force was also higher (M=6.42) before the competitive frame sponsored by the comedian than after (M=5.96).

In addition, I also found statistically significant effects for select

non-competitive frames as well. I found a statistically significant effect for individuals presented with the comedian costs of delay frame, F (1,18) = 4.91, $p<.04$. Support for the use of force was higher before the non-competitive frame (M=6.68) sponsored by the comedian emphasizing the costs of delay than after (M=6.05). Moreover, I also found statistically significant interaction effects for frames sponsored by credible sources as well. I found a strong statistically significant interaction effect for individuals presented with the escalation frame sponsored by the state department official, F (1, 21) = 11.76, $p<$ .002. Support for the use of force was higher before the non-competitive frame (M=6.57) sponsored by the comedian emphasizing the costs of escalation than after (M=5.57).

Table 10. Weakly Support

	Before	After
US State Department Competitive Frame	6.63	5.26
Comedian Competitive Frame	6.42	5.96
Comedian Delay Frame	6.68	6.05
US State Department Escalation Frame	6.57	5.57

Finally, as reported in Table 11, I found a strong statistically significant effect for frames sponsored by the US State Department official for those who weakly oppose the use of force, F (1,12) = 10.71, $p<.004$. Support for the use of force was higher before the non-competitive frame (M=4.50) sponsored by the state department official emphasizing the costs of escalation than after (M=3.25).

Table 11. Weakly Oppose

	Before	After
US State Department Escalation Frame	4.50	3.25

Table 11 provides support for the second hypothesis which suggests that the impact of source and frame should encourage opposition against the use of force for those who have weak opinions.

Conclusion

Framing effects are viewed as evidence that elites are able to manipulate citizens who uncritically accept whatever frame they are presented with (Entman 1993; Riker 1986). The results here demonstrate that this might necessarily be the case. In addition, there was little systematic relationship between strength of overall opinion towards the use of force and propensity to buy into frames as I hypothesized.

First, there was little relationship between those who possessed strong opinions towards or against the use of force and direction of the framing effect. Those individuals who possessed strong opinions supporting the use of force were consistently less inclined to engage in support for such endeavors after presentation of the framing environment. This finding took place regardless if the framing environment was competitive or non-competitive. In addition, this finding took place regardless of the considerations emphasized by the frame. In addition, there was no statistically significant relationship between those who strongly opposed the use of force and direction of framing effect. As a result, the first hypothesis is not supported.

Second, the relationship between source and framing effect is inconsistent. Findings largely do not support the second hypothesis for those who weakly support the use of force. Support for the use of force decreased regardless of source if we compare overall opinion before and after the presentation of the framing environment. In addition, findings are mixed regarding which source is more successful in encouraging support for the use of force if we compare the two together. Findings are more supportive for those who possess weak overall opinions against the use of force. These findings are supported by analyzing opinions both in comparing framing environments to each other as well as analyzing overall opinion levels before and after particular framing environments were presented for specific experimental conditions. If we compare opinion before and after the presentation of frames, support decreased for the use of force as hypothesized. In addition, there is wider variation in scores if we compare distinct non-competitive frames sponsored by the credible source than if we compare distinct non-competitive frames sponsored by the non-credible source. Because of this, the second hypothesis is partially supported.

Finally, the third and fourth hypotheses found little support. Support for the third hypothesis does not exist given the fact that non-competitive frames influenced individuals who have strong opinions as much as for those who possessed weak opinions. In addition, I fail to find support for the fourth hypothesis which suggests that competitive frames should influence those who have strong opinions more than individuals who possess weak opinions.

Future work can build on the results in a few directions. Given the fact that strength of opinion was not an adequate predictor of framing effect, other variables

should be considered. Future research should perhaps consider the impact of framing effects on individuals who possess different propensities to accept risk or different propensities towards cognitive closure. As Druckman (2004a) points out, individuals who are neutral towards risk are more likely to be susceptible to framing effects because prior opinions are not strong in either direction. In addition, it might be fruitful to consider the impact of cognitive closure (Zuckerman 1994). As Webster and Kruglanski (1994), Zuckerman (1994), and Federico, Golec, and Dial (2005) suggest, those with a high need for cognitive closure are more likely to base opinions on peripheral cues or adopt heuristics because they feel uncomfortable in environments characterized by informational uncertainty. Individuals, however, who have low need for cognitive closure, are likely to process information more thoroughly and thus might be less susceptible to buy into frames simply based on their peripheral cues.

In addition to cognitive closure and risk, we can examine other moderators as well. As Druckman (2004b) points out, interpersonal communication might also serve as a moderator of framing effects. Hence, we should perhaps consider the influence of interpersonal communication on the efficacy of the framing effect (Mendelburg 2002). As Morrow (1994) and Wittman (1995) point out, participants can introduce alternative frames into consideration. Hence we need to ask whether interpersonal communication enhances framing effects or whether it mitigates against them. Furthermore, we can also investigate the nature of the discussion group (e.g., homogenous, heterogeneous groups) and its impact on the framing effect (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Visser and Mirabile 2003). Indeed homogenous groups might enhance the nature of the framing effect on participants and heterogenous groups lessen the impact of frames. An important question

that might be asked concerns the nature of discussion groups and multiple framing environments. By attempting to understand the nexus between group and framing environment we will be a step closer to developing a coherent theory of the framing effect. Finally, more work needs to be done in perhaps articulating a coherent theory of framing to account for differences in preemptive versus preventive wars. Preemptive wars take place in environments where the threat posed by the adversary is highly visible and imminent whereas preventive wars address conflicts that take place when the adversary presents a vague or perhaps long-term threat. Framing preventive conflict might present a difficult test in comparison to preemptive conflict.

More generally, the results presented here fit in with research on political communication. Work on mass communication, as Druckman (2001a) has pointed out, has focused on the indirect effects of mass communication (e.g., agenda setting, priming, and framing). My findings fail to confirm past research that frames work through deliberative processes where people seek guidance from sources they believe to be credible (Druckman 2001a; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). However, more work needs to be done in addressing other possible variables as potential moderators on framing effects, in particular as they pertain to marketing uses of force given the real world ramifications of such empirical research.

Appendix B: Research Instrument

Experimental Scenario One

Various pundits, scholars and media personalities have weighed in on the situation in Bajikistan, a small country run by an Islamic government. Bajikistan is an adversary of the US. As is readily known, Bajikistan is said to possess eight operational uranium mines and a nuclear reactor, which it claims is being used for peaceful purposes. However, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) intelligence reports have indicated that Bajikistan has been reprocessing spent fuel from the reactor into nuclear weapons grade material. As a result, it is believed that Bajikistan could produce a nuclear weapon within two years and a "dirty bomb" within a few months. A "dirty bomb" combines a conventional explosive such as dynamite with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. The bomb can kill or injure through the blast of the conventional explosive and by airborne contamination from the radioactive material. Such bombs can be as small as miniature devices or as large as a truck bomb. The goal of any military campaign if it were launched, according to the DIA, would be to take out the nuclear reactor and development facilities around the country followed by the use of ground troops to seal off the uranium mines. Victory, according to the DIA, would be achieved if the nuclear reactor in the country is destroyed and ground troops have effectively sealed off all eight uranium mines.

Overall opinion

1) Taken into account what you have just read, would you support the decision to use force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly oppose decision									Strongly support the decision

Non-competitive condition

Costs Associated with Delay Frame

[US State Department official Ralph Wilson] OR [Comedian Wayne Scott] supports the use of force. [Wilson has extensive background in US national security related matters and has access to classified military documents concerning this crisis] OR [Scott does not have an extensive background in US national security related matters nor does he have access to classified military documents concerning this crisis]. He believes that there are uncertainties regarding whether or not one's position will continue to deteriorate in comparison to Bajikistan if a response to the crisis is delayed. According to [Wilson] OR [Scott], it is unknown how much more formidable of a foe Bajikistan will be if it develops the technology necessary to produce dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, [Wilson] OR [Scott] suggest that it is unknown what the feasibility is of securing diplomatic support to actually contain and/or appease Bajikistan or to know the likelihood and costs of a future war if diplomacy were not to work in appeasing Bajikistan.

OR

Costs Associated with Crisis Escalation Frame

[US State Department official Ralph Wilson] OR [Comedian Wayne Scott] does not support the use of force. [Wilson has extensive background in US national security related matters and has access to classified military documents concerning this crisis] OR [Scott does not have an extensive background in US national security related matters nor does he have access to classified military documents concerning this crisis]. He believes that even though there is a greater than 50% chance that victory may be achieved if conflict is initiated, there is still a chance that the US may not succeed in its military goals and objectives. In addition, according to [Wilson] OR [Scott], the US should consider the likelihood of escalation from intervening third party states if they choose to use force which may make the present crisis worse rather than better.

Overall opinion

2) After hearing the views of [Ralph Wilson] OR [Wayne Scott], would you support the decision to use force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly oppose decision									Strongly support decision

Belief Importance

3) How important do you consider [the potential costs associated with delay] OR [the potential costs of escalation] in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

4) How important do you consider [the feasibility of diplomatic alternatives] OR [the possibility that the US may make the crisis worse if they opt to use force] in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

5) How important do you consider [the likelihood and costs of a future war] OR [possibility that the US may not achieve a victorious outcome] in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not at all important — Extremely Important

Background Information Questions

6) Each of the items below contains two choices A and B. Please *circle* which of the choices *most* describes your likes or the way you feel. Please focus on your likes and feelings (and not how others feel or how one is "supposed" to feel). There are no right or wrong answers.

A. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned or definite routes, or timetable.
B. When I go on a trip, I like to plan my route and timetable very carefully.

A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.
B. I can't understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.

A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost.
B. I prefer a map when I am in a place I don't know well.

A. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.
B. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.

7) I think that having clear order and rules at work is essential for success.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

8) I'd rather hear bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

9) I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

10) I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

11) I usually do not consult many different opinions before forming my own view.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

12) In general, I think it is wise for the US to avoid political or economic involvement with other countries.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

13) The US must play an active role in world affairs

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

14) The US has a special role in world politics.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

15) A strong military should be a very high priority for the US.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

16) There is nothing wrong with using the CIA to undermine hostile governments.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

17) The Iraq War was justified.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

18) Age: (Under 20) (21-25) (26-30) (31-35) (36-40) (41-45) (46 and above)

19) Gender: (Male) (Female)

20) Race: (White) (Black) (Hispanic) (Asian) (Pacific Islander)
(Native American) (Black and Asian) (Black and Native American)
(Black and Hispanic) (Black and White) (Asian and Native American)
(Asian and Hispanic) (Asian and White) (Native American and Hispanic)
(Native American and White) (Hispanic and White) (Other)

21) Education Level: (High School or less) (Some College) (College Degree) (Advanced Degree)

22) What position on the ideological spectrum best represents your political views?

Extremely Liberal	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Extremely Conservative

23) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what? Write down your answer on the line below.

_____

Manipulation Check

24) How credible was the source passing along the information?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all Credible									Extremely Credible

25) Do you consider the environment in which the information was presented to be non-competitive or competitive in nature?

Competitive
Non-Competitive

Competitive Condition

[US State Department official Ralph Wilson] OR [Comedian Wayne Scott] suggests based on research done that we need to consider both the costs of delay and costs of escalation regarding the use of force. [Wilson has an extensive background in national security related matters and he has access to classified military documents concerning these matters] OR [Scott does not have an extensive background in national security related matters and he does not have access to classified military documents concerning these matters]. He believes that there are uncertainties regarding whether or not one's position will continue to deteriorate in comparison to Bajikistan if a response to the crisis is delayed. According to [Wilson] OR [Scott] it is unknown how much more formidable of a foe Bajikistan will be if it develops the technology necessary to produce dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. Furthermore, [Wilson] OR [Scott] suggests that it is unknown what the feasibility is of securing diplomatic support to actually contain and/or appease Bajikistan or to know the likelihood and costs of a future war if diplomacy were not to work in appeasing Bajikistan.

At the same, [Wilson] OR [Scott] suggests that even though there is a 50% chance that victory may be achieved if conflict is initiated, there is still a chance that the US may not succeed in its military goals and objectives. In addition, according to [Wilson] OR [Scott] the US should consider the likelihood of escalation from intervening third party states if they choose to use force which may make the present crisis worse rather than better.

Overall Opinion

2) After hearing the views of [Wilson] or [Scott], would you support the decision to use force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Strongly oppose the decision									Strongly support the decision

Belief Importance

3) How important do you consider the potential costs of delay in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

4) How important do you consider the potential costs of escalation in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

5) How important do you consider the feasibility of diplomatic alternatives in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

6) How important do you consider the possibility that the use of force may make the crisis worse in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

7) How important do you consider the likelihood and costs of a future war in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

8) How important do you consider the possibility that the US may not achieve a victorious outcome in determining your support or opposition to the use of force?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all important									Extremely Important

Background information questions

9) Each of the items below contains two choices A and B. Please *circle* which of the choices *most* describes your likes or the way you feel. Please focus on your likes and feelings (and not how others feel or how one is "supposed" to feel). There are no right or wrong answers.

1. A. I would like to take off on a trip with no pre-planned or definite routes, or timetable.
   B. When I go on a trip, I like to plan my route and timetable very carefully.

2. A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.
   B. I can't understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.

3. A. I like to explore a strange city or section of town by myself, even if it means getting lost.
   B. I prefer a map when I am in a place I don't know well.

4. A. I sometimes like to do things that are a little frightening.
   B. A sensible person avoids activities that are dangerous.

10) I think that having clear order and rules at work is essential for success.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

11) I'd rather hear bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

12) I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

13) I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what to expect from it

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

14) I usually do not consult many different opinions before forming my own view.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Strongly Disagree — Strongly Agree

15) In general, I think it is wise for the US to avoid political or economic involvement with other countries.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly Agree

16) The US must play an active role in world affairs

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly Agree

17) The US has a special role in world politics.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

18) A strong military should be a very high priority for the US.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

19) There is nothing wrong with using the CIA to undermine hostile governments.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

20) The Iraq War was justified.

Strongly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly
Disagree Agree

21) Age: (Under 20) (21-25) (26-30) (31-35) (36-40) (41-45) (46 and above)

22) Gender: (Male) (Female)

23) Race: (White) (Black) (Hispanic) (Asian) (Pacific Islander)
(Native American) (Black and Asian) (Black and Native American)
(Black and Hispanic) (Black and White) (Asian and Native American)
(Asian and Hispanic) (Asian and White) (Native American and Hispanic)
(Native American and White) (Hispanic and White) (Other)

24) Education Level: Education Level: (High School or less) (Some College) (College Degree) (Advanced Degree)

25) What position on the ideological spectrum best represents your political views?

Extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Extremely
Liberal Conservative

26) Generally speaking, do you consider yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what? Write down your answer on the line below.

_____

Manipulation Check

27) How credible was the source passing along the information?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not at all Credible									Extremely Credible

28) Do you consider the environment in which the information was presented to be non-competitive or competitive in nature?

Competitive
Non-Competitive

Conclusion

This study was designed to explore how frames work to influence public opinion for or against preventive war. This dissertation has examined how the nature of the framing environment, source, and initial predisposition interact to explain how elites are able to use frames to influence public opinion. Namely this study sought to answer the following questions:

a) Do non-competitive frames influence public opinion? Do competitive frames moderate public opinion?

b) How do non-competitive and competitive frames influence public opinion for those who initially possess strong opinions towards the use of force in comparison to those who initially possess weak opinions towards the use of force?

Empirical Findings

The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the respective empirical chapters. This section will synthesize the empirical findings that address the study's two research questions.

Non-Competitive Versus Competitive Framing Effects

The first empirical chapter illustrated the impact that non-competitive and competitive frames had on overall opinion. The major question I explored was whether non-competitive frames influenced public opinion and competitive frames moderated such opinion. In this chapter, I explored the relationship between framing and voting behavior in regards to the 2004 US presidential election pitting George W. Bush against John Kerry. I conducted content analysis on one major newspaper, the *New York Times*, from the first day after the end of the Republican Convention (September 8, 2004) to the

day of the presidential election, November 2, 2004. I wanted to determine whether individuals that were exposed to political information from the newspaper determined their vote choice based on frames the newspaper focused on the most. In addition, I wanted to discover whether these findings were statistically different from individuals who did not pay attention to the 2004 US presidential election. I hypothesized that competitive frames were not significantly likely to influence vote choice whereas non-competitive frames, on the other hand, would influence voting behavior in favor of one candidate over another. Non-competitive frames were frames that supported one candidate approximately 67% of the time or more on the issue whereas competitive frames supported a given candidate less than 67%. Non-competitive frames in this study were strongly pro-Kerry (e.g., Iraq, health care, and job growth). There were two competitive frames in this study, one pro-Bush (e.g., the anti-terrorism issue) and the other, pro-Kerry (government spending). I hypothesized that as attentive people attached greater importance to the non-competitive issues, the more likely they were to vote for John Kerry. However, I hypothesized that access to competitive frames for attentive people would moderate vote choice.

Overall, non-competitive frames had minimal effect in influencing voting behavior through exposure. As each of the non-competitive issues grew in importance, individuals were neither more nor less likely to vote for one candidate over another. Of the two competitive frames that were considered in this election, one particular frame had a significant impact on voting behavior (e.g., the anti-terrorism frame). The anti-terrorism frame was highly salient given the fact that the 2004 election was largely viewed as a referendum on 9-11. As people placed more importance on the issue, they were likely to

vote more for George Bush and less for John Kerry. However, individuals who were attentive and not attentive were both likely to consider the anti-terrorism issue as important in determining their vote choice for President Bush. In particular, it was exposure to both the TV and newspaper and/or exposure to TV viewership alone that significantly influenced vote choice in regards to the anti-terrorism issue. Access to the newspaper alone did not significantly influence vote choice in regards to this issue.

Conditional Limitations Associated with Framing Effects: Experimental Analysis

In the second chapter, I examined how non-competitive and competitive frames influenced public opinion. In particular, I wanted to see if the relationship between framing environment and overall opinion would be moderated by frame source and initial opinion. I hypothesized that individuals who possessed initially strong opinions towards the use of force would be influenced by frames based on central cues such as informational substance and individuals who possessed initially weak opinions would be influenced by frames based on peripheral cues such as source.

In general, regardless of intensity of initial opinion, the credibility of the source or the strength of initial opinion failed to serve as a limitation or enhancement on the framing effect. These findings contradict research which suggests that individuals delegate to credible sources because they are competent and trustworthy in nature (Druckman 2001a; Grewal, Gotlieb and Mammorstein 1994; Heesacker, Petty, and Cacioppo 1983; Horai, Naccari and Fatuollah 1974; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Lirtzman and Shuv-Ami 1986). In addition, I also examined hypothesis which attempted to address the relationship between framing environment and intensity of initial opinion. I predicted that non-competitive environments would have less effect on those who

possessed strong overall opinions in comparison to those who possessed weak opinions and that competitive framing environments would have a better chance of possessing a moderating influence for those who possessed weak initial opinions than those who possessed strong initial opinions. In short, these hypotheses were not upheld.

Recommendations for Future Research

Based on this dissertation, I believe that future research integrating framing effects, public opinion, and the use of force can proceed in the following direction.

Relationship between Framing Environment and Other Moderators

We should strive to see if there is a relationship between source credibility and need for cognitive closure. Hence, individuals who possess a high need for such closure might be more likely to buy into frames based on source than individuals who possessed a low need for such closure. Prior research has examined the importance that cognitive style might play in proclivity towards nuanced thought and information processing (Crowson, Debacker, and Thoma 2006; Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Holbert and Hanson 2006; Le Boeuf and Shafir 2003; Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes and O'Brien 1995). The relationship between framing effects and need for cognitive closure might be based on the amount and quality of information during opinion formation and the rigidity with which opinions are firmly held (Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). As Federico, Golec, and Dial (2005) argue, people with a high need for cognitive closure face discomfort in the face of informational uncertainty. As a result, they want to reduce such discomfort as soon as possible. Individuals that possess a high need for closure do not like to engage in extensive or conscious deliberation. Hence, individuals like this might delegate to credible sources when making up their minds.

On the other hand, uncertainty does not create much anxiety for people who have a low need for cognitive closure (Federico, Golec, and Dial 2005). As Federico, Golec, and Dial (2005) suggest, individuals who possess low need for cognitive closure are less prone to buy into frames based on simplistic cues. Such individuals do not consider the costs associated with deliberation and thus are likely to try to weigh all options before coming to a firm conclusion. Hence in this case they might be less likely to buy into frames based on the source than those who have a high need for such closure.

Relationship between Framing Environment and Framing Effect

Debate between elites takes place in a multitude of competitive framing environments. Future work should further explore how exposure to different competing framing environments affects the framing effect. In this dissertation, each of the frames presented in competitive environments was presented equally. However, further work needs to explore environments in which competitive frames are presented unequally in terms of exposure. Competition between elites is inherently unequal. Imbalances in the ability of opposing viewpoints may permit one side to essentially gain an advantage in framing an issue. Further exploring the relationship between exposure and framing effect will help us to understand how frames can be used to engender support for or opposition towards preventive war. In short, do frames influence support for or opposition towards the use of force based on their repetition or frequency? Or is frame influence based on the considerations they emphasize that might be more or less significant to their constituents?

Relationship between Group, Framing Environment, and Framing Effect

Citizens often look to elites for help to form and shape their opinions. Citizens, however, not only base their opinions on what they hear from elites, but also on

discussions they have amongst themselves (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Mendelburg 2002; Mendelsohn 1996; Mutz and Martin 2001; Walsh 2003). Previous work on the implications of competition and discussion has mostly taken place in isolation, rather than in conjunction with each other (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Future work should consider the relationship between the type of framing environment and the effects of different interpersonal communication environments. As public opinion develops in association with a particular conflict, one's initial support for war might change based on the group or groups the individual associates with as well as the frame or frames an individual might be influenced by. Future work should address the differences presented by polarized and non-polarized groups. In particular, is there a cancellation of a framing effect or an enhancement of such effect depending upon personal interaction with a specific group?

Relationship between Time, Framing Environment, and Framing Effect

As Chong and Druckman (2013) argue, how citizens react to counter-frames determines which policy wins in the forum of public opinion. However, as the authors point out, we need to examine further how such counter-framing might be successful. The reality is that counter-framing occurs over time; it is not a static phenomenon. The effectiveness of counter-frames depends on when they are presented in conjunction from the original message and how they are repeated over time. Early messages affect people's attitudes on issues which then affect how subsequent information is perceived. Thus, the framing effect is largely dependent on the durability of attitudes formed in response to earlier communication. Attitudes that are stronger, last longer, and thus may be less resistant to change than attitudes that are more weakly held. Future research should thus consider the effects of time and attitude formation on the impact that frames have on

support for or against the use of force.

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"Deil S. Wright and the No Child Left Behind Act: Implications for the State of Wisconsin." Conference paper delivered at the Urban Affairs Association Conference, Seattle, WA., 25-29 April 2007.

"'When Frames Compete, Who Wins' An Examination of Competitive and Non-Competitive Framing Effects in Terms of Source Credibility in Foreign Policy Crises." Conference paper delivered at the International Studies Association Midwest conference, St. Louis, MO., 3 November 2007.

"The Effects of Deliberation on Framing in Competitive and Non-Competitive Framing Environments." Conference paper delivered at the International Studies Association Midwest conference, St. Louis, MO., 8 November 2008.

"When Frames Compete, Who Wins" An Examination of Competitive and Non-Competitive Framing Effects in Terms of Source Credibility in Foreign Policy Crises." Conference paper delivered at the International Studies Association conference, New York, NY., 15 February 2009.

"A Study of Competitive and Non-Competitive Framing Effects in the New York Times: The 2004 US Presidential Election." Conference paper delivered at the International Studies Midwest conference, St. Louis, MO., 7 November 2009.

"Power Politics and Economic Sanctions: 'So What Can the Nature of the System Tell Us About Sanctions.'" (with Wondeuk Cho) Conference paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL.,23 April 2010.

Teaching Interests: US Foreign Policy, American Government, Comparative Politics, International Relations, International Law, Race and Ethnic Relations in American Politics, Introduction to Politics, Introduction to Political Science Research and Methods, Politics of Terrorism, International Organizations

Teaching Experience

Adjunct Lecturer	U.S. Foreign Policy, Introduction to International Relations, Introduction to Politics, and Terrorism and Intelligence. Spring 2012, Fall 2012. Ripon College. Spring 2012

	American Government I and II. Spring 2012, Fall 2012. Lakeland College. Spring 2012, Fall 2014
Associate Lecturer	International Simulation, Introduction to International Organizations and Law, and Introduction to International Relations. Spring 2014
	American Foreign Policy. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Summer 2013
	Introduction to International Organizations and Law, International Simulation, and American Government. Fall 2013. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Fall 2013
	American Government, International Simulation, and Introduction to International Organizations and Law. Spring 2013. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Spring 2013
	American Government, International Law, and International Simulation. Spring 2012. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Spring 2012
	American Foreign Policy, Introduction to International Relations, and Politics of Terrorism. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Fall 2011
	American Foreign Policy. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Summer 2011
	American Foreign Policy, International Law, and Introduction to American Government. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Spring 2011.
	Politics of Terrorism, Introduction to International Organizations and Law, and Introduction to International Relations. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Fall 2010
Instructor	International Law, University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Fall 2012
	International Law. University Wisconsin-Stevens Point. Spring 2010
	Introduction to Politics. University Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Fall 2008, Spring 2009, Fall 2009, and Spring 2010.

Guest Lecturer	"Introduction to International Relations Theories", Presented in Introduction to Political Science 103, December 2006 and April 2007.
	"Introduction to Marxist Thought", Presented in Introduction to Political Science 103, February 2007.
	"Discourses on the Use of Power in Political Thought", Presented in Introduction to Political Science 103, February 2007.
	"Discourses on Estrangement and Unity", Presented in Introduction to Political Science, 103, February 2007.
	"Discourses on Equality and Inequality in Political Thought", Presented in Introduction to Political Science 103, February 2007.

Teaching Assistant

Spring 2008	Introduction to International Relations
Fall 2007	Introduction to International Relations
Spring 2007	Introduction to Political Science
Fall 2006	Introduction to Political Science
Spring 2006	Introduction to Political Science Research/Ethnicity, Religion, and Race in American Politics
Spring 2005	Ethnicity, Religion, and Race in American Politics
Fall 2004	Introduction to American Politics
Spring 2004	Ethnicity, Religion, and Race in American Politics
Fall 2003	Ethnicity, Religion, and Race in American Politics

Professional Experience and Development

Faculty Advisor: University Wisconsin-Stevens Point Model UN Student Organization. My duties specifically involve travelling to New York, NY once a year with the University Wisconsin-Stevens Point Model UN as they participate in the National Model United Nations conference. While serving as Faculty Advisor, school has received numerous awards for its participation at this conference.

Fall 2011, "9-11 and the US Constitution", Guest talk focusing on legal rights of enemy detainees at Guantanamo Bay, September 12th

Fall 2011 "9-11 10th Anniversary Event", Guest talk honoring victims of 9-11, September 9th

Fall 2010 “The 2010 Elections: Taking a Closer Look”, Guest talk focusing on President Barack Obama’s foreign policy direction in regards to 2010 Congressional elections, November 8th

Spring 2007 Service Learning Project: Center for Teaching and Entrepreneurship**.** (January 07-May 07). My duties involved organizational consultation responsibilities focusing on reforms in the human relations sector. In addition, I was responsible for giving input through filing job versatile analyses reports. My major contribution was to design an organizational flow chart helping to streamline responsibilities amongst leaders involved in this organization.

Fellowship, Grants, and Honors

Chancellor’s List (2004, 2006).

$350 Travel grant for conference paper delivered at the International Studies Association Midwest conference, St. Louis, MO (October 2005).

Cambridge “Who’s Who Among Executives and Professionals ‘Honors Edition” (2006, 2007).

National Scholars Honor Society (2007).

$100 Travel grant for conference paper delivered at the Urban Affairs Association conference, Seattle, WA. 25-29 (April 2007).

Professional Associations

Member since 2001, Pi Sigma Alpha Political Science Honor Society

Member since 2002, Golden Key Honor Society

Member 2007-2008, Southern Political Science Association (SPSA)

Member 2010 Midwest Political Science Association