

THE PREPAREDNESS MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN 1914-1917

by

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To Toddy, who made
the whole thing more interesting

CHAPTER I

TALK OF GUNS AND DRUMS

The Preparedness Issue and Wisconsin

In the years 1914-1917, there took place in the United States what one observer has described as "one of the more remarkable episodes in our long and generally aberrant military history": the preparedness campaign.¹ In 1914, as massed conscript armies were shattering Europe, an undisturbed America under the peace-minded Woodrow Wilson was content with a regular army of some 93,000 officers and men, and a navy which tied with that of France for third place in the world.² These defenses were bolstered by 12-inch coastal guns on disappearing carriages at vital harbors, and there was an organized militia of 127,000 officers and men under state supervision that could be mustered into United States service to back up the regular forces in case of invasion or insurrection.³ The defense budget was less than a quarter of a billion; the country was spending more money on war pensions than on its army.⁴ By the end of 1916, America had decided to join in a naval armaments race, and was developing a strong tendency to turn into a garrison state, although these long-term preparations were not supposed to have any direct bearing on the European War, and in fact could not be completed in time to have any effect on it.

In October 1914, Congressman Augustus Gardner, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's son-in-law, introduced H.J.R. 372,

requesting an investigation into the condition of the armed forces.⁵ The move was widely interpreted as a politically motivated slap at Josephus Daniels, Wilson's Secretary of the Navy. Wilson scoffed at the idea, and showed no interest in any program of increased armaments, although his trusted friend, Colonel House and his Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison, favored the idea. As 1915 went on, Theodore Roosevelt and ex-chief of staff Leonard Wood pressed for a policy of increased military armament, of "readiness" in the abstract, along with the mass of the regular Republican Party.

In May 1915, the Lusitania was torpedoed. Breaking the nation's detachment and perhaps pointing up the dangers of military impotence. Wilson asked Garrison to consult with the Army War College and Daniels to consult with the Navy General Board to produce a defense program. By the fall of 1915, their recommendations had been submitted. Previously the country had been content to lay down a couple of battleships a year, subject to the whim of Congress, but now the Navy Department wanted a big, longrange building program of capital ships and auxiliaries. The Department especially asked for fast, heavily armed battle cruisers, a type which America lacked completely. The Army War College at first advocated just an expanded regular army and reserves; Garrison scaled this down to a regular army of 142,000 and a federalized part-time Continental army of 400,000, largely

superseding the state guards, which would be allowed to wither on the vine as second-string defense and police forces.⁶ Army enlistments would be shortened to create a trained reserve in a shorter time. There was some doubt that so large a force could actually be raised by volunteer methods, Garrison confessed to members of Congress. If not, a case for universal military training would have been made.⁷

Meanwhile, from 1914 on, a host of civilian organizations had begun to raise a cry for greater defense. The Navy League was a long-standing advocate of a larger fleet, of course. But there were some brand new groups too. Some people from Wall Street formed the American Defense League in November 1914, and the National Security League and the Army League sprang up on the East Coast in the December of that same year.⁸ In 1914, the country was showered with articles, motion pictures, speeches and books disclosing its unprepared state: The invasion film "Battle Cry of Peace" was in all of the picture palaces and Dr. Hudson Maxim's book Defenseless America was a national best-seller. In the summer of 1915, military training camps for businessmen at places like Plattsburg and Fort Sheridan began turning out advocates of increased military defenses. The nation's press, shocked by our clashes with Germany and our difficulties with other powers, dominated by the big, internationally-conscious and Germanophobe East Coast newspapers, and

following the leaders of both political parties, was won over. Within a year, the people who had been indifferent to the state of the military and the navy were in the streets clutching American flags and demanding even bigger appropriations.

The preparedness movement was based more on a vague disturbance with the way the world was going than on a reasoned analysis of the nation's defense needs in relation to the international situation. The preparedness was not supposed to be aimed at any particular threat, it was an abstract preparedness, aimed at "no one! Everyone--contingencies," as one of its boosters put it.⁹ Since this preparedness was not bound by any common-sense limitations like the probable strengths and intentions of possible antagonists, it naturally tended to be as total as possible--America must be prepared for anything.

Many different types of people associated themselves with this movement. There were interventionists, who wanted to build up America's armed forces so we would be able to aid the Allies; there were munitions manufacturers and steel magnates who saw a chance for profits; army and navy officers who had a natural loyalty to their own services and possibly to their own chances of promotion; those who longed for an assertion of national power and bewailed the fact that America could not field an enormous army like all

the Continental powers; businessmen who trembled lest the wicked Europeans come over after the fighting had ended and take back all the money they had been forced to give us for munitions. Certainly, there were a great many people who had far better and far more honorable motives: the army was in fact small, the militia inefficient, the organized reserve could be seated in its entirety (and once was) at a dinner table, the 12-inch harbor batteries were outranged by new naval weapons, and what would come to pass after the horrors of the European War (itself undreamt-of until it happened) was uncertain.

This was the preparedness campaign, which was not only a series of legislative proposals, but a genuine, if managed, public movement. In the legislative sphere, the army bill provoked the biggest squabble. Two different versions were introduced in the Senate and House. S.4840, sponsored by Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, called for a 250,000 man regular army and a federalized Continental force, as Garrison had recommended. Representative James Hay of Virginia sponsored H.R. 12766, which provided for a regular army of not more than 140,000 and a much enlarged national guard, still preserving its identity as a state force, but heavily supported by federal funds and under stringent federal regulation.¹⁰ In January 1916, Wilson went on a barnstorming tour to create enthusiasm for preparedness across the nation, then came back and

declined to support the Continental Army plan any more, since it was politically unpalatable to the militia lobby and the states-rights advocates. Garrison and his assistant secretary of war resigned promptly and angrily, but preparedness rolled on.

Growing tensions about the loyalty of "hyphenated Americans," largely due to German-American dislike of Wilson's foreign policy, helped heighten the preparedness issue and turn it into a test of patriotism. The slogan was now: "Stand Behind the President." Meanwhile, the Mexican situation, which necessitated mobilization of the regular army, showed in just what fighting condition our forces were in. However, despite heavy pressure from the big-city newspapers and vociferous sections of the public, the 64th Congress was not to be rushed. In May 1916, it passed a compromise army bill, which provided for a regular army of from 175,000 to 206,000 men, increased to this strength in five yearly increments. The bill also made provision for a reserve officers training corps, an enlisted reserve, and a strong national guard of 475,000 men federally supported and regulated, with a quota of 800 guardsmen assigned each state for every member it sent to Congress.¹¹ Fifteen days after the bill was signed into law, before any of the reforms envisaged for the national guard had had a chance to go into effect, the Hay Act was put to a most unfair test on the Mexican border. In

August, the Senate managed to impose a building program of sixteen capital ships on a reluctant House. So by the end of 1916, we were fairly into a race for naval equality with the strongest power on earth, and perhaps even into a race for naval supremacy, while the performance of the hastily assembled national guard as it struggled with its own ineptitude and lackadaisical railroad managers, had inspired a re-evaluation of the Hay Act.

Since preparedness was both a national program hammered out in the halls of Congress and a popular movement largely inspired and controlled from Washington, New York, and Philadelphia, it might seem rather odd to study its manifestations in a single Midwestern state. Wisconsin, after all, was separated by a thousand miles from the centers of preparedness agitation. No silhouette more ominous than that of a Great Lakes ore boat was likely to appear off her shores. The fact that more than half of her population of 2 1/3 million was either foreign born or of foreign extraction should have militated, one might have thought, against the state's involvement in a campaign that had been begun mainly by upper class Eastern Anglophiles.

However, the fact is that agitation for preparedness was quite intense in the state. The big urban center of Milwaukee, with a population approaching 400,000, supported the largest branch of the National Security League in the

Midwest, outside of Chicago, while the most respected papers in the state went all out for the movement. Not only was there agitation in favor of preparedness, but there was a good deal of opposition against it, stemming from sources as diverse as German Republicans, Milwaukee sewer Socialists, and rural progressives. In short, the state affords us an excellent opportunity to study in microcosm the development, as well as the extent, of a nationwide movement. It gives us a fine chance to see the heights (and depths) attained by patriotism in a vanished, pre-World War America.

CHAPTER II

INVADED AMERICA:

The Role of Communications Media in the Preparedness Campaign in Wisconsin

The preparedness movement in Wisconsin was largely a publicity campaign, carried home to the people by newspaper editorials, articles, advertisements, posters, and motion pictures. All of these media, whether they attempted to exhort, terrify, or merely inform the public, kept the preparedness issue before the people of the state at this time. The pages of Wisconsin's newspapers offer us a convenient way to chart the intensity of this campaign at various times. In the winter of 1914, the papers evinced quite a bit of interest in whether America needed increased defenses. The Democratic and Progressive-oriented press dismissed the issue after Wilson's message to Congress in December 1914, although the Republicans continued to hammer away at the inefficiency and weakness of the defense establishment. Interest in preparedness picked up again in the summer of 1915, and the campaign really started to become intense after Wilson's Manhattan Club speech in November of that year. The newspaper campaign reached its peak during the winter and spring of 1916, while Congress was deliberating the issue, and then faded away during the course of the summer, as public attention

turned to other matters. There was a final burst of activity in the winter of 1916-17, when the national guard's performance on the Mexican border was evaluated, and new military proposals came before Congress.

In 1915-16, there were over 650 newspapers in the state of Wisconsin, most of them small weeklies, some of which carried almost nothing but local news and no editorial comment at all. It would be a little misleading to make any generalizations about the stand of the press at large on preparedness. But preparedness, for various reasons, was largely an urban affair, appealing to the classes most interested in overseas events, most concerned by the stories of the war that was steadily tearing up Europe and impinging on American rights on the seas. And the urban press of all major political parties and factions did join in an intense saturation campaign, by editorial and new-story and feature article, on behalf of preparedness. For the purpose of this thesis, three big representative papers can be cited: the Democratic Milwaukee Journal, with the largest circulation in the state; the Stalwart Republican Milwaukee Sentinel; and the Progressive Republican Wisconsin State Journal of Madison, which supported Wilson, LaFollette, and miscellaneous good causes like women's suffrage and prohibition. The changing stands and attitudes of these papers on the preparedness issue were echoed by the politically aligned papers in other cities of

the state, though often less articulately and explicitly, because of a greater detachment about the issue in smaller cities. Their opinions, their news coverage, shaped the beliefs of the informed and influential people in the state.

The newspapers in the state paid some attention to proposals for increased defense as early as November 1914. General W. W. Wotherspoon, the outgoing Army Chief of Staff, had recommended a regular army of 205,000, backed by a front-line reserve of 500,000, since in his opinion, we could neither defend ourselves from invasion by a first-class power, nor hold Hawaii, Alaska, the Canal Zone, or the Philippines in the face of enemy attack. The sturdily militant Sentinel agreed. The army ought to increase with the size of America's population, the paper felt, and this was neither retrogressing nor standing still.² A mobile army that could be seated in Yale Bowl and still leave room for the university's student body and faculty was much too small for the country's needs.³

The Sentinel also seconded Congressman Gardner's resolution demanding an inquiry into the state of the nation's defenses. This was not at all a political move, the Sentinel pointed out, since the blame for America's run down defenses "lies about evenly between both parties, and in no small measure with the past indifference to the whole matter of a public engrossed in making money and taking its pleasures."⁴ Taking this frank, fair, non-partisan stand,

the paper then went on to charge that what Democratic Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels didn't know about running his department "would fill Dr. Eliot's five-foot book shelves with matter which no sailor would regard as fit to print."⁵ Furthermore, Daniels had tried to "turn the Navy into a 'floating university,' and substitute chocolate creams for 'salt horse' and hard tack, and chautauqua courses for gun practice."⁶ Wilson's defense message to Congress on December 8th was "nebulous, irrelevant, schoolmasterish, and disappointing." The president had used a phrase "citizenry trained to the use of arms. The Sentinel, thinking only in terms of a regular army, particularly scoffed at this; Wilson might just as well have presented congress with a "thesis on the republic of Plato or the Spartan military system as imposed by Lycurgus."⁷

Others were more appreciative of the administration's views on defense. The Milwaukee Journal felt that although it might be possible to furnish the existing army with a more adequate supply of ordnance and transport, the nation should wait and see whether Europe's armament would be as threatening in a few months as it had once been. "Whatever the coming centuries may hold, this present generation has seen enough of war."⁸ The Journal did not find Wilson's message at all disappointing, but said that his protest against increased armament at this time "cannot but strike

a responsive chord in millions of American hearts."⁹ As for Congressman Gardner, the Journal suggested that he lock himself in a sixteen-inch disappearing gun-turret.¹⁰ To the charges of Republican critics that America's defense system was pathetically weak, the Journal replied scathingly: "About the most idiotic jingo journalism we know is that which day by day compares with defenseless and humbled China this country spending half a billion a year on defense."¹¹ Besides, the arguers for preparedness distorted the realities of world politics. "We ought to have an adequate navy, but anyone who tells you that it is a guarantee of peace is simply faking, with proof of his faking strewn all over the bottom of the Atlantic."¹²

The Progressive Wisconsin State Journal also was immune to clamors for increased armament. "...we are in a safer plight than before the war broke out. The nations from whom we may have been supposed to be in peril are struggling with other nations in an exhausting war."¹³ Like the Democratic paper, the Wisconsin State Journal felt we should wait a while for developments. However, in spite of itself, the paper was troubled by doubts as to just what position it should adopt on the subject, and polled some of the nation's leaders on their feelings about the matter, Admiral George Dewey, Vice-President Thomas R. Marshall, Senator George E. Chamberlain, ex-Navy Secretary George Von L. Meyer, and a couple of assorted bankers

stated that they were in favor of increased defenses. Mrs. Elmer Black of the American Peace Society, Socialist Meyer London, Ida M. Tarbell, Rabbi Stephen A. Wise, and ex-Navy Secretary Benjamin Tracy were against it.¹⁴ To help Congress make up its mind, the State Journal conducted a newspaper poll of its readers. Increased armament was voted down 311-118 by the end of November, and by December 10, with 1,251 votes cast in the Madison area, the proportion was still nearly 3 to 1 against any increase in military or naval preparation.¹⁵ "Over half of the people who voted on the question live outside the city. In almost every instance these opposed an increase in either department of the nation's defense. City people, at least the majority of those that voted, favored an increase in both forces."¹⁶ Since the People (or at least the country people) had spoken, the paper which always claimed to be defending their interests did not toy with the idea of advocating increased armament for a while.

By summer, things had changed. War still filled the pages of the newspapers, and showed no signs of going away. The Lusitania had gone down in May with her American passengers and her cargo of rifle-cartridges. The threat of involvement in the conflict had touched the nation; the Republicans hammered away with steady persistence at the nation's unpreparedness. Wilson began to have second thoughts on the issue. A Preparedness program might

produce both diplomatic and political dividends. Besides, a year of headlines incessantly proclaiming crisis and death had perhaps affected the once detached mood and pacific temper of the people. As the Journal said, when Daniels asked Thomas Edison to head a naval advisory board that summer: "The pathos of this is that it means that in all the world, war has become supreme. It rules our minds. We know that preparedness is a necessity."¹⁷ In July, Wilson asked for a report from his secretaries of war and the navy on the state of the nation's defenses. It was easy to see in what direction the President was now heading, and the Democratic Journal hastened to follow the line set by the leader of its party, and took a fresh interest in defense. It concluded that although a large standing army was neither necessary nor desirable, the present forces were ludicrously small. We needed coast defenses which could reply to 15-inch gun dreadnaughts firing at them from fifteen miles away. But we especially needed an invulnerable navy as first line of defense. "Large standing armies have many times destroyed national liberty, and we rightly deem an institution of this kind inimical to the spirit of the republic. A strong navy, however, has never been a menace to a people's liberty, and could not be to ours."¹⁸

On November 4th, speaking before the Manhattan Club to launch his campaign for preparedness, Woodrow Wilson

called for the training of 400,000 citizen soldiers in three years. He further called for a program of twenty dreadnaughts and battle cruisers, a hundred submarines, and seventy torpedo boat destroyers.¹⁹ Wilson's naval program envisaged that after five years America would have a total fleet of 27 dreadnaughts, 6 battle cruisers, 25 of the older type battleships, and ten armored cruisers.²⁰ As the papers detailed the military proposals, the regular army would be strengthened by ten regiments of infantry, four regiments of field artillery, fifty-two companies of coast artillery, four aero squadrons, and fifteen companies of engineers, an increase of some 2,000 officers and 32,000 enlisted men. The brand new citizen army of Continental soldiers would be enlisted for three years and have a reserve commitment of three more years, but would serve on active duty for perhaps no more than two months a year. The patriotism of youths and their employers was solicited for this new venture.²¹

With admirable promptitude, the Journal turned against fellow-Democrat William Jennings Bryan, who had advocated as a defense system twelve great national roads which would allow the shotgun-armed farmers of America to rush to meet any invading force and throw it back into the sea. Since the citizenry could do the job, this idea would save us from spending money on the army or navy. Besides, in Bryan's view, our preparedness relative to that of Europe

was increasing every day. The Milwaukee Journal pointed out (rather accurately) that Bryan could not distinguish between "a patriotic mob and an organized, efficient army." Besides, Great Britain could lose every warship in commission at the beginning of the war and still have a fleet superior to ours; Japan had recently appropriated \$100,000,000 for capital ships, and Germany had not yet lost a single dreadnaught.²² America must follow Wilson's lead and prepare. The Sentinel had already mentioned that an enemy could use the roads as well, and that Bryan's plan was the most hare-brained scheme since Thomas Jefferson's program for amphibious gunboats.²³

The Journal now called for a navy as large as Great Britain's, since "might respects might only and an arbitration treaty of itself does not enforce respect for our rights."²⁴ The Milwaukee Sentinel, as might be expected, had already invoked the shades of Decatur and Farragut to support such a program, since Britain was acting like a law unto herself on the high seas.²⁵ But the Journal's voice on matters of preparedness proved to be shriller even than that of its Republican competitor. When Theodore Roosevelt, not ordinarily an individual associated in the public mind with the advocacy of insipid half-measures in the line of defense, asked for a navy "second in the world in point of size and efficiency," the Journal cried out that "America, the wealthiest of nations, should not put herself

at the mercy or under the protection of any other nation whatsoever, and Col. Roosevelt, when he urges such a policy, is not sounding the note of true Americanism."²⁶ When Dr. Hexamer, of the German-American Alliance, suggested that the only danger to America was Japan, and called only for coast defenses, the Journal pointed out that with 21,000 miles of coast to defend, the cost of a continuous line of fortifications (perhaps, after all, not just what the doctor had envisaged) would make the expense of the Panama canal look like "30 cents."²⁷ What America needed was a fleet capable of meeting any other in the world.

Now the Journal's policy had swept around to the other end of the arc; now the preparedness campaign had begun in earnest, and the Journal glared around the circle of the globe and beheld a ring of potential menaces to America. The Germans had drowned our citizens, the British had interfered with our commerce, the French had boarded our ships on the high seas at gunpoint. "...the country has been compelled to face the threat of war in one quarter, and it may be said, she now faces the threat of war in another quarter. If she were as strong as she is right, any nation would think twice before committing any serious act against her honor or her rights."²⁸ Preparedness fervor went on. Yet even as late as February 1916, the Journal could still grant its opponents honesty. When the Anti-Preparedness Committee put out a slogan: "The

road to war is paved with preparedness. Go slow," the Journal confessed "There is all too much truth in this, and what impresses us vastly more than any catchword, the folder contains the names of some excellent citizens, whose sincere devotion to the public weal cannot be doubted."²⁹ All this was to pass as preparedness rolled on and merged itself with patriotism; in the Journal's eye today's sincerely devoted citizens became tomorrow's poltroons, a little group of willful men.

The Republican newspapers embraced Wilson's belated conversion to preparedness, and welcomed, as the Sentinel put it rather curiously, "a return to that patriotism and military spirit in all classes that were demanded in founding and perpetuating the republic."³⁰ Nonetheless, the paper did object to details of the plans. The Continental army was "attractive but theoretical," and "Everybody knows, as never before, that there is danger of war breaking out at almost any time."³¹ Roosevelt's accusation that Wilson had put forward only a shadow program had some merit. A real preparedness program would be an army of 250,000 regulars, and "no moonshine or paper army that would require twenty years to come to anything (if it ever did come to anything.)"³² The Sentinel found the menaces to the country closer at hand than the Journal; in its opinion Mexico would probably soon "do just what the experts have been saying it would do ever since 1911--throw its united

and determined strength in a war against the United States."³³

The Wisconsin State Journal was not unaffected by the increasing number of drums that beat a call to arms. At first the paper took a narrowly budget-minded and rather hostile view of the preparedness program. Its watchword was "Put all the money into defense."³⁴ Sixty-eight per cent of federal revenues were going for war, past or future, and we got less for our money than any other nation. \$10,000,000 had been wasted on smokeless powder from 1905 to 1913, and the munitions trusts were making profits of from twenty to sixty per cent.³⁵ Our defense money was dissipated in politically-sited dockyards, in an army enlisted for wastefully long periods and littered over dozens of useless posts in skeleton units. As for the moneyed interests who backed preparedness:

What do they want? They want Congress to create the largest standing army and the largest navy in the world. They want the United States to buy a uniform and a gun or a sword for every male citizen over 18 and under 35, and if they could, they would make it 55. They want to make the uniforms and the guns... and sell them to the United States government for three to four times the money it would cost the United States government to make these things for its own soldiers.

In short, they want all the money they can get.³⁶

In short, the State Journal continued to emphasize the necessity of government munitions factories which would take the profit out of war.

Senator LaFollette advocated this too. But the Wisconsin State Journal, like other progressive papers, was to develop a much more positive attitude towards preparedness than Senator LaFollette, its onetime idol, who fought the movement to the bitter end. By the fall of 1915, the State Journal was convinced that war was contagious. The paper dismissed the shortsighted views of those who said "when this war is over, England and France will not feel up to the task of breaking up a dog fight on their front lawn." History did not substantiate the claims of these people. America had been willing to fight France over Mexico after the Civil War, Napoleon had embarked on one war after the other, Serbia had attacked Bulgaria after the First Balkan War, and more recently Japan had displayed a willingness to fight China for the possession of Tsingtao. "The exhaustion of England or Germany or France after this war is no insurance that one of them would not attack us six months after the conflict began."³⁷ Besides, the paper added at a later date, "...all accurate information leads to the belief that Japan in preparing an attack on the United States," and the Japs already had 61,000 trained men on the West Coast and 100,000 more in nearby Mexico, along with the 90,000 reservists who were living in Hawaii and the Philippines.³⁸

Once it had been won over, the Wisconsin State Journal, like the Milwaukee Journal, carried preparedness to an

extreme. If the Sentinel favored an enlarged regular army, the more progressive papers were attracted by the idea that preparedness could be used to give us a citizen army--voluntary or compulsory. Going beyond Wilson's proposals, the State Journal leaned in the direction of universal military training. So it wound up in the usual liberal position of being willing to endorse almost any great sweeping reform no matter what rights and traditions might be swept away in the act of achieving it. A citizen army was democratic, it would place the burden of defense equally on all, and any taint of European militarism would be purged by the fact that it would be indubitably American. Of course, while a mere increase in size of the regular army and navy could only dent the budget, a mass conscript army could profoundly alter a nation's liberties and whole psychology. But this was not quite seen by the Wisconsin State Journal at that time; the paper was also in favor of prohibition, and compulsion seemed to be an easy and efficacious way of furthering progressive ideals in 1916. As the State Journal pointed out, even jury duty was a form of conscription, and "We will never be a great people til we act on the great principle that most social duties ought to be obligatory."³⁹

In its more reasonable moments, the State Journal backed the Chamberlain Bill in the Senate, since the bill was a combination of Swiss and Australian army systems.⁴⁰

At other times, the paper allowed its views on democracy to carry it into positions as far-removed from reality as some of Bryan's views. Since there were 7,000,000 New Yorkers, as many people as the population of Serbia, they should be trained and equipped to defend themselves, "like Swiss." If they couldn't do this, they weren't worth defending. "But we know they are real men," the paper concluded cheerfully.⁴¹

The State Journal also took a more extreme view of preparedness's interrelationship with the current international scene than the Sentinel did. The Stalwart paper after all (possibly with a tender care for the sensibilities of its German-American readers in Milwaukee) had editorialized that "999 out of every 1,000 of sane and pro-American Americans are distinctly opposed to any madhouse policy of plunging the country into a distinctively European and unprecedently irrational and unjustifiable war for any legal punctilio whatsoever."⁴² The State Journal, on the other hand, thought that the President's statements that he would use force to protect the lofty principles of international law and our markets "produce a feeling of security--the kind which comes from a realization of power and the knowledge of how to direct it in the best way."⁴³

And yet the State Journal still took pains to insist that the trusts or the imperialists not be allowed to profit from all this. Its pacifist rural progressive principles

kept an uneasy joint occupancy of the editorial page with its more grandiose dreams of national exaltation. As late as May 1916, the paper praised pacifist Henry Ford, because he opposed the building of dreadnaughts, which were useless, and worse, enriched the steel-makers.⁴⁴ All the nation needed in the way of a sea defense were submarines and planes. Again, even though we might need ships after all to preserve the Monroe Doctrine, "when the mad mob of the world, spurred by poverty, breaks loose," we also needed people to make sure that the money paid out for them didn't go for excess profits to the big corporations.⁴⁵

It must not be thought that a concern about 'pork' in defense was confined to the State Journal, which did tend to monomania on the subject. The Milwaukee Journal, generally a much more temperate paper in this respect, also charged that "hundreds of millions have been squandered on the army and navy for many years without giving us proper defense..." Big guns had remained on paper and a senator had pastured his sheep on what was supposed to be a government rifle range, while the dollars poured out.⁴⁶

Some of these worries were quieted by the reassurances of the President himself, who came to Wisconsin on January 31st, 1916, to promote the cause of preparedness. In Milwaukee, the President joined a crowd of 7,500 at the Auditorium in singing America before he addressed them for 45 minutes.⁴⁷ But his best and most pointed speech was a

whistlestop effort at Racine, in which he denied that the preparedness campaign was a device of the moneyed interests.

Gentlemen, do not allow yourselves to be misled by statements of that sort. Anything that the government does somebody is going to make money out of, but the impulse for this thing does not come from these quarters. The impulse comes from disinterested men who know the actual circumstance of the country and who know that these things are immediately necessary.⁴⁸

Ultimately the progressive-minded newspapers were willing to accept this line of reasoning in order to get the preparedness they so ardently desired.

While giving editorial support to the cause, the press helped to fix the preparedness drive in the public eye through more subtle ways, such as giving ample coverage to the alternative programs propounded by politicians and amateur strategists. Wilson's initial defense proposals were met by all sorts of counter-proposals from pacifists and do-gooders in opposition to the idea, and from restrained conservatives, thoughtful progressives, and out-and-out jingos like Roosevelt, who deemed Wilson's ideas on preparedness the "wholly inadequate" programs of a "Byzantine logothete."⁴⁹ Ex-President Taft, for instance, was in favor of rational and moderate preparedness, using the Atlantic and Pacific to put us on an equality with any attacking nation. With a certain common-sense, he came out on November 11 for a navy equal to Germany's, or to that of any nation capable of mobilizing quickly a big expeditionary

force. A mobile army of 100,000 would do, provided it were backed by the national guard and 300,000 volunteers or reserves who could be ready in six months.⁵⁰ Senator George E. Chamberlain, the head of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, pressed first for a Swiss-type citizen soldiery, then for a 250,000 man army, a good deal larger than the President's request.⁵¹

Senator John D. Works of California, on the other hand, came up with a fantastic plan for a standing army of a million men, parcelled out on their own five-acre lots with their families, peacefully engaged in reforestation and irrigation for ten months of the year. He also mentioned in passing that there were enough Japanese in California to destroy every line of communication from the East in case of war.⁵²

If America were going to prepare, there was at first much sentiment among progressive people that she extract the most good possible out of it by turning the trainees into government workmen instead of soldiers. So the papers carried such oddities as the Post Plan, the brainchild of Wilson's Assistant Secretary of Labor, which proposed that, since soldiers could be trained in a year, they should devote the rest of their four year enlistment to learning a useful civilian trade, except for a small cadre who would train to be NCO's.⁵³ The idea was first broached in December; the Milwaukee Journal picked it up again in

March 1916, in an article entitled "Big Army as a Social Asset." West Point could be stripped of its narrow militaristic function of training leaders for battle and be turned into a Federal University; the feudalistic army could become a great self-supporting training school for the nation's youth.⁵⁴

Along the same lines, Milwaukee and Madison papers carried Herbert Quick's ideas on an Army-which-would-give-the-Boys-a-Chance, a similar vocational-school-cum-Boy-Scout plan which would result in "utilizing for educational purposes the eight-to-twelve hours a day the soldier who is nothing else wastes."⁵⁵ Mr. Quick rhapsodized, "Let us make it our business to give training to such men in great school barracks, in which the article manufactured will be American citizenship with an army on the side"⁵⁶ The plan would be open to lads of sixteen and up who dropped out of school. "Should war break out, they would constitute our regular army, and go to the front;"⁵⁷ certainly an inducement for any normal boy to stay in school.

The exact effect on American life of such socialized militarized bodies was not dwelt upon, nor was the advantage which the federal government might accrue by supporting organizations combining the military inefficiency of reserve units with the economic burden of a big standing army. The plans are interesting as curios; they were not adopted and they show principally the interest of the times in combining

patriotism and uplift.

If the people of Wisconsin could be confronted with divergent schemes for preparedness at the breakfast table, they could read invasion scares, the most lurid of them put out by official sources. As early as September 28, the popular Herbert Quick, in a confused little article in the Wisconsin State Journal entitled "Could the United States Be Conquered? Yes" told his readers that 100,000 men landed on either coast would be three times as strong as any force that could be moved against them for two to four weeks, and could wipe out all opposition with long-range artillery, advancing step-by-step- across the whole country behind their own barrage.⁵⁸ This analysis defied all the principles of tactics, logistics, and commonsense, but perhaps the editors of the State Journal did not possess much knowledge in these fields. In a more credible vein, Quick mentioned that the Germans probably had more machine guns than we had men, and that our conduct of any future war would probably be impeded by the fact that there were not three American generals who had ever commanded a full division, or even seen one.⁵⁹

The Milwaukee Journal's Professor R. M. Johnson was more restrained. He felt that any expedition debarking from transports along our coasts would be a hazard. "Being a raid or a gamble, we may therefore postulate small numbers, which the difficulty of sea transport further imposes.

Three or four army corps, of 30,000 to 40,000 men each, is a moderate estimate...The Army could not sustain itself except by occupying a great city like New York. And there it would meet with almost insuperable difficulties in receiving reinforcements."

In May 1915, the Journal had run articles by the Reverend Dr. Crane, deploring Italy's entrance into the European War as another example of the pernicious effects of armament programs. "When you have been preparing for a certain game for a long time, and the opportunity comes to play it, you naturally want to go in."⁶¹ Less than a year later the Journal was running a Sunday serial entitled "The Invasion of America" in an attempt to scare the country into an interest in armament.

The story-line of "The Invasion of America" had a certain simplicity: we are invaded by a coalition of four European nations, who assail us with an enormous fleet and a huge expeditionary force embarked within 48 hours after the declaration of war, a feat of amphibious warfare which would stagger General Eisenhower. The fleet sweeps aside our impotent little navy, launches 1200 planes to overawe the country, and lands an army that overruns New England and the Middle Atlantic States. The factual accounts of our defense inadequacies were emphasized in heavy black type every couple of paragraphs in this fancy, and the literary style of the piece can best be seen from the

following quotation (taken from the scene in which the bad news is brought to an anti-preparedness congressman.)

"'Good God, man!' The congressman wiped his forehead with a trembling fat hand. 'I can't go back and tell my people that.'" The denouement was particularly illuminating in its revelation of the conception of war held by some of the preparedness advocates: the coalition, after looting and taxing the occupied portion of the United States for eight leisurely months, reembarks all its troops in 72 hours before the newly formed American Army can attack, and sails for home with billions of dollars in profits and the quiet satisfaction of having injured the honor and economy of the United States for the next fifty years. All in all, it was an interesting conception of the economics of war.

But it was not only editorials and articles which dinned preparedness into the minds of Wisconsin's newspaper public. Reminders of the European war and exhortations for increased defense crept into the advertising columns in the late winter and spring of 1916. The Ladies Home Journal advertised in the papers that its feature article for April would be "Why I Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier," by a Swiss Mother.⁶³ Grape Nuts came out with an ad showing a battleship under full steam, with the caption: "The Vital Factor."⁶⁴ In April 1916, the Milwaukee Journal's teaser for its Sunday edition, entitled "Events You Want to Know About", listed only the following four

articles: "Preparedness Against War"; "Discontent in the British Cabinet"; "Betrayed by a Dog" (the story of a French P.O.W.); and "With the Boys in Mexico."⁶⁵ If the people of Milwaukee, at least, were unaware of the crisis-racked world around them, the press could scarcely be held accountable.

If the visions presented to the Wisconsin newspaper public by amateurs at this time were frightening enough, the statistics given to them by the experts were even more intimidating. The War College in Washington, D. C. had compiled an estimate of the size of attack that might be mounted on the continental U. S. by every major power on earth; since this was to support an increase of appropriations, the figures did not err on the side of smallness. The enlightened guesswork of our foremost military thinkers turned out as follows:⁶⁶

Austria-								
Hungary	could land	180,000	troops with	equipment	in	40 7/10	days	
France	" "	404,226	" "	" "	" "	30	days	
Germany	" "	827,000	" "	" "	" "	30 8/10	days	
Great								
Britain	" "	170,000	" "	" "	" "	27	days	
Italy	" "	227,000	" "	" "	" "	35	days	
Japan	" "	238,367	" "	" "	" "	41	days	
Russia	" "	104,074	" "	" "	" "	40	days	

These figures had been drawn from total mobilization strength returns of August 1914. From a military standpoint, they were largely meaningless, except as a device to create enough popular alarm so that the army could get a whacking big increase in the budget. No one could tell what

capabilities any of the powers would have after the war. As for 1915-16, Germany, for instance, could hardly take 827,000 men from its fighting front and land them in New Jersey when its fleet didn't dare to venture outside Heligoland. Since the nations of Europe were so completely in the grip of rivalry and war lust, the possibility that one of them would commit its fleet and a big chunk of its army to a military adventure 3,000 to 5,000 miles away from its endangered frontiers was remote, even after the present hostilities had ended. Diplomatic factors were ignored in preparing this report. Neither the logistical problem of supplying all of these troops, nor the naval problem of transporting them past a strong fleet operating in home waters, landing them on a hostile shore, and maintaining their communications against raids, seems to have been considered. Apparently, what would have been the most formidable naval-military operation in the history of warfare was viewed as a simple proposition of so many men, so many ships, rather like moving commuters on the Staten Island ferry.

All the figures proved was that if everyone combined to attack us at once, a contingency almost as likely as anything else advanced, we would have 2,146,000 troops on our hands, a possibility which would have required so large a standing army by the standards of the time as to make the whole proposition absurd.

The newspapers were principally responsible for this publicity campaign, but not entirely. In February 1916 the motion picture "Battle Cry of Peace came to Milwaukee accompanied by an illustrated lecture by Dr. Hiram Maxim, the machine-gun magnate, all for 25 cents.⁶⁷ The film showed strangely uniformed foreign troops taking over America as artillery fire significantly altered New York's skyline and bayonets held back righteously indignant American citizens. The picture was strongly recommended by all the newspapers in town except the Socialist Milwaukee Leader and the pro-German Milwaukee Free Press, which took a jaundiced view of preparedness anyway. The Journal, in fact, ran four or five favorable reviews a day to promote the picture, written by National Security League members, businessmen, the superintendent of schools, the widow of ex-Senator Mitchell, and the German consular agent.⁶⁸

The Leader's criticism was that the film was a propagandistic appeal to "ignorance and to the passions of the hurrah mob who applauds barnstorming hits in a 5-cent vaudeville."⁶⁹

The Free Press's main objection was that the foreign troops in the film looked like they were supposed to be German; the paper was learnedly rebutted by the Journal, which managed to turn up with an ex-Imperial officer who proved that the screen invaders could not have been intended to suggest German soldiers because, among other things, the arrangement of buttons on their tunics and the manner of

carrying their sabers were not those followed in the Imperial German Army.⁷⁰

There was little reply to this barrage of propaganda for preparedness in the pages of most newspapers. Henry Ford did take out full page advertisements against the movement in late February 1916, a spectacular effort, but still only a one-shot affair. He charged that the media of information and education had been swayed by the clamor for armaments. Preparedness was a delusion foisted upon the country by self-seeking munitions makers and double-dealing officials. All the issues of war would be settled by men sitting around a table, not by men dying in a trench.⁷¹ The Milwaukee Journal admired Mr. Ford's sincerity (which he had demonstrated, in the paper's view, by spending so much money) but deplored his reasoning. "The world goes armed and might preys on weakness. Mr. Ford asks us not to prepare, but he offers no guarantee that we shall not repent in bitterness and anguish."⁷²

More rebuttal for Mr. Ford was provided a fortnight later when Villa attacked Columbus, New Mexico. The Army's standard machine-gun showed a tendency to jam when loaded in the dark, and it took a week for the nation painfully to assemble enough troops for a long-range pursuit into the mountains of Mexico. When the force finally set out, it had no proper staff to coordinate it, it was inadequately equipped for its job, and half of its invaluable

aero squadron was put out of action in three days by accidents and malfunctions.⁷³ The Mexican expedition was a war only in microcosm, yet it seemed to point up the dangers which might happen in a really serious situation. As the Journal said: "The thousands of columns that have been written and spoken have not exposed our nakedness and lack of preparedness for defense as have the last few days, when there has been thrust upon us the duty of protecting the lives of our people and the dignity of the nation. The absurdity of the pretext that we have an army is now clear to everyone."⁷⁴ The Wisconsin State Journal agreed, and noted the odd eagerness of papers (such as the Sentinel) which balked at any trouble with Europe to intervene in Mexico, especially since an effective intervention would take 300,000 men, which we didn't have.⁷⁵

On the 17th of April, the Wisconsin State Journal came out for universal military training (not service.)⁷⁶ Sentimentalists might protest that military training would impress young men with martial attitudes at the most impressionable age, but the Progressive paper pointed out that the Civil War had been fought by boys, many of whom had been killed because of their lack of training. The paper made a careful distinction between universal training and universal service, a distinction which might prove illusory if such a plan were ever put in practice. The minimum period of training advocated by anyone responsible

was six months, and the Army chief of staff wanted a year. If there were a demand for troops during this period, the chances were that the training would become extremely realistic. It was all very well to admire the democratic Swiss system, but the Swiss were not faced with guerrilla raids across the Alps. The State Journal never bothered with such low practicalities. It was lost in a nobler dream: "We must mobilize the nation--the entire hundred million--before we can hope to cope with any European power either in war or in peace; for altho we admit that Europe is war-mad, we must not overlook the war method in the war-madness."⁷⁷ Plainly the forward-looking State Journal, once so repelled by the spectacle of massed bayonets, was now a little fascinated by it. Once committed to preparedness, the progressive mind would go further and faster than the old-fashioned big army and navy stalwarts.

If the campaign for preparedness showed a tendency to get more extreme, it also showed a tendency to become more bitter. When Milwaukee's Polish newspaper, the Kuryer Polski, came out for preparedness, it warned the country not to rely wholly on the navy for defense. "There is danger founded on recent experience that our warships would be tampered with and disabled or destroyed from within, even before they sighted the enemy fleet," an unpleasant reference to certain German attempts at hampering production

of munitions for the Allies in this country.⁷⁸ The Milwaukee Journal imputed stupidity or political chicanery to anyone who dared to deny that the Midwest was for preparedness.⁷⁹ One of its feature articles quoted the words of the President of Princeton University on the subject of those who balked at furthering their nation's defenses: "Let us not shrink from calling things by their right names, and therefore let us brand as traitor whoever lives in our midst enjoying the protection and prosperity of our country and yet dares to express by word or deed the spirit of hyphenated loyalty."⁸⁰ Some of the German-Americans in Wisconsin were against preparedness; some of the rural progressive Congressmen against preparedness had German-American constituents. Patriots could only see a sinister pattern here. The propaganda was taking its effect, and preparedness was beginning to show ominous overtones of a semi-hysterical chauvinism.

After all the hullabaloo, Congress passed the fairly moderate Hay Army Bill at the beginning of the summer. The Wisconsin press was not too enthusiastic, but not overly critical, either. The Democratic Journal was somewhat disappointed a little later in the summer when the House Naval Committee recommended the construction of five battle cruisers as a lesser evil than the Navy Board's recommendation of three battleships and four battle cruisers. Still, it pointed out that it was a better recommendation

than any Republican Congress had ever turned out, though the paper still called for the building of a squadron of each type of heavy warship, which would give the country four battleships and four battle cruisers. Fortunately for the navy, the Battle of Jutland came along at an opportune time. Three of the British battle cruisers engaged in the action blew up and sank almost with the first enemy salvos. Congress speedily put battleships back into the compromise bill, and voted to begin construction of the Journal's cherished two squadrons immediately.⁸¹ All in all, it was a good year for defense. This year's defense appropriation was \$403,710,421.89 more than that of fiscal year 1915-1916.⁸² In five years the nation would have ten new dreadnaughts and six new battle cruisers, and would be able to field 900,000 trained men in case of invasion. After the passage of the legislation, the preparedness issue lay dormant for a while, as the attention of editorial writers and the public was drawn away to the mobilization of the Wisconsin National Guard and then to the fall election campaign, in which the need for preparedness was not a matter for dispute.

An almost united press had done its utmost to impress the necessity for national preparedness on the city-dwellers of Wisconsin by means of editorials and news coverage. The Wisconsin papers gave strong support to the local preparedness activities, sometimes to the point of exaggerating

their actual accomplishments. In much of this, the press displayed overzealousness, and yet it was trying to inspire a mass movement and rouse the public consciousness, all for the sake of a national need. These things cannot be done unless the promoters of a cause, at least, show a little exaggerated enthusiasm. In short, the newspapers were trying to live up to their legitimate role as conscience of the community. Yet at times in this movement, the press did not serve its community well. The progressive papers, which had taken an unrealistic and preachy approach to the European conflict in 1914, displayed an equally unrealistic and unnecessary terror of the possibility of military action against the United States a year later. Although the Stalwart Sentinel was fairly consistent in its approach, the Milwaukee Journal and the Wisconsin State Journal shifted from one extreme to the other, and helped to foster the exaggerated and a little hysteric nationalism that set the tone for much of the bitterness World War I was to engender in Wisconsin. Nor did these papers generally give much space or consideration to the views of the people who opposed preparedness, although in justice, it must be admitted that giving a fair presentation of the issue to a newspaper audience would not have been easy. Both sides were guilty of using misleading statistics, and the very accounting systems and strength reports used by the army and navy at this time helped to muddle any

intelligent thought on the matter.

There were still indications that the preparedness issue was not quite dead in the state and nation. In May, the President had refused to commit himself as being opposed to either a 250,000 man army or to universal military training.⁸³ The national guard was grumbling in the heat of the Mexican border, while in Wisconsin, voices called for more extreme measures of preparedness. In August, during the course of the largest war games ever undertaken by the navy department, the invading Red fleet theoretically annihilated the defending Blue fleet and landed an imaginary army on the shores of Long Island, and the Socialist Milwaukee Leader commented bitterly: "How can the armament and munitions trust expect the old part senators to get any testimony for a bigger army and navy unless the invaders smash the home defenders? You bet the invaders won--the invaders under the banner of the dollar."⁸⁴

All of this indicated that the cause of preparedness might once again flourish in state and nation.

CHAPTER III

THE BIG PARADE:

Local Activity in the Wisconsin Preparedness Movement

The preparedness movement in Wisconsin was not entirely a matter of newspaper editorials and movie thrillers. In a very real sense, it was a local cause, and not merely a remote issue imposed on people's consciousness from above. Preparedness became a popular topic for speakers at club and church meetings. It was reflected in the schools. Organizations of city businessmen boasted it like a Community Chest fund drive. The theme was able to draw not only upon an increasing national consciousness, but upon local pride and popular fancy. Preparedness sparked parades and influenced newspaper advertisement. From a national issue, it turned into a local fad, like mah-jong. If the enthusiasm for preparedness left the great rural mass of Wisconsin's population relatively unmoved, it certainly stirred the more sophisticated and "wide-awake" urban elements. There was much hoopla and absurdity connected with the preparedness movement. There was also an element of some sincerity, as was shown by the action of Mayor L. W. Thayer of Ripon, who attempted to donate a proposed \$75,000 federal appropriation for his city to strengthening the army aviation service.¹

The principal local pressure group for preparedness was the National Security League, regarded by some as a Paul Revere for the nation, by others as a tool of the Steel Trust, and by the Wisconsin State Journal as both. The State Journal spoke of the armor-plate and munitions manufacturers allegedly behind the organization as men whose "interest in the American nation smacks more of treason than of patriotism," but supported the League as an inducement for preparedness in a war-mad world.² Originally, the League had been founded in New York City by a lawyer named S. Stanwood Menken in December 1914, with the announced purpose of merely finding out the country's state of defense, without engaging in any pro-military or pro-naval propaganda.³ By June 1915, at its Peace and Preparation Conference at New York's Hotel Astor, the organization had grown a little more militant: a 21-foot Whitehead torpedo formed the principal decoration of the lobby, and Hudson Maxim, the machine-gun magnate, was on hand to reverently recite the words of Theodore Roosevelt: "The professional pacifists...are at best an unlovely body of men, probably the most undesirable citizens that the country contains. The advocates of pacifism...have been preaching poltroonery."⁴ Later that summer, William R. Brewster, national field secretary, began missionary work, and set up a chapter of the League in Milwaukee, assisted by the Merchants and Manufacturers Association.

As might be expected from the way it was organized, the leadership of the Wisconsin branch was drawn from business circles. Augustus H. Vogel, of the big Vogel and Pfister Leather Company, became president. Willet M. Spooner, the son of the ex-senator and a rising young Stalwart Republican lawyer, was elected secretary, and eventually became one of the five vice presidents of the national organization. Two other Milwaukee businessmen, Fred L. Pierce and Robert Camp, became respectively vice-president and treasurer, while James C. Well, a popular auctioneer, was hired as executive secretary. The local League organization was ^{not} under the thumb of the national office, but pretty much autonomous, and later proved this by neglecting to remit to the national headquarters in New York the 25 per cent of dues collected that the League constitution called for.⁵

At first, the League did not prosper in Wisconsin. Although business circles had organized it, the conservative Chamber of Commerce had not endorsed it, since the strength of America's army and navy had nothing to do with strictly commercial interests and was "of an outside and political matter."⁶ By the beginning of October 1915, there were only 100 members, and forty-eight of these were on the executive committee.⁷ But as preparedness sentiment swelled in Wisconsin, the League's fortunes rose.

In early October, the League induced Governor Emmanuel

Philipp, himself a proponent of increased defenses, to appoint eighteen mayors from all political parties as a state executive committee.⁸ Although this did not actually accomplish very much in terms of enlarging the League, since "about 95%" of its members were always residents of the Milwaukee area, it did serve to put the League in the public eye, and give it recognition.⁹ In mid-November the League set up headquarters at 428 Milwaukee Street, Milwaukee, and announced plans for a state-wide campaign to enroll 30,000 members. It stated that its purposes were patriotic and educational. As part of its educational function, the League would attempt to prevent congressmen and senators from "trying to show how money for defense should be spent...they are too uninformed to talk intelligently." Members would get a small blue shield-shaped button, with an eagle and the caption "National Security League" emblazoned in gold. Forty delegates were scheduled to go to Chicago November 27 for a general conference.¹⁰

In mid-December the League sent out letters to the right sort of clubs in Milwaukee, explaining the country's lack of preparedness and urging the members to join. Rotary, University, Deutscher, Athletic, Press, Scandinavian, Calumet, City, Town, Country, and Woodmont Country were among the clubs contacted, as well as the Chamber of Commerce, the Real Estate Association, and the Merchants and Manufacturers Association. In addition, doctors, lawyers,

ministers and manufacturers not gregarious enough to belong to a club would be approached individually." As the campaign went on, application blanks turned up in nearly 100 stores and hotels in downtown Milwaukee. Another potentially fruitful source of members was exploited when department store managers and factory heads started to canvass their help for members. The League heads wanted to make Milwaukee's enrollment figure two or three times that of any comparable city.

In January field secretary Brewster returned to the Badger State. He called for a closer tie-in of the national guard with the federal government in a speech before the League in Milwaukee, praising Wisconsin's National Guard and Generals King, Boardman, and Holway. He said of the preparedness program: "It is national necessity that must go through under the dictates only of pure patriotism," and refrained from mentioning the Steel Trust at all.¹²

The following month Milwaukee's Mayor Gerhard Bading appointed a committee of one hundred and twenty prominent citizens to represent the city at the mayors' conference on preparedness at St. Louis March 3rd and 4th. Willet M. Spooner, the League's secretary, was named head of the delegation.¹³ On February 16th, Brewster met with a sort of rump session of the committee (only twenty-five showed up) to tell them that the mayors' conference was the most

important step in the preparedness campaign yet taken. The program was "not crystallizing so rapidly as we had hoped," since the advances of the advocates of preparedness unfortunately brought forth greater activities on the part of the pacifists. He also reassured them that the German-Americans were loyal and had been maligned--indeed, since St. Louis along with Milwaukee and Cincinnati had been felt by Eastern papers to be indifferent to preparedness, one of the purposes of this conference was to show the Midwest's devotion to increased armaments.¹⁴ Brewster himself was apparently well satisfied on this point. He returned to Chicago and reassured Mayor William H. Thompson that the Germans of Milwaukee unanimously favored the idea of increased defenses, a statement which, in view of the fact that Milwaukee Germans comprised the readership of the Germania-Herold and the Vorwaerts, can only be termed hyperbolic.¹⁵

Down at Saint Louis with New York's Mayor John P. Mitchel, Big Bill Thompson and other leading patriots, Spooner did a fine job as chairman of the conference's resolutions committee. A provision calling for universal military service was passed without a dissenting vote, worded so that there could be no mistake that it affected all levels of wealth and position.¹⁶ The summer before, Vogel had said "no conscription is needed among our 100,000,000 people, because we have plenty of patriotic

men," but that had been before the preparedness movement had really started to roll.¹⁷

The League did not rest content with merely enlisting businessmen and their employees. In late February, a Boys National Security League was brought together with the help of the hyperactive Willet M. Spooner.¹⁸ In March, the papers announced that Society women (such as the wives of many League members) would take a six-week course of 15 lessons in Red Cross work in case of war, under League sponsorship. At first Red Cross nurses would conduct the classes, and later a regular army officer would give the women some pointers.¹⁹ One hundred thirty five women were League members by April 1, all but fourteen of them from Milwaukee.²⁰ The League did not continue to organize Wisconsin's women, however, for fear of a jurisdictional conflict with other patriotic organizations, such as the Preparedness League, an affiliation of the Women's Defense League of Milwaukee, the Women's Special Aid Society, and the Women's Section of the Navy League.²¹

The University of Wisconsin was another opportunity for League activity. A hundred students, including some girls, enrolled in May 1916 after a big mass meeting addressed by Professors Carl R. Fish, A.L.P. Dennis, and S.K. Hornbeck. The three professors, Lieutenant Wrightson, the university drill instructor, and eleven students were named as an executive committee, and it was decided that the

students would be charged dues at a special rate of only \$.25 a year. Philip LaFollette turned up as an executive committeeman, an action not calculated to please his father.²² At the June elections of officers, the editor of the Cardinal, J. Willard F. Moore, became president.²³

By May, the National Security League had 2,200 public-spirited men and women enrolled in Wisconsin.²⁴ Entrance requirements were admirably designed to encourage growth. Although memberships started at \$25.00, they could also be obtained for \$5.00 or \$1.00. Eventually memberships were sold for as little as \$.10. And, as popular "Jimmie" Well explained, "Reports that membership obligates the member to enlist in time of war are erroneous."²⁵ Small wonder that the League grew rapidly, when one could obtain a blue button certifying one as a 100 per cent American and a civic booster besides, and at so little cost.

Beginning in 1916, people who had not joined the National Security League were exposed anyway to a drumroll of speeches on the necessity of increased defense by national guard officers and civic figures. The most prominent of the after-dinner speakers was Brigadier-General Charles King, retired, West Point graduate, author, veteran of the Philippines campaign, and a former state adjutant general. King still assisted the Wisconsin Guard's training activities, but his most important services to the nation's defense were now at the speaker's rostrum. On

January 8, for instance, he informed Milwaukee's Saturday Lunch Club that Germany could land 385,000 soldiers and 81,000 horses on our shores in fifteen days. The same ships could land an additional 420,000 soldiers and 94,000 horses within ninety days. Since all of America's munition centers were within 100 miles of the East Coast, this could mean no good.²⁶ The Wisconsin Society of Wisconsin learned from General King that any one of three nations could land 300,000 fully equipped soldiers on American soil within fifteen days,²⁷ while Milwaukee's all-Polish Kosciusko Company of the national guard was apprised of the dangers of 330,000 Germans landing on the Jersey coast two weeks after the beginning of war.²⁸ The General took care to point out the seriousness of the situation: a blow in the New York area would set the country back fifty years, only forty per cent of the organized militia was fit for service, and anyway, it had taken 370,000 Americans to overcome 41,300 trained British regulars in the revolution.

The same dangers were pointed out by other speakers, who used the same set of figures which the Army War College had so conveniently conjured up. Major Irving A. Fish, W.N.G. a lawyer by profession, brought the attention of St. Paul's Men's Club to the number of armed men that Germany and Japan could deposit on our coasts. To combat this threat, we should either abandon the navy and station adequate military posts in each section of the country, or create a

standing army of 200,000, with reserves of 1,000,000.²⁹ Milwaukee School Superintendant Milton C. Potter, addressing the convention of Wisconsin Superintendents and Supervising Principals, called for at least a year of compulsory military service for every lad in the great open-air school of the Army.³⁰ Ex-Governor Francis McGovern, at a banquet in Milwaukee's Park Place Methodist Church, advocated tripling the present effective fighting force to meet these threats of invasion. The United States had only one man per thousand inhabitants, while France had thirty-four, and Germany had fifty-one.³¹ F. C. Best, vice-president of the Wisconsin Trust Company, repeated the figures the War College had provided for these after-dinner numbers games to the fisherman's club of Immanuel Presbyterian, and added for good measure a fairly lurid picture of the probable fate of the West Coast at the hands of the Japs. As he evaluated the situation, the Nipponese troops would land around Centralia, seizing the Bitter Root Mountains and the Blue Hills of Oregon. The United States would need 165,000 men just to protect San Francisco's water supply. The capture of Los Angeles would seal the fate of Southern California.³²

All of this war talk did not pass without some opposition. When General King spoke at Sheboygan High School in March, he was promptly censured by the school board, which also condemned the high school principal and the

Sheboygan Woman's Club for inviting him. The board unanimously passed a resolution forbidding principals to let outsiders speak without the school board's consent, and Commissioner John A. Balzer was reported to have called General King, perhaps a little intemperately, "the insane mouthpiece of a rabid capitalistic armament ring which is striving to saddle new burdens on the people."³³ The Sheboygan Woman's Club and PTA censured the school board with equal promptitude, someone charged the board with "Pro-German sentiment," the Milwaukee Journal described its members as mollycoddles, and the board attempted to explain that it had not really meant to protest against talks on preparedness but only against the fact that the board had not been consulted beforehand. Balzer denied calling General King a tool of the armament trust, and merely said that he didn't feel any question as unsettled as preparedness should be brought before young, immature minds.³⁴ All in all, though conservative farmers might be almost as unconcerned about the whole thing as their own dairy cows, the cause of preparedness, backed by civic leaders and the press, appeared to hold the cities in a firm grip for a while. The next open opposition did not come til June, and this was over a minor matter. Mrs. Victor L. Berger, wife of the Socialist editor and head of the Milwaukee school board, was able to prevent high-school principals from releasing the names of 18-year old graduates to the

recruiters by a 3-2 vote of the board. But, although she personally felt preparedness was "military hysteria," Mrs. Berger pointed out that the vote had not been against preparedness per se, but only in favor of letting the parents decide whether or not they wanted their children to enlist.³⁵

Wisconsinites had a chance to do something more concrete for the cause than listen to speeches about preparedness. Both the army and the navy had set up training camps or cruises for business and professional men and students. Applicants were required to pay their own way and furnish their own uniforms. In return, they were given a few weeks of military or naval training in the status of cadets. Cadet status was vital, since ordinary enlisted personnel at this time had to converse with officers in the third person and were forbidden to initiate conversations, not an ideal learning situation.

The army camp idea had started on a small scale in 1913 with two military training camps for students.³⁶ By the summer of 1915, the army had set up a camp for Midwestern businessmen at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, scheduled to run from September 20 to October 17. Although the army had planned for a thousand trainees, less than half that number had signed up by the first week of September, and very few of these were from Wisconsin, much to the annoyance of the Milwaukee Sentinel. As the paper pointed out, the outing

would benefit participants more than an ocean trip or a month in the woods. Since the men would be trained by regular army personnel, they would be more valuable officers in time of war than 95 per cent of the Civil War volunteer leaders had been after six months in the field.³⁷ The Milwaukee Journal was similarly enthusiastic about the camp and called for one in Wisconsin. The paper apparently had in mind something more akin to a military resort than an army boot camp, since it visualized that the encampment would draw many outsiders from "states where the charm and beauty of our north woods are already well known. These states send hosts of tourists every summer to the lakes and rivers of Wisconsin. The habit of going to that region is already formed."³⁸

Judging from the actual interest shown by Wisconsin men in the Ft. Sheridan activities, the army appears to have had good reasons for not starting a training camp in the state, whatever its natural beauty and charm. Only twenty-two Wisconsinites were in attendance, ten of them from Milwaukee, and from Plattsburg came a murmur that "there is a feeling out here that the middle west is not doing quite its share."³⁹ On the other hand, this was scarcely a movement which appealed to the vast bulk of Wisconsin's population. At Ft. Sheridan, a typical tent of six men contained a physician, a lawyer, a metallurgical engineer, a telephone engineer, the head of a smelting plant,

and a grain merchant: not exactly a representative cross-section of Midwestern society.⁴⁰

In 1916, as the preparedness campaign increased in intensity, there was a little more interest, but only a little. The Reverend Paul B. Jenkins of Milwaukee's Immanuel Presbyterian spent his summer's vacation at Plattsburg, not as a chaplain, but in the ranks.⁴¹ Thirty-one University of Wisconsin students volunteered to attend that summer's camp at Ft. Benjamin Harrison in Indianapolis. Madison sent fifteen men to the camp, mostly faculty members.⁴² But since this was more than any other city in the state, Wisconsin's response was still not exactly overwhelming. At least the idea that these camps were for officer training had been dispelled. As Doctor Jenkins said when he came back from New York, "at bottom, the Plattsburg camp is an institute for the manufacture of intelligent opinion as to what it takes to make a trained and dependable soldier." Although five weeks at Plattsburg was better than three years in the national guard, Dr. Jenkins added that "nothing less than a year of steady military training can make the average man into a usable soldier."⁴³ The play atmosphere about preparedness was beginning to wear off, and there was no more talk about officers being turned out in five weeks.

The navy excursion in the summer of 1916 was less successful. At least the army apparently managed to

retain the enthusiasm of the people it enrolled in its programs. Of course, the navy labored under the initial handicap that all of its cruises departed from the East Coast, a fact which made it difficult for Midwesterners to participate, as Ensign Riheldaffer of the Milwaukee recruiting station admitted. However, a fund was raised to defray the railroad fares of applicants.⁴⁴ Fifteen hundred invitations to a meeting at the Hotel Pfister in Milwaukee went out to potential cruise members, but only fifty people responded.⁴⁵ Eighteen Wisconsinites, eight from Milwaukee, finally went to sea.⁴⁶ And worse, the navy, unlike the army, did not seem able to put its message across to the business class. As Dr. P. H. Rogers, returning from an excursion aboard the battleship Louisiana pointed out, there were too many civilians aboard ship for anyone to learn anything, the cruise had fizzled out a week before schedule, and the management of the navy appeared to be incompetent. Besides, "Life on a ship is rather monotonous, moving pictures being about the only general amusement, and then the pictures are awful."⁴⁷

On a less serious level was the women's camp at Lake Geneva, where 150 young women, most of them from out of state, converged to learn Red Cross work and take military training under the guidance of the women's section of the Navy League in the summer of 1916. The camp was headed by Mrs. F. B. Countiss, "Lake Forest Society Woman," assisted

by Mrs. Vylla Poe Wilson, who had headed a similar camp in Chevy Chase, Md., and William M. Lewis, Secretary of the Navy League, The girls, fetchingly clad in khaki cotton divided skirts and middy blouses, sombreros and half high tanned shoes, "agreed that the next two weeks would be a great lark." The camp may safely be assigned a symptomatic rather than a causative role in the preparedness agitation within Wisconsin.⁴⁸

There were other outlets for preparedness sentiments besides training camps. The national guard of Wisconsin was a logical place to learn the rudiments of military training, and had an excellent reputation at this time, but this seems to have been largely bypassed as imposing too onerous an obligation. In the spring and summer of 1916, there was a burst of interest in volunteer drill groups, rifle clubs and the like; a species of do-it-yourself preparedness. Quite a bit of this sort of activity seems to have taken place in Madison. In May, some forty men from the West Side met to form a rifle club under the provisions of federal law that provided obsolete army rifles for such organizations.⁴⁹ At the beginning of June, while Miss Mazie King, vaudevillian, was displaying her Preparedness Dance to interested viewers at the Orpheum, fifty young businessmen formed a citizens' militia group, electing George Kroke president.⁵⁰ Under the recently passed Hay Bill, it was explained, the government would

furnish uniforms and equipment. "No inconvenience is entailed by enlisting, and in the event of war, the members of the company are not bound to answer the call."⁵¹ A week later, however, after a further meeting at the high-school auditorium featuring fire-eating speeches by three local ministers, the members reversed this decision, and resolved that no one should join any state or federal backed company "unless it is his firm purpose to respond promptly and unhesitatingly to such government call to active duty."⁵²

So the Madison Minute Men sprang up, with the avowed intention of raising a troop of cavalry from its midst. The greater portion of the membership, of course, would be just auxiliary. As a Madison businessman said, "Place sixty-five men on horses in the street and that will be the best object lesson you can get; we businessmen will stand back of you."⁵³ The State Journal said that it was a pity there hadn't been five hundred instead of fifty at the organization meeting, and enthused that the proposed new troop would be a "real working unit, not a 'silk-stocking brigade' of troops who will be promoted out of social considerations, center through the park for cross-country maneuvers."⁵⁴ On June 25, an advertisement under the signature of Mr. Kroke, newly turned captain of cavalry, went out for "100 Able Bodied, Red Blooded Young Men" to report to the University gymnasium for training. Military instruction was administered to all comers there by three retired guard

officers and a retired regular army sergeant.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, a little later on Governor Philipp politely declined any new cavalry unit in Wisconsin at that time, and the Minute Men quietly disappeared.⁵⁷

Lieutenant Wrightson at the University offered to give military instruction to all his cadets til June but only a dozen showed up.⁵⁸ He then attempted to set up an auxiliary force of coeds, to be trained in Red Cross work and gallery shooting. As Lieutenant Wrightson explained to the girls at the University of Wisconsin, "every women should know how to handle a rifle and pistol--especially a pistol."⁵⁹

Another volunteer group was formed in Milwaukee around this time by an ex-marine gunnery sergeant named John Bryant. Originally, Bryant had intended to enroll only ex-marines, but soon he admitted all ex-servicemen.⁶⁰ The group was supposed to help defend the country from Mexico, but when no war developed and the national guard went to Texas and an unromantic garrison duty, Bryant was reduced to addressing preparedness-minded boys on "the life of a soldier and first aid to the wounded," a somewhat unfortunate conjunction of topics, one would think.⁶¹

More significantly, there was a great deal of interest in giving the rudiments of military training to high school students or even grammar school students, along the lines of the Swiss and Australian training systems. The National Educational Association, reversing its 1915 decision, came

out for military training in the schools. Although the Wisconsin Teacher's association voted decisively against the measure later on in 1916, a little was actually done on this line in the state.⁶³ The Milwaukee Council of the Knights of Columbus formed the Columbus Cadets, made up of students from the fifth and higher grades, eliciting dark comments about clerical private armies from the Socialist Leader.⁶⁴ As a final concession to preparedness sentiment, the state decided to give military training to the 250 boys at the state reformatory in Green Bay.⁶⁵

It need not be argued that any of these measures had any but the sketchiest relationship with real defensive measures, if real defensive measures were necessary. In fact, the one really valuable bit of volunteer work in the state was done without any fanfare. In April the members of the state's five engineering societies, led by A. W. Beresford of Cutler-Hammer, surveyed the industries of Wisconsin for the Navy's industrial preparedness board, in order to see whether they could be adapted to defense production in time of war.⁶⁶ But these measures did help in psychologically conditioning the people of Wisconsin to accept preparedness. Now, in the early summer of 1916, came the greatest of all psychological devices for mobilizing public sentiment: the preparedness parade.

The parade was an excellent vehicle for conjuring up all of the patriotic and civic energies of those behind

preparedness. It was vaguely military, indubitably patriotic, highly visible, exhilarating, attention-getting, and almost completely painless. At first, the parades were intended to influence legislation in Washington. Later, they were staged for the sheer beauty of having preparedness parades.

The first of the parades took place in New York on May 13. One hundred and forty five thousand men and women marched down Fifth Avenue before 1,000,000 spectators. As the Milwaukee Journal commented: "did anyone ever hear of a host of 150,000 marching all day for anything less than conviction?" (Later, opponents of preparedness would find that there had been less lofty incentives.) At any rate, the Journal went "If it (Congress) still fails to respond, some other motive except doubt about this country's sentiment must be sought," especially since the nonpolitical marchers "knew they themselves were down to the hard pan of flawless Americanism without any alloy of hyphenism. And that had its effect on the spectators."⁶⁷

At the beginning of June, the Midwest began to march. Seventy-five thousand tramped the streets of St. Louis to the music of forty bands. The governor of Illinois reviewed a big parade at Springfield. Even Des Moines managed to turn out five thousand marchers. Most impressive of all, on June 3rd, 130,214 people, counted by electric tabulators, paraded down the streets of Chicago.⁶⁸ The only flag displayed was the Stars and Stripes, which "waved from every staff, was displayed on 1,000,000 bosoms...stretched canopy-like over the

line of march from building to building."⁶⁹ The Journal, searching for more adjectives to describe this parade, could only say "...they marched because they are filled with the warm breathing, throbbing spirit of love for America."⁷⁰

At first Wisconsin was rather cool to the movement. Some people in Madison had toyed with the idea of turning July 4th into Preparedness Day, but an undercurrent of opposition to preparedness had killed the idea. In Oshkosh, plans for a Fox River Valley preparedness parade had quietly been shelved when only fifty interested people could be found after two mass meetings.⁷¹ Early in May, some Milwaukee businessmen had favored a preparedness parade on June 10th, but others had thrown cold water on the notion, since a parade would be unnecessary and ineffective, and "we should not go to extremes, since congress has made a good start."⁷² But after Chicago's fine exhibition, the civic pride of Milwaukee, at least, made a public manifestation of preparedness inevitable.

The National Security League, of course, was there to handle the details, and the indefatigable Willet M. Spooner was named head of the committee to organize the parade, assisted by Mrs. Edgar Bell, Nat Stone, and W. W. Coleman.⁷³ Coleman polled the League members on whether they wanted a mass rally or a parade in honor of preparedness. Although only 30 per cent of the members had an opportunity to respond, the sentiment seemed to be in

favor of a rally. On June 10, at a convention in the Milwaukee Auditorium, the Wisconsin League members at first voted for a mass meeting instead of a parade. But Willet M. Spooner had other ideas and managed to persuade the convention to reverse itself. Milwaukee would march.⁷⁴

Once decided upon, the parade snowballed into an event of overwhelming proportions. Milwaukee could not be outdone by its rival cities in the Midwest. A committee of 1,000 was named by the League to coordinate the parade arrangements. There was a general committee of fifty to coordinate the larger committee. Milton C. Potter, Superintendent of Milwaukee schools, became chairman of the parade itself, and set up offices in the new Plankinton Arcade Building on Second St. July 15th was hit upon as the date of the patriotic spectacle.⁷⁵

On June 20th, Potter sent out the following appeal:

Milwaukee People: Will you walk to show your faith? Do you love this nation first and last through thick and thin? There are those who doubt it. No one who knows you ever doubted you.

Let the whole American people know us as we are. The fifteenth of July is the day of demonstration. Two weeks removed from the special celebration of American independence, it will stand or fall upon its own particular merits as a celebration and declaration of American nationalism.⁷⁶

Two days later, there were already seven thousand marchers pledged to the cause of preparedness. The Eagles promised to provide 2,000; Cutler-Hammer, the Wisconsin Telephone Company, and the Electric Company would each

volunteer 1,000; the Fire Department and the Elks would be good for 500 marchers apiece.⁷⁷ By the end of June, 60-70,000 were supposed to march, including 40 bands, 500 ministers, and 2,500 insurance men.⁷⁸ The Boys National Security League would be in line in white duck sailor suits, and there would be a marching chorus of a thousand voices.⁷⁹

As in Madison, there was some opposition to the idea of a parade, and in Milwaukee some of the opposition was overt, but it was all overridden. School Board Director T. C. Esser tried to put the board on record as approving the spirit of the preparedness parade, and also requested it to pledge that it would march in a body. With a certain lack of tact, he had inserted in the proposed resolution a phrase to the effect that such an action would remove any suspicion that Milwaukeeans were not good American citizens. W. L. Puplow said that since the loyalty of every citizen of Milwaukee was above suspicion, he would not vote for such a resolution, Morris Stern said the decision to march should be made by the individuals, and A. L. Augustyn observed a little peevishly that he had received three invitations to march with groups in the parade and did not know how he could divide himself up. The first part of the resolution, approving the parade, was passed "by a faint vote."⁸⁰

Mrs. Lutie E. Stearns, president of the Downtown Club, refused to march at all. The nations who had believed preparedness for war meant peace were now "at each others

throats, and honor is a tattered rag beneath their trampling feet," she said. The Milwaukee Journal sorrowfully explained to her the error of her ways, but she still refused to march.⁸¹

The liveliest opposition of all came in the City Council, where Socialist and Non-Partisan aldermen had been at each others' throats anyway. When Alderman Cornelius Corcoran introduced a resolution that the council accept the League's invitation to tramp for preparedness, Socialist Alderman Emil Seidel attempted to introduce a small amendment. The amendment would have put the council on record in favor of scrapping the autocratic, expensive, and inefficient military establishment and introducing instead into American life reforms in health, welfare, education, wages, and pensions. Seidel felt that the marchers should be placed on record as favoring these goals, lest the parade be rendered subservient to the interests of special classes. As the Alderman said, referring to the mobilization of the national guard on the Texas border which had just taken place: "Something is radically wrong when we spend hundred and millions of dollars, and still find ourselves unprepared for war. We send our sons down to Mexico, and find they have not enough machine guns. We read that they get only two meals a day on the train. And they travel at a rate of only twenty-five miles an hour... We ought to do more than merely parade. We ought to

indicate clearly what we are parading for."⁸²

The suggestion that someone should define what the parade was about produced, according to the Leader's report: "an insane spasm at the council meeting...during which they bounced about on their seats, shouted epithets at the Socialist minority, and grew so purple in the face that several of them came within an ace of choking to death." Recovering somewhat, the Non-partisans slapped down a gag rule and voted for the Corcoran resolution 24-10, while Alderman John Koerner attempted to hum The Star-Spangled Banner.

Despite the flareup in the council, even the Socialist city administration that had taken office in April was won over. Mayor Daniel Hoan himself volunteered to march, after Potter had assured him that marchers need only pledge themselves to "the sole proposition of our undivided loyalty to the American nation," rather than to an increased expenditure for munitions.⁸⁴ In this way, the Socialists were comforted by the thought that they had captured the parade by forcing its backers to change the purposes behind the demonstration. The patriots on the other hand, were equally well satisfied to enlist the aid of the city administration, and be able to exhibit Hoan marching at the head of the parade. They were also comforted by the fact that parades are not intellectual exercises. But for the moment, the Milwaukee Leader chortled: "the original purpose of the parade has been

abandoned by the promoters in recognition of the opposition in the community to the 'preparedness' that has been designed to strengthen the forces of political corruption and economic oppression at the expense of democracy."⁸⁵ The Socialist labor unions showed a greater suspicion of verbal agreements about the real nature of preparedness parades and refused to march.⁸⁶

Heedless of difficulties, the parade rolled on to fulfillment. The whole program was plotted out on an enormous map twenty-five feet long and three feet wide at the Plankinton arcade offices: line of march, mobilization and demobilization points for the various divisions. From this planning room, the parade would be directed with field telephones as efficiently as a "European Army".⁸⁷ Although paraders would normally march with their business groups or social organizations, 250 young businessmen were available to fit the unattached into formation. The Saturday of the parade, city banks would be open from eight to eleven A.M., but all department stores would close, and Mayor Hoan would give all city employees a half holiday.⁸⁸ As the big day grew nearer, more of the small but vital details of the preparedness demonstration were agreed upon. Fifteen hundred newsboys dressed in red, white and blue would form a moving flag, while marchers of the Federal Canoe Association would carry a flag over their right shoulder, a paddle over their left.⁹⁰ Where the League's planning stopped,

private enterprise stepped in. The transportation companies announced plans to bring thirty to forty thousand parade watchers into Milwaukee, and the lake steamer Christopher Columbus was scheduled to dock with 5,000 more.⁹¹ To provide the white shoes prescribed for marchers, Milwaukee shoe stores decided to remain open till 10 P.M. the night before the parade. Allen's Foot-Ease began an advertising campaign.

On July 14th the Journal reported that 70,000 people would march the next day. There would be 300 organizations in twenty grand divisions with fifty-two bands. The column would be three and a half miles long, and would take five hours to pass the Soldier's Monument reviewing stand where Governor Philipp would sit.⁹²

The day of the parade was hot, but the crowd was good-humored, pressing on Grand Avenue and Wisconsin Street in ranks seven and eight deep. At the marshalling areas, Boy Scouts carrying water and buttermilk refreshed the marchers.⁹³ Half an hour before the parade was to begin, at 1:28 P.M., there was a sudden shower, but the marchers gallantly streamed down Wisconsin Avenue as scheduled, sixteen abreast, while flags and bunting-covered hats ran in the rain, reducing many expensive Palm Beach suits and white dresses to wet but patriotic looking smears of red, white, and blue.⁹⁴

The Newsboys Republic marched, as announced, as a

monster flag, their heads protruding through little holes in the fabric. The employees of the First National Bank carried flags on small fishing rods, while the men and women of the Northwestern Insurance Company had been trained to execute the manual of arms with parasols decorated with flag designs. Everyone else carried 14x24 inch American flags on their right shoulders, and some people on the street were provided with two or three additional banners.⁹³ It was a fine show of patriotism, and for those unable to attend, the Milwaukee Journal ran an article entitled "How it Feels to March in a Preparedness Parade."⁹⁶

Unfortunately, the parade was not quite as large as its boosters had anticipated, lasting only half as long as they had forecast. Part of this may have been due to the shower. Officials counted 28,153 marchers and 45 bands. Interestingly enough, the largest delegation of marchers was sent by the Pfister and Vogel Leather Company, one of whose partners just happened to be president of the local National Security League. Although Poles, Italians, and Greeks had been well represented in the parade, the German organizations had not marched in a body, and German Protestant ministers had failed to respond to the invitation to march in the clergyman's division. Given the mentality of the time, these actions could take on significance.⁹⁷

There were some recriminations. Charges were made that the marchers in the parade had been motivated more by a

practical concern for their jobs than by any high-minded devotion either to American nationalism or increased defenses. Heinrich Bartel, editor of the Milwaukee Vorwaerts, pointed out that: "the methods by which the preparedness parade has been engineered, are thoroughly un-American. It was a forced parade, to which employees were sent like dummies, whether they liked it or not."⁹⁸ The Socialists belatedly had noted that non-marching employees had been threatened with pay docks or worse. Fraternal organizations, Boy Scouts and unorganized workers had been dragged into the parade, but the unionized workers had refused to march. The preparedness banner of Americanism had been won by the underpaid Greeks and Turks of Pfister and Vogel⁹⁹ In his article, Bartel charged that, far from capturing the parade, the Socialists had merely allowed themselves to be identified with the purposes of capitalistic preparedness. There were other Socialists with the same idea, and George R. Kirkpatrick, the party candidate for vice-president, described the Milwaukee parade as "a capitalistic maneuver against the interests of the working class," before parade-leader Hoan at a Sunday picnic-cumrally in Pabst park.¹⁰⁰

Nonetheless, the parade had taken place, the largest in Milwaukee's history. And there was one point on which everyone had to agree. If it had done nothing else, it had closed down many of the city's 2,232 saloons, some of

which had not shut down in forty years.¹⁰¹

It is easy to dismiss all these zealous and at times ineffective activities as being merely the misguided efforts of a few huckstering sup-patriots. Certainly the number of people in the state who were actively concerned in promoting preparedness was small. Despite disproportionate publicity and support given their efforts by a generally favorable press, they never numbered more than a few thousand, mostly concentrated in two cities. And many of their actions, seen from today's perspective, take on the carnival-like foolishness of a misdirected Shriner's meeting. A good number of those who ultimately were involved in the movement probably had no clearer conception of the cause they were promulgating than so many lemmings; the Preparedness Day Parade in many ways symbolized the whole movement.

Yet somehow all of this is a little unfair. A good many of the reforms and advancements in man's history, after all, have been carried out by small and vociferous minorities. More than one popular crusade has been marked by haphazardness and a tendency to excess. The class of people advocating preparedness was substantially the same class which had led the fight for all the popular progressive reforms. It would be rash to make too broad an assertion here. Preparedness was backed by conservatives as well as progressives; Willet M. Spooner himself was a Stalwart Republican. However, in many ways the movement

seems to have been the product of the same attitudes which manifested themselves in urban progressivism. Behind both of these movements was an urge for the reform of a corrupt and inefficient system, a fondness for simple, "democratic," and sometimes extreme solutions, and a burgeoning national consciousness, all of which could culminate in the bright vision, at once naive and arrogant, of an armed and united America standing as a shining beacon against the dark menaces of a corrupt and blood-soaked Europe. All of the people involved were not motivated by fear or by chauvinism: there is a certain pathos in the account of the man who said that marching in the Preparedness Parade was the only opportunity he'd ever had to "do something for America."¹⁰²

Militarily useless, the activities of the preparedness advocates did involve the public mind with the issue, and served gradually to condition the people Wisconsin to increased and unprecedented defense measures. Further, and more ominously, devices like the Preparedness Parade tended to remove the issue from the sphere of rational discussion and turn it into a touchstone of Americanism. As the press became more shrill on the subject, the local advocates of preparedness likewise became more intense and more determined. All of this atmosphere was to outlast the issue itself. The National Security League was the forerunner of the Loyalty Legion and the State Defense Council; the men

who hung bunting in the Milwaukee streets today would reach for buckets of yellow paint tomorrow.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICA, I LOVE YOU:

Wisconsin's Military Contribution towards Preparedness, 1915-1916

Preparedness was largely a vicarious matter for its advocates in Wisconsin, as it was in the rest of the country. As we have seen, much was done at the grass-roots level in the way of organizing committees, parades and even junkets to training camps like Plattsburg and Fort Sheridan. However, not very many people actually joined any military organization. Senator LaFollette himself pointed out the incongruity of the fact that, while 140,000 people paraded for defense in New York City, only 600 enlisted. Of course, some of the most vociferous advocates of strengthened defenses in the state could be found in the ranks of the national guard. In general, however, there were many more upper class types willing to consider impressing every young man into uniform for the cause of preparedness than were willing to join the state guard themselves. When preaching is placed beside practice, one is forced to the conclusion that a good many of the preparedness patriots were mostly in favor of a citizen army composed of other people.

Army recruiting, for example, showed no really significant increase during the preparedness agitation. Even after Villa shot up Columbus, the state's main recruiting

center furnished Jefferson Barracks receiving station only five men a day.² Recruiting was scarcely intensive: the army maintained a sergeant in Milwaukee, a corporal in Madison, and after the Mexican troubles began in March 1916, developed some energy and set up permanent or temporary station in cities like Green Bay, Antigo, Wausau, Racine, and Kenosha.³ The navy did no more. The peacetime army calculated that it could not obtain more than 50,000 recruits a year from the nation, and even the national guard was understrength. If the press of Wisconsin ever realized that these factors might have some bearing on any attempted increase in the nation's state of preparedness, it never showed it.

The state naval militia was no better off. At the beginning of 1915, there had been understrength divisions at Bayfield, Ashland, and Washburn. The Navy Department had provided them with a considerable amount of equipment, including a 28-foot steam launch, two oversized rowboats, a 4-inch gun, and an electrically lit semaphore machine. Unfortunately, it had neglected to provide a training ship, a somewhat necessary item for sailors.⁴ Although some of the Lake Superior men trained with Michigan units, this makeshift arrangement apparently was not sufficient to keep the divisions alive. As The Adjutant General reported rather laconically: "the spring inspections of 1915 being distinctly unfavorable disclosing increasing deficiency in

strength and lack of interest, all organizations were mustered out."⁵ This did not prevent five officers and forty men of the militia from taking a two week cruise on the battleship Kentucky in the summer of 1915.⁶

In July 1915, a new and vital influence appeared on the scene. Grant R. Stephenson, commander of all Michigan naval militia and son of ex-Senator Stephenson, had moved to Milwaukee. Stephenson had commanded the Michigan training ship Yantic for four years and the whole Michigan brigade for two years. Though still in charge of the Michigan militia, he was looking around for something closer at hand to command.

Stephenson proposed that the center of Wisconsin naval activity be shifted from Lake Superior to Lake Michigan. This was a logical move, since the Lake Superior divisions were moribund and the necessary technical skills would be more readily available at Milwaukee. Two divisions (deck and engineering) could be set up in Milwaukee, with 48 men apiece. Racine and Kenosha might be able to provide two more. There was even talk of a navy band.⁷ The whole project was explained to the Milwaukee Merchants and Manufacturers Club by a regular navy captain from Washington. In September, 1915, Stephenson held a preliminary organization meeting at the club, attended by Adjutant General John G. Salsman, a former navy commander named Kuengli, and a delegate from the city Aero club, who wanted to start a

Wisconsin Navy air arm.³

Unfortunately, though two divisions were formed in Milwaukee and covetous eyes were cast on the Isle of Luzon, an obsolete Spanish warship captured at Manila Bay, nothing ever came of it. The new divisions could never be mustered in because of lack of state funds. All that the burst of activity produced was a rivalry between the Lake Superior and Lake Michigan branches over where a state training ship would be located, if the state ever got a training ship.

The Wisconsin National Guard was a much more serious factor in the state preparedness movement. Unlike the naval militia, it was an operational unit. Its leaders, such as Brigadier General Charles King, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Piasecki, and Major Irving A. Fish, were prominent advocates of preparedness. At the same time, the guard was the citadel of traditional views on preparedness. In the event of war or invasion, the brunt of fighting would be borne by volunteers, formed around the militia as cadre, and bolstered by the small, well-trained regular army.

It must be remembered that before June 3, 1916, the national guard was actually only a state force, subject to call by the President in the event of invasion or insurrection. The army furnished the guard with equipment and advice through its Militia Bureau; the Congress set standards in organization and discipline. However, there was no federal pay involved, and no federal control over the

personnel. According to the whims of state legislators, officers were elected by their own men or appointed out of political favoritism. Men attended drill as they saw fit; they were not compelled to, and they were not paid for doing it. Even more damaging was the fact that the size and composition of the organized militia force was entirely up to the state. Nevada didn't maintain any at all, while Cole Blease had once disbanded the entire South Carolina National Guard in a fit of pique at Washington. In case of a foreign war, the President could not call the guard into service, but only ask its personnel to volunteer en masse. In short, "the National Guard remained simply a training school for soldiers who in another war would be raised de nove in Federal volunteer regiments."⁹

The guardsmen of progressive Wisconsin were naturally not happy with this ramshackle state of affairs. General Charles Boardman, The Adjutant General under five governors of Wisconsin, had long advocated a federalized militia, along with the militia heads of other states. If Congress paid money to the national guardsmen for drill and camp, they could force on the states minimum qualifications for officers, and determine the strength and composition of the state forces by using the power of the purse. Further, they could impose a dual obligation on each guardman, making him a federal volunteer subject to the President's call in an emergency, as well as a state soldier. Ultimately, the

Hay Bill of June 1916 was to meet most of Boardman's wishes. So many officers in the Wisconsin guard welcomed the preparedness campaign as a vindication of their own efforts. As Colonel Piasecki said: "For twenty years the national guard has been carrying on a campaign for preparedness. It has been laughed at."¹⁰

Yet there were menaces for the guardsmen in this preparedness campaign. The army general staff openly distrusted the national guard, and sought complete federal control over any reserve force. Garrison's Continental Army Plan would have grievously hurt the guard in manpower and in pride. Guard officers looked askance at Plattsburg, which was ostensibly engaged in turning out officers for any future war. If there were any future war, the national guard officers wanted to be running it. Again, there was fear of a vast system of universal training dominated by the martinets of West Point. As a "National Guard Officer of 30 years experience" wrote, the guardsmen "have joined because they love their country and want to protect it, and any affectation of superiority by some insolent jackanapes, strutting around in imitation of an English army officer, is disgusting and disenheartening." The majority of the regulars were totally inefficient, at least half were "totally incompetent," and only one in twenty realized that "graduating from West Point did not automatically make him a better man."¹¹

Of course, the claims of the national guard to a main place in the nation's defense could only be proved or disproved by being put to the test. If the guardsmen failed or showed deficiencies, they would be in serious danger of being overrun and overshadowed by the preparedness drive they had helped initiate. It is one of the nice ironies of history that this test would be forthcoming not from the anticipated European or Asiatic invaders, but from a pack of Mexican brigands.

The Wisconsin National Guard was the best prepared, perhaps, of any in the union to meet a real emergency. Unlike other states, Wisconsin had not blackened the reputation of its guards by using them as strike-breakers. It retained its officers until age 64, instead of changing them with every state administration. The men received physical examinations and opportunity for target practice, and there were correspondence courses and tactical schools for their officers. Federal property was scrupulously administered. Senator Borah had charged that the \$8,000,000 annual federal appropriation for the guards of the various states was "shamefully wasted, and some of it embezzled,"¹² and ex-Assistant Secretary of War Breckenridge, who had resigned with Garrison over the Hay Plan, had stated that a third of the guardsmen couldn't fire an army rifle, less than half attended drill on an average, and that \$1,350,000 of government property had been lost by guardsmen since 1912,

some of it wasted, some of it carried away, some of it stolen.¹³ But these accusations could not fairly be said to involve Wisconsin.

LaFollette felt his state had the best guard in the country.¹⁴ The Democratic Milwaukee Journal concurred. The Stalwart Republican Sentinel lavishly praised the guard, saying that the Milwaukee battalion alone could provide half a dozen regimental commanders, as many battallion commanders, and a dozen company commanders. The paper went on to comment a little fatuously: "The battalion could safely be placed in line of battle facing almost any troops, save those that had been called upon to fight battles."¹⁵

Despite the quality of this force, the actual military contribution of the state was not that impressive. In the period 1915-1916, the Wisconsin National Guard consisted of three infantry regiments and one infantry company, a hospital and hospital corps, a cavalry troop, and a battery of artillery. The First Infantry Regiment had five infantry companies in Milwaukee, one each in Oconomowoc, Ft. Atkinson, Neenah, Beloit, Madison, Whitewater, and Monroe. Two companies of the Second Infantry were stationed in Oshkosh, while single companies were located in Fond du Lac, Beaver Dam, Sheboygan, Ripon, Manitowoc, Appleton, Oconto, Marinette, Marshfield, and Rhinelander. Two companies in LaCrosse, and one each in Sparta, Tomah, Eau Claire, Superior, Menomonie, Nealttsville, Portage, Wausau

and Mauston comprised the Third Infantry. Provisional machine-gun companies for the regiments were located respectively in Milwaukee, Ashland, and Rice Lake, while provisional supply companies were in Milwaukee, Green Bay, and Superior. The independent infantry company was off in Chippewa Falls. Cavalry, artillery, and medical units were all in Milwaukee.¹⁶ The whole brigade, 3,300 men, was under the competent supervision of Orlando Co Holway, The Adjutant General, a Spanish War veteran. He was assisted by the retired General King and by a handful of regular army officers, most of whom were also advisers to other states.

This force was relatively as well as absolutely small. Despite all of the edifying newspaper articles and preparedness agitation, only two-thirds of one per cent of the eligible men in the state had enlisted. Furthermore, the "best national guard in the union" had qualitative as well as quantitative problems. Although the brigade had drilled as a unit, it had only been for one week in summer. Seventeen armories had gone up since 1906,¹⁷ but some units were cramped for lack of space, and the artillery unit in particular had no proper facilities for sub-caliber firing.¹⁸ Despite the fact that the state emphasized marksmanship and had fielded some good competition rifle teams, nearly eleven hundred guardsmen had failed to qualify even as second-class shots.¹⁹ One wonders what conditions must have been

like in the worst national guard in the union.

There were other soft spots in this tiny organization. Although machine guns had been invented around the time of the Civil War, the Wisconsin National Guard couldn't get any till the spring of 1915, when the 10th Separate Battalion which had been leading a lonely unregimented life up to that time, was broken down into three machine gun companies, one for each regiment. The companies were slated to get four Bennet-Mercier guns apiece, along with six horses, four pack mules, and sixteen gun mules. The weapons weighed 300 pounds when packed with their ammunition for travel, and using men to carry them would have been a little impractical.²⁰ Theoretically, the guns fired 600 rounds a minute; actually, as Mexico was to prove, they quite often didn't fire at all. The men were instructed in bridling mules on wooden horses, and got 288 15-minute periods of military training a year.²¹ While the machine-gun was master of Europe, the United States Army TO & E allotted only four of them to a whole regiment, as a sort of afterthought. Moreover, all of this was on paper. According to the records, only three guns seem to have actually arrived in Wisconsin for the guardsmen by mid-1916. At that, Wisconsin was comparatively lucky; the militia of the United States averaged a little more than a sixth of the number of automatic weapons they were supposed to have.²²

The artillery too seems to have been backward in some

respects. The battery owned its own horses, and had received good marks on its handling of them from the War Department. In January 1916, federal funds were provided for four horse-tenders and a 6-month supply of oats, hay, and straw.²³ It had four three-inch guns capable of firing six miles, and could load the guns and their caissons onto two always-waiting flatcars in fifteen minutes. Only one factor was lacking for it to be a fine, combat ready outfit: it didn't have any qualified gunners.²⁴

If the state troops lagged in handling these heavier weapons, the Wisconsin cavalry was a first-class unit. Guard Troop A was the only national guard unit in the country that owned its own horses, and it had more horses in proportion to men than any other troop. To accomplish this, the men paid dues every month, turned in their summer camp pay, and had to put down a \$5.00 application fee even to get into the troop. Troop A had been given a higher recommendation by the War Department than any of the other ninety-seven cavalry organizations in the country.²⁵

The whole brigade could be mobilized in twelve to eighteen hours at Camp Douglas, Sparta. Mobilization and entrainment plans were constantly on file. Eleven trains would be required to concentrate 3,500 men. The first train would leave West Superior at 5 A.M. on the appointed day; the last train would pull into Camp Douglas no later than 2:30 P.M. the same day.²⁶ Unlike other states, Wisconsin

had picked its training camp for accessibility and utility, not just as an isolated spot where the troops could have a rustic vacation far removed from all communication with the outside world.²⁷

The state did not rest content with its guard. In 1915, an extra \$42,000 was appropriated to increase the strength of the guard.²⁸ At the end of the year, the state authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of each company from 65 to 81 men, and this was upped still further to 150 men late in March 1916. However, despite the preparedness campaign, there was almost no increase in the guard's actual numerical strength.²⁹ On April Fool's Day, 1916, Orlando Holway, The Adjutant General, left for Washington to get permission for the state to organize and muster new artillery and signal units. Holway came back successful, bubbling with all sorts of new ideas on military training for high-school students, and with the promise of federal funds for two new batteries and a signal company, to be equipped out of spare material owned by the state. The cavalry troop would be raised to a strength of 130 men, then split, and a Troop B added to the alphabet.³⁰ As a final touch, a trained aviator, with a high-powered machine, would be stationed at LaCrosse.³¹ Certainly, in the midst of a big preparedness campaign, these were modest goals.

The first night firing in Wisconsin military history took place later in April 1916, when the machine-gunners of

Milwaukee fired at targets illuminated by lanterns at ranges of 300, 500 and 600 yards. Flashlights were used only to check the sights and windage adjustments, the newspapers reported, which is puzzling, if true, since the rear sights were completely useless under normal conditions of night fighting. Also, under ordinary combat conditions, hostile troops do not carry lanterns, but then, as has been said, the guard was a little backward in these newer techniques.³² In May, the active machine gunners held a theater party, showing pictures of machine guns in action, so that they could raise money for a motorcycle and gun carriage, "state funds not being available" as usual.³³

This was a common complaint. Besides the unmustered naval militia, there were three engineer companies floating around in a sort of financial limbo, "encouraged, but not recognized" by the national guard.³⁴ There is a certain paradoxical quality in the popular psychology of the time. Great enthusiasms were coupled with a certain carelessness about providing funds. On the other hand, one has to pay tribute to the spirit manifested by the small groups of volunteers who did try to do something in the way of preparedness without any concrete encouragements, by the cavalrymen who were willing to turn back their pay to buy the military equipment which the government should have provided.

So the guardsmen looked to Washington and dreamed of

increased funds and the maneuvers to come that summer at Camp Douglas. Perhaps a defense-minded government might be willing to give Wisconsin money for three additional regiments of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, more artillery.³⁵ In May 1916, there was a slight jar to everybody's equanimity when the militia of three border states was called into federal service. But Holway doubted that Wisconsin troops would be called. In case they were, however, the guard "never was so prepared for military service as now."³⁶ In every way it was fit for the field, except for the need to procure mounts for the officers. The Wisconsin State Journal pointed out that although General Funston in Mexico had requested six national guard divisions as reinforcement, he had not asked for the Thirteenth Division, which contained the Wisconsin brigade.³⁷ Despite this reassuring outlook, on June 3, all the dress blue uniforms were returned to the Camp Douglas quartermaster, and the guard was dressed "simply for service, not for parades."³⁸ With the signing of the Hay Bill that day, Wisconsin's guard quota had been increased to 10,400 men, and it seemed impractical to provide dress uniforms for that many men. Meanwhile, very far to the south, Pershing's khaki columns chased the rumor of Villa with determination and without success.

On the 18th of June 1916, General Trevino of the Carranzist forces informed General Pershing that the American expeditionary force had better not attempt to go

in any direction but north. At the same time, elements of the U. S. 3rd Cavalry had gone across the border at Brownsville after another group of Mexican raiders, an action of problematic consequences, since General Ricault at Matamoros had just ordered all Americans crossing the border to be shot. Washington called the guard into active service, and for a while it looked like war.

Governor Philipp had anticipated the president's order. His secretary Whittet had drawn up the necessary proclamations, and Philipp signed them from a hospital bed in Milwaukee. The next day, June 19, 1916, the Proclamation to the People of Wisconsin came out on the first page of every newspaper.

National emergencies occur when it is lawful for the president to call forth to federal service the militia of the several states...His call is the call of the nation, and as such I transmit it to the National Guard of Wisconsin; and I call not only upon those who are bound by enlistment oath to serve the state, but upon all other people of Wisconsin, who by their aid and encouragement helped in previous wars, that the quota of Wisconsin troops required for national service may be properly filled and thereafter maintained, and to the further end that in place of those who go forth there may be organized through drills and through discipline, fresh troops to serve the state and the nation if they should be called forth.³⁹

So the brigade was mobilized, 3,295 officers and men.⁴⁰ There was one difficulty: the unit didn't have a commander. Adjutant General Holway would have to stay in Wisconsin organizing the state's contribution and could not accompany

the troops to the border. Brigadier General Boardman, who had been an invaluable state adjutant general for seventeen years, did not seem unwilling, but he was an old man, as was General King. There were two Regular Army officers who might be considered for the post. Senator Mitchell's son William was a captain on the general staff and had been in charge of what passed for army aviation. Captain Lorraine T. Richardson, a native of Janesville, was a twenty-year man from West Point and was readily available at Madison, where he was one of two infantry instructor-inspectors attached to the guard. After a bit of pressuring by Holway, who wanted a Regular Army man to command the brigade, General Boardman nobly endorsed Richardson, who thus exchanged captain's bars and a classroom for the command of an army in the field.⁴¹ Somehow, this did not seem to strike anyone as being odd. There was talk of raising a regiment of cavalry to be commanded by Captain Mitchell, since otherwise the Wisconsin troop would be isolated in a non-Wisconsin regiment, and, as General King said, "the government will need 60,000 cavalrymen for the invasion of Mexico."⁴²

In theory, the troops were to have been assembled at Camp Douglas in twelve to eighteen hours. Actual mobilization took considerably longer, since the men had to be given time to settle their personal affairs. The president issued his call to the states Sunday, June 18; the last

soldier pulled into Camp Douglas June 22. Nevertheless, for a military operation involving 51 units from 35 towns, the actual troop concentration apparently went with surprising smoothness.⁴³

Here was a big boost to the spirit of preparedness: Americans at bay in Mexico and the guard marching down the street. In Appleton, 500 marched in a preparedness parade, headed by L company and a band. Twenty followed the colors right into the guard enlistment office. At LaCrosse, the mayor organized a send-off party at 6 A.M. as the troops left from the railroad station.⁴⁴ Twenty thousand turned out at Madison the night before the local company left. Milwaukee, the largest city in the state, had the most soldiers, and here the departure of the guard was particularly dramatic. Four infantry companies assembled in city hall square and marched to Union Station, while 50,000 cheered and the Soldier's Home Band played patriotic airs.⁴⁵ Blurred photographs of the scene still remain, and the curious can still see the onlookers dressed with odd formality and overarched with black umbrellas; the marching troops in campaign hats and blanket rolls, unburdened by steel helmets or gas masks; the string of 40 volunteers trailing untidily behind all-Polish K Company in their civilian clothes, clutching bundles and suitcases. It all happened a very long time ago. Yet from these pictures it is perhaps possible to get a little of the spirit of the

time, a glimpse of the fine patriotism of an innocent and idealistic America: the flags, the slanted weapons, the heads uncovered in the rain as the band plays America I Love You and the trooptrain pulls out.

By June 22, 4,506 men of the Wisconsin National Guard were at Camp Douglas.⁴⁶ Over a thousand men had enrolled themselves in units of the guard in response to the governor's proclamation, and some two hundred more were seeking to get into the units now at camp. Even so, the brigade was not up to war strength. It is interesting to note that many of the preparedness advocates were able to refrain from setting an example for their fellow Wisconsinites by going to the border, even though they were of military age. The young and active Willet M. Spooner, for example, limited his defense activities, at this moment, to writing out a check to the Red Cross.⁴⁷

Despite all this, there were still more soldiers in Wisconsin than there had been since the Civil War. Thirty minutes after the last trooptrain arrived at camp on June 22, a telegram announcing complete mobilization was transmitted to the commanding officer of the Midwestern department, Major General Barry at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.⁴⁸ The next day, Secretary of War Baker ordered all available militia units to be sent to the border immediately, without waiting for the states to complete mobilization.⁴⁹ Mustered units would be flung piecemeal into the gap, instead of waiting

to be grouped with the other units in their state. It looked as if well-prepared Wisconsin had managed to avoid the effect of this order. Unfortunately, this did not turn out to be true.

Now, with the brigade at Camp Douglas, the Wisconsin National Guard began to look like an object lesson in preparedness, and not the sort of lesson it had anticipated. It began to look like a horrible example of the country's incapacity for an effective defense effort even in a time of some crisis. This was not really due to incompetency in the guard itself. It was mainly the result of the federal government's inability to coordinate and deal with the newly called state forces. However, the confusion and delay did show up the fact that the old-time volunteer concept of preparedness need some revamping in an industrial age.

To begin with, the brigade was still without an official commander. Richardson's nomination had been submitted to the War Department and seemingly lost somewhere in the machine. There was gossip that the War Department would not appoint men on detached duty to command state troops. Philipp heard nothing, and Richardson, without any order, walked around Camp Douglas in captain's bars. Without a commander, there was some danger, state officials thought, that the brigade might be split up, which would not only hurt state pride, but would mean that the men would be placed alongside regiments "probably poorly drilled and

incompetent."⁵⁰ Hugh Scott, the Army's Indian-fighting Chief of Staff, reassured the state that the brigade would be kept intact. It was not until the 5th of July, however, that Richardson was finally made a brigadier general, and he had been promoted to the rank of major in the Regular Army by then.

This was not the only problem. The Mexicans had picked an awkward time to stage a crisis. The Hay Act had been so recently signed that nobody seemed to know just what oath the newly called troops were supposed to swear. The cavalry troop took the old oath in a body, quite incorrectly, as it turned out. Everybody else was administered the new Hay oath, which had different versions for officers and enlisted men.⁵¹

The guard had given regular physical examinations, and now proceeded to reexamine all of its hastily assembled personnel. Not to be outdone, the federal government called up its own army reserve doctors and also proceeded to examine every guardsman. Since the examinations took 15 minutes apiece and there were only five doctors, the guardsmen moaned that it would take a month for everyone to be processed.⁵² Many were disqualified. In the sixty-eight man hospital, for example, seven men were knocked out by state doctors, and the federal doctors accounted for seven more.⁵³ Two hundred and seventy three men of the Second Infantry were disqualified, twenty per cent of the unit.⁵⁴ At first,

it was decided that all disqualified men would have to remain behind, then it was decided that only those rejected by the national guard doctors could not go with the troops to the border, and a little later still, that everyone disqualified by anybody on medical grounds would stay at Camp Douglas. A small number of people who had been already given medical discharges were allowed to reenlist and try and get past the doctors on their second time around.⁵⁵

If the men who were being forced out presented problems, so did the men volunteering to come in. A thousand new and untrained recruits had to be assimilated into units which were having a hard time just meeting the requirements of the federal government. The new recruits lacked equipment, tents, uniforms, and guns--everything but enthusiasm. Troop A was overenlisted at Milwaukee, so part of it broke off amoeba-like and became Troop B, which then could not go to camp because its parent unit had taken all the available cavalry tents.⁵⁶ Troop B was not able to leave for the border till late September. Two batteries of artillery had been organized at the beginning of June in Green Bay and Racine, but since they did not have "even a belt" in the way of equipment, they never did get mustered into federal service.⁵⁷ Along with the First Separate Company at Chippewa Falls and another newly organized infantry unit at Janesville, they remained in state service

and saved Governor Philipp the trouble of organizing a whole new State Guard to handle any domestic disturbances

The troopers of Troop A had other troubles. Since their outfit was the only cavalry unit in the national guard which owned its own horses, reliable transportation seemed assured. Unfortunately, it turned out that the troop had owned many of its horses for some time now, and they were rejected by government inspectors as too old. The government in turn offered \$104.00 apiece for the remaining mounts, a price which Troop A refused to consider. Captain Richardson (he was still a captain at the time) could only say that there "must be some mistake."⁵⁸ But there wasn't. So Troop A left for the border with three horses, privately owned by its officers. The same thing happened to the battery of field artillery.

Other factors helped to create confusion. There were a good many family men in the guard. Governor Philipp had taken early steps to meet their needs. On June 23, he offered to give an honorable discharge to any married man with a dependent family in the Wisconsin National Guard, before it was mustered into federal service. While he would not drive anyone out of the service, no man in this condition would be forced to stay. It was "no disgrace" to resign.⁵⁹ Seven days later the governor announced that he had just discovered that he could not after all discharge the guardsmen because of federal law. Besides, Adjutant

General Holway declared that his investigation had not found anybody who wanted a discharge. His investigation perhaps was not completely comprehensive; two men from the Second Infantry deserted within a week.⁶⁰ The families of the guardsmen were entrusted to the care of the Red Cross, the charity of their husbands' employers, who had formed an Organized Militia League to aid the guard, and the mercies of the federal government, which had just voted down an attempt to pay soldiers' dependents \$50 a month on the grounds that it was a move to "capitalize patriotism."⁶¹ Those men whose dependents were in certifiable need would be allowed to apply through channels for discharge when they reached the border, and that was that. Finally, at the end of July, Senator LaFollette pushed through a \$2,000,000 amendment to the army bill to help those guardsmen with families.⁶²

Despite the bungling and the interminable time it seemed to take the guard to be mustered into federal service, morale at Camp Douglas was high. For one thing, the rigors of camp life were mitigated by the fact that it was a popular excursion site; 10 special trains arrived one Sunday along with 3,000 automobilists, and 12,000 visitors sat around under the trees eating box lunches while the Third Infantry staged a regimental dress parade.⁶³ But there was also genuine eagerness and enthusiasm to serve the country, the same reservoir of sincere patriotism that

the whole preparedness drive was able to exploit. Again, there was the combative naiveté of youths who had no real conception of the meaning of war. Six boys from one Milwaukee high school had a very different commencement that spring, and Walter Donley, who had hung around the local guard drill hall since he was just a kid, was C Company bugler at age 15.⁶⁴ "The boys seem anxious to get off and more than anxious to experience real fighting. They all left their various positions amid the enthusiasm and cheers of fellow employees."⁶⁵

After seeing the situation, one Milwaukee woman wrote: "I spent the five most thrilling hours of my life at Camp Douglas. There are nearly 6,000 men there, and everyone is full of enthusiasm. One can't help but feel the same way, when, as far as eye could reach, there are these thousands of boys in khaki, all ready for the word to move to the Mexican border."⁶⁶ Her enthusiasm might have been dampened if she read the War Department estimate of what to anticipate in the event of war with Mexico. Any war would be a matter of 5 years and 500,000 men. Battles would be won by road-building and police operations against guerrillas. The conflict would be another Boer War, only bigger.⁶⁷ Fortunately for morale, the story ran on an inside page of the Milwaukee Journal.

Enthusiasm could show an uglier side, it developed. When a man from Company H, Manitowac, refused to sign the

federal muster roll, the men of his company stripped off his uniform, dressed him in overalls and yellow ribbons, and marched him from regiment to regiment with a tin can tied to his pants.⁶⁸ When eight guardsmen of Company C, Sheboygan, claiming the family responsibilities Governor Philipp was so concerned with, refused to sign the roll, they were thrown into the guardhouse for four hours as an inducement to altruistic patriotism.⁶⁹ These were only minor incidents, of course. But they were an indication of what could be done to the whole state and the whole nation in the name of preparedness or patriotism, once this drive to the union sacré got going.

The Milwaukee Journal, with its usual astuteness, commented on the situation in its editorial on the Joy of Service:

We can't help remembering the expression and spirit of the man who had been to Plattsburg, and how glad it had made him to feel that he was putting in a little time and work for his country. That is the privilege of the men at Camp Douglas, only it has come in greater measure to them.⁷⁰

On July 1, the troop and battery entrained for San Antonio, having been duly mustered into service, inoculated and having turned in all of their guns and equipment so that they could be issued other guns and equipment, for reasons known only to God and the Quartermaster General. Here again there was trouble. It had been decided that the troops would travel to Texas in day coaches. General

King approved of this, for he felt that soldiers would be much more comfortable on a three-day train trip if they traveled three to two seats, instead of using sleeping cars. The travellers did not approve the idea, and later said it was "the equivalent of trying to kill them."⁷¹ At any rate, the Milwaukee Road turned up with some antiquated coaches. It was around the holiday, so their good equipment would be busy carrying passengers. The troops balked at entering the cars, and Captain Westphal cried indignantly that the accommodations were not fit for cattle, but after four hours, someone gave an order.⁷² Balking stopped, and the men entrained. It seemed that another flaw had been discovered in the guard's preparedness. Although plans had been carefully made to get the troops into Camp Douglas, no one had apparently paid much attention to how they would get out.

At 8:30 that evening, the men pulled into the Milwaukee stockyard tracks and rescue. A new train was waiting for them. Instead of battered day coaches, there were twenty cars, nine of them sleepers.⁷³ Besides the passenger equipment, there were stock cars, flat cars, and two box-cars for kitchen facilities, that could carry ranges set in big galvanized iron boxes for the indispensable coffee. The Milwaukee papers announced that all travel from this point on would be conducted under rigorous censorship, and then proceeded to list the route and timetable. The train

inched off towards Chicago, St. Louis, and points south at an agonizing and preposterous 30-35 miles an hour, required by government regulations.⁷⁴

So Wisconsin crawled off to service. For the men aboard, the trip was memorable. Below Chicago, the temperature was 102°. ⁷⁵ The travel rations were completely inadequate, a slice of corned beef, a little hardtack, and "about a dozen" beans twice a day. The train kept being rerouted for fear of sabotage, and the engine broke down. There were also other delays in the rapid mobilization of Wisconsin troops on the border. At Vinta, Oklahoma, for instance, the mayor met the soldiers with automobiles and took them to an artesian bathing park where they went swimming in the raw. Afterwards, presumably having dressed, the boys visited the races at the fair grounds and enjoyed an afternoon tango party at the principal club house, where the society belles danced with the troopers. "The same courtesies were extended in other towns."⁷⁶

At that, the trip offered no more adventures than the journeys of some of the other units. The Second Wisconsin Infantry was delayed for seven hours by a train wreck in Texarkana, their locomotive ran over a cow, and three cars fell off the rear of the train.⁷⁷ Both the First and Second Infantry Regiments, as they arrived, complained of inadequate water and insufficient rations. It was not until the Third Infantry, the last unit of all, was shipped that

these deficiencies in travel arrangements were rectified. At that, the Wisconsin troops were fortunate. The First Pennsylvania Infantry, 1,614 men, had to beg the mayor of Kansas City for food, since they had been on half rations for two days and almost without any rations whatsoever for one.⁷⁸

So the Wisconsin National Guard came to Texas, just as the border crisis practically ended. The guardsmen arrived in olive drab wool uniforms in 100 degree heat, and stayed to pitch tents in six-inch deep gumbo, fight scorpions, and break untamed broncos for mounts. "Many recruits soon became disenheartened and many expressed the wish that they were back home."⁷⁹ Nasty articles appeared in the Free Press, a man from Neenah telegraphed LaFollette, was arrested then released, and the troops began to drill six hours a day in the sun in preparation for maneuvers.

Back in Milwaukee, the Journal was turning out editorials like this:

Mothers do not complain to have their boys down on the border, for they do not complain, are being physically strengthened.

These things are reassuring when we hear tales, mostly trumped up, no doubt, of complaint and rebellion and whimpering. We know that these men are profiting. And they have the reward of that glow which comes from the knowledge that they are doing something for their country.⁸⁰

Anyone seeing the development of the Journal's views would not be surprised when the paper's editorial policies

avored the spread of this glow by compulsory military training.

During the summer, the guard drilled and trained on the Mexican border. There was never any fighting, just heat and monotony. Under Regular Army direction, the guard units hardened into fighting outfits. The Wisconsin National Guard stood up better than most. Its members were able to march without straggling, and their officers were too competent to accept rations like the tinned beef labeled "Manila, 1902" which laid low a Connecticut outfit.⁸¹ Morale was probably somewhat lower than it had been at Camp Douglas. It was said that twenty per cent of the troops on the border were applying for married men's discharges. Back in Wisconsin, Governor Philipp set up five recruiting districts in the state, for the guard was short 2,000 men even in August.⁸² In fact, because of the numerous medical discharges, there were 74 less guardsmen September 1 than there had been June 22.⁸³

In October, Troop A and Battery A came back and were mustered out with the usual confusion and inconvenience. There were grumblings that the men of Troop A, who had taken the old oath on leaving for the border, had been tricked into signing up for a three-year reserve commitment while under the impression they were receiving for pay. Captain Penner, who was alleged to be trying to get 70 per cent of his men committed or face termination of

federal funds, denied the whole thing.⁸⁴ The Governor appealed to Wilson to release the rest of the Wisconsin men, since there was a period of low employment ahead, the guard by now was fairly fit, and the change to cold weather might adversely affect the men's health. When this plea failed, Adjutant General Holway was sent to Washington in early December. The Milwaukee Journal angrily condemned the "want-to-go-home propaganda sanctioned by Governor Philipp"; the guard could not be efficient if state politicians were allowed to meddle with it, and the same sort of propaganda had already caused a near mutiny in the Michigan guard.⁸⁵ Apparently, volunteer preparedness, put to the test, was wearing a bit thin. The guard finally came home, unit by unit, over the course of the winter.

The Wisconsin National Guard had had its hour in the center of the stage. Now, in the winter of 1916, there was time for evaluation. Certain facts were unpleasantly clear. The Wisconsin National Guard had performed its assigned duties with some efficiency in the field. But it had never managed to achieve its war strength of 7,000, and the trained men in the ranks (some of them pretty sketchily trained themselves) had been diluted by raw unequipped recruits, an intolerable situation in a real emergency. Because of the geographic distribution of the guard, the hardships of border duty had been borne to a disproportionate extent by urban residents.⁸⁶ Too many

family men and small businessmen who had joined for a week at Sparta had spent six months at San Antonio. The guard units of other states had fully manifested their expected inadequacy. In January the Milwaukee Sentinel had editorialized cheerfully that "Those who are familiar with the discipline undergone by the National Guard in the past ten years believe that if put to the test of actual service the guardsmen would furnish a pleasant surprise to their hasty critics."⁸⁷ Now it could only bleat for the defederalizing of the militia, and assail the nincompoops in Washington who "believed in the National Guard as an effective force."⁸⁸

Paradoxically, though there were more trained and hardened troops available in the country than ever before in the 20th century, the nation looked more undefended than ever. Even the Wisconsin National Guard, the best in the nation and the standard bearer of preparedness, looked less impressive mobilized in Texas than it did on paper in Wisconsin. The fine glow which had impelled people to march in preparedness parades and cheer the departing troops was not sufficient materially to increase the actual armed contribution of the state. Although thousands of volunteers had come forward, this was impressive only because of the microscopic size of the force involved. Also, what was gained in efficiency in Texas just might have been partially lost in morale, if the squabblings in Troop A meant

anything. Some of the enthusiasm seems to have been lost in Texas. As the Socialist Milwaukee Leader commented, perhaps without real sympathy, "when he (the guardsman) gets home and is needed to run a bayonet into a 'wop' he may join the noble company of patriots whose motto is to Let George Do It."⁸⁹

The guard had filled a role in spurring preparedness consciousness in Wisconsin. Down in Texas, in quite a different and unintentional way, it may have furthered the cause still more. If it did not, than assuredly the incompetence of its sister units did. By the winter of 1916, all this had been noted, and preparedness, in Wisconsin and elsewhere, was ready to enter upon its final, all-encompassing stage.

CHAPTER V

WHAT PRICE GLORY?

The Opposition to Preparedness

In Wisconsin

The cause of preparedness did not go unopposed in Wisconsin. A thousand miles inland, the state was partially insulated from some of the influences which might disturb the equanimity of those on the East and West Coasts. Moreover, there were three distinct centers of opposition to any move towards an increase in armament at this time. There was a large grouping of Socialists in Milwaukee, traditionally opposed to military expenditures. There was also a large German element in the state, which might be expected to be repelled by some of the anti-German connotations of preparedness in the East. And of course there was the conservative backbone of the state, the farmers, cautious of extravagant expenditures, isolated from the fickle currents of emotion that might sweep the cities, and represented by that militant and unswerving opponent of jingoism, Robert M. LaFollette. The striking thing is not that there was opposition to the idea, but that the opposition appears to have been so ineffectual. Too much can be made of this point. Preparedness was a national issue, and a successful opposition could not have been made within the confines of a single state; the initiatives of the Milwaukee Socialist

Party are not the things which sway the course of a nation. Yet even within the state opposition seems to have been less effective than one might have thought. The opponents of preparedness seem to have been outflanked and put on the defensive at every turn. Having lost the initiative, they were made to seem either irrelevant cranks or cardboard villains in a morality play on Americanism. A thousand miles of spatial detachment did not serve to isolate Wisconsin from the psychology of the times.

First of all, let us examine the opposition from German-Americans. It would be absurd to attempt to define a "German" position on preparedness. Augustus Vogel was president of the National Security League in the state, and people of German extraction were among those who carried flags down Wisconsin Avenue with as much diligence as anyone else. Nonetheless, the fact remains that a sizeable group of German-Americans did unite against preparedness, as they united still more strongly against Wilson's foreign policies. Their identifiably "foreign" position on these issues helped to alienate a great number of people belonging to other ethnic groups, and probably a good number of German-Americans who were more interested in saving their own necks than in helping the Old Country.

Open opposition to preparedness came fairly early in the campaign from this source. At the end of October 1915, 6,000 pro-Germans overflowed Sheboygan's opera-house and

Eagle's Hall at a mass rally harangued by speakers who alternated English with German. Out of this meeting came demands for an embargo on arms shipments abroad, action against British violation of our neutrality; protests against the "misleading phrase of 'Stand Behind the President'," and against "the militarism in this country, which is at present being propagated under the specious pretext of national defense, in order to take hundreds of millions of dollars from the people and divert them into the pockets of a few who certainly do not place the welfare of the nation above other aims. We have so far succeeded as a nation without militarism and believe we can meet the future without it."¹

At about the same time, the Milwaukee Free Press, owned by eighty German businessmen and self appointed spokesman for the German ethnic community, also joined the opposition. Although it had previously associated itself with other Republican journals in flaying the Administrations "inadequate" naval program, the paper suddenly reversed its tack and complained that Wilson was now ready "to jam through Congress a naval and military program in excess of anything our most ardent militarists have dared to dream about." There were some really excellent reasons why the President should not do this. It would reverse ancient policies. It would put us into competition with Europe. It would ignore our exceptional physical and moral

advantages. It might even "weaken America's interest and leadership in the causes of peace, in the pacific adjudication of international disputes"--disputes like the Lusitania incident, one might imagine.²

Now the Free Press began an editorial campaign against preparedness which can only be said to be remarkable in comprehensiveness, inconsistency, and heavy-footedness. Although the paper pointed out the ramshackle quality of our defenses at every opportunity, it also kept stating that no attempt should really be made to improve them because Mr. Wilson's motives for asking an increase in the defense effort were improper, Mr. Wilson's reversal of stand was inconsistent, and anyway, money spent on our armed forces would be wasted unless they were first reorganized top to bottom with Teutonic efficiency, which of course they wouldn't be, because of political chicanery and constitutional limitations. This list of objections did not exhaust the ingenuity of the Free Press's editorial writers. Yet this saturation tactic did not serve to convince, only to alienate.

In November, to give an example, the Free Press denied that it opposed preparedness because it wished to sacrifice our interests to Germany's, but only for motives of purest patriotism. We should not prepare because Wilson had not mentioned making armaments efficient and introducing organizational reforms. Besides, "the war-inflamed present

is not the time for the sober and scientific construction of a program of defense suited to our actual needs." Again, no one really knew what kind of an army or navy we needed to back up our foreign policy, since nobody knew what our foreign policy was.³ Whatever it was, the paper had pointed out (three days earlier) that we had measurably sustained it by "moral potency" in the past.⁴ Finally, preparedness might be expected to be "an excuse for levying extraordinary taxes," just a "pawn and blind to restore the desperate finances of his (Wilson's) administration."⁵

At times, as has been pointed out earlier, the Free Press's stand can only be described as ambivalent. The paper felt that we did not need to strengthen the fleet, since the "absolute fact" that our navy was superior to that of Japan or Germany "is not to be lied away by such a false and deceitful publication as the navy year book, which is issued by the navy department."⁶ On the other hand, we should not spend more money on the fleet since it was so hopelessly inefficient: "submarines sink but don't rise," the heavier warships were all improperly built, only one rear-admiral was a graduate of the war college, the fleet commander-in-chief had made himself "the laughing stock of the world by his antediluvian strategy" in maneuvers,⁷ and the bureau chiefs were a "coterie of barnacles, whose fossilization is equaled only by the tenacity with which they cling to their jobs"⁸

There were other inconsistencies. The Free Press could not be described as an anti-business newspaper. One of its backers was a certain Mr. Trostel, a tanner, who had coined the immortal phrase that the trouble with the Milwaukee workingman was that prosperity had unfortunately weaned him away from his "accustomed sausage and sauerkraut." Now however, the paper saw menaces from the wicked Steel Trust everywhere. Morgan & Company obviously wished to create a demand for armament here, so they wouldn't lose money when the European slaughter ended. Behind it all was the "leering, avid visage of the munitions maker."⁹

Not all of the Free Press's objections to preparedness were without foundation. Unfortunately, behind them all, one could plainly see an overriding concern for the Fatherland, rather than for frugality, the consistency of Mr. Wilson's logical processes, or strict constitutionality. An instance of this is the Free Press's criticism of Wilson's Mid-West speaking tour: "Even more reprehensible has been his repeated emphasis on the trip that we stand in need of preparedness now--this very day; that he does not know what the next hour may bring forth in a situation calling for armed defense."¹⁰ The reprehensibility of all this, it developed, was that America was in the process of conducting negotiations with Germany at this time.

Again, the Free Press subjected a rather vague scare speech of General King to a word-by-word analysis

reminiscent of a medieval theologian's approach to the Apostle's Creed. In the speech in question, the General had merely said that a blow at the strategic center of New York "would be a great temptation to a country oppressed by a long and devastating war, possibly bankrupt, but with an immense standing army ready to go anywhere at the beck of a sovereign." Scrutinizing the text with a microscopic attention to detail for any anti-German implications, the Free Press pointed out that Russia would not attack the Atlantic coast, France didn't have a sovereign, Britain's standing army was not immense, Japan had not been oppressed by a long and devastating war, while Turkey, Italy, Bulgaria, and Serbia could scarcely be objects of concern for the General. By a process of logical deduction, the Free Press came to the conclusion that King was attacking Germany.¹¹

Other manifestations of the preparedness campaign were likewise judged on this single-minded basis. The paper believed that the film The Battle Cry of Peace, so lavishly praised by the National Security League, "inevitably tends to direct any fear of invasion that may possess the average mind against the German nation--a nation which has been our friend on many occasions of dire stress, with which we are traditionally at peace, and whose policy has never been one of overseas conquest like the policies of France and England."¹² Since the invaders in the film were unspecified,

and in fact were wearing American uniforms and distinctive caps, all of this seems a little exaggerated. To many people, the Free Press's fixation on this point could only indicate a guilty conscience. Although some of the motives behind preparedness in the East involved a fear of Germany or a desire to join the Entente Powers and intervene effectively in Europe, the reasons most often cited in Wisconsin as necessitating a large army and navy were Mexican outrages and British trade restrictions.

When they were not bitterly assailing preparedness, the writers of the Free Press jeered at it. If America were in danger, they would advocate universal service, since "a Security League button makes one neither a patriot nor a soldier."¹³ The paper pointed out that: "the standing armies of United States and Great Britain are examples of professional militarism," whereas "the citizen armies of France, Germany and Switzerland...were examples of democratic military preparedness."¹⁴ However, we were not in danger and obviously America would never take such a step, since Wilson, as a Democrat, would be opposed to enlarged federal power, and since he was lukewarm on preparedness, would be opposed to doing anything serious about it.¹⁵ Sharing in this view, Arthur Koenig, nominated for an office in the Germania Society, said confidently that the people didn't realize that it would take half a century to condition the undisciplined American nation to the idea, and the

politicians didn't have any intention of doing anything about it anyway.¹⁶ His forecast was singularly inaccurate.

All of this opposition did not slow up the preparedness campaign. It did serve to throw a bad light upon the loyalty and patriotism of Wisconsin's German-American community, to render the positions of those in favor of preparedness increasingly inflexible, and to build up a growing bitterness. It must be remembered that preparedness was not the major issue causing a cleavage at this time between elements of the German population and the rest of the state. The clash over our foreign policy and the embargo question did greater damage. But it did not help ease tensions when sizable (and readily identifiable) numbers of German-Americans seemed to be trying to sabotage America's defenses for selfish ends; it was atrociously untactful phrasing when the Free Press editorialized that it regarded the collapse of the national guard on the Mexican border "with pardonable satisfaction."¹⁷ Only three out of 2,100 firms in the state refused to respond to a survey of the Wisconsin board of industrial preparedness: two of them were Milwaukee breweries.¹⁸ In the hyper-patriotic atmosphere of the times, such activities could only have unhappy effects.

In May 1915, the country and the state had hailed the willingness of German-Americans to fight for their country, if necessary, over the Lusitania incident. Ten months

later, as bitterness over an open clash on foreign and defense policies increased, letters like this were already coming into the newspaper columns: "It is a peculiar and rather significant fact that the great opposition to preparedness comes from hyphenated papers of the character of the Free Press--papers which descend to obscenity and profanity in their abuse of the government which gives them life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and which even get so low as to speak slurringly of the first lady of the land, and who abuse the president personally."¹⁹ The letter was signed "American", and it is interesting to see the emotional connotations preparedness had assumed for some. The Germans did nothing effective to hinder preparedness in Wisconsin--they did serve, by their short-sightedly chauvinistic policies, to taint the objections of those who fought against preparedness from sincere conviction with the sinister mark of disloyalty.

The Socialists fared no better with their opposition. They were another interest group with a restricted viewpoint and a somewhat limited appeal to the sentiments of the state at large. Worse still, much of the party in Wisconsin was composed of German-Americans, which made them hyphenates as well as dangerous radicals. If their arguments were more sincere than those of their more reactionary brethren, they were even more confused, for the Party, although more or less against any increased armaments, had no clear

ideological stand. Against a determined and concerted drive moving under the banners of Americanism, the Socialists had little enough chance anyway, and their own divisions and amorphous conceptions did nothing to help them.

Three distinct approaches to preparedness were possible for the Milwaukee Socialists. As realistic Americans, they could take the position that adequate provisions must be made to support their country and defend it from attack by other capitalist nations, since capitalism clearly implied war. On the other hand, as radical internationalists who opposed war and militarism on grounds of high principle, they could maintain that any attempt to actually increase our military defenses should be fought as a threat to labor internally and to weaker nations externally. Finally, they could assume a Marxian position of fatalism, and take the long run view that universal service (or the maximum possible militarism) should be welcomed, since it would tend to level society, discipline the workers into solidarity, and turn the armed forces into socialist instruments rather than class weapons.

As it turned out, the Milwaukee Leader, edited by Victor Berger and principal English-language spokesman for the Wisconsin Socialists, adopted all of these positions at various times, which did not really help in making the Socialist opposition either consistent or plausible. Not

that consistency or plausibility in a newspaper's editorials would have substantially changed public opinion; preparedness in Wisconsin, alas, was not the result of public dialogue. But the Leader's indecision was reflected by the public behavior of Socialists in lending themselves to measures like the Preparedness Parade, understandably torn as they were between pink messianic dreams and the grey realities of Milwaukee politics.

In 1915, the National Socialist Party had voted to expell any Socialist official who appropriated money for defense by a vote of 11,041 to 782.²⁰ Berger and his supporters, as realistic practitioners of municipal politics, felt that so idealistic a stand left something to be desired. The request of the party's national leadership that Wilson abandon preparedness in favor of a Socialist peace plan was evidence, according to the Leader, that "the faith of the national executive committee of the Socialist Party in protests, petitions, and resolutions is childish in its simplicity."²¹ Some measures for defense were necessary. "Docility and non-resistance will soon reduce any people or class to the level of the Chinese and Hindoo. Any man who is not willing to fight for his class or his nation does not deserve to belong to a class or a nation."²² At times, the Leader could rise to the heights of an almost lyrical patriotism, as in its attack on some of the pacifists: "The soldier, if he is a mercenary, may be the lowest of

mankind, but there are among us those who will decline to believe that George Washington fell to a depth beneath which no man can go, while there are few families in which there are not held sacred the memories of those who died that the republic might have birth and endure."²³

Pure opposition to military preparedness, besides being silly, was bad politics. The Socialist slogan of "war on war" ultimately adopted for the 1916 campaign was "about as fit to be a practical campaign issue as a hedgehog is fit to be a pillow."²⁴ While the European Socialists were now practised soldiers, who might some day control the armies and navies, the American Socialists were "civilians who imagine they can stop a military engine with hot air and paper wads." So, instead of going into the presidential campaign with anti-war slogans made up by Jewish prophets 3,000 years ago, the Socialists ought to devise a sane program of national defense and lay out a course of action in case of war. Let labor and Socialism have a chance to shape the course of our national defense.²⁵

Besides being both patriotic and practical, defense would ultimately turn out to the benefit of the working class, according to the inexorable dynamics of history. This gave a nice air of Machiavellian astuteness to any Socialist collaboration in defense measures. A big army and a big navy was inevitable, since a capitalist-minded majority could not be expected to turn in a Socialist verdict.

"All of this will at first help mainly the employing class, but in a wider view we shall also benefit from the very evils of militarism."²⁶ Imposition of military discipline on the working class would curb harmful syndicalist and anarchist notions of industrial warfare, while promoting political solidarity. By making strikes more difficult, militarism would drive the workers into the field of politics.²⁷ "This is the historical method by which the army of capitalism shall be turned into the army of democracy, and capitalism shall promote Socialism, through forces of its own creation."²⁸ As a result, "the generations of another historical epoch will hunt for capitalist brains preserved in alcohol as scientists today hunt for the skulls of monkey-men."²⁹

Despite all of these incentives, present and future, for supporting preparedness, the Milwaukee Leader found itself in continuous opposition to any practical method of defense and opposed especially vociferously any slightest attempt to impress workers into khaki. Wilson's initial army plan was condemned as envisaging a capitalist controlled professional army, an enlarged militia with a "ruthless and almost unbroken" record as a tool of class interests, and worst of all, as openly seeking the influences of employers to coerce their employees into service.³⁰ In short, the whole preparedness campaign was nothing but a scheme to suppress the workers and aggrandize the country

by war: "...our hog fat plundering capitalists are planning to build a road of the bodies of American workers on which to invade foreign markets."³¹

It is not necessary to argue that these three positions on preparedness are totally inconsistent. Perhaps, in a mystic religious sense, there is an inner unity in all this, just as one can see in some of the Christian thought on sin. (While sin is part of the divine order and all men must sin by nature, this does not relieve us of the obligation of opposing it all we can.) At any rate, the practical application of these seemingly contradictory views confused even the Socialists and put them into some fairly incongruous positions.

When Garrison, who had been responsible for Wilson's "purely militarist program of a ruling class,"³² resigned, the Socialists deplored the fact that the impractical and spineless Wilson had dropped a man who wanted "a real program of national defense, with full government control over all vital industries supplying the army and navy."³³ Even stranger was the Leader's complaint that "The American general staff does not manage army and navy affairs independently of the war minister. Even in war time, the war department, run by raw civilians or chocolate soldiers, undertakes to give orders to the real soldiers and sailors."³⁴ Oddly enough, the reactionary Free Press was making the same accusations. The Leader had a fatal fascination for German

methods because they were based on at least state socialism; the Free Press admired the state socialism because it was German.

Both papers had a similar interest in universal military service, which began to disappear when such a development became more and more possible. "Our ruling classes have always dodged universal service,"³⁵ the Leader complained, protesting against capitalism's "hired armed thugs--whether in uniform or not".³⁶ When the New York Merchant's Association actually called for universal military training, the outmaneuvered Leader could only cry out "It is easy to see where this lightning of imperialism will strike first."³⁷

In practice, the positive contribution of the Wisconsin Socialists to preparedness was positive obstructionism. The Leader assailed the Chamberlain "conscription bill" because not enough people would be conscripted; people who had received military training in school would be exempt, thus creating a rich-man's son officer class. Besides, the bill would not allow reservists to keep weapons at their own homes.³⁸ The comparatively moderate Hay Bill was a "model of American militarism."³⁹ Because the bill had a mild feature in it which provided that reserve battalions of the national guard could be filled by conscription in time of war if there were not sufficient enlistments, it was a measure to force workmen and students into the private

army of the employing interests. The provision for volunteer military training camps meant that students would spend their vacations under conditions "where they can be taught all the vices that have always characterized professional soldiers."⁴⁰ Despite all its fine talk about the need for Socialists to take a positive attitude towards the problems of national defense, the Leader managed to come up with only one watered-down proposal, and the response of Socialists in the rest of the country showed the difficulty of coming up with any proposal at all.

Berger's plan, advanced in November 1915, and again put forward in January 1916, seems today as innocuous a measure as a proposal for public gavage lessons. Every public schoolhouse in the country should be equipped with a machine-shop and modern tools. Every American boy and girl would serve the country there for a year between the ages of nineteen and twenty. The people taking part in the program would live at home, thus saving a good deal of expense to the government and keeping everyone uncontaminated by professional soldiers. At these schools, the boys and girls would receive vocational training and would learn something about engineering and vehicle mechanics. They would also learn how to use a gun, if necessary. Under such a scheme he asserted, everyone in the United States would be imbued with democracy and a sense of the dignity of labor.⁴⁰

Appalled by this invitation to rampant militarism, Local Marion County, Indianapolis, Indiana, seconded by the Ohio state convention, asked for Berger's recall from the position of national executive committeeman, while New York elements of the party (also upset by the Leader's stand on the Mexican situation) threatened to withdraw their support unless the paper changed its policy. Max Braunstein, a New York Socialist, writing in The American Socialist, asked that Berger be removed as editor of the paper, or that the paper be boycotted.⁴¹ Berger got support from Morris Hillquit, a major Socialist leader in New York, and his own Wisconsin party supported him, so that nothing came of the affair ultimately. Yet even the support from Milwaukee was at times equivocal. The Jewish Branch of the Milwaukee Socialists, although they opposed any attempt to recall Berger, intimated that the editor's ideas on preparedness and refusal to condemn Socialist participation in the Preparedness Parade were "contrary to the feeling of the great mass of party members in Milwaukee."⁴² Plainly a realistic and practical attempt to outflank the preparedness hoopla and establish some sort of reasonable defense system on lines not too repellent to Socialists would have been doomed by internal conflicts as well as by external hostility.

In May 1916, the Leader had protested that the Socialist Party had provided its members with no starting point for

a discussion on preparedness and no guiding line to use as a distinction between preparedness and militarism. "At present all is vagueness and confusion."⁴³ At the end of the year the situation had not noticeably improved. After backing the Preparedness Parade, the Socialist leaders in the state had some second thoughts. As clamor for universal service grew, the Leader preferred to ignore the whole issue and concentrate instead on the alleged iniquities of the Hay Bill, which could theoretically be used, they felt, to draft Socialists and labor officials first in the event of war and pack them off to fight for capitalism in some conveniently isolated bit of landscape. The slogans of the fall election campaign were "Will Your Children Make Cannon-Fodder?" and "Therefore, choose now, between Socialism and Peace, Or Capitalism and War." The decision of the voters was regrettable but predictable.⁴⁴

There was a third source of opposition to preparedness, more important than the other two, yet more diffuse: the residents of rural Wisconsin. Their spokesman on this issue was Robert M. LaFollette, senior senator from Wisconsin. Their influence can be found, in a more negative way, in the opinions and votes of Wisconsin's eleven-man delegation in the House of Representatives. A generalization here could be misleading; if a number of Badger Congressmen were always on the side of the opposition to preparedness, there were others who cast their votes consistently for

the most extreme measures of defense. Furthermore, in Congress, preparedness was an issue of policy, capable of compromise solution, not a black and white (or red-white-and-blue) absolute. None of the members of the Congressional delegation were opposed to that elusive concept known as adequate preparedness. Even LaFollette, most outspoken opponent of them all, was in favor of whatever increases in the coast defense, and the national guard might be found necessary. But most of Wisconsin's Congressmen showed themselves unaffected by or hostile to the wave of agitation for a big increase in defense forces in 1915-1916 and the dispute did not run along party lines. If Democratic Senator Husting followed the President's lead, two of the three Democratic Congressmen, Reilly and Kunop, voted consistently against preparedness, while Congressman Burke came out against half of the big preparedness measures.

In 1916, the national office of the Security League published a list of what it called critical votes on preparedness in the 64th Congress. There were four proposals before the House of Representatives which were judged to be crucial: The Kahn Amendment to the Hay Army Bill, which would have provided for a regular army of 250,000; the Senate compromise version of the bill, which would have provided the same thing; the proposal for a federally controlled Continental Army instead of a federalized National Guard; and an attempt to recommit the naval appropriations bill with instructions to increase it. According to the Security League list, Congressmen Browne,

Nelson, Reilly, Esch, and Konop voted against the 250,000 man army the first time around, while Frear and Lenroot joined them in voting against so large an army the second time the issue was brought to the floor. Only three Congressmen, Cooper, Cary and Stafford, voted in favor of a Continental Army, while Burke, Nelson, Reilly, Esch, Browne, Konop, Frear and Lenroot voted for the National Guard. The motion to recommit the naval appropriations bill fared slightly better at the hands of Wisconsin's Congressmen. Cooper, Stafford, Frear, Lenroot, Browne, and Esch voted for it; Nelson, Cary, Reilly, and Konop against, with Burke paired against. All this negative voting would seem to indicate a great deal of sentiment against preparedness in the state.⁴⁵

Yet the simple listing of votes does not give the whole picture, since it does not take into account the motivations of the legislators, the tactics of politics, or the feasibility of the proposed legislation. Hence, such a listing of votes can not be used as a definitive test of anything, although the National Security League, a little later on attempted to equate a vote against a 250,000 man army with a ballot cast for the kaiser. Browne, for example, who voted against increased preparedness three out of four times, was on record as saying: "the risk of over-preparedness is only a matter of dollars and cents," so "we cannot afford to take any chances when by a mere monetary

consideration we can be absolutely safe."⁴⁶ Representative Cooper, who voted for the more extreme measure of preparedness four times, and Representative Konop, who voted the other way in each case in question, were agreed that the navy should consist of subs and planes, and not of battle-ships, which were worthless, highly profitable to the steel interests, and possibly capable of being used iniquitously against the Latin-Americans.⁴⁷ All that is clear is that the Congressional delegation from the predominantly rural state of Wisconsin, certainly not a body of men usually inclined to be indifferent to public sentiment, refused to tumble head over heels in their ardor for preparedness.

On the other hand, the Congressmen from the Fourth and Fifth Districts, Stafford and Cary, representing the big urban Milwaukee area, voted consistently for increased preparedness.⁴⁸ This does not prove that there was a sharp divergence in preparedness sentiment between rural and urban, but it does tend to bear it out.

At any rate the delegation's voting on this issue was roundly condemned by the bulk of the enlightened urban press, which did not understand how these men could withstand the clear voice of public opinion, by which the urban press meant the urban press. The spectre of disloyalty so conveniently provided by the presence of German-American voters in Wisconsin was rung in; as the Journal put it: "At any rate it will be a peculiar constituency that will

uphold representatives who vote to surrender the rights of America (the McLemore Resolution) and then vote in such a way that some time may leave America with no choice except to see her tiny army and small navy both flee before an invader or witness the destruction of both and find herself invaded."⁴⁹ The idea that both votes might not have been treasonable attempts to cater to the disloyalties of hyphenates, but rather parts of a consistent effort to keep America out of international conflict, apparently never occurred to the popular newspapers of these times. The lowest point of this campaign was the Journal's assertion that "All of them except Senator Husting have voted to surrender American rights of travel on the ocean and fully half of them have voted to make it impossible for the nation to prevent the destruction of any rights that they could not surrender."⁵⁰ But then, at this happy time in the Progressive Era, it was easy to ignore or disparage the opinions and motives of members of the House; the image of the "piffling, blundering, provincial Congressman"⁵¹ was consistently held up to the public eye by all factions of the press.

It was harder to dismiss LaFollette. Although his enemies grew everywhere like thistles, he was warmly supported by an even larger number of people from both office and farm. His opposition to preparedness was firm and unequivocal in the halls of Congress and in the pages of

his own LaFollette's Magazine, with a circulation of about twenty thousand in the state.⁵² It is not that his views on preparedness were so dramatically different from those of congressmen like Esch, who were also disciples of rural progressivism. But whereas the views of Representatives on preparedness were mostly expressed negatively in votes, LaFollette fought what he thought was an artificial hysteria in ringing speeches and passionate editorials. If others saw politics as an art of compromise, LaFollette saw it as a type of crusade. Like some of his opponents on the preparedness issue, he dealt in absolutes, only of a different kind: LaFollette's vision was that of a chess-board America where the People fought against the Interests, and the pieces were either black or white.

Part of LaFollette's anger at preparedness was due to the fact that he thought the whole issue was irrelevant. In discussing a water-power bill he was fighting for, the Senator wrote: "It is impossible when the public is suffering from a brain storm of war hysteria to arouse the people to the real danger that threatens them."⁵³ But there were other, more important reasons. Excessive armament was intrinsically bad, a device of the interests for squeezing money out of the taxpayer and promoting imperialist expeditions.⁵⁴

LaFollette was consistent in his approach. Along with many other progressives, he held these beliefs at the

beginning of the World War. He retained them up to the moment of America's entry, when almost all of his former allies had long since defected and begun carrying flags (sometimes literally) in the preparedness campaign. Herbert Quick, who was busily turning out invasion stories in the fall of 1915, had said eight months earlier: "the danger (of war) may be regarded as nil, for many years to come."⁵⁵ LaFollette felt the situation had not changed materially.

In the Senator's view, there were positive reasons against any program of increased armament. "What state, what city finds security for peace and good order in allowing every man to pack a gun?...States are but aggregations of individuals. Nations are but great groups of human beings. The deadly weapon within ready reach of the hand breeds a murderer...."⁵⁶ LaFollette was not a pacifist. But he wished to avoid as much as possible the use of force in international affairs. If conservatives and Wilsonian progressives stood ready to draw the shining sword of righteousness to defend American honor or that still more intangible abstract known as war-time international law, LaFollette was not. If faced with a choice between naval convoys of neutrals to safeguard commerce, or an embargo, "IN MY JUDGEMENT THE PEACEFUL COURSE WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE COURSE."⁵⁷

Aside from this, preparedness was a tool of the

interests. The real patriots of the country were devoting their great wealth to the making of a public sentiment for a big standing army and a big navy: "...even the preparedness suckers of the country can readily see that there will come a day when the Allies will be unable to borrow any more American dollars with which to buy high-priced American munitions of war...hence the necessity of preparing for preparedness."⁵⁸ Bethlehem Steel and Carnegie wanted more opportunities for selling the government armorplate at \$440. a ton when it could be produced at a cost of \$238. a ton.⁵⁹ The gouging interests promoting preparedness had sold powder which cost them 34 cents a pound to the government for prices ranging from 53 to 80 cents a pound.⁶⁰ The object of preparedness was simply to foist a Frankenstein's monster of militarism on the country for the benefit of a few.

Again, the whole thing was unnecessary. Nelson A. Miles, who had once commanded the whole U. S. Army, had testified that there was no military need. "If 500,000 men were landed on either coast, and we could not raise enough men to drive them out, I would want to move to another country."⁶¹ Besides, the program was based on a ridiculous concept of international affairs. As LaFollette's Magazine said of Senator Williams of Mississippi: "He does not seem to realize that a victorious Germany means a Germany surrounded by jealous European foes who would not hesitate to spring again if she gave them the excuse. The Senator's

war scare is like all the others." Those who proclaimed the danger of invasion were merely holding up "painted soldiers, on a painted fleet, sailing a painted sea."⁶²

In line with his beliefs, LaFollette sponsored a proposal in Congress that would have allowed the Bureau of Census to take up an advisory referendum on whether or not the nation should go to war, in case an overseas clash appeared imminent; Governor Philipp commented (quite unfairly) "an enemy could attack our East and West Coasts, take New York and San Francisco, while the county clerks were preparing notice of the election."⁶³ LaFollette sponsored a measure forbidding the use of warships constructed under the 1916 Navy appropriations bill as instruments for the collection of debts owed American citizens in the Western hemisphere. Both of these attempts strike us as odd today. We are unused to such obvious attempts to hamstring the efficient exercise of national power. And yet, an examination of history might show that the Senator's proposals were not entirely as silly as they might seem.

There was some soft-headedness among members of LaFollette's following, of course. A minister in his magazine wrote that unpreparedness had "moral grandeur," and anyway, if war ever did come, "we could depend on the awful strength of divine righteousness."⁶⁴ Certain of LaFollette's cited authorities were a little weak: Nelson

A. Miles had once been Commanding General, U. S. Army, but the position had ceased to exist after 1903, so the general's opinions on modern war may not have been completely knowledgeable.⁶⁵ The Senator's obsession with the evils of the Trusts stands out as a bit dated, and at times it seems that if LaFollette's opponents saw an America ringed by potential enemies, the Senator saw America only as a potential aggressor.

And yet much of the Senator's argumentation stands up rather well, particularly a seven-hour speech he made in Congress in mid-July, in which he tore to pieces the feasibility of an amphibious attack on the United States, pointing out that the nation's admirals, under cross-examination by Congressmen, had admitted that any attacking fleet would labor under heavy disadvantages because of problems in the fields of supply of maintenance, and that any invading power would have to leave fifty per cent of its naval forces at home to protect itself from other nations. The proposed naval building program, he pointed out, meant that we intended to construct a navy as large as or larger than that of Great Britain, which needed a huge navy because of her extended commitments and complete dependence upon overseas trade for survival. LaFollette went on:

But when we have done that, what then? When you build, England and Germany will build more. You will drive them to it and after you have

spent your \$315,000,000 you will just find yourself a new place to start. Your only limit then will be the limit of taxation upon the American people.

What has happened that we should increase our military appropriations from \$429,000,000 last year to \$840,000,000 this year?

All reason is the other. The other countries of the world are losing their battleships, killing their men by millions⁶⁶

In all of this it does seem that LaFollette mirrored the feelings and beliefs of the average Wisconsin farmer. The urban press might learnedly demur at some of his estimates, but even their pages attested to the man's popularity in the outlying areas of the state. From Mukwonago and Nemoninee Falls came dispatches like this:

What the Senator has said on preparedness appears to have made an impression. His statement that it means a new tax of \$20,000,000 on Wisconsin alone, is apparently a new idea to those who hear his addresses. His denunciation of munitions makers as the beneficiaries of the preparedness policy and charges that they were promoting the move, were applauded by many who felt that the charges were well founded.

The farther into the rural districts the senator goes, the more sympathetic are his audiences with his stand regarding preparedness. It is not a factional question. In the rural centers both Progressives and Stalwarts are to be found who say the Senator is right.⁶⁷

Testifying before the Hay Committee, the Master of the Ohio Grange had said: "We think there may be one other reason for the psychology of the times--the fact that those in the cities who have followed the disastrous conflict

across the water have more nearly lost their bearings than the men and women who are on the farm."⁶⁸ The results of the State Journal's 1914 poll, the unanimous negative vote on the question of increased armament cast by delegates from Wisconsin and 31 other states at the 1915 Grange Convention,⁶⁹ LaFollette's sweeping victory in 1916 after making preparedness an issue in his state campaign, all tend to confirm this idea of a sharp divergence in urban and rural views on the matter of preparedness. Yet this strong rural sentiment, powerfully voiced by LaFollette and echoed to some extent by half the House members from the state, never received any significant support from the newspapers or from the business and professional classes that led public opinion. Even the respected Senator's erstwhile supporters broke with him on this issue, and eventually would turn on him with savage and vindictive fury.

LaFollette, of course, blamed it all on a press that was the hireling of the moneyed interests. Although not all sections of the Wisconsin press may have been immune to economic influences, this explanation is inadequate. As we have seen, the most progressive papers in the state were shrillest in their demands for preparedness. Perhaps the best explanation that can be given for this turn of events is that preparedness expressed the needs and convictions of the city classes that formed the brains and nerves of the state. The tensions of two years of European war,

the exhortations of the leaders of both political parties, conservative and progressive alike, the high appeal to the national interest, the milk-sop-like ineffectuality of some of the opponents of preparedness, all served to sway the upper-middle class and the press almost unanimously in favor of the movement. The informed circles of Wisconsin tended to respond more to the leads given by their counterparts in New York and Washington than to the opinions expressed from the dairy-farm. In the face of the aroused sentiment of the arguments of an independent senator and the unsubtle objections of thrifty farmers seemed to be reactionary and narrowly provincial attempts to halt the progress of the country.

Any chance for a really effective opposition to preparedness in the state was stifled by many factors. Those who fought against preparedness were handicapped by their own diversity and heterogeneous motives: conservative patriots found themselves bracketed with a dubious assortment of pro-Germans, pacifists, and radicals giving the whole opposition the air of a lunatic fringe. Their objections to preparedness were frequently conflicting, their counterproposals frequently absurd, and any reasonable alternative to the preparedness campaign could always be damningly labelled a "half-measure." The campaign for preparedness was organized at the grass-roots level; the forces opposing the movement displayed a conspicuous

lack of this quality. No attempt was made to meet preparedness agitation on its own ground with counter-agitation. Although the national Anti-Militarism Committee did stage a few small parades throughout the country (trundling a mock-up of an overarmored dinosaur named Jingo through the streets),⁷⁰ nothing was done in Wisconsin. It was difficult, in any event, to organize mass sentiment for such a negative concept as opposition to preparedness anyway; people had once responded readily to sweeping positive causes like pacifism, but these were not the times for pacifism. Anyway, most of the people who were able to organize things were on the other side.

Again, besides all the other factors in its favor, preparedness had a big psychological advantage. It could offer to its followers the glory of a strong and united America; it could threaten with the potential horrors of New York's towers toppling under enemy shellfire. The voices, or at least the more sensible voices, who spoke out against increased armament could only hold out the status quo and threaten increased taxes and an enriched big business. The clear confident trumpet-cries that this would be a truly and uniquely American preparedness, not a foreign-type militarism, easily drowned out those who called out that it might be paid for in blood and liberty as well as gold.

CHAPTER VI

THE JUDGEMENT OF THIS HOUR

The Culmination of the Preparedness Movement in Wisconsin

In the June of 1916, Michael M. Olbrich of Madison, making an unsuccessful bid to have the Republican National Convention nominate Senator LaFollette as its presidential candidate, had decried preparedness before a sweltering and indifferent mass of delegates at Chicago. The American people, Olbrich had said, could not be led astray by this fake issue.

They will not fall a trembling before the specter of a dragon conjured like the fabled Phoenix from the ashes of exhausted, annihilated Europe; nor will they lash themselves into a lather of panic before the brown men of the Pacific without some evidence of ill intent....

With the spectacle of a continent a suicide before their eyes, they cannot be convinced that salvation lies in the stupid imitation of the concerted folly that has laid the one half world in ashes at their feet.

Much talk of guns and drums may disturb, it may confuse, it may control the judgement of this hour, but it will not control, it will not stampede the judgement of the American people....²

By the December of that year, a great number of people seemed ready to refute Olbrich's judgments and come out in favor of a peace time garrison state.

All the returns were now in from the Army and National

Guard mobilization on the Mexican border. The cold statistics were not encouraging. The volunteer system for recruiting both national guardsmen and members of the regular forces was a failure. Postmasters were now being paid \$5.00 a head for every man they managed to enlist in the army, an action described by the War Department as "the last gasp of volunteer enlistments."² After all of the talk about preparedness, the army was still short 29,130 men on August 31.³ In fact, between March 15 and August 31, the army had managed a net gain of 8,463 men, despite the Mexican crisis and the patriotic appeals of "Come Help Us Catch Villa." High civilian wages made recruiting almost impossible. As for the national guard, it had turned out to be 4,000 short of minimum peacetime strength when mobilized on the border, and the men were inadequately trained and equipped at that.⁴ All of the flag-waving for preparedness had not generated any enlistments. As General Hugh Scott, army chief of staff, said drily: "The spirit was rife to let somebody else do it."⁵ The army staff now felt impelled to call for universal military training, instead of the "extravagant, inefficient, and dangerous" volunteer system.⁶

General Scott requested a first-line force of 1,500,000 men, backed by another force of 1,500,000 that could be mobilized within ninety days. In 1915, the general staff had asked merely for a standing army of 500,000 with

500,000 men in reserve, but this plan was now obsolete, for fresh and hitherto unnoticed perils overhung the nation. The dragons had grown larger, it appeared. Naturally, because of the niceties of diplomacy, the general was forced to make only the most vague references:

...one of the powers involved in the war, and whose territory extends the whole length of our northern frontier, has increased its army from a relatively small force to a strength approximating that of the other great European powers. Due to the fact that our northern neighbor is largely an island empire, a great portion of any trained force it may possess can be spared for use at a distant theater of operations....

It should be pointed out that our northern neighbor is in alliance with a certain powerful oriental nation--another island empire--and for the same reason when acting in alliance with a power that has control of the sea, has ability to send its army of 2,225,000 men to any part of the world without danger of invasion.

...at present we are practically defenseless before the veteran armies of our northern neighbors, and could easily be crushed by the existing coalition of the island empires.⁷

Senator LaFollette had said of less extreme proposals for preparedness that had been before the first session of the 64th Congress that they were pieces of "impudent graft"⁹ which Congress would have summarily tossed out a year before. Unfortunately, his response to General Scott's ideas has not been preserved for posterity. The Milwaukee Journal, however, in commenting on General Scott's proposals, knew where the plain duty of its readers lay.

these words coming from our chief of staff, who is so little of an alarmist that he has been accused of pacifism, are indeed significant. They contain a solemn warning. They make clear that if we are to be in a position to defend our soil against invasion, we must maintain a fleet equal to any and also, in some way, organize and equip an adequate land force.

We cannot choose enemies. They select themselves.¹⁰

The Milwaukee Sentinel, abandoning its long standing advocacy of an enlarged regular force, came out even more flatly for universal military training. "It is a burlesque democracy which conferred rights upon its citizens without exacting services."¹¹ A universal citizen force would not only unify and democratize the country, but would be the patriotic way to defend the nation, giving everybody an opportunity to do his bit for America. Besides, it would eliminate the "janissaries and praetorian guards" which were "recruited from the labor market and advertised for like harvest hands or lumberjacks."¹² Once the Sentinel had editorialized that Wilson's ideas on an armed citizenry had as much relevance to modern conditions as the drill regulations of Lycurgus; now it found them, in a harsher form, much more up to date--or possibly it was only that the Spartan constitution seemed very up to date at the end of 1916. Did not the paper point out that universal military training was "distinctly a democratic obligation--perhaps the most democratic thing in Germany."¹³ There was a lunatic fringe, of course, who fought this necessary

idea (in point of fact, even Wilson hesitated to endorse it.) "So it was in Lincoln's time with the doughfaces and pacifists who could see nothing but greed and graft in the motives of those who stood for military patriotism and the national defense. So it will go with their fellow mental dyspeptics and moral muckrakers now."¹⁴

So America made ready for a brighter world. The Journal quoted a New York Times interview with "one of the most thoughtful officials in the capital." The official stated that whatever the outcome of the war, the country must be ready to meet attack, even if the war turned out to be a draw. Our relationships with Germany, Britain, Russia, and Japan would be strained in the future. Our interests in China and South America would be menaced. After the war, there would be a fierce struggle for commerce and trade, and these trade wars often spread into the military field. America must prepare.¹⁵

The Milwaukee Journal felt its readers might be in some danger of "lapsing into comfortable forgetfulness," and tried to diminish any unwholesome tendencies in this direction.¹⁶ Not only did America's army need strengthening, the Journal warned its readers, but the navy had to be looked after, although the sixteen capital ships appropriated for at the last session would strengthen it greatly. However, Japan was building a battleship that would be swifter and more powerful than any in the United States Navy. Therefore,

we must not only build ships, but build them to the recommendations of the naval board: the board according to the paper, wanted ships of 40,000 tons, with 12 16-inch guns and a speed of "23 knots an hour (sic)."¹⁷ The Journal pointed out that this would put us in a good position for either preparation or disarmament, since not even Great Britain could keep up with us; if she started building warships, we would build more.¹⁸ Similar ideas had been popular in both Great Britain and Germany before World War I, and the end product had not been very satisfactory, but America was not in a mood to consider these little drawbacks now. The papers ran a small story informing their readers that an anticipatory Charles Schwab of Bethlehem Steel was planning to invest \$100,000,000 in his company in the next few years. (The company was already 50% larger than Krupp.) "We want Bethlehem to be an efficient ordnance-making plant, sufficiently large to serve the needs of our own country, for Europe will no longer need us."¹⁹ The Wisconsin chapter of the National Security League, now 2,600 strong, announced that this year's drive for new members would be as intense as last year's.²⁰ America must prepare.

On February 1st, 1917, all of this campaign for an abstract "preparedness" came to an abrupt end when Germany announced it would revert to unrestricted submarine warfare. America now had an enemy.

It is important not to exaggerate the significance of the preparedness movement in Wisconsin. Even by December 1916, it is not at all certain that a majority of voters in the state had been won over to a big preparedness program. And the patriotic enthusiasm of the urban press and urban pressure groups was never effectively translated into patriotic act. Evidence of preparedness sentiment can be found much more readily in the editorial columns of newspapers than in the strength returns of the Wisconsin National Guard, despite all of the talk about the necessity for a citizen army.

However, a study of the preparedness movement in Wisconsin during this period does reveal some interesting facts about the mentality and spirit of the time. It is clear that the newspapers and the educated classes of the state were affected far more by the mood of the nation than by any provincial attitudes of indifference or hostility to preparedness. It is also clear that these groups, in their discussion of issues, had no clear conception of what ought to be meant by words like "preparedness," or "militarism" or "Americanism." And despite their air of sophistication they had a distorted picture of international reality at the time, a picture made no clearer by the flood of lurid war propaganda that was channeled in their direction by the national news agencies. As a result, these supposedly informed circles were most susceptible to propagandistic

agitation, and were readily induced to take the most extreme positions, not only on the preparedness issue, but on other national and international problems. Well supplied with accurate statistics, incorrect analogies, and misleading perspectives, devoid of any comprehension of the possible long-term consequences of their actions, these elements were ready to set their hands to making over a nation or a world.

It has been said that by 1917 the World War had become "hyperbolic."²¹ The conflict had snowballed to uncontrollable proportions; its means no longer had any relationship to its ends; its effects no longer could fulfill the desires of any one of the nations involved. In a somewhat similar sense, it could be argued that the preparedness movement had become hyperbolic by 1917. What had started out as a perhaps overdue effort to improve the navy and revamp a small, obsolescent army at a time of international tension, had grotesquely mushroomed into a demand for more or less permanent peacetime military superstructure, pointlessly large in relation to any plausible danger, and fixed by compulsion upon the American people. A sane defense policy takes into account over-all national goals and the probable dangers to them. It is a relative thing. The backers of the preparedness movement wanted an absolute preparedness, and were themselves prepared to revert to xenophobia to justify the military incubus they desired.

In this manner, the preparedness movement, in Wisconsin as elsewhere, led its advocates into an intellectual trap. The preparedness boosters wound up advocating a navy the equal of any in the world, and an enormous Swiss-type army. Such a naval building program could have led to a costly and unnecessary arms race, while an army of this sort, although well suited to the needs of a small strategically located nation surrounded by the huge conscript forces of rival warlike powers, fitted hardly any of the peacetime needs of a large isolated nation like the United States, with problems of border patrol, colonial occupation, and industrial riot control. If a few Christian pacifists protested against this military ideal because military training would teach people to kill and create a violence-prone nation, they were reassured by the enlightened circles that experience in Europe had proved compulsory military training actually reduced the crime rate and made the people more obedient, disciplined, and docile. The idea that the real danger might not be the fact that the citizenry would be accustomed to handle weapons, but the fact that it would be trained to follow orders from a centralized authority never seems to have registered on the preparedness advocates. Their proposals, if they had ever become institutionalized, would have involved at best an economic and psychological strain on the nation in peacetime. At worst, they could have resulted in a positive menace to the nation's peace and

way of life.

If the preparedness movement led intellectually to the acceptance of the idea of a garrison state arrayed against the vague menace of the whole world, it led emotionally to super-patriotism. It is not necessary to say that the preparedness movement was the only factor involved in this drive to hyper-nationalism, which affected the very educated and informed elements in the state that might have been expected to stand above currents of popular feeling. Nor is it fair to blame the preparedness movement for the mistreatment of German-Americans and so-called slackers during the war, or the pillorying of Senator LaFollette for lack of "Americanism". But the movement did help create the atmosphere in which these things were possible.

It would be stupid to summarily dismiss the preparedness campaign's effects on the national level as wholly bad, even though the movement's goals seem to have been wrongheaded and its emotional atmosphere unhealthy. Along with the Mexican border mobilizations, it greatly enhanced the ability of the armed forces to intervene effectively in a type of overseas war which the backers of preparedness had never envisaged (or at least had never admitted contemplating.) Although the actual measures enacted during the preparedness campaign were quickly scrapped after America entered World War I, as conscription replaced the Hay Act and a building program of destroyers and submarines superseded

the one for capital ships, the campaign had concentrated America's attention on its military and naval deficiencies and the needs of modern war. Secondly, the movement mobilized the nation psychologically and helped condition it for making an unprecedented national effort and a total commitment to the war.

The preparedness campaign had no major lasting impact on America's postwar defense policies, although the federalized national guard and ROTC provisions of the Hay Act were retained in later legislation. After the guns had ceased to fire on the Western Front, the idea of peacetime preparedness seemed to have lost its relevance. The projected capital ships were scrapped at disarmament conferences, and after so many Americans had had the benefits of army life for extended periods, the popular sentiment to make this privilege universal waned. The Second World War and its aftermath have profoundly changed America's military position. However, although the United States has proved willing to draft its people and embark on enormous defense efforts in time of peace, these things have always been done in response to "clear and present" dangers, never in quest of some abstract condition of preparedness against anyone and everyone. America has accepted conscription as a necessity. For better or for worse, she has never accepted military training as an ideal.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

- ¹Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York, 1956), p. 191.
- ²Report of the Secretary of War, War Department Annual Reports, 1914 (Washington, 1914), Vol. I, p. 7.
- ³ibid., p. 8.
- ⁴Milwaukee Free Press, December 7, 1915.
- ⁵William W. Tinsley, The American Preparedness Movement, 1913-1916 (unpublished thesis, Stanford, 1939), p. 21.
- ⁶Millis, op. cit., p. 195.
- ⁷House Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings, 64th Congress, 1st Session, p. 10.
- ⁸Tinsley, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
- ⁹Milwaukee Journal, February 16, 1916.
- ¹⁰Congressional Record, Vol. 53, part 5, 64th Congress, 1st session, pp. 5080-5082.
- ¹¹Millis, op. cit., p. 202.

CHAPTER II

- ¹Wisconsin Blue Book (Madison, 1917), pp. 315-324.
- ²Milwaukee Sentinel, November 20, 1914.
- ³Ibid., December 19, 1914. ⁴Ibid., December 8, 1914.
- ⁵Ibid., December 10, 1914. ⁶Ibid.
- ⁷Ibid., December 9, 1914.
- ⁸Milwaukee Journal, November 22, 1914.
- ⁹Ibid., December 8, 1914. ¹⁰Ibid., April 18, 1915.

- ¹¹Ibid., June 1, 1915. ¹²Ibid., June 4, 1915.
- ¹³Wisconsin State Journal, November 4, 1914.
- ¹⁴Wisconsin State Journal, November 18, 1914.
- ¹⁵Ibid., November 24, 1914; December 10, 1914.
- ¹⁶Ibid., November 24, 1914.
- ¹⁷Milwaukee Journal, July 14, 1915.
- ¹⁸Ibid., September 17, 1915. ¹⁹Ibid., November 5, 1915.
- ²⁰Ibid., December 7, 1915.
- ²¹Milwaukee Journal, December 7, 1915.
- ²²Ibid., November 7, 1915.
- ²³Milwaukee Sentinel, September 13, 1915.
- ²⁴Milwaukee Journal, November 27, 1915.
- ²⁵Milwaukee Sentinel, October 12, 1915.
- ²⁶Milwaukee Journal, January 23, 1916.
- ²⁷Ibid., November 29, 1915.
- ²⁸Milwaukee Journal, December 5, 1915.
- ²⁹Ibid., February 10, 1916.
- ³⁰Milwaukee Sentinel, October 14, 1915.
- ³¹Ibid., October 20, 1915. ³²Ibid., November 15, 1915.
- ³³Milwaukee Sentinel, March 14, 1915.
- ³⁴Wisconsin State Journal, October 13, 1915.
- ³⁵Ibid., October 13, 1915; October 15, 1915.
- ³⁶Ibid., December 14, 1915.
- ³⁷Wisconsin State Journal, November 9, 1915.
- ³⁸Ibid., May 16, 1916.

- ³⁹Wisconsin State Journal, January 11, 1916.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., January 31, 1916.
- ⁴¹Ibid., January 14, 1916.
- ⁴²Milwaukee Sentinel, February 25, 1916.
- ⁴³Wisconsin State Journal, February 7, 1916.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., May 1, 1916.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., January 15, 1916.
- ⁴⁶Milwaukee Journal, February 16, 1916; February 21, 1916.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., January 31, 1916. ⁴⁸Ibid.
- ⁴⁹Ibid., December 8, 1915
- ⁵⁰Milwaukee Journal, November 11, 1915.
- ⁵¹Ibid., May 1, 1916. ⁵²Ibid., December 16, 1915.
- ⁵³Ibid., December 5, 1915.
- ⁵⁴Milwaukee Journal, March 19, 1916.
- ⁵⁵Wisconsin State Journal, December 30, 1915.
- ⁵⁶Milwaukee Journal, December 20, 1915.
- ⁵⁷Wisconsin State Journal, January 3, 1916.
- ⁵⁸Wisconsin State Journal, September 28, 1915.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., November 4, 1915.
- ⁶⁰Milwaukee Journal, November 28, 1915.
- ⁶¹Ibid., May 27, 1915.
- ⁶²Ibid., January 16, 1916, passim.
- ⁶³Milwaukee Journal, March 20, 1916.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., December 9, 1915. ⁶⁵Ibid., April 22, 1916.

- ⁶⁶Ibid., December 10, 1915
- ⁶⁷Milwaukee Journal, February 21, 1916.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., February 21, 1916, 2nd passim.
- ⁶⁹Milwaukee Leader, February 11, 1916.
- ⁷⁰Milwaukee Journal, March 3, 1916.
- ⁷¹Milwaukee Journal, February 27, 1916.
- ⁷²Ibid. ⁷³Ibid., March 23, 1916.
- ⁷⁴Ibid., March 16, 1916.
- ⁷⁵Wisconsin State Journal, March 16, 1916.
- ⁷⁶Ibid., April 17, 1916. ⁷⁷Ibid., May 6, 1916.
- ⁷⁸Milwaukee Journal, March 5, 1916
- ⁷⁹Ibid., May 10, 1916. ⁸⁰Ibid., April 23, 1916.
- ⁸¹Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York, 1956), p. 204.
- ⁸²Milwaukee Journal, August 27, 1916.
- ⁸³Milwaukee Journal, May 9, 1916.
- ⁸⁴Milwaukee Leader, August 30, 1916.

CHAPTER III

- ¹Milwaukee Journal, July 3, 1916.
- ²Wisconsin State Journal, October 21, 1915.
- ³William W. Tinsley, The American Preparedness Movement, 1913-1916 (unp. thesis, Stanford, 1939), p. 34.
- ⁴Milwaukee Journal, June 14, 1915.
- ⁵National Security League, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, Hearings Before a Special Committee of the House of Representatives, p. 1534.

- ⁶Milwaukee Journal, August 15, 1915.
- ⁷Ibid., October 1, 1915.
- ⁸Milwaukee Free Press, October 7, 1915.
- ⁹National Security League, Hearing, P. 1488.
- ¹⁰Milwaukee Journal, November 21, 1915.
- ¹¹Ibid., December 16, 1915. ¹²Ibid., January 8, 1916.
- ¹³Milwaukee Journal, February 15, 1916.
- ¹⁴Ibid., February 16, 1916.
- ¹⁵Tinsley, op. cit., p. 267.
- ¹⁶Milwaukee Journal, March 6, 1916.
- ¹⁷Milwaukee Journal, August 15, 1915.
- ¹⁸Ibid., February 27, 1916. ¹⁹Ibid., March 12, 1916.
- ²⁰Ibid., April 14, 1916. ²¹Ibid., April 13, 1916.
- ²²Ibid., May 24, 1916.
- ²³Wisconsin State Journal, June 16, 1916.
- ²⁴Milwaukee Journal, May 1916.
- ²⁵Ibid., March 20, 1916. ²⁶Ibid., January 8, 1916.
- ²⁷Ibid., February 10, 1916.
- ²⁸Milwaukee Journal, March 11, 1916.
- ²⁹Ibid., January 20, 1916.
- ³⁰Ibid., April 22, 1916. ³¹Ibid., March 3, 1915.
- ³²Milwaukee Journal, May 24, 1916.
- ³³Ibid., March 21, 1916. ³⁴Ibid., March 22, 1916.
- ³⁵Milwaukee Journal, June 17, 1916.
- ³⁶Herman Hagedorn, Leonard Wood (New York, 1931), Vol II, p. 132.

- ³⁷Milwaukee Sentinel, September 11, 1915.
- ³⁸Milwaukee Journal, August 18, 1915.
- ³⁹Ibid., October 7, 1915. ⁴⁰Ibid., October 3, 1915.
- ⁴¹Milwaukee Journal, June 2, 1916.
- ⁴²Wisconsin State Journal, May 13, 1916.
- ⁴³Milwaukee Journal, September 8, 1916.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., June 16, 1916.
- ⁴⁵Milwaukee Journal, July 7, 1916.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., July 17, 1916.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., September 14, 1916. ⁴⁸Ibid., August 15, 1916.
- ⁴⁹Wisconsin State Journal, May 2, 1916.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., June 6, 1916. ⁵¹Ibid., June 12, 1916.
- ⁵²Ibid., June 13, 1916. ⁵³Ibid.,
- ⁵⁴Wisconsin State Journal, June 13.
- ⁵⁵Ibid., June 25, 1916, ⁵⁶Ibid.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., June 29, 1916.
- ⁵⁸Milwaukee Journal, May 8, 1916.
- ⁵⁹Ibid., May 12, 1916.
- ⁶⁰Milwaukee Free Press, June 26, 1916.
- ⁶¹Milwaukee Journal, July 7, 1916. ⁶²Ibid.
- ⁶³Ibid., November 3, 1916. ⁶⁴Ibid., May 11, 1916.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., May 20, 1916. ⁶⁶Ibid., April 18, 1916.
- ⁶⁷Milwaukee Journal, May 13, 1916.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., June 3, 1916. ⁶⁹Ibid., June 4, 1916.
- ⁷⁰Ibid. ⁷¹Daily Northwestern, June 7, 1916.
- ⁷²Milwaukee Journal, May 13, 1916.

- ⁷³Ibid., June 4, 1916. ⁷⁴Ibid., June 10, 1916.
⁷⁵Milwaukee Journal, June 13, 1916
⁷⁶Ibid., June 20, 1916. ⁷⁷Ibid., June 22, 1916.
⁷⁸Ibid., June 29, 1916. ⁷⁹Ibid., June 27, 1916.
⁸⁰Milwaukee Free Press, July 1, 1916.
⁸¹Milwaukee Journal, July 5, 1916.
⁸²Milwaukee Journal, July 7, 1916.
⁸³Milwaukee Leader, July 7, 1916.
⁸⁴Ibid., July 8, 1916.
⁸⁵Milwaukee Leader, July 12, 1916.
⁸⁶Milwaukee Free Press, June 22, 1916
⁸⁷Milwaukee Journal, July 16, 1916
⁸⁸Ibid., July 6, 1916; July 12, 1916.
⁸⁹Ibid., July 13, 1916. ⁹⁰Ibid., July 6, 1916.
⁹¹Milwaukee Journal, July 12, 1916.
⁹²Ibid., July 14, 1916. ⁹³Ibid., July 15, 1916.
⁹⁴Ibid., July 16, 1916.
⁹⁵Milwaukee Journal, July 16, 1916. ⁹⁶Ibid.
⁹⁷Ibid. ⁹⁸Milwaukee Leader, July 16, 1916.
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- ¹LaFollette's Magazine, October, 1916, p. 1.

- ²Milwaukee Journal, June 21, 1916.
- ³Ibid., March 24, 1916.
- ⁴Biennial Report, Adjutant General of Wisconsin, 1910-12 (Madison, 1912), pp. 28-30.
- ⁵Biennial Report, Adjutant General of Wisconsin, 1914-16 (Madison, 1916), p. 11.
- ⁶Ashland Daily Press, July 1, 1915.
- ⁷Milwaukee Journal, July 23, 1915
- ⁸Ibid., September 10, 1915.
- ⁹Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York, 1956), p. 161.
- ¹⁰Milwaukee Journal, March 5, 1916.
- ¹¹Ibid., December 1, 1915.
- ¹²Milwaukee Journal, April 15, 1916.
- ¹³Ibid., April 16, 1916. ¹⁴Ibid., April 24, 1916.
- ¹⁵Milwaukee Sentinel, September 22, 1915.
- ¹⁶Milwaukee Journal, June 19, 1916.
- ¹⁷Wisconsin State Journal, April 9, 1916.
- ¹⁸Report of Chief of Militia Bureau, War Department Annual Reports, 1916 (Washington 1916), p. 1151.
- ¹⁹Ibid., p. 1139
- ²⁰Milwaukee Journal, April 9, 1915.
- ²¹Ibid., November 14, 1915.
- ²²Milwaukee Journal, June 28, 1916.
- ²³Ibid., January 15, 1916.
- ²⁴Report of chief of Militia Bureau, War Department Annual Reports, 1916 (Washington 1916), p. 1151.
- ²⁵Milwaukee Journal, February 9, 1916.
- ²⁶Milwaukee Journal, May 10, 1916.

- ²⁷Ibid., June 26, 1916. ²⁸Ibid., July 28, 1915.
- ²⁹Milwaukee Free Press, March 24, 1916.
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- ³¹Wisconsin State Journal, April 14, 1916.
- ³²Milwaukee Journal, April 30, 1916.
- ³³Ibid., May 14, 1916. ³⁴Ibid., December 7, 1915.
- ³⁵Ibid., May 24, 1916. ³⁶Ibid., May 9, 1916.
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- ³⁸Milwaukee Journal, June 3, 1916.
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- ⁴³Biennial Report, Adjutant Gen'l of Wisconsin, 1914-16 (Madison, 1916), p. 12.
- ⁴⁴Milwaukee Journal, June 21, 1916.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., June 22, 1916.
- ⁴⁶Milwaukee Journal, June 23, 1916.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., June 30, 1916.
- ⁴⁸Biennial Reprot, Adjutant Gen'l of Wisconsin, 1914-16, p. 13.
- ⁴⁹Milwaukee Journal, June 23, 1916.
- ⁵⁰Milwaukee Journal, June 25, 1916.
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- ⁵²Ibid., June 27, 1916. ⁵³Ibid.
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- ⁵⁵Milwaukee Free Press, July 8, 1916.
- ⁵⁶Milwaukee Journal, June 30, 1916.

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- 58 Milwaukee Journal, June 29, 1916.
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- 84 Milwaukee Journal, November 27, 1916.
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²Milwaukee Free Press, October 24, 1915

³Milwaukee Free Press, November 16, 1915.

⁴Ibid., November 13, 1915. ⁵Ibid., November 2, 1915.

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⁷Milwaukee Free Press, January 18, 1916.

⁸Ibid., September 25, 1915. ⁹Ibid., December 14, 1915.

¹⁰Ibid., February 4, 1916.

¹¹Milwaukee Free Press, March 13, 1916.

¹²Ibid., February 25, 1916.

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- ³¹Ibid., October 30, 1916.
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- ³⁸Ibid., December 15, 1915. ³⁹Ibid., May 23, 1916.
- ⁴⁰Ibid.
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- ⁴⁶Congressional Record Volume 53, Part 13, 64th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 12694-5.
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- ⁵³LaFollette's Magazine, March 1916, p. 15.
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- ³Milwaukee Sentinel, December 8, 1916.
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- ⁵Ibid., December 13, 1916.
- ⁶Milwaukee Journal, December 18, 1916.
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- ¹¹Milwaukee Sentinel, December 13, 1916.
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